This analytical paper draws on an earlier offering and engages with two key policy framings of the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC).

These are: the Revised (Harmonized) Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO II), and the recently reviewed Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP).

Together these two policy framings provide the regional body’s most elaborate and systematic articulation on the Security/Development nexus.

The paper provides a critique of both frameworks against the background of the linear model of regional integration that privileges market and trade integration over project and development integration.

The 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) is one of several Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa that attempts to pull together development and security concerns at the regional level. The formative history of SADC was one of state-centric interaction chiefly amongst the former Frontline States (FLS) – Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – and the former liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC), the Southwest Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). This interaction turned on reducing economic dependence on South Africa under the former apartheid regime and promoting the decolonization of the region, and in the case of the then Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Namibia, their independence.

The SADC in its current form, notwithstanding an enlargement of its membership, was constituted in 1990, and since its inception, but especially since 2006, the regional body has deepened its cooperation with International Cooperating Partners (ICPs), also in the domains of development and security. The politics of resource mobilization determined that both the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) in all its iterations, as well as the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics and Security Cooperation (SIPO I & II), secured significant international support and funding. As a Regional Economic Community (REC), SADC stands in a triadic relationship to the African Union (AU), its peace and security architecture, and the United Nations (UN) (the latter under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter) in the domains of peace and security.

ICP support to the SADC Common Agenda is guided by a framework of cooperation adopted in Windhoek, Namibia, in April 2006. The Windhoek Declaration is based on the five key principles derived from the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and provides for: (1) Ownership, (2) Alignment, (3) Harmonisation, (4) Managing for Results, and (5) Mutual Accountability. The managerial and donor language of governance is unmistakable.

This paper will now turn to the first of two key SADC policy framings: the 2010 Revised Edition of the Harmonised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO II).

HARMONISED STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE ORGAN ON POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION (SIPO II) OF 2010

The SIPO II had as its antecedent the original SIPO of 2004. The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) (the »Organ« for short) dates from 1996 and was formalized and institutionalized in 2004. The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO II). The Protocol embodies the objectives for the Organ. While formal and institutionalized forms of cooperation in peace and security policy predate 1990, such forms of cooperation were an integral part of the liberation struggle and took place while much of the region was in crisis due to the destabilizing effects of South Africa’s apartheid policy.

The SIPO II review that culminated in 2010, and the subsequent formal launch in Tanzania in November 2012, were necessitated by a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape within the SADC, the continuation of old and the rise of new security fractures, and the imperative to improve monitoring and evaluation of the different programmes and activities linked to SIPO II.

STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS OF SIPO II

Structurally, SIPO II coalesces around five sectors. These are: The Political Sector, The Defence Sector, The State Security Sector, The Public Security Sector, and the Police Sector1.

Each of the Sectors is narrated in terms of a common format, namely an introductory overview followed by various objectives, each explicated in detailed strategies, activities, and expected outcomes, consistent with annual action plans, all permeated by the logic and rationality of a managerial model of public policy. Each of the Sectors will now be briefly presented.

THE POLITICAL SECTOR

This Sector starts from the contested premise that »the regional political situation is characterized by the acceptance of political pluralism«. It is equally instructive that the dominant construct of democracy assumed here is a limited form of »electoral democracy«, rather than a more ambitious model of »social democracy«2 or of robust democratic institutions. The state-centric nature of the SADC means that diplomacy is conceived as »inter-state diplomacy«. Part of the security architecture that underpins the Political Sector is the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), the more recently established SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC), and a nascent SADC Mediation Unit with limited competences and influence.

An interesting feature of SIPO II is its recognition that »the deepening of democratic practices contributed to the emergence and growth of civil society organisations«. The construct of »existing common values and culture« – note the word »existing« in the text – and the logic of culture as an encompassing presence gives the narrative a particular discursive bent. It is also noteworthy that SIPO II conceptualizes nation- and region-building as two mutually constitutive processes3 and, in the context of SADC, arguably, rightly so.

The key concerns of the Political Sector are to promote »good governance« (another code word of the International Financial Institutions [IFI]) among member states on »the basis of shared political values and practices« (emphasis added), to improve conflict management, to enhance civilian participation in peace-keeping, and to promote effective management of regional disasters. There is also a commitment to adhere to African Union (AU) and SADC electoral standards.

Nowhere in the text is there an attempt to define the constitutive elements of »democracy« apart from its electoral aspects, and the claim that there is a value consensus on »democracy« and »good governance« is often not supported by the political realities within the SADC – witness the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Angola, among others.

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THE DEFENCE SECTOR

The core objectives in the Defence Sector include among others: to strengthen the peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and to improve the coordination and participation of State Parties in peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations (PSOs), to operationalize the SADC Standby Force (SADC-SF), to protect the people of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, as well as from inter- and intra-state conflicts, to promote regional cooperation in matters of security and defence, to build collective security capacity, and to enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and humanitarian assistance.

The core construct that informs this Sector is that of collective security, rather than one of »wider security«, »comprehensive security«, »common security«, »new security«, and/or »human security«. This is in line with the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, originally developed in 2003 and signed in August 2011, and together this Sector and the Mutual Defence Pact, represents a commitment towards collective self-defence, where an armed attack against one member is deemed a threat to regional peace and security.

THE STATE SECURITY SECTOR

This Sector seeks to prevent threats that may subvert »constitutional order and national sovereignty«, as well as activities »designed to undermine the economic interests of member states and/or the region«.

The State Security Sector is largely the province of statutory, state-based intelligence services in the region, and is meant to draw on the capacities of the Gaborone-based Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) and its national focal points in the member states. A long list of security threats is cited, chief among them being: organized trans-national crime, terrorism, limited resources, food security, economic threats, foreign interference, illegal migration, and – something of an outlier – climate change.4

THE PUBLIC SECURITY SECTOR

The key concerns of this Sector is to provide services in the interlinked domains of law enforcement, public safety, and correctional services; also falling under this Sector are immigration, customs, refugees, and parks and wildlife. This Sector, in common with the other four Sectors, includes a daunting list of security challenges. These range from transnational crime syndication to cybercrime, money laundering, blood/conflict diamonds, HIV/AIDS, overcrowding in correctional facilities, poaching, and maritime piracy.5 One of the potential difficulties emanating from such a comprehensive list of security-related challenges is the danger of »securitizing« development. HIV/AIDS, for example, is essentially a development and public health challenge and not a security threat.

THE POLICE SECTOR

This Sector has been added to SIPO II and focuses on the prevention of cross-border crime and the strengthening of law and order and criminal justice by coordinating the activities of the region’s police services, principally through the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPPCCO).

The rationale for this new Sector is not self-evident, for it overlaps significantly with the Public Security Sector.6 This Sector would be relatively meaningless until such time as the following SADC Protocols have been properly implemented, chief among these: The SADC Protocol Against Corruption (2001), The SADC Protocol on Extradition (signed in 2002, came into force in 2006), The SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Materials (signed in 2001, came into force in 2004), The SADC Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Criminal Matters (signed in 2002, came into force in 2007), and the SADC Protocol on Combating Illicit Drugs (1996).

The Strategies contained in the framework of SIPO II include:

• Political commitment on the part of the Member States,
• Transnational partnerships in the domains of defence, peace, and security,
• Funding, budget management, and independent auditing, and
• Regular monitoring and evaluation.7

The focus of the paper will now shift to the recently revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) [2003/2005-2020].

REGIONAL INDICATIVE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN (RISDP)

Over the past decade and more, the SADC’s policies and strategies were characterized by a healthy level of

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4 See SIPO II (2010), p. 46.
5 See SIPO II (2010), pp. 55-56.
7 See SIPO II (2010), pp. 71-73.
fluidity. The reconfiguration of the SADC itself, as well as ongoing regional and global changes, made this imperative. In general, the latest iteration of the RISDP attempts to resonate with development policies of the member states. Moreover, since 2004, there have been attempts – attempts that have yet to yield substantive results – to link the RISDP with the various national development plans and budgets of the member states. Such a process is ongoing. The SADC Summit of 2015 made yet another attempt to move this complex, but important, process of policy articulation and coherence forward.

The RISDP represents the SADC’s main trans-national socio-economic and development framing. The genesis of the RISDP goes back to 2001 and the Plan was launched in 2004. Since then, important changes in the policy environment necessitated a review of the original RISDP and the 15-year reconfigured development frame provides for seven chapters and lists a number of key priority intervention areas. The focus in this brief paper is on the latter, the key priority intervention areas.

After a brief review of the dominant economic, human, and social trends in the region, followed by a review of current policies and strategies under the SADC clusters, the Plan proceeds to identify key priority intervention areas at both the »cross-sectorial« and »sectorial« levels. These can be summarized as follows:

1. Cross-Sectorial Intervention Areas:
   • Poverty eradication;
   • Combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic;
   • Gender equality and development;
   • Science and Technology;
   • Information and Communication Technologies;
   • Environment and Sustainable Development;
   • Private Sector, and
   • Statistics.

2. Sectorial cooperation and integration intervention areas:
   • Trade/Economic Liberalisation and development;
   • Infrastructure support for regional integration and poverty reduction;
   • Sustainable food security, and
   • Human and Social Development.

Chapter 5 of the RISDP deals extensively with financing for development, including domestic savings, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Official Development Assistance (ODA), Portfolio Investment (PI), and other mechanisms for financing regional development, including: Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), Domestic financial and capital markets, private equity and venture capital, and a SADC Development Master Plan (SADCDMP).

The RISDP culminates in a consideration of the Institutional Framework and the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. The latter, the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, provides for three levels of monitoring. These are:
   • Political and policy level;
   • Operational and technical level, and
   • Stakeholder level.

**FOUR KEY PRIORITIES**

In consolidated form, the RISDP (2015-2020) identifies four key priority areas for the SADC during the period covered by the Plan. These are:
   • Priority A – Promoting industrial development and market integration through, among other policy interventions, the strengthening of the productive competitiveness and supply side capacity of member states; in addition, accelerating the movement of goods and facilitating financial market integration and closer monetary integration.
   • Priority B – Providing and improving infrastructure support for regional integration, chiefly through the SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan of August 2012.
   • Priority C – Promoting peace and security in the region.
   • Priority D – Promoting special regional programmes under clusters such as education and human resources development; health, HIV/AIDS, and other communicable diseases; food security and trans-boundary natural resource exploration; environment; statistics; gender equality in terms of the 50-50 SADC Gender Directive; Science Technology and Innovation; and research and development.

**PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES**

Since the origin and evolution of the RISDP, the importance of industrializing the regional economy has gained momentum. The centrality of value addition to the diverse natural resources of the

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region has also become more salient, with many member states crafting and implementing national policies to address this challenge. Articulating these with the RISDP, however, continues to be a problem, especially as the SADC Protocol on Trade (2008) relies heavily on such industrialization. Moreover, the 2009 Industrial Upgrading and Modernization Programme (IUMP), whose express purpose is to implement the RISDP component on industrialization, have been slow and uneven in coming. The current focus is on value addition in minerals, agro-processing, and pharmaceuticals, and this, too, has proven to be an uneven, multi-speed process.

While the policy architecture is in place, the planning and institutional capacity of the member states remains uneven. Meanwhile, the linear model of integration itself may be in need of a re-think, with greater emphasis on »new generation trade« issues such as services, competition policy, investment, labour mobility, public procurement, and more integrated rules-based trade governance. In March 2016, the SADC approved a Trade Facilitation Programme for implementation by the member states. The recently-signed Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union (EU) and the SADC, too, directed the political focus onto the SADC’s regional integration agenda itself and underlined the weak bargaining capacity of regional grouping in the domain of global trade and investment.

With respect to security, there are simply too many security-related fractures that continue to undermine the policy coherence of a variable geometry the SADC – a region that moves at different speeds and with different levels of political commitment to the SADC agenda, and with differential state and institutional capacities. Ultimately, a number of questions remain, not least how to meaningfully interface the SIPO II and the RISDP so as to make them mutually constitutive.

> »Region-building and Peace-building«,11 two constitutive elements of the wider regional equation, have received new emphasis, for example in respect of a regional industrial development strategy; nevertheless, the organization is still confronted with the task of implementing it and achieving coherence in the industrial policies of its individual member states. The RISDP desk review pointed to yet another challenge, namely, that the link between member states and the SADC Secretariat is weak. Not all member states had established national committees, according to the review, and those that had, had not equipped them with the capacity to meaningfully fulfil their mandate. Most SADC National Committees (SNCs) are still under construction. At the time of the RISDP mid-term review in 2012-13, only four member states – Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and Seychelles – had well-functioning SNCs, while Mauritius and Swaziland had partially functioning committees. The other eight member states had dysfunctional committees.

Finally, in terms of the overall regional agenda, intra-regional trade is still at less than 20 per cent, and in many respects the SADC has limited community outreach projects and remains driven by senior governmental elites.


The Reflection Group »Monopoly on the use of force 2.0« is a global dialogue initiative to raise awareness and discuss policy options for the concept of the monopoly for the use of force. Far from being a merely academic concern, this concept, at least theoretically and legally remains at the heart of the current international security order. However it is faced with a variety of grave challenges and hardly seems to reflect realities on the ground in various regions around the globe anymore. For more information about the work of the reflection group and its members please visit: http://www.fes.de/GPo/en/security_policy.htm

The Think Pieces serve a dual purpose: On the one hand they provide points of reference for the deliberations of the reflection group and feed into the final report of the group in 2016. On the other hand they are made available publicly to provide interested scholars, politicians and practitioners with an insight into the different positions and debates of the group and provide food for thought for related discussions and initiatives worldwide. In this sense, they reflect how the group and selected additional experts »think« about the topic and hopefully stimulate further engagement with it.

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