Security sector reform (SSR) is often wrongly reduced to «functional capacity building» in the security forces. In fact, in many countries SSR is an element of state building, reduces concrete security risks for the population, and should always also contribute to democratic security governance within society.

In other words, SSR is not primarily a technical, but a political task. It touches on core issues of division of power, demands close co-operation with local elites, and may require flanking incentives and conditionalities.

In the long run, a democratically controlled security sector also represents the most reliable guarantee of security for the population. Supporters of SSR processes should therefore be ambitious in the long term but realistic in their choice of interim goals. Lasting change can only occur if local actors buy into the processes.

The potential of civil society organisations is underestimated in this sector. Among their advantages, they operate below the threshold of state diplomacy, have often been on the ground for years, and are well networked. They can survive politically difficult periods and build the trust necessary among important elites.

There are gaps in international SSR support, especially in a number of countries that – while being politically stable – have massive problems of violence and inadequate democratic-civilian control of the security sector. In such countries, the comparative advantages of civil society actors could be especially beneficial if brought to bear.
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List of Abbreviations

AU  African Union
BICC  Bonn International Center for Conversion
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CPCS  Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
DCAF  Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID  Department for International Development, United Kingdom
DG-DEVCO  European Union Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DPKO  United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DR Congo  Democratic Republic of the Congo
EEAS  European External Action Service
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EPLO  European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
EU  European Union
EUAVSEC  European Union Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan
EULEX  European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FES  Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
GIZ  Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GPPi  Global Public Policy Institute
HIPC  Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
ICITAP  International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, United States
ISIS  Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KAS  Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
LFA  Logical Framework Approach
MDG  Millennium Development Goals
MENA  Middle East–North Africa
MONUSCO  United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  Nongovernmental organisation
ODA  Official development assistance
ODI  Overseas Development Institute
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC  OECD Development Assistance Committee
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RUSI  Royal United Services Institute
SALW  Small Arms and Light Weapons
SDG  Sustainable Development Goal
SGBV  Sexual and gender-based violence
SSG  Security sector governance
SSR  Security sector reform
TJ  Transitional Justice
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNMISS  United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNMIL  United Nations Mission in Liberia
US  United States
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WFD  Weltfriedensdienst
Foreword

To some, the term »security sector reform« sounds technical or perhaps even boring, while for others it sets off alarm bells. In fact, security sector reform (SSR) is not primarily a technical issue, as the author of this study argues and substantiates by citing various examples. Quite to the contrary, it is extremely political and in many cases highly sensitive. At the same time, these very processes are crucial for sustainable peace and democratic transformation in many countries.

Across the world, civil society actors accompany and pursue societal change in a huge spectrum of countries and in a variety of contexts. In the aftermath of the Cold War societal transformation was often viewed very positively and comparatively uncritically, but more recent developments – most notably those of the Arab Spring – have highlighted the risks and dangers that can be associated with such transformation processes, too. It would be wrong, however, to abandon all hope of societal transformation based on these sobering experiences. Instead, the point should be to develop more realistic assessments of the possibilities for fostering and supporting change. Support for reform processes in the security sector is one of the fields that demands greater critical attention in this regard.

As soon as state structures and power elites perceive themselves and their positions threatened, and established procedures for regulating conflict and maintaining power balances begin to break down, the risk of violence emerges. At this point, at the latest, societal change and individual human security become existentially dependent on the actions or inaction of the police, armed forces, and intelligence services – in other words, the security sector in the strictest sense. As institutions possessing the de facto monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, but not always subject to democratic control, they can exert decisive influence on the outcome of societal transformation, depending on the path they choose to take: Will they suppress civil protest and disobedience to defend the power of the ruling elites? Are they willing and able to restrain extremist organisations that threaten the security of citizens and properly elected political leaders? Do they exploit their position of strength to take control themselves and exercise political power? In all these and many other societal constellations, the security sector plays an important and often central role. That alone is reason to pay greater attention to the need for reform in this field.

The Motivation of FES:
Peace, Security, and Democracy

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) works to promote international dialogue and democracy worldwide. Alongside promoting democracy, a series of central cross-cutting issues have emerged in which FES concentrates its international engagement. One of these is peace and security, because socioeconomic development and socially just globalisation depend significantly on secure and peaceful environments nationally and internationally. Thus FES has a twofold interest in the question of SSR and security sector governance (SSG): the security sector plays a decisive role in democratic transition and consolidation as well as in safeguarding peace and security.

In recent years, FES has stepped up its efforts in this sphere. A first related international conference, held in Abuja in November 2011, was followed in June 2012 by a workshop in Germany addressing SSR/SSG within the specific German context, engaging the relevant ministries, think tanks, and civil society organisations. Following the workshop, FES published three contributions on SSR/SSG as part of its Perspektive series and initiated the present study. Since then, several other workshops have followed. Currently, FES has commissioned the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) to conduct a cross-cutting evaluation of FES activities on SSR/SSG between 2005 and 2014.

The Objective of the Study:
Practical Orientation and Political Impulse

The present publication is the slightly abridged and adapted translation of a study whose original German-language version was aimed primarily at German experts (published in November 2014). The starting point for the study was the observation that although support for SSR processes had been accorded great conceptual importance in German discussions on crisis prevention and peacebuilding, this rhetoric commitment to support SSR was inadequately reflected in actual policy and practice.
The study originally set out to communicate the overall state of the internationally already well advanced debate to the German policy and practice communities and to digest international experiences for German actors in the fields of peacebuilding, development co-operation, promoting democracy, and security policy. After completion of the study, however, it became apparent that its systematic analysis could also make an important contribution to the international policy and expert discussion on that topic. This was the impetus behind publication of an English-language version of the original German study. The present publication thus contains new contextualisations relevant to a broad international readership while omitting some content likely only of interest to a German audience.

Why Greater Civil Society Engagement Is Needed

If one accepts the study’s assessment that SSR should be properly integrated into overall societal transformation processes and must include a political dimension, then one must also critically examine and potentially realign one’s own engagement. If speaking about democratic security governance in the broader sense – in other words including oversight actors and institutions – the driving factors for engagement should not solely or primarily be commercial profit or based on Western states’ own security interests. Although civil society actors have an important comparative advantage here, their involvement in SSR support has thus far been extremely limited. This study therefore focuses on the potential and possible entry points for greater civil society engagement in the processes of supporting SSR.

Not Reinventing the Wheel:
Drawing upon International Experience

The thrust of the study is to assess the wealth of experience of the diverse actors in the field and to draw conclusions for future engagement from it. There is no need for SSR support to start from scratch, even if civil society engagement in it has to date tended to be restricted and fragmented. There are good reasons to expand such engagement, and this study sets out to offer input for the necessary debate.

Finally, my heartfelt thanks go to the author of the study, Steffen Eckhard, and to Philipp Rotmann and the whole team at GPPi involved in its preparation. The engagement and expertise that went into the entire process – from the inception study through the interview phase to the feedback workshops – are visibly reflected in the final product. Thanks are also due to Thomas Mättig, Sebastian Sperling, Elisabeth Strohscheid, Andreas Wittkowsky, and Natascha Zupan, whose comments and feedback were extremely helpful at various points.

Marius Müller-Hennig
Berlin, January 2016
Summary

Generally speaking, security sector reform (SSR) refers to planned improvements to existing structures and methods in a country’s security sector, with the objective of improving security for the population. On the one hand the country’s police and soldiers have to be well trained and equipped. They must be able to investigate, patrol, and shoot. On the other hand, only control through a democratically elected government can help guarantee that security agencies refrain from exploiting their power for particular interests or become involved in repression against their own population. In many developing and conflict-affected countries, however, democracy and effective security forces are often lacking. A secure and stable environment is, however, vital for sustainable development. The point of the SSR concept is to provide external support for reorganising the security sector in line with democracy and rule of law to ensure the security of the population.

This study pursues three objectives: First, it provides an overview of the concept of SSR support and analyses the most recent trends and relevant developments. Second, on this basis, it identifies the challenges confronting practitioners when implementing SSR measures and examines the solutions and strategies they pursue. Third, in light of the findings, the reasons for civil society to engage in SSR are presented along with possible approaches. The data for the study were collected from fifty-nine interviews with experts and augmented by analysis of policy papers and studies on SSR.

Four international trends can be observed in SSR support: (1) Most Western SSR support is being channelled only to a handful of states. In 2011 more than half of SSR support recorded by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) went to just two states, Afghanistan and Kosovo. Countries with high level incidents of violence but not engaged in full-blown civil war fall through the grid. (2) With SSR, as in the case of development co-operation in general, non-Western states are emerging as new donors. They reject value conditionality for external aid which so far implied the fostering of democratic values as part and parcel of security sector reform. (3) Organisations with commercial motives are also playing a growing role in SSR. Critics argue that these enterprises neglect SSR’s »soft goals,« such as democratic control and human rights. (4) There is a significant gap between the ambitious goals of democratic SSR and the rather meagre results in certain countries in view of the sums invested.

In designing SSR measures, practitioners typically pursue four types of approaches or strategies: functional capacity building, implementing measures whose primary objective is to strengthen the capacities of security agencies in partner countries through official bilateral assistance; state building, the more ambitious and challenging agenda of transforming the overall complex political and security system of a country; local risk reduction, prioritising human security using a decentralised approach; and democratic security governance, also aiming at the protection of the population, primarily by means of ensuring proper democratic security governance.

The ideal compromise between ambition and realism has yet to be found in implementing SSR. A comparison of the four approaches reveals that today, the predominant measures are those that focus on functional capacity building in technical niches in security agencies, like the armed forces, police, and judiciary. The objective is to improve security performance, not to transform security governance. On the other hand, experts emphasise that only a democratically controlled security sector can ensure the protection of the population in the long term. This guards against abuse of power and creates a balance between the security interests of the state and those of the population. Ultimately, SSR without democratic transformation is a recipe for the next autocracy.

There are two reasons why democratic transformation is not central to SSR today: Firstly because new donors are rejecting the idea of promoting democracy through SSR. The United Nations’ SSR concepts refer only to »civilian control«, without clarifying what this should actually look like. Secondly, the experience of poor outcomes in certain SSR processes has led to more modest goals being set in recent programs. This erosion of SSR risks democratic security governance slipping even further into the background. Realistic interim goals are therefore needed, while in the longer term the goal of comprehensive transformation must not be tossed aside.

A political understanding of SSR is key to success. External supporters should not concentrate solely on building functional capacities. Alongside the formal
security organisations, attention must focus above all on the power elites. Every reform will produce winners and losers. In countries with authoritarian governments, reform threatens elites with examination of their repressive activities and therefore also with potentially grave personal repercussions. Here external actors have room to offer reassurance or apply pressure where appropriate.

SSR can only be successful if there is ownership on the ground in the sense of having an interest in change. Because this is not always the case, external actors must apply an even more differentiated approach and be more patient than they have to date. In autocratic states, the first step should be to gradually create space for reforms. In post-conflict societies, on the other hand, short-term stability is the order of the day. Control of power is important here too, although this must not always occur immediately through democratic institutions. If a country lacks any scope at all for change, providing no help at all is preferable to supporting the wrong groups.

On the ground, political support for SSR should be conducted above all through influential embassies and peace operations. Their sway, however, can be restricted when new donors offer SSR without development strings. SSR therefore functions best in combination with an existing societal transformation process, but there are always risks. If SSR neglects democratic control, there may be setbacks in the transformation process, and if SSR ignores the power interests of influential elites, there might be violence.

There is an important role for international civil society organisations to play in SSR. Their long-term perspective and networking on the ground put them in an especially good position to conduct dialogues with security actors below the echelon of official intergovernmental talks and to survive periods of politically adversity. Of course their influence is restricted, and in many countries they are more tolerated than accepted. Especially where elites lack interest in genuine SSR processes, however, they can support local civil society in encouraging influential elites to embrace change and take the first steps toward it.
1. Introduction

On 15 December 2013 in the South Sudanese capital of Juba, the members of an elite military unit turned their guns on one another. Only days earlier, they had been training together at their base. The violence had erupted among the Presidential Guard of South Sudanese president Salva Kiir and then spread like wildfire to other parts of the country. Within days, half a million people had been displaced, tens of thousands in Juba were seeking protection on the bases of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and according to UN estimates one thousand had died.1 Only two years after South Sudan had become independent, a power struggle escalated between Kiir and Riek Machar, his dismissed former vice president and rival.

South Sudan is just one example for how SSR support can backlash on its sponsors. Mali and Iraq are others. In both of the latter countries, US-led efforts to train and equip security forces in the aftermath of 9/11 were seriously flawed. When Islamist fighters seized northern Mali in 2012, half of the security forces trained by the United States deserted to the aggressors, and the other half turned south, where they staged a coup against the democratically elected government. In Iraq, where the United States led reform of the security sector following its intervention in 2003, grave weaknesses in the integrity of the army and police were exposed by the advance of fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in early summer 2014.

Many analysts saw the extent of violence in South Sudan, Mali, and Iraq as a failure of the efforts to reform security institutions.2 In particular, in all the cases, ethnic divides and loyalties had been allowed to persist within the armed forces. Despite these deficiencies, Western conflict experts persistently pinned their hopes on revamping crisis states’ security institutions to enable them to ensure their own stability. All these countries experienced uncontrolled inflows of weapons. In South Sudan, for example, more than half the state budget flows to the security sector, and more than half the adult male population possesses firearms.3 What is more, as the reinvigorated and united Kurdish independence movement indicates, no one can foresee how the associated changes in the balance of power will shape the face of these regions in the long run.

Security sector reform (SSR) in transitioning and conflict-affected countries means more than simply disarming fighters, supplying security organisations with better equipment, and training police and soldiers to use it. It is an intervention in the fragile political balance of states that are autocratically governed or where the idea of democracy is only slowly beginning to take hold. Even in consolidated Western democracies, security sector reform is a politically touchy matter. In Germany, for example, the only real consequence of reforms resulting from the 2011 scandal over the extremist right-wing National Socialist Underground was that certain high-ranking officials had to resign.4 For political elites in authoritarian or politically fragile countries, by contrast, control over the security forces at times represents the foundation of their physical survival. Use of force is an option when they find themselves unable to achieve their objectives by political means. Raising the hurdle for such abuse of power and thus enabling peaceful development stand at the heart of the concept of SSR.

Support for a process of security sector reform should help to alter the structures, laws, processes (security sector governance, SSG) and behaviours of individuals in the security sector in such a way that the security forces are in a position to ensure the internal and external security of the population but cannot become a tool of political interests. That is the sense in which this study employs the terms »security sector reform« and »security sector governance«: »Fundamentally, »good« SSG is understood as the effective and efficient provision of

4. The National Socialist Underground (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund) was a Nazi terrorist organisation whose existence first came to light in November 2011. The group claimed responsibility for a series of racist murders between 2000 and 2007. The failure of German security institutions to recognise either series of murders or their right-wing background led to a number of resignations and dismissals in German security organisations.
state and human security within a framework of democratic governance, while SSR describes efforts to achieve this goal« (Bryden and N’Diaye 2011: 10).

In many countries, security organisations are a source of violence and human rights violations that is difficult or impossible to control. At the same time, numerous studies emphasise the centrality of a stable and secure environment for socio-economic development (World Bank 2011), which explains the engagement of development organisations in SSR. But Western states also see their own domestic security threatened by countries that lack functioning security institutions, which can become a haven for organised crime and terrorism (Eckhard et al. 2013). Without looking further afield, the diverging interests and political objectives of international actors have rendered external SSR support a complicated business. Factoring in the political interests of recipients multiplies the complexity, as seen in South Sudan, Mali, and Iraq. The outcome is that for a whole range of transitioning and conflict-affected countries, huge investments in SSR processes have failed to produce the desired results (Schnabel and Born 2011). After years of euphoria, broad disillusionment has now set in among SSR experts.

It is the main objective of this study to provide a realistic assessment of current international engagement in external SSR support. The study examines practical lessons and experience gained through the implementation of projects from such support. Despite an attempt to balance perspectives, the primary focus is on the civilian dimension of SSR. In line with this, the conclusion summarizes general recommendations for international SSR support as well as more specific recommendations with respect to the work of international civil society organisations.

The objective of this study is not to provide a comprehensive description of the conditions under which SSR measures might lead to success. In view of the case-by-case variance in the political, historical, and socio-economic circumstances, that would demand enormous academic resources. Nonetheless, the individuals and organisations involved in implementing SSR measures are always learning. Experience accumulates from project to project in an evolutionary process confirming productive measures and weeding out undesirable activities. This study reflects the current state of that process.

Data

Alongside published books and studies, the most important data resources used in this study were fifty-nine interviews of experts conducted by the author between November 2013 and May 2014. These took place at the headquarters of the most important donors and agencies in the field of SSR in Berlin, Brussels, Geneva, London, New York, and Washington (see figure 1).

The majority of interviewees were responsible for SSR activities at their organisation’s programme level. It was not possible within the scope of this project to extend interviews to those places where SSR measures are carried out – in other words, South Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Indonesia – but given their career histories, most of the experts consulted also possessed country-level working experience. All interviewees were assured anonymity.

Figure 1: Organisational affiliation of interviewed experts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia Foundation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonn International Center for Conversion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care International</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Peace and Conflict Studies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCAF – International Security Sector Advisory Team</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Rechtliche Zusammenarbeit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engility Corporation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Peacebuilding Liaison Office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Centre for Security Policy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Two interviews were conducted by telephone, but all others were in person. Two additional interviews – with an expert from GIZ and one from ICITA – stemmed from an earlier research project in June 2011 in Islamabad.
Method

The study is divided into four main parts. Chapter 2 explains the historical background of the SSR concept, the controversies surrounding it, and current objectives. It also provides an overview of the central trends in global SSR support, such as regional priorities, gaps, and new actors.

Chapter 3 examines practitioners’ experiences and lessons they have identified from implementing SSR assistance projects. To classify these systematically, a typology of SSR activities is introduced. It is based on two questions of relevance to practitioners in designing projects: What is the objective of the SSR measure? Whose security does the measure prioritize? This results in identifying four ideal typical SSR approaches or strategies: functional capacity building, state building, local risk reduction, and democratic security governance. Each of the four types is analysed along with the main challenges practitioners face in their implementation.

Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the ten most relevant solutions and strategies developed by practitioners in addressing the above challenges. The former chapter focuses on content-related lessons learned, and the latter turns to questions of project management and evaluation.

Chapter 6 summarises the findings of the analysis. In doing so, it examines the overall implications for SSR as a political tool in the context of assisting transforming and conflict-ridden countries, asking, How should projects be designed? What are the priorities? What are the risks?

In addition, the work of civil society organisations is discussed separately in more detail, including potential ways in which these actors can engage more intensively in SSR support.
2. International Trends in SSR Support

2.1 SSR since the Cold War

The origins of our current understanding of SSR in the context of democratisation, development, peace, and security date back to the early 1990s and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although that is when the concept was labelled »security sector reform« for the first time, support for the security organisations of other states had been part of the toolbox of global power politics for centuries. After World War II in the context of the Cold War, the major powers supplied military support on a grand scale to their allied regimes and resistance movements in geostrategically relevant states. This military assistance was organised by the armed forces of the East and West, which supplied their allies with equipment and military training. In the United States and France, such assistance became a component of official development aid. At times, spending for it surpassed the level of non-military development assistance (Wulf 2000; Wulf 2011: 341). This was the origin of the poor reputation the SSR concept earned in some quarters. Large parts of the Western development community and peace movements criticized this kind of assistance as pure geostrategic politics.

The end of the bipolar world order sparked violent internal conflicts in many parts of the world. From Africa to Central Asia to Europe, the ensuing events led to a boom in international peace enforcement and peace operations. On the ground, crisis prevention, development aid, and institution-building measures often overlapped. The SSR concept of the 1990s subsequently evolved to include three different epistemic communities concerned with democratization processes, development co-operation, and conflict management and peace operations. In practice, however, these boundaries quickly dissolved, opening space for an increasingly open exchange between development experts, diplomats, conflict resolution experts, police officers, soldiers, and legal experts.

6. On the description in this passage, see Bryden (2007) and Ball (2010).

7. Hänggi and Tanner (2005: 41) observed that references to security sector governance … appear to be isolated from one another, reflecting different policy discourses each linked to another epistemic community: security policy, development cooperation and, to a lesser extent, the promotion of democracy.«

Democratisation Processes in the post-soviet states

The first epistemic strand originated in the transformation and democratisation processes in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. European diplomats and experts from security organisations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), became involved in providing training and equipment assistance to them. They also launched efforts to foster civilian control of the armed forces, the police, and the intelligence services. NATO’s expansion efforts strongly emphasised democratic control of the armed forces, much to the chagrin of some generals in these countries, who would have preferred to receive only training and equipment assistance. NATO’s accession criteria were an important political incentive for pushing through civilian control of the security sector (Cottey and Forster 2004; Hänggi 2005). Because of (or despite) this, SSR processes in many eastern European states today are regarded as success stories. Some critics believe, however, that too much emphasis was placed on state institutions, rather than on strengthening civil society as an institution for non-state security control.

Development Co-operation and the Concept of Human Security

The second epistemic community working on SSR consisted of experts on bi- and multilateral development co-operation. Their perspective on SSR was heavily influenced by the concept of human security. With its focus on the security and dignity of the individual, the term »human security« entered the international debate during the 1990s as a counterweight to the state-centred thinking of SSR support. From this perspective, the pioneers of a development-led approach to SSR saw both heavily military-biased state budgets and a lack of security for the population as obstacles to long-term development and poverty reduction. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) – considered by some to be the inventor of the modern concept of SSR – was one of the first development agencies to implement SSR projects, although initially with a steady focus on the

8. Interviews with representatives of NATO and European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), Brussels, December 2013.
armed forces in developing countries. These early projects revolved around the long-neglected promotion of human rights standards and the armed forces’ responsibility for the security of civilian populations. These were later joined by projects targeting the police, judiciary, prisons, civil society, and non-state security institutions (Ball 2010; Brzoska 2003). Since the end of the 1990s, increasing numbers of studies have stressed that long-term sustainable development is impossible without a secure environment (World Bank 2011; Wulf 2000).

In 2005 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) finally turned SSR into a legitimate part of development assistance. Its Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) expanded its statistical recording of official development assistance (ODA) to include the sphere of security (OECD 2005a). Since then, measures for civil control of the security sector, civil peace operations, work with child soldiers, and control of small arms and light weapons have become part of the portfolio of activities states may list as official development aid. To guard against the creeping militarisation of development co-operation, however, assistance provided to the armed forces is explicitly excluded (Pachon 2012).

Another key development was the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, enacted in Busan, South Korea, in November 2011. Key to this document was the observation that a group of forty-five fragile and conflict affected states had made almost no progress towards reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The participants in Busan decided to pursue special efforts to assist these (now forty-seven) states. Given the importance of security as a precondition for sustainable development, SSR featured prominently in the New Deal (OECD 2012). Even more recently, the international community has endorsed a new set of development goals, the so-called Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030, with goal 16 explicitly calling for the promotion of »just, peaceful and inclusive societies«. This represents another big step towards expanding the international focus of development co-operation beyond the preceding objectives of the Millennium Development Goals, which did not include peace and security.

Conflict Management and Peace Building

The third epistemic angle on SSR stems from peace building in post-conflict societies. Unlike Eastern Europe and certain Latin American countries, which underwent peaceful political transitions, the Balkans, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East experienced the spread of violent internal conflicts in the 1990s. These confrontations endangered not only human security in the affected countries, but also threatened international stability. Violence can destabilise regions, and internal conflicts can create areas of limited statehood susceptible to becoming havens for organised crime and terrorism. Reducing such risks to international peace and security can also be an objective of SSR support.

To end violent conflicts, the United Nations initially relied on diplomacy and on deploying peacekeeping troops to separate warring parties and monitor cease-fire agreements. After the genocide in Rwanda and the massacre in Srebrenica in the mid-1990s, however, it became clear that in some cases, stable peace can only be achieved through military intervention (peace enforcement) and long-term engagement to rebuild failing states. Since then, major international and regional organisations – among them the United Nations, OSCE, European Union, African Union (AU) – have developed capacities to dispatch peace- and state-building operations. The security sector in conflict areas is typically only one of several entities in need of reform. As the United Nations (2012) notes, »SSR … is a core element of multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding, essential for addressing the roots of conflict and building the foundations of long-term peace and development.«

It can be considered a general rule that post-conflict societies are politically unstable. Active fighters must be disarmed and reintegrated into society, army, or police. SSR in the context of state building takes place in extremely difficult conditions, and the chances of success...
are limited. Yet, enabling a local government to ensure public safety and stability remains the key precondition for implementing an exit strategy, allowing the withdrawal of international forces.

2.2 Objectives, Scope, Activities and Principles of SSR

Analogous to the fragmented origins of SSR, different organisations published their own versions of the concept. The model developed by the OECD dominated the discussion for a long time. More recently, the United Nations, including the Security Council in April 2014, has published conceptual documents and resolutions on SSR (see figure 2). To this day, however, there is no globally accepted, comprehensive conception of SSR. Opinions diverge in a number of areas, above all concerning whether SSR should be part of a democratic transformation process or merely serve to improve security institutions in a functional sense (see section 2.4).

Defining SSR Objectives

Early SSR measures revolved exclusively around the state and its ability to enforce its monopoly on the use of force across its territory. This is a precondition to ensure security against internal and external threats (Ebo 2005: 1). Today many actors also regard SSR as a means of improving human security. The objective is to ensure the security of the individual from »direct and structural violence.«13 The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Many consider a democratically controlled security sector the best means for enhancing human security (Sedra 2010a; see also section 3.5).

To cite but one example, according to the EU Council, »Security Sector Reform will contribute to an accountable, effective and efficient security system, operating under civilian control consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance, transparency and the rule of law, and acting according to international standards and respecting human rights, which can

Figure 2: Important SSR concepts since 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Conflict, Peace and Development Co-Operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform and Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EU Council Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Commission Communication on Support to SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Handbook on Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Political Guidance: Ways to Improve NATO’s Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution 2151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: AU, African Union; DFID, Department for International Development; EU, European Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; UN, United Nations; US, United States.

13. According to Schnabel and Farr (2012: 4), »Commitment to the human security concept, which, like SSR, is a product of the progressive understanding and new security thinking that emerged from the end of the Cold War, is a central component of people-centred approaches to both security and development; contested as it may be, human security has focused on the primacy of freedom from fear and want, and the provision of security from both direct and structural violence and threats.«
be a force for peace and stability, fostering democracy and promoting local and regional stability« (EU Council 2005: 4).

Today even NATO military doctrine includes training measures that at least theoretically seek to promote human rights or democracy. Whereas train-and-equip approaches continue to represent one element of the concept, the aspects of human rights, accountability, and democratic civilian control reflect the idea of human security. The goal is no longer to merely develop the personnel and material capacities of the security sector alone, but also to substantially alter security governance. Bureaucratic procedures and rules for democratic control are needed to regulate the legitimate provision of security. They also can prevent governments from abusing their monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force (Born, Fluri, and Lunn 2003). As a result, governance of the security sector has become the central theme of the concept. The real challenge is in striking the proper balance between enhancing governance and improving actual security in cities, towns, and along borders (Ball 2002: ii; Wulf 2011: 338).

Scope of the Security Sector and Spectrum of SSR Activities

For as long as experts have debated the concept of SSR, there has been contention over a narrow versus a broad definition of the security sector. The narrow definition that exclusively relates SSR to a country’s military forces has ceased to play a role in viable SSR concepts (Schnabel and Born 2011). Donors first broadened their definitions to include the police and central civilian security institutions (secret services) and then the judicial sector and even traditional (unofficial) security institutions. Today all significant bilateral and international donor organisations have adopted broad definitions of the security sector (EU Council 2005; OECD-DAC 2007; United Nations 2012; United States 2009b). Traditional and private security actors are in many countries relevant in providing security and in conflict resolution, but often cannot be reached by SSR projects on the ground. This is where the need for new ideas is most significant (Abrahamsen and Williams 2006).

While definitions of the objectives and scope of the security sector have converged, major differences remain in terms of the activities carried out in the practice of SSR.

Figure 3: A comprehensive approach to security sector reform

Source: After Downs and Muggah (2010: 139), who reference a UN SSR Task Force presentation.

Note: DDR, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; SALW, Small Arms and Light Weapons; TJ, Transitional Justice.

»Classical« SSR projects are restricted primarily to providing training and equipment. Measures for civilian control of the security sector – such as financial management, managerial skills, and strategy development – were added in the 1990s, in the wake of the democracy movements in Eastern Europe. These were followed, in association with the human security concept, by an even broader approach, which now understands SSR as all measures that serve to promote the security of the population of a state. In the broadest sense, these can even encompass such measures as installing street lighting at crime hotspots.

Most actors implementing individual SSR projects today focus on one or a few of the SSR areas and activities indicated in figure 3. The graphic underlines the diversity of measures that currently fall under the holistic approach to SSR. That said, it is important to remember that a coherent vision for the »ideal security sector« does not exist. According to the United Nations, this is actually advantageous, because each society should define the details of its security sector in accordance with its own historical and cultural needs (United Nations 2012).

Principles of SSR

Due to the lack of a universal model for the security sector, most SSR concepts emphasize a series of principles on how to deliver assistance. Part of the intent is to set these concepts apart from classical train-and-equip approaches. Since the OECD-sponsored Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), donors have agreed to orient their support for SSR processes towards the priorities and strategies of local actors, thus encouraging local ownership.15 They seek to promote respect for human rights, take gender into consideration, and follow the principles of transparency, good governance, and do no harm.16 Furthermore, SSR programmes should be based on a clearly defined and well-coordinated strategy and include effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (Schnabel and Born 2011: 12f). In practice, however, it is the rare donor that completely lives up to these ambitious principles.17

2.3 Actors and Blind Spots in SSR Engagement

The »traditional« donors and actors involved in external SSR support have primarily been Western states and multilateral organisations, but they are now being joined by a group of so-called new donors with a different set of interests.

Traditional Actors in External SSR Support

The number of organisations involved in SSR support has grown steadily since the 1990s. Most of them engage in several activities at once, among them participating in the global conceptual discourse, designing strategies for individual countries and regions, and implementing individual projects to support SSR processes on the ground.18 Five types of actors can be identified on the basis of their engagement priorities.

Donor organisations, bilateral or multilateral, are comprised of government ministries or international organisations with significant budgets for financing SSR measures. Typically, they do not implement projects themselves, but formulate regional or country-specific SSR strategies and fund programmes or projects for their implementation. Such actors include DFID from the United Kingdom, the German Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the European Union Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG-DEVCO).

State implementing organisations are government agencies and semi-public groups that implement SSR support programmes or projects in third countries using their own personnel and expertise. They work above all on behalf of donor organisations. Some control their own budget, while others do not. Examples include national armed forces, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) run by the US Department of Justice, and the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the German development co-operation agency.


16. These approaches are intended to avoid a series of unintended consequences involving humanitarian development aid. See Anderson (1999).


18. The distinction between the strategic, programme, and project levels follows the established project planning and management literature in the field of development cooperation, on which most bilateral and multilateral donors base their activities and tenders (Woodrow and Oatley 2013).
International (intergovernmental) organisations, depending on their mandate, implement SSR measures or participate in preparing SSR strategies and concepts, either on the basis of their own regular budgets, special budgets, or on behalf of a donor. Examples include the OECD and OSCE, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the European Union (within the Common Security and Defence Policy framework), and NATO (for example, the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan).

Private and semi-private non-commercial organisations influence the formulation of SSR concepts and country-specific SSR strategies as civil society actors and implement projects in recipient countries using their own (donated) funds or funds from donor organisations. Examples include such nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as Saferworld, Oxfam, and Care as well as certain organisations that receive core funding through the state but operate largely autonomously, such as the German political foundations and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).  

Commercial service providers are consultancy firms in the fields of security and development that operate with clear commercial profit-seeking motives. They rarely participate in conceptual SSR discussions, but instead concentrate on implementing projects. Examples include such development providers as Adam Smith International and the German Result Group, the security firm DynCor, and consultancy firms like PricewaterhouseCoopers.

Figure 4: SSR engagement by region, 2005–2012


19. DCAF describes itself as an »international foundation.« Member states provide almost half its budget, the other half stems from smaller projects funded by various donors. Interview with a representative of the Swiss Foreign Ministry, Geneva, December 2013.
demobilisation and small arms control (separate indicator) are also excluded. It is thus important to note that OECD data systematically underestimate global SSR engagement. On the other hand, it brings to light the civilian dimension of SSR compared to classical police or military training and equipment assistance. SSR projects captured by OECD data serve to protect human security, enhance civil control of the security sectors, advance police and judicial capacity building, and promote human rights safeguards.

A glance at the available OECD data reveals that the volume of Western SSR support has tended to increase since 2005, with a peak of almost 1 billion US-Dollar in 2011. Figure 4 provides an overview of these projects. The regional priorities in recent years have been Europe, Southern Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East–North Africa (MENA).

The trend is dominated by a small number of states and SSR projects. In 2011 just two countries, Afghanistan and Kosovo, accounted for more than half of global SSR spending, while for 2012 the corresponding figure was eight. The fluctuating figures for the MENA region reflect the US intervention in Iraq. Kosovo accounted for most of the spending in Europe, and the apparent collapse in spending in 2012 in Europe resulted from the European Commission reducing its engagement there, from 149 million to 2.6 million US-Dollar. After the European Union (442 million US-Dollar), the biggest sources of OECD-relevant SSR support in 2011 were the United Kingdom (102 million US-Dollar), the United States (83 million US-Dollar), and Germany (62 million US-Dollar). In 2014, the focus were southern Africa and central Asia, those regions where we also see most major international peace operations.

**Disconnection: SSR Allocation versus Violence Hotspots**

The current concentration on fragile states in development and security policy has created a growing discrepancy in Western SSR allocations (see section 1.1). There

Figure 5: Comparison of countries with high rates of violence to countries with extensive SSR engagement


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20. For example, according to the US-based Center for International Policy, in 2011 SSR-related measures in Central America and South America reported by the United States to the OECD amounted to slightly less than 10 million US-Dollar. For the same period, US military and police assistance amounted to approximately 700 million US-Dollar. See Center for International Policy, Security Assistance Monitor, http://justf.org (accessed 10 January 2016).

21. In 2011 Afghanistan and Kosovo combined received 461 million US-Dollar in SSR support, while the other 110 recipients shared 371 million US-Dollar. In 2012 Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kazakhstan, Libya, the Palestinian territories, South Sudan, Sudan, and Ukraine together received 283 million US-Dollar, while the other 111 countries shared 251 million US-Dollar.
are several countries to which the West provides generous SSR assistance, but these are not the states where the level of violence is highest, indicating a particularly problematic security situation.

Figure 5 illustrates this imbalance, showing the five countries with the highest rates of violence (Y-axis) and the five receiving the largest amount of SSR support (X-axis, size of circle). Of interest, countries receiving the most assistance are those where the United Nations had implemented a peacekeeping operation (Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), Palestinian territories, Kosovo, and Haiti). Such missions generate political visibility and attract additional bilateral funding. Violence is greater, however, in a different group of states, in particular in Latin America. The violence in a number of Latin American countries stems from social tensions in urban areas, drug wars, and other problems that fall outside the international community’s conflict management grid.22 The criminal context of violence in these countries is a problem for real SSR: «In many cases ›security‹ is then prioritised and democratisation neglected» (Kurtenbach 2013: 7, author’s translation).

2.4 New Actors, Different Interests? Commercial Firms and New Donors

Commercial service providers in SSR Support

According to OECD data, in 2011 Western donors carried out SSR projects worth almost 1 billion US-Dollar. Although that is still less than 1 per cent of the 134 billion US-Dollar spent on global development aid,23 the funding allocated to the sector has tripled since 2005, excluding military and police SSR support, which remains outside OECD statistics (see section 2.3). As a result, increasing numbers of commercial actors see SSR as a developing business.

The first group includes commercial security firms like DynCorp and Academi (formerly Blackwater), which have been contracted since the 1990s (principally by the United States) to deliver military equipment and implementation training assistance programs around the world.24 Some experts believe that these organisations initially underestimated the growth in development spending for SSR support and so are now increasingly seeking entry into the market for bilateral project funding.25

The second group includes commercial implementing organisations that are established players in development co-operation, such as PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and are now entering the security field. They are interested because some of the larger donors, among them DFID, began to tender huge contracts worth millions of dollars.26 The requirement of advancing project spending for at least six months means that only large consultancy firms and consortia are able to bid for such contracts, with smaller NGOs forced out of the market.27

The impact of increasing numbers of commercially driven actors becoming involved in SSR support remains to be seen. Commercial contractors argue that their experts conduct training with the same experience and professional commitment as active police officers assigned to international peacekeeping missions. As commercial organisations, they assert, they are also in a position to conduct projects more professionally and efficiently.28 Critics argue that commercial service providers are quicker to drop the «softer goals» of SSR, such as democratic control and human rights, which oftentimes are not a priority of local partners either. For participating non-commercial organisations and foundations, promoting democracy and improving human security are typically the reasons they became involved in security in the first place. As a result, some of their representatives...
assert, they will insist on pursuing these objectives even under difficult circumstances. Occasionally there have been efforts to regulate the activities of commercial organisations in conflict-affected and developing countries, but they relate primarily to the use of force by security contractors and not so much their involvement in SSR processes.

New Donors’ Interest in SSR Support

Even if the United Nations has internationally agreed to SSR guidelines, the SSR support concept remains contested. Critics assert that it is dominated by a Western understanding of state and security and regard SSR as an element of the West’s global ideological hegemony (see section 1.2). Imposing Western liberal values, as David Chandler (2006) contends, should be considered a violent process in its own right.

An attitude similar to Chandler’s position has been adopted by the »new donors« in the field. This includes several of the so-called emerging donors, among them Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS), which by 2008 already accounted for 10 percent of global ODA (Smith, Fordelone, and Zimmermann 2010: 2). They see their own engagement in third states as an alternative to the Western model of development co-operation and reject terminology that distinguishes between »donors« and »recipients« of »aid.« Instead, they frame their aid as economic relations and emphasise mutual advantages and the exchange of technical know-how. Moreover, and particularly important for SSR, many new donors reject the values conditioned by Western donors. For them, any attempt to tie development assistance to the introduction of democratic standards or human rights is unacceptable.

In contrast to the Western SSR landscape, the SSR engagement of new donors appears firmly in the hands of the state. As far as the available sources indicate, there is no evidence of any significant involvement by independent foundations or other actors outside state control. Examples of individual projects suggest that political motivations do play a role. In 2011 the United Arab Emirates – the only non-Western country to report its SSR support figures to the OECD – allocated spending of a little more than 2 million US-Dollar that went exclusively to countries with large Muslim populations, primarily to Jordan and lesser amounts to Yemen, Egypt, the Palestinian territories, India and Pakistan.

Commercial interests are believed to lie behind China’s engagement in the security sectors of certain African states, some of which maintain close military relations with Beijing. These states sell oil and other natural resources to China and in turn receive access to Chinese security and arms manufacturers. Although the content of co-operation varies, it involves »financial assistance for military infrastructure, de-mining support and training for African armed forces« (Saferworld 2011a: iii). China asks no questions about human rights, thus making it »an attractive source of weaponry for countries with poor human rights records« (ibid.: 49).

Alongside these aspects of assistance, regional geopolitical interests also play a role in SSR allocations of these new donors (as they do for Western states). Russia, for example, backs its intervention against drug smuggling and terrorism in Central Asia with SSR projects. Examples are assistance to Tajikistan in building a military hospital and training border guards in the Kyrgyz Republic (Paramonov and Stolpovski 2008: 8). In another example, Turkey participates in multilateral peace building and uses SSR assistance in its neighbourhood to underline its status as a regional hegemon. Accordingly, Ankara contributes police officers to United Nations and OSCE missions and participates in Western SSR assistance to Afghanistan.

30. The best known are the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, with 208 signatories (http://www.icoc-psp.org), and the Montreux Document (http://www.eda.admin.ch/pisec), both promoted by the Swiss government (both accessed 10 January 2016).
These new donors are playing an increasingly larger role in international SSR support. Whether the reasons are geopolitical, economic, or otherwise, what unites these actors is that they do not pursue a normative democratic line on SSR. Altogether the new donors have to date contributed little to the conceptual discourse. China, however, as some experts have pointed out, shows signs of altering its approach, because its engagement in South Sudan exacerbated local conflicts and created backlash that negatively affected its larger economic interests (Large 2012; Patey 2014). Chinese politicians recently made some surprisingly conflict-sensitive statements on South Sudan, and China also contributed to African UN missions. Overall, experts today sense a growing Chinese interest in cooperating with Western donors on SSR issues in Africa.

2.5 Implementing SSR: Aspiration versus Reality

Until the end of the Cold War, the principal nations involved in strengthening security forces in other countries were the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Twenty-five years later, the number of actors has proliferated. In addition to state institutions, there are now numerous foundations, NGOs, and international organisations around the world supporting SSR in conflict-affected and developing countries. Their aims and principles have increasingly converged. Supporting democratic values and strengthening human security has become an objective even formulated (at least theoretically) in NATO doctrine. In view of the inclusion of Peace and Security in the Sustainable Development Goals it must be expected that work with security institutions in crisis-affected and developing countries will continue to enjoy high visibility.

Do the billions of dollars invested in SSR measures year after year improve living conditions for the people in the affected countries? Does outside assistance actually enhance stability and security? Conclusive answers to these questions are elusive, because broad-based scientific evidence is lacking. What research there is, however, points to sobering conclusions. The authors of studies – whether concerning Afghanistan, DR Congo, East Timor, Iraq, Liberia, or Sierra Leone – consistently criticise what has been accomplished thus far and question the success of SSR measures (Albrecht 2010; Ebo 2005; Funaki 2009; Gbla 2009; Hood 2006; Jaye 2009; Mackay, Sedra, and Burt 2011; Murray 2009; Sedra 2007, 2010b). While waiting for a comparative study with convincing criteria allowing evidence-based statements about the success or failure of SSR in conflict-affected and developing countries, the question arises whether the past euphoria about the SSR concept was perhaps premature. Could unrealistically high ambitions be to blame if experts today largely agree that there is a growing gap between theory and reality (Peake 2009; Scheye 2010; Schnabel and Born 2011)?


36. For example, the Guardian reported, »In a rare overt political intervention in Africa, the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, said he was deeply concerned by the unrest in South Sudan, which has left more than 1,000 people dead and reduced oil flows by about a fifth.« See David Smith, »China Urges Immediate End to Conflict in South Sudan,« Guardian, 7 January 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/06/presidentssudan-south-sudan-meet-juba-discuss-conflict (accessed 10 January 2016).


3. Challenges in Implementing SSR Measures

Several evaluations and research projects on SSR processes in various countries, when taken together, reveal a growing gap between theory and practice in implementing SSR measures (Peake 2009; Scheye 2010; Schnabel and Born 2011). It might be expected that this literature would include practical lessons on success factors, but that is only the case to a limited extent. Aside from a few exceptions (such as Egnell and Haldén 2009), there are no comparative studies. At best, there are long lists of factors that in individual cases have facilitated or impeded SSR measures. Without differentiation by context, type, and category of SSR measure, such a list offers little of use to practitioners planning a new SSR program elsewhere.

To differentiate SSR activities, earlier studies adopted classifications based on various concepts and definitions. Because of the gap between conceptual gospel and practical realities in SSR (Peake 2009), however, the results of this approach might appear misleading. Instead, it would seem more promising to stick to the actual decisions and compromises SSR practitioners face when designing their strategies. After evaluating the interviews conducted for this study, it is clear that SSR approaches primarily rest on two key decisions: the objective of SSR assistance and whose security to prioritise.

The ambition of SSR assistance (objectives): The first decision SSR experts make involves ambitions. Projects are designated according to either of two objectives: One the one hand, the objective of improving the security sector relates to SSR measures designed to enable a state to meet its security responsibilities more effectively within the given system. This is irrespective of whether a state is run by a dictator or governed along democratic principles. SSR projects designed to improve functioning operate primarily at the level of the partner country’s official security institutions. This may encompass local and central levels and extend to judicial institutions or also the parliament (in terms of professionalising parliamentary control). On the other hand, the goal of changing the security sector goes much further than merely optimising effectiveness or efficiency. Instead, SSR measures in these cases seek fundamental changes in security governance. Concrete goals include persuading security forces to respect human rights, and placing the relationship between security organs and the population on a more democratic foundation. Whether SSR programs include such a normative component is the key discriminatory element.

The approach of SSR (whose security to prioritise): Regardless of whether the objective of an SSR measure is to improve or change the security sector, practitioners distinguish between two fundamentally different approaches or schools of thought (Ebo 2005; Sedra 2010a). The first approach pursues SSR support focusing on the security of the state. From this perspective, SSR in the first instance is supposed to serve the integrity of the state. The primary task of SSR is to ensure (or restore) the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force internally and against external enemies. Although this can produce indirect medium-term improvements in the security of the individual, this is of secondary importance. The second approach focuses on the security of the population. From this perspective the primary goal of SSR is to improve human security (Krause 2007; MacRae and Hubert 2001; United Nations Development Program 1994). The measurement of success is not the effective provisioning of security by state organs, but the question of whether after a measure’s implementation the individual’s freedom from direct and structural violence has improved. This approach prioritises project activities in rural and urban areas, often outside the scope of formal state institutions.

Taken together, the two poles inherent to each of the two decisions can be represented in a 2 x 2 matrix (figure 6). For the sake of specificity, the resulting strategies are designated functional capacity building, state
The four strategies are not hard and fast; practitioners may find that their specific project falls somewhere in between. Rather, the four strategies should be considered ideal types that represent (and at times even exaggerate) empirical reality. This kind of conceptual hyperbole, however, will facilitate identification of challenges in each of the four categories (sections 3.1 to 3.4) and the presentation of the solutions developed by practitioners (Chapter 4).

### 3.1 Functional Capacity Building

SSR as functional capacity building concentrates on improving security governance at the level of the central state. This includes asserting the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force and the associated strengthening of state authority. This occurs in the first instance through official assistance at the level of the armed forces, police, courts, ministries, and (rarely) parliament. The distinguishing element in these cases is that capacity building is formally restricted to the goal of providing effective security through such measures as equipment and training assistance, legislative reforms, and support formulating and implementing security strategies.

One example of a functional capacity-building approach can be found in Pakistan. After independence in 1948, the country went through a democratisation process that repeatedly was interrupted and set back by temporary military dictatorships. Rather, the four strategies should be considered ideal types that represent (and at times even exaggerate) empirical reality. This kind of conceptual hyperbole, however, will facilitate identification of challenges in each of the four categories (sections 3.1 to 3.4) and the presentation of the solutions developed by practitioners (Chapter 4).
with 300 million US-Dollar of foreign military financing.\textsuperscript{41} The acting US agencies on the ground are State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). As one example, since 2002 ICITAP has been implementing a project to support the Pakistani police to combat serious crime. ICITAP advisors work directly with the Pakistani police academy to improve its curriculum, offer courses on investigative skills and other policing methods, and provide equipment, such as digital fingerprinting systems (United States 2009a: 30).\textsuperscript{42}

From the perspective of donors, such as the United States, functional capacity-building SSR projects often serve concrete foreign policy objectives. One could, for example, deliver aid in exchange for secure passage to deliver military supplies to Afghanistan. Another example is the expectation that improving a state’s security institutions will put it in a position to resolve internal security problems on its own.\textsuperscript{43} In Pakistan, this has been the case in the fight against terrorism and against the Taliban in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Similarly, a joint German, Danish, and Portuguese policy proposal discussed in the European Union in 2013 suggested equipping regional powers in the Gulf of Guinea to enable them to provide stability within their regional sphere of influence (Puglierin, Feyock, and van Diepen 2014).\textsuperscript{44} When such international political objectives are in play, the aim of functional capacity building is mainly limited to improving the operational capabilities of the partner state. The danger is – and this is the first challenge of functional capacity-building SSR projects – that «softer» civilian and democratic institutions are not considered at all or only inadequately so. This is dangerous, as Ebo (2005: 29) warns, as «operational efficiency without effective democratic oversight is a recipe for the brutalisation and oppression of the population by armed and security forces, particularly of the poor and vulnerable.» Pakistan is not the only place where experts have observed this dynamic. Deficits in support for the civilian side of security sectors and for control by democratic institutions have also been seen in other countries like Afghanistan (Mackay, Sedra, and Burt 2011; Sedra 2006), Sierra Leone (Albrecht 2010; Gbla 2006), East Timor (Hood 2006), and Iraq (Wilcke 2006). The consequences can be fatal. Analysts have observed that functional capacity-building projects frequently go hand in hand with high levels of corruption and embezzlement of public funds. One familiar pattern involves security forces in countries lacking a professional, depersonalised bureaucracy, where the army or police can therefore distribute pay down the organisational hierarchy, ensuring each level the loyalty of the one below it. To profit from this system, security forces the world over have invented «phantom» officers. Where this practice is widespread. Such as in the DR Congo or Afghanistan, there is ultimately little or nothing left for the individual recipients. Single police or soldiers are forced to look elsewhere for an income, often to the detriment of the population through criminal activities or roadblocks, where they extract «petrol money» from the population (Thomas-Jensen and Gingerich 2010: 32, Perito 2012).\textsuperscript{45}

Alongside corruption and mismanagement, the second central problem of functional capacity building is the sustainability of SSR measures. In Afghanistan, for example, it was a military priority for the United States to train Afghan soldiers and police to support the fight against the Taliban (Perito 2009, 2012). The result was a security sector that currently comprises more than 350,000 men and women. Although there are plans to reduce its size to about 230,000 after defeating the Taliban, it will still be too much for Afghanistan’s strained state budget. In 2009/2010 Afghanistan had an estimated security budget of 4.1 billion US-Dollar that stood against state revenues of just under 1 billion US-Dollar.\textsuperscript{46}

42. Interview with a representative of ICITAP, Islamabad, June 2011.
43. Interviews with representatives of ICITAP and the US State Department, Washington, DC, December 2013. ICITAP notes on its website, «ICITAP is a law enforcement development organization whose mission is to work with foreign governments to develop effective, professional, and transparent law enforcement capacity that protects human rights, combats corruption, and reduces the threat of transnational crime and terrorism, in support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.» See Department of Justice, ICITAP Fact Sheets and Resources, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitapfact-sheets (accessed 10 January 2016).
44. Non-Paper by the governments of Germany, Denmark, and Portugal dated 17 October 2013 (in the author’s possession).
The situation is similar in Liberia, where an SSR program has been in place since Charles Taylor resigned the presidency in 2003 under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), American police trainers, and a project funded by the British government and implemented by UNDP are working to enhance the capacity of the Liberia police force. By 2011 they had trained some 4,400 officers, but even that comparatively small number is already beyond Liberia’s state budget. As a result, the country has depended on financial subsidies from the United States, Germany, Norway and Ireland (Human Rights Watch 2013; International Crisis Group 2009). In addition to finances, sustainability is also hampered when locals are not integrated into reform processes. For example, part of the UNDP project included support for formulating and implementing a national security strategy. In doing so, UNDP recruited numerous advisors from Western and African countries who drafted a set of security-related policy papers and proposed rules and regulations.47 Their suggestions became part of the country’s security architecture without representatives of Liberian institutions having made much of a contribution. Today these laws and regulations are largely ignored in Liberian security practices (Scheye 2011). They came from outside and were never adapted to the Liberian context, so no one in the local police and armed forces cares whether they are implemented.48

Although the police, army, and secret service are the primary targets of functional capacity-building programs, there are some exceptions. After the fall of Saddam Hussein and the dissolution of the Iraqi armed forces, the United States and the United Kingdom led SSR efforts there. Their focus, not least to counter on-going violence, was in training and equipping new Iraqi security forces. Up to 50,000 trainers and military advisers worked in the country until 2011. As is often the case when external donors pursue a functional capacity-building strategy, the parliament received little support. This is despite its relevance as one of the few Iraqi institutions able to bridge the country’s religious divide. Until today, many parliamentarians have no staff, cannot adequately assert their democratic rights and carry out their duties, and suffer from repression. In an attempt to balance bilateral SSR assistance, UNDP set out to support the Iraqi parliament. Among others, UNDP experts attempted to strengthen parliamentarians in exercising their right to oversee public spending by the security sector.

The failure of the international community, and above all the United States, to establish coherent and effective security organs through their functional capacity-building efforts in Iraq was revealed in early summer 2014. With immense speed, ISIS’s comparatively small forces were able to seize control of large swathes of northern Iraq, including major cities. This event made apparent that the success of SSR depends on much more than the sum of capabilities of security forces and their control organs. The progressive collapse of the Iraqi state is also a failure of the political elite to represent all parts of the population equally, including in the security forces.49

As shown here, SSR projects in the form of functional capacity building can take many forms. They are united by the attempt to improve the working of state institutions, including the armed forces and civilian institutions, such as ministries, parliaments, or courts. Existing work reveals two challenges. First, although isolated measures are conducted in the civilian sphere of the security sector, democratic institutions are not a priority of functional capacity-building projects, which are largely planned and implemented by experts within security organisations. The individuals involved come from police, military, and judicial backgrounds and are not experts on democratisation. If training improves the effectiveness of police and the armed forces without matching capacities in the civilian parts of the security sector, there is the threat the society might disintegrate.48 Of course even a democratic government can deploy its police repressively, but it is more often that autonomous security agencies lead to brutality and repression (Ebo 2005: ii). Second, functional capacity building often occurs in situations where political leaders tend to be driven by time pressure or geostrategic considerations rather than


local analyses of conflict and needs. This lays the ground for corruption and mismanagement and undermines the sustainability of SSR investments.

3.2 State Building

Whereas SSR as functional capacity building addresses a fairly small portion of a country’s security sector, SSR in the context of state building is more comprehensive. State building occurs primarily in countries that are incapable of overcoming civil war or extreme fragility on their own. Ideally, SSR in state building goes beyond prioritising the mere effective functioning of individual components of the security sector to lend more weight to long-term civilian control of the security forces. This goes in hand with a normative component. Only a democratically legitimised and controlled security sector, in this understanding, will ultimately be able to serve the population and guarantee peaceful development (Born, Gacond, and N’Diaye 2003; Luckham 2003). Similar to functional capacity building, state building programmes primarily address the central state level. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. State building can encompass a series of functional capacity-building measures. Combining them in a larger strategy in association with a democratization process, however, is what distinguishes the more ambitious state building from mere capacity building. The example of South Sudan illustrates this in practice.

Following the country’s declaration of independence in July 2011, the UN Security Council deployed UNMISS, a peace operation mandated to support the democratic state-building process including a comprehensive SSR program. It called for developing an SSR strategy, implementing a demobilisation and reintegration programme, and establishing a police force by means of providing equipment and training and drafting legislation and organisational guidelines. In December 2013, the mission consisted of 3,000 civilian experts and police and 7,000 blue helmets and had an annual budget of 924 million US-Dollar. At the same time, the mission’s SSR unit loosely coordinated a whole range of bi- and multilateral implementing organisations, each engaged in individual functional capacity-building projects. One example is a project funded by Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom and implemented by GIZ to strengthen the effectiveness of the police in South Sudan by providing a voice and data radio system and training staff in its use. It is thus both the characteristic and the challenge of state building that one organisation serves as a coordinating hub, sustaining a holistic SSR strategy and advocating this strategy vis-à-vis the host government, not in the sense of imposing an external vision, but based on a previously formulated political agreement. In most cases, such processes are mandated by the Security Council and implemented by a peace operation.

State-building projects face the challenges of corruption and sustainability for each individual activity, similar to those for functional capacity building. Beyond this, it is a central challenge for the international community to create a single and coherent political reform agenda and to communicate it to host governments. In many post-conflict societies, democratic security governance is neither much of a priority nor in the interest of local politicians, police officers or military officials. It is arguably the most complex challenge to ensure, on the part of local partners in government and security forces, that there is genuine political interest in security transformation and peaceful development.

This is precisely what has ultimately not occurred in South Sudan and many other countries. In South Sudan, donors paid too little attention to ethnic tensions in the political arena as well as the security forces. Critiques rightly argue that UNMISS was satisfied to note that function capacity-building projects had been implemented according to plan. At the same time, however, they neglected to urge the elite circles around the president and his former deputy to find a political solution to their economic and political differences. The outcome, as noted, was the eruption of violence.

A different situation can be found in Rwanda. What transpired there illustrates what can happen when donors implement SSR as functional capacity building, encounter difficulties, and make mistakes. In the case of South Sudan, donors are currently still left to find a solution to the civil war or extreme fragility.


52. By the end of 2012, GIZ reported having equipped more than eighty police stations and more than 200 vehicles with radio equipment and having trained more than 275 members of the police. See Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, »Polizeiprogramm Afrika–Südsudan,« http://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/20622.html (accessed 10 January 2016).

53. See Adeba, »The ›Coup‹ and Implications for Security Sector Reform in South Sudan.«
local enthusiasm to pursue projects, but no similar interest in democratic transformation. Before the 1994 genocide, the United States was already involved in Rwandan SSR through weapon deliveries and training programs. After 1994, the State Department and the Pentagon expanded their engagement, primarily by supporting demobilisation, training, and equipment programmes. On the ground, Roncor, a commercial security contractor, implemented the programs. Today Rwanda possesses effective armed forces (Wilén 2012), which also participate in UN blue helmet missions. At the same time, the country stands on the brink of autocracy (Stroh 2007, 2008), one possible reason being that there was no international actor engaged in Rwanda, urging state-building-style democratic reforms in the security sector and beyond.

It is difficult, however, to simply blame the United States for its lack of decisiveness on democratic reforms. Especially in the case of state building on the foundation of rudimentary governmental structures, the success of external support depends on the will of local actors. As Mazarr states (2014), »As success stories from South Korea to Chile show, the path from state weakness to strength has to be traveled by the states themselves, gradually and fitfully, most often under the influence of strong, decisive leadership from visionary architects of governance.« Unfortunately it often transpires that local actors are interested above all in functional capacity-building measures and not democratic security governance. The long-term effects of the SSR efforts in Rwanda therefore remain unclear. It might be that the United States merely supported another African authoritarian regime, throwing back the continent’s struggle for political transformation. While the situation in Rwanda continues to unfold, two key challenges to SSR in the scope of state building are notable: First, in regard to the host government, political interests must seek not only to improve the security forces, but also to change security governance on the basis of civilian control and democratic norms. Second, internationals must also unite behind this goal. They should be prepared to commit themselves for the long-term and be willing to accept setbacks and at times exert political pressure.

3.3 Local Risk Reduction

As the term implies, local risk reduction as a SSR strategy targets the level of the individual. The concept of human security is emphasised much more strongly in this approach than in functional capacity building or state building. Under the widely accepted UN definition, this means that implementation of an SSR program should directly improve individuals’ security in their specific context (Krause 2007; MacRae and Hubert 2001; United Nations Development Program 1994). The human security aspect of SSR originates from criticisms of the state-centred approaches. In many cases, state building and functional capacity building did not bring about improvements to human security, either because projects were ineffective or members of the police, judiciary, or armed forces abused their powers (Ball and Hendrickson 2006; Jaye 2009). Organisations with a background in development co-operation thus sought to rectify this outcome. These are primarily NGOs and foundations such as International Alert, Care, and Oxfam. They typically entered the field of SSR support because they found that questions of security affected their primary objectives: resolving local conflicts, supporting human rights, and preventing violence against children or women.

Examples from South Sudan and DR Congo illustrate what these programs look like in reality. In South Sudan, external donors, including USAID and UNDP, implemented measures to improve human security at the county and community levels jointly with the South Sudanese government. SSR experts visited various communities to organise a series of focus groups involving tribal elders, women, and youth to assess local security risks. UNDP then planned a series of smaller measures, for which about 100,000 to 200,000 US-Dollar was made available per county. In Bailet County, cattle stealing, unemployment, health problems, and lack of law enforcement were identified as central security risks.

58. For example, the Akobo model for conflict reduction was funded by USAID and implemented by AECOM. See Sudan »Recovery Fund – Southern Sudan (SRF-SS),« June 2010, http://mptf.undp.org/document/download/4270 (accessed 10 January 2016).
UNDP experts together with community leaders therefore decided to set up police checkpoints at strategic locations.\(^{59}\)

The second example demonstrates one of the key challenges for this kind of SSR strategy. In 2002 the Sun City power-sharing agreement between DR Congo president Joseph Kabila and several rebel groups ended a phase of severe fighting and atrocities in the Kivus in eastern DR Congo. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) and a number of Western states have since been supporting the implementation of this agreement and providing SSR assistance. Because the victims of violence had disproportionately been women, the UN mission and external advisors pushed for the adoption of legislation against sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), which the Congolese parliament passed in 2006. Simply formulating and passing a law does not, however, guarantee change within the security forces. As one Congolese observer recently noted, DR Congo has »probably one of the best laws in the world … to protect women. But how many women know about this law? How many men know about this law? Actually, it’s not only a question of them knowing it, but the application.«\(^{60}\)

Pursuing a decentralised approach to local risk reduction, USAID responded by preparing a strategy to improve security for women in rural areas, alongside the SGBV law.\(^{61}\) Because USAID only operates as a donor and does not implement projects itself in DR Congo, the strategy involves at least three organisations responsible for implementation (Thomas-Jensen and Gingerich 2010): DPK Consulting organises rule-of-law training on SGBV for local civilian staff in DR Congo and supports mobile courts. Avocats Sans Frontières implements smaller projects to enable the population to access rule-of-law institutions in rural areas, holding workshops in neighbourhoods and communities and broadcasting radio announcements to educate women in particular about their rights and how to assert them. USAID tasked Global Rights with holding stakeholder meetings to advance implementation of the 2006 SGBV law in the Kivus. To this day, however, none of these measures has brought about any substantial change in the precarious security situation of women in DR Congo.\(^{62}\)

The DR Congo example points to a fundamental problem in the implementation of local risk reduction projects: How can a decentralised approach based on several relatively small projects improve the security of the population as a whole? For implementing organisations in particular, the question is how can a financially and geographically limited project be shaped in such a way that it ideally (at the least indirectly) reaches the entire population.

3.4 Democratic Security Governance

Democratic security governance also takes an approach that focuses on the security of the individual. As opposed to local risk reduction, however, the lever is not the »functional« resolution of security risks in the local context, but the idea that individual security is safeguarded best in the context of a democratically controlled security sector. This posts the same connection between democracy and security that also underlies state building: Only a democratically controlled security sector can ultimately ensure the security of the individual. Born, Fluri, and Lunn (2003: 7f) have identified a series of reasons for this, starting with protection against authoritarian rule and legitimisation of the internal use of force. They also argue that democratic systems are best suited for creating a long-term balance between restricting individual liberties and the security needs of the state and the community. Parliaments generate public acceptance of security budgets and can communicate the security needs of the population from constituencies to the capital. Anoth-

\(^{59}\) Interviews with experts from the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Berlin, December 2013. See also »Community Consultation Report, Lakes State, South Sudan«. Published by South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control, South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission, United Nations Development Programme. May 2012, Juba, South Sudan: http://www.ss.undp.org/content/dam/southsudan/library/Documents/CSAC%20Reports/UNDP-SS-Lakes-consult-12.pdf (accessed 10 January 2016).


\(^{62}\) A 2014 UN investigation concluded that the problem of sexual violence in DR Congo continues unabated. Half of all reported rapes were committed by soldiers from the Congolese army or other state actors. See United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, »Progress and Obstacles in the Fight Against Impunity for Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo,« April 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/CDReports.aspx (accessed 10 January 2016).
The security sector is often only one aspect of values defined by their own understanding of the world. The security sector is often only one aspect of their actual objectives. For example, German political foundations, such as the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) are supporting democratic transformation processes in a variety of countries. In some of those cases, support for democratic security governance and contributing to a democracy-compatible civil-military relationship might be sensible goals within the larger objective.

The regional focus of democratic security governance projects covers a wide circle of countries and not only those with high levels of violence. Thus international actors also work in states that have stable political systems but largely autonomous, repressive security organisations, such as Chile before and during the transition to democracy and currently Egypt (Kurtenbach 2013). Value-led SSR projects are often only tolerated by local political elites, and they rarely change the security sector directly through involvement in central state equipment, organisational reform, or legislation. What is left to this approach is above all dialogue and co-operation with individual actors in security organisations and ministries and providing support to political parties, parliaments, and civil society groups, like the media and think tanks, in capitals or regions.

Examples for such projects can be found among the portfolio of FES, which supports the development of democratic security governance in a number of states, in particular in Latin America, West Africa, and Southeast Asia. The basis of FES’s approach is that a professional and democratically embedded security sector can safeguard [local] liberty and freedom without encroaching upon civil liberties and interfering in the democratically legitimized policy processes. In Thailand, FES representatives organised roundtable discussions on topics such as democratic control of the security sector, which bring together political figures, civil society representatives, and trades unionists in a series of dialogue platforms. Local partners are an important factor in externally supported democratic security governance, not least to ensure that SSR measures are anchored in the local civil society. In the Philippines, the local FES office runs workshops and other capacity-building programs for parliamentarians together with local partners from the International Center for Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance. Every year since 2006, FES and the Geneva-based DCAF have held the regional Inter-parliamentary Forum on Security Sector Governance in Southeast Asia to foster exchange between parliamentarians on questions of improving accountability and civilian control of security forces.

There are several countries where the local political climate forbids cooperating with parliament, ministries, or security organisations on topics such as democratic security governance. One important and also widely adopted approach is therefore to support civil society. Since George Soros and his Open Society Foundation permanently changed the civil society landscape of Eastern Europe in the 1990s, civil society actors have come to play a major role in extra-parliamentary control of the security sector. In many countries political foundations and international NGOs work together with local NGOs, media, and think tanks to strengthen their capacities through project funding and training as a means to promote democratic standards and the observance of human rights in the security sector.

63. Most actors pursue the goal of promoting universal values such as democracy and human rights, but less universal matters, such as religious beliefs, may also be central. This is the case with Arab donors (see section 1.4).


68. Interview with representative of EPLO, Brussels, December 2013.
Value-led work in the security sector is often highly sensitive and sometimes involves considerable risk to external organisations and their local partners, whose activists can easily become the target of state repression. Alternatively, local NGOs may instrumentalise international support for their own diverging political ends. Overall, as various experts report, the space for value-led work has been shrinking steadily for years in many countries, especially those with autocratic governments. For example, in 2013 Egyptian courts closed the offices of several international NGOs, and local staff were detained. The reason was plainly the co-operative projects these organisations had implemented with local civil society actors in the context of the Arab Spring. In the subsequent trial, the judges ruled that the activities of the foreign NGOs were «a new form of control and dominance and a cheaper form of soft colonialism» (cited in Maier and Fuchs 2013: 390, author translation).

SSR projects aimed at democratic security governance should not be overly ambitious. This is a lesson the German Foreign Ministry learned with a project it funded in Indonesia from 2006 to 2010. The objectives were to strengthen parliamentary and civil society control of the Indonesian armed forces and the police. The first implementation report noted that the room for «direct cooperation with Indonesian state institutions is … considerably smaller» than expected. Four years later, the next implementation report was even more downbeat as the ministry admitted, «it was not possible to fully achieve all the stated goals of reform efforts. It transpired that reform of the security sector represents a long-term measure that must always be seen in the context of the achieved state of democratic development.»

The above examples clearly demonstrate two aspects: First, there is a direct connection between the state of democracy and the space for SSR. It is therefore, as Wulf (2011: 354) has argued, a mistake to believe that SSR projects will always be successful under a (halfway) democratic regime: «democratisation is not by itself a guarantee of reform.» Second, democratisation and reform of the security sector may sometimes in fact hinder one another. Influential politicians or security actors in an authoritarian state may block reforms or resort to violence if they fear losing power or retribution for misdeeds following a democratic transformation. SSR projects for democratic security governance are therefore always susceptible to the possibility that their aim – to change security governance – can only be fulfilled very slowly or not at all and that setbacks are to be expected. The challenge for SSR projects in democratic security governance is therefore to find effective approaches that local elites will not perceive as excessive interference in their internal affairs.

73. Interviews with experts from DCAF and Graduate Institute, Geneva, December 2013.
4. Towards Solutions from Practice

Individuals and organisations learn from experience. In dealing with the challenges discussed above, many of the institutions and experts consulted for this study have developed innovative approaches and lessons learned over past years. Some of those apply only to one SSR strategy, while others apply to all four – functional capacity building, state building, local risk reduction, and democratic security governance. The objective of analysing the examples from practice mentioned in interviews with these experts is not to outline concrete instructions or recommendations, but to describe in a general way what these specialists regard as the most important lessons and examples for dealing with the challenges identified. These can then be applied by practitioners to their own respective working contexts.

4.1 Strategic Partnerships for Holistic SSR

Functional capacity-building projects in particular often lack a comprehensive agenda that combines delivering functional training as well as realizing human rights standards. Experts on the ground prioritize based on their professional expertise and this undermines holistic SSR support. They are mostly active or former state employees from the police, armed forces, or judiciary. Depending on their professional priorities, their mentoring and training will focus more or less extensively on civilian and democratic control and human rights.74 This is equally the case with military training assistance, with EU and UN police and rule-of-law missions, and even with commercial service providers, who frequently employ former police officers or soldiers. NATO and Pentagon representatives argue that the armed forces have improved their SSR strategies and today pursue a more comprehensive approach that also takes civil aspects into account.75 It is questionable, however, whether the problem can be resolved on a conceptual level.

As an alternative, one strategy to deliver comprehensive SSR programs would be to realize close partnerships of organisations with different specializations. One example in which this was done, according to American ICITAP experts, was in an SSR programme they have been running since 2006 in Nepal.76 To set up regional training centres, they worked with an NGO specialising in human rights, which lent the issue the necessary weight in the process of shaping the training curriculum. Strategically selected partnerships can enable experts from outside the security sector to contribute new perspectives and suggest innovative solutions for old problems. The problem of paying Afghan security forces outlined in Chapter 3.1, for instance, has now been resolved by civilian UNDP experts using a new system for transferring payments via mobile phones (Perito 2012).

Lesson 1: Carefully thought out partnerships between specialist organisations can combine strengths in project implementation to create a more holistic approach to SSR.

4.2 Strategies for Greater Sustainability in SSR

In many cases of state building and functional capacity building, it quickly becomes apparent that the security sector cannot be maintained with local resources alone. In these instances, international donors often supply budget assistance, hoping for a soft landing. As the awaited economic upturn takes more time than expected or a country begins to demand more autonomy from donors, the limits of this approach become apparent. In view of this problem, US police experts today argue that future projects will concentrate on sustainable training of small, well-trained, and effective elite units. The essence here, they say, is long-term training for members of the police, armed forces, and judiciary of partner countries.

As the example of DR Congo demonstrates, that approach must be carefully considered. Following local elections in 2006, the US Congress approved an initial equipment and training programme for the Congolese army costing 5 million US-Dollar and for which a series of private service providers were employed to implement (Thomas-Jensen and Gingerich 2010: 19). In 2010 the State Department awarded an additional

contract for 35 million US-Dollar to the private security firm DynCorp to continue this engagement. In 2013 it became known that the 391st battalion trained by DynCorp as a model unit had been involved in mass rapes near Goma, even though according to US sources, the training also included components on human rights and gender-specific violence (Arieff and Coen 2013: 17). The European Union had also been training a model elite police unit since 2005, but a few years later the European Court of Auditors said that its investigators had been unable to find the thousand-strong force, asserting, »[W]e could find no trace of it.« 77 Lack of political will in DR Congo represents the greatest obstacle to sustainable security reforms, and MONUSCO is looking increasingly helpless in dealing with the lack of interest.78

Some experts therefore argue that sustainable SSR cannot be furthered by rapid training of large numbers of security force members or by creating small elite units. They are correct that in a context of restricted local resources, it is better to provide training to a small number of soldiers, police, and judges, but this alone will not ensure comprehensive reform. Instead, it is more important to ensure that interest in the success of SSR exists on the part of local actors in politics and security institutions.79 Thus, experts working in individual communities today focus police reforms on contact with citizens (community policing) to nurture public interest in reform processes. A promising approach at the national level by contrast is to identify individual champions and provide them with long-term support. For example, after the 1999 intervention in Kosovo, the US embassy identified a number of promising young activists and funded them to study at elite American universities. Since returning, some have engaged in civil society and some in the government, and they are increasingly becoming political alternatives to the established and sometimes corrupt leaders.80

Lesson 2: Implementation of functional capacity-building measures alone will not guarantee successful sustainable SSR. External actors must ensure that interest in the success of SSR exists on the ground. Supporting local champions is a promising long-term approach.

A similar problem regarding the application of reforms led to another approach helpful in resolving the problem of sustainability of SSR support. Experience shows that like pure training measures, new security laws and structural reforms often show little lasting effect because they are not applied in practice. This is especially the case where new laws or strategies are quickly pushed through by foreign, short-stay experts, who are rarely on the ground for longer than a year at a time. Here there is a lack of acceptance (local ownership) by the local security forces.

Representatives of DCAF and DPKO therefore argue that the practical relevance of reform concepts, strategies, and legislation can be maximised by ensuring that they are formulated by local actors rather than external advisors. DCAF pursued this line in a project in Liberia that has been working since 2008 to reduce sexual violence committed by the Liberian security forces. Here the corresponding organisational guidelines were not introduced from abroad but drafted by local committees whose composition encompassed Liberian security institutions and civil society. This made it possible to tap into the traditional problem-solving mechanisms of Liberian society, which in turn reduced the magnitude of open contradiction between top-down decree and bottom-up reality. While the final concept did not fulfil Western ideals in all respects, it was realistically formulated and locally accepted, and the individuals involved became multipliers for its application in everyday police and military practices.81

78. Interview with a representative of the German Foreign Ministry, Berlin, May 2014. See also Thomas-Jensen and Gingerich (2010).
80. Observation by the author during earlier research in Kosovo.
Lesson 3: The use of external advisors to draft security legislation is problematic. The chances of sustainable implementation increase if laws, regulations, and procedures are developed in a locally supported process, even if it is time-consuming and the outcome may not necessarily meet Western expectations.

4.3 Donors Should Treat SSR as a Political Process

Especially in state building, it is important to recognise that SSR support from outside is politically highly sensitive. Security institutions cannot be reformed simply on the basis of functional criteria. In practice, international actors often fail to take this into consideration when implementing various measures: "Conventional security packages typically ignore how bargaining between state authorities, elites and civil society actors is non-linear and overlapping" (Downs and Muggah 2010: 140; Engnell and Haldén 2009). The result is such unintended consequences as outbreaks of violence. Thus in South Sudan, the international community must now accept the criticism that when training the Presidential Guard, it closed its eyes to the ethno-political power struggles with which the unit was riven (Eckhard and Gaus 2014).

It is therefore necessary that international actors pursuing SSR measures for state building understand the power relations in the security sector and the society. Understanding the politics of the security sector not only helps in being able to predict conflict and violence at an early stage, but also offers an opportunity for transformation. Political coalitions can be forged among important groups, and influential change agents can be given encouragement within a security agency.

A political approach by international actors can only be ensured if SSR projects are not implemented in a technical niche remote from the political discourse between donor and recipient countries. It is not enough to simply task a service provider with project implementation. Instead, the project leadership should be organisationally located at a politically influential level. A pertinent example is found in Liberia, where the United States, independently of UNMIL, has been channelling capacity building to the army since 2003 through a 210 million US-Dollar programme. Initially, it hired two private security firms, DynCorp among them, which deployed former soldiers and security advisors whose priority lay above all in providing equipment, conducting training programmes, and supporting organisational reform (Ebo 2005: 19). Yet despite consuming hundreds of millions of dollars, the two service providers failed to build a coherent army structure. In 2010 the US embassy took charge of the project, deploying a team of fifty military trainers supported by civil advisors in Operation Onward Liberty.

The change in supervision was driven by the realisation that political pressure is an important component that should flank SSR projects. The authority of the US embassy is much greater than that of a group of retired soldiers whose primary motive is to earn money. The United Nations learned this lesson some time ago, refraining from employing private security firms for training and mentoring purposes. As a result, they can anchor their police and rule-of-law components at higher echelons within missions (at the level of deputy head of mission) to lend them greater political weight.

Lesson 4: Change in the security sector can be successful when international actors properly understand the power relations in the local security sector and put political weight behind their interests.

82. Jackson (2010: 133) states, "Any reform program needs to understand the specifics of violence and to focus on history, anthropology and politics of violence in order to reconstruct meaningful security. Currently, too much of the focus is on technical models … constructing security institutions based on unwritten political assumptions."


84. Interviews with representatives of DPKO, New York, December 2013.


4.4 Dealing with a Lack of Local Political Will

Ultimately the approach of making SSR measures politically more visible is also driven by the insight that external donors should deploy their political instruments more selectively. Reforms of the security sector create political winners and losers, so there will always be factions in a country that do not support an SSR process or even move to actively sabotage it. Donors need to take this into account when designing SSR measures, not in order to force SSR measures onto the local population, but to support SSR processes with pressure and incentives where local power holders might attempt to subvert them. Thomas-Jensen and Gingerich (2010: 7) identify the government’s lack of political will in DR Congo as the major obstacle to sustainable security reforms. This led them to conclude, “In the absence of strong internal pressure, the US and other concerned actors must generate coordinated external pressure on the Congolese government.”

Examples of this can already be found in several countries, but they are to a great extent case-specific and hard to generalise. During the 1990s, Western diplomats used NATO’s accession criteria to incentivise democratic reforms of security sectors of membership candidates (see section 2.2). The European Union also uses such conditionalities as incentives for reform in the context of implementing stabilisation and association processes with accession candidates. For instance, in the Balkans, in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, the European Union uses its structural assistance program strategically to persuade local actors to make concessions to European norms in reform processes. One crucial instrument is the annual progress report that acceding countries must submit. On the other hand, the European Union has had a problem in its inability to successfully link its technical and political instruments. Thus, for years the European Commission delegation and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) failed to strategically coordinate their reform priorities and communicate this to the Kosovo government (Eckhard 2016: Ch. 4).

Which incentives and means of exerting pressure will function with any particular government will depend on the context. NATO and the European Union obviously cannot always leverage their accession criteria. Heiduk’s (2009: 28) report on SSR in Southeast Asia contends that a “foreign-policy image as ‘democratic states’” makes governments in Jakarta, Bangkok, and Manila “responsive to international pressure and can ensure that the security forces commit significantly fewer human rights violations.” The World Bank uses its financial weight to persuade recipients to implement efficiency and rule-of-law criteria in administrative reform programmes (including in the security sector). For example, its Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative will forgive state debt if a series of criteria are agreed to or observed in the public sector. These are regularly reviewed in Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability reports and are decisive for debt relief and further loans.

The use of political incentives and pressure by external donors is a balancing act. On the one hand, practitioners find it to be necessity to selectively overcome local resistance at crucial junctures. Only, however, if reform of security governance is actually carried out within the realities of power and politics – not only via showcase legislation and decrees, for example, but with a parliament actually determining the budget for the security sector – will SSR measures leave a lasting impact. On the other hand, it is unacceptable for external intervention to arrive in the guise of neo-colonial domination by “advisors.” It is legitimate that donors have concrete ideas about values, but they must be negotiated. Thus it is important that external influence occurs “on the basis of a balance between [international] interests and values and the legitimate expectations of [local] partners, which must always be defined on a case-by-case basis” (Ganser 2014: 1). The implementation of values must certainly not be allowed to become an end in itself, as occurred in the 1980s with the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, and turn into domination of international values over local traditions (Stiglitz 2002, 2006). In Kosovo in 2004, the total dominance of the UN Interim Administration triggered a severe wave of...
violence that significantly set back the state-building project there (Narten 2008). Such a risk can never be completely eliminated, but it can be minimised through knowledge of the local political system and its change agents.

Whether the use of external political incentives and pressure in SSR processes is necessary and proportionate, and how exactly this should unfold, depends on the details of the individual case. What is important in general is that the authority of local actors over the shaping of the security sector not be undermined. Political incentives should be understood as a supplement to be used when local actors at times are unwilling or unable to make politically uncomfortable decisions.

Lesson 5: With detailed knowledge of the security sector and its actors, a properly measured application of political leverage, such as financial incentives or conditionalities, can exert a positive influence on SSR processes.

4.5 Achieving Broad Impact with Decentralised Projects

SSR projects for risk reduction face the fundamental problem that they operate in a decentralized manner and with limited resources but ultimately seek to reach the entire population of a country (see section 3.4). In practice, three main strategies have proven valuable in dealing with the problem of scale.

The first two strategies are illustrated by a project run by Saferworld, one of the larger NGOs working on security issues in Bangladesh. Although it has not experienced civil war, Bangladesh has confronted various security problems over the past forty years. It is the world’s most densely populated state, its democratic system is unstable, and it suffers from widespread political violence, organised crime, religious extremism, corruption, and domestic violence (Saferworld 2011b). Since 2004 the United Kingdom has been supporting reform of the national police through a functional capacity-building programme implemented by UNDP (Phase 1: 2004–2009, 13 million US-Dollar). In parallel, Saferworld has for many years been implementing local projects using funds from the Dutch Foreign Ministry (for 2010–2011 about 500,000 US-Dollar). One of these projects seeks to reduce security risks to the population created by arms smuggling in the border regions. Another project sensitises local police to security problems – such as wild dogs, concentrations of sexual assaults, and lack of pavement – at the community level. An additional project works with local communities to find innovative ways to reduce security problems in connection with gambling, domestic violence, drug abuse, and so on.

Saferworld pursues two approaches to expand the reach of what are fundamentally financially restricted projects. First, it uses documentation of landmark projects implemented in model communities to convince local politicians in other regions to implement similar schemes. Second, where possible it seeks to collaborate with well-networked local partners, which in Bangladesh would be BRAC, an anti-poverty NGO. The collaboration enabled the Creating Safer Communities project, which was initially restricted to two communities, to be expanded very quickly to sixteen communities and five administrative districts.

As a third strategy, it is often found that projects successfully spread when implementing organisations can ensure that interest in success exists on the ground. Mattes (2009) reports a case in Morocco where the king personally supported and pushed an SSR process in light of growing problems with organised crime, drug smuggling, and human trafficking. The reform programme he initiated included a functional capacity-building element supported by the United States (judiciary and police), but also a series of risk-reduction measures designed to protect the population across the country against abuses of power by the security forces. Political will is often also present in decentralized settings and can be exploited by individual projects, for example, by conducting surveys before implementing a project to ensure that individual population groups (often women) have a strong interest in supporting a reform initiative. In 2014 this occurred in a project implemented in Somalia by the European Com-

mission and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), where the actual project details and the means required were only defined after a substantial preliminary investigation (see also the example of UNDP in South Sudan in section 3.4).94

Lesson 6: For SSR projects focused on risk reduction for the population, three strategies assist maximising project impact beyond the limited context of a local measure:

- Documentation to persuade influential decision makers of a project’s effectiveness;
- Collaboration with well-networked local partners; and
- Selection and design of projects to engender local interest in success.

4.6 Successful Democratic Security Governance without Political Mandate

A series of countries in Central America and South America, Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia have by now developed stable political systems – in many cases even with civilian control over the security sector – but are at best semi-democratic with persisting autocratic elements (Kurtenbach 2013). In such countries, there is either no parliamentary opposition or the political parties operate largely in concordance with the government. In addition, the ruling political elite typically has little or no interest in making fundamental changes to security governance. It is precisely these countries that fall through the grid of international SSR assistance given the present focus on fragile states (see section 2.3). Especially in countries like Colombia and Honduras, but also Indonesia and Thailand, the challenge for projects aiming at democratic security governance is to implement them in such a way that they promote transformation of security governance without becoming seen as unacceptable interference by the political elite. According to experts, two principal strategies have proven successful in practice.

The first strategy operates at the regional level. The idea is to agree, within the framework of existing regional forums, on normative guidelines for security governance, whose impact then spreads to countries in the region. One example is found in West Africa, where a number of organisations, including FES and DCAF, had for years been supporting a regional discourse on the security sector. The agenda deliberately included a mixture of topics that are of relevance to serving police officers and soldiers, such as regional crime, in addition to such issues as effective civilian control, anti-corruption and human rights. The discourse has led to the formation of a network of actors from politics, civil society, and the security sector within which understanding can arise through discussion and exchange and at the same time objectives for SSR can be agreed upon. In this case, regional guidelines on security governance were prepared and published in 2011 by the parliament of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians (Born, Gacond, and N’Diaye 2011). The handbook has come to serve civil society actors as a normative point of reference for demanding national-level changes to legislation and the enforcement of existing laws on democratic control of the security sector.95

The second successful strategy for democratic security governance in the security sector relates to situations in which the security forces themselves represent a security risk. Examples are found in the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Guinea-Bissau, where regular armed forces have a tendency to intervene in internal conflicts. In these countries, numerous NGOs are working through dialogues with regular and irregular military entities to alter their behaviour in the event of conflict, especially towards civilian populations. The particular importance of the role played by higher-ranking officers is expressed in an interview with the photographer Herlinde Koelbl, who addressed the »intellectual and moral stance of commanders« in military units:

»Soldiers are acutely aware of the unmentioned grey areas, the situations where a superior would look the other way. One of the commanders I spoke to said that atrocities always reflected a weakness of leadership.

94. Interviews with staff of DG DEVCO, Brussels, December 2013.

They will do anything they can get away with. If your subordinates believe they can kill unpunished, some will do so.«96

One example of a project seeking dialogue with leaders in security organisations is found in Guinea-Bissau, a country that has failed to come to peace since experiencing civil war at the end of the 1990s. Despite having a democratically elected government, there have been repeated coup attempts, and fighting continues in parts of the country. In 2010 the European Union decided not to renew an SSR support mission after just two years for lack of local political will.97 Instead, a variety of smaller NGOs and foundations are now engaged, including the German Weltfriedensdienst (WFD). Since 2009 WFD and a local partner organisation have been implementing the Mom Ku Mom project, whose goal is to alter the behaviour of security forces towards civil society. The core of the project consists of training events on military bases and in schools and producing a handbook for military training.

This type of project has already been or is being implemented in many countries, including by International Alert in the Philippines and by FES in Colombia and Chile.98 They are driven by the conviction that it is not enough for sustainable democratic security governance to alter structural circumstances and legislation, but that a rethinking on the part of security actors can also generate bottom-up democratic security governance. This is achieved when leaders realise that protecting the civilian population and subordinating themselves to a system of democratic security governance is their central responsibility.

Lesson 7: Alongside work with ministries, parliament, political parties, and civil society, two strategies are useful for supporting democratic security governance:

- Promoting normative landmark projects at the regional level for broader impact.
- Developing projects to convince influential security actors (change agents) of the benefits of democratic security governance.

96. »Der Feind hat viele Gesichter,« Zeit Magazin, http://www.zeit.de/zeit-magazin/2014/19/herlinde-koelbl-fotografie-targets-schiessziele/seite-2 (accessed 10 January 2016). Soldiers spend up to 80 per cent of their time drilling and training. Expanding the content covered by them should be a simple matter. In countries with compulsory military service, working through the armed forces can have a nationwide impact. Interviews with NATO representatives, Brussels, December 2013.


5. Innovations in the Management of SSR Projects

Along with the substantive questions of SSR discussed above, there is a close connection between the issue of how SSR support is delivered from an organisational perspective and the outcome of the actual measures (Eckhard 2016). This concerns how SSR measures are selected, funded, planned, coordinated, implemented, and evaluated. Most SSR support has traditionally been organised around a systematic framework of projects and project cycles. Projects exist on a cascade of levels that extends – with declining abstraction from political objectives – from the strategic level to the programme-portfolio level and the project level to individual activities (seminars, dialogue events, and so on). The project cycle describes the process by which individual projects are identified, planned, implemented, coordinated, and evaluated within the scope of a longer-term programme (European Commission 2004; Lust, Vai, and McGrevey 2011). A project is a deliberate intervention in the social structure of a country whose impact, in the classical understanding of evaluation, can be assessed by comparing ex-post and ex-ante data (OECD-DAC 1991; OECD 1986).

The most relevant developments and trends concerning management of SSR measures are discussed in light of these definitions. What these innovations have in common is a detachment from the rigid paradigms of project management outlined above. Among practitioners, one hears loud calls for greater flexibility and rejection of oversimplified quantification concepts.

5.1 Greater Flexibility in Project Planning and Implementation

There was significant agreement among experts in almost all the organisations consulted for this study that more successful implementation of SSR measures requires fundamentally breaking the rigid frame of classical project management. Their assessment is based on two lessons from the field. First, SSR projects can almost never be implemented as planned. There are almost always delays, but nonetheless most projects are run on a fixed project cycle defined by donor budgeting rules. This can lead to a delayed project being terminated after the project cycle even if its goals have not yet been achieved. Second, the operational context in crisis- and conflict-affected countries oftentimes changes quickly. Thus, for example, agreements reached with local ministries on training curricula or the sequencing of legislative initiatives might have to be modified. The excessively rigid goal setting, planning, and implementation rules (as in the Logical Framework Approach, LFA) would, however, make this difficult or impossible to do.

Examples of the inadequate adaptability of SSR measures are found in numerous countries, including DR Congo, as a report by the European Court of Auditors reveals (ECA 2013: 21ff). In the case of DR Congo, the auditors encountered unfinished construction projects (i.e., police stations and courthouses) and a reform of the law concerning the judicial system that had not been brought to a conclusion by the time the project ended. The Court of Auditors uncovered the wastage of more than €1 million through inefficient project execution in Congo alone. Another example where the reality of implementation failed to match the goals of an SSR measure is from South Sudan. Since 2012 the European Union Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan (EUAVSEC) has been helping the country establish structures for civil aviation security. In substance, it concerned the new airport at Juba, which was still under construction when the mission deployed. Only after the mission had arrived did it become apparent that funding difficulties would prevent the construction project from being completed within the allotted timeframe. Therefore, the mission had to train security forces without an airport, a particularly unsustainable approach.

A contrasting example of working within a LFA is found in an often praised SSR programme in Burundi. The project was implemented by the Dutch embassy and integrates several of the lessons cited in this study. The programme was designed from the outset to be long term and was planned jointly with the government of Burundi. Phase 1 (2008–2011) was developed to satisfy immediate post-war needs as a peace dividend using...
flexible financing instruments. It also laid the groundwork for Phase 2 (2012–2015) with a collaborative needs analysis and the formulation of a reform strategy by the Burundian security forces. The programme is explicitly holistic and links the level of police and military capacity building with a political dialogue on conflict resolution within Burundian society. Those responsible for the project conclude on the basis of the experience of Phase 1 that it is important to be able to respond quickly when windows of opportunity open. To that end, the project management structures were further simplified for Phase 2: »In preparation for the second phase starting in 2012, the setup of decision-making, monitoring and financial control for SSD [Security Sector Development] projects is being improved, using mechanisms that are less complicated, bureaucratic and donor driven and more embedded within the structure of the partner institutions.«102

Lesson 8: It is critical for successful implementation of SSR measures that the formal aspects of project management permit rapid and flexible responses to a changing local political context.

5.2 Three Ways to Coordinate Project Implementation

SSR within the scope of state building, in particular, faces the challenge of knitting together a large number of functional capacity-building projects with different slants and run by different actors to create an effective SSR process (see section 3.2). In Kosovo, for example, the number of NGOs jumped from thirty-five to more than four hundred after the NATO air strikes in 1999 (Currion 2010). Development co-operation always involves coordination challenges. There is hardly a study that does not recommend stronger efforts by implementing organisations to establish a more uniform approach and greater coordination with other actors on the ground. Donors, too, regularly promise to do better at their conferences.103 The magic formula remains elusive, however. Currently the trend is towards greater coordination through local actors.

In practice, three partially effective approaches to coordination can be identified, all of which have their weaknesses.

In the first approach – coordination by gap filling – actors do not actively coordinate in the recipient country, but merely seek to fill gaps left unoccupied by others. Regular negotiations with donors should in theory allow the recipient local government to establish a certain degree of coherence, but in practice these countries often lack the resources required for such coordination.

In the second approach – international coordination – an influential actor (often a UN organisation) sets up a coordinating group to exchange information about current and planned activities. The best known of these are without doubt the UN Country Teams, operating on the basis of a cluster approach (Steets et al. 2010). In countries like Afghanistan and Kosovo, there were also special coordinating groups for specific parts of the security sector, for example, at the level of police reform. One problem with this approach is the absence of a sanctions mechanism, so in practice any organisation with diverging views or interests can deviate at any time from a previously agreed division of tasks or sequencing of activities, as regularly occurs (Eckhard 2016). Everyone calls for coordination, but nobody likes to be coordinated.

The third approach – coordination through a New Deal compact – is currently regarded by development experts as the way forward for SSR.104 Official development aid is based on negotiations between donors and recipient governments, stemming from most recipients lacking the capacity to effectively coordinate the aid supplied by the international community. Following on the Busan New Deal (see section 2.1), a new approach treading a path between the first two approaches described above is now being implemented in Somalia; a similar approach was also adopted for Afghanistan at the 2012 Tokyo conference. In mid-2013 the Somali Ministry of Finance and Planning established a task force to coordinate external aid, and it prepared a New Deal compact, a mix of local


103. One example out of many would be the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005b).

development strategies and partnership agreements with international donors. Organisations like the World Bank, United Nations, and European Union declared in advance that they would be willing to increase their support to the Somali government via the instrument of budget assistance within the scope of the compact. That means that donors have a say in planning development projects, but local ministries are responsible for their administration and the choice of implementing organisations. If successful, a New Deal compact secures local ownership and more coherence in development co-operation measures.

SSR processes in Somalia are part of that country’s compact, at least to the extent permitted by OECD-DAC criteria (but functional capacity building in the narrow sense is not). Moreover the compact only applies to a limited extent to SSR measures aiming at democratic security governance, because external funders with normative aims may not wish to serve (only) the political line of the government. Beyond that, Somalia does not yet in practice possess adequate administrative capacities to administer major international budget assistance, so donors fear corruption and embezzlement. Consequently, implementation involving the first €1.9 billion has begun according to the substantive priorities of the compact, but for the moment the funds continue to be administered by international donors.\(^\text{105}\)

Lesson 9: If there is clear local interest in SSR measures, these are most effectively coordinated by the recipient government. If a minimum of accountability can be ensured, local ministries should be more deeply involved in the awarding of external SSR project funds.

5.3 Better Evaluation Using Context-Appropriate Methods

The traditional project cycle ends with an analysis of the impact achieved, to enable improvements in subsequent cycles and in the interests of transparency and account-ability in public spending. Development co-operation organisations have been conducting evaluations since the 1960s, and foreign ministries and defence ministries are also increasingly interested in them (Rotmann and Steinacker 2014).\(^\text{106}\) Two trends can be identified in this area.

First, development organisations today seek to analyse the starting situation before an SSR measure begins. In the field of SSR measures, this means to not only evaluate upon conclusion of the project, but to actually launch the project on the basis of a concrete analysis, for example, of the perceived security risks in a community or region. This approach not only has the advantage of allowing for a pre-post comparison, but also creates the basis for sharper targeting of projects and the inclusion of local actors in project design. The Dutch Foreign Ministry applies such an approach in Burundi (see section 5.1), and the European Union has recently begun planning SSR measures as two-phase projects whereby the first phase concerns needs analysis. The first phase of the Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism project, implemented by RUSI in the Horn of Africa, analyses the reasons, from the perspective of the population, leading people towards radical or violent activity, while the actual SSR measure in Phase 2 will be adapted to the findings.\(^\text{107}\)

Second, some experts consider the recent rapid spread in evaluation and performance assessments an “obsessive measurement disorder” (Natsios 2010). While not questioning the fundamental benefit of analysis and evaluation, they criticise the scale of application of quantitative indicators in, for example, the scope of so-called results based management (OECD 2000). One critic calls this “simplified numerical representations of complex phenomena” that in practice creates false incentives (Merry 2011). Changes in attitudes and structures on the basis of sustainable SSR measures are notoriously difficult to record methodologically, and only become detectable in quantifiable indicators in the long term. The rigid use of quantitative indicators in evaluations and impact assessments could tempt implementing organisations to apply for funding of those projects only, in which results are


\(^{106}\) Interviews with NATO representatives, Brussels, December 2013.

quick and easy to observe. Therefore it is important that the selection of criteria and methods for evaluations be adapted to the context of the SSR measures, as practised in other fields, like humanitarian aid (Beck 2006). For SSR, this means that evaluations must be configured to give adequate attention to the conflict context and to political turbulence in the security sector of the recipient country.

Lesson 10: Evaluations are an important aspect of targeted deployment of external SSR support. It is important that the criteria and methods be adapted to the context of the SSR measures.

Support for security sector reform in crisis-affected and developing countries has increasingly been gaining international attention. SSR is today a regular part of development co-operation for almost all Western donors. SSR support recorded by the OECD has doubled since 2005 to over 600 million US-Dollar in 2014, with measures excluded by OECD definition amounting to many times that (see section 2.3).

From a donor’s perspective, there are two main reasons to support SSR processes. First, in development co-operation circles, it has become accepted that a sustainable development process is impossible without a stable and secure environment. Consequently, the need to contain violence and the concept of human security have gravitated to the heart of international development policy. Second, countries with weak state institutions can become a security risk for the international community if they turn into havens for terrorism and organised crime. The European Union argues that a ring of »well-governed states« is the best precaution for its own security (EU Council 2003) (see section 2.1).

In practice these considerations provide SSR its different approaches: functional capacity building, state building, local risk reduction, and democratic security governance (section 3.1). Each sets its own priorities in designing projects: security of the state, security of the population, establishing or improving security, and fundamentally transforming the security sector, respectively. All these aims are in fact closely intertwined. Without effective state institutions, improvement to individual security cannot be guaranteed. Some of the most influential minds taking part in the Western SSR discussion are certain that long-term security for the population can only be ensured if democratic institutions control the security sector (Ball 2005; Born, Fluri, and Lunn 2003; Wulf 2011). From that perspective, SSR as purely functional capacity building to improve security institutions is a dead end in the long run. SSR is part and parcel of societal transformation, and it must be conceived as such a process of change while taking local interests into consideration.

This chapter lays out how the individual parts of this study come together to produce this conclusion, what discrepancies exist in the current practice of international SSR support, and thus where there is need for adjustment. The role of civil society actors in SSR support is underestimated as a whole, especially in countries where the political space for security reforms is narrow. As a result, it is important to examine ways in which civil society organisations can engage more effectively in SSR support.

6.1 International SSR Support: Building More than Just Capacities

In April 2014, the UN Security Council (2014b) adopted Resolution 2151, its first one on SSR. In her function as president of the Security Council in that month, the Nigerian delegation argued, »[T]here is an excessive focus on ›hardware‹ issues relating to training and equipping the security sector compared with the efforts to enhance the delivery of ›software‹ – related support, which would entail a stronger focus on democratic governance and management of the security sector« (UN Security Council 2014a: 6). Many experts interviewed for this study also see the current focus of SSR support as primarily being in the fields of functional capacity building and local risk reduction. This suggests that change in security governance and the objective of democratic control still play subordinate roles in SSR support. Two reasons are determinative. First, the meagre outcomes of many recent SSR processes, including in Afghanistan and DR Congo, have led to disillusionment among experts (section 2.5). They therefore now argue for pragmatic projects with modest ambitions, which of course excludes the goal of democratic security governance.

Second, views differ about the thrust of SSR. Critics see an SSR agenda rooted in democratic norms as a part of a global value domination effort launched by Western donors. For this reason, many new donors reject value conditionality in SSR support (section 2.4), and the SSR resolution discussed in the Security Council (unlike earlier SSR concepts from the OECD) takes a restrained...
line on the normative question of democratic control of security institutions. While groundbreaking in certain respects, for example its emphasis on local ownership, the resolution speaks in general terms about «oversight» and «good governance» in the security sector, without clarifying who should be responsible for these, that is, a democratic or just any form of government (UN Security Council 2014b: 2).

Bucking that trend, this study concludes that external supporters of SSR must not lose sight of the long-term goal of democratic transformation. The challenge is to accomplish this in practice in the long run, but at the same time set realistic short-term goals for individual SSR measures on the ground in accord with local interests. The issue involves not only deploying specialists, but also having a political understanding of SSR. The following passages lay out that conclusion in greater detail, describe starting points for putting it into practice, and discuss what risks are involved.

The Goal of SSR: Short-Term Realism, Long-Term Ambition

With SSR, it is not sufficient to merely expand the functional capacities of security forces. In the long term, a democratically controlled security sector can best prevent the abuse of power and thus ensure security for the population. In the absence of suitable empirical comparative studies, this statement remains a normative argument, albeit one with the support of a string of influential figures in the SSR discussion (Ball 2005, 2014; Born, Fluri, and Lunn 2003; Dudouet, Giessmann, and Planta 2012; Wulf 2011): democratic control means finding a balance between the security interests and expectations of the population and the security interests of the state. On the one hand, this means choosing between investing tax revenues in the security sector or in civilian areas, like health and education. On the other hand, there is the complex trade-off between state restrictions on individual liberties and securing the common good. Only in a democratic system can the population be assured that it can peacefully remove a government that no longer fulfills its responsibilities to general satisfaction (see section 3.5).

At the same time, SSR must also be realistic in its ambitions. Experts point out that SSR processes promise success above all where there is fundamental interest in change and space for it: «Security sector reform will achieve little without a broader process of transformation of the society» Wulf (2011: 354). In reality, however, that interest is often lacking, both in general and specifically when it comes to democratic reforms. It is therefore important to closely coordinate any SSR process within the political context of the partner country and to focus on realistic short-term goals. For example, in countries with autocratic military regimes, it might be helpful on the one hand to begin negotiations by carefully outlining the functional advantages of separating the armed forces, police, and state administration. That discussion might in the long term also create space for more civilian or even democratic oversight. On the other hand, in post-conflict societies lacking functioning state institutions, the first concern is to create the basic capabilities for establishing public order. Here it is important first of all to establish a simple but effective division of powers and control, and only afterwards call for long-term democratic transformation. If a country offers absolutely no room for democratic transformation, external actors should be prepared to refuse security support.

Persuasion is needed internationally to ensure that SSR donors do not lose sight of the long-term goal of democratic control, even if it appears politically unrealistic in the short term. SSR support focused purely on functional capacities risks supporting and even consolidating autocratic regimes and could prevent a broader transformation by society. Especially among Western donors, there is a need to counter the prevailing trend of functional assistance in implementing SSR. A dialogue about this should be sought with the so-called new donors. The Security Council is divided over the issue of a democratic SSR agenda, but the divide does not run between OECD and non-OECD countries. As the discussion in the Security Council demonstrates, important African states, like Nigeria, also support a democratic SSR agenda. So the connection between external support for building functional security capacities with the goal of democratic transformation is by no means a purely Western agenda (Tadesse 2010). Addressing that misunderstanding, for example by more prominently including non-Western perspectives in the conceptual discourse would be an important step.
Beware the Politics of Implementing SSR

The implementation of SSR measures is dogged by a fragmented approach that relies overwhelmingly on functional assistance in technical niches. SSR, however, is a highly political process. Control over intelligence services, police, and the armed forces secures access to power. That insight, as Richard Moncrieff of the International Crisis Group writes, has not yet been taken on board everywhere in the implementation of SSR processes: »The problem with the reform agenda to date is [that actors] have applied bureaucratic logic to a political problem. This [approach] never got to the heart of the problem. People at the top are prepared to use violence to settle political scores, and until that is sorted out, the rest is just playing around the edges« (cited in Hutton 2010: 198).

The challenge of SSR – and what separates it from other development sectors like education, health, or energy – is that the reform of security institutions is inseparable from changes in a country’s political system, that is, its division of powers. SSR means changing control over the use of force, which in many countries stands as the most important resource for political power. Change always produces winners and losers. For elites in the judiciary, intelligence services, police, and armed forces, the loss of power can involve great economic and personal risks, especially if, for example, a democratic transformation leads them to be called to account for human rights violations or corruption. Access to the state monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force secures power; loss of the same might result in extreme economic and social disadvantage (including for family members) and sometimes even the difference between life and death (section 3.5).

Thinking about SSR politically means anticipating the disadvantages for security sector elites and taking account of their interests. Because (democratic) SSR will result in a redistribution of power, external actors must seek to ensure that the new balance of power stands on a solid foundation. This is confirmed by Putzel and Di John (2012) in their summary of a ten-year research project on crisis states. They conclude that reform of state institutions must take greater account of the political dynamics behind a more or less stable balance of power (political settlement), and if this is neglected – for example, when particular population groups are not represented in the security forces – there is a risk for renewed outbreak of violence (as seen recently in South Sudan and Iraq).

Even the most technical of tasks – such as introducing bookkeeping procedures to improve financial transparency or structural interventions to separate government from security organisations – can touch on the interests of individuals. In many countries, the military oversees some aspects of state service provision, for instance, by building social housing (Sri Lanka) or providing a large part of the population with pensions (Egypt). To finance these activities, security actors in such countries are commercially active in resource exploitation or as privileged recipients of state contracts. Here there is rarely any significant degree of transparency, so corruption and abuse of power are the order of the day. All involved have a great deal to lose, which makes SSR such a sensitive issue.

Starting Points for More Political Support for SSR Processes

The crux of the issue here is how a political, interest-focused approach to SSR can be put into practice. There are no universal answers because the shape of external support depends to a great extent on the details of the individual case. The solutions and approaches from practical experience (see figure 7), upon which this study concentrates, can do little more than supply inspiration that will need to be adapted to the respective local context.

It should be accepted that SSR is a long-term process that must be run and driven locally. Outside actors can only supply assistance in the form of ideas, incentives, and occasional pressure. For external actors, it is a necessity that they know and understand the constellations of power and interest inside and surrounding the security sector (L4) and find creative political incentives for an SSR dialogue in dealings with political elites (L5). For example, commercially active armed forces in countries like Indonesia would be interested in capacity development on topics such as financial accounting. In other countries, training and equipment initiatives would be obvious door openers. In some settings, important security actors have never had the opportunity to travel, so an offer to visit other countries to study reform processes abroad would be of interest. With these and other incentives, the space for discussion and persuasion can be opened.
If there is local interest in change in the security sector, donors should maximise the inclusion of local actors in SSR measures (L3) and identify reform champions who can be supported on a long-term basis (L2). It is not especially helpful merely to provide material aid or have international experts write a large number of laws and regulations in a short space of time. Instead, only a locally run process that uses the local language and local solutions can maximise the sustainability of reform strategies. One very promising approach of this kind is found in the SSR process in Burundi supported by the Dutch Foreign Ministry (section 5.1) (Ball 2014).

Beyond this, a balance must be struck between changing and preserving. As demonstrated by Germany after World War II, the transformation of a security apparatus does not occur overnight. Throughout the early years of the Federal Republic of Germany, influential government posts were occupied by officials who had successful careers under the Nazis. There is always a danger that too much pressure to reform will provoke violence. In Iraq, for example, the United States dissolved Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus in 2004. The immediate result was that entire units of the army went underground to fight the new government and destabilised the country, with some degree of success, as revisited in summer 2014.

If there is no political interest at all in reforms, progress in SSR cannot be imposed from outside. In this case, it is better to supply no assistance at all to state agencies than to support the wrong people. It is sometimes difficult to determine the actual depth of interest in change. In Myanmar, for example, local leaders are now exhibiting an openness to dialogue on security reforms after years of isolation. In Egypt, on the other hand, the generals currently believe that only they can lead the country to a peaceful future, so the prospects for democratic SSR support are poor.

The work of civil society actors plays a decisive role in countries with little space for a political transformation. Often only they can operate to a certain degree outside of official bilateral co-operation and in the long run prepare the ground for SSR. There are numerous NGOs and foundations engaged in a global dialogue on questions concerning conflict management, human security, and democratisation in the security sector. In many coun-

If there is local interest in change in the security sector, donors should maximise the inclusion of local actors in SSR measures (L3) and identify reform champions who can be supported on a long-term basis (L2). It is not especially helpful merely to provide material aid or have international experts write a large number of laws and regulations in a short space of time. Instead, only a locally run process that uses the local language and local solutions can maximise the sustainability of reform strategies. One very promising approach of this kind is found in the SSR process in Burundi supported by the Dutch Foreign Ministry (section 5.1) (Ball 2014).

Beyond this, a balance must be struck between changing and preserving. As demonstrated by Germany after World War II, the transformation of a security apparatus does not occur overnight. Throughout the early years of the Federal Republic of Germany, influential government posts were occupied by officials who had successful careers under the Nazis. There is always a danger that too much pressure to reform will provoke violence. In Iraq, for example, the United States dissolved Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus in 2004. The immediate result was that entire units of the army went underground to fight the new government and destabilise the country, with some degree of success, as revisited in summer 2014.

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tries, they are well established, know the power alignment, and are often closely networked with local civil society, political leaders, and sometimes even security actors. This means they are also in a very good position to assess the success factors for SSR. Where state political will for reform is lacking, civil society actors can co-operate with local think tanks, media, NGOs, associations, and political parties working for change and political alternatives.

Although international and local civil society organisations are central to SSR, they currently play virtually no role in state SSR funding. For 2011 the OECD recorded 1,001 SSR projects globally, of which only 116 were implemented by NGOs or civil society institutions.111

A political approach to supporting SSR processes is important. This insight is reflected almost unanimously in the solutions from the field, but in practice this perspective plays almost no role as of yet. One decisive obstacle is the rigid corset of project management adopted by almost all the implementing organisations operating in the field of SSR. What is needed are political strategies, flexible funding, and longer project durations (in several phases), rather than project goals selected for their quantifiability and for being accomplishable by a certain date (see figure 8). For the moment, however, this remains a hope for the future, as the required changes to project management would be virtually irreconcilable with the current accountability frameworks of most donor organisations.

Dealing with Risk in SSR Support
SSR involves great risks, both for the recipient society and for the intervening side. First, past security reforms have caused outbreaks of violence in certain countries (Kurtenbach 2013). This always occurs when the political transformation process fails to generate a stable balance between elites (South Sudan) or reforms produce massive losers who turn on the new government (Iraq). The configuration and control of the security forces are the fulcrum of power relations. If these are misread, there is a great risk of external SSR support triggering violence. This issue is especially important where SSR becomes part of an exit strategy for withdrawing international forces, as in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Second, donors run the risk of losing credibility in the recipient country and at home through their choice of means for SSR support. In SSR support, donors often have to work with individuals who have committed, ordered, or tolerated human rights abuses. In the recipient country, this can be detrimental to credibility, and at home, there is considerable political risk if such details are taken up by the media. In Germany, no direct SSR measures can be funded out of the state development co-operation budget because of a political scandal in Guatemala in the 1980s112. The situation is similar where donors support autocratic governments with SSR measures for geopolitical reasons (section 2.1).

These risks are balanced by the duty to help countries in crisis and to protect threatened population groups. The UN General Assembly (2005) has confirmed this responsibility to protect. In every case, the decision to intervene

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111. It remains unclear whether this is for lack of funding opportunities or because they apply a different label to avoid the personal and institutional risk common to NGOs and their representatives potentially associated with SSR engagement (section 3.6). Figures based on ODA data from the OECD, http://stats.oecd.org. For more detail concerning this data, see section 1.3.

in a country – whether through a military operation, by providing equipment and training for security forces, or through dialogue with influential leaders – means weighing risks and responsibility. As German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said in relation to this in 2014, »In the end, we are just as responsible for what we don’t do as we are for what we do.« When choosing instruments, SSR means focusing directly on the core area of state sovereignty and political power. Especially in the context of civil war and violent excesses, there is no other option but to take this aspect of conflict into consideration.

6.2 Civil Society SSR Engagement: Valuable but Expandable

Civil society plays a doubly important role in SSR processes. First, local civil society organisations like media, universities, and think tanks play crucial parts in civilian, societal control of the security sector (and government). Internationally, civil society NGOs offer a form of SSR support whose primary objective is not the security of the state but the security of the population. In other words, local risk reduction and democratic security governance in the security sector are the goals of civil society SSR support (as counterweights to the bilateral functional capacity-building approach). Globally speaking, however, only 10 per cent of the SSR funding recorded by the OECD is channelled through international or local civil society actors.

As emphasised by many of the experts interviewed for this study, there are good reasons for more involvement of civil society in (support of) SSR processes, especially in distinction from »official« bilateral or multilateral SSR engagement. First, civil society – unlike bilateral state SSR – requires no mandate negotiated between states for its work on issues of SSR. NGOs and foundations can often pursue their own thematic priorities on the ground and accompany and support SSR in indirect ways. This means they are also in a position to survive periods when the political space for SSR engagement in the partner country is extremely restricted. At the same time, they can respond flexibly to spontaneous interest in SSR, even if local actors do not wish to initiate an »official« SSR process straight away. This is currently relevant in countries like Myanmar, where local elites are exploring initial steps towards transformation.

Second, in many countries, aid organisations and foundations have already been working for a long time on a wide range of topics and goals. They are politically well informed, involved in the local civil society discourse (to the extent there is one), and often possess a network of partner organisations with which they collaborate to implement projects. This places them in a special position to identify influential individuals in and beyond the security sector and to foster and support relationships in the long term.

Work with New Donors and Commercial SSR Actors

New donors are playing a growing role in bilateral development co-operation and also increasingly in SSR support (see section 2.4). As already noted, the UN Security Council is divided over the degree to which supporting security sector reform should be linked to a broader (democratic) transformation process. The gap between the positions here is not between the »West and the »rest.« The SSR concept developed by the African Union also clearly acknowledges the necessity of civil democratic control of the security sector. There is an important role for civil society here: »The viability of a continental approach to SSR owned by the AU is, to a large extent, dependent on the extent to which it allows robust civil society involvement, and is informed and responsive to it« (Tadesse 2010: 31).

In the sense of »track II diplomacy,« a first obvious approach would be a global dialogue among civil society organisations. The goals could be to clearly define the different normative positions on SSR support processes and to identify the extent to which there might be an intermediate, middle path for strengthening local civ-

114. According to OECD data, see section 2.3.
116. Interviews with expert from Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS), Berlin, May 2014.
117. Interviews with representative of Graduate Institute, December 2013.
il society organisations in countries with SSR processes (bypassing the fraught question of democratic transformation at least temporarily to create room for change).

The trend for large projects requiring major financing, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, is side-lining smaller NGOs and foundations that lack the resources to apply for SSR projects (section 1.4). Thus, commercial organisations – whose motivation, from the perspective of critics, are at best dubious – come to dominate the field. International civil society organisations should seek dialogue with these organisations, for example in order to openly explore the possibility of partnerships. They should also lobby the major international bilateral and multilateral donors to ensure that the framework for civil society engagement is upheld or improved. In particular, a need also remains for medium-sized projects that can be handled by NGOs and foundations on their own.

Enhance Learning and Evaluations in Project Work

It is important to encourage self-critical and constructive assessment among all organisations engaged in the field of SSR support (section 5.3). This means comparative and country-specific evaluations and studies that enable learning processes. What works and what does not is often a question of the specific case. Progress (and failure) is only rarely clearly apparent to those directly involved, so organisations in SSR support need firmly anchored instruments, such as evaluations, to identify in an incremental learning process which measures are successful in a country and which should be abandoned. Currently, in most cases if there is evaluation, it too often serves financial or political accountability, not organizational learning.

Foster Democratic Security Governance by Directly Influencing Violent Actors

NGOs can make a contribution to conflict transformation by influencing the behaviour of security actors and conflicting parties through direct exchange. The latter include not only state security organs, militias, and warring factions, but also on occasion political parties or trades unions, as in Indonesia, Thailand, and South Africa.118 Saferworld, International Alert, Misereor, and other organisations already engage in such contexts in various countries.

For effective interaction with the elites of local security organisations, it is important to find concrete incentives to drive collaboration. Examples with a proven track record include structuring meetings of genuine interest, setting up exchanges and travel programmes, and focusing discussion on value-neutral but locally relevant topics, such as drug problems, migration, youth, unemployment, and access to resources (Scheffran et al. 2013).119 Exchange creates trust and thus space for normative debates. Which arguments will work, however, depends on the individual case.

Tie SSR to Transformation Processes

Some NGOs are already engaged primarily in promoting democracy but extend that engagement on a case-by-case basis to the security sector. Currently capacity-building measures play an important role here, for example, in training provided for leading members of parliament, political parties, and trades unions as well as journalists and academics.

Beyond that, there is an important role for NGOs to play in confidence building and initiating first steps for broader SSR processes, with or without international governmental support. They are able to operate outside official government consultations and open local doors, but it is important to bring together individual measures to create a political strategy. The individual project is not the goal; its utility in the long-term political process is (for example, as a door opener). Three approaches stand out in this regard.

- **Setting in motion political change through convincing arguments in dialogue with government and security actors:** The suggestion for dealing with leaders is the same as for conflict transformation – trust creates room for change. SSR is a gradual process. Apparently insignificant shifts can be of great importance and bring about significant change in the medium term, for example, if they lead to an official SSR process.

- **Bringing together strategically selected groups or individuals:** In many countries, there is no exchange between security forces, government, and civil society and therefore also no debate. NGOs can offer a neutral space where this can happen, for example, by holding meetings outside the country.

- ** Developing regional landmark projects to strengthen the hand of local actors if local elites lack the political will to change:** An example of this approach from this study is the handbook on *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector* drafted by the ECOWAS parliament with facilitation by FES and DCAF. The guide has become the normative standard for parliamentarians and activists in the region.

Overall, civil society organisations play an important role in SSR. Their engagement is especially relevant in countries where there is little room for transformation and change, but success comes slowly. In some countries, many years must pass before security reforms become possible. Changes that appear insignificant to outsiders may represent decisive progress from a local point of view. Often this can only be achieved through patiently acquired confidence. Organisations where one individual works with security actors over a number of years are often the most successful. The relevance of personal relationships, the long term, and the different perspectives on »success« must always be considered when NGOs design SSR strategies and engage in the unavoidable formulation of project funding applications.

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