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## Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACIRC</td>
<td>African Capacity for Immediate Responses to Crisis</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society Organisation</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>ECOSOCC</td>
<td>Economic, Social and Cultural Council</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>European Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa–EU Strategy</td>
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<td>PanAf</td>
<td>Pan-African Programme</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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II. Introduction

The Fourth EU–Africa Summit took place in Brussels, Belgium, on 2–3 April 2014. In contrast with previous summits, alongside discussions on aid and financial commitments, much emphasis was laid on trade and investment. This is against the background of the diffusion of narratives describing a rising Africa driven by fast-growing economies and a youthful and urbanized population that is set to double. On the other hand, a transition is taking place, with the predicted end of the »Cotonou model of cooperation« and the complex birth of the European Partnership Agreements (EPA). In parallel with this, engagement and cooperation between the EU and Africa on the Malian, Somali and Central African fronts seem to be reinforcing peace and security as a major component of the EU–Africa relationship. Nevertheless, a general impression that »results are not matching expectations« appears to be growing and putting pressure on the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES).

This was the backdrop for the international conference »EU–Africa relations after the fourth summit – Finding common ground«, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30 September–1 October 2014, and organised by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), under Chatham House Rules. The two-day roundtable was attended by some 50 participants, including senior officials from the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), as well as from EU member states, and also representatives of think tanks and civil society organisations (CSO) from both continents. By bringing together selected experts on EU–Africa relations, the conference sought to analyse the outcomes of the fourth summit, discuss ways forward and help to consolidate cooperation between Africa and Europe.

The overall objective of the conference is to furnish an annual platform for further strategic exchanges to provide input for EU–Africa relations. Specific objectives of the conference included:

- analysing the fourth EU–Africa summit and its probable effects on the partnership in the future;
- identifying issues of common concern that have the potential to foster political dialogue and produce results by the next summit;
- supporting the partnership to enable it to adapt to a changing global environment while preserving the spirit of cooperation enshrined in the JAES.
II. Overcoming the "Aid-recipient" Paradigm: Building-blocks after the Summit?

"When I say WE, I mean the European Union and Africa"

There was overall agreement that the summit marked a shift from previous summits and took place in a pragmatic atmosphere. According to observers, Europe was more reserved and less patronising, whereas Africa was less ideological and confrontational. Hence, the summit was able to serve as a stepping-stone for a more reciprocal and respectful partnership. However, too little time has passed since the summit for it to be possible to draw definite conclusions. Furthermore, a key remaining challenge is to overcome the "donor–recipient" paradigm.

1. Towards a More Political Partnership and Clarity of Interests?

With some 60 delegations of heads of state and/or government, the two-day summit in April 2014 was the biggest so far. The number of side-events (business forum, CSO forum, youth event, parliamentarian summit) and bilateral meetings was also unprecedented. After years of disagreement, it seemed that the partners were – first and foremost – interested in a rapprochement. Even if the EU had just failed to reach an agreement on the EPA with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), no quarrels were reported during the summit. It seems that this rather pragmatic approach led to constructive deliberations on climate, the Post-2015 Development Agenda, peace and security and migration. At the same time, contentious issues such as human rights, aid conditionality, EPAs or the International Criminal Court (ICC), were not part of the official discussions and will have to be addressed in the near future.

Several roundtable participants nevertheless questioned the timing of the EU–Africa Summit and why it was organised before the new EU administration took office (new European Parliament in July 2014 and new European Commission in November 2014), which might undermine the EU’s political commitment to implementing the roadmap. Moreover, participants emphasised that, while the EU is seeking African support in multilateral forums – for example, on climate change – it was not clear whether the EU was willing to support African interests, such as reform of the UN Security Council to bring about better representation of African states. Finally, concerns were raised about the risk of a decreasing EU engagement with Africa due to pressing current issues in its neighbourhood, such as Syria and Ukraine.

Political dialogue remains key to the partnership. This ambition applies, for example, to peace and security, with regard to which political dialogue seems already rooted in day-to-day cooperation, with regular joint PSC meetings and joint expert groups. Nevertheless, the point was made that, despite the EU’s considerable efforts to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), CSDP missions and operations were nevertheless launched without proper consultation with the AU side.
Finally, the roadmap that was adopted during the summit contains a promising new feature, the Joint Annual Forum (JAF). The JAF, which is to replace the impractical Joint Task Force, is supposed to guide the implementation process, as well as the monitoring and assessment of joint actions. Participants welcomed the idea of the JAF, but stressed that it needs to deliver and must not become yet another technical instrument. What is needed is a forum that is underpinned by political dialogue in order to make sure that the partnership is more results-driven and more visible.

Even though it seems that a frank debate took place during the summit, the fact that both partners are still not stating their interests clearly enough remains a challenge. The failure to discuss contentious issues during the summit is a case in point. A certain tension between altruism and realpolitik was evident during the roundtable debates. It was stressed that altruism, illustrated by statements such as »what is good for Africa«, was creating ambiguity, leading to all kinds of wrong assumptions, such as criticism of an alleged »neo-colonialism«.

2. A Strong Focus on Trade and Investment

The summit declaration has an increased emphasis on trade and investment in comparison with previous declarations and acknowledges that »it is time for a fundamental shift from aid to trade and investment«. This ambition seems to herald a break-away from the traditional donor–recipient logic. Moreover, at the margins of the summit, a business forum attracted many more participants than originally planned (more than 1,000 – the organisers had aimed at 200). It is to be expected that trade and investment will become a more important issue within the partnership. Indeed, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Africa grew by almost five times between 2001 to 2012, from 27.2 billion US dollars to some 132.8 billion US dollars. Although this growth was driven primarily by China, the EU and its member states are still the biggest sources of FDI. A participant even stated that »African embassies are opening in European capitals in order to link with foreign direct investors«.

However, trade is not facilitating development in its own right, but remains a tool for strengthening economic interdependencies. Participants highlighted the fact that norm-setting and good governance are paramount for encouraging private sector investment that is in line with national development priorities. In that context, the recently launched EU–AU dialogue »Fostering the implementation of UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights through regional cooperation« was presented as a concrete step forward. At the same time, some participants cautioned against an overly strong emphasis on trade and investment and stressed that issues of good governance must not be forgotten. Reference was also made to the summit, at which good governance did not receive much attention.

Since the summit, EPAs have been signed with ECOWAS, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC). Cameroon signed an interim EPA at the end of July 2014. As a major bone of contention between the EU and Africa, the EPAs were also discussed at the roundtable. Although the EPAs have been signed, most participants were critical of both their content and the negotiation process, which was accelerated by the EU’s October deadline. It was the heavy
external pressure from the EU that made African states sign rather than a real *buy-in* to the reform agenda; the two partners differ concerning their visions and interests with regard to trade policy. Hence, doubts remained about timely implementation of the EPAs. The fact that Africa is barely trading within itself was also highlighted.

3. CSO Concerns: Less Participation, More Consultation?

CSO representatives welcomed the pragmatic atmosphere during the summit and appreciated the debates on climate change and the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Both African and European civil society representatives, however, aired their disappointment – some used the word *disillusioned* – with the current situation in light of the promise of the 2007 EU–Africa Lisbon summit that permanent structures would be put in place in order to empower CSOs as the leaders’ watchdogs. Even if there was broad agreement among participants that the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) has not been working effectively, there were criticisms that the summit did not do enough to foster future CSO involvement in the partnership. A systemic process involving civil society at all levels of the partnership is lacking: there are no permanent platforms for cooperation and no regular participation. Concerning the roadmap, a participant commented that *it seems that the people-centred approach has vanished*.

Although CSO representatives appreciated the organisation of an African–EU Civil Society Forum in October 2013 there was criticism that it was held – unlike the business forum – some six months prior to the summit. Apart from the fact that civil society was given only three minutes to present their views to the leaders, CSO representatives raised concerns about the fact that the summit declaration and the roadmap mention only possible consultations in matters pertaining to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and do not state when and if CSO should be involved.
The AU has grown in stature and has entered into numerous partnerships in recent years. In order to reap benefits from these partnerships, however, it is necessary for Africa to manage them properly and be clear on its goals and interests. The multiplicity of AU partnerships also begs the question of what consequences this will have for the future of the Africa–EU Partnership.

»Make new friends but keep the old«

1. The EU–Africa Partnership in a Multipolar World

One participant described the current challenge Africa faces in terms of the first line of a well-known traditional children’s song: »Make new friends but keep the old«! Indeed, Africa’s growing potential (youthful and urbanised population set to double, raw materials and so on) has led to a multiplicity of partnerships with a diverse range of actors. Most of these new partnerships follow a business-like approach, which seems – at the moment – to match African priorities better, challenging the EU’s value-driven agenda. As the EU gives the impression that it will take a more pragmatic approach to Africa in the future, participants commented that this should not lead to a reduction of critical dialogue on democracy, good governance and human rights. Bad governance more often than not leads to inequality, instability, conflict and migration and needs to be addressed. There was overall agreement that the EU, with its vibrant civil society, democratic institutions, social market economies and so on, needs to continue its efforts to promote democracy – and should apply conditionality where necessary – simply because it has a lot to offer that other actors cannot.

Because conflict is bad for business it seems that even China is changing its doctrine of not interfering in domestic affairs. One participant remarked that China has become more cautious and is taking political developments on the ground more and more into account before investing. Indeed, because the conflict in South Sudan threatens its investments, China not only got involved in the mediation efforts but is set to send 700 peacekeepers. The 700 combat troops will be the first ever Chinese contribution to a UN mission. Developments of this kind could be an entry point for cooperation between the EU, Africa and new actors on the continent on issues pertaining to peace and security. Furthermore, the EU and Africa could seek to include new actors in areas of common concern, such as climate change, the Post-2015 Development Agenda and global governance reform.

Because both continents are in partnerships that affect each other the question is whether »the EU–Africa cooperation is just a subsequent one to other – more important ones«.
2. The Peril of Multiplying Dependencies and the Challenge of African Agency

Summits with African leaders are in vogue at the moment. This year alone has seen three big summits – the France-Africa summit, the EU-Africa summit and the US-Africa summit – while India and China will hold meetings with African leaders in 2015. Regarding this multiplicity of partnerships, the great majority of attendees agreed that this is normal for an organisation trying to build up its visibility at the international level as an autonomous actor in its own capacity. The EU is engaged in a similar process. Hence, such a multiplicity of partnerships is not negative in itself. However, as was pointed out, if Africa does not leave behind the aid paradigm there is a real risk of simply »multiplying dependencies«. In order to reap benefits from these partnerships, it is paramount to manage them properly and develop a common African position towards external actors. This can only be done, however, if Africa defines its strategic interests and aligns its various partnerships with them. The review of the existing partnerships initiated by Dr Dlamini-Zuma, chair of the African Union Commission, is an important first step in that regard. In her opening address at the last AU summit in June 2014, Dr Dlamini-Zuma also called on heads of state to ensure that the outcomes of the partnerships do not undermine the continental Agenda 2063.

»The most important partnership Africa has is the partnership with itself«

In this context, despite criticism, the recently agreed Agenda 2063 is unprecedented and a first step in the right direction. Moreover, unlike the EU, in January 2014 the AU adopted a Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Climate change issues have not yet materialised in a common AU position ahead of the COP 21 in Paris, however.

Participants stressed that these common positions at continental level should be communicated widely throughout Africa via the media. That would build up the credibility of the inter-governmental institutions and bring them closer to African people.

In light of these developments, several participants called for the application of the principle of subsidiarity to the AU: political decisions should be taken at their most appropriate levels, whether continental, regional, national or local. The engagement of regional economic communities (REC) and AU member states is crucial to the success of any policy. It was stressed that AU member states were the alpha and omega of the system, while their reluctance to apply norms commonly agreed in Addis Ababa remains. It was highlighted that the AU should promote itself and its policies/projects more at the level of the RECs and in various capitals. Thus more political dialogue is needed not only between Europe and Africa, but also between the AU, the RECs and the member states. Participants praised the fact that the RECs in particular lend credibility to public policies and boost legitimacy. As a consequence, deeper cooperation between the AU and the RECs could be explored, with the AU as norm-setter and the RECs as implementers. In this vein, participants also remarked the fact that the EU may have invested for too long in the AU at the expense of the development of the RECs.
IV. Key Recommendations for the Way Ahead

Roundtable participants highlighted the following areas of common ground, which have the potential to foster political dialogue between the EU and Africa. However, detailed preparatory work and a commitment to implementation will be crucial.

1. Sustainability of Cooperation on Peace and Security Issues

During the summit the EU renewed its commitment to peace and security and the APSA. However, participants highlighted the fact that the cooperation system was running out of steam: it is a demand-driven process; the number of crises are increasing; and the EU is demanding that Africa commit more resources and assume more ownership. Consequently, addressing the issue of the sustainability of the current cooperation system on peace and security will entail urgent «creative thinking» from both sides. If unresolved, this issue will continue to affect the political climate between African and European partners and undermine EU and AU capacities to tackle conflicts.

In order to become more independent of foreign assistance the AU launched the African Capacity for Immediate Responses to Crisis (ACIRC). This instrument is designed to be a complementary tool to the APSA and could indeed stir things up within Africa regarding capacities and political will to respond to crises. On the other hand, ACIRC is only a military tool for short-term stabilisation missions and will also need political dialogue – within Africa (AU, RECs and member states) – to be successful. This has often proved difficult. Furthermore, intervening powers could dominate political processes on the ground and thus threaten peace efforts. Apart from that, the question of other external actors who might be involved in subsequent peacekeeping missions must be addressed. If the EU decides to support ACIRC it must take this complex environment into account.

Last but not the least, participants cautioned against certain elements of the EU’s engagement in Africa. First, the EU (and its member states) should avoid further «multilateralisation» of French interventions in Africa. Second, in light of the so-called «war on terror», the EU should avoid further securitisation of the development agenda and take a more comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of conflicts. In this vein, as European militaries are looking for new theatres and discussing their raison d’être after the end of the Afghanistan operation, the EU must be careful that this does not translate into a push for more European military engagement in Africa.

2. Do Away with Commission to Commission Partnership

To date, the partnership has mainly been between the two Commissions. This relationship must be expanded, however, and should factor-in the interests of European and African member states, as well as the RECs. On that basis, the EU and the AU need to identify areas of common concern and should «dig deeper» in order to see where interests converge. Only if there is a real common interest in issues will it be possible to create enough momentum and political will for successful implementation of joint actions and give the partnership more visibility.
3. Future CSO Involvement

Participants called strongly for greater involvement of CSOs. If decisions and policies are to be successful there must be a broad representation of actors and interests. A real people-centred partnership can be guaranteed only if CSOs are properly involved. It was mentioned that there is already a marked disconnect between the political level and agreements reached at summits, on one hand, and the facts on the ground, on the other. Both partners should also be more specific on when CSOs should come in and be clear on their role. This is becoming even more important as the space for civil society is shrinking in both Africa and Europe. Furthermore, rapid impact and flagship projects will also be key in enabling Africa to leverage its positive momentum and bring on board the young generation.

4. Conflict Prevention and Elections

Roundtable participants stressed that early-warning mechanisms have not been developed sufficiently. However, early-warning mechanisms are not aimed at predicting or forecasting conflicts, but rather at identifying risks and informing policy-makers before they understand them.

Crisis prevention and setting up an effective early-warning mechanism is difficult. However, some potential causes of social tension can be known in advance, such as elections. Indeed, 2015 will be a year of elections, notably in West and East Africa, opening up opportunities for peaceful and democratic changes of power, on one hand, and opportunities for social tensions and politically driven destabilisation, on the other. Social and political tensions in such cases are more or less predictable. In that regard, the first project of the newly adopted Pan-African Programme (PanAf) of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) will aim at helping the AU to develop its own election observation capacity. While welcoming this effort, some participants questioned the subsidiarity principle: is the continental level the most appropriate level for election observation or would the regional level be more appropriate?

5. Trade and Investment

Apart from peace and security, trade and investment were the main issues during the summit. High European investment figures, coupled with strong interest on the part of African states in European investment, suggest that trade and investment is becoming a more important issue in the relationship. Most participants welcomed this emerging and rather pragmatic approach and stressed that both sides should enter into a frank dialogue and put their (economic) interests on the table. Such an engagement should do away with the donor–recipient relationship, as well as continued harping on historical explanations of injustice, and thus would be beneficial for both sides. Although a more pragmatic approach was basically welcomed, participants also remarked that the partnership cannot be built on interests alone, but also needs joint values.

6. Roadmap

Participants – somewhat ironically – identified «three» priorities for the period leading up to the next summit: implementation, implementation, implementation. The JAF is the most
important instrument in that regard and is at present – along with an agenda – the object of conceptual work. Initially scheduled to take place in February 2015, it is likely to be shifted to March or April. Unfortunately, as things stand at the moment, the JAF will comprise only working-level staff whose task is to prepare the ministerial meetings at which the political dialogue takes place. Given the criticisms of the old structure and the impracticality of technical meetings within the framework of the Joint Task Force without an accompanying political dialogue this would be bad news. Apart from that, no ministerial meeting took place in 2012 and 2013. As described above, the JAF cannot afford to be just another technical instrument but should also provide a platform for political dialogue. Consequently, the first JAF should be presented and structured in order to create as much political momentum as possible. It could allow the new EU team to engage with its African counterparts for the first time after taking office. Also, it could be an opportunity for the AU to reinvigorate the partnership in light of the outcomes of the review of partnerships that will be presented at the next AU Summit in January. In order to maximise political momentum, it would certainly be a welcome gesture if the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HRVP) – Federica Mogherini – were to explore the possibility of participating in the upcoming AU summit.

**Rapporteur:**
Julien Daemers, Associate Analyst, EU Institute for Security Studies
Annex 1 – Agenda

Conference
EU-Africa-relations after the 4th Summit – Finding common ground
Addis Ababa
30th September – 1st October

„Investing in People, Prosperity and Peace“
(Roadmap 2014 – 2017)

ARRIVAL: Monday, 29th September 2014
Afternoon & evening
20:00 Arrival Participants at Hilton Hotel
Dinner at Hilton Hotel

DAY 1: Tuesday, 30th September 2014
Venue: Hilton Hotel Addis Ababa, Ibex Nyala

09:00 – 09:30 Registration & Coffee
09:30 – 09:45 Welcome and Opening
Mr. Manfred Öhm, Head, Africa Department, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

09:45 – 10:30 Keynote speech
H. E. Dr. Anthony Mothae Maruping, Commissioner for Economic Affairs, African Union Commission

10:30 – 12:00 Session I: Fourth EU-Africa Summit – Assessment and Way Forward
Chair:
Ms. Faten Aggad, Programme Manager, European Centre for Development Policy Management

Input:
Mr. Gary Quince, Ambassador, European Union Delegation to the African Union
Mr. Desire Y. Assogbavi, Head, Oxfam International

Comment:
Prof. Christa Randzio-Plath, Vice President, German Association of Non-governmental Development Organizations

Guiding Questions
• To what extent has the 4th EU-Africa Summit been a stepping stone towards a more political cooperation?
• What has happened so far: Have the partners used the momentum of the summit? If so, where and how?
• What does the apparent shift towards a more business-like approach mean for the political dialog on democracy and good governance?
• Being a people centered partnership, has civil society been sufficiently involved in the summit? If not, what needs to be done?
Questions:

- How does the growing interest of emerging powers in Africa impact on the EU-Africa partnership?
- How does Africa perceive its different partnerships in terms of political and economic cooperation? Where is the added value for the EU-Africa relations?
- Are there common interests between Africa, Europe and emerging powers? If so, which are these and could they be used to involve emerging actors in the partnership?
- Is it possible for the EU to join forces with democratic powers e.g. South Korea or Japan in order to foster democracy in Africa?

Guiding Questions:

- What are fields of common strategic interest?
- Which of these issues/interests have the potential to foster a closer cooperation and strengthen political dialog?
- Which aims/milestones could realistically be reached until the next summit?
- Who are the drivers in the respective fields of common strategic interests (EU, AU, RECs, member states, civil society, and corporate interests) and how could they be further involved to promote reaching milestones and produce useful outcomes?
Guiding Questions:

- *He who pays the piper calls the tune* – European security interests in Africa or supporting lasting peace and security in Africa? What is the respective political rationale/strategy behind the build-up of African (mainly military) conflict management capacities?
- Do the two partners pursue the same goals regarding peace and security in Africa?
- Really an improvement? What are the political implications of the new African initiative “AICRC” for intra-African as well as EU-Africa relations?

**DAY 2: Wednesday, 1st October 2014**

Venue: Hilton Hotel Addis Ababa, Ibex Nyala

09:00 – 11:00  **Session IV: Peace and Security Cooperation: Do we talk about the same?**

**Chair:**
Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution

**Input:**
Ms. Elizabeth Choge, Expert on Regional Mechanism, Peace and Security Department, African Union

Mr. Jean-Francois Hasperue, First Councillor, Peace and Security Section, European Union Delegation to the African Union

**Comment:**
Dr. Abdel-Kader Haireche, Chief of Political Affairs, United Nations Office to the African Union

11:00 – 11:45  **Tea/Coffee break**

11:45 – 12:45  **Session V: Main conclusions, policy recommendations and entry points for further debate**

**Chair:**
Mr. Florian Koch, Desk Officer, Africa Department, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

**Rapporteur:**
Mr. Julien Daemers, Associate Analyst, European Union Institute for Security Studies

12:45 – 13:00  **Closure**

13:00 – 14:45  **Lunch**
Annex 2 – List of Participants

1. Ms. Selam Abraha  
   Project Manager  
   Oxfam International

2. Dr. Adekeye Adebajo  
   Executive Director  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution

3. Ms. Faten Aggad  
   Programme Manager  
   European Centre for Development Policy Management

4. Ms. Olusegun Akinsanya  
   Director  
   Institute for Security Studies

5. Mr. Desire Y. Assogbavi  
   Head  
   Oxfam International

6. Mr. Simon Badza  
   Advisor to the director  
   Peace and Security Council, African Union

7. Ms. Diana Baker  
   Political Affairs Officer  
   United Nations Office to African Union

8. Ms. Ambela Barbara  
   Editorial Assistant, Department for Economic Affairs  
   African Union Commission

9. Mr. Oladiran Bello  
   Head, Governance of Africa’s Resource Programme  
   South African Institute of International Affairs

10. Mr. Nahom Berhanu  
    Assistant to Liaison officer to the African Union  
    British Embassy

11. Ms. Emilie Brückmann  
    Second Advisor, global affairs  
    French Embassy

12. Ms. Anna Burylo  
    First Secretary, Operation Section  
    European Union Delegation to the African Union

13. Mr. Joseph Chilengi  
    Chair  
    Economic, Social and Cultural Council  
    African Union

14. Dr. Mary Chinery-Hesse  
    Member of the Panel of the Wise  
    African Union

15. Ms. Jennifer Chiriga  
    Deputy of the Chief of Staff  
    Bureau of the Chairperson, African Union

16. Ms. Elizabeth Choge  
    Expert on Regional Mechanism, Peace and Security Department  
    African Union

17. Ms. Carmen Csernelhazí  
    First Secretary  
    European Union Delegation to the African Union

18. Mr. Juilen Daemers  
    Associate Analyst  
    European Union Institute for Security Studies

19. Ms. Sahra El-Fassi  
    Programme Manager  
    European Centre for Development Policy Management

20. Mr. Biruk Feleke  
    Assistant, Press and Information Department  
    European Union Delegation to the African Union

21. Mr. Giuliano Fragnito  
    Assistant to the Ambassador  
    Italian Embassy

22. Mr. Christian Gahre  
    Second Secretary  
    Norwegian Embassy

23. Dr. Abdel-Kader Haireche  
    Chief of Political Affairs  
    United Nations Office to African Union

24. Mr. Jean-François Hasperue  
    First Counsellor, Peace and Security Section  
    European Union Delegation to the African Union
25. Ms. Sina Henke  
Advisor, Africa Peace and Security Programme  
Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit

26. Ms. Amy Scott Hill  
Political Affairs Officer  
United Nations Office to African Union

27. Mr. Aji James  
Political Affairs Officer  
United Nations Office to African Union

28. Ms. Mwila Kamwela  
Technical Assistant, Joint-EU Strategy Support Mechanism, African Union  
African Union Commission

29. Mr. Florian Koch  
Desk Officer, Africa Department  
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

30. Prof. Adebayo Olukoshi  
Director  
Institute for Economic Development and Planning

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