The Limits of Political Reform in Jordan

The Role of External Actors

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- Over the last decade, the entrenched ruling elite and the security apparatus in Jordan have placed substantial political reform on the back burner. The onset of the Arab Spring gave impetus to emerging social groups – mainly youth – who increased pressure on the regime to commit to genuine reform.

- The modest package of reform that the Jordanian monarch presented on the heels of a series of demonstrations rang hollow among a sizeable segment of the population, particularly with the politically disillusioned activists in Jordan. The regime skillfully designed the reform package to reproduce a political status quo that a considerable percentage of Jordanians reject. The top-down reform package came as yet another gambit to silence the internal opposition and appease the West.

- The scope of political reform in Jordan has been shaped by the combination of three factors: external actors (the United States and Saudi Arabia), domestic pressure for reform, and, lastly, the regime’s reaction to, and in some cases manipulation of, the aforementioned two.

- The regime managed to exploit regional instability, the Saudi strategy to prop up like-minded regimes, as well as the American fear of short-term instability for its own benefit. Thus, it succeeded in selling a reform package, which only reinforced the regime’s autocratic grip.
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Since the accession of King Abdullah II to the throne in 1999, the young monarch and the entrenched ruling elite surrounding him have placed substantial political reform on the back burner. While the King diligently presents himself to the West as a reformer, he has systematically failed to support his rhetoric with a credible blueprint for transition from autocracy to democracy.

Jordan's most recent political reforms, implemented in the wake of the spread of the Arab Spring, were meticulously and skillfully designed to reproduce a political status quo loathed by a considerable percentage of the population. The King's top-down reform package was seen as yet another gambit to silence the internal opposition and appease the West.

Yet despite the regime's lip service to reform and the lack of political will to effect genuine democratic transformation, there are a few positive steps that should not be disregarded. The passing of several constitutional amendments, the establishment of a constitutional court, and the founding of the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) to oversee and manage parliamentary elections represent positive reform efforts. The relatively free and fair parliamentary elections earlier this year are a testament to the success of such measures.

This paper argues that the scope of Jordan's political transformation has been a function of the interplay between three factors: external forces, domestic pressure for reform, and the regime's reaction to – and in some cases, its manipulation of – the aforementioned two. The paper will identify the political changes that have occurred, analyze the means by which reform is influenced in Jordan, and evaluate the role of external factors – Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the tumultuous regional environment – in defining the scope of political transformation. Finally, it will address the regime's reaction to external and internal pressures for or against reform, and its use of such forces to achieve its own objectives.

1. Political Transformation and the »King's Dilemma«

In a plethora of appearances in Western media outlets, King Abdullah II has assiduously cultivated his image as a reformer. On several occasions, he has gone so far as to criticize his people and institutions for being timid and reactionary, suggesting that he and senior government officials – ironically, his appointees – are not on the same page. Most recently, in an interview with the American journalist Jeffery Goldberg, the King accused the General Intelligence Department (GID) of impeding his reform efforts (Goldberg 2013). Distinguishing himself from other autocratic Arab rulers, he speaks in a way that appeals to his Western audience. Furthermore, King Abdullah II never misses an opportunity to make perfectly clear that political reform and his citizens' empowerment are his top priorities.

Early in the King's reign in 2001, the King reached a low point after dissolving the parliament and suspending elections for over two years, ruling without constitutional constraints. Implicit in this move was a deep-seated feeling among the ruling elite that the parliament was not expected to understand the monarch's vision, let alone help implement it (Barari and Satkowski 2011: 41ff.).

Reflecting a supposed change in position, and in order to substantiate his rhetoric on political as well as economic reform, the King later promoted a number of initiatives. The National Agenda, introduced in 2005, was the most heavily publicized and the most comprehensive blueprint for political and economic transformation. However, on the same day that the King received the plan from the committee, the National Agenda was shelved once and for all. Supposedly, the King was advised against enacting the sweeping reform plan, and thus demonstrated that neither he nor his advisors were interested in true reform. Subsequently, power became centralized around a handful of unelected politicians – the liberals in particular – who ruled the country irresponsibly. They opted for privatization without parliamentary oversight or any other institutional checks and balances. As a result, corruption ran rampant throughout the country.

With a teetering economy, pervasive corruption, and the onset of the Arab Spring triggered by the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi, many Jordanians took to the streets, calling for a fight against corruption and seeking political reform. Yet the inability of the ruling elite to make the necessary changes could not be more obvious. The regime now finds itself stranded between the declared commitment to reform and its deep-seated fear of chaos. In one of his speeches
in June 2011, the King differentiated between «the required democratic transformations and achievable ones on the one hand, and the risks of chaos and sedition on the other hand».¹

The government has used all the tricks in the book to slow down reform, if not avoid it altogether. The often reiterated rhetoric of a gradual, safe, and measured process of reform has been nothing but a smokescreen to conceal an entrenched fear of change. It is clear that the monarch suffers from the «king’s dilemma», a term coined by Samuel Huntington in his book *Political Order in Changing Societies*: While clinging to the status quo is untenable, enacting changes could set in motion a process that could leave the king powerless (Huntington 1968). Hence, the regime has become reactive, and all changes – though modest and superficial – have been made in response to the pressure of the street.

The gerrymandered electoral law lies at the heart of Jordan’s political struggle, essentially rendering the parliament ineffective and less representative of certain groups or parties. The opposition demands a reformed electoral law, which would provide for fair representation and proper institutional oversight. However, as the opposition has failed to consolidate and articulate a clear political vision, the regime has the upper hand. In other Arab autocracies, the rulers used a tactic of limited and controlled reform to defuse popular discontent. King Abdullah II is no exception. He had no intention whatsoever to increase the scope of parliament by transferring to them the right to appoint the cabinet and the responsibility for security apparatus oversight.²

With many of the region’s countries (and Jordan’s neighbors) in a state of tumult, the palace has resorted to a new political strategy of buying time. In March 2011, the Prime Minister set up a 52-member National Dialogue Committee, which was assigned with drafting an electoral law and a political parties law. The initiative was dismissed by Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which declared it an ineffective stalling tactic. According to the head of the Committee, former Prime Minister and current Speaker of the Senate Taher al-Masri, the Islamists had two demands: they requested a royal committee (appointed by the King rather than the Prime Minister), and they wanted to amend the constitution.³ Masri raised the demands with the King, who replied: «Don’t touch the constitution.»⁴

Not surprisingly, the ruling elite took advantage of the regional turmoil to turn the tables on political activists by discouraging Jordanians from joining the weekly protests. The state-sponsored media has persistently reminded Jordanians of the «blessing of stability» and internal security, a message that has resonated well with a majority of the population, as they witness neighboring countries descending into civil strife and sectarian tensions. Moreover, the security apparatus and the government have employed a combination of targeted arrests and co-optation to further weaken the protest movement.

By mid-2012, the momentum for change was rapidly losing ground. The dramatic resignation of the reform-oriented Prime Minister Awn Khasawneh, a former International Criminal Court judge, marked a turning point in the regime policy vis-à-vis reform. Khasawneh – widely seen as an honest and principled politician – took the issue of reform seriously and was adamant about restoring the public’s diminished trust in state institutions.⁵ However, soon after taking the position, Khasawneh realized that he was skating on thin ice, when discovering that the country’s power centers restricted his role to an extent that made him feel as if he were walking in a minefield.⁶ Khasawneh felt that the monarch was merely using him and his good name to buy more time before resetting Jordan’s policy to the anti-reform mentality that had prevailed prior to the Arab Spring.⁷ As the reform-minded Khasawneh grudgingly left the political scene, Fayez Tarawneh – a conservative and traditional politician – stepped in.

To longtime observers, the appointment of Fayez Tarawneh as Prime Minister – who in the eyes of many critics could be seen as the epitome of the anti-reform

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⁴. Ibid.
⁵. The author’s interview with Awn Khasawneh, former Prime Minister, Amman, Jordan, 11 June 2013.
⁶. Ibid.
⁷. Ibid.
elite – was a complete turnaround on reform.⁸ The resulting modest reform package further convinced observers that the monarch was either uninterested in genuine reform or incapable of overcoming institutional constraints. The impression that the King seeks to deflect criticism by pointing out the institutional influences standing in the way of reform, has led some critics to raise the question of who exactly is in control of the government.⁹

In sum, notwithstanding the superficial constitutional amendments, the introduction of a constitutional court, or the establishment of the IEC, the political changes came nowhere near the desired reform that would lessen the King’s authority and politically empower the people. To understand the underlying causes of this modest transformation, one must assess both the regime’s handling of domestic politics and the external forces at play.

2. Jordan’s Domestic Actors

The »top-down, gradual approach« to reform reflects the perennial reality of a hard-shelled autocratic regime. Undoubtedly, genuine political change entails introducing radical constitutional amendments to undercut the King’s seemingly massive authority, thus laying the grounds for representative and accountable government institutions. Needless to say, Jordan’s monarch has no intention of giving up his prerogatives to a parliamentarian government as long as he can continue ruling unchecked.

Jordan’s domestic political pressure has hardly been significant enough to sway the King. By and large, the protest movements (widely referred to in Jordan by the word »Hirak«, meaning »movement«) do not engage in alliances with any key regional or international players with a stake in Jordan (Yom 2013: 129). The Hirak is both fragmented and lacking in a unified political vision. For this reason, the protest movements continue to be ineffective. Therefore, the regime has the relative luxury to lead using top-down reform, which will not bring about a significant political transition.

The fragmentation of the Hirak’s constituents and the dissonance among them are the central reason behind the failure of the opposition and protest groups to bring about a different outcome. With such a wide disparity among its main groupings, the Hirak failed to formulate a unified vision, let alone a detailed blueprint for reform.

First and foremost, the MB is the only organized and influential group that pressed for radical changes and could potentially contend with the regime politically. At the height of what Malcolm Kerr dubbed the »Arab Cold War« in the 1950s and 1960s, the Jordanian monarch and the MB were allies against a common enemy: the Jordanian secular pro-Soviet and pro-Nasserite radicals (Kerr 1971). The tide of Pan-Arabism posed an enormous threat to the then very young King Hussein. When the late King faced an attempted coup in 1957, the MB stood by him. Acknowledging their role, the King rewarded them by allowing the MB to continue with their activism overtly while banning all other political parties, thus significantly empowering the MB politically.¹⁰ This marriage of interests continued until Hussein shifted gears in the early 1990s, when he embarked on a peace treaty with Israel. Ever since, the regime and the MB have been at odds, without being mortal opponents though.

To observers of Jordanian politics, the MB remains the main political force in the Hirak. When the street was simmering in Jordan and the regime felt compelled to act, the MB opted for a procrastination tactic. The prevailing argument was that they would better position themselves if they waited for what was expected to be a looming victory for the Sunni, MB-dominated Syrian opposition. To cut an optimal deal with the regime, key figures within the MB bet on time.¹¹

The stonewalling and the noncommittal nature of the MB’s position discouraged other forces within the Hirak, many of whom began to think that the MB was just using them to secure a lucrative political deal with the palace. To the MB’s credit, it is the only movement with a

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⁸. The author’s interview with Basil Okoor, co-founder of Ammannews and founder and current editor-in-chief of JO24.net news website.
⁹. Ibid.
¹⁰. The author’s interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, former Chief of the Royal Court, Amman, Jordan, 12 June 2013. Abu Odeh made the case that the 1957 crisis was a turning point with far-fetched consequences. The dissolution of parliament, the banning of political parties, and the focus on tribes and the MB led to a political empowerment of the latter two.
¹¹. The author’s interview with Mamdouh al-Abbadi, former Member of Parliament and former cabinet member, Amman, Jordan, 10 June 2013. This argument was advanced by many of my interviewees, including Taher al-Masri and Musa Ma’aitah, the former Minister for Political Development, whom I interviewed in Amman on 11 June 2013.
political vision, regardless of whether this vision is rooted in pluralism or incorporating others merely as a means to gain power.

The regime responded by advancing two arguments via state-run media outlets in order to discredit the organization. Firstly, they argued that the MB is not a Jordanian movement promoting a national agenda, but rather an organization with external links to the MB Guidance Office in Egypt (maktab al-irshad) and Hamas in order to advance transnational agendas. Put differently, the MB was presented as a Trojan horse for external interference. Secondly, state media characterized the MB as a power-seeking organization with no plans for reform.

These accusations were deepened after the MB’s fiasco in Egypt. In fact, the military coup and the unfolding crisis in Egypt (…) further revealed the depth of the Jordanian monarch’s antipathy toward the Muslim Brotherhood (Barari 2013). Contrary to his statements that his reign is inclusive and that all political actors within the country are trustworthy, the monarch dislikes the MB. He believes that they are opportunists who would not hesitate to oust him if the chance arose. His deep mistrust in the MB surfaced in an interview last March when he dubbed them as «wolves in sheep clothing» (Goldberg).

Furthering the complexity of the situation, the anti-reform elites have attempted to provoke dormant internal ethnic divisions within the MB itself, between East Bankers and Jordanians of Palestinian descent. They have tried to paint the movement as one with Palestinian dominance in order to warn the East Bankers that the MB is not what it appears to be. Wittingly or not, the regime’s discourse has resonated well with some East Bankers who are wary of the increasing political role of Jordanians of Palestinian descent.

Interestingly, there has been a different internal rivalry between the MB and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), which came to the fore when the moderate wing – commonly referred to as the doves – led by Irhaiel Gharaibeh and Nabil al-Kofahi, launched a broader national initiative called Zamzam. Zamzam Initiative, or the National Initiative for Reform, was launched in 2012 by moderate Islamists from the MB and other political figures to address the challenges facing the Kingdom. The Initiative demanded the preservation of state sovereignty, the adoption of gradual reforms, and the selection of honest people for decision-making posts. The MB rejected the Initiative, which was seen as a sign of a division within its ranks.12

The active roles of moderate MB figures in the new initiative generated significant backlash within the organization. Accusing the security apparatus of backing Zamzam, Zaki Bany Ershead, Deputy General Supervisor of the MB in Jordan, argued that the initiative was suspicious and designed to cause a rift within the Brotherhood’s ranks in collaboration with official parties (al-Samadi 2012). In August 2013, the differences reached the press in the wake of the Egyptian military coup when Irhaiel Gharaibeh implicitly accused his hawkish rival of creating unnecessary tension with the regime. Such infighting was not lost on observers and the regime exploited these differences in full.13

The second constituent group of the Hirak is a number of disgruntled youth protest groups, which are scattered across the country. Indeed, it is this amorphous group that suspended all previous taboos when they began to direct their anger and criticism at the monarch himself. Important as they may sound, these groups remained local, fragmented, and without a genuine democratic discourse. It is worth mentioning that these groups are primarily composed of East Bankers, the historical bedrock of the regime. Although the regime was perturbed by the upheaval of these young activists, it was able to manage them by using a strategy of co-optation and prosecution until they eventually ran out of steam.

The third category is groups with tribal demands. These groups only sought to realize parochial interests and some political gains rather than genuine democracy. Some specifically called for the reversal of privatization, which for many Jordanians is a euphemism for the looting of the country.

12. Historically speaking, two key trends have dominated the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. The first one, referred to as the »Hawks«, is close to the teaching of Sayyid Qutb, the renowned Egyptian thinker who was executed by Nasser’s regime in 1966. His book Milestones, in which he presents his ideas, is seen as the essential reference and inspiration of the Jihadi movements. The Hawks tend to focus more on the Palestinian cause and attach great importance to the relationship with Hamas. The Doves, on the other hand, are a trend focusing more on national Jordanian issues. This group is mainly composed of people of East Bank origin. Over the last two decades, observers often referred to two other trends within the movement. One is linked to Hamas and the other is reform-oriented. The Dove trend is allied with the reform-oriented centrist group while the Hawks are in alliance with the group identifying with Hamas.

The dissonance among the groups within the larger Hirak and the disparity between their shifting demands made it almost impossible for them to unify or at least reach an agreement on their minimum demands. To their dismay, all attempts to join forces were either short-lived or dampened by mutual suspicion. The regime succeeded in cultivating the perception that the MB was using the other groups in order to reach a deal with the state. Ultimately, the Hirak groupings failed to join forces to create enough political pressure. The internal opposition was further debilitated and hamstrung by the role of external factors.

3. Regional and International Impact

The King’s statecraft and his restrained, balanced foreign policy have helped insulate Jordan from the fallout from the conflict-prone region. However, Jordan has not been immune to intense external influence throughout the course of the Arab Spring. Many politicians in Jordan in fact believe that the dynamic of change in Jordan is, by and large, shaped by external influence. In the absence of external support or pressure, radical changes in Jordan are hardly possible. The United States and Saudi Arabia are considered the two external players to most heavily impact the scope of reform in Jordan. For the United States, the tumultuous regional developments following the ascendance of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as the disheartening conflict in Syria, have further discouraged pressuring the monarchy on reforms, while such events have compelled Saudi Arabia to embolden the monarch to forgo reform altogether.

With the onset of the Arab Spring, Riyadh framed its strategic outlook based on propping up like-minded regimes. For Riyadh, the protest movements that overwhelmed much of the Arab world undermine stability, weaken the region’s economy, and empower radicals (Helfont/Helfont 2012: 84).

Driven by this rationale, Riyadh engaged in — to use the parlance of Princeton University professor Bernard Haykel — a »counter-revolution against the Arab Spring«. According to Haykel, Saudi Arabia’s »response is centered, as its foreign and domestic policy has long been, on »stability«, the Saudis don’t want anti-Saudi forces, including such enemies as Iran and al-Qaeda, to increase their influence in the Middle East« (Haykel 2011).

This Saudi strategy can be witnessed most explicitly in Bahrain, where Saudi forces marched into the capital Manama in 2011 under the banner of the GCC to prop up the embattled Sunni regime in its struggle with the Shiite opposition. Riyadh played up the Shia component of the protests, arguing that Iran was behind the events at Bahrain’s iconic Pearl Square with the intention of subverting the regime. Likewise, Riyadh has not been oblivious to Iranian attempts to secure a foothold in countries like Jordan, where Iran offered to supply the monarchy with free oil for 30 years.\(^{15}\)

Thanks to its oil wealth, Saudi Arabia has made efforts to reinforce its grip on regional politics, adding to many cases of rentierism underpinning the region’s autocracies. To discourage the Jordanian monarch from implementing far-reaching political reform, Riyadh provided Jordan with the necessary rent to bolster the King’s position and invited Jordan to join the GCC. Implicit in the Saudi invitation is the message that Jordan can only enact limited political reform in order to keep the monarch’s position unscathed.

With this in mind, Amman and Riyadh share similar perceptions of regional threats. Aside from their dislike for Iran and the fact that they both belong to the so-called »moderate camp« in the Arab region, they have each demonstrated concerns regarding the ascendance of Sunni-oriented MB movements due to the Arab Spring. Ultimately, the Jordanian King’s desire to extract considerable sums of Saudi money — in addition to both coun-

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14. The author’s interviews with: Rana Sabbagh, a journalist, Amman, 5 June 2013; Lamis K. Andoni, a journalist, Amman, 23 June 2013; and Mubarak Abu Yamin al-Abbadi, a lawyer and former Member of Parliament, Amman, 5 June 2013. They all made the same observation.

15. The Jordanian monarch knew that this offer would not be without strings attached, and he turned it down. The Iranian arguments fell flat even with the MB, which sees Iran as playing a negative role in the region by upholding the Syrian regime. Iran also attempted to drive a wedge between the Gulf States and Jordan by offering economic assistance to Jordan.

16. This term was coined by US and Arab media in the early 2000s to distinguish between the »axis of moderation«, which included Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAE, and the »axis of resistance«, namely Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The first group entertained close ties to the West and supported a political settlement with Israel, while the second opposed US policy on the Middle East and stood behind the Arab national liberation movements. Since the events of the Arab Spring, this distinction has mostly become obsolete.
tries’ shared animosity towards the MB – led the King to turn his back on reform. Saudi financial support and their GCC invitation would have been inconceivable had the King shown interest in empowering the MB in Jordan. Therefore, the Saudi gambit paid off.

Meanwhile, the US administration initially opted for a different approach toward their ally in Jordan. While maintaining support for the King, the US urged him to introduce gradual, yet genuine reforms. To the Saudis’ dismay, the United States played a constructive role at the start of the Jordanian protests, advising the government to continue on the path towards reform.

At the start of the Arab Spring, US calculations were drastically different from Saudi objectives. President Obama and his administration took to the logic that undemocratic regimes are unsustainable in the long run; therefore, a country such as Jordan should embark on the path to reform before it was too late. In case these regimes could effectively make the transition to democracy, Washington would benefit; however, the US would find itself in a bad position if the implementation of reforms were to destabilize its allies. In the King’s interview with Jeffery Goldberg in March of this year, the King dubbed the US naïve in believing that the region’s Islamists could be the engine of reform (Goldberg).

The Saudis and the Americans clearly differed in their strategies on how the Jordanian monarch could sustain his regime; and to some extent, the kingdom became a battleground for these two diverse perspectives. Washington pushed for gradual, top-down political reform, while Riyadh favored limited reform in exchange for economic development and stability.

Over the past year, as the region has grown increasingly tumultuous, the American and Saudi sides have come to a sort of consensus on the priority of stability in Jordan. The King has accentuated an image of Jordan as being on the brink of turmoil, reminding observers that the future is either with his regime and its vision of reform or the Islamists, but not both. The monarch has been successful in presenting the MB as a bogeyman to both stymie American pressures for reform and to gain economic aid from the GCC. In March 2013, President Obama paid a visit to Jordan in which he showered praise on the King for his reform efforts.

For the time being, the US and Saudi Arabia feel obliged to support the status quo, or at most, a limited top-down reform package, which has been the King’s ultimate objective all along. He gave in to external pressure only after securing the complicity of the US administration and GCC aid, allowing him to ditch genuine reform and present his own view of gradual reform, which is limited in both scope and essence.

4. Conclusion

The monarch framed the parliamentary elections of January 2013 as the key pillar of his reform package. The state mobilized all of its resources and used all of the tricks in the book to persuade Jordanians to register and vote. Many saw the elections as a referendum on the package of reform.

The outcome was disappointing. The turnout among eligible voters was a mere 39 percent, a severe blow to the regime’s reform measures. Even worse, the parliament is largely unchanged. On the whole, it remains a toothless institution elected through a gerrymandered electoral law with members who only seek patronage and have no real impact on decision-making. The King, aided by the government and the security apparatus, still dictates all key decisions whether they regard foreign policy or domestic concerns.

On the heels of a series of demonstrations early this year, the modest reform package presented by the Jordanian monarch rang hollow among a sizeable segment of the population and the politically disillusioned activists. The changes – including the aforementioned constitutional amendments, the new electoral law, and the mechanism for parliamentary consultation over government formation – have led to no marked change. The crux of the matter is that the King’s prerogatives remain intact, leaving the country a long way from genuine political transformation. Even anti-reform forces could not have hoped for a better scheme. The reform package therefore is more of a preemptive measure to help the regime silence the internal opposition, rather than an inclusive and credible blueprint for the transition from autocracy to democracy.

Thus far, the role of external factors has been detrimental to the internal forces in Jordan calling for reform. Riyadh provided Amman with the necessary financial
aid to help the government stabilize the country and address the public’s economic needs. And fearing that instability could engulf Jordan, Washington propped up the regime by offering aid and political support to the King, who used the Islamists as a scarecrow to further his desired outcome.

In sum, the Jordanian regime exploited regional instability, the Saudi strategy to support like-minded regimes, and the American fear of short-term instability in order to get away with a reform package that only reinforces its autocratic grip. With the Hirak remaining fragmented and lacking a unified strategy or vision, it will be unable to amass enough force to pressure the regime to change course. If the Hirak were able to cultivate support from an external force, perhaps this outside pressure could effect a more profound political transformation on Jordan’s outward-facing monarchy.
References


The Activities of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Jordan

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) opened its Amman office in 1986 and is accredited through a long-standing partnership with the Royal Scientific Society (RSS). The aims of the work of FES Amman are to promote democracy and political participation, to support progress towards social justice and gender equality as well as to contribute to ecological sustainability and peace and security in the region. FES Amman supports the building and strengthening of civil society and public institutions in Jordan and Iraq.

FES Amman cooperates with a wide range of partner institutions from civil society and the political sphere to establish platforms for democratic dialogue, organize conferences, hold workshops and publish policy papers on current political questions.

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