

Conference Report

# Building a sustainable partnership for the future?

## The EU-Africa relations in the run-up to the 2014 Summit

17-18 September 2013 | Berlin



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**STIFTUNG**

European Centre for Development  
Policy Management  
*ecdpm*

## IMPRINT

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# **Building a sustainable partnership for the future?**

## **The EU-Africa relations in the run-up to the 2014 Summit**

**17-18 September 2013, Berlin, Germany**



ECDPM is an independent think and do tank specialising in the political and economic aspects of EU-Africa relations.

The Centre facilitates policy dialogs, provides tailor made analysis and advice with partners from the South and participates in North-South networks. The Centre also supports institutions in Africa to define their own policy and development agendas. ECDPM operates from Maastricht (NL) and Brussels (B) and has some 50 staff members of more than 20 different European and African nationalities.



The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is a private, non-profit organisation committed to the values of Social Democracy. It is the aim of FES to facilitate the political and social education of individuals from all walks of life in the spirit of democracy and pluralism as well as to contribute to international understanding and cooperation. FES carries out its mission in Germany and internationally through its programmes of political education, international cooperation, study and research. At present, FES maintains more than 100 offices worldwide, of which 19 are in sub-Saharan Africa.

# Table of Contents

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Towards the 4th EU-Africa Summit	5
<hr/>	
I. Dramatic changes in the Africa-EU Partnership	6
<hr/>	
II. Africa-EU relations under pressure	8
<hr/>	
III. The Way forward: What should be done to revitalize the EU-Africa relations?	12
1. Treat Africa as a continent of opportunities instead of a continent of crises	12
2. Clearly define the EU's comparative strengths and value added	13
3. European and African attitudes and mentalities need fundamental change	15
<hr/>	
IV. Key recommendations for the 2014 EU-Africa Summit	16
1. Strengthen the political dialogue	16
2. Change from within is more effective than external conditionalities	16
3. Apply value driven agendas in a consistent way	17
4. Invest more African resources in development processes	18
5. Continue cooperation in peace and security	18
6. Build EU-African alliances in multilateral fora	18
<hr/>	
Annexes	
I. Agenda	20
II. List of Participants	24

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# Towards the 4th EU-Africa Summit

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the European Centre of Development and Policy Management (ECDPM) held a conference on 17-18 September 2013 on future perspectives of EU-Africa relations in the run-up to the 2014 Summit that will be held in Brussels on 1-2 April 2014

The conference brought together some 40 senior officials from the African, ACP and EU institutions and member states, as well as participants from think tanks and civil society organisations from both continents.

The overall aim of the conference was to address key areas of common concern and interest in the Africa-EU partnership that could contribute to the agenda setting of the 2014 EU-Africa Summit.

Specific objectives of the conference include:

1. To make an assessment of the rapid changes in the global landscape and the implications for the EU-Africa partnership;
2. To facilitate a political dialogue between equals and to foster a deeper understanding of European and African perspectives on some of the key issues of strategic interest in the partnership;
3. To contribute to bridging the gap between diverging approaches in key areas of the Africa-EU partnership;
4. To identify possible priority themes and partnership areas for the 2014 EU-Africa Summit.

# I. Dramatic changes in the Africa-EU Partnership

The overall context of EU-Africa relations has fundamentally changed since the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) by African and European Union Heads of State in Lisbon in 2007. In only six years major evolutions have taken place in Africa, Europe and the global world.

## Putting the African boom in perspective

Many African countries are experiencing unprecedented economic growth mainly as a result of the booming extractive sectors, but there is also another side to these fast growing economies. Various parts of the African continent are increasingly confronted with rising (youth) unemployment, persisting poverty and inequalities, governance problems, political instability and conflict and terrorism. In addition there are looming and potentially catastrophic demographic and environmental threats that severely could affect prospects for development in the coming decades. Africa does not yet have performing institutions that are able to deal with these major challenges. Many pan-African, regional and national institutions are perceived to be weak, overly dependent on donor funding, and not up to the standards yet to tackle the multitude of problems.





*From left, Mr Geert Laporte, Deputy Director, European Centre for Development Policy Management; H.E. Brave Ndisale, Ambassador of Malawi to the EU in Brussels.*

## An inward looking EU in crisis

On the other side of the spectrum, the EU is struggling with a serious economic and financial crisis that affects credibility amongst not only its own citizens but also elsewhere in the world. In spite of the Lisbon Treaty the EU has not been able yet to reinforce its role as a global political player. On the contrary Euro-skepticism seems to be rising in several EU member states further affecting the EU's cohesion in the partnership with Africa and at the global level.

## Emerging players create a more competitive context

The continent-to-continent relationship has also become more complex in the light of the

emergence of key players besides the EU who are expanding their economic links with the African continent and the individual African countries.

For several decades since the end of the Cold War Europe has been to a large extent the exclusive partner of Africa. This is now changing rapidly and in recent years the economic growth in Africa attracted increasing interest from new global players such as China, India, Brazil, South Korea, Turkey and other emerging economies. These players have offered African leadership greater choice and more bargaining power in the relationship with the EU and with the US.

Investments, economic cooperation, trade and technical assistance from these new partners increased spectacularly over the past years. Africa has the possibility to pick, choose and prioritise its relationship. The new emerging economies are also perceived to be deploying a more ambitious perspective on African development by focusing their efforts on growth and productivity, investment and South-South cooperation instead. This contrasts with a traditional donor-recipient type of relationship that is largely based on aid. The new partners of Africa also seem to adopt a different style of partnership vis-à-vis the African leadership. They claim to avoid interfering with the internal politics of African governments. Yet at the same time they do not seem to have major problems openly building alliances with controversial African elites. Obviously, this type of cooperation based on strong vested interests, may have contributed to more self-confident and assertive attitudes of African leaders in the Partnership with the EU. Beyond the formal diplomatic declarations, the role of the EU is openly put into question. Under the leadership of Ms Dlamini Zuma the African Union (AU) is currently assessing its partnerships with a multitude of countries that take a strong interest in engaging with Africa. The EU now finds itself in a position where it has to demonstrate its comparative advantage vis-à-vis other partners in Africa.

## II. Africa-EU relations under pressure

### Partnership ‘grew colder than warmer’ in the past years

Despite the high expectations of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), both continents have not been able to clearly benefit from this mutual engagement. Nobody seems to contest the underlying principles such as equality, mutual respect and partnership. But many Africans perceive the partnership to be “unequal” and mainly driven by European agendas.

### EU problems of credibility and consistency

Some of the following factors have contributed to increasing frustration on the African side: First of all, the never ending Economic Partnership Agreements negotiating saga has done a lot of harm to the EU-Africa partnership. This key bone of contention (“*a well intentioned diplomatic disaster*”) has for more than 10 years already undermined trust between both continents. EPAs are not just a technical trade issue but a major political issue that, if unresolved, will continue to affect the overall political climate between the African and European parties



Titel: From right, Ms Christiane Kesper, Director, Division for International Cooperation, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin; Mr Peteris Ustubs, Director, West and Central Africa, European External Action Service; Mr Alex Vines, Head, Africa Programme, Chatham House.

before, during and after the Summit. Instead of pushing the issue under the table it would be good if both parties could address the EPAs upfront and identify routes to prepare well and get out of this deadlock during the Summit.

Secondly, African participants also pointed to the major gap between Europe's strong value-driven discourses on democracy and governance and the double standards in applying these in different country or regional contexts. It was repeatedly stressed that there is nothing wrong with the EU's value driven agenda, which most African strongly adhere to. However, the inconsistent application of these principles, through different types of conditionalities, is perceived to undermine the credibility and trust in the EU. Too often it is felt that, in practice, the EU's value driven agenda clashes with its security and economic interests. This was a key concern in relation to Europe's ambiguous response to the Arab Spring. In that context reference was made to the recent situation in Egypt where the impression has been created that the EU seems to *"support an undemocratic coup with a view to save democracy."*

There can be no doubt that the EU and its member states have legitimate economic and security concerns when it comes to Africa. The EU has a recognized value added in setting examples in areas such as governance, democracy and human rights. However, the EU should make sure that it does not turn a blind eye towards totalitarian regimes or that it does forget to apply in certain country contexts, the principles that it is preaching. Political and economic realities continue to provoke doubts about the consistency of the EU undermining trust between the continents.

Thirdly, while the EU tries to redefine itself as a global force, it could gain credibility in Africa if it would clearly put its economic, trade and security interests on the table instead of pretending to act only out of altruism by *"helping the poor Africans"*. As the largest donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA), the European support is still highly appreciated in several African countries. But at the same time it was felt that there is nothing wrong in being more explicit about Europe's strategic interests in Africa, beyond development, such as in trade, investment and security.



*Dr Obadiah Obed Mailafia, Chief of Cabinet, ACP Secretariat.*

## Also major African inconsistencies

Major frustrations were also raised over incoherencies on the African side.

First, there is a feeling that African élites have not yet made enough efforts to equally distribute the benefits of the economic boom in Africa. In spite of the declared ambition to build a partnership with the EU beyond aid, African countries and institutions still tend to stick to handholding. It was recognized that the African Union (AU) invested, in the past 11 years of its



*From right, Ms Laima Jureviciene, Director of the Development Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania; Ms Faten Aggad-Clerx, Programme Manager Africa's Change Dynamics, European Centre for Development Policy Management; Mr Florian Koch, Desk Officer, Africa Department, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin; Mr Manfred Öhm, Head of Africa Department, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin*

existence, considerable efforts in putting Africa on the map and in defining common African agendas. However, these efforts seem to be overshadowed by an excessive external aid dependency, seriously putting into question the credibility and commitment of the African leadership.

The EU continues to “pay the bills” for major African undertakings (e.g. African Peace Operations) and in some African countries the EU funds up to half of the state budgets. Participants further stressed, that African countries should do more in funding the efforts in the field of peace and security as the current dependence on EU funding “*can't be continued like that*”. At

the same time more capital leaves Africa, including through illicit capital flight, than the continent receives in terms of aid. Capital flight therefore was discerned as a major common enemy to Europe and Africa and for global development in general. As more and more taxes have been evaded and tax havens became a topic of shared concern, both sides need to undertake all possible efforts to tackle these illicit financial flows. European public opinion and taxpayers as well as African civil society increasingly demand more accountability on these issues that undermine a fair distribution of the wealth that is being generated in Africa.

Second, increasing doubts were expressed over the commitments by several African leaders for democratic reforms. Progress towards democracy and governance is at times very slow and in some countries even crippled. Weak capacities and institutions with low delivery capacity as well as inconsistent leadership keep undermining Africa's success. There is no shortage of policy declarations but binding legal frameworks and a greater focus on implementation are badly needed to overcome the endemic problems of non-compliance with agreed commitments. Ultimately external pressure can only play a marginal role in solving these endemic problems. This will only be realized if citizens are empowered and governments held accountable through countervailing powers.

### **Moving beyond a “paper” strategy**

Instead of trying to live up to its expectations as a dynamic political strategy between both continents, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) has remained too much a “paper strategy” that seems to lack real political traction. It is managed in a rather heavy and bureaucratic way and lacks the means to back up its ambitions. Despite efforts being undertaken to keep up a regular and intense dialogue between the two regions at the institutional levels (Commission-to-Commission meetings, and technical expert meetings, reinforced EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa and the AU mission in Brussels) the JAES has not been able to create genuine interest among African and European political leadership and deliver on its expectations. The EU is perceived to firmly keep control over the agenda setting, the substance and the process of consultations and meetings.

### **III. The Way forward: What should be done to revitalize the EU-Africa relations?**

In the current climate of mutual distrust and growing apathy over the EU-Africa partnership, the upcoming 2014 Summit does not seem to be generating a lot of excitement. Participants made a number of suggestions that could contribute to strengthening mutual interests and revitalizing the partnership:

#### **1. Treat Africa as a continent of opportunities instead of a continent of crises**

It is time for Europe to look more positively at the fast changes that are taking place in Africa. Obviously there are still many hurdles, but Europe could better seize the opportunities of a continent that will substantially increase its weight in the global economy in the coming years and decades. Some individual member states have fully understood this African potential. Merkel and Cameron have led high level delegations to Africa. France will hold its Heads of State Summit with Africa in December 2013. In economic terms there is more interest to invest, at least in the well performing economies in Africa. Today, the UK is the single largest foreign direct investor in South Africa. But European investors should also be open to take risks in other more difficult and less performing African economies with a high potential.

However, even though African resources are truly strategic for Europe, Africa should not solely be seen as a supplier of minerals. With its growing middle classes, Africa soon might provide major opportunities for European exporters of manufactured or consumption goods. In this context, reference was made to Angola as the largest consumer of Portuguese wine in the world.

In the medium to longer term demography and migration could also become major drivers of a stronger EU-Africa partnership. The EU still tends to see migration as a threat rather than an opportunity. The countries in the world with the youngest populations are African. While Europe needs to deal with its aging populations in the coming decades, structured migration from Africa could open windows of opportunity in particular for the labour market. In that sense, Africa could become part of the solution of a decreasing population in Europe.

Last but not least, joint and coherent action of the EU and Africa in multilateral fora could make a real difference. The EU and Africa count for more than 80 countries. If the Caribbean and Pacific states (which are part of the ACP Group) are added to that, this creates a strong block of more than half of all the states in the world. Obviously it would not be easy to build common



*From right, Dr Mehari Maru, Researcher, African Rally for Peace and Development; Mr Jeremy Lester, Adviser on Conflict Prevention, Africa Department, European External Action Service; Mr Jan Henrik Fahlbusch, Desk Officer, Africa Department, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin*

interests and achieve common goals with such a large and diverse group of countries, but in areas such as climate change and sustainable energy, alliances could possibly be worked out.

## **2. Clearly define the EU's comparative strengths and value added**

In a multi-polar world where there is an increasing interest to engage with a more attractive “African bride”, the EU should clearly stress its value added vis-à-vis other potential partners. The EU sometimes clearly illustrates its frustration over the fact that *“Europe does a lot for Africa but this goes largely unnoticed or is less visible than the engagement of the BRICS in Africa”*.

For insiders who closely follow the African security situation, the EU's role in support to the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is quite well known.

In terms of development aid the EU remains by far the largest partner of Africa, but the initiatives of the new emerging partners seem to attract more attention. BRICS mainly focus on highly visible projects that are implemented in quite an effective way over short periods of time (e.g. infrastructure, investments in extractive sectors).



*From left: BrigGen Joel George (Pal) Martins, Director, Pax Africa; Dr. Siphamandla Zondi, Director, Institute for Global Dialogue; Mr Jonathan Tostevin, Deputy Team Leader, Africa Directorate, Department for International Development*

African participants stressed however, that these emerging players should not be considered as a threat to the EU's engagement in and with Africa. There are clear areas where European involvement will not and cannot be replaced.

The EU has a recognized track record in social development areas such as the Millennium Development Goals, education, health systems and areas relating to environment and climate change. Particularly in the area of new technologies relating to sustainable energy and the green economy, the EU could become a key partner of Africa.

Because of its longstanding relations with Africa, the EU might also have a deeper knowledge of the African continent which might also result in a comparative advantage in relation to private sector and business opportunities.

But from the perspective of several African participants in the seminar, the EU's undisputed comparative advantage is in its soft value agenda such as support to democracy, governance, rule of law and institutional reforms. Clearly this is a view that is not always shared by African governments who tend to be rather allergic to the EU's role in this area. Yet participants felt that *"more than ever the EU is needed to support good governance, the fight against corruption and peace and security"*. Europe itself has overcome war and engaged in a process of reconciliation. It therefore has a wealth of experience in these areas that should be shared with Africa. There is strong recognition for the roles that the EU has been playing in fostering processes towards stronger democracies and participation in Africa, including through resources provided under the European Development Fund (EDF). Both sides stressed the need to further promote the adherence to international norms and standards in relation to human rights and accountability in public affairs, economic governance and the fight against corruption.

Ultimately the success rate of democracy support initiatives will largely depend on the way in which these are African driven. From an African perspective the longer-term processes of democracy building are not always given enough attention by the EU. What is needed are initiatives that better take into account this time dimension in political reforms that all too often have simply been reduced to the organization of precipitated elections.

Obviously more sophisticated capacities and approaches will be required to deal with complex processes of state building. Mali was mentioned as an interesting test-case where the EU institutions with its member-states was able to act quite rapidly after the French military intervention through a wide range of development and state building instruments. It was also positively perceived that EU has been able facilitate collective action with the UN, the AU and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

### **3. European and African attitudes and mentalities need fundamental change**

As Africa wants to be perceived as a player on the global scene, Europe needs to take these aspirations seriously. In particular as their African partner is now more assertive, new forms of engagement need to be found. This implies that the EU would abandon its sometimes patronizing relationship with Africa. It also implies a need for a truly strategic partnership based on mutual interests and on respect for local and domestic processes in Africa.

It was also felt that there is an urgent need to break with aid addiction. African governments should step up their efforts to mobilize domestic resources, improve systems of revenue collection and redistribution of wealth and tackle the endemic capital flight. Obviously, the EU also has a responsibility in enacting laws that could tackle this capital flight. A conducive climate needs to be created in Africa for stimulating the development of human resources and private sector initiatives, particularly in areas of new technologies, so as to reduce areas with extreme dependency on external technical assistance.

## IV. Key recommendations for the 2014 EU-Africa Summit

Participants remarked that the timing of the Summit 2014 (close to European Elections etc.) will not be conducive to substantial results, yet expectations are high. In particular the African side would like to focus on implementation and outcomes of the African European partnership. A careful management of expectations is therefore crucial to avoid disappointment.

The upcoming Summit is likely to focus on issues of economic and sustainable development and security, yet a broad range of agenda items are currently being discussed between the EU and AU institutions. These relate to investment, employment, natural resource management, private sector development, green economy and energy, innovative technologies and research, conflict prevention and democratic governance. It was felt that there is a risk with too broad an agenda the Summit would avoid discussing the real controversial issues that have seriously affected the partnership in the past years.

Participants made the following recommendations:

### 1. Strengthen the political dialogue

A more open and frank dialogue with no taboos is needed to create an effective and equal political partnership, focusing on the essential issues that have given rise to controversies. Both parties are well advised to openly address, even the most delicate issues (EPAs, tax havens, governance issues, International Criminal Court, ...) that sometimes have had detrimental effects on the partnership. It is better “to agree to disagree” than to remove these items from the Summit agenda.

### 2. Change from within is more effective than external conditionalities

The issue of conditionalities was raised as a key point of contention. Partnership should be based on ownership, and not on externally imposed conditionalities that have not worked in the past. Self imposed assessments could work better than externally imposed ones provided that these are organized in a serious way. African leaders therefore could demonstrate more proactive political leadership in the implementation of the various policies and strategies. As Africa strengthens its own vision of governance, democracy, and security and development, the AU has taken several initiatives to promote and reinforce continental mechanisms of “peer pressure”, transparency and accountability such as the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and The African Governance Architecture.

Also the African mining vision, that was adopted by the Heads of State at the February 2009 AU summit following the October 2008 meeting of African Ministers responsible for Mineral Resources Development, speaks to the need to have a platform that seeks to integrate mining much better into development policies at local, national and regional levels. Its objective is to have a transparent use of natural resources that sustains growth and development.

In a similar vein, initiatives such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) increasingly contribute to regional and continental development agendas. These initiatives are also gradually leading to a shared sense of ownership and buy-in by African leaders and African societies. Rather than imposing their own European donor agendas that might be ill-adapted the EU could provide more support to the various African initiatives of the AU and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Yet, it was felt that some of the promising African policies and initiatives sometimes lack the necessary traction when it comes to implementation. Democratic governance and internal drivers of change are major prerequisites in each country to realize effective change.



*Mr Peteris Ustubs, Director, West and Central Africa, European External Action Service*

### **3. Apply value driven agendas in a consistent way**

Participants felt that Europe has a historic responsibility in resolving conflicts and promoting good governance, democracy and human rights. There is a wealth of knowledge to be shared with the rest of the world. However, this practical experience and expertise should never be applied through a standardized (*'one size fits all'*) approaches.

Rather than being reactive to conflicts the EU could invest more energy in anticipating conflict. The link between peace & security and development and the “securitization of development” could be further refined in close cooperation with the African institutions and instruments. Africa has its own peace architecture in place but major questions were raised as to its effectiveness and financial sustainability. Lessons should be learnt of the Mali case by both Africa and the EU with a view as to better anticipate similar types of crises in Africa in the future.

#### **4. Invest more African resources in development processes**

In a partnership of equals Africa should stand more on its own feet in terms of human and financial resources. The Summit should address this issue. Failure to do so risks continuing the state of dependency vis-à-vis the European partner. Solutions therefore need to be found to create mechanisms that can ensure the sustainable funding of African institutions and programmes. In addition more investments could also be made in strengthening the necessary human resources to deal with the complexities of the African transformation agenda. This implies, amongst others, that African countries are able to negotiate good contractual arrangements that generate fair resource rents with multinationals, operating in the extractive sectors. It requires more efforts to distribute the benefits of the African growth and to create jobs. It also involves more transparency towards the media, social movements and the African populations at large. Better informed citizens ultimately allow for improved governance.

#### **5. Continue cooperation in peace and security**

The European Union should continue its strong support to the African Peace and Security Architecture, in particular with respect to the role to play in support of peacekeeping. For the future cooperation in this field it is crucial to take into account the lessons learned from the crisis and intervention in Mali. In order to avoid mistrust, fatigue and frustration the EU should put more emphasis on following up on the implementation of existing formats and structures (e.g. ASF). While the EU is strongest contributor to the APSA, the expectations to and role of the new global players, in particular China, in support of peace and security in Africa should be set on the agenda.

Although peace and security are being considered a priority area of cooperation, EU and AU should avoid a further securitization of the development agenda.

#### **6. Build EU-Africa alliances in multilateral fora**

As both Africa and the EU enter into a more competitive global environment clearly defined rules are needed to promote fairness and preserve principles of solidarity at global level. The EU and Africa could join hands in international fora to realize these ambitions in areas such as the huge Post 2015 Agenda of structural transformation, fight against terrorism and climate change. Particularly in this area there is a major potential for common interest. Africa produces the least pollution and is confronted with the most damaging effects. Both continents seem to be willing to bring this agenda forward and to mitigate the effects of climate change and help climate adaptation. By doing so they could send out a clear message that could have a major impact at the global level. Also within the framework of the Global Partnership for Development Effectiveness and in the light of the post-MDG developmental agenda, a strengthened European-African cooperation could significantly shape the international standards and objectives of development cooperation.



# Annex 1

## Agenda

Tuesday, 17<sup>th</sup> September

09.30 – 10.00 Welcome and Opening

Speaker: Ms. Christiane Kesper, *Director, Division for International Cooperation, FES Berlin*

Mr. Geert Laporte, *Deputy Director, ECDPM*

10.00 – 12.00 Session I **A brave new multipolar world – what are the strategic interests of the EU in Africa in a context of increasing competition?**

Chair: Mr. Geert Laporte, *Deputy Director, ECDPM*

Input: Mr. Alex Vines, *Research Director, Chatham House*

Mr. Peteris Ustubs, *Director, West and Central Africa, European External Action Service*

H.E. Brave Ndisale, *Ambassador of Malawi to the EU*

- What are the challenges for the EU-Africa strategic partnership in view of the rise of the new economic powers in Africa?
- In an increasingly multipolar world order which issues should Africa and the EU prioritise in their partnership? Where has the EU comparative strengths?
- The new scramble for African resources – to what extent are EU approaches any different from the economic interest based approaches of the emerging powers?

12.00 – 13.30 Lunch

**13.30 – 15.30 Session II      Good Governance for Africa:  
Perspectives and ambitions**

Chair:                    Mr. Manfred Öhm, Head, *Africa Department, FES Berlin*

Input:                    Dr. Kojo Busia, Chief, *APRM Section,  
United Nation Economic Commission for Africa*

                              Mr. Matthias Veltin, *Head, Policy Department for Africa,  
Federal Foreign Office*

                              Mr. Roland Zinzius, *Deputy Head, DG Development  
and Cooperation, African-EU Partnership and  
African Peace Facility European Commission*

- What roles could the AU and the EU (jointly) play to foster genuine (deep) democratization, particularly in countries where the process is stalled or largely confined to introducing the formal features of democracy?
- How does the EU perceive and respond to African initiatives? What can be learned from specific cases e. g. of the APRM Review?
- What have been the strengths and weaknesses of EU democracy promotion efforts? How to design relevant EU support strategies and mechanisms?
- What are the implications of promoting good governance under the aid paradigm?
- Where do the European governance agenda and its security and economic interests contradict each other?

**15.30 – 16.00 Tea/Coffee break**

**16.00 – 18.00 Session III Bound to cooperate? - Europe's role in African conflict management**

**Chair:** Mr. Florian Koch, *Desk Officer, Africa Department, FES Berlin*

**Input:** Mr. Christian Manahl, *Political Advisor, EU Delegation to South Sudan*

Mr. BrigGen (ret.) Joel George Martins, *Director, Pax Africa*

Mr. Jeremy Lester, *Adviser on Conflict Prevention, Africa Department, European External Action Service*

- Which lessons learned can be identified from the European Support to the APSA hitherto?
- What are the potentials for the emergence of a genuine European (foreign) policy towards African conflicts and conflict management?
- From multilateral to unilateral intervention – what kind of approach will the EU (and its member states) ultimately favor in severe conflict situations?
- What are the African expectations towards the European support of the APSA and European involvement in conflict management in Africa?

**19:30 Official Dinner**  
Restaurant Amici am Gendarmenmarkt

## Wednesday, 18<sup>th</sup> September

**09.00 – 11.00 Session IV**    **Re-shaping the EU-Africa relationship in the light of the Post-MDG debate: supporting an African transformation agenda?**

Chair:                    Dr. Iwa Salami, *Senior Lecturer, University of East London*

Input:                    Ms. Laima Jureviciene, *Director of the Development Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania*

Dr. Obadiah Mailafia, *ACP Secretariat, Chief of staff*

- In the context of the post-MDG debate, where do African and European priorities meet or diverge regarding a new post-2015 development framework?
- What are the cornerstones of an EU-African partnership that focuses on a sustainable and inclusive transformation agenda?
- What are specific elements of and necessary prerequisites for inclusive economic transformation? What have to be specific European and what specific African contributions?
- Which specific and common objectives can be formulated at the April 2014 summit for the future cooperation between EU and AU?

**11.00 – 11.30**    **Tea/Coffee break**

**11.30 – 12.15 Session V**    **Main conclusions, policy recommendations and entry points for further debate**

Speaker:                Mr. Geert Laporte, *Deputy Director, ECDPM*  
Mr. Florian Koch, *Africa Department, FES Berlin*

**12.15 – 12.30**                    **Closure**

**12.30 – 13.30**                    **Lunch**

# Annex II

## List of Participants

1. Mr Mohammed Amin Adam  
Executive Director  
Third World Network-Africa
2. Ms Faten Aggad-Clerx  
Programme Manager Africa's Change  
Dynamics  
European Centre for Development  
Policy Management
3. Ms Emily Barker  
Rapporteur  
European Centre for Development  
Policy Management
4. Dr. Oladrian Bello  
Programme Head, Governance of Africa's  
Resources Programme  
South African Institute of  
International Affairs
5. Dr. Kojo Busia  
Senior Development Management  
Officer  
United Nations Economic  
Commission Africa
6. Ms Sahra El Fassi  
Rapporteur  
European Centre for Development  
Policy Management
7. Mr Jan Henrik Fahlbusch  
Desk Officer, Africa Department  
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Berlin
8. Ms Carolina Feilman Quina  
Senior Consultant  
European Union
9. Ms Matshepiso Finca  
1st Secretary Political  
Embassy of the Republic of South Africa
10. Ms Laima Jureviciene  
Director of the Development  
Cooperation Department  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania
11. Ms Christiane Kesper  
Head, Division for International  
Development  
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Berlin
12. Mr Florian Koch  
Desk Officer, Africa Department  
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Berlin
13. Mr Marko Laine  
Counsellor  
Embassy of Finland
14. Mr Geert Laporte  
Deputy Director  
European Centre for Development  
Policy Management
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