A Mandate Is Not Enough
The Security Council and Peacekeeping

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- It is not enough to provide clear, credible and achievable mandates for peace operations. An accompanying peace process, mediation efforts and a strategy for transition are of equal importance. Another central aspect is the time needed to deploy a mission. All options for accelerating this task, including UN standby military assets, should be considered.

- The decision about the appropriate actor to implement a Security Council mandate should include consideration of whether the advantages of delegating the implementation to a regional organisation (financial relief for the UN, better knowledge of local conditions) compensate for the loss of steering capability and credible neutrality from extra-regional contributors.

- UN-commanded peacekeeping operations draw troops and money from different actors. This division of labour gives rise to criticism. As regards Western countries, small gestures – such as a moderate increase in troop deployment or the provision of high value assets, such as drones and helicopters – can have a strong impact.

- Several regional organisations can contribute significant capabilities for peace operations. Nevertheless, a lack of resources and political will impede the exploitation of this potential. The UN-SC should strive to realise these potentials within a cooperative UN framework.
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1. Introduction

It is often said that peacekeeping is the flagship activity of the United Nations (UN). In terms of media attention or the share of the overall UN budget, this is obviously true. Asked who is responsible for peace operations, most people would quickly suggest the UN Security Council (UN-SC), where the most powerful states on earth gather. This is obviously true, too, as a look in the UN Charter proves, which assigns the »primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security« (Art. 24) to the UN-SC.

Nevertheless, the troops (the Blue Helmets) deployed on the authorisation of the most powerful organ in the world are often perceived to be in a state of crisis and despair, at least from a Western perspective. Particularly in prominent conflicts, the UN seems to perform badly: the deployment of missions is slow (for example, in Chad), crucial capacities are lacking (for example, in Darfur), the protection of civilians fails (for example, in Eastern Congo) and scandals tarnish the image of missions over and over again (for example, in the Balkans). How is this possible? What is behind the simple connection between the UN-SC and peacekeeping?

From the Foundation of the UN to the Complex Missions of Today

Since the foundation of the United Nations, 66 missions (both UN-commanded and non-UN-commanded) have been mandated by the UN-SC. Over this long period, the conception of how to exercise the UN-SC’s responsibility has changed, as has the character of missions. The contemporary understanding of conflict resolution in a wider sense comprises the whole spectrum from mediation efforts, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping to peacebuilding and finally transition (exit from a mission). The UN-SC is active at all stages, although with a focus on peacekeeping and its related activities peacemaking and peacebuilding. The distinction between these overlapping elements of the process from conflict to peace is a recurring subject of academic debate. For the purpose of this short analysis, peacekeeping is understood as »a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers«, as it was defined in the so-called Capstone Doctrine, a central document on peacekeeping doctrine, published by the UN Secretariat in 2008. Between peacekeeping and peacebuilding there is not even a thin line: the nature of the relationship is something between an overlap and identity, depending on the area of scrutiny and the particular mission. Therefore, and to avoid conceptual misunderstandings, the term »peace operations« is used in general in this paper for all missions with a military component and mandated by the UN-SC.

Structure of the Argument

This paper briefly discusses some key issues related to the further development of peacekeeping and questions the role of the UN-SC in this process. First, the making of a peace operation will be explained briefly. Subsequently, four major construction sites for UN Peacekeeping and the UN-SC will be discussed. The first concerns handicaps in the implementation of a peacekeeping mandate – most prominently the issue of rapid deployment. The underlying question is how a rapid presence on the ground can be achieved in a given situation. In the next step, the major distinction between UN-commanded and non-UN-commanded peace operations will be discussed. Another kind of division of labour – that within an UN-commanded operation – is addressed in the next section. Following a particular focus of the international debate, the paper deepens this issue by discussing peacekeeping partnerships, in particular between the UN-SC and the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) as well as between the UN-SC and regional organisations. Arriving at the current agenda and prospective decisions, the long story of peacekeeping reforms is summarised and related to the UN-SC. Finally, the paper looks at peacekeeping with regard to the UN-SC, taking into account its current composition.

2. Mandating a UN peace operation

Peacekeeping as One Element of Conflict Management

In an ideal world – and also in doctrinal documents on conflict resolution – a peace operation is always only one

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element in the spectrum of conflict resolution efforts. The best outcome would be if preventive diplomacy and mediation efforts were able to prevent the emergence of a dangerous security situation which requires additional police or military forces in the form of a peace mission.

Reality shows, however, that some degree kind of »robust« support is needed in most attempts to solve conflicts. However, to avoid the danger of »throwing peacekeepers at conflicts«, the complementary character of peacekeeping and mediation must be underlined: a peace operation needs a peace process to have an achievable goal. The only variable which can be optimised is time, or more precisely: the appropriate composition of »peace tools« at the right moment. One thing which has been identified in this regard is the high importance of rapid deployment (see section 3).

We can now turn to the »peace tool« which is the focus of this paper: an UN peace operation.

The Basic Setup Sequence of Peacekeeping Operations

In the majority of cases, the establishment of a peace operation starts with an analysis of the conflict situation by the Secretariat before the Council commences discussion of the details of a particular operation. The Secretary-General will then make recommendations on the scope of the envisaged mission and the required resources. After that, the UN-SC takes action and adopts a mandate which authorises the operation for a limited period. The mandate contains not only the reasons for taking action, but also the legal framework which applies to the mission. In general, peacekeeping in the form of missions deployed in the conflict regions of the world is not even mentioned in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, the fundamentals of the Charter have been considered sufficient to establish the customary practice of UN peacekeeping. The reference to Chapter VII of the Charter – which is contained in most contemporary mandates for peacekeeping operations – signals that the UN-SC authorises the mission to use force if necessary to implement the mandate. Nevertheless, as this reference is nowadays more or less a formality, there often remains much room for interpretation. This leads in some cases to uncertainty for the forces on the ground and can serve as an incentive for potential spoilers to test how »robustly« local force commanders interpret the mandate. On the other hand, the fact that peacekeeping is not set in stone (because it does not explicitly exist in the Charter) provides political leeway for adapting the practice of peacekeeping to new challenges – and to avoid the Sisyphean task of changing the legal fundamentals.

Requirements for Peacekeeping Mandates:
Clear, Credible, Achievable

A general and permanent concern about mandating peace operations is that mandates should be clear, credible and achievable. Obviously, this is not always the case. »Clear« means that mandates should be formulated concretely and unambiguously. This regularly arises with regard to the aforementioned problem of the use of force. A good example of clarity in this regard is S/RES/1975 (2011) which explicitly authorised the mission in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) »to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population«. The aim of »credible« and »achievable« mandates refers to an appropriate allocation of resources, which needs to match the tasks for which the mission is designated.

The challenges involved are huge. First, the range of tasks of current peace operations encompasses not only ending the fighting between conflict parties, but also the protection of civilians, the restoration and/or extension of the authority of the host state, disarmament and re-integration of combatants, de-mining and other tasks which extend partly into the area of peacebuilding. This issue, also known as the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus, was already addressed by DPKO which formulated three tasks for peacekeeping operations in this context:

- articulating peacebuilding priorities;
- enabling other actors (national and international) to implement peacebuilding tasks;
- implementing early peacebuilding tasks by the peacekeepers themselves.4


3. In addition, a monthly so-called »horizon scanning« briefing by the Secretariat’s Department for Political Affairs has been held since November 2010 to detect emerging conflicts early.

Second, conflict environments are often demanding in geographical as well as security terms. Well-known examples of this kind of operational theatre are the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Darfur, where the huge landlocked territories and the multiple factions alone constitute a challenge. For UN-commanded operations, with their notorious lack of tactical airlift and sufficient force level, these operations can quickly turn into a nightmare.

3. Four Major Challenges for the UN’s Peacekeeping Efforts

To make clear what can be expected – and needs to be done – by the UN-SC, it is necessary to shed light on central construction sites of contemporary UN peacekeeping.

3.1 Rapid Deployment

For the credibility of a mission, the timeliness of deployment is of overwhelming importance. Nevertheless, in many cases much time elapses between issuing the mandate and the full deployment of a UN-commanded peace operation in the field (outsourced, non-UN-commanded operations are often more rapidly deployed, see below). In some cases – for example in Darfur – missions do not reach their authorised strength for years.

Different Conceptual Solutions for Rapid Deployment

Various approaches have been discussed to improve this situation. The most utopian, but nevertheless conceptually very attractive proposal is a standby-force which is UN-controlled or at least rapidly deployable at the UN-SC’s behest. The attempt that came closest to this idea was the Standby High Readiness Brigade, which was predominantly maintained by Scandinavian states and existed from 1996 to 2009. Such rapidly deployable forces could serve as bridging missions, preparing the ground for a following regular UN-commanded peace operation or remaining in reserve over the horizon for cases of urgent need. Of course, these tasks can also be performed by national military detachments (such as the United Kingdom’s Royal Marines in Sierra Leone in 2000), coalitions headed by a lead-state (such as the Australia-backed INTERFET in East Timor from 1999 to 2000) or by contingents of regional organisations (such as EUPFOR Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2006). However, the aforementioned operations not only show the feasibility of rapid deployment – they also underline the need for powerful actors to take the lead, which presupposes their willingness and/or matched interests.

Rapid deployment is so essential that all options should be pondered: a standing UN Emergency Peace Service, pre-payment for reinforcements on standby (for active TCCs backing their own troops already deployed) or the procurement (or permanent charter) of a small number of enablers such as a strategic airlift wing or a helicopter squadron. This would be in line with the new global service delivery model which is proposed in the Global Field Support Strategy of DFS and DPKO (A/64/633). The shift from mission-centred to a modularised global approach in terms of logistics could, for example, be complemented by regional tactical airlift capacities, while the strategic airlift capacities could be attached to the global service centres.

A Two-step Mandating Process as a Pragmatic First Step?

Prior to the question of rapid deployment, another proposal for an enhanced mandating process with the consequence of more rapid force projection has recently been brought back into discussion by the Indian presidency of the UN-SC in August 2011. The idea originally dating back to the landmark Brahimi report of 2000 is to have »a two-stage mandate generation process wherein the Security Council can leave a resolution in draft form until such time as the Secretariat is able to confirm or deny that the required troops and critical support elements are available from contributing Member States« (S/2011/496). This procedure offers at least two advantages: first, designated contingents could prepare earlier and hence be more rapidly deployed in theatre. Second, this process would probably have positive

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6. As proposed by the UNEPS initiative, see http://www.globalactionpw.org/?page_id=60.
effects on the peacekeeping record of the member states of the Security Council. Currently, there is no positive correlation between the membership of the Council and an engagement on the ground. But if a decision would reach its serious stage after force generation, this would be an incentive for the UN-SC’s members also to do their utmost to keep the High Body effective.

3.2 Mandate and Control? UN-commanded and Non-UN-commanded Peacekeeping

The Delegation of Peace Operations to Regional Organizations

Besides the aforementioned option to enlist contributions by single member states or coalitions, the UN-SC can also decide to delegate the entire peace operation to a regional organization. The act of delegation is based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The legal framework which applies for the operation, however, is laid down in the mandate, which is often based on Chapter VII of the Charter (see Section 2).

The Council frequently makes use of this possibility: the biggest part of current peacekeeping in terms of personnel deployed is implemented by organisations such as NATO and the AU, legitimised by a UN-SC mandate. The NATO-led International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan alone has more than 130,000 troops on the ground, compared to 98,000 uniformed personnel in all current 15 UN-commanded missions (as of August 2011). In total, there were nearly 157,000 military personnel in non-UN-commanded missions in 2010.

Advantages: Coherent Contingents and Relief for Strained UN Resources

For comprehensive international efforts to maintain peace and security the missions which are mandated, but not commanded by the UN have a number of considerable benefits. First of all, the member states acting on the basis of a UN-SC mandate not only contribute the troops, but also pay for the mission. Comparing ISAF with all UN-commanded missions together, the aggregated budget for all NATO troops in Afghanistan (an estimated 50 billion USD per year) and for UN-commanded peacekeeping (7.06 billion USD for 2011-2012) shows clearly that the UN is dependent on other actors to implement peace operations – assuming that the concerned states contribute their troops not least because of the nexus between payment and direct leadership. A second advantage is the common pre-deployment experience that troops of regional organisations often share. This is in particular true for NATO forces who conduct training on a regularly basis. Besides better interoperability, they are more rapidly deployable due to this common training.

Main Disadvantages: Less Control and Allegations of Misuse of the UN-SC’s Authority

On the other hand, the UN-SC clearly has less control over these operations than it has over UN-commanded missions. Regarding the latter, the reporting mechanisms allow close consultations between the missions’ leadership and the UN-SC. Briefings of this kind are held by the Secretary General and regularly through his Special Representatives, but there are also annual meetings with force commanders to feed field experience into the Council’s considerations.7

In contrast, non-UN-commanded operations tend naturally to develop their own dynamics. This phenomenon is even more likely in conflicts where the consent of the conflict parties is lacking. This is of course the case in missions which are better described as peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping operations, such as the intervention in Libya, which was mandated by S/RES/1973 (2011). After adoption, the leaders of the coalition forces interpreted their mandate – to protect civilians from atrocities – amply to act effectively as the rebels’ air force and helped to defeat the regime of Muammar Gaddafi.

Non-UN-commanded operations, such as ISAF in Afghanistan, which aims to stabilise an existing government and extend its authority, consequently fall under the label of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. They are also open to this change when there is no consent of all conflict parties to the deployment of the mission. And indeed, ISAF’s job is not the separation of mostly equal conflict parties, participating in a common peace process, but rather to defend the fragile state authority

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against an enemy. This might change in the course of the transition until 2014. But the development of counterinsurgency as a central task of ISAF and the subsequent setup of the NATO forces in Afghanistan could anyway be considered as a dynamic which was predominantly triggered and pursued by the executing organisation, not by the mandating UN-SC.

On the one hand, this is comprehensible because in a non-UN-commanded operation, national governments have to explain casualties to their own public and cannot pass responsibility to the UN. When the conflict environment is hostile, a robust posture is self-evident in this regard. On the other hand, such behaviour is regarded critically by those who suspect especially Western countries of misusing the UN-SC to legitimise national policies. This was the case with the intervention in Libya where many African states saw their prejudice confirmed that powerful states can act how they want and still remain legitimised by the UN-SC.

The allegation of pursuing national policies and using the UN-SC to legitimise them is one well-known criticism. Another is the inevitable preference of states to deploy their own troops in non-UN-commanded operations rather than in UN-commanded operations.

3.3 Division of Labour in UN-commanded Peacekeeping

A little different from the picture previously illustrated – mainly Western forces carrying the burden of peacekeeping in terms of numbers – the impression changes when we look at UN-commanded peace operations. A distinctive specialisation can be observed between those countries that provide the troops, those that contribute financial resources and those that decide about the mandate.

Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs)

The specialisation of stakeholders can be derived by comparing some numbers: regarding the troop contributing countries, a group of countries from South Asia and Africa – basically Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Egypt, Nigeria, Nepal and Rwanda – have dominated the top ten for years. The top five of them contributed together more than 35,000 troops in 2010, each of them more than the first Western Country (Italy) on the list, which ranks fourteenth with less than 2,000 troops. A similar picture crystallises for contributions of military observers and civilian police. By contrast, the financial contributions (which correspond to the economic strength of the member states) are predominantly made by Western states, altogether more than 80 per cent of the budget.

Representation in the UN-SC

Turning to the decision-making side, what are the driving forces in the UN-SC? Recent studies underpin, not surprisingly, the notion of the dominance of Western countries in the agenda-setting and policymaking of the body. These are the permanent members United States, France and the United Kingdom. Besides academic analysis, the ongoing calls for reform of the Security Council, aimed at changes in terms of veto power, permanent membership and regional representation, underline this observation. In particular, traditionally strong TCCs cite their peacekeeping record as a reference for their claim to permanent membership.

Representation in the UN Secretariat

A look at the administrative side of peacekeeping would also be useful since the central actor that leads and manages UN peacekeeping day after day is the UN Secretariat. A few numbers suggest the clear dominance of Western countries. As of 31 October 2010, 317 staff members from the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and Germany (to mention the Western countries with the biggest representation) served in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS), compared to a total of 74 staff members originating from India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Uruguay (some of the most important troop and police contributing countries). This relation is due to the nexus between financial contributions and deployment of personnel to UN posts.

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
Nevertheless, and not questioning the independence of the international officers at the UN, it is obvious that it makes a difference in terms of agenda-setting and influencing operational details if a member state has more or less close connections with the UN system. Having said that, these considerations are predominantly of relevance for daily activities. The big decisions on where to go remain with the UN-SC and especially its five permanent members. But in times of lack of interest or low activity in the Council, the sum of decisions arising from daily work can aggregate to exercise a significant influence on the course of the whole system.

Division of Labour Causes Tensions

This division of labour is not necessarily a problem, but it is likely to cause tensions. First, the TCCs could suspect that they have to sacrifice lives where others only give money and political directions. Second, the countries which provide the money might judge that their money – which is always needed somewhere else, particularly in times of economic crisis – is not being spent efficiently. Third, the decisionmakers often have reason to ask for more of both resources, in cash and in kind. Small mutual steps towards the other group might have a major impact. A traditional (Western) financial contributor could provide some high value assets, such as airlift, intelligence or command and control capacities. Traditional TCCs could more willingly accept and implement management tools to improve financial accountability. And UN-SC members, finally, could also show a higher engagement for the implementation of the mandates they have adopted. Re-hatting or re-assigning contingents who are set free due to the envisaged downsizing in other conflict theatres could make this politically viable.

Attempts to Strengthen Cooperation between the UN-SC and the TCCs

The UN-SC has made several attempts to strengthen its cooperation with the TCCs, especially within the past two years. The debate started with a French-British initiative in 2009 and continues today with the latest debate concerning a UN-SC presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/17) dating back to 26 August 2011. There, the Council confirms its willingness to facilitate the communication with the TCCs and it recognizes the need to improve its access to military advice, including from Troop Contributing Countries, and intends to pursue its work on mechanisms to that effect. This can also be seen as an attempt to take steps toward the already mentioned topic: the need for formulation of clear, credible and achievable mandates, which is also affirmed in this statement.

Cooperation with Regional Organisations on Peacekeeping

The results of cooperation with regional organisations to facilitate the outsourcing of peacekeeping in accordance with Chapter VIII vary. Regarding the African Union, there has been some progress on strengthening its peacekeeping capabilities, at least in terms of institutional developments. Despite a precarious lack of resources, exacerbated by the financial crisis, further steps are under way. The UN-SC expects in this regard a report by the Secretary-General which shall define a strategic vision for UN-AU cooperation in peace and security this year. This will be the latest in a series of steps undertaken to improve cooperation between the AU and the UN. The first was the so-called Prodi report.
(A/63/666S/2008/813) which recommended, among other things, two mechanisms to support AU peacekeeping (a case-by-case one for missions and a more strategic one for capacity-building). Consultative meetings between the UN-SC and the AU Peace and Security Council, increasingly close cooperation between the two secretariats and the establishment of a joint task force on peace and security in September 2010 have been further developments recently. Nevertheless, »securing sustainable, predictable and flexible financing (…) remains a key challenge«, as the Secretary-General’s 2010 report on this issue urges.

Turning to other regions, in South-East Asia the ASEAN countries are developing a peace and security community which is supposed to be in place by 2015. Further steps, which are incorporated in the three-year work programme of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting,11 include the establishment of a network of peacekeeping training centres to conduct joint training, planning and sharing of experience and the assessment of capabilities and needs for further peace support activities. In the European Union, there are discussions on the deployment of the EU’s Battlegroups – in part or as a whole, on a battalion basis. Regarding military capabilities, these forces are promising and past deployments of smaller contingents consisting of Battlegroup members have proven effective. The aforementioned advantages of NATO forces – in particular a high level of training and up-to-date equipment, together with excellent command and control capacities – also applies to EU forces. Nevertheless, the EU has not mandated new bigger peace operations – or support missions for UN operations – in the past few years and there is no sign of a change. This is deplorable in particular because of the steps undertaken in the 2000s when, beginning with the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Crisis Management12 in 2003, both organisations developed a framework for close cooperation on various levels. In particular with regard to the aforementioned issue of rapid deployment, there was a feeling that the EU could change this situation with the deployment of their BGs as bridging missions (for example, Artemis for MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). The picture today is different: the EU is instead focusing on a regional approach and fostering regional ownership with capacity-building measures, for example, via the African Peace Facility, which has re-ceived 740 million euros since 2004.13 This reflects the EU’s basic principle of subsidiarity, but might also give the impression that the EU wants to pay its way out of having to put troops on the ground.

4. Current Reform Efforts in UN Peacekeeping and the Role of the Security Council

The Brahimi report of 2000 (A/55/305 – S/2000/809) can be seen as the current peacekeeping reforms’ starting point. Since then, much effort has been made to overcome the problems caused by the various surges in peacekeeping during the 2000s. The latest of these reform steps is the New Horizons Process, based on a non-paper14 which was issued by DPKO and the DFS in 2009. It focuses on four main areas:

Policy Development

First, the area of policy development includes the important questions of protection of civilians, robustness and the peacebuilding-peacekeeping nexus. Protection of civilians remains a difficult topic, not least due to the manner in which S/RES/1973 (2011) on Libya was implemented. Nevertheless, DPKO has developed a mission-wide framework to clarify how this mission-wide task can be implemented. Progress on robustness is less visible, however. Presumably it will also depend on the outcome of the current debate on the correlated topic of consent, which not only refers to classic consent to the deployment of a UN peace operation, but further to the peace process and the different provisions of the mandate. For the important peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus, interrelated with the question of transition currently under discussion, the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations asked DPKO in its last report to finalise »a strategy for critical early peacebuilding tasks undertaken by peacekeeping missions« (A/65/19 para. 10). This is still due. Finally, the question

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of how to act if the consent of the conflict parties is lacking or, even worse, is withdrawn in the course of a conflict, needs ongoing attention. Doctrinal solutions to this problem may perhaps not be expected but rather changes to the manner in which the UN-SC creates new mandates.

Developing and Enhancing Capabilities

Second, the aim of further developing and enhancing capabilities is in line with the capability-driven approach of the New Horizons non-paper. This does not mean that numbers are less important, even though there was a trend towards the consolidation of troop numbers in 2010 (which might have led to such an assumption). However, participants in the current debate see promising room for improvement in the capabilities of the military as well as in terms of civilian personnel. An important step for the latter was the release of the so-called Civilian Capacity Review (A/65/747 – S/2011/85), a report dealing with the challenge of civilian expertise in post-conflict environments, in March 2011.

The Global Field Support Strategy and Enhanced Management

A third strand of the current reform efforts is the Global Field Support Strategy which aims basically at shifting from a mission-centred to a global approach for procurement and logistics. This includes modularisation, shared back-offices and other measures aimed at enhancing efficiency.

The fourth area of planning and oversight focuses on enhanced consultation procedures between the different actors, as well as improvement of field managers’ accountability and a review of command and control mechanisms.

Technical vs. Political Peacekeeping Reform

Most of the more technical initiatives are initiated and often driven by the Secretariat, but it is obvious that they are dependent on the UN-SC’s backing. In this regard, it should be mentioned that the Brahimi report could not have had the impact it did without support from the UN-SC. In its own – more political than technical – domain, the UN-SC is also able to initiate action, and it has done so in recent years: one might mention the initiatives of France and the United Kingdom in 2009 and the revitalisation of the UN-SC’s Working Group on Peacekeeping.

Its members’ commitment to enhancing UN peacekeeping is the most important resource the UN-SC can contribute to peacekeeping reforms. This is not easy, however, because the UN-SC’s schedule is fully occupied with day-to-day crisis management. But the Council has shown several times that it is able to slip the shackles of daily business. Actually, driven by some important TCCs on the Council (see also Chapter 8), cooperation between peacekeeping stakeholders is a prominent agenda item. The UN-SC has shown that it has a strong interest in enhancing this partnership, which can be seen in the discussions relating to the TCCs’ concerns and, for example, in the spirit of S/PRST/2011/17.

The manner of formulating new mandates is an indicator of the seriousness of the UN-SC’s commitment to reform.

5. Prospects of Continuing UN-SC Commitment to UN Peacekeeping

There are good reasons to expect continuous engagement in peacekeeping and peacekeeping reform on the part of the UN-SC in the coming months.

Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Require Ongoing Efforts

First, it has become clear that the consolidation phase in peacekeeping was a short one. New need for action is on the horizon, for example, in Libya, South Sudan, Somalia and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, also due to financial shortages, the debate turned quickly to political missions and the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding or in other words: rapid exit from a peacekeeping operation. Of course, peacebuilding at an early stage, provided by political missions or the political components of complex operations, can avoid the problem of the declining leverage of military deployments by building domestic capacities for sustainable post-conflict
It should therefore be imperative to strengthen political missions and the »suit contributing countries«. Therefore, the quest for alternatives to decade-long military deployments has been welcomed, also by those experts who have observed a lack of creativity in the UN-SC’s policymaking which sometimes seems only to recognise the options »don’t react« and »send Blue Helmets«. Furthermore, the second option was also chosen in situations in which the critical precondition of a peace process was not present.

The UN-SC is well advised to make use of a wider range of options for peacemaking and peacekeeping. This lesson seems to have been learned, as the renewal of the debate about preventive diplomacy by the Secretary-General’s report in autumn 2011 shows. However, the UN-SC also needs to strengthen its robust tool of peacekeeping because only a well-balanced approach which includes a military (and possibly deterrent), as well as a diplomatic component is able to unfold the full potential of each. The capability-driven approach currently being pursued will hopefully help to make UN peacekeeping as effective as possible. Keeping in mind the current budgetary strains, it is also necessary to push reforms forward aimed at making peacekeeping more (cost) efficient.

Another reason for focused work on peacekeeping issues in the coming months is the composition of the UN-SC. On the one hand, there are member states that have a strong interest in a functioning UN peacekeeping system. There is the United States, which needs to downsize its global military engagement, but also France and the United Kingdom which have been engaged in conflicts where they might want to reduce their presence (Ivory Coast and Afghanistan) and also need some follow-up in Libya. On the other hand, India, Nigeria and Brazil are three high-profile troop contributors in the UN-SC which have a genuine interest in improving relations between the UN-SC and the TCCs. India showed this willingness during its presidency in August 2011, chairing the session on peacekeeping operations. Nigeria, which is taking over the presidency in October, might also want to leave a mark before its term ends at the end of the year. Finally, if Pakistan is elected for its seventh term on the Security Council in October, another important TCC will re-enter the stage and make sure that peacekeeping reform remains high on the agenda.

6. Summary and Conclusion

This paper underlines that the UN-SC needs to deal with a number of issues in order to adapt peacekeeping to contemporary challenges.

Summary

First, peace operations have to be deployed more rapidly. Many different ways of doing this are imaginable, from more enabling assets such as airlift capacities to an explicit assignment of lead nations as compulsory elements of a peace operation. In addition, a two-step mandating process should be considered.

Second, the decision between only mandating or mandating and commanding a peace operation by the UN-SC is of critical importance. Despite the many advantages of delegating an operation to regional or other organisations, there currently exists an imbalance to the detriment of UN-commanded operations.

Third, this imbalance continues in the division of labour between the different stakeholders in UN peacekeeping. Steps by each side are necessary to avoid impediments for the upcoming conflict resolution efforts.

Finally, the peacekeeping partnerships with single TCCs and particularly the regional organisations have a lot of potential. Nevertheless, more resources (AU), political will (EU) and time (ASEAN) are needed to realise this potential. Therefore, the classic form of engagement, performed by single member states, remains essential.

Conclusion

The UN-SC’s major task of securing peace and international security can be regarded as a complex system with a multitude of decisions that often have to be made at
the same time. Providing clear, credible and achievable mandates is essential, but not enough. The Council and its members also need to consider the various links between their decisions and implementation on the ground. The reforms which are under way can help to establish more standard procedures and more predictability to create some leeway, making it possible to address the most important issues, such as emerging crises. They deserve the utmost attention because avoiding outbreaks of violence should be the aim of all actors concerned about security.

Better standards and procedures alone are insufficient. The authority, effectiveness and efficiency of the UN and in particular of the UN-SC depend primarily on the commitment of the member states.