

A stylized world map composed of a grid of grey dots, with several dots highlighted in red to represent specific countries or regions.

Enmity into Amity: How Peace Breaks Out

CHARLES A. KUPCHAN
April 2011

- A theory of stable peace should draw on all three main intellectual traditions of international relations theory: realism, liberalism and constructivism. Theorizing about the sources of peace not only yields intellectual insights, but also provides valuable guidance to policymakers about how to transform interstate enmity into amity.
- Although each case of rapprochement unfolds along a unique path, they all follow the same basic sequence: unilateral accommodation sets the stage for reciprocal restraint, which then provides a foundation for societal integration and, ultimately, the generation of new narratives that transform oppositional identities into a shared identity.
- As for the causes of peace, rapprochement emerges as a product of engagement, not coercion: peace breaks out when adversaries settle their differences, not when one side forces the other into submission. Commercial integration is much less important than commonly presumed; diplomacy, not economic interdependence, is the currency of peace. Managing the domestic politics of rapprochement is essential to securing reconciliation. Nonetheless, especially during the initial phases of rapprochement between antagonistic states, regime type is not a determinant of outcomes; democracies and autocracies alike can make for reliable partners in peace.
- Third parties – outside powers or international organizations – can play an important role in facilitating rapprochement. However, the adversaries themselves must ultimately commit to engage in direct negotiations and settle the disputes that divide them.



Contents

1. Introduction	2
2. International Relations Theory and the Problem of Peace – The Need for Eclecticism ..	2
2.1 Realism	2
2.2 Liberalism	3
2.3 Constructivism	3
3. How Peace Breaks Out – A Four-Phase Process	3
3.1 Unilateral Accommodation	4
3.2 Reciprocal Restraint	4
3.3 Societal Integration	5
3.4 Generation of New Narratives and Identities	5
4. The Causes of Peace	6
4.1 Engagement Is Not Appeasement	6
4.2 Regime Type Is a Poor Indicator of the Potential for Enemies to Become Friends	6
4.3 Diplomacy, Not Economic Interdependence, Is the Currency of Peace	7
4.4 The Centrality of Domestic Politics	7
5. The Role of Third Parties	8
6. Conclusions	9

1. Introduction

Scholars, policy analysts, and journalists love to write about war. Books about armed conflict regularly make it onto best-seller lists. The front pages of the world's main newspapers are often dominated by articles about Afghanistan, Iraq, or some other war zone. Meanwhile, peace gets relatively little attention from either scholars or journalists. Programs in peace studies are, especially in the United States, a rare breed. And it is a safe bet that German newspapers will not any time soon be running headlines that read: »All Quiet on the Franco-German Border.«

This intellectual preoccupation with war is hardly surprising. As Thomas Hardy once observed, »War makes rattling good history; but peace is poor reading.« When wars occur, there is all too much action, noise, and drama. When peace breaks out, nothing happens; there is no action or noise, and often little drama. The diplomats do their work, but often behind the scenes. For most observers, peace is a non-event – the dog that does not bark – and is therefore chronically understudied.

Even if this intellectual bias might be understandable, it is unfortunate. Around the world, areas that were once the sites of bitter conflict are now devoid of strategic rivalry. The United States and Great Britain were once fierce enemies but now enjoy a »special relationship.« Western Europe has finally left behind centuries of bloodshed and has become a zone of stable peace. Indonesia and Malaysia settled their differences in the 1960s, and have since anchored ASEAN, a regional grouping that has preserved peace in Southeast Asia since 1967. The same goes for Brazil and Argentina, which were for many decades hostile rivals, but since the 1980s have amiably anchored stability and regional integration in South America.

Even though these examples make clear that stable peace does indeed break out, we know precious little about when and how lasting peace takes root. Rectifying this gap in our knowledge may enable scholars and policymakers alike to contribute more effectively to making and preserving peace. If we spend more time studying peace, we might do a better job of avoiding war.

2. International Relations Theory and the Problem of Peace – The Need for Eclecticism

The main schools in the field of international relations – realism, liberalism, and constructivism – all have something to contribute to explaining the outbreak of peace. At the same time, each paradigm has its own shortcomings. The exploration of stable peace, like many other issues tackled by scholars of international politics, has suffered from the intellectual barriers that accompany theoretical divides. Realist accounts tend to be pitted against liberal ones, and rationalist accounts against constructivist alternatives. Insufficient attention has been paid to approaches that cut across paradigmatic divides. Indeed, theoretical eclecticism is precisely what is needed to open up new horizons in the study of peace.

2.1 Realism

On the surface, the realist paradigm is inconsistent with the study of peace. Realists maintain that the preoccupation of states with power and security makes international competition inescapable. But some scholars working in this tradition – so-called *defensive realists* – argue that it is important to distinguish between status quo states, which seek security, and greedy or revisionist states, which seek power. When a region is populated only by status quo states that do not threaten each other, they should be able to avoid rivalry.¹

On the basis of this logic, defensive realists are able to explain peaceful coexistence – the mere absence of war. But they are unable to offer an account of deeper forms of peace – those that entail not just the absence of rivalry, but also partnership and amity. Within the EU, for example, war is not just in temporary abeyance, but it has been eliminated as a legitimate tool of statecraft. Member states are not cautiously letting down their guard because they see their neighbors as non-threatening; rather, they are engaging in a project of economic

1. See, for example, Charles L. Glaser, »The Security Dilemma Revisited«, *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171–201; Andrew Kydd, »Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other«, *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114–155; Andrew Kydd, »Game Theory and the Spiral Model«, *World Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997); Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

and political integration that has entirely transformed Europe's strategic landscape. Simply put, the existence of the EU defies the core tenets of realism.

One of the great strengths of realism is its insistence on the degree to which states are always concerned with considerations of power and security. But one of its great weaknesses is its inability to explain transformational change – a weakness stemming from its focus on material power and its exclusion of normative and ideational factors.

2.2 Liberalism

In contrast to realism, which emphasizes the international system's competitive nature, the liberal tradition emphasizes the potential for peace. It focuses on how institutions, international law, ideational convergence, and regime type can tame the international system, mute its competitive incentives, and promote cooperation.² Nonetheless, liberalism still adheres to a conceptual framework in which the international system comprises self-regarding, sovereign states – even if it submits that instruments are available to induce discrete episodes of international collaboration.

Stable peace, however, entails a far deeper transformation in interstate relations than that envisaged by liberals. It is ultimately the product not of the rationalist calculations that predominate in the liberal paradigm, but of societal bonds that endow interstate relations with a social character. Liberalism correctly emphasizes that international institutions, ideas, and domestic regimes potentially have peace-causing effects. But it falls short when it comes to explaining the emergence of societies of states.

2.3 Constructivism

The constructivist school's insights about the ability of changes in state identity to facilitate transformation of the international system make it a natural theoretical

starting point for the study of stable peace.³ Furthermore, constructivism recognizes the social character of interstate relations and therefore is well-equipped to theorize about societies of states. Nonetheless, constructivist accounts of international society often distance themselves too far from the material notions of power that inform realism and liberalism, thereby overlooking the important role played by rationalist conceptions of strategic necessity. In addition, many constructivists leave unanswered important questions concerning when and how changes in state identity take place and make possible the emergence of international society.

This essay acknowledges the strengths and weaknesses of these three intellectual traditions by developing a theory of stable peace that draws on all of them.⁴ Realism adequately explains the initial onset of reconciliation. Strategic necessity induces a state faced with an unmanageable array of threats to seek to befriend an existing adversary; resource constraints make accommodation and cooptation preferable to balancing and confrontation. The process next moves into the realm of liberalism. Domestic attributes – regime type, coalitional alignments, and substate interest groups – come into play, with societal integration facilitating and deepening the process of reconciliation. A constructivist perspective best explains the final stage of the process. Changes in political discourse erode the self/other distinctions that are at the foundation of interstate competition, replacing them with a shared identity.

3. How Peace Breaks Out – A four phase process

How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace examines twenty different cases of stable peace, ranging from the thirteenth century to the present and spanning the globe.⁵ This study revealed that stable peace breaks out through a four-phase process. The process is elucidated in this section, using rapprochement between the United States and the United Kingdom (1895–1906) as an illustrative case study.

2. Classic works in the liberal tradition include: Immanuel Kant, »Perpetual Peace« (1795), in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *The Philosophy of Kant* (New York: Modern Library, 1949); and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (New York: Longman, 2000).

3. See Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

4. The arguments in this essay are developed in depth in: Charles A. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2010).

5. The cases examined in *How Enemies Become Friends* are attached as Appendix I.

3.1 Unilateral Accommodation

Reconciliation begins with an act of *unilateral accommodation*: a state confronted with multiple threats seeks to remove one of the sources of its insecurity by exercising strategic restraint and making concessions to an adversary. Such concessions constitute a peace offering, an opening gambit intended to signal benign as opposed to hostile intent. Through an act of accommodation, the initiator indicates that it does not have predatory intent and that it believes the intentions of the target state are also benign, sending a clear signal of its desire to step away from competition.

In the case of the United States and Great Britain, this diplomatic breakthrough occurred in 1895–1896. In 1895, a border dispute broke out between Venezuela and British Guiana. The United States deemed the dispute to be in its sphere of influence, and requested that Great Britain submit the issue to neutral arbitration. London initially rejected the request. Washington was then beset by blustery talk of the use of armed force against Britain. Faced with the prospect of a potential Anglo-American war, the Royal Navy informed the British cabinet that it did not have sufficient assets to go to do battle with the United States without exposing other more important strategic positions. London promptly backed down in its dispute with Washington, submitted the issue to arbitration, and effectively acknowledged the US claim to hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

London was motivated by strategic exigency, not altruism. In the words of Stephen Rock, »Britain’s cultivation of American friendship was part of a broader policy of imperial consolidation, a cautious retreat dictated by the exigencies of her strategic position«. »Although their principal concern in both the short and long term was to avoid war with America,« Rock writes, »they were also eager to secure the fiscal and strategic benefits associated with the elimination of the United States as a potential adversary.«⁶ Nonetheless, London’s readiness to acquiesce to Washington constituted a bold opening move; Britain accommodated the United States in order to send a signal of benign intent and open the door to potential rapprochement.

6. Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 36; and Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000), p. 30.

3.2 Reciprocal Restraint

Phase two entails the practice of *reciprocal restraint*. The state that was the target of accommodation responds in kind to the initiator’s offer of good will. The two countries then trade concessions, each cautiously stepping away from rivalry as it entertains the prospect that competition may abate and eventually give way to programmatic cooperation. Both parties readily practice accommodation and expect reciprocity; cautious testing gives way to a purposeful effort to dampen rivalry and advance reconciliation.

When confronted with Britain’s willingness to accommodate US demands, Washington responded in kind. The United States did not take advantage of London’s compliant stance by increasing its demands or pressing for a resolution that would have been disadvantageous to British interests. Indeed, Washington backed away from its initial insistence that Venezuela’s entire claim be arbitrated, instead agreeing to Britain’s request that certain districts be excluded from the jurisdiction of the tribunal. When the dispute over Venezuela’s border was resolved in favor of the British claim, Washington readily accepted the decision. The United States also practiced reciprocity in its handling of a separate dispute that had arisen over the hunting of seals. At the same time that the two parties were seeking a resolution of the Venezuela question, Britain was pressing the United States for damages incurred by US interference with British sealing vessels in the Bering Sea. Washington agreed to settle this disagreement by establishing a tribunal of arbitration.

Thereafter, rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain entailed a sustained period of reciprocal accommodation. The two countries resolved through negotiation or arbitration disputes over the US desire to build and fortify the Panama Canal and the border between Alaska and Canada. When the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898, Britain was the only European power to support the United States and welcome Washington’s imperial expansion into the Pacific. In a conversation with President McKinley, the US ambassador to London explicitly endorsed a US strategy of reciprocity: »What seems called for as [sic] reciprocation of so much friendliness. I think the present attitude of the British Government and people is most valuable to us, and may be still more so in the future.«⁷ Between 1896

7. Lionel M. Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics, 1898–1906* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 22.

and 1898, the practice of reciprocal restraint enabled the United States and Great Britain to dampen decades of pitched rivalry and lay the foundation for a durable rapprochement.

3.3 Societal Integration

The third phase in the onset of stable peace entails the deepening of *societal integration* between the states engaged in reconciliation. Until this point, rapprochement is primarily an elite phenomenon, restricted to the decision-makers, diplomats, and military personnel engaged in statecraft and the pursuit of reconciliation. In the third phase, rapprochement broadens its societal base; regular contact between the states in question extends to bureaucrats, private-sector elites, and ordinary citizens. Interest groups that benefit from closer relations begin to invest in and lobby for the further reduction of economic and political barriers, adding momentum to the process of reconciliation.

As Anglo-American rapprochement advanced into this third phase, business communities on both sides of the Atlantic lent their support. At a dinner meeting of the New York Chamber of Commerce in November 1898, the participants, against the backdrop of the British and American flags, opened the evening by singing »God Save the Queen« as well as »The Star Spangled Banner.« The Anglo-American Committee was established on both the sides of the Atlantic. The charter founding the New York branch was signed by over 1,000 leading opinion makers and called for »an intimate and enduring friendship between these two kindred peoples.«⁸ Opinion in the press and among the British and American publics followed suit. After the Spanish-American War, according to Robert George Neale, »Public opinion in Great Britain outside court circles was almost unanimous in its support for the United States action against Spain in both the Caribbean and the Pacific.«⁹ A similar shift took place in public attitudes in the United States. A diplomat in Washington noted that »unanimous, or almost unanimous friendliness to England is now manifested by the Press throughout the length

and breadth of the country ... pass[ing] the bound of moderation in as great degree as the dislike and distrust of yesterday.«¹⁰

3.4 Generation of New Narratives and Identities

The fourth and final phase entails the *generation of new narratives and identities*. Through elite statements, popular culture (media, literature, theater), and items laden with political symbolism, such as charters, flags, and anthems, the states in question embrace a new domestic discourse that enables the emerging partners to hold benign identities of each other. The distinctions between self and other erode, giving way to communal identities and a shared sense of solidarity, completing the onset of stable peace.

The final phase in the onset of Anglo-American rapprochement entailed the generation of a new narrative of the other – one that eliminated oppositional identities and blurred self/other distinctions. This change in narrative had three distinct elements. First, both British and American elites began to refer regularly to the friendship emerging between their countries. After the United States colonized the Philippines, *The Times* not only endorsed the move, but referred to Americans as »kinfolks.«¹¹ Richard Olney, who had been the US secretary of state when rapprochement began in 1896, called Britain America's »most natural friend.«¹² A discourse of hostility was giving way to one of amity.

Second, officials and opinion makers on both sides referred with increasing frequency to the racial and cultural bonds between their two peoples. In June 1898, Lord Coleridge claimed that the United States and Britain »have a common kinship of race, we have one language, we have one literature, we have one law.«¹³ He made this statement at an Anglo-American banquet in a London hotel; the backdrop was a flag in which the American and British designs had been merged. Olney in a speech in 1898 noted »the close community ...

8. Stuart Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1894–1904* (East Brunswick, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1981), pp. 119–120.

9. Robert G. Neale, *Great Britain and United States Expansion: 1898–1900* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1966), pp. 134–135.

10. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, p. 44.

11. Neale, *Great Britain and United States Expansion*, p. 90.

12. »Olney Talks at Harvard,« *New York Times*, March 3, 1898.

13. »Anglo-American Banquet,« *The London Mail*, reprinted in *New York Times*, June 19, 1898.

in origin, speech, thought, literature, institutions, ideals – in the kind and degree of civilization enjoyed by both.«¹⁴

Third, Britons and Americans began to state plainly that war between their countries was becoming unthinkable. In 1904, A.H. Lee, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, stated, »I cannot for a moment contemplate the possibility of hostilities really taking place« between the United States and Great Britain.¹⁵ In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt wrote to Lee: »You need not ever be troubled by the nightmare of a possible contest between the two great English-speaking peoples. I believe that is practically impossible now, and that it will grow entirely so as the years go by. In keeping ready for possible war I never even take into account a war with England. I treat it as out of the question.« Such statements were more than mere rhetoric. British and American war plans were concurrently revised to reflect the fact that both sides were coming to see armed conflict between them as a very remote prospect.

Although each case of rapprochement unfolds along a unique path, they all follow the same basic sequence – from unilateral accommodation, to reciprocal restraint, to societal integration, to the generation of new narratives. The process begins in the realist realm of strategic necessity, moves through the liberal realm of societal integration, and concludes in the constructivist realm of new narratives and identities.

4. The Causes of Peace

Examination of twenty historical instances of stable peace yields important findings as to when, not just how, peace breaks out.

4.1 Engagement Is Not Appeasement

First, the cases make clear that rapprochement emerges as a product of engagement, not coercion. Rivals find their way to lasting peace when they resort to diplomacy

14. Charles S. Campbell, *From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783–1900* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1974), p. 201.

15. Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815–1908* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 380–381.

to settle their differences, not when one side coerces the other into submission. Moreover, successful diplomacy requires the states in question to practice strategic restraint – to withhold power and accommodate their adversaries in order to indicate benign intent and replace mutual suspicion with mutual confidence. The exercise of strategic restraint is in many respects the »elixir« that puts rivals on the path to peace.

It follows that talking to the enemy is not appeasement – as is often claimed by engagement’s critics – but, under the right circumstances, good diplomacy. To be sure, the effort to pursue diplomatic accommodation with an adversary may not work. The target state may refuse to reciprocate the initiator’s signals of benign intent, ensuring that confrontation continues. Iran, for example, has thus far failed to respond in kind to the international community’s readiness to negotiate a deal on its nuclear program. It is true that Iran views the stalemate in broader terms, arguing that regional security and normalization must figure prominently in negotiations. But in light of the strategic centrality of its nuclear program, its intransigence on the issue warrants a tightening of sanctions; combining sticks with carrots may help change Tehran’s calculus. Moreover, engagement is inappropriate when dealing with an adversary that is implacably committed to confrontation on ideological grounds – such as Al-Qaeda. But Al-Qaeda represents the exception, not the rule. Its ideological commitment to radical goals is fortunately a rarity.

4.2 Regime Type Is a Poor Indicator of the Potential for Enemies to Become Friends

Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, democracy is *not* a necessary condition for stable peace. Although liberal democracies appear to be better equipped to fashion zones of peace due to their readiness to institutionalize strategic restraint and their more open societies – an attribute that advantages societal integration and narrative/identity change – regime type is a poor predictor of the potential for enemies to become friends. The Concert of Europe was divided between two liberalizing countries (Britain and France) and three absolute monarchies (Russia, Prussia, and Austria), but nevertheless preserved peace in Europe for almost four decades. General Suharto was a repressive leader at home, but after taking power in 1966 he nonetheless guided Indonesia

toward peace with Malaysia and played a leading role in the founding of ASEAN. Brazil and Argentina embarked down the path to peace in 1979 – when both countries were ruled by military juntas. These findings indicate that non-democracies can be reliable partners in peace and make clear that the United States, the EU, and democracies around the world should choose enemies and friends on the basis of other states' foreign policy behavior, not the nature of their domestic institutions.

Engagement's opponents claim that pursuing rapprochement with a non-democratic adversary means abandoning hope that its government will change. On the contrary, doing business with autocracies has the potential to bring about a change of leadership through the backdoor – by weakening hardliners and empowering reformers. Engagement with Iran, for example, could undermine a government that relies on confrontation with the United States to rally popular support and disarm the opposition. Under such circumstances, political liberalization is »homegrown,« and thus more likely to prove durable.

Belligerent governments have frequently been the victims of rapprochement. The power of Sweden's aristocracy and military waned in step with the advance of rapprochement with Norway. The ancien regime's militarism was of diminishing relevance and the advance of integration with Norway and other democracies strengthened Swedish liberals. The military juntas that governed Brazil and Argentina when reconciliation began in 1979 did not survive the onset of rapprochement. Hardliners in both countries were undermined by reconciliation, clearing the way for the ascent of liberalizing coalitions: Brazil and Argentina were democracies by 1985. In none of these cases was rapprochement the only factor that helped bring about a change of government, but the more benign strategic environment that accompanied reconciliation certainly strengthened the hand of reformers. Over the long run, working with recalcitrant autocrats may undermine them far more effectively than containment and confrontation.

4.3 Diplomacy, Not Economic Interdependence, Is the Currency of Peace

Third, and again contrary to conventional wisdom, diplomacy, not economic interdependence, is the currency of peace. In only one of the twenty historical cases exam-

ined in *How Enemies Become Friends* – the gradual unification of Germany between 1815 and 1871 – did economic integration clear the way for political integration. In all the other cases, only after political elites succeeded in taming strategic competition did the pacifying effects of economic interdependence make a major contribution to the onset of stable peace. Flows of trade and investment have consequences, but the diplomats must first lay the groundwork through negotiations and the practice of reciprocal restraint.

From this perspective, only after the diplomats have resolved the bulk of the disputes at issue can economic integration between rivals – Japan and China, Palestinians and Israelis, Bosnia's Serbs and Muslims – help consolidate rapprochement. In similar fashion, the international community can wield important political leverage by loosening economic sanctions on Iran, Syria, or Cuba. But the main benefit of such action would be the political signal it sends, not the purportedly pacifying effects of commercial integration. Growing economic ties can help lock in rapprochement, but only after a political settlement is at hand.

4.4 The Centrality of Domestic Politics

Fourth, although diplomacy is the currency of peace, domestic politics weighs heavily in the outcome of efforts to advance rapprochement. When reconciliation stumbles, it often does so because it is blocked by domestic opponents in the countries advancing toward peace. One of the main obstacles is that nationalists are always waiting in the wings to label engagement as appeasement.

When General Suharto initially reached out to Malaysia, he dispatched a delegation of hard-line military officers in order to strengthen his hand against nationalists. In Brazil, General Ernesto Geisel trod carefully as he pursued dialogue with Argentina in order to sidestep opposition from the security apparatus. Such deft domestic maneuvering helped Indonesia and Brazil successfully reach out to their adversaries. In contrast, the Concert of Europe collapsed due largely to the nationalist forces stirred up by the revolutions of 1848. In both Britain and France, the voices in favor of accommodating Russia lost out to the newly empowered nationalist opposition. The result was the erosion of the Concert and the outbreak of the Crimean War.

It is also the case that opposition to rapprochement can come from economic interest groups that might be weakened by stable peace. The American colonies formed a stable union among themselves in 1789. But the union fell apart in 1861 as the growing power of the industrializing North threatened the economic interests of the agrarian and slave-owning South. Syria and Egypt put their troubled past behind them and fashioned the United Arab Republic in 1958. But the UAR collapsed in 1961 when Syria's landed gentry and its merchant class, whose power and wealth were undermined by union with Egypt, revolted and sponsored a military coup. Senegal and Gambia formed a confederation in 1982, but it collapsed in 1989 due primarily to opposition from Gambian elites whose wealth and influence were threatened by economic integration with Senegal. In short, reaching out to the enemy often entails domestic political perils. Consolidating stable peace requires good politics, not just good diplomacy.

5. The Role of Third Parties

Third parties – either outside powers or international organizations – can play an important role in shepherding rivals toward rapprochement. Their main function, however, is primarily ancillary: They can facilitate and set the stage for a diplomatic breakthrough between adversaries, but they cannot do more. Ultimately, the adversaries themselves must engage in direct negotiations and settle the disputes that divide them. Simply put, there is no substitute for face-to-face diplomacy, the practice of reciprocal restraint, and the deepening of engagement between the societies in question.

During the 1960s, Southeast Asia's retreating colonial powers, as well as the United Nations, generated proposals intended to help the region's newly independent countries find their way to stability. In addition, when Indonesia rejected the formation of Malaysia and adopted a policy of *confrontasi*, the international community imposed painful economic sanctions. Third party engagement helped generate constructive ideas for promoting regional stability and international sanctions helped ensure that Indonesia paid a price for its aggressive stance toward its neighbor. But in the end, it took direct diplomacy between Indonesia and Malaysia to bring about a breakthrough. Jakarta's readiness to reach out to Kuala Lumpur eventually set the stage for bilateral reconciliation and the formation of ASEAN.

In similar fashion, the imperial powers withdrawing from Africa and the UN generated numerous proposals for promoting stability as decolonization proceeded. One such proposal was for confederation between Senegal and Gambia. That idea did not come into being, however, until a set of local conditions fell into place – including a coup in Gambia, the consequent arrival of Senegalese forces in Gambia, and direct negotiations between Dakar and Banjul.

More recently, the European Union in 2010 played a central role in convincing Belgrade to acknowledge the ICJ's finding that Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence was legal. Through diplomatic pressure and promises of expedited accession negotiations with the EU, Brussels played a central role in convincing Serbia to moderate its position. Nonetheless, it is now up to Belgrade and Pristina to engage in face-to-face negotiations and work toward the normalization of relations. Third parties can set the stage, but cannot substitute for mutual accommodation between adversaries.

Third parties can also facilitate rapprochement by providing security guarantees or other forms of strategic reassurance, thereby giving rivals sufficient confidence to risk the vulnerabilities associated with the practice of strategic restraint. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, for example, the US security guarantee to Western Europe helped clear the way for early steps toward European integration, including Germany's rearmament and its inclusion in NATO. Looking forward, the prospect of a NATO or other third-party military presence in the Palestinian territories may well help Israelis and Palestinians reach and adhere to a peace settlement.

At the same time, the engagement of third parties can also hinder efforts to advance rapprochement. During the 1980s, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) made impressive progress toward forging a regional security community, motivated in large part by the Iranian revolution and the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, however, the GCC suffered a reversal; multilateral cooperation among its members waned. The main impediment was reliance on security cooperation with the United States, Britain, and France; most GCC members opted for security cooperation with third parties at the expense of multilateral arrangements with each other. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the consequent US invasion of Iraq in 2003 only inten-

sified this trend. The dominant role of the United States in providing security to the Gulf states undermined security cooperation among GCC members.

6. Conclusions

Stable peace *is* possible. Enemies *do* become friends. When adversaries settle their differences and replace rivalry with cooperation, they succeed in leaving behind conflict and expanding the footprint of peace. This finding is uplifting news, suggesting that there is an alternative to the destructive wars that have so darkened the course of history.

At the same time, zones of stable peace are all too rare and fragile; they are difficult to establish and by no means permanent once they have formed. Switzerland is today a zone of peace, but it took no less than five civil wars among its separate cantons to consolidate a stable union. The Soviet Union and China fashioned a remarkably close partnership in the 1950s, but by the early 1960s they were again rivals. Yugoslavia was for many decades a zone of stable peace. Nonetheless, it suffered a bloody dismemberment during the 1990s and is today gone forever.

These historical examples should provide cautionary lessons for the EU and other existing zones of peace. Europe has enjoyed over six decades of stable peace, and the EU is continuing to extend its pacifying and stabilizing effects to new members. But the economic downturn, immigration, and enlargement have fostered a worrying renationalization of politics within the union. Europe is not past the point of no return; its leaders and citizens alike must breathe new life into the project of integration.

Establishing new zones of peace and preserving and expanding existing ones entails recognizing that diplomacy, not trade or investment, is the currency of peace. The practice of strategic restraint is the *sine qua non* of efforts to back away from rivalry and edge gradually from enmity to amity. The readiness of leaders to withhold power and forgo opportunities for unilateral advantage is not a sign of weakness and an invitation to aggression – as critics of engagement insist – but instead a critical diplomatic vehicle for demonstrating benign intent and opening the door to mutual accommodation.

Although the initial phase of rapprochement takes place in the realm of *realpolitik* – unilateral accommodation is an act of strategic necessity, not altruism – the outbreak of peace is a sequential process that requires theoretical and practical eclecticism. After diplomacy has set the stage for reconciliation, sub-state actors – bureaucracies, the private sector, civil society, educators – advance societal integration, deepening rapprochement's social foundations. The process ends in the realm of constructivism, with opinion leaders propagating narratives and identities of friendship, which ultimately seal the deal.

Although strategic and societal interaction do much of the work in turning enemies into friends, managing the domestic politics of rapprochement is as important as the diplomacy. President Obama has enjoyed considerable success in resetting relations with Russia, but had the Senate failed to ratify the New Start Treaty, his efforts may well have proven futile. Washington's effort to reach out to Havana is even more complicated on the domestic front; with Republicans in control of the House, easing sanctions on Cuba will be an uphill battle. In similar fashion, the greatest obstacle to normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo is not the diplomacy – it is selling a deal to Serbia's legislature and electorate.

The diplomatic and domestic challenges that serve as obstacles to stable peace should not be cause for despair. Rather, they make clear that scholars and policymakers alike need to work ever harder to encourage the spread and preservation of durable zones of peace.



Literature

Anderson (1981): *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1894–1904* (East Brunswick, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1981), pp. 119–120.

Bourne (1967): *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815–1908* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 380–381.

Campbell (1974): *From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783–1900* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1974), p. 201.

Gelber (1938): *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics, 1898–1906* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 22.

Glaser (1997): *The Security Dilemma Revisited*. In: *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171–201.

Kant (1795): *Perpetual Peace*. In Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *The Philosophy of Kant* (New York: Modern Library, 1949).

Keohane/Nye (2000): *Power and Interdependence* (New York: Longman, 2000).

Kupchan (2010): *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2010).

Kydd (1997): *Game Theory and the Spiral Model*. In: *World Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997).

Kydd (1997): *Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other*. In: *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114–155.

Neale (1966): *Great Britain and United States Expansion: 1898–1900* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1966), pp. 134–135.

Rock (1989): *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 36.

Rock (2000): *Appeasement in International Politics* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000), p. 30.

Schweller (1998): *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

Wendt (1999): *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).



Appendix I

Case Studies

Rapprochement

Successes

Main Case:

- Great Britain and the United States (1895–1906)

Supporting Cases:

- Norway and Sweden (1905–1935)
- Brazil and Argentina (1979–1998)

Failures

- Great Britain and Japan (1902–1923)
- Soviet Union and China (1949–1960)

Security Community

Successes

- Concert of Europe (1815–1848)
- European Community (1949–1963)
- ASEAN (from 1967)

Failures

- Concert of Europe (1848–1853)
- The Gulf Cooperation Council (from 1981)

Union

Successes

- Switzerland (1291–1848)
- Iroquois Confederation (1450–1777)
- United Arab Emirates (from 1971)

Failures

- United Arab Republic (1958–1961)
- Senegambian Confederation (1982–1989)

Unions – Concluding Cases:

Successes: United States (1789), Italy (1861), Germany (1871)

Failures: US Civil War (1861), Singapore/Malaysia (1965)



About the author

Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. His most recent book is *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Imprint

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Global Policy and Development
Hiroshimastr. 28 | 10785 Berlin | Germany

Responsible:
Marius Müller-Hennig | Global Peace and Security Policy

Phone: ++49-30-26935-7476 / Fax: ++49-30-26935-9246
<http://www.fes.de/GPol/en>

To order publications:
Sandra.Richter@fes.de

Global Policy and Development

The department Global Policy and Development of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung fosters dialogue between North and South and promotes public and political debate on international issues in Germany and Europe. In providing a platform for discussion and consultation we aim at raising awareness of global interdependencies, developing scenarios for future trends and formulating policy recommendations. This publication is part of the working line "Global Peace and Security Policy". Contact: Marius Müller-Hennig, Marius.Mueller-Hennig@fes.de.

Dialogue on Globalization

Dialogue on Globalization contributes to the international debate on globalization – through conferences, workshops and publications – as part of the international work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). *Dialogue on Globalization* is based on the premise that globalization can be shaped into a direction that promotes peace, democracy and social justice. *Dialogue on Globalization* addresses »movers and shakers« both in the global South and in the global North, i. e. politicians, trade unionists, government officials, business people and journalists as well as representatives from NGOs, international organizations, and academia. *Dialogue on Globalization* is coordinated by the head office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Berlin and by the FES offices in New York and Geneva. The programme intensively draws on the international network of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung with offices, programmes and partners in more than 100 countries. Read more at <http://www.fes-globalization.org>.

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the organization for which the author works.

This publication is printed on paper from sustainable forestry.



ISBN: 978-3-86872-674-9