On a new mission
The foreign missions of the Bundeswehr and German security policy
Stefanie Flechtner
The Compass 2020 project represents the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s contribution to a debate on Germany’s aims, role and strategies in international relations. Compass 2020 will organise events and issue publications in the course of 2007, the year in which German foreign policy will be very much in the limelight due to the country’s presidency of the EU Council and the G 8. Some 30 articles written for this project will provide an overview of the topics and regions that are most important for German foreign relations. All the articles will be structured in the same way. Firstly, they will provide information about the most significant developments, the toughest challenges and the key players in the respective political fields and regions. The second section will analyse the role played hitherto by German / European foreign policy, the strategies it pursues and the way in which it is perceived. In the next section, plausible alternative scenarios will be mapped out illustrating the potential development of a political field or region over the next 15 years. The closing section will formulate possible points of departure for German and European policy.

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Abstract

Something unthinkable until the beginning of the 1990s has become part of “normal” German foreign policy: in crises and conflicts soldiers of the Bundeswehr are being deployed outside the NATO area, in the Balkan region, in Afghanistan, the Middle East and in Africa. Not only the missions and structures of the Bundeswehr have changed because of these foreign deployments, but the “expeditionary force” also represents one of the most profound changes of the Federal Republic’s principles for foreign and security policy.

At the same time these foreign missions are only one part of Germany’s reorientation in security policy. With the end of the East-West conflict the concept of security in Europe has changed, now reaching beyond the traditional military perspective. With the concept of a comprehensive multilateral and preventive security policy including a wide spectrum of civil capabilities together with the military, Germany is trying to live up to new and changing challenges.

Germany’s security environment is still subject to change. It is characterized by historically unique stability and security within Europe on the one hand and by growing global interdependence creating new factors of risk and threat on the other.

Against this backdrop, this article puts forward three scenarios for German security policy and the Bundeswehr’s future: in scenario 1, Germany is not able to realize the ambition of a comprehensive security policy; the Bundeswehr is running the risk of wearing itself out in missions. In scenario 2, thanks to the consistent and efficient realization of the concept of a comprehensive security policy, Germany is experiencing its first successes in the consistent stabilization of crises and conflicts; the Bundeswehr is on its way to becoming a postmodern army. In scenario 3, due to the uninhibited proliferation of nuclear weapons, Europe is facing a new threat; German security policy is radically reviewed and once again the Bundeswehr is becoming an army of defence.

The different development paths indicate that German security policy will in future be faced with multi-faceted challenges. The path of a comprehensive security policy must be pursued consistently. For this purpose its tools for security policy must be developed further while at the same time fostering security policy integration, mainly within the scope of the EU. At the same time politics must not lose sight of those “risk factors” which might principally question Germany’s security policy course. This includes simmering threats like the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and also the potential erosion of the domestic foundations of German security policy.
I. The international framework

I.1 11/9 and 9/11 – about the change in the security landscape

Two dates, 11/9 and 9/11, connected by reversing the figures, have become the symbol for the profound changes in world politics at the threshold of the 21st century. They also represent a significant change in Europe’s security landscape and our concept of security.

The fall of the Berlin wall on November 9, 1989, marks the end of the Cold War and the division of the world into two ideologically rigid blocks facing each other in hostility. Germany and Europe had a historic chance to overcome the division into East and West that existed since World War II. This vision has become part of our reality since German reunification and the eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004.

However, Yugoslavia’s disintegration shortly afterward showed Europe that the threat of war and conflict in Europe had not been eliminated with the end of the East-West conflict and that major challenges, even security-related ones, had to be resolved on the path towards a “continent united in peace”. With the advent of the catchword “globalization” Europe also realized that the dynamic process of opening borders reaches far beyond the end of the obstructive confrontation and the political geography of our continent, and that this process is equivocal regarding its impact on Europe. On the one hand hardly any other region has benefited as much as Europe from the abolition of political and economic borders, as well as from the technological and communications links around the world. On the other hand this has created new vulnerabilities, dangers and threats.

With the end of the Cold War Europe’s security environment has become more complex. On the one hand this is due to the fact that in the “global village” it becomes more and more difficult to separate internal and external aspects of security. This is linked to the awareness that our security is not only dependent on repelling military threats by traditional defence, but to an increasing extent also on coping with a large number of non-military problems and hazards such as global climate change, the tides of refugees and the competition for resources. On the other hand the spectrum of actors relevant to Germany’s and Europe’s security has also become more multifaceted. Since the dissolution of the bipolar order new actors have been emerging onto the world stage. The unique power position of the USA, especially from a military point of view, is still undisputed but at the same time there is an increasing number of states which, supported by their enormous economic speed of development, quite rightly claim the status of Global Players. Non-state actors have also gained more influence on security-related world affairs, primarily due to the progressive denationalization and privatization of violence.

The latter was dramatically made clear to the world on September 11, 2001. With the assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon a small group of terrorists not only destroyed two major symbols of the economic and military power of the United States, but also the American feeling of invulnerability. The assaults triggered a basic reorientation of US foreign and security policy by the Bush administration. Since then the American government has mainly been emphasizing the military power of the United States following its interests, first and foremost unilaterally outside the international institutions. At present it is hard to estimate the long-term effects of this reorientation. It is clear that 9/11, the American declaration of the “War on Terror” and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have changed and shaken international relations. They have polarized the international community, NATO and Europe itself, and they have even touched upon and changed international thinking about security and security policy.
I.2 Enhanced security, human security, preemptive defence – about the change in security-related thinking

The issue of security is dominating the current international debate like no other. Even in Germany and Europe thought and action in foreign policy are mainly geared to security. But what is the meaning of notions like “security” and “security policy” at the beginning of the 21st century? Uncertainty and lack of clarity still prevail regarding this issue. Especially in Europe, the essence of states’ security policy is much less clearly defined than during the time of the East-West conflict. This is mainly due to the enhanced concept of security and security policy as described above. In Europe the debate about security policy was clearly characterized by military categories until the end of the 1980s, while in today’s thinking about security policy social, economic and ecological issues play central roles alongside military aspects. The enhanced notion of security has now made its way to the German and European security debates. However, politics still finds it hard to translate it into practice. In addition, the notion of enhanced security is itself ambiguous, and in the current debate it is interpreted in two very different conceptual directions: on the one hand towards a comprehensive policy of peace-keeping, on the other towards an expanded defence policy.

Approaches of common collective security have gained importance since the end of the Cold War. This fact is based on the argument that in an increasingly globalized world one’s own national and regional security can only be promoted and guaranteed by strengthening international security and multilateral order. In other words, in the interdependent world of the 21st century Europe and Germany will not be safe as long as other sections of the world’s population are living in great insecurity. This approach is most clearly based on the concept of “human security”. This concept puts the individual and his/her protection from political violence, war and arbitrary treatment into the focus of security policy. In doing so the goal of physical security (“freedom from fear”) is closely linked to the goals of human development (“freedom from want”) and the guarantee of universal human rights. Hence “human security” does not only include a collective concept but also a holistic concept of security policy. Originally the Human Security Concept was discussed and developed within the scope of the United Nations, and recently it has also received increasing attention within the framework of the EU.

The increasing presence of collective security concepts, however, has only been one side of the coin in the discourse about security policy since 1989. In the current debates security policy is also often perceived in terms of selective national security and based on the idea of national self-defence. A state (or an alliance) must be able to ward off independently external dangers and threats even in an emergency. By comparison, collective interests like international security and order are of minor importance. This type of thinking in state security policy is not new, but in the wake of the events of 9/11, it has gained importance once again, not only in the United States but also in Europe. In addition, the notion of defence itself has gained a new meaning in the context of the new threats, especially the threat from international terrorism, distancing itself from the concept of traditional territorial defence. This new enhanced idea of defence is most radically represented by the United States of America. In the concept of pre-emptive self-defence defined by the US administration in 2002, the clear goal of US defence policy is to stifle an opponent’s capability to attack, right from the beginning. Therefore the new defence concept reaches beyond national borders, even including preventive military strikes in

cases of emergency. The US administration thus advocates a new proactive concept of self-defence which, however, is highly disputed in terms of politics and international law. Europe and Germany have not yet followed this radical enhancement of the notion of defence. Specific aspects of this agenda, however, also play a role in Germany, especially in defence beyond our own borders.

The German and European interpretations of the enhanced notion of security are still ambiguous. The debate described above on security policy is oscillating around the thinking patterns and concepts without clear positions. A central issue, not only in theoretical terms but also practical terms, is whether security policy in the 21st century should be primarily oriented towards the idea of a common or national security policy, towards strengthening a collective peace order or one’s own defence.

I.3 UNO, NATO, and the EU
– about the change of institutions for security policy

The development of international institutions also reflects the comprehensive and often contradictory changes in security policy since the end of the East-West conflict. In recent years a clear trend has been observed towards reinforcing regional security cooperation. This is exemplified by the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the EU. At the same time traditional institutions of security policy like the United Nations Organization (UNO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been put under enormous pressure to reform and adapt the scope of security policy, and their ambitions and relevance have been questioned repeatedly.

After 1989 many people thought the hour of the United Nations had come in security policy. It seemed that with the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council would be able to free itself from the shackles of obstructive bipolar confrontation and be able to act and take decisions in security issues. In fact the United Nations currently does play a more active role in issues of international security. In particular the number of UN peace missions has increased greatly. And yet, the UN has been increasingly criticized regarding its role in international security. The criticism is mainly directed at the UN’s operative capability to act. As early as in the 1990s, due to the dramatic “failures” in Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkan region, confidence in the UN’s competence diminished greatly. Despite the reforms achieved in the following years and the introduction of “robust” mandates there are still doubts regarding the UN’s capability to act in view of the lack of human and financial resources of many peace-keeping missions.

Additionally, the UN’s general claim regarding security policy, especially the authority of the Security Council, is being increasingly questioned. All attempts made so far to reform the Security Council to put it on a broader basis of legitimacy have failed. In addition, the UN Security Council is running the risk of being marginalized and ignored in central issues of international security. This is demonstrated by the wars waged without a UN mandate in Kosovo and Iraq. Finally, the demands for reform of the UN Charter have become louder since, in the eyes of many critics, it no longer meets the needs of today. However, despite the criticism and the existing need for reform, the UN still is the only security policy institution with a universal character. For this very reason in the 21st century the UN seems to be more irreplaceable than before.

4) The main criticism is that the concept of preemptive defence blurs the separation line between defence legitimated by international law and wars of aggression prohibited by international law.
5) See development in Africa (African Union, ECOWAS, SADC) but also in Asia (ASEAN, APEC) and in Latin America (OAS).
6) In the 1990s alone the UNO executed 35 peace missions compared to less than 20 between 1946 and 1989.
7) A „robust“ mandate (according to chapter VII of the UN Charter) enables blue helmet soldiers of the UN to defend not only themselves with weapons but also the mission and civilian persons.
NATO too has been undergoing profound change since 1989. After the end of the East-West conflict many observers thought it would break up. With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the bipolar confrontation, it seemed that NATO had fulfilled its mission but lost its raison d’être. And yet NATO still is one of the central institutions of European and transatlantic security. This was only possible, however, with a profound strategic reorientation which can be summarized under the notions of “out of area” and “out of defence”. After starting off as a defence community restricted to the transatlantic area, NATO has become a globally active security agency. Nowadays its tasks focus on international crises and conflict management, fighting international terrorism, and dialogue and co-operation with third countries on security-related issues.

Despite the transformation of the Alliance, which seems successful at first glance, the tensions and the number of unsolved issues seem to increase rather than decrease even within NATO itself. This is exemplified by the open dissent between its members on the issue of Iraq and even more so by the gap between their expectations and demands regarding NATO’s future. While the Europeans would like to see NATO once again as the political forum of transatlantic partnership – or to use Gerhard Schröder’s words – as the “place where the transatlantic partners consult and co-ordinate their strategic concepts” – Washington hopes for a better distribution of the military burdens by NATO, asking the Europeans to improve their capabilities for military co-operation. It remains to be seen if these different perspectives can be united in a strong common vision of transatlantic security in future.

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) may be the most meaningful response to the changes in the security policy landscape in Europe. The EU heads of state and government committed themselves in Cologne in 1999 to “providing the European Union with the necessary funds and capabilities to live up to its responsibilities within the scope of a common European security and defence policy”. The ESDP was born. It is not only an important step on the way to a “political Europe”, but it also expresses the will of the Europeans to make their independent contribution to regional and international security. On top of this the EU, like no other institution, is characterized by the new enhanced concept of security policy. In ESDP, military and civil instruments have been considered as equal components of security policy from the beginning. The EU’s strategic ambition reaches even further: according to the European Security Strategy of 2003 the clear goal of the Union is to include all security-related policies of the EU and its members in a common agenda for security policy, especially its diplomatic, economic and development tools.

The EU is still far from reaching this goal, however. Yet within the confined scope of the ESDP the EU has already made remarkable progress. The development of civil and military capabilities of the ESDP in particular has progressed rapidly in recent years. The ESDP has been in operation since 2003. Since then it has undertaken 15 missions to the Balkan states, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. New missions to Kosovo and Afghanistan are under way. Germany is a major player in EU security missions and the further development of ESDP. Thus the EU has become a central reference point for German security policy in only a few years. On the international level too, the EU has increasingly been perceived as an important actor in security policy. Nevertheless many observers still have doubts regarding the “force of conviction” of the European security policy. Criticism is frequently voiced that the EU has a weak military position and therefore would only accept seemingly “easy” missions, e.g. operations of minor military intensity. Or to put it in transatlantic terms: “the US does the cooking, the EU does the dishes.” There are also doubts about the political foundation of European security policy because until today the EU member states have disagreed on security policy issues and been unable to find
a consensus. Without this consensus, however, the EU is unable to act. Europe’s division over the Iraq war and the subsequent helplessness of the EU have sadly exemplified this fact.

In the foreseeable future the United Nations, NATO and the EU will provide the institutional framework for the commitment of the Federal Republic of Germany in issues of security policy. Its position and weight will depend on the development of the framework conditions for security policy and also on the future strategic orientation of German security policy.

II. The foreign missions of the Bundeswehr – a paradigm shift in German security policy?

Since World War II German foreign and security policy has been characterized by continuity. The decision to deploy German soldiers in international military missions represents a certain break in this continuity. The Bundeswehr’s foreign missions are a central part of Germany’s response to the changing international security environment after 1989. However, they are also part of a new conceptual design of German security policy at the beginning of the 21st century.

II.1 The Bundeswehr becoming an expeditionary force

For the first time, on May 16, 1993, the German government deployed armed soldiers to a mission outside NATO territory. The deployment in Somalia within the scope of the UN mission UNOSOM II was disputed. The opposition in the Federal Parliament, consisting of the SPD (the German socialist party) and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (the German green party), were against it. Since the beginning of the 90s there have been heated and controversial debates in politics and amongst the public about the participation of German soldiers in international missions. The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 did not change much although it clarified the legal situation in so far as Germany’s participation in international missions was declared admissible provided that it was approved by the parliament.

The peak of the political debate on foreign missions and the actual turning point in the German security policy was reached with the Kosovo conflict. In view of the worsening humanitarian situation in Kosovo the Socialist/Green coalition government decided in 1999 to take part in the NATO airborne attacks against Yugoslavia. Thus soldiers of the Bundeswehr were waging war for the first time. The missions took place without a mandate from the UN Security Council, its justifications under international law were disputed. Maybe it is an irony of history that the decision considered by many a break of taboo, an abandonment of the German guiding principle “no more war”, was taken by the very political powers that in the past had held a sceptical view of the military, and that had strictly opposed out-of-area missions until the middle of the 90s.

However, the decision also provides proof of the protracted and controversial process of rethinking in German security policy and the revaluation of the military linked to it. By today, the deployment of German soldiers in security missions has become a permanent part of the Federal Republic’s international commitment, accepted by a broad majority of the political spectrum. More than 200,000 soldiers of the Bundeswehr have been sent abroad since 1993. Thus the Bundeswehr is today one of the major contributors to
international peace missions. Germany’s military deployments have been marked by a strong commitment to multilateral structures and action. Multilateralism is not only a constant, but also a condition for the Bundeswehr going “out of area”. However, beyond this, the new mission of the Bundeswehr is not yet clearly defined. This is especially true of the geographical focus of the missions and the Bundeswehr’s range of tasks, which nowadays range from national defence, to actual combat and stabilizing missions, right through to non-military services like re-establishing infrastructures destroyed by wars. Quite clearly, however, international interventions have become the primary task of the military and decisive for its structure. This is also indicated by a recently introduced new army structure based on intervention, stabilization and supporting forces.

Within few years the Bundeswehr has evolved from a purely defence-oriented army into an interventionist, active and multi-purpose instrument of German security policy. Without any doubt this development may be considered a paradigm shift in German foreign policy. It would be wrong, however, to see the paradigm shift in terms of the military alone. Those advocating such a position are overlooking another central aspect of the change: nowadays the military is only one instrument of a much larger spectrum of security policies in Germany. And this development also has an impact on the tasks and philosophy of the military.

II.2 The concept of a comprehensive security policy

Germany’s current concept of security policy is most clearly described by the notion of a “comprehensive security policy”. The debate about the enhancement of the notions of “security” and “security policy” had already begun by the end of the 80s, but the real breakthrough of this approach in Germany only occurred under the Socialist/Green Federal Government. Its stronger emphasis on mechanisms of civil conflict resolution, and also the practical experience gained in Balkan missions, played a major role in this reorientation.

In recent years the concept of a comprehensive security policy in Germany has been fostered on various levels by numerous initiatives. The “White Paper on Germany’s Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr” adopted by the Grand Coalition in 2006 also underlines the importance of this approach. However, no clear definition of the concept is to be found either in this document or in any other official description of German security policy. But analysing the new approaches in German security policy the concept can be summarized under the following four guiding principles:

A comprehensive set of instruments: German security policy is based on a broad range of instruments and policies. According to the White Paper it is “neither solely nor preferentially based on military means”, but also on instruments of diplomacy, economy and development policy and the police. Thus, together with the Ministry of Defence, many civilian institutions are involved in German security policy, such as the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development with its “supra sectoral concept for crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peace promotion in German development co-operation”. Even outside the ministries in charge, Germany is fostering the development of civilian capabilities for its security policy. One example of this kind is the Centre for Civilian Peace Missions (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, ZIF), which provides training for skilled and senior staff in civilian and monitoring missions. Linked

8 The White Paper explains: „International conflict prevention and conflict resolution including the fight against terrorism will be the Bundeswehr’s more probable tasks in the foreseeable future. They are decisive for its structure and they shape its capabilities, leadership structures, availability and equipment.” (page 64)

9 In official descriptions of German security policy the notion „extended security policy” (www.bmvg.de, glossary „Security Policy“) is frequently used and less often the notion „far reaching concept of defence” (defence policy guidelines 2003).
to the guiding notion of a comprehensive security policy, new tasks have been created for the military, especially services with a civilian character like the reestablishment of infrastructures in mission countries destroyed by wars.

An integrated security policy: the notion of an integrated security policy describes the ambition to have a coherent and co-ordinated approach by all security-related actors. With the Federal Government’s general concept of “Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peace Consolidation” (2000) and the action plan “Civil Crisis Prevention” (2004), this approach was anchored and promoted in Germany’s security policy. In order to provide a network for the German actors in the mission areas specific measures were developed, such as the German model of “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” (PRTs) in Afghanistan which, unlike the British or American PRTs, is not a military programme but a cross-ministerial one.

Strong multilateral integration and effective multilateralism: the multilateral integration of national security policy has a longstanding tradition in Germany. However, the international missions of the Bundeswehr have given this dictum a new quality. It does not only comprise the goal of “closely co-ordinated multinational action” (as in the White Paper) but mainly the process of establishing common security related capabilities and structures (see Chapter 1.3) driven within the scope of the EU. Within the framework of the European Security Strategy, Germany also devoted itself to the goal of “effective multilateralism”, a security policy based on multilateral institutions and multinational co-operation focussing on strengthening such structures.

A policy of prevention: Germany’s comprehensive security policy is finally resting on the ambition to be “preventive”. According to the White Paper “more and a more broadly based prevention … shall reduce the risk of crises and thus the specific military response to crises” and “shape the German contribution to peace, security and development … more efficiently and sustainably”. The Federal Government defines prevention “as policies before, during and after a conflict”. In Germany the first catalogue of measures for the implementation of a preventive security policy has been introduced in the form of the above-mentioned general plan and the plan of action for crisis prevention.

II.3 Deficits and opportunities in Germany’s new security concept

Meanwhile, the concept of comprehensive security policy has been firmly established on the international level, too. Within the EU it has even become the determining factor of security policy. All in all this approach is still quite young though, on the international level Germany can hardly find any role models for further experience and orientation. Shaping a comprehensive security policy in terms of the four above-mentioned guiding principles is a highly ambitious and complex political challenge. It requires a change of structures, instruments and especially of thinking patterns in the entire foreign policy and security apparatus (and beyond).

Germany has just embarked on this course. There are still many unanswered questions, also regarding the above-mentioned equivocal nature of the enhanced notion of security. Thus, it is unclear whether Germany’s new comprehensive security policy primarily follows the concept of collective security or national defence. Between Gerhard Schröder explicitly confessing “a co-operative peace policy” on the one hand⁶ and Peter Struck’s

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10) Quote from Gerhard Schröder’s speech during the UN General Assembly 2003 and on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Bundeswehr in 2005.
argument of defending German security “in the Hindu Kush” on the other\(^1\), there is a lot of room for interpretation regarding the purpose and goal of Germany’s new military engagement.

Another question is the extent to which German politics is in a position and willing to realize the concept of a comprehensive security policy. The degree of success in the implementation of the four guiding principles varies. Germany’s set of security instruments and capabilities has been clearly enlarged since the 90s. Important progress has also been made on the international integration of the national security policies, especially within the context of the EU.

With regard to networking various instruments and actors, however, success stories are rather few in number. Regarding co-operation and co-ordination it seems that the political ambitions still end at the boundaries of the ministries in charge. This is illustrated best by the White Paper conjuring up “interconnected security … in the awareness of a comprehensive national and global security concept” at the beginning, but when it comes to comments regarding its implementation it restricts itself to discussion of the military aspects as such. Even the ambition to shape Germany’s security policy in a preventive fashion has remained a mere declaration up to now, since Germany lacks not only strategies for action but also the political culture for a real policy of prevention. In German security policy, most decisions are taken in an “ad hoc” fashion, driven more by the agenda of current crises and conflicts than by a long-term strategy of prevention.

Despite these critical statements the new concept for German security policy presents an enormous opportunity. With the concept of a comprehensive security policy Germany has phrased a response oriented towards the more complex and diffuse challenges of security policy in the 21st century, and is oriented in its ambition to apply a comprehensive, interconnected, multilateral and preventive security policy. The Bundeswehr still plays a crucial yet novel role. Accordingly the military is embedded in a broad framework of civil strategies of security policy, precisely intended to enable this civil framework of action - because with military means alone, neither can international peace be promoted nowadays nor can national security be guaranteed. This is found increasingly on the international level, too. It is reconfirmed by practical experience like the positive developments in the Western Balkans, a conflict region where the international community and Germany have committed themselves in a “comprehensive” fashion.

11.4 How consistent and sustainable is the new German security policy?

The “success story” of the Balkans also indicates, however, that a comprehensive security policy is linked to long-term commitments and incurs high costs. So how sustainable is Germany’s new security policy at the home front At first glance domestic support seems very high and stable. There is a broad consensus in politics about the concept of a comprehensive security policy. Germany’s international security commitments are supported in principle by all political parties and parliamentary groups with the exception of “Die Linke”. Thanks to the constitutive parliamentary approval, all international Bundeswehr deployments possess a high degree of democratic legitimacy.

On second glance, however, there are also signs of growing scepticism and unease in Germany regarding the Federal Republic’s current course in security policy. This is exemplified by a discussion initiated by conservative politicians under the slogan “Hindelang instead of Hindu Kush”, referring to a refocus of the Bundeswehr on national defence.

\(^1\) Germany’s security is also defended in the Hindu Kush.” Quote of the former Minister of Defence Peter Struck about the Afghanistan mission in 2002.
The claim for a more active role of the Bundeswehr in homeland security, repeatedly demanded by leading CDU politicians within the context of fighting terrorism, aims in a similar direction. Even on the left wing of politics, critical voices are increasingly heard in view of the more active German commitment in security policy, especially by military means.

The stance of the public is also equivocal. Surveys show that the majority of the Germans support the way in which the Federal Republic is assuming its international responsibility. According to an Emnid poll in 2006, 81% of the interviewees were in favour of international deployments by the Bundeswehr “with a peace-keeping character”, and “the participation in international combat missions to create peace under UN mandate” was supported by 56%\textsuperscript{12}. However, when asked about concrete missions, public consent sank considerably. For example, the Bundeswehr’s mission in the Congo was only supported by 47% of the interviewees, and deployment in the Lebanon by only 32%. Polls also illustrate that the “theoretical” support for international security engagement dwindles rapidly when, in practice, the population is confronted with the costs incurred by the missions, both financially and especially in terms of lives lost\textsuperscript{13}. This may explain why in 2006, 52% of the interviewees appealed for a “more reserved German role in international politics”.

All in all the attitude of the Germans regarding security policy and the Bundeswehr’s role can best be described by the notion of “friendly disinterest” proclaimed by Federal President Horst Köhler. The general complaint of politics regarding this “disinterest”, however, also highlights a paradox in the German debate: on the one hand politicians are complaining about a lack of public interest, on the other people with political responsibility are avoiding politicization of security issues, among other things because this might jeopardize the foreign policy and security consensus made so important in Germany.

Germany’s new security engagement, and especially its military engagement, is still an explosive topic right across the political spectrum. The paradigm shift in policy, initiated by the Federal Republic with the Bundeswehr’s foreign missions and the concept of a comprehensive security policy, has neither been concluded nor fully implemented. The domestic foundation of the new German security policy could soon become fragile, especially if the costs of such a political course keep increasing, if no success stories are written or serious political alternatives arise in the debate. In each and every case the question of when, where and how Germany should engage itself by using military means will remain one of the central debates about foreign policy in German society.

\textsuperscript{12} All poll results quoted in the following are based on Emnid polls in 2004 and 2006. The results were retrieved from the website of the Federal Ministry of Defence (www.bundesverteidigung.de), with the exception of the poll on the Lebanon mission (in: “Germans against the Lebanon mission”, Focus, online edition Sept.13, 2006)

The thesis spread at the beginning of the 1990s that the military would lose its importance because of the end of the East-West conflict has not been borne out, as shown above. The Bundeswehr is no longer a static instrument of defence but an active and versatile means of shaping German foreign and security policy. At the same time, however, the military is no longer the sole or primary instrument of security policy, but is embedded in a comprehensive concept.

Against this backdrop, three scenarios have been developed for the German security policy and the role of the Bundeswehr in the year 2020. These scenarios described in the following are based on two main development factors:

- the stability and/or change in Europe’s current security environment and the associated threat perception in Germany;
- the efficiency of the concept of comprehensive security within the scope of Germany’s international commitment.

Furthermore the scenarios include the following aspects:

- Germany’s integration into international institutions of security,
- the security-related thinking (in terms of collective security or national defence) in Germany,
- mission and tasks of the Bundeswehr,
- resources of the Bundeswehr,
- support for security-related and military engagement in politics and amongst the public.

III.1 “Worn out in mission” – the Bundeswehr in a crisis of legitimacy

Security in Europe is stable. Beyond the stable European area, however, there are still numerous unsolved foci of crises and conflicts. The negative repercussions of these conflicts are increasingly felt in Europe. The influx of refugees from Africa has reached new dimensions. Instability in the Middle East leads to bottlenecks in the oil supply, pushing up energy prices. The “war on terror” is being continued, but without visible success.

The Bundeswehr is still fulfilling missions in various crisis and conflict regions. The reality of these foreign missions indicates, however, that the Bundeswehr does not live up to its strategic ambition to be the instrument of a “comprehensive” and “preventive” security policy as defined at the beginning of this century. The actions of the military and civilian actors of security policy are inconsistent and insufficiently co-ordinated, and hardly any progress has been achieved on the multilateral integration of the Bundeswehr. Due to strategic differences between the governments of the member states, and growing Euroscepticism in the population, the security-related integration of the EU has come to a halt. Even NATO lacks political impulses for success as an international crisis manager, and the USA pays little attention to it.

The Bundeswehr is running the risk of being worn out in its current missions. Many of the foreign missions have already lasted for ten or fifteen years without sustainable pacification or stabilization of the crisis and conflict regions. After initial success due to the military engagement of the international community, the security situation has worsened again in some regions such as in Lebanon. The Afghanistan mission failed some years ago. Germany and its NATO partners decided to withdraw from Afghanistan after
a massive increase of attacks on coalition troops, reduction of the number of allied troops and the deaths of many NATO soldiers, including Germans. Since then there has been a civil war in Afghanistan.

Frequently the Bundeswehr feels abandoned by politicians concerning its missions. In view of the precarious security situation in many regions there are no opportunities for more civilian engagement and action. Many civil actors are withdrawing, especially in the area of governmental and non-governmental development policy. The military remains behind in the crisis region as the sole actor still capable of acting. However, in view of the unstable security situation, the troops on the ground are mainly concerned with their own security. In the Bundeswehr the purpose and goal of such missions are openly doubted.

Even in Germany itself, such foreign missions are increasingly questioned by the public and politicians. Many people cannot see a contribution to international peace or to Germany’s security in the Bundeswehr’s international engagement. The criticism voiced also highlights the high costs incurred by the missions. Leading conservative politicians are demanding a radical change of direction in the Bundeswehr, moving away from the “global peace mission” towards the protection of “immediate national security interests”. Besides guaranteeing collective defence in the EU and NATO, the Bundeswehr should focus on tasks of immediate national interest, like protecting national infrastructures against terrorist attacks, or securing the external EU borders against illegal migration and organized crime. At the other end of the political spectrum a “new peace movement” is forming, demanding the abolition of the “counterproductive and expensive” Bundeswehr.

In the year 2020, the Bundeswehr finds itself in a deep legitimacy crisis. In view of the lack of success German security policy has lost a lot of its political and strategic credibility. The military commitment of the Bundeswehr seems to end in a bottleneck. And even regarding security-related alternatives there is no consensus in the current discussions. The Bundeswehr is dogged by failure due to the antagonism between ambition and reality in its security policy.

III.2 “Winning peace” – on the way to a postmodern army

Security in Europe is stable. However, beyond the stable European area there are still many unresolved foci of crises and conflicts whose impact is also felt in Europe. Germany’s comprehensive commitment to global security and international peace, however, is showing positive effects.

Together with its partners Germany has already generated some success stories regarding the sustainable pacification and stabilization of crisis and conflict regions. The Western Balkans have been successfully integrated into the EU; last year, the presence of international troops has been considerably reduced once again in Afghanistan due to the ongoing political and economic consolidation of the country. The situation in the Middle East has at least stabilized since the increase of civil and military presence of the international community in the region.

In Germany these success stories are considered proof of the fact that the concept of a comprehensive security policy has stood the test. Remarkable progress has been achieved regarding the implementation of this concept, especially the effective co-operation between civil and military capabilities. The relevant security actors and institutions
are closely interlinked on the national level, consistently complementing each other in mission areas. This is also increasingly true at the international level regarding co-operation with security related partners in the UN, NATO and the EU. The EU is considered the pioneer of the comprehensive security model. A high degree of military and civil integration has been achieved by now also due to German initiatives like the pan-European declaration of the parliaments “for a European army” initiated by the SPD. Some troops of the Bundeswehr have already been incorporated in the new integrated EU armed forces. Now the EU represents the most important point of reference for German security policy, even in military terms.

The Bundeswehr’s foreign operations are focussed on a limited number of long-term comprehensive civil/military missions. The role of the military is clearly defined within the scope of such deployments: its task is the (re)establishment and maintenance of public security and order. It thus creates a central precondition in the crises and conflict regions for the local political peace process and also the necessary space and scope for developing the civilian security capabilities.

German security policy is oriented towards a comprehensive and collective concept of security and security policy. Germany’s political leadership substantiates its international engagement by reasoning that in the long run national security can only be promoted and guaranteed in the globalized world by strengthening international security and order. This concept is supported by the majority of the population.

Yet, despite these successes, the course of German security policy and the Bundeswehr are still subject to debate. One reason for this is the high costs incurred by a comprehensive security policy. The implementation of this concept still requires significant financial, material and human resources. The Bundeswehr’s long-term deployments and structural reform processes at home focussing on the interlinkage and integration of the armed forces on national and international levels are a strong cost factor. In view of tight budgets a significant increase of the Bundeswehr’s funding cannot be considered, and therefore the Bundeswehr is still suffering from a certain lack of funds.

Yet another reason is that the Bundeswehr is appreciated for its contribution to collective security and to international peace, but its contribution to defence is increasingly doubted both by politicians and by the public. Thanks to stable security in Europe an attack on Germany’s territory is very improbable, but there are still threats to its national security because of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to which politics has not yet found satisfactory answers. After the “war on terror” has failed only a few people in Germany believe that the military can make a meaningful contribution to solving these problems. In view of unresolved security challenges and the high costs of military missions, politicians are repeatedly forced to substantiate the benefit provided by the Bundeswehr and its contribution to security.

In 2020, the Bundeswehr is on its way to becoming a postmodern army. The guiding principles of national defence which had shaped the ideology, structure and missions of the military in Europe for centuries hardly play a role any more. Instead the Bundeswehr considers itself an element of a comprehensive and collective security policy. This is reflected in its missions and also in its structure, which is increasingly characterized by the interlinkage with civil structures and the integration in international institutions.
Uncertainty in Germany is growing. The awareness of living in a region of security and peace prevailing since the end of the East-West conflict in Germany has given way to a feeling that there is a new direct threat. The second “nuclear era” has begun. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has dramatically accelerated in recent years. All previous attempts of the West to mitigate and monitor the proliferation of nuclear weapons have failed. Due to unrestricted proliferation even economically weak, authoritarian and socially unstable states are developing into military and nuclear superpowers. In the Middle East the nuclear arms race has created an explosive conflict situation in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood.

According to international experts, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have come close to “nuclear maturity”. There is proof that Iran has “the bomb” and is even testing a cruise missile (Shehab 5) whose range is said to reach Central Europe. The Iranian leadership is now testing its new strength as a nuclear power, thus enhancing its international course of confrontation. The Teheran government aims at weakening US hegemony in the region to establish Iran as the new power in the Middle East. To strengthen its own position in the region the regime tries to attract smaller countries of the region to join a common defence alliance under Teheran’s nuclear shield, stylizing itself as the “champion of the suppressed Islamic world” in the confrontation with the West.

In a counter-reaction the USA and Europe try to isolate Iran economically and politically. However, the USA is also threatening military measures. The undertones in the conflict are sounding increasingly aggressive. The Iranian leadership is threatening openly to make a nuclear strike “against the Western alliance” should the USA genuinely provoke Iran or one of its allies with military means. The Iranian president recently declared in an emotional speech: “Our missiles are also pointing at Europe.” Thus all of a sudden Europe is moving into the focus of a new nuclear confrontation.

The call for defence against the nuclear threat is heard all over Germany. The political elites in Europe and Germany have started rethinking their security policies. The concept of a comprehensive security policy has been relegated to the background and strategies of military deterrence and containment are dominating the debates. National defence has once again clearly reached the top of the security policy agendas instead of collective security and global peace.

The Bundeswehr is undergoing profound change. The White Paper of 2020 is proclaiming the consistent conversion of the “intervention army” into a “European defence army of the 21st century”. During the presentation of his White Paper, the Minister of Defence declares that national security requires military dominance, as the experience with the East-West conflict shows: Europe can only protect itself by credibly illustrating that it “can win the war”. The reform agenda for security policy is outlined as follows: focussing the Bundeswehr on its defence mission, re-establishing a clear differentiation between civil and military security policy, step-by-step withdrawal from international peace missions with the exception of some strategic foreign missions, especially in the Middle East; focussing the military transformation on the expansion of high-tech defence and deterrence capabilities, especially to advance a European missile defence system in co-operation with the US National Missile Defense programme.

A broad majority in politics and amongst the public is supporting the change in security policy. There is even little resistance when the defence budget is increased at the expense of the social budgets to fund the restructuring and technical modernization of
the Bundeswehr. It seems that the population is prepared to pay a higher price for its security under the new threat scenario.

As a defence alliance NATO is experiencing a political renaissance in Europe, due in part to Europe’s participation in American arms technology within the scope of NATO. The US government is supporting the reorientation of the transatlantic alliance on the defence mission. From its viewpoint, however, NATO remains only one possible option for action among several. Compared to NATO, the EU is significantly losing its relevance in security policy because it lacks an effective defence policy.

In the year 2020, the Bundeswehr is on its way back to becoming a defence army. At the beginning of the century security policy in Europe was still clearly characterized by the challenge of asymmetrical non-governmental threats, whereas now states, with their military and nuclear potentials, are once again in the focus of the Western threat analysis. In view of the perception of a direct threat to Germany’s existence the aspect of national defence is coming to the fore in security thinking. There is a recollection of the traditional mission of the military as an instrument of defence and deterrence. Even though the new national defence due to technical progress in arms technology, looks quite different from the defence strategies of the past.

IV. Options and recommendations for action

The above-mentioned scenarios illustrate that the German security policy will be facing a multi-faceted challenge in the years ahead. It will have to make sure that the new course of a comprehensive and integrated security policy is consistently continued and applied. This requires new instruments, structures and strategies for the national level and the integration of security policy on the international level, especially in the EU. At the same time, however, German politics must not lose sight of those “risk factors” which might fundamentally question the new course in security policy. This includes the looming threat to international security from weapons of mass destruction. It also includes domestic factors that are decisive for a consistent and sustainable security policy.

IV.1 Consistent and efficient realization of the concept of comprehensive security policy

There is no doubt that Germany has made major efforts in recent years to implement a comprehensive security policy. However, to close the gap between ambition and realization of this concept, German politics must make further steps\textsuperscript{14}.

In that respect the availability of a comprehensive set of instruments of security policy is certainly the smallest challenge. Germany already has a broad spectrum of civil and military capabilities. This set of instruments is also available on the multilateral level within the scope of the EU. There is a deficit, however, with regard to the real availability of civil actors, since most of the specialists (police, lawyers, experts in administration and business) are tied to domestic tasks. It would be great progress if permanent pools of skilled staff and executives could be established for civilian security missions. The central challenge, however, is not the availability of individual skills, but availability within the interaction of the entire set of instruments. A combined civil and military security policy which is interconnected and preventive requires integrated thinking beyond traditional

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ministerial boundaries in foreign and security policy. It would be a positive signal if a general concept – e.g. a national security strategy – could be elaborated on the basis of interlinkage and prevention. In contrast to the White Paper, the strategic statements should not focus on the military but should include all relevant actors and instruments in a well-balanced fashion. The recent proposal to embed each foreign mission of the Bundeswehr in a civil/military concept appropriate to the mission country would also constitute a step in the right direction.

Germany must reform its security structures and institutions to efficiently implement the idea of a comprehensive security policy. This applies to the development of effective co-ordination and co-operation structures amongst the various security related ministries and actors at the national level. First and foremost, however, this challenge applies to the international integration of German security policy. Integration within the scope of the EU is also of utmost importance for the implementation of Germany’s concept.

IV.2 Europeanizing security and promoting “effective multilateralism”

In recent years the EU has made major progress in security co-operation and establishing common security structures. The multilateral integration of security policy must be continued with courage and determination even though EU scepticism is on the rise among political elites and the public alike. Europeanizing security would not only contribute enormous synergy potential in the military realm, but also the perspective of a new civil/military, multi-laterally integrated security policy. On the European level, however, integration of the different capabilities of security policy is still a major task: on the vertical level regarding the interlinkage of civil and military instruments, but especially on the horizontal level with regard to the integration of the 27 national sets of capabilities of the member states. By defining a courageous political vision, such as a “European army”, the EU could send out a meaningful signal that helps to mobilise the necessary political will. Besides this long-term vision, that might only be realized after 2020, the EU’s short-term aims should be the following: development and expansion of joint training (civil and military actors), further strategic manifestation of European security policy, mainly the development of a common military doctrine and common “rules of engagement”, as well as strengthening the common security policy. Regarding the latter many proposals are already under discussion (ranging from a EU Foreign Minister to a civil commander for ESDP). It is crucial, however, not to restrict reforms to the transfer of the traditional structures of the nation state to the European level, but also to realize the concept of a comprehensive security policy by enabling institutions to deliver an integrated civil-military response to crisis.

A common European “voice” in security policy would also enormously increase the EU’s political room for action on the global level – be it regarding solutions for international crises and conflicts or shaping and strengthening global structures. The idea of an “effective multilateralism” is crucial in this context as a guiding principle. In the era of global interdependence, German and European security does not only depend on the (unilateral) defence against certain threats, but also on an effective international order enabling global politics to be shaped in an efficient manner and in the interests of all. The goal of German and European politics has always been to substitute “the law of power” by “the power of the law”, on the European, but also on the international level. As a matter of course the European security strategy defines “effective multilateralism” as one of its three strategic goals. To promote this idea even beyond Europe, in particular vis-à-vis its most important partner, the US, multilateral solutions must be shown to work. Current challenges in international security, be it in the Middle East peace process, in the stabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan, or in the nuclear conflict with Iran, offer Europe many reasons to start to put “effective multilateralism” into practice.
IV.3 Revitalizing the international disarmament and non-proliferation policy

The nuclear challenge is underlining the need for multilateral solutions. The current proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represents a massive threat to the German and international security. The European Security Strategy even calls proliferation "potentially the greatest threat to our security." The political attention directed to this threat has nevertheless dwindled since the end of the East-West conflict, since nuclear weapons are no longer pointing at Europe. The German and European security policies have not yet found a satisfactory answer to this threat. In individual cases such as Iran, Europe is actively supporting an international solution but there is still no active multilateral policy of non-proliferation and disarmament going beyond the individual cases.

Proliferation is no longer an isolated case. On the contrary, it already covers entire regions. In particular the developments in the Middle East and South Asia are reason for concern. Even the established nuclear powers are currently sending out signals of re- rather than disarmament. France and Great Britain, for example, recently decided to modernize their nuclear weapons programmes. The USA is even going one step further with its so-called "mini nukes" programme. With this programme the US, for the first time, is assigning a tactical role to nuclear weapons and thus moving beyond the realm of deterrence. The non-proliferation policy of the international community, especially the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is based on the principle of mutual commitment: the non-nuclear states renounce nuclear weapons while the nuclear states resolve to take steps towards disarmament. Currently this principle is being eroded by both sides.

In view of this development it is even more worrisome that negotiations on the NPT came to a halt some years ago and that there are no resolute initiatives to revitalize the international system of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control. As a non-nuclear power and pacemaker of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Germany has a great responsibility to stand up for nuclear disarmament with determination and credibility. Germany should not limit its efforts to the current “problem cases” of Iran and North Korea, but should instead, together with its European and transatlantic partners, look for ways and means to once again give the global non-proliferation regime meaning and credibility.

IV.4 Focussing and legitimizing the military engagement

For its implementation, the new German concept of a comprehensive security policy requires considerable political and financial means. Already today, the international deployments of the Bundeswehr are already causing high burdens on Germany. However, it is unlikely that the resources provided for security policy will increase in Germany in the foreseeable future. Therefore, priorities must be set to fulfil the international commitments accepted by Germany without risking an “overstretch” of national security resources. In particular the military engagement abroad needs a stronger focus. Germany has already shouldered various long-term commitments with the Bundeswehr’s current missions. Decisions on new military missions should be considered even more carefully. The deployment of the Bundeswehr must not become a matter of routine as it always

16] The German White Paper only states that the proliferation is “gradually becoming a potential threat for Germany.”
17] “Mini nukes” are nuclear bombs with reduced explosive force which can also be used for tactical purposes like the explosion of subterranean bunkers.
represents major financial and political commitments with great risks to the lives and health of the soldiers. Government and parliament are therefore obliged to carefully weigh up ethical values and national interests, risks and opportunities, as well as cost and benefits in each and every case.

There is no blue-print for how to take this decision. As a means of orientation for decision-makers, the concept of the comprehensive security policy offers a framework of conditions that must be fulfilled before deploying the Bundeswehr:

First, the international mission must be embedded into a strong multilateral framework. Ad hoc coalitions cannot guarantee the necessary amount of institutional integration and political coherence required to realize a comprehensive security approach.

Second, the mandate for a military deployment may only be issued within the scope and on the basis of a comprehensive mission or a comprehensive civil/military concept. This means that the Federal Government must commit itself to providing civil instruments and capabilities in parallel to deploying armed forces. Furthermore, when taking a decision on deployment, it must be clear that the commitment accepted is generally of a long-term nature even if the mandate is limited in time in order to allow for stronger parliamentary control.

Third, military deployments require strong political legitimacy, both at home and abroad. The most important sources of international legitimacy are International Law and the mandates of the UN Security Council. This legitimation is irreplaceable to guarantee broad international support for the mission (and thus also a sharing of burdens), and to guarantee the acceptance of the mission, including in the crisis region itself. Furthermore, military deployments must be properly legitimized on the national level by corresponding democratic structures and processes. Thanks to the constitutive parliamentary approval of any military deployment, the Bundeswehr’s foreign missions have a stronger democratic legitimacy than in other European countries. The close tie between the armed forces and Parliament is a strength of German security policy and must not be undermined. Yet to guarantee the sustainability of German security policy and must not be undermined. Yet to guarantee the sustainability of German security policy and military engagements even in the long run, the process of legitimation must reach beyond Parliament. There is a current trend in German politics to present decisions taken by small circles of the political elite as if there are no political alternatives. Particularly in the sensitive area of military missions this practice is more than doubtful. Strong democratic legitimation means that all options of security policy, including alternatives to a Bundeswehr mission, are discussed with and amongst the public, instead of presenting decisions already taken “as the will of the people and to garnish them with ethical arguments if they are not immediately accepted by the masses”19. If this aspect is neglected, support at the “home front”, especially the seemingly strong national consensus in German foreign and security policy, might soon prove to be fragile.

Germany’s and Europe’s security environment is still undergoing change. The number of factors and actors relevant for national and international security is growing, with both positive and negative impacts. Due to this dynamism it is hard to anticipate the future development of Germany’s situation in terms of security and threats. The three scenarios presented here underline the broad spectrum of potential developments. The German approach focussing on comprehensive management and resolution of international conflicts as well as strengthening collective security and order (instead of focussing on the military defence of the national security alone), is the right answer to this amorphous

and dynamic environment. The implementation of this approach, however, will in future require enormous efforts by German security policy, including the Bundeswehr. The “friendly disinterest” of the majority of the public does not suffice to ensure success on this path. The central challenge in German foreign policy still is to enhance the political and public awareness regarding the security challenges of the future, and also regarding the answers national and international politics can offer to these challenges.

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