Isotopes, Media and the Third World

Exchange and Intercourse - Or Confiscation and Commodification?

Reinhard Keune
Electronic Media and the Third World
Exchange and Cooperation - Or Condescension and Confrontation?

Reinhard Keune

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0. Summary

The past decade of the North-South dialogue has been characterized by many a theme: drought and starvation, debts and the energy crisis, barriers to trade and "surrogate wars". Not least, however, a considerable role in the North-South dialogue has been played by the controversy over a New International Information and Communication Order (NIICO) — until the argument, with the United States' exit from UNESCO, the responsible United Nations organization, for the time being came to a spectacular end. Now that the pattern of ideological threat and counter-threat, with its subsequent political and pragmatic compromise, a scheme of things that functioned for at least a decade, has lost its effectiveness, the question arises: What next?

The words that follow are an attempt at a brief analysis of North-South relationships in the sphere of the media and communications following the eruption of the UNESCO crisis. The discussion concludes that overly dogmatic assertions are of no help to anyone or any interest involved in the situation. At the same time, however, it is clear that a pragmatic, flexible approach, one that fosters the development of the South while not compelling the industrialized countries to betray their pluralistic concept, runs up against the most varied difficulties: New information technologies call for new decisions involving content. Well-intentioned offers of co-operation and exchange come to naught in view of objectively present deficits in the North as in the South. Again, modern communication technologies are one of the last growth sectors in a crisis-ridden global economy, thereby conjuring up new perils of domination and condescension or tutelage — economic and cultural.

This paper draws, from examples that are symptomatic and developments that can be foreseen, a cautious conclusion: that the electronic media — radio, television — by virtue of history, technology, organization and media-immanent considerations, can be a model for and play a pioneering role in a new, better North-South climate of understanding and intensified co-operation.
1.0 Introduction

The former Bonn Finance Minister Manfred Lahnstein, who today is on the board of directors of Bertelsmann AG, a major West German publishing house, where he is responsible for matters involving new media, recently passed on to a circle of invited guests considerations that are being entertained by a U. S. media giant. The media organization has taken as its model the worldwide concept of the Ford Company for automobile production in the last years of the 20th century: namely, to aim at manufacturing in the respectively most favourable location – whether Cologne or South Korea – the same car, according to identical blueprints, with the same assembly robots, with equivalent basic materials to start with – and accordingly the same end-product. Concessions to the taste of the local public are planned for such relatively minor and alterable features as chrome trimmings; round instead of square headlights; or automatic drive instead of gear-shift, and so on.

The American media concern is planning along the same lines as the automobile producer: It has meanwhile become possible – thanks to modern technologies – to produce the media commodities of entertainment, information, sensation, sport anywhere in the world, and to reproduce these wares at any other point. Square headlights and accessories that suit the taste of the public in a certain region can in case of need be supplied subsequently on demand. This approach seems to be validated by the worldwide popularity of shallow American TV series. By now these programmes are being transmitted in a hundred and more countries. The situation makes dramatically clear what dangers underlie the comparatively harmless enjoyment of “Dallas” or “Dynasty”. It is characteristic of the development that the electronic media, particularly television, recently have been at the centre of the debate – this although in the industrialized West there is a prevailing conception that in the Third World television is a luxury of the urban, privileged elite; that it is not reaching, according to this mistaken Western impression, the broad masses of hundreds of millions in the rural areas.

For a decade, from 1975 to 1984, problems of imbalance in the North-South and South-North flow of information centred on the example of the press agencies, and the strongly ideologically coloured debate was touched off by the monopoly of the “Big Five” (Associated Press, United Press-International, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, TASS) – while the electronic media of radio and television, because of their naturally imposed limits of transmission, were not debated about, or were mentioned only on the fringes of the argument.

New communication technologies – particularly satellite television and satellite radio, but also internationally interlinked, computer-supported data networks and information banks – today are casting a new light on the North-South problem. Accordingly, the electronic media are going to have to take over a key role in the North-South dialogue, regardless of whether those concerned and responsible in the industrialized world or in the developing countries want to face up to this or not.

This treatise will concern itself with existing or planned situations that provide examples for the future interrelationships of electronic media in the South as in the North. The discussion also seeks to draw certain conclusions. Whether and to what extent these conclusions can be realized depends in part on when and where the interrupted dialogue that has come to a dead stop between the leading Power of the West, the United States of America, and the Third World on questions of international information and communication gets started again. Meanwhile – and presumably also long after the date on which a new dialogue commences between the U. S. and the Third World – it is in particular, Western Europe that has in its hands the key to rational cooperation. All the Europeans need do is seize the opportunity.

1.1. Equivalence of Contents – Exchangeability of Forms

Not only in the Federal Republic of Germany, but worldwide as well, there is an ongoing process of formation of multinational media concerns. Their declared purpose is the conquest of considerable shares of the media market. These media firms’ commercial orientation reduces to only fringe consideration such principles as pluralism, a balanced communication flow between South and North, the relevance to developing countries’ needs of the content that is being broadcast or telecast – and even simply the striving toward international understanding and the keeping of the peace. All such considerations of principle take secondary place to sales strategy. (Cf. Hamelink/A/I-III/Schiller/A). With this commercial aspect foremost, it necessarily follows that the effort is in the direction of as broad as possible a palette of marketable contents – a range that at the lowest possible expense can be adapted from case to case, according to regional or national acceptability. It is clear who will be the losers in this situation: It will be, of course, the countries of the Third World, in view of their economic and to a degree, too, their political weaknesses.
If one discusses this tendency with U.S. media representatives, they introduce what at the first glance seems to be a convincing counter-argument—one that very soon, however, reveals itself as not relevant to the international debate: The American media people will tell you, justifiably, that their products must first and foremost make the grade—be paid for—on the U.S. market, and that, although the global sale of the same media products brings welcome additional earnings, this extra revenue is not the object of the sales strategy.

That is the way things have seemed up to now. But this heretofore perhaps applicable situation can and will change. The change is ahead because new communication technologies even today, in theory and practice, are facilitating a resolution of the problems of distance and language barrier—and within a few years will be taking care of those twin problems, distance and language, once and for all. In 1982 already, a proud Japanese engineer and representative of industry demonstrated at the annual meeting of the International Institute of Communications in Helsinki the principle of an automatic, computer-supported translating device. The mechanism permitted a German and a Japanese to telephone each other, each conversation partner using his own language—with the apparatus translating the German words into Japanese and the other way around.

The implications of this technical breakthrough are striking. The Japanese estimate that their translation computer will be available in 1990. Consider the anticipated progress on that project in conjunction with mechanisms already existing today—data banks and on-line computer connections in a world network—and it becomes evident that centrally stored contents very soon can be summoned in any desired form and any language.

Naturally in the foreseeable future there will be no computer that dubs in, lip movement for lip movement, “Dallas” dialogue in Chinese; nor a computer that takes a U.S. best-selling novel and automatically distills from it a television special that is marketable the world over. Yet it is a fact that neither speech differences nor geographical distances nor time zones will any longer erect an insurmountable barrier against the proliferation of the electronic contents that are produced by the financially strong, commercially oriented multinationals. This prospect calls up new dangers and new possibilities. Ahead are situations with which especially those will need to concern themselves who today are already determining policy for and/or are the owners of the electronic media.

1.2 New Information Technologies and Developing Countries

In conjunction with impoverished developing countries, which often—with and without help from abroad—cannot even satisfy the basic needs of their populace, to speak of modern information technologies seems at first glance to be irrelevant. But as we look deeper, a few examples of situations in various developing countries, plus some delving into the plentiful literature that has meanwhile become available (cf. B) quickly indicate the relevance of relating the new media possibilities to the needs of the Third World. Thus we find that one of the world’s least-developed regions in the communications sector, the island world of the Pacific, is already opening itself to the numerous possibilities and offers in regard to media activity. For years the University of the South Pacific, its central facilities located in Suva/Fiji Island, has been using a technologically long obsolete experimental satellite for daily linguistic link-ups with the university’s branch facilities in 14 countries in the Pacific. The satellite is multi-purpose: It serves the relaying of university news and general news reports; it transmits curricula and lectures; helps with the organization of the teaching and academic or scientific activities of a university whose individual institutes are scattered over a vast area; and, incidentally, also sees to it that this or that rumour travels with the speed of light through the Pacific area.

Another example of media enterprise in the Pacific region: In Papua/New Guinea and some other countries of the area, private individuals and businessmen have invested money in three-meter parabolic dishes. With this equipment, the investors receive programmes of U.S. and Australian television stations by satellite. Then they make the programmes available to their respective “customers” for a moderate fee, or, for advertising purposes, without cost.

Another development in the Pacific region exemplifies the diverging approaches of, on the one hand, governmental or public-corporation-run electronic media and, on the other hand, commercial media interests: While an unpublished result of an investigation by the Australian post and telecommunications authorities for the South Pacific Forum (a regional merger of South Pacific countries, Australia, the United States and New Zealand) was that the establishing of an efficient telecommunications network for the vast area would cost many hundreds of millions of Australian dollars, there is also a sharply differing view: U.S. and Australian commercial television channels are convinced that at least the servicing of this region with television could be done more cheaply than the Australian Government survey estimated—and in fact
at a profit. Accordingly, a U. S. television station in Los Angeles (cf. B, Proposal, Channel 9) has distributed to South Pacific Governments a plan proposing to transmit a U. S. programme to the region via satellite. Within the format the individual countries would have an opportunity to use programme breaks for national “windows”, during that air time telecasting programmes of their own. As the first country in the region to do so, Tonga has decided to try out this project. Action has been quick to follow: Just last year (1984) U. S. and Australian planning technicians arrived in the island kingdom. They drew up blueprints for the requisite ground station and the technical apportioning of transmission periods between American telecasts and Tonga’s domestic programmes. In Papua/New Guinea the Government is undertaking similar discussions and investigations.

That such plans for prevailing tiny countries with a few tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of inhabitants can be considered at all is due in the first instance to a dramatic technological development, and subsequently a cost breakthrough. Some “then and now” comparisons show what has happened: The international INTELSAT administration, operator of the largest network of telecommunications satellites, in 1965, after INTELSAT I had been launched into a fixed orbit around the earth, scheduled, in all, only 40 hours of television transmission that year. By contrast, in 1982, after the going into operation of the fifth generation of satellites, the transmission for that year totaled 21,708 hours, not counting telecasting arranged for by fixed bookings, such as for the TV news exchange between North America and Western Europe (cf. B/Hultén I).

A similar numerical comparison illuminates the cost situation. INTELSAT I in 1965 had only one-channel capacity, sufficient for the simultaneous transmission of 240 telephone conversations. At that time the investment costs per year and per telephone channel came to fully U. S. $ 32,500. Sixteen years later, in 1981, INTELSAT V already had enough capacity for 12,000 telephone conversations, with investment costs of only U. S. $ 300 per year and per telephone channel (cf. B/Hultén II).

Under the spell of the attractive medium of television, and as modern satellite technology makes very much possible what even just ten years ago seemed impossible, in the South Pacific the question of the socio-cultural consequences recedes far into the background. Only a few of the participants and those responsible for programming or management ask themselves what effect a “mixed concept” (like, for example, a ten-hour programme from Los Angeles along with a one-hour “national window”) will have for local customs, the cultural and national identity of the host country, the national economic situation, and so on. Nor is there any more attention to the question of priorities in considering whether for the time being the still cheaper and more effective medium of radio should not, for economic and developmental reasons, have precedence. True, in 1984 fully 14 radio stations of the region turned to UNESCO and the Federal Republic of Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation with a request for support of radio by means of intensive and co-ordinated training of specialists (cf. B/Project Proposal) – an approach that in 1985 led to the starting of a community programme in the region (cf. B/ UNESCO); but the idea of co-ordination with the television projects of commercial stations (dubious as such TV programmes are from the standpoint of any given South Pacific country’s economic and socio-cultural interests) has not been put forward by anyone from the media or in political life.

Other than this comparative lack of attention to the future consequences of imported commercial television in the Third World, by contrast, the rapidly ensuing effects of video recorders in the Third World – because these effects are already painfully apparent, while it is not yet foreseeable to what extent proliferation of the video recorders will go – have touched off lively discussion about social and economic consequences. While Bangladesh imposes severe penalties for the uncontrolled importation and private possession of video cassettes, other countries such as the South American Guyana or the already-mentioned Fiji Islands choose to emphasize positive future domestic effects of video. Guyana has postponed an official decision on the introduction of national television. Instead, for now, Guyana leans toward a “small solution” – that is, the domestic production of video programmes for home audiences. The postponement of Guyanese domestic television production has been decided upon in the hope that by this delaying policy it will be possible to avoid the high investments for professional television production and especially for a television network that would reach all centres of the population. Guyana currently prefers, instead, to rely on the considerable attractiveness of video to foster developmental purposes. In the Fiji Islands, where video recorders are also already quite popular, the Federal Republic of Germany’s Hans Seidel Foundation is seeking to make use of video, especially in rural areas, for projects of adult education and rural development.

The omnipresence of video on the contemporary media scene is a particular concern for the world’s largest developing country, the People’s Republic of China. The opening of the nation and the liberalization of the economy brought on and are also still occasioning, as an inevitable consequence, an invasion of video – including the shipping to the country of video cassettes emphasizing pornographic scenes and/or violence. The cassettes from overseas enter China via its large harbour cities. Eyewitnesses to what is happening report barely concealed porn presentations by “private entrepreneurs” in the waiting rooms of railway stations and at other easily accessible places. The party and the Government, understandably, are worried about this development. They have asked China’s Ministry for Radio and Television to work out, also with the help
of Western specialist institutions, a concept for stemming the tide of video importations, especially on the themes of pornography and violence.

In other spheres of technology, too, China confronts new developments and decisions. The intention to put into operation in 1987 two Chinese-owned directly transmitting television satellites was made public at the end of 1984 (cf. B/China Daily). Intensive Government activities are already underway in regard to the coming necessities: a need to reapportion media tasks as between the central Chinese television CCTV and the numerous provincial stations; and also an appraisal of the future possibilities of the intra-Chinese exchange of programmes and news.

In the sense that the African nation has so far avoided looking heavenward to satellites for electronic-media services, Tanzania is the world's last two-dimensional country. Up to now the mainland part of Tanzania has also refrained from introducing even the classic, land-based television transmission. This position stems from economic considerations. (By contrast, the part of Tanzania that is the island of Zanzibar was able, thanks to the generosity of a West European electronics concern, to install black Africa's first colour-television system at the beginning of the 1970s.) The Government of Tanzania and the Central Committee of the ruling party believed in 1984 that, despite all economic necessities and bottlenecks, the question of introducing television could no longer be put off. But the first contacts with a German advisory institution made quite clear to those responsible for a decision that in the mid-1980s the question no longer was whether television is possible and financially viable, but, rather, which technological system makes the most sense in case of a positive basic decision for TV, taken on the basis of cost/use considerations.

Should the television system the country adopts be the "classical" one, relying on terrestrial transmitters and converters with microwave links and repeater stations? This alternative, given the highly varied topography of the country, would be a challenge to the technical planners and to the Tanzanian budgetary deficit. On the other hand, the use of a telecommunications satellite with community reception for "cable islands" in congested urban areas involves quite as many planning, economic and technical decisions as would the procurement and use of a Direct Broadcasting Satellite (DBS) or a large optical fibre loop system to link the most populous urban areas with the new capital of Arusha.

As these examples indicate, new technologies also multiply the options of the Third World's governments and media people; but at the same time the new ways multiply, too, the problems that descend on a given country as far as political, economic, and financial considerations, the host nation's socio-cultural identity, and its own unique domestic cultural ways of life are concerned.

The opportunities and the risks continue to multiply many times over if those responsible for media planning take into consideration such other communications technologies as computer-based systems; data and news banks; on-line communication and beyond national borders and national competences— and the concomitant concentration of management in large multinational central headquarters. Relevant within this conjunction are these two observations:

The first comment derives from an observation by Herbert Schiller. Schiller rightly determines that the communication sector, in the broadest sense, not only is one of the last large growth branches within a crisis-prone economy, but perhaps actually the only one (cf. A/Schiller). Since it is already true today of the technologically most advanced country, the United States of America, that over 30% of the American working population is employed in the communications sector, and more than 50% of U. S. earnings from foreign trade are accounted for by this branch — then this circumstance is also a signal and a challenge to developing countries. Newly industrialized countries such as South Korea and Singapore could only temporarily earn revenue from a branch that has emigrated from the classic industrialized countries, the textile industry. (Meanwhile, in the Federal Republic of Germany quality textiles are being produced again.) Countries like the just-mentioned South Korea and Singapore have had to acknowledge their inferiority to the Japanese in the mass production of automobiles, and up to now have also been lagging behind the Japanese competition in photographic articles and photo equipment. But this situation is changing: A South Korean firm was able to announce proudly, in a full-page advertisement in June 1984, that South Korea is one of the four countries in the world that are able to manufacture a chip with 256 KB memory.

The second observation relevant to the media decisions confronting the Third World is that astonishingly, undisturbed by the superpowers and (still) largely unobserved by the huge transnational producers and service concerns, a small United Nations authority with its headquarters in New York City is developing an interesting and global activity in the sphere of researching new technologies. The U. N. subsidiary is also investigating effects of the new media technologies on developing countries. The agency that is undertaking this inquiry is the United Nations Center for Transnational Corporations.
1.3 A New Information Order?

The debate between North and South from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s on a “New International Information and Communication Order” (NIICO) to a large extent was dominating the discussion of media questions in the United Nations subsidiary organization, UNESCO, responsible for considering the matter; but to a degree the discussion also went on in the U. N. itself. An overwhelming majority of the developing countries pressed for a NIICO. Doing so, they were seeking more equality of opportunity in the communications sector vis-à-vis the industrialized North and its practically omnipotent media enterprises (news agencies, television-news agencies, TV programme offerings, publishing houses, radio networks’ foreign services, etc.). These more nearly equal chances the Third World countries sought to attain, if necessary, at the price of governmental regimentation, filtering and censorship.

With an increasing self-confidence on the part of Governments of the Third World, which, after a phase of de-colonialization, began to sense the weight of their responsibility for two-thirds of humanity, the desire also grew to liberate themselves from the domination of the industrialized North in the sphere of information and communication. An aspect of this new urge toward self-expression was the Third World countries’ wish through the media to present their respective unique problems and achievements in their own way. But this interest ran up against the developing South’s inferiority to the North in nearly all areas involving the media – including an inadequate potential of qualified specialists in all branches of the information sector; the lack of a technological infrastructure for articulating the South’s own standpoints as differentiated from those of East and West; independence on technological structures handed down from colonial times (which often, for example, even made a telephone call to a neighbouring country possible only by way of Paris or London); and, not least, the obstacle in the industrialized North’s tradition of forming its picture of the world almost exclusively through the eyes and ears of its own foreign correspondents, television teams, agency journalists.

Against this background it is understandable that within the Third World demands have been expressed that are in diametrical opposition to concepts of pluralism, freedom of the press, and the individual procurement of information - concepts that, at least for the West’s democratic countries, are considered as requisites anchored in basic rights.

The consequence of this conflict between the North’s and the South’s approach to the use of media was an interplay of ideological threat and counter-threat. Not until 1978 did the controversy seem to be resolved, this in a resolution of a UNESCO plenary session that was passed by acclamation. Before this vote vote of approval of a common stand, preparatory work had been done by an independent commission of experts under the chairmanship of Ireland’s Sean McBride, the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems. This commission only submitted its final report, however, in 1980, two years after UNESCO had adopted the so-called NIICO Resolution (cf. A/McBride I and II).

The 1980 UNESCO General Assembly reacted to the report of the McBride Commission with a lively and in part heated discussion. On October 24, 1980, UNESCO passed Resolution DR 8. Its most important recommended goals:

1) elimination of the imbalances and inequalities which characterize the present situation
2) elimination of the negative effects of certain monopolies, public or private, and excessive concentration
3) removal of the internal and external obstacles to a free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information and ideas
4) plurality of sources and channels of information
5) freedom of the press and information
6) the freedom of journalists and all professionals in the communication media, a freedom inseparable from responsibility
7) the capacity of developing countries to achieve improvement on their own situations, notably by providing their own equipment, by training their personnel, by improving their infrastructures and by making their information and communication means suitable to their needs and aspirations
8) the sincere will of developed countries to help them attain these objectives
9) respect for each people’s cultural identity and the right of each nation to inform the world public about its interests, its aspirations and its social and cultural values
10) respect for the right of all peoples to participate in international exchanges of information on the basis of equality, justice and mutual benefit
11) respect for the right of the public, of ethnic and social groups and of individuals to have access to information sources and to participate actively in the communication process.

One of the more notable aspects of this resolution is that it foresees a “New International Information and Communication Order” as no longer consisting solely of “external” measures, that is, ways of influencing the international flow of information. Instead, there is also a specific reference to internal – that is, national – hindrances which must be done away with in bringing about the new order. Another noteworthy point in the resolution (whose compromise
character needs to be kept in mind) is the pledging of an effort to seek a balanced relationship between journalistic freedom and journalistic responsibility — that is, between a media person's individual right and his socio-political commitments.

The “New Order” anticipates prerequisites, self-help on the part of the South as well as non-self-serving assistance from the North. Another key aspect of the resolution is its clear reference to ethnic and social groupings within a society — thus including minorities — with emphasis on these groups' right to participate as equals in the national and international communication process.

All the elements mentioned above had for years on end been lacking in the debate about the concept of NIICO. Their inclusion among the criteria for a new national and international media order prepared the way for the consensus that UNESCO achieved on the resolution.

One can delve into the history and present status of the debate on a New International Information and Communication Order in what has meanwhile become a comprehensive body of literature on the subject. For example, an article on the topic appears in the 1984/85 issue of this handbook (cf. A/Keune/II). To serve the present discussion, however, we need to append the following observations:

— This report of the McBride Commission continues to be — along with the report of the Brandt Commission on the general North-South situation — a valid document toward a conciliation of interests between North and South, East and West.

— The International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) adopted by the 1980 UNESCO plenary session not only continues to be a concrete example of pragmatic compromise; it has also meanwhile become a most relevant instrument of North-South cooperation in the communication sector. To be sure, a potential conflict was built into this UNESCO special programme at the outset: On the one hand, the developing countries hoped that this international apparatus would be a source of massive financial support for their media purposes. On the other hand, the Western donor countries had long since built up their own structure for cooperation in the sector of communications, and regarded the IPDC as primarily an instrument for co-ordination and advisory services. Despite this incipient misunderstanding things are working out not badly: Today, it is true, the IPDC still disposes over only moderate financial means (its yearly expenditure is between 2 and 3 million U. S. dollars). But the UNESCO creation can do much, by way of initial financing or complementary grants, to influence the direction of model projects on the developing-country media scene. The Federal Republic of Germany, too, which up to now has made the IPDC no direct grants, is trying successfully to have its funds-in-trust contributions (financial trustee services for individual UNESCO projects) recognized within the framework of the IPDC. And meanwhile, too, the United States, which gave as one of its reasons for leaving UNESCO a protest against the purported onedimensionality of the U. N. subsidiary organization in the sphere of media and communication, has kept its goodwill for the IPDC, and also is granting it indirect financial support while bolstering the International Programme’s effectiveness in other ways as well.

— A belated spinoff from the debate about NIICO that was carried on primarily within UNESCO was the commissioning of an independent panel of advisers by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in Geneva — a panel usually referred to as the Maitland Commission. The West German representative on the commission was Dr. Volkmar Köhler, Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation (largely concerned with Bonn's aid programmes for the developing countries). The Maitland Commission has issued a report called “The Missing Link” (cf. A/The Missing Link) which calls for numerous support measures for the improvement of individual communication in the Third World. The Maitland Commission's report also proposes the founding of an advisory centre for developing countries in Geneva, at the headquarters of UNESCO — an organization that was already in existence long before the founding of the United Nations itself. Since individual and mass communication, in view of the many possibilities for utilizing the new media and the new technologies, are hardly separable any longer, it remains to be seen how the ITU and the crisis-ridden UNESCO will work matters out together and divide their respective fields of operation.

— The intense debate over a New Information and Communication Order has seen forces emerging, in, and has brought forth arguments from, the Third World that deserve the most careful analysis. The method of dealing with such deep-lying and long-range problems as the debt and energy crisis, the raw-materials issue, and overpopulation — matters that in the Western media are gone into only occasionally, when they are of topical interest — the way in which these developing-country problems are handled is going to depend on how possible it is for the Third World to articulate its standpoint on the issues, and find access to the North's media for that message. The course of events in the Third World, and the South's efforts to become an equal partner in the exchange of information and news (details of the situation are gone into below), are, accordingly, directly relevant to any attempt at resolving the basic problems in the North-South relationship.
1.4 Know-how Transfer and Exchange of Programmes and News - a Solution?

The International Programme for Development of Communication - with U.S. backing and support - was established as an instrument for know-how transfer; as a vehicle for fostering communications structures in developing countries. This purpose certainly corresponds to the demands of countries of the Third World - even although no massive financial support from the West has been forthcoming. Furthermore, the UNESCO compromise resolution of 1980 contains all the elements that could benefit an exchange of information and opinion between the Third and the First World, with mutual regard for respective North-South ideological positions. Then why isn't the anticipated South-North exchange working out? Why isn't the Third World, with its abilities and forces combined in the Group of 77, transmitting just as many television programme hours to North America and Europe as, the other way around, those continents are delivering to Africa, Asia and Latin America? (At least 150,000 programme hours a year to the Third World from the United States alone, followed by Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany.) In other words, why does the Third World fail to use as an equal partner in the North-South relationship the same opportunities and possibilities - which in theory long since have been granted to it - that the big news agencies in West and East (in the East, notably the Soviet TASS), the newsfilm agencies, the Western television producers have long been exploiting?

The answer is clear: The South is still far behind the North because of the North-South economic gap, the know-how gap, the technology gap. In turn, these gaps compel developing countries to put up with a North-South communications gap. If this is the difficult circumstance, the question becomes: What is being done to make a reality of the theoretical equality of the North's potential partner, the South?

One answer to this question of what is happening to improve the situation is found in the purposes and activities of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (an organization with the initials GTZ). During the past one-and-a-half decades the GTZ has provided the Third World, to a value of hundreds of millions of Marks, with technical installations and technological know-how in the communications field. The lion's share of the more than DM 1,300,000,000, which, according to the statistics of Bonn's Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ), meanwhile has flowed into the communications arrangements of the Third World has gone into the service of improving the South-North flow of information. The GTZ's programme has been a major factor in the Federal Republic of Germany's having become the largest donor to and fosterer of communications facilities in countries of the Third World.

In addition, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation has made suggestions to improve the content of Third World media material. For example, the GTZ got the African radio and television union URINA, the umbrella organization of all African radio and television stations, to establish a programme-exchange centre in Nairobi. In the immediate future the centre is to intensify the cooperation of African radio and TV stations with one another; in the long run, it also aims to strengthen the voice of Africa in the concert of world communication.

Besides the Federal Republic of Germany, other Western industrialized countries, including France (which is primarily active in the media field in West Africa, but more recently has also been increasingly so in Asia) and Great Britain (with decreasing U.K. interest and decreasing investment), have furthered the international initiative toward know-how transfer and the exchange of programmes and news.

Delicacy is called for in many aspects of the North-South development. A case in point: A department chief of GTZ found himself called upon in 1983, addressing a broad circle of West German media specialists, to urge modesty and reflection before making approaches to the Third World (cf. Fumetti/B). It is apparent from his words and other admonitions that the answers to the questions involved in North-South media projects are not always going to be simple. This is doubtless the essential point of the GTZ official's words of caution: A mere readiness to "help", or a missionary zeal to export Western principles to developing countries with other structures than those of the West, produces only minimal results - or may even be counter-productive. Instead, those who are working in the field of international media need systematically to look for ways and means to help the Third World articulate its own messages. This requirement is especially indicated if on the one hand Western preconceived models for a developing country prove unsuitable; and on the other hand if perhaps we have not been listening closely enough to what our partners and colleagues in the Third World explain that they really want in the sector of information and communication.
The imbalance in the North-South information flow that many countries of the Third World are complaining about manifests itself, from the perspective of developing countries, first and foremost in the sphere of the press agencies. The almost monopolistic position of the “Big Five” (AP, UPI, Reuters, AFP, TASS) - among them, these large agencies have dominated, and are still dominating, more than 90% of the news market – has been both an occasion and a motive for the Third World’s seeking help by establishing new, alternative sources of information for its vast population, and for audiences in the North.

Since approximately the mid-1970s, accordingly, there have been efforts to build up regional and international media counter-weights to the world agencies. Almost at the same time, planning work got underway in Africa for a Pan-African News Agency (PANA); in Asia – where, with the name Organization of Asian News Agencies (OANA), an umbrella organization of national news agencies was already on the scene – the preparation was undertaken for an Asian News Network (ANN). ANN began in 1981/82 with the regular exchange of Asian agency news. PANA instituted its transmission service in mid-1984 (cf. Höhne/Asia-Pacific News Network/Avery/C).

As for Latin America: Because of the predominance of privately owned, commercially structured media in this region, the Central and South American countries have not managed to set up a unified organization like Africa’s PANA and Asia’s ANN. But instead, in Latin America at the beginning of the 1980s two regional background-information services were planned and initiated. One, ASIN (Acción de Sistemas Informativos Nacionales) circulates material from official governmental sources, transmitting the information with the help of the teletype network of the IPS agency (Inter Press Service). The other, ALASEI (Agencia Latinoamericana de Servicios Especiales de Información), represents an attempt, via ALASEI’s own network and its own correspondents, to obtain background reports relevant to developmental matters, and then circulate them throughout the region.

A special course of development is proceeding in the English-speaking Caribbean. There the British worldwide agency Reuters in the second half of the seventies parted with its Caribbean regional service. The service went over to ownership and management by a group of Caribbean newspaper publishers, and since then has been operating as the Caribbean News Agency (CANA). And the Arab regions? Efforts toward a merger of national news agencies in this part of the globe, or to set up a pan-Arab news agency, have all come to nothing. The chief reason is found in the deep-lying ideological and political differences within the Arab world, particularly since the attempt at Camp David, U. S. A., to bring about Egyptian-Israeli conciliation, and eventually peace between the Arab countries and Israel. The Egyptian agency MENA (Middle East News Agency), which before the above-mentioned attempt at Egyptian-Israeli conciliation led the news market in the Arab world, also has been recording setbacks – at least in those Arab countries that are hardliners in the matter of refusal to recognize Israel.

Why shouldn’t the Third World pool its resources and enter into the media field a large agency of its own, as a counterforce to the “Big Five” agencies of West and East? One attempt in this direction was made by the non-aligned developing countries known as the Group of 77. Their network, set up in the 1970s, is called the Non-Aligned Newspool. With the aim of granting a large part of the Third World a voice of its own on the media scene numerous national news agencies of the developing South supply the Newspool. The Yugoslavian news agency TANJUG serves as co-ordinator. The material provided by the various national agencies is then circulated worldwide from Belgrade.

Another global media enterprise of the South is the alternative Third World News Agency IPS. It has its juridical seat in Panama and its editorial headquarters in Rome. IPS is – other than most of the above-mentioned regional and international enterprises – neither a national nor an international organization. Instead, it is owned by a co-operative, which is comprised of the correspondents and other journalists who work for the agency (cf. Fernández/A). IPS was launched in 1964 at the instigation of a small group of Latin American and Italian journalists. It attained its present importance as a source and transporter of news of the Third World in South-South channels and in the South-North direction only at the end of the 1970s, during the debate about a New International Information and Communication Order. IPS has remained of major significance up to today, with its now some 200 correspondents in 55 countries. IPS transmits services in Spanish, English, Arabian, German, Dutch and Swedish.

Many of the mentioned alternative efforts in the realm of news agencies were and are intensively supported by the Federal Republic of Germany. PANA – especially its subregional system for West Africa, WANAD – was able to figure on grants from Bonn as early as ALASEI and CANA. The West German financial assistance has come via UNESCO in the form of funds-in-trust (cf. UNESCO/C).
A critical evaluation of the above-discussed models of media organizations quickly reveals that up to now – perhaps with the exception of IPS – no agency or other news organization of the South has been able to come up to the expectations and demands of its founders. A great breakthrough – presumably taking the form of a definitely declining share of the market by the “Big Five”, matched by a rise in the fortunes of a Third World news organization or organizations – this hope has yet to be fulfilled.

One reason for this South-North information deficit may be that the Third World’s attempts to create a media voice of its own are not yet as professional as the offerings of the “Big Five” agencies of West and East. Thus, the material of the Non-Aligned News Pool meanwhile – and this in the eyes of all potential users, North as well as South – is regarded as not sufficiently topical, and tending too much toward governmental press-release journalism. So it is, for example, that the West German Radio (Westdeutscher Rundfunk) in Cologne after a lengthy trial of the Pool ended its subscription to the service. As for the Asian News Network, after encouraging progress at the beginning ANN fell prey to a financial crisis. What went wrong? It seems that ANN was doing well enough as a regional news agency; but it ran afoul of an international approach that in practice is apparently impracticable without the sacrifice of professional news-gathering and transmitting quality: The Asian News Network regularly transferred the headquarters of its service from one member-country to another. It also suffers under the very heterogeneous quality of the information offerings from states with widely differing economic resources and divergent ways of life.

Again, the Pan-African News Agency spent more than ten years in planning and preparation before the first news item could move over the wire. Therefore it is too early – as it is in the case of the ALASEI agency – to make a conclusive evaluation of the PANA service, which got underway only in 1984.

Actually, the one Third World news enterprise that, as of now, can be judged favourably is the co-operatively organized agency IPS. Today it is just behind the North’s (that is, the West’s and the East’s) “Big Five”: IPS has become the sixth-largest news-and-information enterprise on the world market (measured by the extent of its transmission network and the number of correspondents, not by turnover). This success certainly finds its rationale in the fact that the dedicated IPS journalists also own the agency.

In summary, it can be concluded that the simple addition to the informational market of state sources of news that have predominantly the character of press releases or governmental proclamations offers no answer to the challenges posed by the existing fiercely competitive and highly professional large news agencies, transmitting their offerings with a keen eye for topical interest, and operating on business principles.

3.0 Programme Exchange – Merely Lip-Service?

Similar to the dissatisfaction, in the perspective of the Third World, with the current news-agency arrangements is the discontent that developing countries express relative to the electronic media. The North’s radio and television do their reporting on developing countries almost exclusively through the eyes and ears of Western correspondents and Western news-film agencies. (The problems is discussed in detail later in this analysis.) Moreover, quite as much North-South electronic-media disequilibrium is encountered in the exchange of non-topical and other-than-political programmes. While the United States, followed by Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, provide tens of thousands of television programme hours to the Third World year after year, it is rare indeed that, say for example, a Philippine entertainment film or an African feature by African authors is fitted into even the late-night programming of European television channels (cf. Nordenstreng C).

Rightly, it is recognized that this oft-lamented one-way street can only become two-directional, opening the way for a flow of electronic programmes to the North, if producers and television stations in the Third World, as a first step, begin with regional co-operation.

Media people and political leaders in many developing countries have been pondering how a programme exchange with each other in Asia or Africa could get underway as a first step toward global cooperation. To this end, the Asian regional association of radio and television, the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU), at its annual assembly in 1983 in Auckland/New Zealand requested its General Secretariat to make a comprehensive study of possibilities for, barriers to, and prospects for programme exchange in Asia. A year later, however, at the ABU annual assembly, this time in Tokyo, the words “programme exchange” appeared neither in the Secretariat’s activities report nor in other presentations. No study on the matter or on regional exchange in general was submitted. What had gone wrong? When ABU members asked this, the General Secretariat expressed its regret and came up with the “explanation”: Programme exchange being one of the most problematic aspects of regional electronic-media co-operation, and there having been other urgent tasks – the Secretariat gave as two examples the co-ordination of
reporting on major sports events and the arranging of day-by-day news exchange – there had been no time to deal with programme exchange.

Trying again, the ABU sought help in another direction: It assigned the regional Asian documentation and research centre for media, AMIC in Singapore, the task of exploring the hindrances to and the possibilities for a regional programme exchange – this “most problematic aspect”.

Perhaps the ABU Secretariat’s hesitation about getting into regional programme exchange becomes understandable in the light of further-going experiences that have already been made with television and radio-programme exchange in Africa. In 1981 the African regional radio/TV organization URTNA (Union des Radiodiffusions et Télévisions Nationales d’Afrique) began, as mentioned earlier, and receiving extensive personnel and technical support from the German GTZ, on planning and setting up an African centre for programme exchange in Nairobi/Kenya. At the URTNA assembly in 1985 in Brazzaville/Congo, the centre was able for the first time to provide the members of the Union with an over-all catalogue of programmes under consideration, in production, or already produced. The catalogue contains more than a thousand titles. The centre also demonstrated the functioning and purpose of an exchange point by way of a promotional video documentation (cf. Union/C). The operations of the URTNA centre as reflected by the catalogue are impressive – even if a somewhat more thorough-going analysis of the work that has been done on programme exchange produces a more modest evaluation. Up to now only five of more than 40 African television stations or networks have been active participants in television-programme exchange. They also share the costs of copying, dubbing, etc. The proportion of the proffered television programme hours that is available in more than one language is still relatively small. And besides, the total of programme titles listed is inflated in that some of them represent radio or TV programmes in which African chiefs of state or heads of Government express radical views on political developments in their country or in the region – programmes that for the vast majority of the URTNA members are either of only slight interest, or are flatly rejected as politically unacceptable.

Latin America represents somewhat of a special media situation. In Asia, media planners are beginning with their first theoretical considerations. In Africa, the cost-use relation has not yet proved itself in a first effort. By contrast, in Central and South America, programme exchange up to 1985 has been based exclusively on the regulative mechanism of the commercial programme market. That market is favourable to – besides imports from the United States – above all “telenovelas”, which are trivial, endless series on the model of made-in-U. S. A. soap operas. Only with the founding of the ULCRA (Unión Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Radiodifusión) has there been, for the
4.0 Television News Exchange – A Model Worth Emulating?

The problems that confront television news exchange between North and South are in part relatively simple and distinct, compared with the matter of North-South exchange of television programmes. With programme exchange, many uncertainties still exist, and many questions are open: Who plans, and where and with what funds, the dubbing centres? Is it to be only a matter of the exchange of national programmes, or might there also be co-production by two or more radio or television stations or channels? Will it be sufficient to use the cheaper, but slower, air-freight methods of dispatching cassettes, or should there be resort to the more expensive, but speedier, transmission methods of microwave links and satellites? By contrast with such difficult alternatives, in the news exchange among electronic media, especially television, the alternatives and priorities are sharply defined – particularly the requirement of up-to-the-hour topicality. Perhaps this relative simplicity of the facts of media life in the news sector explains why television news exchange within the Third World and between North and South meanwhile has made marked progress; and why this process is, moreover, on the verge of introducing into the previous pattern of global information what actually amounts to a radically new element.

The desire for fresh, day-by-day information from a variety of sources, and the demand for authentic pictures for the particularly attractive medium of television is extensive; it works its influence even where censorship and onesided ideological attitudes seek to restrain a free evaluation of the alternative sources of information that would allow the news selection to be based solely on professional journalistic considerations. This underlying tendency to uninhibited selection of news from various sources can, provided the demand for such information is accommodated by the availability of a correspondingly broad palette of high-quality material, lead – and this even in media systems under totalitarian rule, as recent examples have shown – to a diversification of the news reports, and consequently, even to more pluralism.

Could there really be such a development as, at least on the populace's TV screens, pluralism even in a totalitarian state? And if so, why, among all the media, should it be television that would seem to be on the fringe of fostering such a pluralistic development? After all, similar attempts at diversification of content via more exchanging and a better balance, both with press agencies and in the programming spheres of radio and television, have had largely disappointing results. To arrive at an answer to this riddle, we had best trace the story in some detail.

To begin with, there was a stroke of luck: namely the fortunate outcome of a conference in 1971 in Cairo. The Arab regional organization Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) had invited the news directors of their member-institutions, UNESCO experts and European specialists to a seminar. For the first time in a region of the Third World, a conference was concerning itself with the question: How should television news exchange between TV stations of the Arab region be organized? The debate centred on two media matters as models. Since television in the Arab world was also largely dependent for its international reportage on the three Western news film agencies UPIN, Visnews and CBS News, one of the two alternatives before the conference was, as later with press agencies, to set up a “counter” or “alternative” agency with Arab correspondents and Arab teams. The other model up for debate in Cairo was based on the practise of neighbouring European regions, on the other side of the Mediterranean: Despite all ideological differences, the East European OIRT and the West European EBU, in unusual harmony, are operating a system or television news exchange – the East’s Intervision, the West’s Eurovision – that follow very similar principles, and that, via Vienna and Prague, are even in an exchange with each other. OIRT and EBU have not decided to set up regional agencies; instead, the East European and the West European network conduct the exchange themselves, from an Eastern station or channel to its counterpart in Western Europe, and vice versa, by means of their own co-ordinating administration.

Which of the two models should the Arab world choose, that was the question – the option of setting up a “counter” agency, or that of direct exchange among the electronic media themselves? The Egyptian news agency MENA aggressively maintained at the conference that it could easily take over the television business and offer daily regional news packages to all the Arab TV outlets. Nevertheless, the decision went the other way. The Arab States Broadcasting Union resolved, at this seminar back in 1971, in favour of the Eurovision model. That is, there would be a self-organized exchange among the member-institutions. This key decision has set a precedent for the entire third World. Since Cairo 1971, no one in Asia, Africa or Latin America any longer has demanded, or even discussed, a Third World agency “of our own” for television news.

The adoption by the Arab world – in a decision that, as observed above, has set a precedent for all the Third World – of the Eurovision model of television news exchange has far-ranging significance. The choice of this model puts on the shoulders of the journalists who serve future regional systems in the Third
World - not a governmental authority or official agency - the direct responsibility for the TV news exchange. More even than this, it can be assumed that standard media operating procedure in the Third World from now on will be the trio of basic principles that guide Western Europe's Eurovision network:

- Every station or channel is free to offer others material from its own production - or not to offer the material;

- Every media outlet is free to take and use material, or not to take it, from the offerings of the other television organizations that are partners in the exchange;

- Every TV facility has the option, according to its priorities, of, having accepted this or that visual material, then processing the footage according to its own criteria: editing (and/or cutting) the material, supplementing the text with the recipient media's own commentary, any of this - yet with regard for the principles of fairness and objectivity.

Only one serious attempt has been made to deviate from the latter principle: During the constitutive assembly for a new broadcasting union for Latin American and the Caribbean (we shall be considering this event in more detail below) in June 1985, the agenda included a proposal from the Argentine Government. It recommended that a future Latin American television news exchange should impose on members the requirement that they are to present - in unaltered form - every contribution by every participant. After only a short debate this proposal was turned down.

Now of course even the theoretical adoption of the principles practised by Eurovision cannot exclude the danger of censoring, suppressing or slanting the news. But the qualified television journalist will by all means and in every circumstance be seeking to sound out and broaden the dimensions he has to maneuver in: the leeway to use his discretion in taking over for retransmission this or that exchange material. And he will also be endeavouring to blend his own journalistic contribution into the exchange offering. The fact that it is the news editor himself who becomes the responsible person and the activist in the exchange - that he is not reduced to being simply the accepter of material from an agency - is significant: the aspect that the news editor has the possibility of adding to exchange material that comes annotated only by its sound track his own commentary, and making his own presentation, thus fully exploiting the room for manoeuvrability - even if within narrow limits - that is available to him. This is a further indication that the television news exchange can be a model; a basis for a new quality of cooperation between North and South in the sphere of information.

Why, during the discussion of new media trends and problems, hasn't a great deal been said about radio matters? Simply because in most cases the material radio news uses for its reportage is not self-generated: it comes from the press agencies. And unfortunately, the predominantly North-to-South direction of the flow of information also very much applies to the press agencies. Yet there are regions of the Third World that radio, too - and especially radio - could serve well. Often it would be the developing countries' ideal medium for regional exchange and regional cooperation. As things are, the radio station of a small South Pacific island state, by subscribing to a world news agency or the BBC World Service, can provide its listeners with an adequate picture of international events; but without getting any information from this global service about what is going on in the other states of the vast Pacific area - extending as it does from Papua/New Guinea in the West to Pitcairn in the East. Since none of the independent countries of this region as yet has television, the regional exchange of news by radio would be a most suitable way for the South Pacific world to become more familiar with itself, and to intensify country-to-country cooperation.

In fact, offers have come from Australia to provide the co-ordinating and editorial services for such a South Pacific regional radio arrangement; but the proposals have run up against the understandable national sensitivities of the small island states.

4.1 From Eurovision to – Mondovision?

The Eurovision system for television news exchange, operated by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), traces its official inauguration to the ceremonies in 1952 surrounding Queen Elizabeth's ascent to the throne of Great Britain. Since then, the Eurovision model has been under close scrutiny by media politicians and media practitioners in various parts of the Third World - as an impulse for their own planning. Then what would be more natural than an effort to extend this European model, to link up Eurovision with other regional systems, and, one day, to make the ultimate transition: from Eurovision (cf. Melnik/C) to - Mondovision? In fact, developments are proceeding in this direction - even if it will hardly be possible for a long time still to speak of having reached the final stage, a "Mondovision" system embracing the entire world's visual media.
With the East European Intervision and the large networks in North America the EBU quite early concluded an exchange agreement. Thanks to this arrangement, material from Eurovision is available in Eastern Europe and North America, and material from these regions can be used by Eurovision. After some initial hesitation, in 1976/77 the EBU decided to extend this policy of exchanging to the broadcasting unions of the Third World. Soon afterward, the European Broadcasting Union signed agreements with ABU, ASBU and URTNA on trading television news. True, in view of the deficit in "counter offers" from Asia, the Near East and Africa, there is no real "exchange" in the literal sense. Nonetheless, this agreement between Eurovision and Third World television at least has cleared the way for the taking over, free of charge, of news from Eurovision by the members of the above-named regional organizations – with, at the same time, the option open for a future news flow in the opposite, South-North direction.

Yet even this first stretch of the road en route to the introduction, one day, of "Mondovision" was studded with obstacles. Because Eurovision also works in close cooperation with the three large Western global agencies for television news films, a prerequisite for the full utilization of the daily Eurovision offerings by other regional networks is the simultaneous conclusion of arrangements – at a price – with each of these three big agencies. This would often involve expenditures that are beyond the modest means of many media outlets in Asia, Africa and the Near East.

Another difficulty confronting cooperation of Third World electronic media with Eurovision is that because the West European network, in making available Eurovision news material via the INTELSAT system, pays only for the up-leg from the European ground station to the satellite, the potential user in the South has to shoulder the cost for the down-leg part of the satellite transmission. Since in most cases the respective national satellite ground stations are under the control of the country's PTT Ministry (which as a rule does not administer matters pertaining to broadcasting and the information sphere), this ministry also sets the rates for the use of the ground station. And this price-setting is related to expenditures and earnings in the field of individual telecommunications (telephone, teletype, etc.). Only exceptionally does the fee schedule take into account the special needs and the financial limitations of the national television system. This situation unfortunately often prevails, too, even where television is in the hands of the state.

The consequence of this unfortunate price situation was that developing countries set high "home-made" fees for the down-leg part of the transmission, averaging U. S. $ 1,000 and more for the first ten minutes and $ 50 to $ 200 for each following minute. Such a rate policy worked prohibitively – and is still doing so – against the practicability of satellite transmission of television news.

For the acceptance of even a ten-minute package of TV news each day, five days a week, would involve what seems to media managers in developing countries an astronomical outlay, far beyond their ability to pay.

Aware of this financial problem, the World Broadcasting Conference, the broadcasting unions, UNESCO and the world news conferences in recent years have made urgent appeals to the Governments of the Third World's countries, calling for a general decrease in the fees for the transmission of television news. UNESCO has suggested a preferential-to-TV tariff of U. S. $ 200 for the first ten minutes and $ 20 for each additional minute. Some countries of Asia – including the continent's poorest, such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka – meanwhile have followed this recommendation. Moreover, China, Malaysia and India have also drastically cut their fees.

By now "Mondovision" has proved to be more tangible than a vision. Despite all resistance, the four regional organizations ABU, ASBU, URTNA and EBU decided in 1983 to take up a suggestion by UNESCO – to risk a first test run for the future world television network. March of that year was chosen for the global experiment. Participants included numerous television stations and channels from Peking in the East to Dakar on the Atlantic Coast. It is true that, for reasons to be gone into below, the rehearsal of Mondovision was not quite global: The Western Hemisphere did not participate. But the successful overcoming of technical and administrative difficulties, along with problems of communication, during the only one-month experiment, ranging over three continents, was encouraging. Immediately after the trial run, the "Interunion Broadcast Conference" convened in Algiers. The participants were representatives of all the regional broadcasting unions and numerous Third World persons in public and political life who were concerned with the media. The conference agreed that the Mondovision trial had been impressive. They resolved to continue to foster global cooperation in the realm of television news.

With all due satisfaction over the formal success of the experiment, however, the majority of the persons directly responsible for operations in the four participating broadcasting unions agreed that things could have gone a good deal better – that this global pilot project had also uncovered considerable weaknesses: The quite differing qualifications of the participating news editors and their teams had meant, in turn, major differences in the quality of the proffered and exchanged programmes. Probably because they were uncertain about the reactions of an unaccustomedly international public, many of the participating telecasters took flight in stiff "press-release" or "proclamation" journalism; or they offered pictures that hardly mirrored their respective countries’ realities. But perhaps more important than anything else that was learned, the experiment made clear that simply the taking over of principles...
such as those of Eurovision, and unrehearsed participation in a regional and an international exchange alone cannot build a solid foundation for future cooperation in this sector.

In other words, the first experiment in global telecasting was a clear reminder that you don’t begin work on a house at the highest level - the roof; “Mondovision”. Instead, first you erect, anticipating and supporting the roof to come, columns or beams; regional TV exchange systems on regional bases. These regional arrangements have to prove their solidity before the roof is positioned. Putting first things first, we shall do well to look briefly at the developmental status of the electronic media of individual regions of the South, in that way becoming better able to estimate the outlook for Mondovision.

4.2 Asiavision – in Six Years, the Impossible

A first regional exchange system for television news in the Third World began operations in Asia on January 16, 1984: Asiavision. The undertaking, sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU), has organized the daily exchange of television news among Asian media outlets in two subregions and two co-ordination bureaus, in Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur. The daily news offering from Asiavision is supplemented with selected material from Eurovision – whose offerings are made available in Asia on the same day – via satellite linking the two continents.

Here a few details of Asiavision procedure: In Region A, which is co-ordinated from Tokyo, and which comprises China, South Korea, Japan and Indonesia, news material is exchanged once a day and five days a week. In Zone B, to which Southeast Asia along with the Indian Subcontinent (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh) and Sri Lanka belong, with Kuala Lumpur as the point of co-ordination (also the secretariat’s headquarters), since April 1, 1985, two news packages a day have been assembled and distributed.

The ABU's efforts to organize its own exchange system for television news as a component of South-South media cooperation and as an important supplementation of the Western news-film agencies' offerings goes back to 1971. At that time, the ABU for the first time convened a special regional session of its members, in Tokyo. Representatives of other regional broadcasting unions took part. The project was co-sponsored and organized by the Federal Republic of Germany's Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Other broadcasting unions of the Third World and of the industrialized North followed up this initiative by sponsoring – in 1973 in Cologne, in 1977 in Cairo, in 1981 in Jakarta – world news conferences for radio and television. In 1976 the ABU and its German partner assigned to a small team of experienced TV news coordinators the task of exploring the prerequisites for establishing an Asian exchange system. The results were published at the end of 1976 in Singapore under the title ,,Television News Exchange in Asia“.

On the basis of this study, in 1977 the ABU began with the regional Asian training centre for radio and television Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (AIBD), and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation with a six-years long training programme for television news from various member-countries of the ABU. This training project was not restricted to the instruction of news editors for the difficult sphere of television news exchange; it included (in an average of two four-week courses per year) entire news teams. Those invited from each member-state were an editor/producer, a cameraman, a sound specialist, a cutter or video operator – this assortment of personnel so as to attain an identical standard of quality in news exchange, news production and news presentation. The aim was to enable the team to select themes from the perspective of regional and international acceptance; and to package the theme-offerings from a technical and a production aspect as to make them competitive with high-quality agency material and/or with the news production of European and American colleagues.

At the end of 1983, after six years of specialized training at the AIBD, some 450 employees from the sectors of production, technology and editing were back at work in 14 Asian broadcasting enterprises. This group now was not only qualified to produce news materials at the desired level of competitive quality, but was also familiar with the technique of “editing by camera”, including meeting editorial deadlines in relation to satellite-transmission times and the conditions of international satellite television traffic.

Although Asiavision’s inauguration of operations was delayed until January 1984, many of the methods and skills acquired in the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development's special courses meanwhile were to prove otherwise useful: The trainees could put their newly acquired abilities to helping improve the quality of the products of the broadcasting institution to which they had returned after training at the AIBD. In some cases, too, the training was reflected in a noticeably intensified usage of ENG (electronic news gathering) units for topical programmes and for documentaries. It is noteworthy, too, that during the six-year period, training emphasis gradually shifted
from film to electronic reporting, because the participating broadcasting organizations meanwhile had almost entirely converted their topical news reporting to the ENG system. As co-ordinator of the training programme and as advisor to the ABU for the planning and organization of Asiavision, during the entire period the project was served by a veteran editor of the West German Channel I television's news programmes. He was "lent", via the auspices of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, to the Asian Broadcasting Union and the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development.

The problem of training qualified specialists was not the only prerequisite for Asiavision to begin operating. At the same time the planners had to find a procedure for the daily co-ordination of the exchange package – that is, the way for the participating media institutions to communicate with one another about the day's news offering and that day's queries and special interests. The solution turned out to interconnect the participating media enterprises on the same circuit each morning by satellite. Thus the satellite audio hook-up with central headquarters in Kuala Lumpur about what is to be in a day's news package.

Another task was to work out the procedures and formats for the teletype interchanges, and for the transmission of "dope sheets" – that is, brief-as-possible, yet complete, summaries (like a book's table of contents or a press agency's news "budget") of the individual news contributions.

But the greatest obstacle on the way to an operative Asiavision was the problem of finding economically viable broadband transmission possibilities for the television signal in each of the participating countries and in the central headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo. Because of the geographical extension of the Asian region and in view of the almost complete lack of microwave links (only between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore is there such a connection), it was clear from the beginning that for the transmission and exchange of news contributions about same-day events, the only resort could be communications satellites.

A slower method than satellites had been tried and had failed: Loss of time that ensued when video cassettes or news films were sent by air freight had already in Asiavision's preparatory stage led to the participating members' being able to exchange only background material, not topical news items. Thus contributions sent by air freight could not be used as an equivalent supplement to the material offered by the news-film agencies, because these agencies to some extent were already transmitting up-to-the-hour news packages to the region by satellite.

With the above problems in mind, the ABU Secretariat in Kuala Lumpur and the study group, in which interested ABU members were participating, that was working on television news put priority on an effort to make use of the Indonesian satellite system Palapa in the Southeast Asian region. (Palapa, which along with the Indian satellite SITE is one of the first national systems in the Third World, can serve not only the broadly extended Indonesian island world, but also transmits to the five of the Southeast Asian countries that are associated with Indonesia in the ASEAN community: the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei. Both Indonesia as operator of the Palapa satellite system and the other ASEAN member-countries indicated their readiness to make this domestic satellite's facilities available for television news exchange within the countries of the ASEAN economic community – and to negotiate a solution that would be financially manageable by the participating media enterprises. The fact that, at least for the time being, Palapa has not actually been used is primarily because of a regulation in a contract between Indonesia, as the operator of Palapa, and INTELSAT. This contract stipulates that Indonesia must abstain from all employment of the Palapa satellite facility that could mean "economic damage" for the INTELSAT system. Although the international board of managers of INTELSAT in another case (similar contracts exist with other regional and national satellite operators in the Third World) years ago had made an exception in favour of the special TV news situation, nevertheless two initiatives to get a similar concession for Palapa in regard to the desired news exchange in Southeast Asia came to nothing.

Two circumstances led to a slowing down of the initial trend to favour Indonesia's Palapa satellite facility over INTELSAT: On the one hand there was the above-described unresolved juristic problem with INTELSAT about the use of Palapa. Secondly, there was the fact that media outlets of 14 Asian countries most of which Palapa would not have been able to reach sent trainees to courses in Kuala Lumpur and expressed interest in Asiavision.

Because of various national situations, some countries and/or electronic-media enterprises in those countries are still distancing themselves from the plans for Asiavision. As of now, the Philippines cannot take part, for financial reasons, because of the national economic crisis. The Thai media outlets that are associated in the "Thai TV Pool" up to now have not joined the Asiavision planning because of these outlets' special structural problems. Singapore currently is still hesitant. Iran, for technical reasons, is linked via satellite with Zone A (Tokyo) – which, if only because of the time difference, is not a fortunate arrangement. Vietnam, which also is showing interest in Asiavision, does not, because of its tie-in with the Soviet Intersputnik system, have the technical facilities to participate in an exchange by way of the Intersat transponder. Interestingly, it was a U. S. television company that, with the aid
of a mobile earth station, for the first time made possible a transmission from Vietnam for Asiavision.

It can be seen even from such a bit of evidence as the carefully kept up list of the daily exchanged news items that the training for, planning of and operation of Asiavision is turning out definitely to the good of the regional and international news reportage of many Asian TV outlets. The trend is away from say-nothing "official" news with "press-release" character to lively spot news of the day; and to information with real relevance for the developing world. That Asiavision even just a few months after it began operation was able to cope with the otherwise customary censorship customs was evidenced, in mid-1984, during the severe student unrest in Bangladesh. The Government, as was to be expected, had imposed a total ban on filming by the national television – and of course Dacca allowed no picture reporting by foreign teams or correspondents. But in the morning satellite-linked editorial conference of Asiavision participants, the news co-ordinators from other countries pressed their colleagues in Bangladesh for timely picture material. Under this pressure, the national censorship gave in. It permitted production of a news film which was offered and circulated by Asiavision, with the authorities sticking to their ban on the coverage in Bangladesh itself.

4.3 Afrovision – Only a Vision?

As the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union had done earlier, Africa's URTNA in 1979/80 turned to the Federal Republic of Germany's Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) with the request: Will you survey the possibilities of introducing an African regional exchange for television news (cf. URTNA/C). This project was undertaken by a small commission of experts: representatives of the European Broadcasting Union and of URTNA. The committee made a comprehensive report. The gist of it was that neither the level of training in the African media enterprises nor the technical prerequisites (microwave links or satellite operation) nor the financial situation of most stations permitted an immediate start on such a system. In 1982/83 the study was continued by UNESCO specialists. In view of the progress of the African telecommunications system PANAFLTEL by then, the UNESCO researchers evaluated the situation somewhat more positively than had the FES survey; but in principle came to the same – "not now" – conclusion.

The African media situation being less propitious than that of Asia, it was only at the turning of the year 1984/85 that URTNA could arrive at an agreement with UNESCO and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. It provides for a start on a several-years-long training programme for news teams from Africa, based on the Kuala Lumpur model that is described above. The first training course for African TV personnel was conducted in Cairo in the autumn of 1985, with the Egyptian television system ERTU as the fourth partner in the project, providing the requisite local facilities. It is anticipated that probably by the end of 1987 most of the larger African TV outlets will dispose over news teams with qualifications for coping with the special disciplines of television news exchange similar to the skills of their training-centre-graduate colleagues in Asia. It remains open whether at the same time the stations can begin with a regular exchange system, for such an arrangement poses numerous further financial, technical and personal-related imponderables.

After the television media of the Arab world, which are associated in the Arab States Broadcasting Union, were the first in the Third World to consider a regional system, it seemed plausible that the ASBU could function as a bridge between, on the one side, Western Europe's Eurovision and Eastern Europe's Intervision and, on the other side, media groups in Africa and Asia. Quite early as Third World television goes, between 1973 and 1976, the ABSU, with help from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, had sent numerous news teams for training in Amman and Cairo; and the ABSU also introduced an exchange procedure, which at that early date was based on the daily transporting of video cassettes by air freight. Moreover, in 1976 fully 60 TV news items from the Arab region – in particular Mashrek – were offered to Eurovision, and were then distributed beyond Western Europe by that TV association. But this initial Arab-region media progress ran into political differences. The disagreements led to an almost ten-year delay in the plans to finance the Arab world's own satellite – Arabsat – and to launch it into orbit.

This waiting by the Arabs for a regional satellite of their own at the same time hindered the concretization of plans for an Arab TV news exchange via Intelsat. Besides, all the North African Arab countries (Egypt as the last, in 1985) decided to seek a linkage with the world news market of television by direct cooperation with Eurovision over microwave links. This special development in North African Arabia proceeded as a similar initiative was mounted by the seven Arab Gulf states: They merged their facilities as Gulfvision, and it is working on a subregional exchange for the area. Gulfvision has its headquarters in Riyadh. For 1986 it plans to erect a central building with a co-ordination centre for news exchange. Egypt's departure from the Arab League and from the ABSU has made the Arab media situation much more problematic. In addition, for a long time the remaining members could not agree where to locate the co-ordination centre for the Pan-Arab exchange operated by
Arabsat. While the Secretariat in Tunis wanted to do the co-ordinating, it looks now as if the Algerian television has carried the day, and will be providing the co-ordinating centre. Although the technical prerequisites for an Arab exchange have been at hand since a second attempt in 1985 (a first Arab satellite turned out to be not 100-percent operable), it remains a question how such an exchange in the Arab region is to be carried out. Since the Arab transmission system is not technically compatible with INTELSAT (a deficit that could, however, easily be eliminated by the parallel operation of two ground stations), this technological divergence of the two systems, Arabia's and INTELSAT, poses a certain danger that a future Arab exchange service could be isolated from the other regional systems in Africa, Asia, and the neighbouring continent of Europe.

4.4 Latin America – Without a Vision?

While in the other regions of the Third World the 1960s and 1970s already were seeing the formation of associations of state-sponsored and/or public corporations and to a degree also private radio and television broadcasters as regional associations, it was not so in Latin America. There the situation up to now has been quite otherwise. In 16 of the 31 Latin American countries, the dominant broadcasting pattern is privately owned, commercial radio and television, and in most of the other countries, too, the commercial stations are part of the electronic-media pattern. So a first step in this region has been the setting up of associations of commercial broadcasters, or of the owners of the systems. In Latin America there are separate organizations for radio interests (Asociación Interamericana de Radiodifusión/AIR) and for television (Organización de la Televisión Iberoamericana/OII).

The statutes of both organizations rule out, both de jure and de facto, a full membership for public corporation, state-sponsored and non-commercial stations (e.g. university transmitters). Up to now, consequently, the public corporation, state and non-commercial sector of the Latin American electronic media has been prevented from participating in a regional association; and accordingly has not been represented internationally by the existing organizations.

Yet a survey by UNESCO that was made in 1984 indicates that, despite the primarily commercial pattern of the region's electronic media, the public corporation and state broadcasters have become an important factor, and are continuing to gain in significance. Of the total of some 4,500 radio stations and networks, fully 605 are operated after all, UNESCO reports, “by the state or by universities, by the Catholic Church, other groups and religious organizations, as well as cultural and educational programmes”. In the television sector the relationship is similar: Fully 77% of all told 610 channels are operated by the state or non-commercial private sponsors such as foundations, cultural and religious groups, and universities. An over-all look at the distribution of these 77 television stations over the subcontinent, including Mexico, Central America and the English-using Caribbean shows, remarkably, that in nearly all countries (with the exception of Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras and Panama), state, public-corporation and/or educational TV channels are being operated.

Up to now, a unified regional representation of non-commercial radio and television has existed only in the English-using Caribbean: through the Caribbean Broadcasting Union. In view of the financial weakness of the CBU members and the seemingly perpetual crisis afflicting efforts toward regional cooperation in the area, the CBU up to 1983 was in a state of almost total hopelessness – the more so inasmuch as the Union did not boast of even the minimal infrastructure, a permanent Secretariat. Now the situation has improved somewhat. Since 1983 the CBU has had a General Secretariat with headquarters in Barbados, presided over by a capable salaried employee of the Union, Mr. Michael Rudder. In addition, the cooperation of the CBU with the FES-established and sponsored CARIMAC institute at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica resulted in intensified activity by the Caribbean Broadcasting Union, and also lent the union added status among the regional broadcasting unions.

The other non-commercial electronic outlets of Latin America have been trying to make up for the lack of a unified umbrella organization by resorting to the – typical for this subcontinent – splinter associations: On the religious level, there is UNDA-AL for the Catholic and WACC Latin America for the Protestant Church; for the universities, there is an association of Latin America's university-owned stations.

Internationally and in an interrelationship with the large broadcasting unions – among them, in the industrialized world, the European Broadcasting Union for Western Europe, the Organisation Internationale de Radiodiffusion et Télévision/OIRT for Eastern Europe (including some Socialist countries of the Third World), and for North America the “substitute union”, the North American National Broadcasters Association/NANBA – Latin America's important public radio and television sector up to now has not been represented at all.
The desire for public broadcasting in Latin America is being expressed constantly more unequivocally, since the TV operators are well aware of the increasing importance of the broadcasting unions when it comes to, for example, the negotiating of transmission rights for major sports events (the Olympics, soccer world championships, Wimbledon tennis, etc.) within regional and international television news exchange; and in regard to reporting on world events (e.g., the U.S. President's visit to China, the starvation catastrophe in Africa, the "Life Aid" pop concert to benefit the African food-aid campaign, etc.).

The Latin American public broadcasters would like through a regional organization of their own to participate in decisions on handling such major media events – the more so inasmuch as the non-commercial media's access to Latin America's associations of private radio and TV broadcasters has been barred by the OTI and AIR statutes.

Accordingly, in January 1985 representatives of the public sector came together for a first Latin American and Caribbean broadcasters' conference in San José/Costa Rica. They discussed ways and means of regional cooperation. This conference, with UNESCO its primary sponsor, resolved to discuss, at a follow-up conference in July 1985, specific steps to establish a regional broadcasting union of the public media and, if possible, to found such an association immediately after the broadcasters' session.

As it turned out, the regional broadcasting union for Latin American public media was established in June 1985, in San José, which also was chosen as the headquarters of the new organization's General Secretariat. The name of the association is Unión Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Radiodifusión (ULCRA). The founding document was signed by authorized representatives of 15 Latin American Governments, including Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, Cuba, Mexico, and all the Central American countries. The delegates also elected a board of directors, on which state media institutions are to be represented with seven seats, and non-state-sponsored media outlets without commercial purpose with five seats. The constitutive assembly of ULCRA also approved a programme of activities. One of its most important priorities: the setting up of a television news exchange programme according to the principles of Eurovision.

So it is that Latin American broadcasters – who for quite a while seemed unable to develop a vision of future television news exchange based on regional and international cooperation – have, through the decisions in Costa Rica, taken a giant step forward. In Latin America as in other parts of the developing world, non-commercial broadcasting establishments are short of money, of qualified personal, even of forward-looking perspectives – and of technical prerequisites for a future active role in this important media sector of TV news. Still, the founding of the Latin American and Caribbean Broadcasting Union is an auspicious beginning.
5.0 The News-Film Agencies – Counter-Force or Allies?

How have the large Western news-film agencies reacted to the founding of Asiavision, and the efforts in other parts of the Third World to establish exchange systems for television news – arrangements conveying on these associations responsibility for the direction and management of their own broadcasts? Understandably, the big Western agencies have been observing the development in the Third World watchfully, and not without suspicion. For the established agencies regard the coming into existence of these Third World systems as direct competition – in a situation in which the big agencies of the North up to now had had a monopoly – since for smaller media outlets in the South a subscription to Visnews or UPITN was often the only source of international reportage. For these smaller Third World stations to have their own net of correspondents would have been much too expensive, and often there were – and are – no alternative sources for such international reportage. But since the large Northern agencies have not eliminated their deficit in regional reporting from and about countries in the various areas of the Third World (as the felt need for Asiavision shows), the attraction to the developing countries of having their own regional TV systems has grown, and will keep growing. The resultant pressure of competition on the big Northern agencies has led the established classical agencies to develop aggressive counter-strategies – even to an offer to all TV stations in Asia from one of the Northern agencies to organize and carry out the regional exchange, which was then still in the planning stage.

But need regional news exchange systems by Third World media outlets on the one hand and the services of the established Northern agencies on the other hand exclude one another? (Even if smaller and financially weak outlets in the Third World as of now possibly, for reasons of money, still must decide for only one or the other alternative?) Once more the Eurovision example shows that acceptance of this mutual exclusion need not be a foregone conclusion. For the West European broadcasting network, as a case in point, for decades has been cooperating with the three big Northern TV news agencies to mutual advantage. On the average over recent years, the daily exchange of Eurovision material has been made up of 49% agency news and 51% contributions from Eurovision’s participating stations and channels.

Can’t such a regulated co-existence of agencies and exchange systems also be a goal of media planning in the Third World? One would think so; and the developing countries now seem to agree, judging by a recent event: During the Third International Broadcast News Workshop in Jakarta in 1981, with delegations from all the broadcasting unions attending, a dialogue was begun between these unions and representatives of the three large Northern television news agencies. Even the start of this discussion provided indications that the agencies perhaps need to rethink their market strategies – including their subscription prices – if they wish to protect their present share of the market and to get involved in a regulated co-operative arrangement with television stations of the Third World.
6.0 Data Banks, News Banks, On-Line Communication – the Cure-All?

“A Market of 500,000,000 Marks” proclaimed a headline in the Süddeutsche Zeitung of Munich on July 23, 1985. The economy and the social system would be inconceivable today, the newspaper article went on to state, without dependable supplies of news and information. “Besides the ‘classic’ factors of landed property, labour and capital,” the newspaper article continued, “today ‘information’ and the varied forms of its communication, transmission and processing are increasingly regarded as factors of production in their own right.”

Following this comment, the chairman of the board of the Philips Communications Industry AG (PKI) in Nuremberg was quoted in an interview. He replied to the question how he would depict the present national and international market for the communications technologies. The chairman’s reply: “The communications market is very dynamic and – what is perhaps still more important – it is highly promising for the future. In the sectors of information and communications technology, a yearly worldwide growth rate of 8 to 10% is being estimated – which makes this branch the strongest growth sector in the economy.” By 1990 the world market for these technologies may well have come to a volume valued at some 500,000,000,000 West German marks (almost U. S. $ 200,000,000,000). “Similar growth rates,” the communications executive continued, “are anticipated for the Federal Republic of Germany – although here one should not forget that our West German domestic market does not come to even one-tenth of the world market. Even so, solely for the gradual construction of a universal telephone network, suitable for the transmission of all kinds of information and informational services, some 300,000,000,000 marks will need to be invested. Such a project naturally is not going to be realized in two or five years; it is a ‘generation task’ of the next 20 to 30 years.” So the chairman of the board of a major communications company sees the future communication-media development.

Now that some newly industrialized countries, such as South Korea or Singapore, have already profited markedly from this dynamic communications-technology market, it can be supposed that after years of economic crisis other, larger areas of the Third World will also be drawn into the energy field of so dynamic a market; and that individual communication as well as mass communication may well emerge as the “locomotive” of the economic upturn. This would be a development that one could serenely leave to the laws of the market and of growth, without requiring much of a helping hand from the developed North.

We have already considered the new dangers that computer-based systems, on-line-communication techniques, and so on, are visiting on the developing countries. So the assumption that a dynamic growth branch will also, automatically, favour the economic development of the Third World is too simple – and too perilous. Documentation of the existent deficits in the Third World’s electronic-media balance is offered by the above examples of a small cross-section of the over-all problems in the specialized sphere of the regional and international exchange of television news. These examples also illuminate the efforts and the major investment that must be made in policy determination, planning, financial outlay, and the training of qualified personnel. In this complex situation with its serious problems, there are no cure-alls. Still, an optimistic view is indeed offered in the perception that the electronic media, given an adequate employment of effort in planning and training, plus sufficient investment of funds, are quite likely to benefit from the dynamics of information technology – one of the last growth sectors of the global economic system.
7.0 Available Literature

In the five years between the appearance of the McBride Report and the Maitland Report, there has been a clear improvement in the supply of reading matter available on developments in the field of international information and communication; literature on partial aspects, such as the international exchange of news; and sources on the economic and socio-cultural implications of news media technologies.

Important contributions to the newer literature on media matters have been made by, in particular, such authors as Herbert Schiller, Cees Hamelink, Jörg Becker, and also by UNESCO, together with such regional research and documentation organizations as AMIC and CIESPAL. Nevertheless, the bulk of the useful literature is still within the “grey area”: lecture manuscripts, conference papers, seminar reports and the resolutions passed by international panels. Accordingly, the lists that follow can offer only a comparatively small excerpt from the plethora of available literature on media matters. Moreover, an intensive involvement with the problems and opportunities for the developing world in regard to its future media arrangement also presupposes contacts with the institutions and organizations that have been named in the foregoing account.

8. Index of Reading Material

A. Documents and Publications in the Field of the “New International Information and Communication Order”

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D. Institutions

Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre (AMIC), 39 Newton Road, Singapore 1130

Centro Internacional de Estudios Superiores para América Latina (CIESP AL), Avda. Diego Almagro Andrade Maria Esquina, Quito, Ecuador.

International Institute of Communications (IIC), Tavistock House East, Tavistock Square, London WC 1H 9LG

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Plaza, New York, N. Y. 10017

United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Place de Fontenoy, F-75700 Paris