International Conference

NATO LOOKS SOUTH – SOUTH LOOKS AT NATO?
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Welcome Address
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Keynote:
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Siegmar Schmidt, University of Koblenz-Landau, Germany

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Ladies and Gentlemen!

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you at Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Berlin!

The subject of the conference “NATO looks South – South looks at NATO?” is of great importance for us, as we face the issue from both sides in our daily work: On the one hand in our foreign and security policy cooperation with our partners in Europe and the US, which is reflected in our efforts to strengthen the transatlantic dialogue, and on the other hand in our contributions to promote development and democracy in countries of the so-called “Third World”.

This conference takes place in the run-up to the NATO summit in Riga at the end of November. Important questions regarding the future of the alliance will be discussed during this so-called “Transformation Summit”: the new concept of “global partnerships”, the implementation of crucial internal reforms and NATO’s future relations with the countries of the South.

This relation has changed fundamentally since the end of the Cold War, especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11. The hardly successful Mediterranean Dialogue, initiated in 1994, then extended in 2004 to the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative”, now covers the entire region of the “Broader Middle East”. Whereas the majority of the participating countries traditionally felt like objects of NATO’s security activities, the new initiative tries to establish a new cooperative approach and a joint security dialogue. Until then, the interests and needs of the southern Mediterranean countries were not sufficiently considered. Furthermore, there is a certain scepticism towards the US policies in the region. This scepticism comes along with the uncertainty as to NATO’s future aims.

Since 2004, NATO has supported the African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS): This was the beginning of NATO’s engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa. In June 2006, the alliance conducted its first manoeuvre in Africa, around the Cape Verde Islands. But there is also scepticism to be found in Africa itself. For the African Union and the majority of the African countries, NATO’s intentions and aims remain obscure – despite its important support of the African Union’s Darfur Mission. The alliance is merely seen as an instrument of US foreign policy. Except in military circles, there is only little concrete knowledge about NATO.

Even within NATO itself, there is no clarity about the Alliance’s future role and strategy. It goes without saying that in the face of the 21st century’s challenges, the alliance should contribute substantially to global peace and stability. But the question as to what this contribution should look like is highly controversial. The US and the UK, with their concept of global partnerships, aim at a new institutional framework to facilitate better cooperation with Western-oriented and militarily potent countries like Japan, Australia and New Zealand. A couple of European countries still have their reservations regarding these plans.
NATO’s Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, summarized the discussion in the following words: “NATO has no ambition to become a global alliance but NATO needs global partners”.

This brief description of the situation makes it clear that there is a huge demand for dialogue, exchange and information on all levels and between all actors. In recent years, we, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, tried to contribute to these security policy dialogues. We accompany efforts to enhance the security policy cooperation at the UN level as well as on regional levels through our work in New York and in strategically important countries like China, Brazil, India and South Africa. These efforts have made it clear that the assessment of security-related problems diverges significantly between North and South.

The countries of the North focus on new threats from countries of the South: regional conflicts, the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing states and recruiting areas for terrorists. Many representatives from the South prefer wider security concepts and put issues like food and water deficiency, diseases and ecological crises on the “Human Security”-Agenda. One precondition for successful cooperation in the field of security policy is the identification of joint priorities in which the voices and the interests of the South are clearly considered.

Starting from the general necessity of cooperation between North and South in the field of security policy, this conference discusses the above-mentioned questions in relation to two regions of the South: the Broader Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. To achieve faithful and efficient cooperation, both sides have to foster mutual understanding, identify common interests and evaluate practical experiences.

In light of the competent and experienced panelists, I am confident that we will experience an informative and enriching dialogue! And I hope the conference will bring us forward in our efforts to strengthen mutual understanding and confidence – and will therefore make a contribution to more common security.
NATO, the South and International Security – Priorities before the Riga Summit

Siegmar Schmidt

“A foreign legion for the Pentagon” was the title of an article by William Pfaff published in the International Herald Tribune. It discussed proposals to support US military actions with NATO troops and mentioned that the European allies were not willing to do so. This article is four years old, but not much has changed in the debate: The question still is what the future task, the raison d’être, of NATO shall be.

To explain this, let me briefly look back at history. The idea of NATO was described very bluntly by its first Secretary General, Lord Ismay: “keeping the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” NATO became the cornerstone of transatlantic cooperation and the US the stabiliser of European security.

NATO was first and foremost a defence alliance, but also had additional functions. It tried – successfully or not – to coordinate foreign and security policy and made considerable efforts in conflict mediation between member states. It was always quite clear that NATO was an asymmetrical alliance of the US – the superpower with superior capabilities and budgets – with the rest. NATO always emphasised that it was a community sharing similar values, but this was a very generous assessment as countries like Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey, while not democracies, were members of NATO for a long time. So NATO was never a club of democracies. Nor was it characterised by internal consensus. It has a long history of controversial discussions and conflict, for example about strategy and burden sharing. But with respect to its main task, deterrence, there was more or less consensus.

The transformation process of NATO after the end of the Cold War is not yet finalised

However, the security environment changed completely after the demise of the Soviet Union. Now transformation was high on NATO’s agenda, and this transformation process has not yet been finalised. It became quite clear that, concerning membership and geographical scope, NATO overlapped with the EU, which founded its foreign policy with the Maastricht treaty of 1993 and later developed the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This led to a discussion on “interlocking institutions” – some commentators called it “inter-blocking institutions.”

High on the agenda was the enlargement of NATO. It started with the Partnership for Peace Initiative in 1994, first aimed at assisting Eastern European countries in reconstructing and re-orienting their armies. The first enlargement round took place in 1999 with 3 new members, followed by a second round with a further 7 new members in 2004. NATO now has 26 member states; it has a special relationship with Russia and a distinctive partnership with Ukraine.

The new security strategy of 1999 first of all approved the old security concept: It states that the primary role of NATO’s military forces is “to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states.”
But at the same time NATO offered to support peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OECD. NATO was already following Senator Lugar’s famous dictum: If NATO does not go out of area it will go out of business. There was, however, no general consensus as to how far out of area it should go.

**The Iraq war brought transatlantic differences into focus, endangering the foundations of NATO**

After the terrorist attacks of 9-11 in New York NATO played a secondary role. Although its secretary general activated Article 5 of the treaty for the first time and declared the terrorist acts an attack on a NATO member, the US did not intend to use NATO in the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Iraq war then brought transatlantic differences into clear focus. From a European perspective, the statement by US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld that the mission defines the coalition violated the very raison d’être of NATO and implied the possible future demise of NATO.

The question whether European Defence and Security Policy (EDSP) and NATO are partners or competitors was raised after the Maastricht treaty. The US always argued that there is a danger of duplication. There was a long debate on how to cooperate. The arrangement found in “Berlin plus” was a step forward, but it has not really solved the problem.

Important issues were addressed at NATO’s summits in Prague in 2002 and in Istanbul in 2004. Besides inviting 7 countries to accession talks, the Prague summit brought forward the core idea of a NATO response force. It should be technologically advanced, consist of land, sea, and air forces, and be ready to move quickly wherever needed. A long list of commitments deals with improving military capabilities, especially European capabilities. My impression is that not much of this has been implemented. No decision was taken in Prague on the global role of NATO.

**The Istanbul Summit in 2004 achieved only a weak compromise**

The Istanbul Summit in 2004 first of all reconfirmed NATO commitments in the Balkans, particularly Kosovo. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, taken over by NATO in 2003, was expanded and the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in this country increased. The open-door policy was reaffirmed. A very important decision was the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative by which NATO offered cooperation to interested countries in the broader Middle East region, starting with countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It should, inter alia, promote military to military cooperation, inter-operability, and border security, particularly in connection with terrorism and trafficking. It was also agreed to assist Iraq with the training of its security forces. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were identified as major threats. The results reflect a weak compromise; major questions remained unresolved.

NATO’s two most important current military engagements are in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. The mission in Kosovo under NATO command has about 16,000 NATO troops from 24 member countries. The mission in Bosnia was handed over to the EU in 2004, and there are two small missions in Serbia and Macedonia. ISAF in Afghanistan, taken over by NATO in 2003, is its second very large engagement today, with about 15,000 troops. Also important is the training of Iraqi military personnel. Sixteen out of 26 NATO members have troops in Iraq, the remaining 10 are unlikely to send troops. Finally, NATO is supporting the AU mission in Darfur in close cooperation with the EU.

**NATO has serious deficits in five areas**

Five deficits within NATO can currently be identified. The first is lack of cohesion. The 26 member states have less common interest than before (the EU of course faces a similar problem itself). The second deficit is the lack of a clearly defined mission. NATO has enlarged its role step by step, but it is still not clear what kind of out of area missions it will carry out – for example, under UN command or self-man-
A lot of mistrust towards NATO in Africa and probably also elsewhere

African countries regard the concept with scepticism. One major problem for NATO is that it is regarded in Africa – I can only speak about Africa here – as the commanding height of the West, dominated by the US. In many African states NATO has a negative or at best ambivalent image, and I am not sure whether an intervention declared as NATO-led would really be welcome there. This would probably be different if it took place in cooperation with the AU or the EU.

Another question on the agenda is the character of NATO missions. For example, what role does the UN play in NATO’s peace-support missions? What does “projecting stability” mean? Is it just support for the “war on terror” or an American toolbox for “coalitions of the willing”?

So there are a number of questions for further discussion. First, what does partnership really mean? The Europeans really complain that they do not have a voice in decision-making inside NATO as the Americans do not even listen to them. And what institutions are to be created for Global Partnership? Will this bring NATO into competition in Africa, for example with the EU? Will NATO be capable of dealing with non-military challenges? And are there alternatives to a Global Partnership?

To sum up, the old NATO – a defence alliance in the Euro-Atlantic region – is no longer a viable and convincing concept. Some residual functions of NATO will remain. One important function still is transforming Eastern European security. NATO will also continue to carry out peacekeeping operations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which allows the UN Security Council to mandate peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations of regional organisations. A third important task of NATO is to ensure the interoperability, the standardisation of armed forces. Yet the future of NATO is really uncertain.
How important are NATO’s weaknesses?

Professor Schmidt’s keynote speech led to a controversial discussion on NATO’s weaknesses as well as on the nature of NATO partnerships and its idea of a Global Partnership. Carlo Masala of NATO Defence College in Rome conceded that NATO did indeed no longer have a clearly defined mission, but emphasised that this was due to the fact that the security environment no longer allows this. After the Cold War, there is no clear risk; rather, risks are manifold and need to be addressed by multiple missions and instruments, he said. Masala also conceded that NATO lacks civilian instruments, but said creating them would duplicate the already existing civilian capabilities of the EU. Instead, NATO should rather have access to these EU civilian capabilities in the context of burden sharing.

Siegmar Schmidt agreed with Masala concerning the diversity of current security threats, but remarked that NATO’s pragmatic approach, lacking a clear mission and focus, makes it difficult to gain public support for NATO in its member countries: absent a clear mission, it is difficult to communicate why particular operations are important. Regarding NATO-EU cooperation in the use of EU civilian capabilities, Schmidt replied that the problem is on what terms NATO would have access: If NATO wants to use EU instruments, what does this mean for decision making on the mission in question – will the EU have a say?

Differing views on what NATO means by partnership

The concept of Global Partnership is a much more pragmatic idea than it seems, said Antonio Ortiz of the NATO Policy Planning Unit in Brussels: It is basically about talking to other players everywhere because threats are global. In a bureaucratic organisation like NATO this cannot be done informally but needs to have a name and some kind of structure, Ortiz explained. But that does not mean that a partnership with countries like Pakistan or South Africa might change NATO’s geographic focus. It also does not mean NATO might further expand its membership, and dialogue is also not restricted to democracies. Ortiz stressed that NATO’s partnerships, for example under the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, essentially mean technical military to military cooperation; the political component should not be over-estimated. Masala added that the idea to transform NATO into a community of democracies is off the table. Rather countries like Japan and Australia, who already support NATO and cooperate with it but have less access to NATO structures than, for example, Belarus under the Partnership for Peace, should be given more access to NATO institutions, without offering them membership.

Schmidt agreed that NATO had a pragmatic approach, which had been successful in restructuring East European armies but was hard to sell to the public. He doubted whether the modest attitude towards Global Partnership, as described by Ortiz, was actually shared by the US, where Schmidt saw very quite ideas about the future of NATO. For example, the US Congress is discussing whether Israel should become a member of NATO because it is a democracy, has significant military capabilities and is a partner in the fight against terrorism, Schmidt noted.

That NATO was really offering other countries an equal partnership was put into question by his Excellency the Ambassador of Zambia. Small countries rather felt they are like the horse that is being ridden by bigger players like NATO, which induces mistrust, he said. Adekeye Adebajo agreed and suggested that NATO, whose Cold War task has disappeared, should go out of business.
Panel 1

The NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue – A Successful Model for North-South Security Cooperation?

We refuse to have outside views imposed on us

Ahmed Abdel Halim

Egypt had initially strongly supported the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue. In 1994 a representative of NATO came to me and complained about Euro-Mediterranean partners because they did not accept the participation of NATO in the Barcelona process. He asked me to support him in his contacts with Egyptian officials on this matter, and I promised him to do so. Two days later I was summoned by the minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Amre Musa, where I met the same representative of NATO. We promised him the support he asked for and actually supported the beginning of the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue.

Today, however, we have serious problems with NATO and with this Dialogue. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was launched in July 2004, but Egypt refused to meet a NATO representative in that year. In the following year the atmosphere was a little better and we permitted the Secretary General of NATO to come to Egypt at the end of 2005.

So far the Dialogue with NATO is only a one-way street

Egypt is a moderate, if not the most moderate country in the region. We have contacts to all parties in the Middle East. And I do not use new terms like “Wider Middle East” or “North Africa” because we do not share the political concept implied and reject the division of the region. These are new names for the interests of the West, and in particular the US, which we do not agree to.

So far our relationship with NATO, which should be a two-way street, is actually only a one-way street. That is why we are not in full cooperation concerning the new development of NATO. If we could elaborate rules, frameworks and tentative agendas that regulate the relations between NATO and the Mediterranean states, we would do a great service to our nations.

We need equal obligations for all sides and a dialogue on the roots of the Middle East crisis

An agreed framework and agenda for the Dialogue should deal with the basis and timing for cooperation case by case. It should stipulate equal obligations of all parties towards each other. It should say something on the spheres of cooperation – economic, social
NATO democracy differs from one country to another. It differs between the US and Europe. It differs between the West and other regions of the world because circumstances vary. The most dangerous belief implied in this concept is that you can impose reforms from outside.

We need to elaborate a new vision, to participate with our partners in drafting a document with a new name. We do not wait for our partners to elaborate their own thoughts and then export them to our region. Unless and until NATO takes a decision to sit down with the countries of the Middle East in a wider conference and find a minimum agreement on the points essential to both sides, there cannot be a real partnership.

The most dangerous belief is that reforms can be imposed from outside

The view from outside considers the wider Middle East as a unified block, ignoring the cultural and political diversities between the countries in the region. Moreover this view mingles terrorism with politics: It says that the reason for terrorism is the absence of democracy and the delay of reforms in the region. But democracy has to be defined. Even within
NATO’s Mediterranean policy – a gradual and cautious approach focussed on common interests

Carlo Masala

NATO has had a Mediterranean dimension for as long as it has existed. But only in the very recent past has the Alliance begun to devote the attention and resources needed to turn this aspect of its agenda into a priority area. In the process, NATO has raised expectations concerning its future role in the broader Middle East, including speculation about future roles in stabilising Iraq and even in bringing peace to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That may be difficult to live up to.

NATO’s relationship with the Mediterranean may be divided into three phases. The first began with the ratification of the Washington Treaty, since Article 6 of NATO’s founding charter specifically included the “Algerian Departments of France” in the North Atlantic Treaty area. The second footnote to the Washington Treaty from January 1963 effectively deletes that reference in the wake of Algerian independence. But by that time, two more Mediterranean countries, Greece and Turkey, who had joined NATO in 1952 in the Alliance’s first enlargement, were established Allies.

The second phase extended from the period of decolonisation to the end of the Cold War, during which time the Mediterranean was described as NATO’s “Southern Flank”.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and disintegration of the Soviet Union transformed the geopolitics of the Euro-Atlantic area and heralded the third phase of NATO’s Mediterranean engagement. Whereas Europe had now embarked on the road to unity and integration, the Mediterranean was increasingly an area of potential conflict as a result of the rise of Islamic extremism in North Africa and the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and growing demographic pressures. In the intervening decade and a half, this third phase has evolved in such a way that NATO’s Mediterranean policy may now be divided into three pillars, that is the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Alliance’s involvement in Iraq.

NATO’s new Mediterranean policy rests on three pillars

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, France, Italy and Spain sought to foster trans-Mediterranean cooperation in regional frameworks such as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Western Mediterranean Group. These initiatives failed to prosper, however, as a result of civil war in Algeria and the imposition of international sanctions against Libya.

At the same time, a consensus emerged among the Allies that stability and security in Europe was closely linked to stability and security in the Mediterranean. Hence NATO’s decision in February 1995 to “initiate a direct dialogue with Mediterranean non-member countries”. Following consultations with Mediterranean countries, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia accepted invitations to join what became known as the Mediterranean Dialogue.
The Mediterranean Dialogue – a reactive and gradual approach to the region

The method initially applied to the Mediterranean Dialogue may be described as “reactive” and “gradual”. It was “reactive” in the sense that NATO’s primary goal was to dispel mistrust about its objectives and to promote a better understanding of the Alliance in the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. It was “gradual” because the Dialogue was effectively designed as a gateway through which to identify and develop areas of cooperation.

Since its creation, the Mediterranean Dialogue has constantly enlarged its membership, enhanced its activities and deepened its agenda. The number of participating countries has increased from five to seven, after invitations were extended to Jordan in November 1995 and Algeria in February 2000. At NATO’s 1997 Madrid Summit, a Mediterranean Cooperation Group was created, bringing representatives of the NATO Allies together with their peers from Mediterranean Dialogue countries in political discussions in both bilateral – the NATO Allies plus one Mediterranean Dialogue country – and multinational frameworks – the NATO Allies plus all Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

Also in 1997, an Annual Work Programme was created covering activities ranging from cooperation in military activities, to civil-emergency planning, crisis management and disaster relief. In 2002, NATO foreign ministers decided to upgrade the practical and political dimension of the Dialogue by putting new items on the agenda such as consultations on security matters of common concern, including terrorism-related issues. At its 2004 Istanbul Summit, the Alliance offered to elevate the Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership. In its wake, a first meeting between NATO and all Mediterranean Dialogue countries at the level of foreign ministers took place in Brussels in December 2004, underlining the programme’s enduring importance for both Allies and Mediterranean countries.

The evolution of the Mediterranean Dialogue from a modest forum for cooperative security dialogue into a genuine partnership seems to appeal to other Mediterranean countries. The Palestinian Authority, for example, has expressed an interest in joining.

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative offers cooperation tailored to individual countries’ wishes

The second pillar of NATO’s engagement in the Mediterranean is the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) that was launched at NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Summit. Its aim is to establish cooperative relations with the countries of the broader Middle East and notably with individual members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Broadly speaking, the ICI follows the logic of the enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue, focusing on areas of common interest such as cooperation in the fight against terrorism, defence reform and joint training.

The key principles of this initiative, which has to date been joined by Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, are joint ownership, flexibility and complementarity. Joint ownership means that the ICI is a two-way street and must be supported by
both sides. NATO does not wish to impose anything on ICI partners but is instead eager to listen to their ideas and learn about their needs to identify areas for cooperation. The initiative is sufficiently flexible to allow for the different needs and interests of the partners. Moreover, NATO is only engaged in those areas where it can bring added value to the region and has no intention of duplicating or competing with initiatives undertaken by other actors such as the G8 or the European Union.

In practice, the initiative offers tailored menus of cooperation activities for ICI participants covering a wide range of fields, including providing advice on defence reform, defence budgeting, defence planning and civilian-military relations. There is a special focus on cooperation in the fight against terrorism, sharing intelligence-related data, cooperating in the field of border security and in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery.

Anticipating the future direction of this initiative, three options appear to be currently available to NATO and its partners. The first may be described as a “gentle-collaboration” strategy. This should primarily emphasise “soft” security, that is information networking and the creation of a “dense web of cooperative efforts”. This strategy focuses on confidence-building and imposes few, if any, political pre-conditions, requirements, or desired end-states on ICI members. With this flexible approach, ICI members should be encouraged to combine their activities as frequently as possible (in groups of two or more). This is, in effect, the current approach.

The second option may be described as a “measured-collaboration” strategy in which NATO seeks to develop institutional links with the GCC and specifically to engage GCC members in targeted areas of cooperation. This is not on the agenda at present.

The third option may be described as a “states-further-afield” strategy. This would involve bringing as many countries in the broader region into the ICI as possible and developing cooperative initiatives and activities with all of them. Such an approach should help ensure early participation in and ownership of the ICI by its member states. Moreover, in the longer term, it might even lead to the creation of a regional security forum along similar lines to the ASEAN Regional Security Forum in Southeast Asia, including both regional and extra-regional actors.

After internal disagreements on the Iraq war, NATO now offers training to Iraqi security forces

The third pillar of NATO’s Mediterranean engagement is the Alliance’s involvement in Iraq. Although disagreements among Allies over the Iraq war were so great that the then US Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, described them as a “near-death experience”, realism and pragmatism rapidly returned once the dust had settled. Indeed, irrespective of their positions in the run-up to the US-led campaign, today all Allies have an interest in the creation of a stable and democratic Iraq and in ensuring that the Iraqi security forces can assume greater responsibility for their own security. In this way, the Allies agreed at the Istanbul Summit to assist Iraq with the training of its security forces.

In response to a request from the Iraqi government, NATO established a Training Mission in Iraq and is now running a training centre for senior security and defence officials on the outskirts of Baghdad. The Alliance also helps coordinate offers of equipment and training from individual NATO and Partner countries. Moreover, in addition to in-country training, NATO is hosting mid- and senior-level Iraqi officers at the Alliance’s various educational establishments, including the NATO Defence College in Rome.

Elsewhere in Iraq, NATO has no stabilisation role, but is providing support to Poland in terms of intelligence, logistics expertise, movement coordination, force generation and secure communications. In this way, Poland has, since September 2003, been able to command a sector – Multinational Division Central South – in which troops from both Allied and Partner countries are operating.
Cultivating relationships that might enable NATO later to play a greater role in the region

To date, all NATO’s activities in the wider Mediterranean region have been modest and, above all, cautious. The Alliance has sought to handle regional sensitivities with care and not to put the progress that has been achieved at risk. At the same time, however, NATO has been building the regional expertise and investing in the necessary relationships that may, in time, enable the Alliance to become a more influential actor. Moreover, while the caution NATO has displayed so far may have reflected conditions on the ground, many of the region’s greatest security challenges, such as stabilising Iraq and resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, demand a more proactive approach.

Although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not currently on NATO’s agenda and the Alliance is not a party to the Middle East peace process, a possible NATO role in resolving this long-running dispute has been discussed in political and academic circles. Indeed, commentators and analysts have proposed both extending NATO security guarantees to Israel and a peacekeeping role for the Alliance between a sovereign Palestinian state and Israel.

While strengthening the ties between Israel and NATO is feasible in the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue, Alliance officials have repeatedly made clear that three pre-conditions need to be met before NATO could consider playing a more active role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These are a stable and lasting peace accord between the two parties to the conflict; agreement between Israel and Palestine about a role for NATO; and a UN mandate for NATO’s operation. That said, in the event that these pre-conditions are met, the weight of expectation will be so great that the Allies may have little choice but to take on the challenge, thereby opening another chapter in NATO’s history.

* * *

The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
The NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue is a success as politics is not on the table

Uri Na’aman

Although Israel is located geographically in the South – specifically in the Middle East – we are basically a Northern and Western country. We share the values of the North and are close to it as a real democracy with an open and civilian society, an open and advanced economy and of course military capabilities that could serve the free world.

For 12 years we have been a member of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and will stay there even if some kind of Global Partnership should be created. Our answer to the question whether this Dialogue is a successful model is: Yes. Is it perfect? No. Does it meet all needs and expectations of Israel? No. But it is a successful model for North-South security cooperation.

A practical programme that does not deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict

First, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is basically not a political but a practical one. For Israel it is very convenient that the Arab-Israeli conflicts are not part of the daily work of the Dialogue and are not on the table. Two months ago we had the regular work programme meeting with representatives of the Dialogue and NATO in Brussels. I insisted that Israel say a few words about the war in Lebanon that had just finished. Everybody said something on the issue in a very polite manner and then moved to the next item. We are practical; conflicts in the region are not the main issue in the Dialogue. This is very important to make it successful. A meeting of the ministers of defence at the beginning of the year in Sicily was a unique opportunity to meet one or two other ministers of defence from the Middle East – and I am not talking about Jordan or Egypt, whose ministers we meet frequently.

NATO offers a menu of activities. The number of the activities offered grows from year to year. It covers not only military and defence matters but also, for example, the defence economy. There is no question that this menu is very beneficial. Israel gains a lot from the activities that we choose to take part in.

The participation of Mediterranean Dialogue countries in peacekeeping operations of NATO is an example of the value of the Dialogue. Morocco, Jordan and Egypt took part in such operations. Israel’s involvement is of course restricted by sensitive religious aspects in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, but we offered NATO Israeli assets in research and rescue operations and for natural disaster events. Algeria and Israel also agreed to take part in the operation “Active Endeavour” by the NATO fleet in the Mediterranean against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These are threats not only to NATO but also to North Africa. The participation is further proof that the Dialogue is successful.
NATO should do more for the region, for example in disaster preparedness

The weaknesses of the Dialogue should, however, also be mentioned. First, I have criticised NATO for a long time because it does very little in the region and for the region. Until 2005, not a single event took place in the region for 11 years of the Dialogue. Since then we have had at least three.

NATO is also doing very little to promote the interests of the region. An example is earthquakes, under which many countries in the region have suffered. Under the umbrella of NATO we could build capabilities and be better prepared to cooperate among ourselves and also with NATO, which could contribute much more assistance here.

It is true that there is mistrust towards NATO. But mistrust also comes from NATO’s side. For example, three or four years ago, NATO invited the Mediterranean Dialogue countries to take part in Partnership for Peace and NATO exercises. The agreements needed for this have not been completed yet, even though we have actually taken part in exercises. The reason is the fear of some NATO countries that participants from North Africa might use the opportunity of exercises in Europe to immigrate illegally.

To sum up, there are some doubts and criticisms about the Mediterranean Dialogue. But it is a positive experience of North-South security cooperation that could even be an example for other regions like Africa. The low level of politicisation of the scheme is very positive.

NATO is seen as US-dominated. Is this simply a misperception?

There was virtual consensus that NATO has a negative image in the Middle East and is regarded as an instrument of unilateral US policies. However, a major dispute emerged during the discussion on whether this perception is adequate. It was suggested from the audience that in order to change NATO’s image, its policies need to change, not the way they are sold. Carlo Masala objected and said NATO should not be confused with the US. According to him, NATO is not a US-led alliance but acts on the consensus of 26 members; that is why it does not fight in Iraq and, contrary to the US, never had a policy to change regimes in the Arab world. NATO should communicate its policies better, but Masala also blamed governments and institutions in the Middle East – like universities using outdated textbooks – for nurturing misconceptions about NATO.

Catherine Guicherd took a different view. Even if the negative image of NATO were unfounded it would still limit NATO’s policy options, she said. However for her – as for Halim – NATO is indeed an alliance led by the US; its policies are driven, on the one hand, by the desire of the US to use NATO and, on the other hand, by the amount of resistance to that in Europe. Antonio Ortiz took a similar view, but drew somewhat different conclusions: Though he also saw NATO as US-led, he emphasised that the US has only weak interest in NATO – varying somewhat according to the administration of the day. In general, the US sees NATO’s mechanisms as time consuming and prefers unrestricted unilateral action or coalitions of its own choice, he said. Yet the South has to deal with the US in one way or another; Ortiz suggested that doing this via NATO might be a way for weaker countries to water down US influence.
Another question was whether additional states may become members of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, whose current members are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Masala replied that since Algeria joined in 2000, no other state has asked to do so – this was not NATO’s decision. Na’amän said that as for Israel, other countries may join. Lebanon might do so once it is stabilized and a normal country; Na’amän hoped the Siniora government would survive the pressure from Hesbolah, Syria and Iran. Libya might join and the Palestinian Authority as well once it has become a regular state. Iran however is, according to Na’amän, a more serious problem as it is a threat to Israel, to NATO countries and beyond.

Reservations about the “war on terror”

Finally, Nana Owusu-Darkwa remarked that NATO’s engagement in the South will ultimately be predicated on the “war on terror” and asked if that kind of engagement is in the interest of Africa. The “war on terror”, said Halim, is also a US expression that Egypt rejects. It needed to be clarified what terrorism is exactly. Egypt, he said, had proposed an international conference on the fight against terrorism in the early 1990s, but this was adamantly rejected by the US. If Egypt is now called on to fight terrorism on US or NATO terms, it will resist this.
The inadequacies of the AU mission in Darfur and the failure to protect: some lessons

Nana Owusu-Darkwa

The international community has failed to genuinely and systematically engage with the Darfur crisis. The present situation in Darfur demands a multinational force with a strong protection mandate working alongside the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This AU force of just over 7000 troops is ill equipped to handle the crisis; it has only a weak mandate and cannot cope with the huge logistical problems. AMIS has de facto been relegated to an observer mission incapable of, and disinterested in, executing its limited mandate, especially concerning the protection of internally displaced persons and women. The position of AMIS in Darfur is also compromised because it is seen as an agent of Khartoum, given that the AU-brokered Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of May 2006 has been signed by only one of the rebel groups and is highly unpopular among Darfurians.

AMIS cannot achieve its goals despite its expansion

AMIS was established following the ceasefire for Darfur agreed in April 2004 (which was, however, not respected by the conflict parties). AMIS began operations in El Fasher on 9 June 2004 with 60 observers and a protection force of 310. Its enlargement to AMIS II was approved by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 20 October 2004 with a total established strength of 3,320, amongst them 2341 military personnel (including 542 observers) and 815 civilian police. The Darfur Integrated Task Force was created to assist with planning, force generation, logistics, administrative support, and liaison with partners.

Following an AU-led Joint Assessment Mission including representatives of the AU, the UN, the European Union (EU), and the US in March 2005, the PSC approved another expansion of AMIS II (AMIS IIE) in April 2005 to a military component of 6,171 and civilian police component of 1,560. The implementation of the expansion commenced on 1 July 2005. The mandate of AMIS IIE was also expanded to enhance the process of a political settlement in the Darfur crisis and to end the culture of impunity practiced by Khartoum. However, this ambitious goal has all but failed. It has become clear that such a weak and rhetorical mandate can never usher in a peaceful democratic settlement and end years of carnage and discrimination suffered by Darfurian citizens.
NATO is assisting AMIS on the AU’s request

The increasingly weakened, or more accurately nonexistent, capacity and the overstretched operation of AMIS forced the AU Commission Chairperson, Alphar Omar Konare, to seek NATO support. NATO assistance thus far has been in the area of logistical support, most particularly in strategic airlifts. The Alliance also trained AU troops in strategic-level planning and operational procedures, as well as providing support to a UN-led mapping exercise (see paper by Alexia Mikhos).

NATO is also involved in a special AU air movement cell at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, coordinating the movement of incoming troops. This operation is jointly undertaken with the EU and provides support to staff of the AU cell. Additional NATO assistance is needed, for example in intelligence gathering and information analysis, as is institutional capacity building for staff of the AU Peace Support Operation Department – including training and supply of office equipment – once a transition to a UN mission takes place.

Cooperation with NATO and donors brings a number of problems for AMIS

The AU’s operation in Darfur faces a multitude of challenges. The most pressing and paralysing are in the areas of financial resources, institutions and human capacity building.

First, regarding finance, the entire AU operation in the Sudan continues to be based exclusively on unpredictable and precarious funding from external partners. This undermines the independence of action and the attainment of the Pan-African vision of the initiative. The delay between the time when pledges are made and when they are redeemed hinders the timely payment for mission expenditures. Bureaucratic procedures stipulated by the donors contribute to these delays. The late submission of financial reports by the AU to donors and long internal procedures for the opening of bank accounts further complicate this. The number of finance officers at headquarters in Khartoum and El Fasher is insufficient given the complex reporting procedures, and the absence of budget allocations at the disposal of AMIS for the day to day running of activities or for influencing the situation on the ground creates operational difficulties.

The AU’s weak financial and accounting systems, coupled with a lack of absorptive capacity, could benefit from a systematic harmonization of administrative procedures between NATO and the AU. The AU could also learn from NATO’s well-structured procedures since inadequate and faulty accounting and administrative mechanisms would ultimately hamper the cooperation.

Second, the proliferation of international efforts and initiatives to broaden the peace process is a cause for concern. The AU sees such activities as counterproductive and a scramble for prominence in Darfur. In November 2006 the AU noted the frequency of visitors to sectors without clearance from AMIS headquarters, and emphasized the need for proper coordination.

Third, the drawing of troops from AU member states with different military traditions and regimes into a single unit is problematic given the fact that the military is politicized and politics is a militarized endeavour in most African countries. The question of interoperability should be seriously addressed by the AU. The Constitutive Act of the AU provides for the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF), a way to get around this problem; it is envisaged to address questions of standardization and uniformity in training and procedures.

Shortcomings in management and strategic planning

A fourth problem is inefficient structures and the lack of progress made in many AU operations. The debacle in Darfur and the continuing paralysis experienced by the AU Commission is not simply the result of lack of funding, notwithstanding the importance of logistical support for the successful operation of AMIS. It is equally important that the strategic planning of these endeavours be complemented with appropriate technical staff. For instance, it makes vital sense for the Peace Support Operation Department to be headed by a military, not a civilian.

Fifth, institutional arrangements and organizational culture run counter to the effective use of AMIS’s resources. For example, helicopters are designated for duties other than what they were originally procured for: They are in constant operation ferrying sick military personnel to their home countries. There are also reports of troop demoralization, of delays in the
payment of salaries, or in some instances no payment at all. In October 2006, AU vehicles were loaded onto a plane bound for Nigeria. Officers cognisant of these practices renamed the AU mission “ABIS”, the “African Business in Sudan”. These officers were of the opinion that the incapacity of AMIS is not the result of a lack of resources but of poor management, logistical weakness and diversion of money into activities other than those concerned with AMIS. These problems are compounded by Sudan’s lack of sound institutional and infrastructure systems.

In sum, the main weaknesses of AMIS appear to lie in the following fields:

- Lack of capacity and strategic planning for the mission – the strategic management capacity of both the AU Secretariat and the Member States’ advisory bodies has shown weaknesses.
- Lack of effective mechanisms for operational-level management – the mission structure at field level is inadequate for integrated management.
- Lack of the tools and know-how needed to handle the relations of the mission with a variety of external actors, including local communities, the Government of Sudan, external partners and agencies.
- Insufficient logistic support and ability to manage logistics. For example, frequent breakdowns of armored personnel carriers, which, given their deplorable status, continue to hinder mobility, fire power, and the defence of troops.
- Insufficient capacity in the key area of communication and information systems, compounded by unclear reporting lines from the field to the AU Secretariat.
- Problems in force generation and personnel management.
- Complete dependence on external partners to finance the mission, and over-dependence on partners’ technical advice, with attendant constraints, delays and political ambiguities.

Lessons learned for future AU missions

For future cooperation between the AU and international organisations like NATO and the EU, a number of lessons can be learned from AMIS regarding planning and management:

a) A proper planning process needs to assess the situation on the ground, including cultural, political and institutional features of the host population and government and, if necessary, regional differences within the host country. According to the level of complexity anticipated for the mission in question, the planning needs to involve political, military, police, civilian and humanitarian representatives as required, but also take into consideration key outside players, particularly national authorities, UN agencies, major donors, and the international financial institutions (IFIs).

b) Particular attention should be paid to the police component – AMIS has had to systematically step up this component.

c) The capacity of the AU Peace Support Operation Department for planning and strategic management of missions is in urgent need of enhancement.

d) Planning should begin prior to the formal mandating of a mission so that political decisions on the shape and ambitions of missions are informed by a realistic assessment of what is achievable, given conditions on the ground and resources available. This, however, requires that AU financial provisions for peace support operations include a “pre-mandate commitment authority”, allowing the Secretariat to begin planning missions ahead of mandate adoption.

e) Mission leaders – political, military, police – should be chosen as early as possible so that they can participate in the planning of the mission which they will have to implement.

f) The AU (and the regional economic communities) should develop the capacity to undertake contingency planning covering potential mission scenarios so that subsequent planning can be more effective once a particular operation is launched or if planning assumptions change in the course of the mission. This would preserve the comparative advantage in rapid deployment which African missions have demonstrated, as missions would be better prepared.

g) The AU should have a more focused approach in its relations with its multiple partners and not be fenced in by the hollow rhetoric of “African Solutions to African Problems.”
h) The AU should assess how partners are engaged and respond to requests for support to a mission. The role of the host country towards the mission and its reaction to the mandate and to the deployment must be constantly reviewed.

What is needed to make AMIS more effective operationally?

In order to make AMIS more effective, an overhaul on the operational level should encompass the following areas:

- a dramatic increase in the size of the battalion engaged in Darfur,
- aggressive patrolling (with each patrol having at least two armed personnel carriers and two on standby) and a show of force,
- the establishments of checkpoints and roadblocks,
- increased presence near IDP camps,
- quick impact projects to win over Darfurian publics,
- information campaigns to publicise the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), which would allow the people to buy into the accord,
- strengthening and ensuring the effectiveness of the central command,
- final review of the Government of Sudan’s plan for the disarmament of the Janjaweed,
- implementation of the security aspects of the DPA, and
- verification of areas of control by the parties.

The AU should also aim at a broader communication strategy for its mission in Darfur, using electronic and print media and covering not only member countries but also the world at large. Special staff should be recruited to design and run a media strategy for AMIS and a comprehensive communication strategy on the role of the AU in Darfur.

Further, the present parallel structures instituted by the UN are undermining AU command and control and cast doubt on the credibility of the transitional arrangements: Is the UN reinforcing AU structures or running an independent program? AMIS and its Integrated Task Force in Khartoum and EL Fasher should ensure transparency in the implementation of the transitional arrangements, and proper coordination.

Khartoum must be pressured to allow UN troops into Darfur

But involvement of the UN is essential. Unfortunately, the AU and the Government of Sudan are both unhappy with the wording of the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1706 (31 August 2006). This resolution provides for the extension, until the end of December 2006, of AMIS with its number on the ground expected to grow to 11,000; it will then be replaced with a major UN peacekeeping force numbering up to 20,000 or more troops. The resolution is perceived by the AU as undermining its leadership role in the Darfur peace process, while Khartoum sees it as an attempt to transform its security services and thus to undermine Sudan’s national sovereignty.

The challenge is how to compel or cajole the Sudanese government to allow UN troops into Darfur. What strategic plans are to be put in place if Khartoum insists on blocking UN peacekeeping deployment? It seems the international community has failed to learn from Rwanda and ‘Never Again’ is a mere slogan, especially when massacres have an African name. A no-fly zone should quickly be put in place in Darfur to curb Khartoum’s genocidal tendencies. Targeted and sustained economic and political sanctions should be imposed on the Government of Sudan. The international community, including the AU, should speak with one voice in order to bring about the necessary change.

An unwillingness to intervene resolutely?

Political structures and interests both on the side of the AU and of NATO make resolute peace support operations in Africa difficult to achieve. A salient challenge bedevilling such operations by the AU is its very composition and structure. The organization has been dominated by some of the worst violators of human rights. Ironically its adherence to anti-colonialism has as its central concern the maintenance of Africa’s old colonial borders. The AU has unthinkingly opposed any form of intervention in the internal affairs of states ruled by one party or one man. The preamble to the African Charter for Human and Peoples’ Rights promises the elimination of “neo-colonialism and Zionism,” while the duties of Africans are, amongst others, “to preserve and strengthen
social and national solidarity and the territorial integrity of state”. Thus the individual is given a subordinate position, the sovereignty of the state reigns supreme. The AU Commission has been so disappointing because it is under the thumb of a political organization even more jealous of state sovereignty than the UN. A call to NATO to deploy forces under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to stall the massacre of civilians in Darfur would be challenged by the AU Commission.

NATO, for its part, has made clear its unwillingness to submit troops to a second Mogadishu. There, in October 1993, “Operation Restore Hope” became “Operation Abandon Hope” when the attempt to capture a renowned warlord went disastrously wrong, resulting in US causalities – 18 dead and 84 wounded – and in images of the dismembered body of a young American helicopter pilot dragged through dusty streets. President Clinton ordered the troops home and abandoned the country in even a greater mess than it was in when they touched down. This was a symbolism that no US administration could risk again: the voting public could not stand the sight of body bags. The “Mogadishu factor” explains why the Clinton administration withheld US forces from Bosnia for the next two years and ordered that Serbia and Kosovo be bombed from a height that ensured both the safety of US pilots and the deaths of hundreds of innocents below them.

Precedents presumably exist to legitimize a humanitarian intervention by NATO forces in Sudan. The main legal challenge that NATO may face were it to entertain deployment in Sudan is that Sudan is not part of Europe and will invoke Africa’s Common Defense Security Policy as protection. Though the instrument is not operational it, categorically states: “an attack against one is an attack against all”, borrowing, ironically, from Article 5 of the NATO treaty. One factor that complicates the matter is that Sudan is not a failed state. But in the end the question is if NATO is unwilling to dispatch troops to support AU forces, and disinterested in intervening to save the people of Darfur from massacres and crimes against humanity.

NATO’s aerial bombardment of Serbia in 1999 is a case in point. It was plainly a breach of Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter (non-intervention against a sovereign state) because it was not taken pursuant to a Security Council resolution under Charter VII. In the three months before the air strikes, evidence emerged that Serbia was engaged in a plan to terrorize the Albanian majority in Kosovo – to “ethnically cleanse” the province by persecuting its majority so severely that most would flee, creating a refugee crisis for neighbouring states. The legal justification for NATO’s attack, absent UN Security Council approval, was that a) the Serbian state was engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity; b) this conspiracy was producing a humanitarian emergency which threatened international peace; and c) military intervention in the form of air strikes was a proportionate deterrent offering a reasonable prospect of avoiding the tragedy, or at least punishing its perpetrators.

Conditions such as these could provide a legal basis for humanitarian intervention. A regional organisation like NATO can undertake such a mission in case an authorisation under Charter VII of the UN Charter is blocked by superpower politics in the UN Security Council. This de-legitimises the UN. But the failure of the UN Security Council to commit to justice, and the illogical rule that any one of five governments there may outvote the rest of the world, begs the question of its independence and effectiveness in times of grave humanitarian tragedies.
Since June 2005, following a request by the African Union (AU), NATO has been assisting the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) in effectively expanding its presence in Darfur. This has been NATO’s first mission on the African continent and as such represents a landmark decision, taken by NATO’s key decision making body, namely the North Atlantic Council. This supporting mission is also evidence of NATO’s continuous transformation to adapt to the ever changing international security environment.

NATO’s logistical support to AMIS extends to the fields of strategic deployment, in close cooperation with the European Union (EU), and of staff capacity building. It has currently been authorised by the North Atlantic Council until 31 December 2006.

Since June 2005, NATO has coordinated the airlift of 16 battalions and of more than 500 civilian police personnel in and out of the region, in close coordination and consultation with the EU. With the exception of the Rwandan rotation, which has been suspended until at least the end of the year, all of the NATO-sponsored aerials for the AMIS autumn rotation are now complete. Two EU-sponsored rotations remain to be executed.

The co-ordination of NATO’s airlift has been done from Europe. A special AU air movement cell was set up at the AU’s Headquarters in Addis Ababa to coordinate the movement of incoming troops and civilian police personnel on the ground in Africa with the presence of both NATO and EU staff under AU leadership. The NATO/EU mechanisms put in place to support the AMIS deployment have proved highly effective in this respect, demonstrating the successful close cooperation between the two organisations on this issue.

Moreover, in August last year, NATO helped organise a United Nations-led mapping exercise. The key purpose of the exercise was to assist AU personnel to understand and operate effectively in the theatre of operations as well as to build their capacity to manage strategic operations.

Further on NATO’s training support to AMIS, NATO has offered staff capacity building to 184 AU officers both in the Darfur Integrated Task Force in Addis Ababa and the Force Headquarters in El Fashir. In a welcome development, the training sessions proved increasingly popular with AU staff, being attended by a larger number of AU personnel than initially expected. The course packages covered topics such as operational and strategic level planning as well as peace support operations.

Following a Note Verbale sent by the AU on 25 August 2006, NATO has now deployed two personnel in Addis Ababa for a duration of about three months in order to train and mentor AU officers in the Information Assessment Cell of the Darfur Integrated Task Force. Moreover, following an AU request on 19 September 2006, NATO is providing mentoring and staff capacity building to the Darfur Integrated Task Force for an AMIS Lessons Learned Exercise to cover military, civilian police and civilian support staff activities. In this area, NATO is working in full complementarity with the EU, which will also be providing substantive input to the process.
In response to an AU request, NATO’s support to AMIS also extends to providing further training support for the establishment of an AMIS Joint Forward Mission Headquarters as well as in the area of unit pre-deployment certification. Moreover, NATO is considering, in close coordination with all its partners, an AU request of 5 June to offer a possible NATO contribution to partner training assistance in the area of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). In this regard, NATO participated as an observer in a course on DDR organised by the German Development and Cooperation Agency (GTZ), which has just been completed in Rwanda.

**A principle of NATO’s engagement is that the AU must be in the driving seat**

NATO’s assistance to AMIS is guided by the key principle that the African Union (AU) has to remain in the driving seat in the efforts to bring peace to Darfur in line with African ownership and thus the idea of African solutions to African problems. Thus, NATO provides its strong support to the AU’s leadership regarding Darfur and sees its role as contributing to strengthening the AU’s capability to resolve this difficult conflict in the region.

NATO’s support to AMIS does not imply combat troops but only relates to logistic support. Any NATO assistance is in response to the AU’s requests. Indeed, NATO’s assistance is driven by the expressed needs of the AU as well as by close coordination with and transparency vis-à-vis other international organisations, particularly the United Nations (UN) and the EU, as well as bilateral partners to ensure maximum complementarity and effectiveness. The aim for NATO is to provide added value.

NATO has received positive feedback and appreciation from the AU on the cooperation so far between the two organisations as well as on NATO’s logistical support to AMIS. This has been perceived as very useful and as going some way towards increasing the effectiveness of AMIS.

As mentioned, NATO’s support was authorised by the North Atlantic Council until 31 December 2006, the date of the expiry of AMIS’ mandate. On 24 November 2006, the AU Peace and Security Council, at the level of Heads of State and Government, is expected to meet to debate the future of AMIS beyond 31 December 2006. In the event that the Council decides to extend AMIS in the new year, NATO stands ready to consider any request from the AU for continued support to AMIS.

**Much is at stake in Darfur – not only for the AU**

In conclusion, it is clear that Darfur is presently at a critical juncture, and much is at stake. The urgent need is for lasting peace and prosperity in the region. Neither the AU nor the international community can afford failure in Darfur. The AU Peace and Security Council has noted, in accordance with other international actors, including the UN Security Council, its support for a transition from AMIS to a UN operation with the consent of the Government of Sudan to ensure long-lasting peace in Darfur. For the moment, Sudanese President al-Bashir has stated that his government is ready to accept additional international support to AMIS, but is opposed to a UN operation in Darfur.

In this context, NATO, together with other international organisations, in particular the EU and the UN, as well as other key individual partners, need to continue to work hand in hand to provide added value support to the AU, as requested, strengthening its capabilities to bring peace in Darfur and enabling in such a way African solutions to African problems in line with African ownership.

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The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
The EU policy on strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts

Wolfram Vetter

A lot has been said and written about the challenges the African Union (AU) is facing in conducting its mission in Sudan (AMIS): about the political conditions with an incomplete peace agreement; diverging interests and agendas of the AU member states, which include Sudan as one of the conflict parties; the conditions in Darfur, which has the size of France but hardly any infrastructure; the weak planning and logistic capacity in the AU, in particular at the time when the mission was launched; and the heavy dependence on donor support. However, despite good efforts and some success, like for instance the donor coordination mechanism in Addis Ababa, not enough attention has been paid to the quality of the partners’ assistance and the ways and modalities through which this assistance is being provided to the AU.

The difficulties have first of all to be addressed by the AU itself, with the Union further building up its structures and its capabilities to manage interaction with partners and to better manage the partners’ assistance. However, partners also have to improve their coordination and to ensure better coherence and consistency. Progress has been made; a good example is the cooperation in the African Standby Force (ASF) workshops.

The AU has to meet many other tasks besides conflict management

The EU’s relations with partners, however, go beyond exchange and dialogue on peace support operations and support to the ASF. The AU has a broad agenda and has to build its authority and legitimacy towards its constituency, its member states, by delivering on issues which are, from the African perspective, no less important than dealing with conflicts: the fight against disease and hunger or the promotion of fair trade regimes. This broader agenda is not always taken into account by all partners, which have the tendency to look at, and exclusively support, the AU’s conflict management activities.

The EU, with its development programs and its trade relations with Africa, traditionally has a broad perspective towards Africa. With the political dimension of the Cotonou Agreement and with the European Security Strategy of 2003, the EU has also defined its political and security interests with regard to the neighbouring continent which largely match with African interests and the agendas of the AU. In addition, the EU is perceived as a rather neutral player in Africa. In its ambitions and structures, the AU even mirrors to some extent the EU, and both consider each other as “natural partners”.

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From the comprehensive EU Africa strategy to a joint EU-AU task force

These characteristics of the relationship are reflected in the EU Strategy for Africa, which was adopted by the European Council in December 2005. It reaffirms the EU’s commitment to peace, stability and development and defines a single comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the whole of Africa. The Strategy builds on the key principles of ownership, responsibility and mutual accountability, and it is the first European political framework to address Africa as a single entity. The Strategy is also a platform to improve the coordination, coherence and consistency of the EU’s policies and instruments for supporting Africa with those of its Member States. Last but not least, the Strategy identifies the AU as a key partner for the implementation of the Strategy.

Since the adoption of the Strategy, relations with the AU have further developed, particularly as far as their political dimension is concerned. The bi-annual ministerial Troika meetings are becoming more and more important, and contacts on the level of senior officials and experts have become numerous and intensive. The Ministerial EU/AU Troika Meeting in Bamako agreed that it would also be appropriate to develop a “Joint EU/Africa Strategy” which will be submitted for adoption by the future second EU/Africa Summit.

The EU Commission, the EU Council Secretariat and the AU Commission are working in a Joint Task Force which covers the whole range of issues, from an exchange of views on conflict situations to practical cooperation projects in fields such as education, migration and budgetary planning. The Joint Task Force also serves to prepare and to follow up on the annual top level meetings. At the last meeting in Addis Ababa in September, in which Commission President Barroso and a senior representative of the SG/HR Solana also participated, a € 55 million institutional support programme for the AU was agreed and a programme for the exchange of officials and trainees was launched.

The EU is very well positioned to provide capacity building to Africa in the field of security

This political and development framework and the positive and constructive EU/AU relationship also constitute conducive conditions for EU’s engagement in support of African capacity building efforts in the field of peace and security. Capacity building support is also one of the most prominent commitments in the EU Africa Strategy. This is the context in which the EU Commission and the Council Secretariat have developed the “European Union Concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts”.

The Concept, which was finalised in July 2006, builds on two assumptions: Firstly, the EU wants to develop and deepen the strategic partnership with the AU. Capacity building activities therefore have to be embedded in this overarching partnership. Secondly, the EU has a wide range of instruments: from the European Development Fund (which also finances the African Peace Facility and its € 35 million capacity building envelope), other Community instruments like the Stability Instrument, the crisis management instruments and expertise in the Council Secretariat and the EU Military Staff, and the programmes run by EU Member States. A combination of these instruments would make European assistance more coherent, consistent, effective and efficient in the interest of the African partners and the EU, and it would give more adequate visibility and influence to the EU.

In accordance with these assumptions, the Concept does not propose any concrete activities but defines a framework for cooperation. The Concept at the same time underlines that the guiding lines for this cooperation are defined in the pan-African peace and security architecture as laid down in the Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council and the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy.

In its last part the Concept proposes three sets of measures on how the EU response can be reinforced: Firstly, measures for better coherence, consistence and coordination at EU level: setting up of a structure within the Secretariat for coordination with Member States and the Commission; organisation of an infor-
mal coordination group with Member States’ representatives etc. Secondly, measures for establishing a strong partnership with the AU (and the sub-regional organisations): meetings of the EU and AU Peace and Security Councils, strengthening of the EU presence in Addis Ababa. Thirdly, the proposal to develop EU policies designed to strengthen African capabilities in the field of training, logistics and other areas.

**Capacity building is a long-term task, and the pace will be set by Africa**

The preparation of the Concept was welcomed on 13 November 2006 by the EU Council, which has also called for speedy implementation. However, it is obvious that capacity building will be a long term task, and that the pace will be set by the African partners themselves. Consultations with EU Member States and other partners have started, and first discussions with the AU have also taken place. There is a strong view that the realisation of the Concept will also facilitate the overall coordination with other partners in the G8-plus context, including the UN, US, Canada and Norway. The UN will be a key partner, and in keeping with the EU’s policy on effective multilateralism, the EU would be keen to support efforts aimed at strengthening the AU/UN cooperation. Consultation will also be proposed to NATO.

The EU wants to add value and make a contribution to identifying and filling the gaps in capacity building support in concert with all interested and active partners. If implemented, the Concept could make a contribution to more effective African-led peace support operations. In this respect it is also a contribution to the lessons that need to be learned from AMIS.

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The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent those of the Council of the European Union.
Support for AMIS does not bring NATO into conflict with Khartoum

The relations between NATO and the government of Sudan were another point raised by the audience. Alexia Mikhos explained that NATO works through support to the AU and thus has no direct relations to Khartoum regarding Darfur. Sudan has not objected to current NATO support to AMIS. Recent misgivings in Khartoum about NATO rather were the result of misleading press reports according to which NATO planned to enforce a no-fly zone or to deploy troops in Darfur – neither of which is true, she said. She stressed that NATO engagement has been determined by requests to NATO from the AU.

The arms trade and the interaction between conflicts in the region need to be addressed

The audience also suggested that in order to solve the conflict in Darfur, its causes have to be addressed, amongst them arms supplies to the warring parties. Mikhos agreed this is a major problem but said that this is an issue not for NATO but rather for some of its member states. She suggested also that a look be taken at regional actors involved in the conflict, such as Chad and the Arab League. Nana Owusu-Darkwa made a similar point with respect to the conflict in Somalia, where, she said, the Arab League and Eritrea were supporting the Islamic courts while the US was funding their adversaries, amongst them warlords.

This led to a question about the role of Ethiopia: Might it take a leading role in mediation for Darfur or Somalia? No, replied Owusu-Darkwa. Ethiopia is a regional hegemon, and the AU Council has not been able to come to an agreement concerning the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia that was already under way, she explained. An intervention in Sudan would also be seen as in Ethiopia’s self-interest rather than as an attempt to end the conflict – for two reasons: Sudan is an Islamic country, while Islamism is perceived as a threat by Ethiopia; and there are disputes over the Nile water between both countries.

His Excellency the Ambassador of Ethiopia shared the view that Ethiopia is not well-placed to mediate in Somalia. However, he claimed that his country is only interested in peace and stability in Somalia and that Ethiopia, by supporting the Transitional Government – which is recognised by both the UN and the AU – is executing a decision of the regional organisation IGAD. In the case of Sudan, Ethiopia might be considered for mediation, he said.
Panel 3

Expectations and Realities – A Security Partnership between NATO and Africa?

Leave peace missions to the UN and disband NATO!

Adekeye Adebajo

The African Union – a weak organisation taking on too much

According to ancient European folklore, alchemists tried to turn lead into gold and in the process discovered the scientific method. Africa’s alchemists, who are seeking to transform the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), must avoid a similar quest for an illusory city of gold. It is important that the AU learn some of the lessons of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution set up in 1993. It deployed less than a hundred military observers to Rwanda, Burundi and the Comoros with decidedly mixed results. It failed because of both logistics and financing. And 75% of the OAU was actually financed by external donors. So we have to ask: Are our leaders really serious, as they are not prepared to pay for something as important as security?

One of the problems of the AU also is that it is meant to coordinate the African regional communities. But unlike the AU, organisations like ECOWAS and SADC have long experience in peacekeeping and managing conflict, and many of them refuse to be coordinated. Also, the AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit is very able and building a strong team, but there is no proper coordination and collaboration either within the AU between the Peace and Security Council and Political Affairs or with civil society. Alpha Omar Konaré, the Chairman of the AU Commission and former president of Mali, has also clashed with the plenipotentiaries on the powerful
Permanent Representatives Committee, who represent AU member states, because they believe he is still behaving like a head of state and going over their heads directly to state leaders.

The AU intervention in Darfur was very brave, but also a very big disappointment. AU soldiers can barely protect themselves, let alone the Darfuris on the ground. It is clear that in trying to prove it is more than the OAU, the AU has bitten off more than it can chew. It has failed to learn from the OAU Mechanism. The UN – not NATO – will have to take over this force. The strategy should be to continue putting pressure on the Sudanese government to agree to this. If I was this government, I also would not want NATO to come into Darfur. It is clear that the UN is the organisation with the legitimacy to get the job done.

**Neither NATO nor the AU are legitimised to intervene in Africa**

So we really should be looking to the UN, not to NATO or the EU, as the proper institution to intervene in Africa. The UN is the only organisation that has the credibility and legitimacy to intervene in Africa. 90% of its peacekeepers are currently deployed in Africa, 60% of the UN Security Council’s efforts are taken by Africa, 7 of the current 17 peacekeeping missions of the UN are in Africa. Africa looks to the UN to address security issues. The UN Charter states clearly that the UN has primary responsibility for international peace and security wherever in the world – there is no exception for Africa in the UN Charter, and we should not make one either.

There is also suspicion because of the Kosovo intervention that was launched by NATO without UN approval, as the US feared that the Russians and/or the Chinese would cast a veto. It is this sort of illegality that a lot of Africans are scared of. It is pretty clear that the US, after the UN had refused to give it a blank cheque over the invasion of Iraq, wanted to move away from the UN and use institutions like NATO for interventions. So we should not be naïve about NATO out of area operations.

My call is to work through the only universal and legitimate multilateral organisation, which is the UN. First, there is a pressing need for a proper division of labour between the UN and Africa’s security organisations. They need to be greatly strengthened. In Liberia and Sierra Leone the UN took over peacekeeping
operations from ECOMOG. In Burundi it took over from an AU mission, where there was a South Africa-led force.

In peacekeeping, the UN should also make use of African regional hegemons

Secondly, it is important to use regional hegemons like South Africa and Nigeria, but to strengthen them through UN peacekeeping missions. These states have acted as lead states in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi. It is important to do this under a UN umbrella because the UN makes up for the lack of logistics and finance and also makes it much easier for other countries to accept hegemons bringing their weight to bear.

Third, Western donors should show a similar generosity to Africa as they have to Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. A situation in 2000 where 2 billion dollars went to the rich man’s war in the Balkans and barely 1.15 million dollars was pledged to West Africa’s poor man’s war in Sierra Leone is not acceptable.

Finally, it is important that the UN adopt a regional approach to its work in Africa – it is starting to do this a lot more. The mission in DRC has to link up with the departing mission in Burundi; the missions in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan likewise should adopt a regional approach. The coordination has been quite strong in the case of the missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, thanks to the UN office for West Africa in Dakar.

To conclude, the fall of the Berlin Wall has led to the end of the division of Europe. But the Bismarckian curse still haunts the continent as conflicts continue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, or the Bakasi conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria. If the curse of Berlin is finally to be lifted from Africa, it will be the UN, and not NATO, that will serve as the deus ex machina.
Limited cooperation, but no real partnership between NATO and AU

Catherine Guicherd

In June 2005 NATO deployed for the first time in Africa, responding to a request of the African Union (AU) for assistance to its ambitious mission in Darfur (African Mission in Sudan, or AMIS). Could this first collaboration between the two bodies be the harbinger of a longer and larger security partnership? I will demonstrate that the description “security partnership” does not apply at present and will not apply for the foreseeable future. What we are likely to see, instead, is the pursuit of a low key technical cooperation in capacity-building and more rarely in operations. This cooperation will take place within parameters set by other players, including other multilateral organisations and NATO’s individual member states, and its extent will be largely determined by political, rather than capability considerations.

A partnership without coherent partners?

A “security partnership”, we would argue, has two main requirements. The first is the existence of identifiable “partners” in the form of coherent bodies whose members share a common vision of the organisation’s aim and identity. The second is congruence between the partners’ security visions on a significant range of issues. However, neither premise seems to apply to the pair constituted by NATO and the AU.

A quick look at debates around NATO’s nature and missions over the past few years makes clear that there is no longer an agreement among its members on what NATO is about and for. In other words, the perception that NATO is a self-conscious strategic actor pursuing clearly defined common interests no longer reflects Alliance reality (1).

Three partly overlapping fault lines divide NATO. The first pints the tenants of a “transatlantic NATO” (i.e. the original NATO) against the partisans of a global NATO relying on partnerships with, and possibly membership of, all democratic nations around the world. This line of thought, strongly supported by the United States (US) prior to the Riga summit of November 2006, has met with little support from European allies outside the United Kingdom (UK). The second line divides those who would like to keep NATO primarily as a military aAlliance against those who are keen to make it a political forum and build on its diversified engagements of the past few years (in humanitarian relief, security sector reform, state-building, etc.) to make such missions standing Alliance functions. France is representative of the former view, whereas the NATO Secretariat as well as Washington are keen to consolidate new types of missions, re-branding NATO as a “force for good” in the process.

Finally, there is the difficult relationship of NATO with the EU, which concerns both the division of labour between the two organisations and the modalities of consultation between them. A number of actors, in particular in the US and the UK, are not entirely comfortable with the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and would rather maintain NATO’s monopoly on military affairs, whilst the EU would fulfil complementary civilian functions (police, reconstruction, etc.). Others disagree, arguing that the EU must also have a military dimension. Most say that EU-NATO coordination should be improved, but a few, including France and Turkey, are for different reasons strongly opposed to any other form of interaction than through the so-called “Berlin plus” procedures, which regulate the management of EU operations carried out with NATO assets.
How united the African Union can become remains to be seen

The AU, for its part, is only a few years old. The components of its “African Peace and Security Architecture” (APSA) – Peace and Security Council, Panel of the Wise, African Standby Force (ASF), Peace Fund, Continental Early Warning System – have hardly been put in place, and tested even less. It is therefore too early to pass judgement on its cohesiveness as a strategic actor. Darfur provides a mixed picture: whilst AU members have succeeded in maintaining their political unity, they have been unable to react to the massive human rights violations in the region, despite their commitment to a bold version of the “responsibility to protect” in AU founding documents. (2) Whilst the operational weaknesses of AMIS are well-known, differences of political perspectives, in particular between Arab and Sub-Saharan members, are also part of the explanation.

Beyond Darfur, the commitment of member states to see the AU live up to its high level of ambitions remains to be seen. Some key powers, like Nigeria, but also energetic Ghana, may prefer to support the development of ECOWAS (Economic Community of the West African States), which is more cohesive and now has a visible track record in peacekeeping as well as in mediation. Similarly, in some circumstances, South Africa may prefer to work through the more compact SADC (South African Development Community) rather than an unwieldy AU. Others may simply not be willing to strengthen an organisation which, if it lived by its principles of “non-indifference” to genocide, massive human rights violations and forced changes of governments, would severely constrain their domestic sovereignty.

Security priorities of NATO and Africa: a multiple-level mismatch

The congruence of NATO’s and the AU’s security visions is also in doubt. A triple mismatch characterizes NATO’s and the AU’s security perspectives:

- Geographically, it is clear that the pull of current NATO engagements is not driving the Alliance toward Africa or African preoccupations. For the foreseeable future, NATO’s priorities will remain the Balkans and Afghanistan. As the task in those two regions is proving more difficult and longer term than anticipated, there will be little will or capacity from the Member States to engage elsewhere – although the US may some day convince the Allies to share the burden in Iraq. NATO’s geographic priorities also have to be seen within the broader context of the continuous disengagement of Western forces from Africa over the past ten years, whether as part of UN missions or bilaterally. This desire to disengage explains, conversely, Western eagerness to support African capacity-building for peace operations. NATO is no exception to that rule.
- Functionally, within the broad diversification of NATO activities of the past few years, the clearest sub-trend has been an intensification of counter-terrorism policies/operations and a focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). By contrast, even if terrorism is also on the AU’s agenda, it is as a political and internal security phenomenon and not among the security challenges that the ASF is meant to address. Rather, the ASF vision centres on peace operations, from monitoring to traditional and more complex peacekeeping. Even if one of the ASF scenarios may require tactics close to NATO’s counter-insurgency operations, this is only a tool at the upper end of the spectrum of the ASF development plan. (3) WMD, of course, are much less of a concern for Africa than small arms and light weapons, which the AU and all African sub-regional organisations have committed to combat., even if action remains much behind pledges. Therefore, on this terrain again, the agendas of the two organisations hardly seem to match.
- Politically, although Sudan may be an extreme case, NATO’s involvement in many parts of Africa remains a sensitive matter. For African public opinions – as is the case for the Muslim public and, to a large extent, Western public opinions – NATO is an instrument of US policy. Regardless of whether this perception is correct (this has been a perennial bone of contention since NATO’s creation) it creates a reality that frames and limits NATO’s policy options on the African continent. Consequently, widespread hostility to the US invasion of Iraq in the developing world, added to the resentment elicited by a US record of unilateralism since the beginning of the first Bush Jr. Administration, and its adversarial policies toward the United Nations (UN), have compromised NATO’s ability to play a
significant role in Africa for a long time. The widespread perception that NATO is doing the US “bidding” in Afghanistan only serves to sharpen the picture. Because of this wide range of differences, NATO operational engagement in Africa will necessarily remain extremely limited. There may, on the other hand, be a slightly broader scope for NATO work in African capacity-building. But in either case, NATO’s action will likely take place within parameters set by others, i.e. the UN and, to some extent, the EU.

**African peacekeeping is shaped more by the UN, and maybe the EU, than by NATO**

Any NATO-AU relationship in peace and security has to be seen in the context of a broader range of interactions. These involve other multilateral actors, in particular the UN and the EU, but also national players, most prominently the US, France, the UK, and to a lesser extent other European countries with a colonial past in Africa. National actors can act bilaterally, in support of, or in parallel to, the multilateral fora to which they belong, and occasionally seek to instrumentalise the latter for their own national purposes.

The United Nations is in many ways primus inter pares in African peace operations. It can be described as the “framing actor” in capacity-building, in the sense that the ASF scenarios for which the AU is equipping itself are mostly those of modest operations complementary to UN missions, or short operations transitioning to the UN. (4) This compatibility requirement between AU and UN missions reflects the reality that, until Darfur, every African peacekeeping operation had been taken over by a UN deployment. If the scenario developing in Darfur in autumn 2006 proves anything at all, it is the need for even fuller compatibility between UN and African deployments than anticipated in the plans. In this context, it also useful to remember that some 75% of UN peacekeepers remain deployed in Africa. This suggests that, absent African capacity, in case a conflict escalates on the continent, a UN operation will appear as a better alternative than any Western option, NATO or otherwise.

The European Union has two domains of comparative advantage over NATO. One is political, i.e. there is greater political agreement within the EU than within NATO to engage in peace and security matters in Africa. In truth, the EU consensus on ESDP missions in Africa remains fragile and is not immune to setbacks (e.g. if problems had arisen in EUPFOR in the DR Congo recently). However, the EU has more scope to engage progressively, through small scale and non-coercive missions in areas such as security sector or police reform, which can over time help build a consensus for bolder operations. But already today, it is more likely that European nations would be willing to deploy in Africa in “Battlegroup” rather than in “NATO Response Force” format. Second, the EU has the capacity to play on the complementarity of its instruments. Even if tensions and disagreements between the Commission and Member States regularly recur, large scale financing at the hands of the Commission to support or accompany peace operations can underpin ESDP engagements. In this respect, the EU Peace Facility for Africa is a particularly important asset, which can have no equivalent on the NATO side.

**Bilateral relations will continue to be an alternative avenue way of security cooperation**

Every major Western power – otherwise a member of NATO – has its own support programme for capacity-building, and occasionally operations, in Africa. Coordination among donors has somewhat improved somewhat since 2005 via the establishment of a G8 “clearing house” to exchange information and avoid conflict between different initiatives. However, one would be misled in to thinking that this amounts to “harmonisation” as programmes continue to respond largely to national priorities. There is little ground, at this stage, to believe that national bureaucracies and their political masters would be willing to deprive themselves of this asset for the benefit of NATO.

Conversely, it is unclear that the AU or the African sub-regions would have an interest in relinquishing privileged bilateral partnerships for the sake of unpredictable multilateral ones. In this context, it will be interesting to see how the French initiative to “Europeanise” its national programme to support African peace support capacities (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix, RECAP) evolves in the next few years: Will the French political and military institutions implementing RECAP accept to share in its further development with European colleagues, and at what level will the latter be willing to contribute?
What, then, is left of the “partnership” between AU and NATO?

This overview of the political and operational landscape of AU-NATO cooperation allows us to narrow down the list of what seems realistic in their security relationship. For that purpose, it is useful to distinguish between operational support and capacity-building.

As for the former, it is clear that there is little room for NATO operations in the form of “boots on the ground” in Africa, whether this is through autonomous NATO operations or in support of AU or UN missions. On the other hand, there is space for further operational support of the kind provided to AMIS, e.g. coordination of air transport, technical assistance in logistics management, staff training – that is, for a range of activities in which NATO has little public visibility, as they require limited or no deployment in the field. Conversely, even a NATO contribution to Security Sector Reform or Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration programmes would seem to go beyond the limits of the politically acceptable for Africa (not to speak of some NATO members).

However, in thinking about potential future NATO support to African missions, it is important to remember that NATO has very limited own assets that can be employed without a direct contribution from the member states. On the human resources side, technical assistance, planning and training missions can be carried out using spare personnel from the various NATO standing headquarters, but only if they remain limited in time and scope. More ambitious missions would require “force generation”, a process always fraught with delays and inadequacies, especially when missions have a weak legitimacy. Heavy logistics support, such as that provided to AMIS, remains predicated on the availability of national resources, itself a factor of members’ political commitment to use NATO as a vehicle (rather than the EU, for example) and their arbitration between competing priorities (e.g. Afghanistan, Balkans, Iraq for some).

In capacity-building, outside the realm of operations, it is possible to foresee – and to recommend – the pursuit of NATO’s low-key contribution to the ongoing ASF development work. This has been was the case in 2005-2006, as NATO experts participated in some of the ASF Workshops. Here it would be advisable for NATO to focus on areas where it has a comparative advantage, i.e. logistics and communications for interoperability, logistics management, field intelligence management, command and control, etc. Should this be acceptable to the two organisations, continuous NATO expert advice to the AU’s Peace Support Operations Department (PSOD) in Addis would also be possible. However, there are two technical/political conditions for this to succeed and be helpful: that the PSOD be staffed at sufficient a level sufficient to absorb the advice thus provided, and that any NATO support take place squarely within an AU-led ASF development process in which the UN is the lead partner.

As is the case for operational support, the degree and form of assistance provided for capacity-building remains conditional upon an internal consensus among NATO members to use NATO to channel resources to Africa. Given only weak support among member states for NATO engagement on the continent, it would be unrealistic to expect either NATO to be given fresh resources to support African capacity-building, or resources to be redirected from other programmes (national, EU or UN) toward NATO for that purpose.

Cooperation between the AU and NATO, therefore, can be pursued and somewhat amplified. But describing the relationship as a “partnership” now or in the foreseeable future would seem to be an abuse of terminology.

Endnotes

(2) The AU Charter, for example, endorses “The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (Article 4 h).
(3) ASF scenarios are described in Framework for the African Standby Force, 2003.
In recent decades Africa has experienced more coups, civil wars and instability than any other part of the world. Over the last years, the number of crisis management operations in Africa has steadily increased. Although the United Nations (UN) continues to play a leading role, continental and regional efforts are becoming increasingly important. The forefront in these efforts, the African Union (AU), has created a Peace and Security Council and is developing a continental early warning and mediation capacity (CEWS) along with an African Stand-by Force (ASF) to undertake peacekeeping operations. However, financial constraints, coupled with operational limitations and political difficulties, have underlined the need for increased support to African regional arrangements.

NATO, along with the rest of the international community, recognises that African states and organisations are more likely to show the political will to respond to crises than non-African actors. While there is still no formal policy underpinning NATO-AU relations, NATO has underlined its support for African regional and sub-regional organisations by providing logistical support to the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) in the areas of strategic deployment and staff capacity building. This assistance has positively strengthened the perception of NATO’s role and missions in Africa and more generally in the UN environment. It has also offered a new platform for potential assistance to Africa, maybe opening the door for a longer-term relationship with the AU.

Instability in Africa can cause threats to NATO members

Conflicts in Africa have taken a devastating toll on the people of the continent. But instability in Africa also undermines global security. Regional crises and conflicts have become havens and breeding grounds for terrorism and criminal activity, creating “free trade zones for the underworld” (as Douglas Farah has called it) and spreading hunger and disease. Failed, failing and sometimes even suicidal states undermine the very fabric of African societies, often leading to mass refugee flows, economic crises and disruption of the flow of vital resources. Uncertainty and instability in Africa are therefore perceived as a threat to the security of the Alliance and its members.

NATO has demonstrated considerable adaptability over the past years. It has recognized that security has become globalised, that threats emanate from a far wider area than in the past and that it has to defend its members against these threats whenever and from wherever they may come. NATO is engaged in fighting terrorism, strengthening security and building stability in many regions in the world. This approach to security can indeed be interpreted as a revision of the old containment policy, now targeting risks of a wider nature. However, NATO is also committed to a broad approach to security and the Comprehensive Political Guidance document adopted at the NATO Riga Summit, on 28-29 November, acknowledges that peace, security and development are more interconnected than ever.

Certainly, in approaching Africa the analysis cannot only be threat-based. NATO is acutely conscious that enhanced political dialogue is key to addressing today’s security challenges. Global responses need to involve more actors than just NATO member states and the Alliance seeks to promote stability and shared values through its network of partnerships and through

NATO pays more attention to Africa but seeks no leading role there

Antonio Ortiz
enhanced cooperation with other organisations, the UN and the EU above all.

**Not a global NATO, but a global network of NATO partners is called for**

But in order to address global risks and challenges, NATO does not need to become a “gendarme du monde”. We do not need a global NATO, but a NATO with a global network of partners and fellow organizations. What is needed is an increasingly universal and comprehensive approach to security, with organisations, including the AU, playing their respective roles. In dealing with “globalised insecurity”, it matters less and less where a country or group of countries sits on the map. What matters is their willingness to engage, together with others, to make a difference. That is the rationale in the concept of NATO’s global partnerships: it is a reflection of NATO’s transition from a geographical towards a functional approach to security. In this context, it is only logical that NATO is paying increased attention to Africa’s security.

**NATO members increasingly see their own security interests at stake in Africa**

Allies also have particular security interests in the continent that work alternatively in favour or against deeper NATO involvement in Africa. These often conflicting views complicate the shaping of a policy, let alone a strategy, to frame NATO’s relationship with Africa.

In this regard, the United States 2006 National Security Strategy states that Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and recognizes that U.S. security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states. Africa’s expanding energy sector, China’s rising role and concerns over the spread of radical Islamist terrorism have converted what was often an “afterthought into an attention-getter” (1). The possible creation of one single African U.S. command (currently responsibility for Africa is spread across three separate regional U.S. military commands) may provide additional impetus to the engagement of NATO and individual Allies.

**NATO shares the global “Responsibility to Protect”**

However, there is a more important argument in favour of a more active NATO role. NATO, as a politico-military organization, is a responsible actor in the international community. As such, it shares the Responsibility to Protect human populations from genocide and serious human rights violations. NATO’s motivation to intervene in Darfur was essentially a humanitarian one. The Alliance’s first mission in sub-Saharan Africa – an area that until 2005 had not really been within its range of attention – was in response to a call from the AU and the United Nations to assist in mounting a delicate operation in Darfur.

Cruel experience has shown that genocide often happens where the powerful have no vital interests. The excitement about China’s role in Africa may hide the unpleasant fact that Africa is not at the centre of world geopolitics. The problem is that nations and organizations may not want to intervene to prevent mass human rights violations because they are taking place in Africa or in places which are not considered as priority areas. That is why it is so important to develop Africa’s own Capability to Protect (2).

The AU has made little progress on capacity building over the past years and that has proven to be the primary limiting factor for an effective AMIS operation in Darfur. But what Africa actually needs to effectively stop genocide is efficient combat forces, multinational military forces adequate to stop mass killing, not just traditional peacekeepers. Of course, the political will to use them will always be a fundamental factor, but at least the AU would have the option to do it. Today, NATO remains the most effective multilateral military framework and it could use its wealth of expertise to assist the AU to develop this capability to protect.

**A new political framework for NATO-Africa cooperation**

The network of NATO partnerships offers a good basis on which to build a more solid relationship with the AU and with individual African states. At the Riga Summit, NATO decided to increase the operational relevance of its relations with non-NATO countries and increase NATO’s ability to provide practical advice on, and assistance in, the defence and security-related
aspects of reform in countries and regions where NATO is engaged. The Alliance also decided to strengthen its ability to work effectively with individual countries and make the tools from its Partnership for Peace programme – or at least some of them – available for other partnership frameworks, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue (which includes North-African and Middle Eastern states) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative for the Persian Gulf.

In this context, there is no reason why in the near future NATO could not extend this system of partnerships and relationships with contact countries to interested sub-Saharan African states that show willingness to shoulder a greater share of the international security burden and develop a structured relationship with the AU. This would build on NATO Allies’ understanding that assistance to African crisis management operations be furthered on a case-by-case basis, upon request by the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations, in accordance with NATO’s own procedures and financial considerations, and in close coordination with other international organisations, namely the European Union.

What NATO can offer

Since the early 1990s, the need to strengthen and make use of regional organisations has been repeatedly stressed, though without moving much beyond rhetoric. The initial steps taken by the AU to develop an African capacity for peacekeeping provide a good opportunity for a concerted effort to develop regional capacity.

The 2005 UN World Summit outcome document underlines the importance of a strong AU and welcomes efforts of international organisations to develop capacities such as rapid deployment, standby and bridging arrangements. It also supports the implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity building with the AU. This is a sensibly targeted proposal and requires specific actions in areas ranging from funding and pre-deployment training to doctrinal development, information processing, headquarters organisation and strategic/tactical airlift. In this context, NATO could identify areas of substantive expertise where it could provide assistance to the AU upon request. This assistance would improve the AU’s posture in meeting the security challenges in its region.

NATO has developed a close operational relationship with the UN over the last ten years of working together in the Balkans and more recently in Asia. One aspect where the Alliance can specifically contribute to African security is through NATO support to UN operations, filling in UN operational shortfalls in areas such as strategic deployment or UAV-gathered intelligence.

Another possible field of cooperation is energy security, where Africa is acquiring an increasingly important strategic role as an alternative provider and where NATO is developing an initial awareness. NATO’s most likely added value would be in strengthening maritime security by helping African partners to identify risks or threats to energy facilities or individual vessels, by sharing NATO-agreed or Allied intelligence and by monitoring shipping lanes that are insufficiently covered by national assets through the deployment of specific maritime operations.

Some principles and limiting factors for NATO-African cooperation

There are a number of drivers and challenges for NATO-AU cooperation. First, any increased NATO involvement in Africa will have to take into account the UN’s primary responsibility and leading role in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

Second, a fundamental principle in NATO’s supporting role in Darfur has been to emphasize the AU’s leadership. One important factor is that, throughout its relatively short history of stabilization operations since 1995, NATO has made a point about being in charge and maintaining a distinct command. While operating under a UN mandate and closely coordinating with international community actors in the field and at HQ level, NATO has been reluctant to hand over command to the UN or work under the authority of an international administrator or special representative. It would indeed be difficult to imagine NATO soldiers on the ground in Africa under a non-NATO command, except maybe in the form of advisors or trainers. This idiosyncratic NATO approach, coupled with respect for Africa’s ownership and specifically for the AU’s leadership, will necessarily limit NATO’s role to a supporting one, and probably even one complementary to a UN support package. For NATO, the AU has to remain in the driving seat of African conflict.
resolution and any possible future NATO role is likely to be limited to a very specific contribution to strengthening African capability to meet security challenges.

Third, with regard to the AU and African sub-regional organisations, the best way forward is to support their capacity by allowing the strategies and plans of these organisations to establish the agenda for action, rather than pushing separate priorities and projects. Effective coordination and reinforcement of an agreed division of labour is crucial. The UN has repeatedly emphasised this aspect and has called for a more structured dialogue (including the signing of Memoranda of Understanding) between the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations for peace and security.

Finally, from a strategic point of view, NATO’s effort will need to be adapted to what the UN calls the “special needs of Africa”. The question is whether NATO’s expertise is suitable for Africa and whether an imported peacekeeping or stabilization operation model would be sustainable in the long term. Recent external support for the AU and sub-regional organisations has focused on providing capacity for military interventions. However, what is also needed, and may be more important, is to strengthen the African ability to use a wider range of tools to prevent and resolve conflict that are more adapted to an under-resourced continent. The bottom-line is to ensure that aid and assistance do not make matters worse.

All in all, NATO and African partners will have to dispel misconceptions and achieve better mutual understanding before engaging further in future partnerships. The challenge is to overcome what Axelle Kabou, a French-Cameroonian author, called the “crepuscular ambition of remaining oneself whatever the price”.

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Endnotes


(2) David C. Gompert: For a Capability to Protect; in: Survival, Spring 2006.


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The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Is NATO trying to replace the UN as primary actor in security matters?

A dispute arose again over whether NATO was dominated by the US. Alexia Mikhos denied this and stressed that the alliance decided by consensus of its members. For Adekeye Adebjo, however, it was evident that in practice NATO was driven by the US; he cited the example of NATO expansion to the East which, he said, came from Washington, not Brussels. Another contentious issue was whether NATO wanted to displace the UN or the EU as primary actor in security matters. Mikhos as well as Antonio Ortiz denied that these organisations competed for possibilities to intervene. Nobody disputed that the primary responsibility for peace lies with the UN, said Ortiz. He underlined that NATO operated on requests from the AU and the UN: All NATO operations, except in Kosovo, have been under UN mandate and have promoted rather than undermined UN peacekeeping.

Suspicions were voiced that NATO interventions in Africa are motivated at least partly by security interests of NATO members rather than by concern for Africa. His Excellency the Ambassador of Zambia remarked that NATO is seen as interventionist, so UN oversight or even EU security policy would be a better road to take for Africa. But every foreign intervention in Africa has mixed motives, replied Catherine Guicherd: We may want to help, but at the same time we have our own interest, like promoting stability or preventing.

NATO member are not keen to intervene in Africa

As NATO troops are tied down in Afghanistan and Kosovo, most NATO members are in no way keen to intervene in Africa, remarked Winrich Kühne. The debate about a possible intervention only came up because Sudan is blocking a UN mission in Darfur. Kühne suggested it is best not to be too concerned about NATO interests in Africa, which are in reality quite feeble, and instead to deal with a more practical question: Who can do what best? The UN has a good record in peace building and UN missions enjoy rather high legitimacy, he continued. But the UN cannot enforce, for example, a no-fly zone over Darfur. Only NATO can do this, Kühne argued. Ortiz made a similar point: NATO has the means to intervene but is not seen as legitimate, while the UN is legitimate but does not have the means, he noted.

Private military companies – risk or potential for Africa?

Finally the question was raised whether the use of private military companies is a risk or a potential for peacekeeping in Africa. Adekeye Adebajo replied these companies are dogs of war, and the UN as well as regional organisations refuse to work with them. In contrast, Antonio Ortiz said that private military companies are sometimes contracted by the UN, the EU and even NGOs. Most of them are, however, not active in Africa, but clearly in Iraq. And in Africa, added Catherine Guicherd, they are rarely engaged in fighting but rather in doing training and logistics. The problem here, she said, is quality control – the activities of these companies are not properly regulated by law.
The controversies during the conference showed quite clearly that NATO, and its offers of partnership and dialogue, are arousing strong suspicion in Africa and the Middle East. The alliance is widely perceived as dominated by the US and its global interests; one panellist even called for its disbandment. NATO representatives felt this image is wrong and stressed that NATO decides by consensus of its 26 members, and thus cannot be dominated by one of them. This argument failed to convince most other participants.

Yet NATO was indeed sometimes blamed for US strategies that it does not subscribe to. Here it seems useful to recall that NATO, as Siegmar Schmidt stressed, increasingly has difficulties in agreeing on a common mission exactly because some approaches are controversial within the alliance. A major reason for this are widening transatlantic differences. Besides, NATO member states – not only the US – have foreign policies that follow national priorities and are, at least in dealing with Africa, not always well harmonised with the approaches of other members or of the alliance itself.

NATO suffers from a lack of legitimacy

Regardless of whether the perception of NATO as an instrument of US policy is at least partially correct, it in any case means that NATO suffers from a serious lack of legitimacy in its engagement in Africa and the Middle East. A greater NATO role in global and regional security in the South will not be easily accepted in many countries there. On this point conference participants seemed to agree.

But again, NATO representatives felt there are misperceptions: The alliance’s dialogue and partnership initiatives with countries in the Middle East, Asia and Africa do not mean NATO is trying to intervene in these regions in order to shape security arrangements there. Rather it is following a cautious, gradual and pragmatic approach, offering mainly technical military-to-military cooperation in order to build contacts to other important actors and engage them in some way. A common political vision is, according to NATO representatives, neither a precondition nor a primary goal of this cooperation.

There was no consensus on the value of this approach, in particular on the experience thus far with NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. For Israel’s representative it was valuable because cooperation is pragmatic and the conflicts between Israel and Arab countries as well as Palestinians are not on the agenda. Exactly for this reason the Egyptian participant regarded the Dialogue as a failure: According to him, it is a one-way street, giving no room to voice Egypt’s concerns over attempts to impose Western concepts of democracy and security on the region. The difference is easy to understand: The current US administration has supported Israel’s policies, and NATO’s Dialogue...
has, at least, not helped Arab countries change this. It is thus welcome in Israel, while Egypt is frustrated by a dialogue that apparently offers no way to influence NATO member’s policies perceived as violating Egypt’s interests and making conflict management in the region even more difficult. Two conclusions can be drawn from this: Political conflict can impede pragmatic and technical cooperation; and the value of such cooperation in terms of global security is not evident as long as it does not contribute to policy change.

**NATO wants to avoid troop commitments in Africa**

NATO’s much more recent engagement in Africa is also meeting with mistrust. Concern was voiced that it follows the security interests of NATO members rather than African needs and priorities. That such interests do play a role is not in dispute; after all, states rarely take action without consideration of their own proper interests. However, the conference also showed that African states have few reasons to fear NATO intervention simply because the alliance is interested in avoiding troop deployments in Africa due to heavy long-term commitments elsewhere. It assists the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) only on request of the African Union (AU) and only with logistics, training and capacity building. NATO hopes to leave the task of peacekeeping in Africa largely to the AU and to African regional organisations, and of course the UN.

That the primary responsibility for global peace lies with the UN was widely agreed. However, the UN has legitimacy but lacks the means to mount more robust peace support operations. Most conference participants felt the AU and African regional organisations should be supported in building this capacity so they can take up the task in Africa. NATO seems prepared to give technical assistance here. Whether it should do so or rather leave this to the EU, which is seen as more neutral and funds much of the AU’s peace support capacities, remained in dispute at the conference. It is, however, unlikely that the AU and African regional organisations will acquire the necessary means in the near future. Will external forces, including NATO or NATO member states, then be called to assist in the context of UN missions, and will they respond? This question was raised, but not answered, during the conference.
Speakers

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