Too many or too few?
Demographic growth and international migration
Ernst Hillebrand
The Compass 2020 project represents the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s contribution to a debate on Germany’s aims, role and strategies in international relations. Compass 2020 will organise events and issue publications in the course of 2007, the year in which German foreign policy will be very much in the limelight due to the country’s presidency of the EU Council and the G 8. Some 30 articles written for this project will provide an overview of the topics and regions that are most important for German foreign relations. All the articles will be structured in the same way. Firstly, they will provide information about the most significant developments, the toughest challenges and the key players in the respective political fields and regions. The second section will analyse the role played hitherto by German / European foreign policy, the strategies it pursues and the way in which it is perceived. In the next section, plausible alternative scenarios will be mapped out illustrating the potential development of a political field or region over the next 15 years. The closing section will formulate possible points of departure for German and European policy.

Jochen Steinhilber
Katrien Klüver

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Dept. for Development Policy
Hiroshimastraße 17
D - 10785 Berlin

Tel. +49-30-26935-972
Fax +49-30-26935-959
kompass2020@fes.de
www.fes.de/kompass2020
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Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 2

I. Demography and migration: global trends ................................................................. 3
   I.1 The growth of the world population to 2020 and beyond ................................ 3
   I.2 International migration: Current situation and general trends to 2020 ........ 4
   I.3 Western Europe and international migratory flows ............................................. 6
   I.4 Germany and international migratory flows ....................................................... 6
   I.5 Unofficial migration .......................................................................................... 7
   I.6 Demographic effects on Germany .................................................................... 8
   I.7 Dynamics of migration processes to 2020 and beyond ................................... 9
   I.8 Additional push factors for ecological reasons? .............................................. 10

II. German and EU policy to date for controlling international migration .............. 11
   II.1 Germany policy on immigration control ......................................................... 11
   II.2 The EU as a framework for German policy measures .................................. 12

III. 2020 scenarios .................................................................................................... 14
   III.1 Crises in the south, crises in the east – and the Pope is no longer German... ... 14
   III.2 Muddling through successfully ................................................................... 15

IV. Recommended German policy approach ............................................................. 16
   IV.1 Action on population growth ...................................................................... 17
   IV.2 Action on Immigration ................................................................................. 17
Abstract

The world population is set to grow by 17% by 2020, from 6.5 billion (2005) to around 7.56 billion. By far the largest part of this growth will take place in the developing countries, with the sharpest increases taking place in the least developed countries. The LLDC’s share of the world population will rise from 11% to 14% by 2020, that of the currently developing countries overall from 81.3% to 83.6%.

At the same time, the number of migrants worldwide will continue to increase. From 1960 to 2005, the number of migrants rose from a total of 75 million to currently around 191 million. Until 2050, an additional net figure of around 100 million people will migrate from the third to the first world. The factors that have triggered migratory movements in the past, particularly income differentials between regions, will also apply in the future. It is not expected that the gap in income between the industrialised countries and the developing world will close in the foreseeable future; rather there are many indicators that this gap will widen even further (with the exception of China).

Within Europe, Germany – which is currently home to some 31% of the European population of foreign extraction (France 14%, UK 12%, Italy 9%) – will continue to be the main destination for migrants. Calculations of the German Federal Statistical Office give annual net legal immigration scenarios of 200,000 to 300,000 during the period until 2020. Germany will be the second largest recipient country of legal migrants after the US and will continue to be of particular appeal to immigrants from Europe’s non-EU countries and Eastern Europe, as well as having a particularly high influx from Turkey.

Levels of illegal migration will continue to increase worldwide, with human trafficking and people smuggling already accounting for the third largest sector of global organised crime.

The two 2020 scenarios are based on different developments in the two regions of particular importance for migratory movements to Europe – Eastern Europe and the “arc of crisis” in the Middle and Near East. Depending on political and economic developments in these regions, immigration to Western Europe can take on very different forms in the future.

Viewed realistically, the chances of German or European policy having any impact on the decisive factors triggering migration – population growth and differences in income in a globalised world – are very small. Action is therefore best concentrated on controlling and managing migration. Given the unabated immigration pressure, particularly from the developing countries, the EU will have to develop a common policy of controlled immigration of primarily well-educated, young people and of effective protection of external borders against unwanted immigration. An efficient policy of integration will remain decisive and key to the management of any further immigration.

At the same time, to solve Germany’s demographic problems, an active population and family policy promoting parenthood is required which will raise the birth rate to the level of those Western European countries that are having more success in this area.
I. Demography and migration: global trends

I.1 The growth of the world population to 2020 and beyond

According to UN calculations, the world population will grow by 17% by 2020, from 6.5 billion (2005) to around 7.56 billion. Most of this growth will take place in the developing countries and, here again, mainly in the least developed countries. The population of the industrialised countries will, by contrast, stagnate, since the birth rate in most of these countries is below the population replacement rate.

Table 1: Growth of world population by 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (in thousands)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 464 750</td>
<td>6 842 923</td>
<td>7 219 431</td>
<td>7 577 889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>905 936</td>
<td>1 006 905</td>
<td>1 115 358</td>
<td>1 228 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 905 415</td>
<td>4 130 383</td>
<td>4 351 001</td>
<td>4 553 791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>728 389</td>
<td>725 786</td>
<td>721 111</td>
<td>714 959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
<td>561 346</td>
<td>598 771</td>
<td>634 104</td>
<td>666 955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Amerika</td>
<td></td>
<td>330 608</td>
<td>346 062</td>
<td>360 905</td>
<td>375 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td></td>
<td>33 056</td>
<td>35 017</td>
<td>36 952</td>
<td>38 909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 211 265</td>
<td>1 225 678</td>
<td>1 236 561</td>
<td>1 224 413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 253 484</td>
<td>5 617 246</td>
<td>5 982 871</td>
<td>6 333 475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least developed regions</td>
<td></td>
<td>759 389</td>
<td>852 025</td>
<td>951 610</td>
<td>1 057 086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correspondingly, the share of the world population of today’s developing countries will rise from 81.3% to 83.6% by 2020 and that of the least developed countries (LLDC) from 11% to 14%. However, also in the currently developing countries – particularly in China – population growth will slow down in the long term.

The HIV pandemic will have a significant impact on demographic growth only in the southern part of the African continent. Life expectancy has been falling there since the mid-1990s and will continue to fall to an average life expectancy of 43 by the middle of the next decade. Outside of this region, the very high birth rate in the LLDC will, however, broadly offset the negative impact of this increased mortality.

UN calculations assume a continuation of the global trend towards urbanisation: in 2020, around 56% of the world population will live in cities, with only 44% still in rural areas. The highest level of urbanisation will be reached in North America, closely followed by Latin America. Levels of urbanisation in the hitherto most rural continent, Africa, will rise from today’s 40% to around 48%.
In the long term – by 2050 – the UN expects the world population to grow to some 9.1 billion. Today’s developing countries will account for 95% of this increase. Looking at individual countries, the following ones will make the largest absolute contribution to the growth in the world population: India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Congo, Bangladesh, Uganda, US, Ethiopia, and China (in declining order). The countries that will experience the largest relative population increase by 2050 all number among the least developed countries. All but two of them are situated in Africa: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger and Uganda.

According to these UN-calculations, the population of today’s industrialised countries will only have fallen slightly by 2050, with this relative stagnation increasingly being the result of immigration. Stagnation of population levels is however by no means restricted to the developed nations. Birth rates are not only already below the population replacement rate in almost all industrialised countries, but also in 23 developing countries, which together account for a quarter of the current world population. This group includes China, whose birth rate in recent years was below that of some industrialised countries.

1.2 International migration: Current situation and general trends to 2020

Worldwide, the number of migrants will continue to rise. It is presumed that this increase will take place at an even faster rate than in the last 50 years. In the period from 1960 to 2005, the number of international migrants rose from 75 million to 191 million, an increase of 121 million people in 45 years.

Table 2: International Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>75,9</td>
<td>81,5</td>
<td>99,8</td>
<td>154,0</td>
<td>175,0</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>32,1</td>
<td>38,3</td>
<td>47,7</td>
<td>89,7</td>
<td>110,3</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>8,7</td>
<td>42,3</td>
<td>63,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>43,8</td>
<td>43,2</td>
<td>52,1</td>
<td>64,3</td>
<td>64,6</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>57,7</td>
<td>36,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic and Social Survey 2004: International Migration, NY, UN, 2004, Table II.1.

191 million people correspond to a share of the world population of around 3%. Some 63% of these migrants live in the industrialised countries, where they account for around a tenth of the population; 37% live in developing countries, where they made up a seventh of the entire population at the beginning of the millennium. In the last few years, the net figure of legal immigrants from the third to the first world was around 2.4 million annually.

3) Swiaczny, Frank, Internationale Wanderung als globales Phänomen, loc.cit., p. 129 ff. The figures for the distribution between IC and DC were changed in accordance with the 2005 UN revision of the assessment of migrant levels (note 2).
Immigration to Europe has accelerated particularly in the 1990ies. Looking at the total number of migrants, the US ranks first (38 million), Russia – since the collapse of the USSR – second (12 million) and Germany third (10 million).\(^5\)

According to UN estimates, by the year 2020, the following net balances of migration (immigration minus emigration) are to be expected:

**Table 3: Migration rates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Migration rate (net)</th>
<th>Net migration (in thousands, per annum, both sexes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least developed regions</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Further ahead, in the period of just over 40 years to 2050, according to UN estimates, a net figure of around 100 million will migrate from the third to the first world (emigration minus remigration; illegal/undocumented migratory movements not included).

The main sending countries in the next few decades will be China, Mexico, India, the Philippines, Pakistan and Indonesia. The relatively important part that Eastern Europe has played in terms of migratory movements within Europe in the last 15 years should decrease as the population in this region itself begins to age.

With all such forecasts it must be pointed out that the evidence to back them up is thin. In many respects, they are no more than ceteris paribus projections of past migratory trends. Newer and ever more intensive forms of migration such as short-term and circular migration as well as illegal migration are either insufficiently represented in these models or not at all. No matter how carefully and methodically these figures are calculated, they remain, at core, speculative. Moreover, most sources lament a lack of reliable data for the calculation of international migration figures.

I.3 Western Europe and international migratory flows

Most migrants in the next few years and decades will be heading for today’s industrialised nations. Within this scenario, Europe will tend to become ever more attractive. The UN expects that, in the future, Europe will absorb a third of the total net number of international migrants.

Early in the decade (2003), a total of 23.5 million foreigners were living in Western Europe. Of these, around 10 million were actively employed, an increase of 38% on 1995. Assuming that migration levels in the coming years will be around the same as in the last ten years, by 2020 the resident population of foreign extraction in Western Europe will rise to 43.6 million. A growing proportion of these persons will be pensioners.

No account has yet been taken of the enlargement of the EU since 2004 in calculating the numbers of immigrants expected to come to Western Europe (nor of the consequences of Rumania’s and Bulgaria’s entry into the EU). Figures from Ireland and the UK – which did not impose any restrictions on labour migration from new member states – show that actual migration has far exceeded the numbers forecast. This is doubtless the result of a considerable “rerouting” effect, with a disproportionate share of migratory movements being redirected to the UK due to the entry restrictions in countries such as Germany and France. Nevertheless, the numbers still do indicate that the migratory potential from the new member states might be much greater than was at first supposed.

I.4 Germany and international migratory flows

Within Europe, Germany – which is currently home to around one third of the European population of foreign extraction (France 14%, UK 12%, Italy 9%) – will continue to be the main country of destination for immigrants. If the existing trends persist, Germany will continue to hold particular appeal for immigrants from Europe’s non-EU countries and Eastern Europe, as well as having a particularly high influx from Turkey.

Germany can expect an influx of immigrants up to 2020 on around the same scale as that of the last decade. In absolute figures, the UN estimates average net immigration levels of around 200,000 persons per year. Calculations of the German Federal Statistical Office give net immigration scenarios of 200,000 to 300,000. Hence, the net immigration figure for the period from 2007 to 2020 for Germany is expected to be around 1.4 million. This will make Germany the second largest recipient of international migrants after the US.

Net figures alone, however, say nothing about the true number of “new arrivals”. The number of immigrants coming to Germany in the last five years was around 840,000 per annum, as against a figure of 640,000 for those leaving. Basing projected figures on the average for the last five years, then some 10.9 million persons will migrate to Germany between 2007 and 2020, of which 8.5 million will be non-Germans. Assuming that the cultural and social integration of newcomers represents the real challenge ahead for those Western European societies that attract immigrants, then these absolute figures more clearly illustrate the scale of this task than the net figures. The simultaneous emigration of native Germans and foreigners who have lived in Germany for some time makes the task of integrating this significant number of newcomers only slightly easier.

10] German Immigration Council, Migration und Integration – Erfahrungen nutzen, Neues wagen. Annual report of the German Immigration Council, Nuremberg 2004, p. 66. Foreign nationals have constituted 78% of (recorded) arrivals in the last five years and 82% of exits.
On top of this, the diversity of immigrants will increase and the foreign population will in the future be much more heterogeneous, making economic, social and cultural integration even more complicated.

The question where migrants will mainly come from in future is of significant importance for estimating not only the dynamics of future migration but also for estimating costs, benefits and potential problems of integration. Basically, the more qualified immigrants are, the greater the probability that immigration will benefit the recipient country in fiscal and economic terms. Likewise, studies also show that the likelihood of a net profit for the receiving country is greater in the case of immigrants from countries with higher per capita income (and thus better education and training).11

On the face of it, this is good news for Germany, with its relatively large share of immigrants from Eastern and South-East Europe. On the other hand, however, it must be seen that, within this general pattern, one country – Turkey – plays a pre-dominating role. Immigration from this country, however, is characterised by extremely low levels of qualification. Whereas, for example, the proportion of those Russians living in OECD countries who were educated to university level is more than 40% and, for Ukrainians, this figure still reaches 27.2%, for Turkish migrants in OECD countries (primarily in Germany and the Netherlands) the figure is a meagre 6.3%.12 This is one of the reasons why the proportion of the foreign resident population in Germany educated to university level is at 15.5% much lower than in, for example, Switzerland, the UK or indeed France (2001 figures).13 This structural peculiarity of German immigration has become even more marked in recent years: Between 1996 and 2005, the proportion of workers with few or no qualifications of the total coming into Germany rose from 25% to 45%.14

In generally, it must be supposed that the general educational level of immigrants from Turkey and developing countries will remain below that of immigrants from European countries. A report commissioned by the EU on the push and pull factors in migration processes from developing countries concludes in this respect: “In comparison to western countries of destination, migrants’ educational levels, although increasing, are still low, with many having no more than primary education”.15

1.5 Unofficial migration

The figures given above for emigration and immigration do not include illegal migrants. The number of illegal immigrants is, by the very nature of the subject matter, difficult to determine and can therefore only be estimated using indirect indicators.

An OECD study estimates that the ratio of illegal to legal immigrants could be somewhat higher in Europe than in the US. In this country the proportion is estimated at around 3:1, i.e. for every three legal immigrants another illegal one can be added.16

There are various differing estimates concerning the dynamics of illegal immigration. In respect of Europe, a report for the European Council comes to the conclusion that there

11] „Studies show that the fiscal effects vary by national origin of the migrants, with higher benefits flowing from those coming from high GDP countries.” Salt, John, Current Trends, loc. cit., p. 23.
12] Ibid, Table 18.
13] Ibid, Table 19.
are few indications that the extent of illegal immigration has increased significantly in recent years\(^\text{17}\). In contrast, the 2004 annual report of the German Immigration Council refers to estimates according to which in the last decade the number of illegal immigrants has been rising more sharply than other forms of migration (family reunification, labour migration, refugees and asylum seekers).\(^\text{18}\) Most scientific studies assume that the number of illegal immigrants will rise in the next few years. Not least, the growth in specialised criminal structures supports this assumption: human trafficking and people smuggling have now become the third-largest area of international organised crime.\(^\text{19}\)

### I.6 Demographic effects on Germany

The migratory movements expected in the next few decades will have no significant demographic effect on the sending countries, since population growth compensates greatly for the effects of emigration. The situation will be quite different for the receiving countries. In view of low birth rates, immigration is, on the whole, an important factor of the demographic development. However, its overall effect should not be overestimated. For Europe as a whole, immigration corresponded to only 10% of births in recent years (Oceania 17%, North America 32%).\(^\text{20}\)

Even in Germany, a country with a very low birth rate, the effect of immigration on the ageing process is relatively insignificant if one is not aiming – as, for example, in the 2002 UN model calculations for “replacement migration” – for massive population shifts. To keep for example, the ratio of 15- to 64-year-olds to those of 65 and over constant until 2050, more than 180 million people would have to migrate to Germany over this period.\(^\text{21}\)

In respect to the sustainability of Germany’s pension system, calculations by the German Federal Statistical Office indicate that raising the age of retirement would have a more positive effect than high immigration and a low increase in life expectancy combined. Overall, it can be said that even in the long term – looking ahead to 2050 – “the demographic effects of migration on the increase in the proportion of older people are very small”.\(^\text{22}\)

#### Table 4: Percentage of the German population of 20-to-65 year-olds according to different immigration scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-level immigration</td>
<td>61,3</td>
<td>60,6</td>
<td>55,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-level immigration</td>
<td>61,3</td>
<td>60,4</td>
<td>54,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-level immigration</td>
<td>61,2</td>
<td>60,1</td>
<td>52,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scenarios are based on the mean increase in the average lifespan and the following levels of immigration: high: more than 300,000 per annum; medium: 200,000 per annum (UN estimate), low: 100,000 per annum.


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\(^{17}\) Salt, John, Current Trends in International Migration, loc. cit., p. 3.

\(^{18}\) German Immigration Council, loc. cit., p. 32.


\(^{20}\) Swiaczny, Frank, Internationale Wanderung als globales Phänomen, loc. cit., p. 137.

\(^{21}\) Swiaczny, Frank, Internationale Wanderung als globales Phänomen, loc. cit., p. 150.

\(^{22}\) Swiaczny, Frank, Internationale Wanderung als globales Phänomen, loc. cit., p. 146.
It is inevitable that the effects of the low birth rate in Germany (1.4) will become noticeable in Germany’s age distribution in the coming decades; immigration on the scale expected will do little to change this. At the same time, it can be seen that other industrialised countries such as France, Norway, the Netherlands and the US have birth rates that render immigration virtually superfluous as a stabilising demographic factor. There is, from a demographic perspective, considerable room for manoeuvre for an active population and family policy in Germany which would allow Germany to solve its demographic problems largely by its own.

1.7 Dynamics of migration processes to 2020 and beyond

Considering the factors that drive international migration, it cannot be assumed that the immigration pressure on the first world will abate in any way as the world population increases. Differences in demographic development are a negligible factor in this regard: international migration is much more strongly influenced by other factors than by bare demographic facts.

It is therefore advisable to treat with caution the immigration figures for Europe and Germany estimated by the UN. According to this projection, immigration to Germany will in future remain on the level of the average of the past 50 years. However, there is a range of developments that gives cause to suppose that international migration will rather increase in the future.

Differences in income and development

Historically, the most important incentive for international migration have been income differentials between sending and receiving countries. Based on this assumption, an increase rather than a decrease in worldwide migration is to be expected in the coming years. Both the rate of growth in the Third World and the rate of global economic growth were higher in the post-war decades than they have been since the current cycle of liberal globalisation began in the early 1980ies. Accordingly, the relative gap in income between the industrialised and developing countries – with the exception of China and some other Asian countries - has widened in the last two decades. Assuming that there will be little change to this trend in the next twelve years and that an essentially liberal world trade order will continue to obtain, then – despite the expected windfall profits for exporters of raw materials – a large part of the developing countries can expect not a closing of the income gap but a widening of it.

Even in the more dynamic developing countries and emerging markets, the “winners of globalisation”, such as Turkey, China and India, the per capita growth rate will be only around twice that of most industrialised countries. Given the huge differences in their starting positions, the divide in absolute terms will therefore not narrow in the next future but widen. Even assuming that calculations based on purchasing power parities show a somewhat more benign picture, it is nevertheless a fact that the central economic pull factor for migration – a considerable gap in income between sending and recipient regions – will continue to exist and may even become wider in many cases. Robert Wades’ statement: “The fastest way for a poor person to get richer is to move from a poor country to a rich one” will still hold true in the future.

26 Wade, Robert, Globalisation isn’t working, Prospect Magazine, July 2006.
Communication, information and technological change

Historically, technological factors have always had a great influence on migratory movements. The mass migrations from Europe to America in the 19th century only became possible because the invention of ocean-worthy steamships created a cheap, reliable method of mass transportation. Accordingly, intercontinental migratory processes have received new impetus due to the improving communications and travel options offered in the era of intercontinental flights, sinking communication costs and the new types of communication offered in the internet age. The hard and soft costs of migration decisions tend to fall with these developments. At the same time, the growing interconnection of commercial systems in the globalised world economy is proving to be another factor that stimulates migration.

Migration networks

Migration leads to the creation of dense networks of contact and communication between the countries of destination and the countries of origin of migrants. According to modern migration theory, these networks are an important factor in migration decisions, since they tend to lower the costs of migrating and facilitate the initial establishment of migrants in the destination countries. To the extent that past migration processes have resulted in firmly established diasporas in the industrialised countries, the migration decisions of successive migrants are made considerably easier. Moreover, established migration networks tend to reinforce existing migration patterns.

Urbanisation and social change

Historically, international migration has been strongly related to rural-urban migration. The first step in migratory movements is often enough that from rural areas to the slums of the growing cities; if employment or economic prospects cannot be realised there, international migration might follow as circumstances allow. In this respect, the ongoing trend towards urbanisation in the developing countries is also an indicator for growing international migration pressure. Urbanisation will increase considerably up to 2020, particularly in Africa, while it will stabilise to a high degree in the other regions of the Third World.

I.8 Additional push factors for ecological reasons?

It is difficult to calculate the effect of future climate change on migration potentials and trends. The German Immigration Council sees a cluster of factors here that may have a powerful effect on future migratory movements.

However, looking at the calculations of the Stern Review of November 2006, it can be concluded that climate change will have hardly any effect in the period in question. Increases in average temperature in the range of 1 degree Celsius – more is not to be expected by 2020 – will, according to the Stern Report scenarios, affect only food production in some regions of the Sahel (the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates in its last report from early 2007 an average rise in temperature of 0.2 degrees Celsius in each of the next two decades).

30) German Immigration Council, loc. cit., p. 42 f.
Even with a rise in temperature of 2 to 3 degrees by the end of the 21st century, says the Stern Report, the economic losses will amount to only 5 -10% of global per capita consumption (i.e. the global social product would be 5 -10% lower than with no climate change). In view of the tremendous potential for productivity growth in most areas of material production in the next hundred years, these developments seem unlikely to trigger large migratory movements, even if for some of today’s developing countries the damage might be significantly higher than 10% of GNP.\textsuperscript{31}

## II. German and EU policy to date for controlling international migration

German policy roughly follows the global political mainstream which is increasingly aiming to control and manage migration. Worldwide, governments are increasingly preoccupied by the level of migratory movement and are accordingly trying to regulate these processes. Since 1974, the Population Unit of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs has been following the attitudes and views of governments worldwide on migration issues and how these attitudes and views develop. While the topic was of hardly any importance in the mid-70s, since then there has been a trend of increasing concern about the extent of global migration. Around one third of governments from industrialised countries declared in 2001 that, in their opinion, migration levels were too high. An additional 21% of governments of developing countries found migration levels too high. The proportion of governments implementing policies to reduce immigration rose from 7% in 1976 to 40% in 2001.\textsuperscript{32} This trend is expected to become stronger in the coming years.

### II.1 Germany policy on immigration control\textsuperscript{33}

In the past, immigration control in Germany has been characterised by a plethora of generally uncoordinated, selective measures. These did often have the intended effect, but were never incorporated into a coherent overall plan. It must also be borne in mind that within the EU, any comprehensive, strategic control of immigration by single member states is possible only to a limited extent.

#### a) Family reunification:
this currently represents the most important source of immigration, not only in Germany, but also in Western Europe as a whole. Permission for family reunification immigration is in principle a sovereign decision of the German Federal Government. Its discretion in this matter is however qualified by the protection of marriage and the family, as firmly laid down in public international law, European Community law and the German Constitution. The immigration of family members cannot therefore be controlled in an arbitrary manner. Within this context, the government can assess and weigh up against each other the public and private interests that argue for and against a family reunion. Control of this type is based on reunion rules specific to spouses, partners, children and other family members respectively, mostly by means of qualifying periods for immigration to Germany or using age specifications, for which there are now also mandatory European requirements.

\textsuperscript{31} Stern Report, The Economics of Climate Change, London, 2006, Executive Summary, pp. VIII–X. Even the collapse of the economies in Eastern Europe after the change of system, which led to a drop in per capita income of 25–30% in a very short space of time, did not result in migratory processes on a scale that would necessarily be described as extremely problematic for countries of destination in western Europe.


\textsuperscript{33} The account given of German immigration control is based on the text of the report by Steffen Angenendt commissioned by the FES London (note 15) and the relevant chapter of the report of the German Immigration Council.
b) Labour migration: immigration permission for employment purposes is at the sole discretion of each country due to the lack (as yet) of any European or international regulations thereto. Instruments targeted at controlling labour migration are work permits and work prohibitions. In the past, German governments have applied restrictive instruments, particularly to asylum seekers, refugees, relatives of immigrants and students. These instruments have been modified frequently according to the labour market situation. For the purposes of indirect control, individual priority tests are also used, specifying which groups of persons have access to the labour market in which order. Nevertheless, these restrictive instruments are greatly qualified due to the freedom of movement for workers set out in Article 39 of the European Community Treaty. On expiry of the transitional periods for the EU-10 and Rumania and Bulgaria, then, by the middle of the next decade, the German labour market will be open to all EU citizens with no restrictions.

c) Asylum seekers: The most powerful instrument for controlling immigration of asylum seekers has been the restriction imposed in 1992 on the right to asylum as guaranteed in the German Constitution. Victims of political persecution do continue to receive protection, but any “non-imperative” request for the right to asylum is to be blocked. The duration of the asylum procedure has been shortened and the number of asylum seekers reduced. The improvement of identification procedures has made it easier to uncover any abuse by asylum seekers with multiple applications under various identities. Other controls have been the reduction of social benefits by revising the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Law and the reallocation of asylum seekers to other European countries.

In addition to these group-specific instruments, there are other instruments used to control migration in general, including repatriation. Often there is, however, no repatriation because identities are unclear, ID documentation is missing, no information is provided or because the (alleged) countries of origin do not wish to take their citizens back. To avoid this, readmission agreements are concluded, regulating technical matters among other things. Since voluntary return is deemed the best option for those required to leave, the German government assists these persons by means of certain programmes and by cooperating with transit countries and the countries of origin. Since many foreigners without residence permits cannot be deported due to legal or actual obstacles to deportation and often live for years in Germany with only temporary suspension of deportation, there have been repeated legalisation campaigns (“regulations on long-standing cases”).

II.2 The EU as a framework for German policy measures

A Common European immigration and asylum policy has continued to gain importance, not least due to Germany’s active role in shaping such a policy. While the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 defined some areas of asylum and immigration policy as “matters of common interest” and thus initially envisaged cooperation of only the member states, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 transferred the areas of visa policy, immigration and asylum to a common policy context (Art. 73). The Treaty of Nice, which came into force on 1st February 2003, sets out an automatic transition to qualified majority decisions in the area of asylum and refugee policy where common rules and principles are stipulated for this area. Moreover, the principle of the freedom of movement of workers within the EU, which is gradually coming into force for all member states, will have a considerable effect on migration to Germany.

34 The key elements of the account given are based on the relevant chapter of the report of the German Immigration Council, loc cit., pp. 125-168.
In Articles 61 to 63 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community amended in 1997 in Amsterdam (EC Treaty) the areas of common immigration and asylum policy are set out:

- External border controls
- Issuing of visas, entry, residence and freedom of movement of nationals of third countries
- Criteria and mechanisms for determining which member state is responsible for considering an application for asylum
- Minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, for qualification of nationals of third countries as refugees, for procedures for granting or withdrawing refugee status and for giving temporary protection
- Measures to counter illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal residents

The European Council decision adopted in Seville in June 2002 to include migration issues in EU trade policy, development policy, foreign and security policy and in other areas of cooperation with third countries was supposed to combat the causes of migratory movements and to reduce the extent of both legal and illegal immigration. Better control of migratory movements should be achieved by the Comprehensive Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration, the Plan for the Management of External Borders and the Directive laying down Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum Seekers in Member States. The combating of illegal immigration should also be reflected in the relations of the EU with third countries. By intensifying economic cooperation, trade, development aid and conflict prevention, the economic prosperity of the countries concerned should be promoted. Readmission agreements and “migration clauses” for cooperating in immigration matters should play a central role in future in EU cooperation and association agreements.

At the European Council Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003 the freedom of movement of EU citizens and their families was re-regulated, giving greater equality with nationals of the member states in question, and family reunion of third country nationals was standardised in key areas. For non-EU citizens, a right of permanent residence and right of resettlement were established.

The rules made at EU level are already today strongly determining the ways immigration can be controlled by the member states. In view of this development, the issue in future will be less that of developing national solutions but of representing German interests as effectively as possible at EU-level negotiations. The most difficult task here is that of regulating labour migration. In the draft text of the EU Constitution it was stipulated that member states alone decide the level and conditions of entry of third country nationals to the national labour markets. If, in the future, common rules are sought beyond this formulation, the problem would be to find rules capable of doing justice to the extremely diverse economic, demographic and social realities of a very heterogeneous economic area of 27 member states and their populations.
III. 2020 scenarios

III.1 Crises in the south, crises in the east – and the Pope is no longer German...

In 2020, in some parts of the Christian and Islamic worlds a political consensus has been reached that birth control amounts to interference in the divine plan for creation. The growing influence of fundamentalist currents has become manifest in all kinds of different forms – in the Near East, with the election victory of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, in the US, with the election victory of an “Evangelical” in the 2016 presidential elections, and in Latin America, where conservative church groups (helped by the closely-knit network of educational institutions that organisations like Opus Dei and Legionarios de Cristo had build up in the past) were exerting growing pressure on politicians. There had been already dissent about the role of contraceptives and family planning at the 2014 World Population Conference in Santiago, Chile. Here, an array of countries announced that they were to pull out from the objectives set out in Cairo in 1994 for controlling the growth of the world population. After the election victory of the “Evangelicals” in the US, development aid and trade privileges were linked to the waiving of family planning. The large scale production of a cheap AIDS drug by a Chinese-American pharmaceutical company has put paid to the campaign to use condoms in parts of the developing world. Likewise, in 2016, with mass production of an effective anti-malaria drug, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, it has been possible to contain one of the deadliest illnesses in the tropics.

In the wake of these developments, the population begins to rise sharply again in many developing countries – particularly in the Islamic countries, in sub-Saharan Africa and in some parts of Latin America. The Angolan Pope Pius XIII calls each birth a “triumph of hope for a better tomorrow on the Lord’s Earth”. Likewise, Islamist groups refer to an “Intifada of women in childbed”, that will bring with it victory over an increasingly ageing West.

The ageing of the Western world, particularly of Europe, is, however, relative; the migratory movements to Western Europe – legal, but increasingly also illegal – could never really be brought under control. Instead of the expected 8–9 million, in the ten years from 2010 to 2020, a net figure of more than 25 million people have migrated to Western Europe. The causes of this development are various:

• The unfolding crises in north Africa have become more acute with the systemic crises in Morocco and Tunisia, the unrest akin to civil war in Egypt after the assassination of President Gamal Mubarak, and the unrelenting tensions in the Middle East. One notable exception in all this has been Algeria, which, thanks to the Sonatrach-Gazprom gas cartel, is earning enormous export revenues. These developments have led to a sharp rise in migration to Southern Europe and France, then further on too to the traditional recipient countries of north African immigrants in Northern Europe, particularly the Netherlands and the UK. At the same time, the continuing economic decline of sub-Saharan Africa has caused a further rise in numbers emigrating from this region.

• EU-membership has failed to consolidate the economic situation in Central Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, leading to even greater immigration pressure on Western Europe. Despite considerable EU transfers to these regions, it has not been possible to protect the industrial core of the economies of Central Eastern and South-Eastern Europe from the growing competition from East Asia and India.

• Lack of consensus and different assessments of the significance of mass immigration to Europe has prevented any effective EU policy on migration control being imple-
mented. Flanked by the pro-immigration media campaigns of the Murdoch group, the “Wall Street Journal” and the “Economist”, an alliance of economic lobbyists (under the leadership of the European employers’ union, UNICE), immigrants’ associations and a range of NGOs has established a campaign entitled “Europe without Frontiers/Europe sans Frontières”, which has prevented any effective control of the EU’s external borders. Under these circumstances, it has never been possible for the EU to implement its resolution on a coordinated immigration policy (CEIP/Coordinated European Immigration Policy) to control the immigration pressure from the “arc of crisis” in the Near and Middle East and from the new “rust belt” in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. In the CEIP, the EU nations had agreed in 2015 to strengthen the coordination of the immigration controls thus far in place. This would take the form of, for instance, an EU right of codetermination for legalisation campaigns in individual member states and the option that countries could impose their own migration limits with reference to the new EU members in the Balkans. There would also be a common points system (European Skilled Migration Scheme) for controlling immigration more strictly according to labour market requirements and immigrants’ qualifications.

III.2 Muddling through successfully

By 2020, the global birth rate has fallen slowly, in line with the UN “medium scenario” for demographic development in the world. There is a general consensus (which, at least in the West, is not questioned) that the slowing of population growth is one of the more effective tools for combating poverty in the developing countries. After 2010, when the Catholic Church, under the leadership of Pope Benedict XVI, authorises the use of condoms as the “lesser evil” in view of the “greater evil” of AIDS, the use of this form of contraception increased. However, social changes too have played a role here: the processes of democratisation in the Islamic world are slowly leading to greater social autonomy for women, with a concomitant effect on the use of contraceptives and the numbers of births per woman.

At the same time, economic growth in traditional sending countries has been more positive than could have been expected. Parts of north Africa and sub-Saharan Africa (here particularly the countries in the oil and gas-rich Gulf of Guinea) have seen a stabilisation of economic growth through significant price increases for raw materials. Turkey has been able to maintain its position as a medium-sized emerging economy, with reasonably strong growth despite the high level of competition from East and South-East Asia; the country succeeded especially to expand its economic influence in Central Asia and the Black Sea area. Since the country’s education system could not meet the demand for skilled labour, the government in Ankara started a widespread “return campaign” in 2018 aimed at the Turkish diaspora in Europe. This campaign had only limited success because most second and third-generation Turks felt too deeply rooted in their countries of birth. Nevertheless, the campaign has positively changed the perception of the Turkish population of the long-term prospects of Turkey’s economy and has resulted in a decrease in the number of emigrants.

The economic growth of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe has progressed slowly but steadily. Competitive advantages based on low labour costs coupled with a continuously improving infrastructure have let to a steady relocation of labour-intensive production from Western to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. While Western Europe was loosing industrial jobs, unemployment in the erstwhile “new member states” has been falling continuously. At the same time, the effect of the post-communist demographic collapse of the early 1990s has led to a sharp drop in the number of young people entering the labour market in these countries.
At EU level, a compromise for dealing with immigration was found in 2015 with the “Coordinated European Immigration Policy“ (CEIP). This was based on:

- an agreement on a common policy of external border controls against illegal immigration while ensuring that humanitarian principles were upheld; here a central emphasis has been put on cooperation with the north African countries.
- Better coordination of policies regarding legal immigration, with key provisions referring to the right of EU countries to have a say in legalisation campaigns of individual member states and the establishment of common minimum standards for granting rights of residence and citizenship.
- Creation of an EU-wide points system similar to the Australian model, seeking to manage immigration according to the needs of the labour market and the skills of immigrants. The most difficult problem to solve in this context has been that of family reunification. Ultimately, an agreement was found, based on promoting “pre-emptive” language acquisition and staggered waiting periods depending on education and skill levels of applicants.

In sum, the somewhat lower immigration pressure and the implementation of targeted policies to control immigration result in immigration levels that, albeit still considerably higher than estimated at the start of the millennium, lead neither to huge distortions of the labour markets nor to serious problems with the integration of immigrants.

IV. Recommended German policy approach

There are no short and medium term policy interventions that would have an effect on most determinants of global population growth. Population growth is a matter of extremely slow social processes that only change over the long term.

With migration policy the situation is similar, although the possibilities of effective intervention are greater here. The one area where there is potential for effective action is that of immigration control.

By contrast, the room for manoeuvre for governmental policies to influence the key factor triggering international migration – the global economic north-south divide and the income differentials this implies – is extremely limited. Basically, seen from the point of view of the economic interest of the developing countries (excluding east Asia, which is profiting greatly from the current trend) it would be advisable to simply abandon the experiment of neo-liberal globalisation in its current form. Since this is extremely unlikely to happen, policy-makers can, at best, offer palliative measures within the framework of the existing world economic order. Opening markets to agrarian exports from developing countries would be one such possibility. However, only some regions would benefit from this. This would be those regions which dispose of the necessary combination of natural resources and technical and commercial know-how (as in Latin America, for example) that is the prerequisite for successfully making use of these market opportunities.

The same reservations apply to development cooperation. Development aid has hitherto failed to show that it can make any really significant contribution to poverty reduction or economic growth in the recipient countries. It should therefore in future be granted primarily as part of a policy of enlightened self-interest according to geostrategic, commercial and political interests of the donor country. In the context given, this means that migration aspects should play a far greater role in future. Development coopera-
tion should be linked to a much greater extent than hitherto to the recipient countries’ willingness to cooperate in this area, especially with respect to the fight against illegal immigration.

IV.1 Action on population growth

Since the growth of the world population takes place to a great degree in the developing world, the chances of German policy influencing this are extremely slim. It therefore makes little sense to concentrate foreign or development policy resources too much on this area. Never the less, German policy-makers can and should

- seek out dialogue with the German churches, particularly with the Catholic church and make it clear that they consider the ban on contraceptives misguided;

- counter the attempts of conservative groups, particularly in the US, to undermine family planning measures and the use of contraceptives in developing countries and, where necessary, actively advocate the retention and/or stepping up of such programmes and provide the necessary resources for this;

- take greater account of migration and population growth potentials when determining the priorities of German economic, financial and technical cooperation. Due to the existing immigration structure in Western Europe and Germany, this primarily means making North Africa, the Middle East (including Turkey as the country with the greatest potential for immigration to Germany) and Eastern Europe the focus of cooperation in terms of bilateral and EU neighbourhood policy.

IV.2 Action on Immigration

Given the expected rise in immigration pressure from developing countries, Europe must develop a clear strategy for channelling and managing this pressure in future. Three types of emphasis come to the fore in this respect:

- Developing a clear system of controlled immigration that regulates immigration in accordance with the requirements and potentials of the labour market, taking into account the burden on the social security systems as well as demographic trends. Here, it is advisable to develop a points system such as the Australian one which, based on human capital and the likelihood of successful integration, promotes the immigration of the well-qualified and the young. Some tough decisions will have to be taken here in relation to family reunification. This has been the main type of immigration to the industrialised countries for some time now. From a labour market and integration perspective, however, it is not without its problems. Here too, it would be desirable, in line with, for instance, current proposals in the Netherlands and the UK, to develop a system over the medium term that ties family reunion to a minimum level of education and language proficiency and is dependent on active participation in integration measures. To manage immigration effectively, however, also the necessary analytical tools must be developed, by which the demand for workers and immigrants can be forecast to a sufficiently accurate degree in the first place.

- Tighter control of the EU’s external borders through efficient, coordinated measures. This is conceivable only if the transit countries in the Mediterranean basin and in Eastern Europe are involved in this policy and cooperate with it. It will be necessary therefore to develop effective “incentives” for cooperation for the governments of these countries.
The effective enforcement of existing legal provisions and the better control of information. This seems particularly important in view of the growing problem of illegal immigration, human trafficking and people smuggling. Also immigrants are “rational economic men”, particularly those who raise considerable sums to pay for the services provided by the international people-smuggling networks. As with any economic decision, a migration decision is based on assessments regarding the probability of success and the costs and benefits of such an undertaking. Accordingly, existing legal provisions should indeed be implemented to keep any ambiguities and overblown expectations to a minimum. The current bland approach to law enforcement in this area – symbolized by the repeated legalisation campaigns for illegal residents in various European countries – invites people to try illegal immigration even if they know that it is an illegal undertaking in the first place. In this context, it will also be important to change the incentives involved in employing illegal immigrants. Businesses employing illegal immigrants (often under extremely exploitative conditions), should be heavily sanctioned and the punishments for illegal staffing should be made much more severe. Moreover, there should be much more intensive, systematic provision of information in the regions sending illegal immigrants as to the legal status and the admission, working and living conditions in Western Europe.

At the same time, German policy-makers should not allow themselves to be persuaded that immigration will solve the problems of an ageing society. Encouraging immigration of the young and well-qualified will certainly have to provide part of the solution. Yet, in view of the long-term sustainability of the German economic and social welfare system, an active family and population policy will be of much greater importance; the aim being to bring the German birth rate to the level of its Western European neighbours such as France or the Netherlands. Furthermore it will be necessary to strengthen the participation of women in the labour market, to raise the retirement age and to reform parts of the social security system and its funding mechanisms and to change the inherent “live style” incentives these systems create.

On the author: Ernst Hillebrand is a political scientist and director of the London Office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
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• Climate change
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• International assignments
• Multilateral institutions
• Organised crime
• Peace-building
• Proliferation / armament
• Religion and politics
• Terrorism
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