Jochen Steinhilber

“Bound to Cooperate?”

Security and regional cooperation
Dialogue on Globalization contributes to the international debate on globalization – through conferences, workshops and publications – as part of the international work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). Dialogue on Globalization is based on the premise that globalization can be shaped into a direction that promotes peace, democracy and social justice. Dialogue on Globalization addresses “movers and shakers” both in developing countries and in the industrialized parts of the world, i.e. politicians, trade unionists, government officials, businesspeople, and journalists as well as representatives from NGOs, international organizations, and academia.

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1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War did not mean the outbreak of perpetual peace: While some older, protracted conflicts were flaring up again, the 1990s experienced the emergence of numerous new conflicts – most of them intrasocietal conflicts with a great number of different ethnic, religious, or material causes – that tended to spread rapidly across an entire region. At the same time, the end of bloc confrontation led to a security vacuum, a new “global obscurity,” for which as yet no patterns of political action had been developed. There is without doubt the renaissance of big-power politics and the use of war as a means to political ends, and beginning in the mid-1990s, the multilateral world order sustained more and more damage – a development that finally culminated in the UN Security Council crisis during the events leading up to the war in Iraq. The UN, the supposedly stable and efficient backbone of a robust world peace order, has since been unable to fill the vacuum. Unilateralism and coalitions of the willing, on the other hand, have not made the world a safer place either. The need for new structural elements of the world order that could contribute to resolving regional conflicts and building an architecture of global governance is growing.

More and more, regional arrangements are now moving into the center of interest. While in the past many ambitious regional projects were doomed to remain patchwork, a number of promising regional approaches to security policy have developed in the course of the past decade. The cooperation ranges from exchange of information, confidence-building measures and intergovernmental cooperation to the development of joint peacekeeping capacities and intervention capabilities. It is true that most regional processes are still fragile and limited in scope. However, anumber of factors – the regionalization of conflicts, a growing consciousness in many regions for shared problems, the UN’s weakness and its realization that stable (sub)regional organizations can provide a complementary contribution to building a common security architecture, and the regional reorientation of a number of up-and-coming countries like China and Brazil – could cause this process to pick up steam and consolidate.

The renaissance of regional cooperation refers primarily to developments in the regions of the South. Traditionally, there has always been strong skepticism in the South about overarching security structures with uncertain political (and cultural) orientations. This feeling intensified in the 1990s. However, the focuses of security thinking have since shifted from the East-West axis to the North-South axis. And while the North – led above all by the US, but also by the EU – has been discussing the “new threats from the South,” reconceiving its security strategies, and intervening “on the ground”, security views of other regions have for the most part been unnoticed.
But in the regions of the South, where 90 percent of the new conflicts take place, efficient and effective security cooperation can lead to faster and better solutions to conflicts, to more autonomy, and to a better perception of regional interests at the global level. At the same time, it serves to ease the UN’s capacity burdens. But it will be a long time before regional approaches assume the character of (in the words of former French Foreign Minister Poncet) “development centers” of an “effective multilateralism,” laying the foundations of a “peace pyramid” with the UN as its apex.

Against this background, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, in the framework of its working focus “Regional Renaissance – Security in a Globalized World,” has looked into perceptions of security and security risks in the regions of the South. Special focus has been given to the role played by regional organizations and security arrangements: What threats are viewed as the most pressing ones? Has a common regional problem consciousness developed? Is regional cooperation a reality? What instruments of security policy have these organizations developed, and what have they led to? What are the greatest challenges faced by these institutions?

With the aim of strengthening regional security dialogues, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has in 2005, together with numerous partners, conducted a number of conferences in the regions themselves – in Brazil, China, Mozambique, Egypt, India, Jamaica, and Uzbekistan. Conferences held in Berlin, Brussels, and New York have served as a platform for an exchange of the experiences made with the various approaches towards regional security cooperation. These conferences also helped to feed this information back into the debates underway in the North.

The present paper is based on the discussions conducted at these conferences, and it sums up the most important results of this issue focus. Starting out with a brief outline of security discourses, the paper goes on to discuss the problems involved in security cooperation in selected regions of the South. The paper does not aim in any way to present an exhaustive, in-depth picture of the regional security processes underway in the South. Instead its aim is to present a first overview of the developments that have taken place in recent years, to point out some opportunities, and to underline some of the problems encountered in regional cooperation, in this way providing a basis for further research and reflection.

The author would like to take this opportunity to extend his heartfelt thanks to the numerous colleagues who contributed important inputs to the working group as well as to the FES’ partners and the speakers who provided key contributions to the knowledgeable and highly informative discussions conducted at the conferences.
2. Mapping the threats – threat scenarios

2.1 Security discourses

While in many regions of the world insecurity has long been a constant of human development, in recent years the security discussion in the industrialized Western nations has experienced something like a revolution in perceptions. There is hardly any other issue that attracts so much political and public attention today. Security is becoming a permanent concern, one in which the various dimensions of security – internal/external, state/human, military/civil – tend to become amalgamated. The omnipresence of the issue of security – be it due to extensive reporting in the media (on terrorist attacks and climate change, corruption and child abduction, disease and virtual viruses), the incessant calls for political action, or political decisions taken in the name of enhanced security – has served to permanently activate our sense for security. The world around us appears to have been “desecuritized.” According to an ancient Arab proverb, “The dream of the hungry is bread.” What the members of our 21st century “risk society” (Ulrich Beck) yearn for is what has come to be known as “comprehensive security.”

The East-West conflict was the set of events that served to structure international politics in the postwar era. However, the end of bloc confrontation not only – as numerous observers have noted – swept away the key ideological, regulative, and military coordinates of the international system. In the view of the industrialized Western nations, the collapse of the “Second World” replaced the largely routinized conflict associated with bloc confrontation with what may be called a “new obscurity.” The North-South conflict, which, in view of vicarious wars and interventionist policies, was long regarded as no more than a South dimension of the East-West conflict, is now coming more and more to be understood as a conflict formation in its own right. Alongside the socioeconomic and distribution-related core of the conflict, security issues have moved into the foreground of attention in recent years.

For some time now politics in the countries of the North has been directing more and more of its attention to “new threats and risks” from the South. Many security analyses conducted by governments and multilateral organizations perceive the countries and regions of the South as a security risk, asking whether and to what extent conflicts and problems besetting the South might spread to the North, or at least whether these developments could adversely affect its economic security (resource availability). Security experts point to the spillover effects of regional conflicts, to the dangers posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failure, and “breeding grounds of terrorism”; at the same time, classic political (development) problems – including poverty, hunger, disease, and environmental crises – are now being redefined as security problems that entail incalculable risks for the countries of the North. More complex, diffuse, and thus more unpre-
dictable than the East-West conflict, the North-South conflict harbors considerable conflict potential for the growing perception of insecurity in the countries of the North.

Does this mean that the South is becoming the new East? There is no doubt that security thinking in the industrialized Western countries has shifted its focus from the East-West axis to the North-South axis. What was once the periphery has now become the focal point of thinking on security. It would, however, be distorting if we were now to proceed straightaway to the construction of a new, unified concept of the adversary, one that simply proceeds to stylize the South as the new East, shifting its focus from Marx to Mohammed. Thus far at least, the North-South conflict has not involved any confrontational phases or clear-cut conflict fronts of the kind familiar from the East-West conflict. And in view of the complexity of the – mainly nonmilitary – problems involved and the different interest constellations typical of the regions of the South (as well as of the North), there is no reason to anticipate, at least for the foreseeable future, any situation which would array compact blocs of intransigent conflict parties against one another. Furthermore, a number of countries that play an important role in international politics – including e.g. China – have come to see themselves not as part of the South but as global players; and observers in the Arab countries are more inclined to see a dichotomy between the “West” and the “Arab world.”

Still, the confidence crisis besetting the politics of the North now appears to extend from trade and financial policy to international agreements (International Criminal Court) and the issue of security policy. While it was for a long time chiefly the economic powerlessness of many regions in the South that defined the asymmetry of the relations between North and South, in recent years the South has come more and more to see itself as politically marginalized (in terms of security). Many countries of the South “enjoy” the North’s attention only when they have developed into “powers of chaos,” i.e. only if their political, social, economic, and ecological destabilization potential is large enough to generate serious impacts on the international system. The further any such insecurity moves toward the North, the more confrontational, so it seems, will be the methods used to combat its causes in the South. So whose security are we talking about? Who is supposed to be protected from what dangers?

There is no doubt that agreement on a definition of today’s risks and threat scenarios must be the point of departure for a system of common security. Without agreement on the problems involved, there can be no agreement on possible solutions.

2.2 Examples of regional threat scenarios

**Intercountry peace and fragile societies – Latin America**

Latin America has – particularly since the end of the armed conflicts in Central America – come to be seen as one of the world’s most peaceful and least militarized regions. As early as 1967, in the Treaty of Tlateloco, the signatory Latin American
and Caribbean states created the world’s first nuclear-weapons-free zone. Today Latin America is free of ABC weapons and carrier systems, has the world’s lowest military budgets (1.7% of GDP on average), and has the world’s lowest level of intercountry conflicts. While there continue to be quite a number of differences of opinion between the countries of the region – not least regarding the course of national borders, as is illustrated at present by the claims raised by Bolivia to access to the sea through Chile. However, in the 1990s the region’s most important intercountry conflicts were addressed and settled by diplomatic means in connection with the democratization processes there (e.g. Argentina/Chile, Peru/Ecuador, El Salvador/Honduras, Chile/Peru). After 150 years of intercountry conflicts in Latin America, this classic threat scenario is now likely to recede even further into the background.

In Latin America regional insecurity must therefore be seen as stemming chiefly from intracountry problems. The region’s political systems continue to be fragile, above all in the Andean region and Central America. Party-system crises, neopopulism, cyclic financial and economic crises, and a tendency to amalgamate civil and military tasks are seen as important sources of insecurity. Drugs-related crime, closely linked with massive violence, is among the key factors contributing to political and social instability. Latin America continues to be the continent with the world’s most inequitable income distribution. Marginalization, social exclusion, and poverty are among the factors that go into the making of the growing criminality that is destabilizing the societies in the region.

The weakness of democratic and state structures – and easy access to small arms – have, in many areas of Latin America, prepared the ground for the activities of nonstate actors, and in particular for transnational crime with its international connections. In Colombia – beside Haiti the region’s only persistent, decades-long low-level conflict between various paramilitary groups, guerilla organizations, and state actors - problems are intensifying and thickening. These problem situations involve trafficking in drugs and arms, street crime, state dysfunction, guerilla activities, and counterrevolutionary violence. The Columbian conflict was long seen as a national problem. The adoption of Plan Columbia in 1998 and the direct US intervention in the conflict have altered this situation. And the US is now regarded by a number of Latin American countries an “external security risk” that has contributed to “militarizing” the conflict. Just as in the case of the conflicts in Central America, the aid the US is providing is chiefly military in nature. The military component of the “fight against narcoterrorism” and the ramifications of organized transnational crime have served to draw the neighboring Andean countries and Brazil deeper and deeper into the conflict. The conflict in Colombia, initially an internal one, has now become a regionalized Latin American conflict.

At a special conference convened in October 2003, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a multidimensional security concept that is clearly dominated by the “new security risks”: Apart from transnational crime and guerilla activities, money-laundering, and trafficking in arms, drugs, and humans, the concept also cites as important security problems extreme poverty, environmental disasters, disease, and attacks on digital security. In the Andean region and the Caribbean, poverty is identified as the chief cause of insecurity, while in Central

The OAS adopted a multidimensional security concept that is clearly dominated by the “new security risks.”
America natural disasters top the agenda. Street crime and other forms of ordinary crime are an important source of instability in most countries of the region.

From the Latin American perspective, international terrorism plays no more than a subordinate role as a regional threat scenario. Since the events of September 11 Latin America has been the sole region of the world not to be hit by any international terrorist attacks. However, the “war on terror” and the fuzzy definition of the aims of this war have ensured that the issue nevertheless ranges high up on the agenda of regional security forums. Viewed from the US perspective, it is above all the weakening of state structures in the field of external and internal security and the creation of extra-legal spaces which this development entails that constitute a potential risk of terrorism. Wide regions of Columbia, but also the border regions of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil, with their sizable Muslim populations, have been identified as potential retreat areas for terrorists – though no evidence has yet been presented indicating that there are in fact any terrorists there.

A "seismic" conflict region – the Middle East and North Africa

For the most part attempts to compare the Middle East with other regions are a troublesome undertaking. This is clearly illustrated – at least at first glance – by security perceptions: While what is known as “soft security issues” are now moving into the foreground e.g. in Latin America, security perceptions in the MENA region continue to be shaped mainly by two traditional conflict formations: the Arab-Israeli territorial conflict and the hegemonic conflict on the Persian Gulf. A number of intra-Arab border conflicts put the final touches on the picture of a traditional threat scenario (e.g. between Egypt and Sudan).

There is no doubt that a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is not only the key to efforts to stabilize the Middle East. Intensifying conflicts, but also and above all rapprochement and peace processes between Israel and its direct Arab neighbors, also have repercussions on the other Arab countries as well as on intra-Arab relations. Between these countries, however, there are numerous different factors that determine how and in what intensity this conflict defines the threat scenario. For Israel and the Palestinians this is the existential conflict that dominates everything. For Syria, Israel remains above all a military and territorial threat. The agreements between Israel and Egypt and Jordan in turn show that peace – perhaps not a “warm” peace, but at least a step-by-step one - is possible with a number of Arab countries. While for Egypt, 27 years after conclusion of the peace treaty, Israel now poses far less of a military territorial threat, the “cold peace” between the political elites does not appear to be developing into a set of comprehensive peace structures firmly rooted in the societies concerned. The threat is lately given an economic or social turn, now formulated in religious terms – though with one important exception: concerns regarding Israeli nuclear weapons and the fears of nuclear proliferation in the region to which they give rise. For a country like Jordan, concerned over the refugee issue and its future relationship to a possible Palestinian state, the underlying regional conflict nevertheless continues to be the primary source of insecurity. While regional security patterns have not changed fundamentally during the past decade, we can still make out a slight shift...
in the threat scenario: In the course of the Madrid and Oslo talks, the parties at least recognized the possibility of limited cooperation between Israel and the Arab countries.

However, the dominance of these classic threats should not draw off attention from the pressing social and political domestic challenges faced by virtually all countries in the region. Edgar Morin has referred to the Middle East as a seismic point in which all of the conflicts concerned are being played out simultaneously: the conflict between religions, the conflict between religion and laicism, between democracy and autocracy, the conflict between poor and rich, and the conflict implied by aging populations and overpopulation. Numerous social, political, and cultural deformations are additional factors serving to destabilize both the region and the countries in it. These developments are followed with unease by many—not least in Israel—especially as far as some countries are concerned that entertain friendly relations with it. The central security problems which the countries further removed from the main conflict, e.g. the Maghreb states, are forced to contend with include internal conflicts stemming from lack of democratization, marked social polarization, and religiously motivated extremism and terrorism.

The security environment of the countries in the Gulf Region was long shaped by the hegemonic conflict between Iraq and Iran. The war in Iraq and the downfall of Saddam Hussein have altered the security perceptions of the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates). Iraq no longer poses an immediate threat to these countries. But Iraq’s instability is giving rise to new threats. The Gulf states now fear that Iraqi Sunnis might perpetrate reprisal terrorist attacks in the Gulf region itself. In addition, the growing power of the Iraqi Shiite factions could encourage the Shiite communities, above all in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to ratchet up their political and economic demands. For the Gulf states, Iraq’s weakness at the same time means that a vital counterweight to Iran has ceased to exist. Encircled by a hostile US, rivals like Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia as well as relatively unreliable partners like Russia, an isolated Iran could seek to play a more active role in the Gulf region. In view of the further development of its nuclear program, its influence on Shiite factions, and a marked Iranian nationalism, the Gulf states fear that Iran’s weight in the region may well be growing. Most of the Gulf states therefore welcome a strong US presence in the region as a counterweight to Iran, but also as a means of stabilizing Iraq. At the same time, though, a protracted US occupation of Iraq will not only serve to aggravate tensions with Iran, it will also continue to place the regimes in the Gulf region under growing internal pressure. With the political reform process continuing at a very slow pace—above all in the region’s most conservative, and most influential, country, Saudi Arabia—several of the region’s monarchies are in the midst of a change in leadership. Pro-American policies are a source of encouragement to extremist groups—a serious threat to the political stability of the regimes there.

In addition, more than in many other regions of the world, (cultural) globalization is widely perceived as a threat in the Arab countries. The diffident process of opening underway in some countries of the region as well as a tendency toward “cultural erosion” is inextricably bound up with a need felt in large parts of the societies concerned—above all in North Africa—for cultural autonomy and inte-
Cultural globalization is widely perceived as a threat in Arab countries. Domestic responses to foreign-policy decisions may prove to be highly sensitive.

Africa has long been seen as the “war continent.” In the 1990s this picture was accentuated by state-failure processes.

A number of highly heterogeneous scenarios with a multiplicity of threat dimensions can be identified for sub-Saharan Africa. Beset as it is by domestic conflicts, regionalized civil wars, violent state-failure processes, resource conflicts, genocide, and wars of secession, Africa has long been seen as the “war continent.” In the 1990s this picture was accentuated by the state-failure processes and civil wars in Sierra Leone, Zaire/Congo, Somalia, and Liberia as well as by the genocide in Rwanda. In 2003 the German war-research organization Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung reported wars in eleven of the 44 African countries south of the Sahara and armed conflicts in five other countries of the region.

While the era of military coups appears to be over in West Africa, the security landscape there, and in particular in the Mano River Basin, continues to be shaken by violent conflict and massive state failure which pose a threat to the stability of the entire region. After over ten years of war accompanied by systematic human rights violations and massive refugee flows, Sierra Leone and Liberia have been nearly completely devastated and Guinea severely affected. Civil-war economies, integrated as they are into the world market, have been one of the decisive factors that ensure that these conflicts do not lack adequate funding. Proceeds from exports of uncut diamonds were the main source of revenue for several of the conflict parties. Nigeria is likewise beset by numerous domestic conflicts that are increasingly destabilizing this regional West African power. Apart from the conflict over independence for the Casamance region, the countries in the Sahel zone may be seen as more stable. Mass poverty, cyclic food crises, and continuing desertification are seen here as additional security-relevant problems.

East Africa is an island of relative peace. The domestic situation in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda is quite stable for African conditions. Massive crime, arms-smuggling (mainly along the border to Somalia), HIV/AIDS (lower rates than in other subregions of the continent), and, in particular, international terrorism top the East African security agenda. The most important problems threatening regional security include Uganda’s involvement in the Congo conflict and the numerous unresolved, smoldering conflicts in countries surrounding East Africa (southern Sudan, Somalia, and the ethnic conflicts in Rwanda/Burundi). On the Horn of Africa, Somalia, where state structures collapsed in 1991, is seen as a special risk. Somalia is a power of chaos par excellence, an arena for numerous warring clans, and, for some years now, a retreat area for al Qaeda fighters. Contentious territorial issues like the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, minority problems, above all in the multiethnic state of Ethiopia, with its over 80 ethnic population groups,
and numerous food crises in Africa’s poorhouse are additional factors contributing to the unstable situation on the Horn of Africa. The dominant problem besetting the region of Central Africa is the Congo conflict. The conflict, involving armed intervention by seven foreign states, is seen as Africa’s “first world war,” and since 1994 the turmoil there has cost the lives of over four million people. Today the conflict is above all a predatory war fought for resources and raw materials like diamonds, gold, and coltan.

Now that the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique have come to an end, none of the countries in southern Africa are beset by ongoing armed conflict. One continuing source of insecurity, though, must be seen in power-related excesses on the part of some governments in the region, sometimes coupled with violent confrontations between government and opposition. The conflict in Zimbabwe over the succession to the office of president and the issue of land reform may be seen as paradigmatic for this conflict type. South Africa is harder hit by the HIV/AIDS pandemic than any other country in the world, and this development is increasingly eroding the country’s social structures, which are in any case fragile. Poverty, underdevelopment, disease, political threats to regime security, and transboundary problems (migration, illegal trade) are security priorities that range high on the agenda in southern Africa. International terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on the other hand, play as good as no role at all in the region.

By way of summary, the AU and the subregional organizations have identified, in their security strategies, a multiplicity of overlapping causes for the precarious security situation in Africa: These include criminalization of the state by the groups occupying it (“the state as booty”), economic factors such as competition for valuable resources (civil-war economies integrated into the world economy), ecological factors such as competition for scarce goods (land, water, firewood), and genuinely political factors such as weak civil society, weak or nonexistent institutions, state failure, and politicization of ethnic-cultural differences. These factors are reinforced by the fact that internal conflicts tend very rapidly to develop into regional conflicts.

Classic threats and new risks: Asia

As a continent, Asia is marked by a number of different subthreshold rivalries and conflicts. More than in other regions, here the hegemonic interests of various big powers like China, Russia, the US, Japan, India, or – to a lesser extent – Indonesia have tended to come into collision situations in the subregions of Asia. Apart from the core conflicts associated with Taiwan, North Korea, and Kashmir, there are a number of other territorial conflicts that have to do mainly with strategically important shipping lanes. The greater part of the South China Sea, with the Spratly Islands, is claimed by China, which seems to be intent on creating its own “Caribbean” in the face of claims and counterclaims raised by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. Aside from the oil and gas reserves suspected in the

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1 One major problem here is the high rate of infection among soldiers – the data vary between 17 and 60% – a problem that also has ramifications for the development of regional peacekeeping facilities in the SADC framework.
South China Sea, to say nothing of its fishing grounds, a number of the world’s most-traveled, and internationally and regionally most important, sea lanes intersect there. To cite an example, 85% of Japan’s oil imports are transported via this route. The UN estimates that worldwide some 140 border conflicts at sea are conceivable in coming years – the lion’s hare in Southeast Asia. Another point of contention between China, Japan, and Taiwan is the Senkaku Islands in southern Asia. There are also a number of conflicts there over resources, mainly concerning access to drinking water.

One consequence of these conflicts, be they smoldering or open, is that the countries in the region have been arming at a breakneck pace in recent years. With China, India, and Pakistan, and North Korea having joined the nuclear club, the region is now marked by a high density of nuclear powers, a situation which harbors dangers of nuclear escalation and poses considerable security problems, in particular as far as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is concerned. Growth in conventional arms, e.g. the rapid expansion of China’s naval forces or Japan’s new defense program, has also progressed at an alarming pace in recent years. Even now East Asia is home to some of the world’s largest national armed forces. Now that the Asian countries have recovered from the last economic crisis and brought their budgets under control, their military spending seems set to continue unabated.

In the Treaty of Bangkok (1995) the ASEAN countries declared Southeast Asia to be a nuclear-weapons-free zone; and apart from the disputes over the region’s sea lanes, the major threats to security and stability in this subregion are posed more by internal than by intercountry conflicts. The region is anything but homogeneous; it includes countries with a huge variety of ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds. Despite their long historical traditions, most of these countries are relatively new. Their borders were in large part drawn artificially, a fact which has given them populations containing many linguistic, religious, and ethnic minorities. The picture of the region continues to be marked by numerous separatist disputes and internal, civil-war-like conflicts – like those in Indonesia or the Philippines, or Nepal and Sri Lanka in South Asia. Most of these conflicts appear to have domestic roots, though nearly all of them have a regional dimension.

The substantial risks seen for the region include, on top of religious and ethnic conflicts, transboundary crime (trafficking in drugs, arms, and humans), migration and refugee flows, social tensions, and disputes over access to and use of resources (irrigation water, fishing grounds). New violence actors, including a new breed of pirates, but also terrorist groups, have become entrenched in the Malacca Straits – emboldened not least by Indonesia’s present fragility. The US has also identified South/Southeast Asia as a “second front” in the war on terror.

In Central Asia a number of border conflicts have been settled in recent years (e.g. between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan or between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan), but the courses of many borders continue to be a matter of dispute. And growing water scarcity in the region could once again exacerbate these conflicts. Nor should ecological threats be underestimated. Toxic salts from what remains of the Aral Sea have made parts of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan a contaminated disaster area that is home to 20 million people.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has again moved closer to its Asian neighbors to the south – bringing the region into closer contact with their problems as well. Today, in Afghanistan’s shadow, Central Asia is seen as an important transit region for the drugs trade. Since the attacks in Tashkent in 1999, the problem of international terrorism and the infiltration of radical Islamists has ranged high on the security agenda, at least for Uzbekistan. In terms of domestic policy, the region’s governments are no match for these conflict potentials. The region’s deficient democratic structures and its in part openly autocratic regimes harbor – as we saw in the unrest that recently broke out in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – a substantial destabilization potential for the region as a whole. Thanks to its infrastructure (research reactors, scientists) and its uranium reserves – Kazakhstan has one quarter of the world’s uranium resources and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s leading producers of enriched uranium – Central Asia must be seen as a sensitive region – sensitive as regards proliferation as well.

2.3 New threat scenarios and conflict formations

A broader concept of security

Security perceptions differ considerably from region to region. There is no common “South security agenda.” Even within some regions – here we need think only of the Middle East and East Asia - it often proves difficult to impossible to reach consensus on threat perceptions. Generally speaking, the main part of the “threat triad” embraced by the North that plays a role in the perception of the regions of the South is the spillover effects generated by failing states. While it is true that there is a real danger of proliferation in regions like the Middle East or Central Asia, this risk plays little more than a subordinate role in most threat analyses. The situation is somewhat different as far as international terrorism is concerned: Not only are a number of regions directly affected by it (Maghreb, Gulf states, East Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia), other regions (like e.g. Latin America) in which this problem is not of the utmost priority will be forced indirectly to devote more attention to the problem complex of terrorism – and this may in part have polarizing effects in some regional organizations (OAS).

At the declaration level at least, most regional organizations have adopted a broad security concept, and these organizations also underline, more prominently than in the analyses conducted in the North, economic and social threats. Such broader definitions of security can be found in the declarations of the AU, ARF-ASEAN, and the OAS and MERCOSUR, where the departure from the “doctrine of national security” amounts to an important change of course. The lists of global threats compiled in the most recent reports on UN reform (“Towards a more secure world”; “In Larger Freedom”) serve to sum up the most important security risks, and these are largely congruent with regional problem lists: economic and social threats, including poverty, disease, and environmental degradation; conflicts between and within countries, including civil war and genocide; nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons; terrorism and transnational crime. However, agreement on a more comprehensive security agenda is likely to prove to be little more than a paper consensus. Since such security agendas are in part so broadly formulated
that all governments are able to identify with their perception of the problems involved, they are unlikely to lead to any concrete security priorities or strategies.

Still: Many governments and organizations now see the long-dominant realist security concept as too narrow and rigid. The basic assumptions underlying this concept – threats are as a rule seen as external, primarily of a military nature, and they call for a military response (keyword: national defense) – generally fall short of the mark. Multidimensional security concepts may be seen deeper at the vertical level (Security for whom?) and broader at the horizontal level (Security against what?) than the realist security concept. Having reviewed the growing array of broad security concepts, some of which are overly vague and thus lead more to confusion than clarity, the present paper will name only those that figure most prominently in the ongoing debate:

The concept of human security, which, developed by UNDP, is now used by some multilateral organizations and may be found in the foreign-policy concepts of a number of different countries, focuses not on states or regimes but on threats to the security of individuals. The twofold goal formulated by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the Millennium Summit is to guarantee that people are able to lead their lives in freedom from want and fear. Human security thus pursues a universal aim. The seven elements of human security identified by UNDP show, though, that the sources of human security are innumerable: They include economic (e.g. freedom from poverty), health-related (access to medical drugs), ecological (e.g. protection from pollution), and food security no less than personal (protection from torture), social (e.g. survival of traditional cultures), and political (e.g. political and civil rights) security. The concept thus has recourse to a multiplicity of different approaches and strategies, all of which involve a great number of highly different actors (governments, international organizations, NGOs, the private business sector). Its main aim is not only immediate protection but also longer-term empowerment of the persons concerned.

The concept of comprehensive security, originally developed by Japan in the 1970s, is used above all in (Southeast) Asia. This concept likewise goes beyond the traditional military threats, including in its considerations other, nonmilitary threats such as e.g. trafficking in drugs, arms, and humans, migration, environmental degradation, or hunger. Comprehensive security thus covers both domestic and external destabilization factors. In the past, most countries, e.g. in the ASEAN region, identified stable and economically prosperous domestic development as an important precondition for national security goals. However, national strategies continue to focus on protection against terrorism (and of existing regimes). The state is the central object of security. As a means of guaranteeing this security, many countries have in recent years looked more and more to regional cooperation, though the underlying premise here has been the need to preserve national sovereignty and to rule out any interference in national “internal affairs.”

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2 The members of the so-called Human Security Network include Austria, Canada, Chile, Slovenia, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Norway, Switzerland, and Thailand.

3 “The concept of security has too long been interpreted narrowly [...] Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives [...] Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (UNDP).
This concept, reformulated somewhat as “extended security,” and geared more to external affairs, has found its way into the considerations of a number of European countries and multilateral alliances. As early as 1991, NATO, on the lookout for new tasks, noted that in the future security analyses would focus far less on deliberate hostile threats to alliance territory than on diffuse risks. Dialogue and cooperation, but also military means of crisis management, are to be used strategically to counter the “new risks.” This approach places the military option (“out of area”) on the same level as political and economic measures. The German concept of extended security, in turn, includes three dimensions: In view the multiplicity of conflict causes, comprehensive security must have at its disposal a broad spectrum of political, economic, and development instruments. The idea is that integration, cooperation, and the combined efforts of international organizations are needed to bring about common security, the reason being that in the present situation no one country is able, on its own, to guarantee peace and security. And finally, preventive security is needed to address potential conflict causes by political and economic means, but also to combat security threats by military means.

Problems bound up with the concepts of extended security

The debate over more comprehensive concepts of security has encountered difficulties in bringing the necessary, broader view of conflict causes and the heterogeneous nature of the various national and regional threat scenarios into line with the need for clearly contoured security strategies that have real prospects of implementation.

The “shotgun approach” of human security has made it possible to assemble a heterogeneous coalition of international organizations, governments, and NGOs behind the concept. Used as a motto for campaigns, it has lent itself to coming up with a number of concrete successes – including e.g. the international agreement banning anti-personnel mines. But it does appear unsuited as a political guideline for any cooperative security policy. For instance, the concept’s explicitly integrative approach makes it difficult to define political (security) priorities and to distinguish between human security and human development. The concept “human security,” it seems, is intended to define a new frame of reference for development goals. The idea is to contribute to heightening the relevance of these goals in connection with the newfound attention that has been paid to the multiple facets of security in the wake of the events of 9/11 in the US. However, instead of making security into an all-embracing political benchmark and criterion, one that e.g. views poverty mainly as a security risk, it would appear to make more sense to insist on the autonomy of development tasks and to undertake greater efforts to tie the realization of a good number of the dimensions of “human security” to concrete rights, as has been done e.g. in the case of human rights. Furthermore, a number of critics have noted that development policy has picked the wrong “companions” here: Security, it is noted, always also implies protection from others – and the “securitization” of the many dimensions of social development could also serve as a new source of legitimacy for military interventions or other defensive measures designed to protect one’s own (national) security.

The related “extended security” approach places the military option on the same level as political and economic measures.

Comprehensive concepts of security have encountered difficulties in bringing the broader view of conflict causes into line with the need for clearly contoured security strategies.
While the concept of comprehensive and extended security is likewise rooted in a broader understanding of the sources of insecurity, states and alliances continue to be the central reference point of security thinking. Furthermore, the concept of extended security is very open in semantic terms: Is its aim to achieve common security through a multilateral security regime in the framework of OSCE/UN or on the basis of alliances with strategically important partners? Are the regions of the South seen more as a “global security risk” for the NATO countries – implying that the concept must be interpreted as a revised edition – now with a South thrust – of the old containment policy, or does the concept give due consideration to the various security interests of the South? Is preventive security conceived more on military lines (as it is for the US) or in the sense of a medium- to long-term preventive policy based on development and economic policy?

While it is true that there are weighty exceptions in nearly every region (Arab-Israeli conflict, Korea conflict, Kashmir conflict), it can, on the whole, be said that the relevance of intercountry conflicts is declining. However, other risks play only a secondary role in regions in which traditional threat scenarios continue to define perceptions of security (Middle East). On the other hand, new and different problems loom larger in the (regional) security consciousness of other regions in which the threat of a military confrontation between two states has declined (e.g. in Latin America) or new conflict causes have become more pressing (e.g. in Africa).

Regional conflict formations and the transformation of belligerent conflicts

Today the security interests and threat perceptions of individual countries in the South are bound up less with world-spanning political conflicts than with relations and developments within given regions. (Sub)regional conflict formations (regional security complexes) have emerged in many (sub)regions of the South. These “security regions” (Buzan) are typified by a number of interlinked security processes. These would include institutional weaknesses affecting one or more countries, informal economies, migration, transnational guerilla activities, smuggling, environmental disasters, or exploitation of resources. In a system of this kind the primary security interests of the states concerned are so closely interlinked that they cannot be viewed in isolation. West Africa, Columbia and its neighbors, and the Central Asian countries around the Aral Sea are illustrative examples of such systems. As we see from the examples of the Middle East or South Asia, however, the mere existence of a regional security complex does not per se imply that there is at the same time any shared security perception or cooperation.

The most vehement expression of such regional conflict formations are the so-called “new wars” (Kaldor), over 90% of which are played out in the regions of the South. While concepts like “state,” “international system,” and “war” are core elements of traditional international relations, “state failure,” “globalization,” and “post-nation-state conflicts” (Duffield) constitute the triad defining the field of armed conflict in the 21st century. The events associated with war and conflict are increasingly shifting into societies. While “intragare wars” have in recent decades become the dominant type of armed conflict, the term itself often proves somewhat myopic. While many conflicts are rooted in internal causes, they often spread very quickly to neighboring countries and entire regions.
Below the fragile glacis of the nation state we find structures that, far from creating stability, are themselves the cause of conflict. The transformation of the form of armed conflict is usually traced back to the crisis of statehood that can be observed in many regions of the South. Many states there are weak or have failed or collapsed completely. Dissolution of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force, weak institutions, and state structures whose legitimacy is not sufficiently anchored in society are generally seen as an important precondition, or at least as a concomitant, of escalating violent conflicts. According to Herfried Münkler, “state-failure wars” have, in many regions supplanted the “nation-building wars” that accompanied the process of decolonization. Autocratic rule and neopatrimonial politics, often accompanied by systematic corruption, have discredited state institutions. This lack of robust statehood and elites that are oriented to the common good tends in turn to strengthen other substate structures: While the loyalty of “the citizen” is weakening in such “shadow states,” ethnic and religious ties and social control exercised by clans and local potentates tend to move in to fill the gap.

The “new wars” are typified by a high degree of diffusion, irregularity, and asymmetry. All of the definitions that were – at least in Clausewitz’s notion of the matter – typical of the classic war tend to become blurred – e.g. the boundaries between government, army, and population, between combatants and civilians, between national and foreign territory, and between politics and the economy. A failing state (and its troops) may often itself become a violence actor. But it will only be one among many others, with highly heterogeneous groups, including paramilitary units, rebel organizations, police forces, criminal gangs, and so-called “sobels” (soldiers by day and rebels by night) defining the dynamics of a conflict. The central aim here is no longer primarily to capture state power. Instead, the scene is dominated by other goals, e.g. identity politics or appropriation of (local) sources of wealth, energy resources, etc. In many of these conflicts the civilian population is subjected to systematic expulsion, persecution, rape, and murder. War economies emerge, and while these serve on the one hand to fund the fighting, they are also themselves the basis of conflicts. Here statehood often appears to block the access of regional warlords to the world economy only until the former have something of interest to offer, be it diamonds, opiates, or women. We often find mixes consisting of a multiplicity of conflict causes, and informalization of conflicts ultimately leads to situations in which agreements between the conflict parties are less likely to bring an end to a conflict, with conflicts simply tending to run their course, or gradually to lose steam – but always with the danger that they may flare up again at any time.

It therefore seems important in dealing with regional security complexes to focus more attention on societal security. As opposed to human security, what plays a key role here is less “(...) the survival of the planet than concrete issues bound up with migration and flight, with reciprocal stabilization and destabilization, with economic exchange and competition” (Tobias Debiel). Apart from the state, which continues to lay a central role for our understanding of security, the focus on societal security serves to direct attention to large social groups and collectives, be they defined in ethnic, religious, or other terms. In order to come up with a practicable concept of security, it furthermore makes sense, particularly with a
view to regional dynamics, to concentrate on threats of an existential nature for these security complexes. It is generally difficult to find a more precise definition for these “existential threats.” Theoretically, all conceivable problems can be declared to be potential security risks. Global problems, e.g. of the kind summed up under the “human security” approach, are, however, not regarded per se as an immediate threat in every security complex. What “securitization” means in this context is that problems perceived by political elites, but also by important social groups and public opinion, are no longer ignored (depoliticized) or politically routinized but that they are instead politicized to an extreme degree. It is simply no longer enough just to manage the problem; emergency measures may become necessary that usually have little or nothing to do with what is generally understood by the term political processes. In regional security complexes involving agreement on common threats, these tasks will, ideally, be mastered in the context of regional structures.

4 There are sometimes also reverse processes at work here, and a security problem may become routinized e.g. through institutionalization or the sheer ’normalcy’ of emergency measures.
Security and regional cooperation

3.1 Regionalism and its booms

Regionalism has always been discussed in the South, too. Regional initiatives are associated with a number of positive attributes: Apart from encouraging economic and political (security) cooperation, regional initiatives are conceived as a means to consolidate state-building and democratization processes, to increase political transparency, to create and promote the development of shared norms and values, to compensate for the influence of (regional) hegemons, and – above all in recent years – to cushion the negative effects of globalization. For the countries of the South, regional approaches were in the past often linked with efforts aimed at achieving independence. Today developing countries also associate with regional integration the opportunity to find a hearing in an international system dominated by the West, to place their own ideas and problems on the global agenda, and to gain political clout.

Regionalism experienced a number of different booms in the course of the 20th century. In the 1960s and 1970s a number of free-trade agreements were concluded in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, most of them patterned on the European single market. However, owing to weak institutions, purely inward-looking economies, underdevelopment, and the legacy of colonialism, most of these attempts at regional cooperation ultimately failed. At the same time, regional security organizations gained importance in view of the East-West divide and the limited effectiveness of the UN. In many regions political and military alliances were little more than a reflection of the bloc confrontation typical of the Cold War. One aim of the US’s policy of containment was to build a hegemonic security regionalism together with organizations like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), or ANZU (the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Treaty). The attempts of the Soviet Union to establish other security organizations on top of the Warsaw Pact were – as is shown particularly clearly by Brezhnev’s stillborn idea for a pan-Asian security cooperation – less successful. But the NATO-inspired alliances that were forged in Latin America and Asia also soon lost their relevance and credibility. The US did not provide their members the same security guarantees it had granted to its Western allies. In addition, for many countries the principle threat was less communism than a number of domestic and interregional conflicts that these alliances were not designed to resolve, and that were in part even further aggravated by the clear-cut ideological fronts envisioned by this form of regionalism. The policy of détente that came about in the early 1970s then quickly deprived these alliances of a good measure of their relevance.

In the first decade after the Second World War three large political groupings emerged as key regional security organizations: the Organization of American States (OAS), the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Their

Today developing countries associate with regional integration the opportunity to find a hearing in an international system dominated by the West.
aim was to control and settle peacefully conflicts between their members. In ad-
dition, the OAU and the Arab League aimed to use closer cooperation as a means
of stepping up the process of decolonization and boosting efforts geared to regional
autonomy. However, these regional organizations saw themselves confronted with
a situation in which the central conflicts in their regions were bound up with one
country that was not an alliance member: Israel, Cuba, and South Africa. In many
other conflicts, e.g. the Lebanon crisis and the Iran-Iraq war, in Chad or in the
confrontation between Nicaragua and El Salvador, these regional organizations
proved unable to contribute much to coming up with peaceful solutions.

Beginning the later 1970s the crisis of the regional organizations went hand in
hand with the rise of a number of subregional organizations (ASEAN, ECOWAS,
GCC, OECS, FLS, SAARC, the Arab Cooperation Council, the Maghreb Union). Some
of these organizations came about in response to wars and revolutionary develop-
ments in their immediate vicinity (e.g. the communist victories in Indochina,
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, the revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, or
developments in Nicaragua). The ideological homogeneity of these subregional
organizations, far more marked than was the case with the regional organizations,
served to give a new impetus to efforts aimed at regional cooperation: While eco-
nomic integration was seen as one of the central conditions for any successful
“triad competition” between Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific region,
growing disaffection with the international trading system, and the inaccessibil-
ity of the Bretton Woods Institutions when it came to the interests of the develop-
countries, made economic cooperation a more interesting option for other
regions.

The end of the bloc confrontation that had for decades polarized numerous regions
was also an important factor behind the new momentum gained by regional
security cooperation. It was above all in Europe, southern Africa, and Southeast
Asia that this gave rise to integrative effects and improved cooperation. It is true
that Latin America – with the exception of Cuba – was affected more indirectly
than directly by the authoritarian “national security doctrine” promoted by the
US. But now anticommunism could no longer serve as a rationale for authoritarian
regimes – a circumstance that at least indirectly facilitated the process of democra-
tization, ultimately the key condition needed for better regional cooperation. In
other regions, e.g. in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, but also in the Middle East, on
the other hand, the lines of conflict did not change fundamentally when the Cold
War drew to a close. In the Balkans and Central Asia, finally, the breakup proces-
ses besetting the “second world” gave rise to a number of new conflict flash
points.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the US’ partial retreat from its role as the
world’s policeman increased the chances of regional actors to solve problems on
their own. At the same time, the regions saw themselves faced with growing pres-
sure to solve their problems on their own initiative. Following the debacle suffered
by the US and the UN in Somalia (“Mogadishu syndrome”) the Western powers
showed clear signs of intervention fatigue; they were increasingly reluctant to
become involved, multi- or bilaterally, in conflicts in the regions of the South. The
global model framed by the United Nations was also hampered by its lack of
influence as well as by the clumsiness and slowness it sometimes showed in

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attempting to resolving conflicts (ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia). Effective (sub)regional initiatives now came to be seen as important structural security elements of a new global governance. Boutros Boutros Ghali’s 1992 “Agenda for Peace” no longer saw in influential regional structures models in competition with a universal system but the precondition for a “sound internationalism.”

3.2 Examples of security arrangements in the regions of the South

Over the past ten years a number of very different security arrangements have developed, consolidated, or realigned in many (sub)regions. The present brief outline can discuss only the most important developments in this field.

Latin America – a regional security community?

In the 1970s and 1980s Latin America was still seen as a fragmented continent marked by numerous intercountry rivalries and conflicts. In the 1990s, though, the continent experienced the development of a relatively dense structure of multilateral relations, including a good number of regional and subregional forums and organizations that have been concerned with security issues in addition to questions bearing on economic cooperation (Rio Group, Andean Group, MERCOSUR, OAS). One of the most striking patterns of development in Latin America is the close interplay between democratization, regional cooperation, and security policy. Democratic development in the countries themselves and regional economic cooperation have created the foundations for trust and thus also for the possibility of engaging in security cooperation. However, the depth of cooperation and the relations between the countries in question vary from subregion to subregion. We can identify three scenarios in Latin America: a US-dominated geopolitical subregion to the north which includes Mexico, but also the Central American countries; an unsettled Andean region typified by weak governments and internal conflicts; and a largely peaceful zone in the south that is marked by growing integration based mainly on rapprochement between Brazil and Argentina. In fact, though, it is only in the Cono Sur that some first structures of a security community can be made out.

In view of the fact that democratic development is the backbone of regional cooperation, and the thesis of “democratic peace” – according to which democratic states will not wage war on one another – seems to have been substantiated in Latin America, defense of democratic stability has become one of the priority tasks of the continent’s (sub)regional organizations. This task includes fostering democratic structures by providing election observers in the framework of the OAS (e.g. in Peru for the election that saw Alberto Fujimori elected to a third term), technical support, and advisory services and training (e.g. in Haiti). Under the Washington Protocol (1992) the organization can, based on a 2/3 majority, exclude from its General Assembly governments that have used illegitimate means to topple a democratically elected government. The “American Democratic Charter,” adopted in September 11, 2001, in Lima, obliges the OAS member states to respect human rights and to improve preventive conflict-resolution processes. The Charter was formally applied for the first time in April 2002, when the OAS initially
condemned the “change in the constitutional order” in Venezuela and then took on a role as mediator between opposition and government in talks concerning a referendum. At the subregional level, “democracy clauses” have also been adopted by the MERCOSUR countries (in response to the failed coup staged by Oviedo in Paraguay) and the Andean states (in the form of an additional protocol to the Cartagena Agreement) which permit them to expel offending governments. This means that these institutions are in possession of mechanisms that permit them to intervene in the internal affairs of member states in specifically defined cases. However, the principle of nonintervention (by military means) serves de facto to limit the enforceability of these agreements.

A number of declarations and resolutions have been concerned with both traditional threats and the so-called “new threats.” Since 1995 the OAS has adopted 40 resolutions on this issue alone. The aim here is to use, primarily, a number of confidence-building measures to counter traditional intercountry security risks. These include exchange of information (e.g. white papers) and military observers, initiatives designed to enhance the transparency of military spending, efforts to improve communication in border regions, registration of conventional weapons with the UN, military maneuvers using shared weapons systems, and agreements on nuclear control. In this way progress has also been made in developing civil-military relations under regional leadership – one of the cardinal issues facing security policy in Latin America.

While new organs have also been created in the past ten years to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and money-laundering, these institutions only have weakly developed infrastructures and bear very little influence. In the US view, the OAS should create a deliberative body of its own to deal with military and security issues; the body would be located with the Inter-American Defense Board. The Latin American countries remain skeptical. They – and above all Brazil – see in this proposal an attempt to strengthen the hand of the US. Something similar can be said of the development of joint regional military potentials, a step that has been called for repeatedly but still seems to be a long way off in Latin America. Between the MERCOSUR countries, however, there are already a number of examples of coordinated military maneuvers and missions, including the joint UN mission conducted by Chilean and Argentine troops in Cyprus or the cooperation between Chilean and Brazilian troops in Haiti.

In ways unfamiliar to other regions, the development of regional structures also hinges on the relationship between the Latin American countries and the US. There are three elements that serve to make this process a complicated one: For one thing, there is an obvious asymmetry between the United States and Latin America in general and as regards security policy in particular. In addition, the Latin American countries have different strategic alignments with the US. While e.g. Brazil is interested in creating in South America a sphere of influence to counter the interests of the US in the region, Argentina has the status of a special non-NATO ally of the US, a status normally reserved for close friends of the US like Israel. Third, the Latin American countries and the US are generally at odds over their assessments and strategies concerning a number of security-relevant issues – above all as far as terrorism and drug-trafficking are concerned. The US’ demand that the Latin American countries should provide more support for the
“war on terror,” stepping up their relevant policy and intelligence activities, may have serious consequences, not least for the democratic and civil-military relations of some of these countries, which continue to be highly fragile.

Africa – on the way to a Pax Africana?

One good place to observe the renaissance of regional politics is the African continent. The numerous (sub)regional approaches to cooperation and integration pursued in the past for the most part remained patchwork, often a side-by-side of different approaches, which often ended in failure. This fact has, in recent years, given rise to a new awareness of the need for continent-wide regional cooperation. In view of repeated calls for an African renaissance, the new NEPAD economic program, and the establishment of the African Union (AU), the political climate would now appear to be conducive to building and consolidating a common security architecture in Africa in the course of the coming years.

One of the foundation stones was laid in 2001 with the establishment of the African Union (AU), which is currently grappling mainly with the security agenda. A Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) is now set to identify the central security threats faced by Africa, to define the goals of security policy, and to developing implementing bodies. With a view to closing the gap between the numerous declarations that have been made on democracy and human rights and the actual practice involved in implementing these declarations, the Union is now being equipped with the appropriate instruments and legal frameworks. The possibility now given to intervene in a member country “pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (Article 4h of the AU Constitutive Acts) amounts to a clear-cut departure from the principle of nonintervention once sacrosanct in the region.

The AU’s most important institutional component is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) established in 2004 – a kind of African security council that, designed as an instrument of collective security and early warning, has the task of responding promptly to conflicts in Africa. The PSC has been invested with substantial powers and authority. Among other things, its task is to make recommendations on interventions in member states to the AU assembly, to initiate peacemaking and peacebuilding measures in conflict situations, to impose sanctions, to provide humanitarian aid in cases of natural disaster and armed conflict, and to implement the common African defense policy. The Peace and Security Council is made up of representatives of 15 African countries that are elected by a two-thirds majority of the AU assembly for a term of two or three years. While unanimity is sought for council decisions, a simple majority is sufficient on procedural questions and a two-thirds majority is required for substantive decisions. The PSC is supported by the AU Commission (above all by its Peace ad Security Department), an early-warning system, a Council of Elders, a stand-by army consisting of five subregional units, and a special fund earmarked for peace missions. The stand-by troops are, in the ideal case, supposed to be deployed under a UN mandate. As a regional organization, however, the PSC can, under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, also authorize peace missions on its own initiative.
One factor crucial to an “all-in-one” African security policy is the need to align the AU’s relations with both the existing security structures of the subregional organizations and the United Nations. Of a total of eight Regional Economic Groups (REGs), it is above ECOWAS in West Africa and SADC in southern Africa that have a dedicated security agenda. As early as 1999, the ECOWAS member states decided to set up a supranational crisis mechanism, and the mechanism has already reached a stage of development that is quite advanced compared with the security arrangements in place in other regions of the world: its instruments are also designed explicitly to deal with internal crises. Far-reaching rights were transferred to a Mediation and Security Council (MSC) – a comparatively flexible and responsive body that is now authorized to take all security-relevant decisions on the basis of a two-thirds majority. The organization’s work is supported by four early-warning centers in Banjul, Ouagadougou, Monrovia, and Cotonou as well as by training centers like the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana, which provides systematic training for ECOMOG troops in preparation for their missions. Unlike all other subregional organizations in Africa, ECOWAS is already in possession of broad experience from its – not always uncontroversial – peace missions (ECOMOG in Liberia, ECOMOG II in Sierra Leone, and ECOMOG III in Guinea Bissau).

While the security structures within SADC have not yet been developed to this level, integration of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDS) into SADC’s structures (2001) and the appearance of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) (2002/04), a strategy paper on politics and security, seem to point to a new dynamic here as well. The goals of security cooperation in southern Africa include a joint defense agreement patterned on NATO, development of a peacekeeping force and regional early-warning systems, and a coordinated foreign and security policy. The process of implementing the relevant resolutions is presently somewhat behind schedule, the reason being that many of the projects involved go far beyond the current state of cooperation.

The remarkable regional dynamic in security policy gives hope that stable structures and institutions will emerge that offer African solutions for African problems. The regional dynamic that has developed in security policy in Africa in recent years may be seen as remarkable, and it gives reason to hope that stable structures and institutions will emerge that in fact offer, and implement, African solutions for African problems. But these efforts at cooperation remain fragile, and the large stock of resolutions, declarations, and protocols have yet to prove their merit in actual practice. Apart from the chronic underfunding of all (sub)regional organizations, other critical points of friction on the way to a consolidated peace architecture in Africa include the reluctance of newer and smaller countries to cede sovereignty in politically sensitive areas, conflicts of interest among member states (e.g. between Francophone and Anglophone countries within ECOWAS), the dominance of large countries in the subregional organizations (e.g. Nigeria and South Africa), and a lack of implementation capacities in the nation states involved.
The Middle East – halting regional approaches?

At present the MENA region lacks any overarching regional security structure. The reach and the conflict-solving potential of the two most widely known (sub)regional arrangements – the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council – are limited above all by the fact that two key countries of the (sub)region, namely Israel and Iran, are excluded from each of these organizations – if indeed they are not explicitly directed against these two countries.

The Arab League’s conflict-solving potential is notoriously weak. While the AL has developed a number of intergovernmental security institutions, these are largely ineffectual when it comes to coordinating national policies, to say nothing of working at the preventive level to ensure that conflicts do not come about in the first place. In particular as far as defining a common threat scenario and the issue of how to deal with Israel are concerned, there is very little unity among the league’s members. But the organization does function as a contact partner and moderator for a good number of different external peace initiatives (Greater Middle East, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). It was only with the 1991 Madrid Middle East peace conference that the possibility of an Israeli-Arab cooperation emerged, though as yet no stable forms of cooperation have developed.

Apart from some, in part very close, bilateral cooperation projects, above all with outside countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is thus the only institution engaged in pursuing, at least in a rudimentary form, closer security cooperation in one of the subregions. Although when it was founded in 1981, the GCC was officially devoted mainly to the pursuit of economic, social, and political goals, the actual motivation behind the move was to create a defensive alliance. This was rooted above all in a threat perception shared by the conservative Gulf states, which feared the impacts of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Yet the strategic momentum of this cooperation was quick to spill over into economic areas. Today, economic cooperation, which is set to be crowned in 2010 by a common currency, is the driving force behind the dynamic of this union of six countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates).

While the GCC offers its member countries a relatively coherent platform for negotiations with NAFTA or the EU, the path to an effective and strong defensive alliance has been marked by setbacks and unrealized initiatives. Since 2001, however, the member countries have renewed their efforts to create an autonomous alliance, one with a common air-defense system, and integrated command and communications structure, a pan-Arab arms industry, and an effective rapid-reaction force. Some progress has been made on air-space surveillance and the use of joint maneuvers as a means of improving the compatibility of weapons systems and command structures. For the coming years there are plans to develop a rapid-reaction force ("Peninsula Shield" / Dara` Al-Jazira) – it was dispatched to protect Kuwait during the events leading up to the third Iraq war, and had at least a symbolic effect – as well as an early-warning system. While the six member countries have agreed on a mutual assistance pact patterned on NATO, the security of this group of countries is generally based less on collective defense than on external security guarantees (provided above all by the US, the UK, and France).
that were reconsolidated following the end of the second Gulf war. Kuwait even went so far as to conclude military agreements with all five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

While the GCC involves a number of advantages, there continues to be widespread mistrust between the member countries. The conditions for deepening cooperation have not improved over the past five years. While the GCC involves a number of advantages that are hardly to be found in other regional projects – comparable social structures, a shared language, a (with the possible exception of Bahrain) relatively similar state of economic development, and similar systems of rule – there continues, despite the settlement of numerous border disputes, to be widespread mistrust between the member countries, and this factor is not exactly mitigated by the autocratic nature of the regimes involved and the growing domestic pressure on these regimes. Of all countries, it is Saudi Arabia, the most conservative member country, that now sees itself confronted with growing internal unrest. The small member states in particular view its dominant role in the GCC with a critical eye; these countries could well visualize a deeper form of cooperation than their big neighbor to the west.

While the alliance’s institutional structure has been kept to a minimum, beyond the GCC there is no security cooperation in the subregion. Nor is there any forum that might bring together the Gulf states with their powerful northern neighbors Iraq and Iran. Whether or not the elimination of Iraq as an immediate threat will have positive implications for the regional cooperation between the Gulf states is a matter that remains to be seen. It might, though, at least be possible to bring about a rapprochement among the different threat perceptions that have until now prevented any cooperation from emerging. It is mainly Teheran that has shown itself in favor of assuming greater regional responsibility – as a counterweight to the US presence in the region – and it would welcome an opportunity to become part of a regional arrangement from which it has been barred since the revolution of 1979. Iraq might also be interested in again engaging in closer cooperation with its southern neighbors and exchanging views on security issues in a forum not wholly dominated by the US. A dialogue between the “big three” would serve to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s hand in the GCC – a development that would be certain to be viewed with distrust by the smaller member countries. And for this reason none of the GCC member countries would be willing to accept any kind of security arrangement as an alternative to security guarantees provided by the US. This is why it will prove necessary to bring together in a security network the region’s numerous overlapping bilateral, but also multilateral relations, existing organizations like the GCC, and regional powers like Iran – in a loose organization patterned less on NATO or the EU than on the Asean Regional Forum in Southeast Asia. The ARF, with its cautious consultation processes that bring together small and hegemonic countries from the region and beyond, with its policy of strict intergovernmentality and its broad set of confidence-building measures, would perhaps be well suited to serve as a model on the Gulf, showing how security processes can be initiated in touchy regions and between fundamentally distrustful and in part antagonistic countries.
Asia – regional diversity

Asia’s various subregions are marked by a range of different intensities of regional cooperation, extending from an aspiring regionalism (Southeast Asia), blockades (South Asia), and nonexistent regional structures (North/East Asia).

One of the most prominent regional security projects to emerge in recent years is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was founded in 1994. Today it is Asia’s only relatively effective security mechanism. When the Cold War came to an end, the strategic power constellations in Asia underwent a shift, and the ARF was set up to bring about a constructive dialogue between the most important regional organization (ASEAN) and the region’s key powers. Apart from ASEAN’s member countries, the security forum’s participants today include China and Japan, North and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, the EU and the US, Russia and India, Mongolia and Papua New Guinea.

The aim of this multilateral forum is to contribute to stability in the Asia-Pacific region by engaging in three stages of cooperation – development of confidence-building measures, strategies of preventive diplomacy, and various approaches to conflict resolution. The first step on the road to cooperative security consists in efforts to use consultation, dialogue, and transparency to create mutual trust in an embattled, conflict-prone, and highly heterogeneous region that is home to a number of hegemonic powers. The most important confidence-building measures (CBMs) include white papers and annual defense “policy statements,” a dialogue on threat perceptions, exchange of cadet officers, registration of conventional weapons with the UN, observation of military maneuvers, and greater participation of defense experts and military personnel in the ARF’s activities. The ARF holds annual meetings of foreign ministers, followed by Senior Official Meetings, “inter-sessional groups” that address e.g. issues of disaster aid, peacekeeping operations, or civil relief, and numerous Track II Meetings, some of which are organized by think tanks set up for the purpose (e.g. the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific). These activities have led to the creation of a number of formal and informal networks designed to build a foundation of trust and confidence on which further steps can be based. While the forum continues to be focused on CBMs, efforts undertaken to strengthen the chair of the ARF, support provided by the ASEAN secretariat, and a register of security experts in the region have proved to be important preliminary inputs for the preventive diplomacy stage. However, at present the ARF has neither the capacity nor the institutional structure – to say nothing of a political mandate – to assume the role of an actual conflict-resolution mechanism. The ARF’s underlying philosophy is based on the standards and practices of ASEAN: the goal of achieving multilateral cooperation via a gradual and more informal process. Decisions are taken by consensus, following processes of cautious consultation, and without a vote. Political and personal relationships are more important than institutional arrangements. The idea is to use this low-threshold form of cooperation to win over countries like China in particular, but also many small countries that have otherwise been skeptical about multilateral approaches, for closer cooperation (“soft institutionalization”). The ARF, in its own view, “should not move too fast for those who want to go slow or not too slow for those who want to go fast.”
Developments in recent years clearly indicate that the ARF is in fact more than a “talkshop” – indeed it has become a legitimate political actor that provides an important contribution to building confidence in and a basic understanding for multilateral cooperation in the region. But one of the most difficult and touchy issues facing the organization, precisely with regard to efforts to promote institutionalization, is and will remain, the question of national sovereignty. And even though interference in the internal affairs of another country continues to be taboo, there has, since the 1997 Asia crisis, been a controversial debate underway in the organization – its keywords include “constructive intervention,” flexible engagement,” and “enhanced interaction” – on how it might be possible to at least make some minor inroads into the sacrosanct principle of noninterference. It is not least the way in which the dictatorship in Myanmar has been dealt with that indicates unambiguously the problems to which a lack of more substantial negotiating capacities may lead within an organization.

At the same time, however, the forum has played as good as no role whatever in the “hot” security issues facing the region: The negotiations on the Korea question are being conducted in the framework of the so-called six-party talks, ASEAN has reached agreement with China on the South China Sea question outside the framework of the ARF; China regards the question of Taiwan as an internal affair; and the organization was unable to provide any substantial contribution to resolving the East Timor conflict. In recent years the ARF has for this reason keyed its activities more and more to “new” transboundary security problems such as crime (piracy), terrorism, and trafficking in humans and illegal arms.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO – until 2000: the Shanghai Five), which includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and – since 2001 - Uzbekistan, is a more recent organization, though one with a similar orientation. Originally established with a view to improving border security between the former Soviet republics and China, the organization has since come to be seen as a strategic counterweight to US dominance in Central Asia, as a response to the eastward expansion of NATO and the renewed US-Japanese security alliance.\(^5\) The confidence-building measures adopted by the member countries – e.g. joint maneuvers, agreements on disarmament (including a control mechanism), and a larger measure of transparency along member borders – have in recent years have been enlarged to include agreements on nontraditional security challenges. Although what is known as the “three forces” – terrorism, separatism, and religious fundamentalism – are now seen by the organization as the most important security risks facing it, multilateral cooperation has been slow to develop in these fields. Whether or not the “anti-terror structure” (RATS) set up a year ago in Tashkent will develop into an efficient and differentiated instrument is a question that still remains to be answered. One highly contentious issue in the region is what groups are to be regarded as under “suspicion of terrorism.” Against the background of the ongoing domestic conflicts in a number of member countries, any undifferentiated action against the “three forces” could, in the medium term, tend to undercut cooperation.

\(^5\) When Uzbekistan, which maintained close military and political ties to the US, joined the organization, this orientation was in doubt. But since then the US-Uzbek relationship has experienced a chill.
Still: Efforts to reduce tensions in regions bordering on China have met with some noteworthy successes. And within just a few years the SCO has come up with an approach to initiating a dialogue between the countries of Central Asia and the two regional hegemons, Russia and China. Apart from domestic instabilities and democracy deficits, the hegemonic competition in the region – and here in particular relations between the SCO, its member countries, and the US – and the related, redoubled efforts of the young Central Asian countries to consolidate their sovereignty may well prove to be the greatest obstacles to any improved multilateral cooperation in the field of security.

While the ARF is in the process of – slowly but gradually – developing, the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation, SAARC, has generally come to be seen as one of the region’s least successful models of cooperation. With its members India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and the Maldives, and viewed in terms of the political regimes, economic realities, and religious and ethnic makeup of its member countries, SAARC is one of the most heterogeneous organizations found in the world. This cooperative venture, which was originally created on India’s initiative to reduce political tensions between the region’s two large neighboring countries, suffers from India’s dominance; and until today the organization’s programmatic and institutional development has been systematically obstructed by both the conflict between India and Pakistan and the organization’s founding principle of not touching on issues that are matters of contention among the member countries. Attempts to resolve conflicts in South Asia, e.g. the civil war in Sri Lanka, or the agreements between India and Pakistan on the Ganges issue have for the most part taken place outside the SAARC framework. But at least the track-two initiatives initiated in the SAARC framework may be seen in a positive light. Against this background, the process of economic integration, boosted by a free-trade agreement signed in 2004, could also lead to a better environment for security cooperation in South Asia.

6 The mix of three agreements concluded by India and Pakistan in 1988 to reduce tensions is somewhat bizarre: a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities; promotion of cultural exchange, and the avoidance of double taxation.
4. Patterns of regional security cooperation

4.1 A renaissance of regional cooperation – but not everywhere!

The times seem to be past when regional cooperation was chiefly a European experiment. The renaissance of regionalism is above all a renaissance in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Cooperation in the countries of the South continues to be a gradual, unsteady, and highly fragile process. But despite all setbacks and failures, new regional security arrangements have emerged in many (sub)regions over the past ten years, and old arrangements have realigned and stabilized.

However, the Middle East and North/East Asia in particular, two of the world’s most insecure regions, are not part of this trend. Both regions are marked by a fragile balance of mistrust rooted in longstanding conflicts and by big-power struggles (Asia) and unresolved problems bound up with nation- and state-building (Middle East). While North/East Asia accounts for 25% of the world economy, a huge weight, the region lacks a strategic balance based on a common system of cooperative security. The concept of the Middle East as a region is primarily a perception by outside observers, whereas the region’s self-healing powers are notoriously low. Both regions lack democratic cohesion and a shared interest in integration as a path to overcoming regional insecurity and political antagonisms. In East Asia in particular, security cooperation is channeled mainly through fragile concerts of the large countries in the region. While regional structures in the Middle East have not shifted fundamentally in recent years, the Arab-Israeli peace processes have, despite all blockades and setbacks, still brought about change: Cooperation appears, in principle, to be possible, even though thus far very little has been achieved in practice. On the other hand, as far as South Asia and the Gulf region are concerned, while there are formal arrangements in place there, these have remained largely stagnant, and little progress has been made in implementing them. Here a high density of external interventions, hegemonic tensions, and years of intensive conflict have served to prevent any improvements in cooperation.

4.2 Heterogeneous patterns of cooperation

Even in regions that have experienced the development of highly promising approaches to cooperation, these tend to vary substantially in depth, scope, institutional design, and regard to the security-policy instruments. A pattern or grand design of security cooperation doesn’t seem to exist. In most regions, a good number of overlapping and part competing bilateral, subregional, and regional security institutions are set up that differ considerably in terms of form and generation. The ambivalence between new and old regulatory elements and bilateral and multilateral concepts indicates that thus far very few regions have come up with a basic consensus on a future model of regional security cooperation. In fact,
cooperation hinges on specific conditions that vary from region to region, and for this reason the three key European security arrangements – NATO, CFSP/ESDP, and OSCE – are not very well suited to serve as models.

The form of regional cooperation adopted inevitably depends on a great number of different factors: the external problems affecting a region and the internal challenges that need to be addressed; domestic problems and the constitution of the countries concerned; the relationships between the states concerned and the extent to which they regard the security challenges as common problems; and finally, the role played by the global powers in the region. Between the extremes – the Hobbesian state of nature: war of all against all and the state of perfect cooperation and mutual trust – there is a broad spectrum of possible security constellations and appropriate regional institutional arrangements.

Collective defense in the form of alliances – as in NATO and, until the early 1990s, the Warsaw Pact – is the traditional recipe used to counter the classic security dilemma posed by threats emanating from other states. Defense pacts are based on a clear-cut, shared perception of a potential adversary – an “external federator” – as well as on mutual commitments to provide support against threats from the outside. Deterrence and military preparations for collective defense are thus the central means used to contain conflicts and threats. Such alliances usually lack measures catered to internal affairs. The Gulf Coordination Council is modeled after this concept until today. In other subregional organizations (e.g. SADC), security alliances are merely one aspect among others. Many alliances – like ASEAN – which were originally based on a clear-cut analysis of the potential adversary, have become more inclusive since the end of the Cold War. In view of the highly complex and in part intrinsic security situations that exist in the many regions of the South, purely military and security alliances like NATO do not appear to be suitable.

Although collective security likewise includes a commitment to provide mutual support, the threats and risks involved tend to be more diffuse in nature. Collective security is therefore keyless less to exclusive alliances than to broader arrangements. We can find aspects of a collective security of this kind in ARF-ASEAN. In a narrower sense, the concept of collective security refers to a global security system of the kind set out in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, a system that has yet to be realized: With the exception of direct self-defense, the UN Security Council is, formally, invested with a monopoly on the use of military force.

In a concert system, though, regional security is the task of a highly selective group – a “committee” of the most powerful states. Whereas in collective security structures all member countries enjoy the same formal rights and duties, in concerts only the hegemons are the subjects of the world order, and the small and mid-sized countries are their objects. While it is true that the big powers may reach agreement on joint measures, their actual objective is more likely to be to maintain the status quo and to avoid any direct confrontation between each other. Concerts can be found today in East Asia and – restricted somewhat in institutional terms by the ARF – in Southeast Asia as well. Regions in which concerts constitute the defining form of security cooperation usually have at least a dense network of bilateral security guarantees.
Cooperative security perceives security as a collective good. Cooperative structures therefore have no common adversary and even include countries that are regarded as hostile.

If the norms of cooperative security adopted by a group of countries ban the use of force as a means of achieving interests, and if their members are politically reliable (expectational reliability), the result is a pluralistic security community. They are founded on a closely intertwined set of shared norms, on communication and institutional structures. No such full-fledged security communities have yet emerged in the regions of the South. But the south of Latin America in particular is seen as a subregion that is developing in just this direction.

It is only when member states are prepared to transfer a measure of sovereignty to the regional level that “fused” security communities, or integrative security, can come about. The EU is seen as a pluralistic security community on its way to integrative security. None of the regional organizations in the South have yet reached the level of cooperation characteristic of Europe – a fact not surprising in view of the relative youth of the organizations in question – and the 50-year, crisis-ridden history of the European integration process. While no pluralistic security community can be identified in Africa, some sovereignty has already been ceded there to regional organizations in the framework of ECOWAS and in the case of the AU’s “African Security Council.”

In keeping with the depth of their cooperation and their security agenda, regional security arrangements have been equipped with various security instruments. The spectrum extends from a halting exchange of information (SAARC) and comprehensive confidence-building measures (ASEAN, OAS, MERCOSUR) to the development of joint early-warning systems and peacekeeping capacities (AU, ECOWAS). But many regional organizations (MERCOSUR, OAS, ARF-ASEAN) are marked by a striking discrepancy between existing sets of security instruments – geared for the most part to dealing with intercountry conflicts – and the new, for the most part internal, threats.

Many regional organizations are marked by a striking discrepancy between existing sets of security instruments – and the new, for the most part internal, threats.
4.3 The dynamics of cooperation

Looking at the dynamics of cooperation, we can identify a number of rough patterns:

- Most instances of security cooperation in the South are embedded in a new form of regionalism. The ongoing regionalization processes now appear to be more motivated from “inside” and from “below,” with regional processes being initiated less by dominant countries or superpowers outside a region (hegemonic regionalism) than by individual weighty countries within a region itself. Regionalism is thus seen as a possibility to come to terms with the problems posed by global transformation processes which individual nation states are no longer able to tackle on their own. This insight applies in particular for international political economy, but also for security policy: On the one hand, security-related interdependencies between countries are on the increase in many regions; on the other hand, if they are to deal effectively with security problems in the first place (or to prevent – often undesired – external interventions), the regions have no choice but to develop security structures of their own. Interest in a common security policy is thus rooted less in temporary problem situations than in the changes that have shaken regional and international structures since the end of the Cold War. In some regions these developments are fostered by a growing awareness of the possibility that regions act on their own accord. Such efforts have found their most succinct expression in the program of the “African renaissance.”

- Governments continue to be the driving force of regional cooperation, and intergovernmental cooperation is the predominant pattern encountered here. There will be no (security-related) regionalization without the political will of the countries immediately concerned. Both large and small countries can take the initiative: Bilateral reconciliation processes involving the most important countries in a region – e.g. Argentina and Brazil (or Germany and France) – that have overcome historical resentments and brought their regional power structures into balance are often what it takes to set the stage for a regional development of this kind. In the case of MERCOSUR e.g., regionalism emerged from bilateralism and the fear of a third country (Uruguay) of being left out in the cold. In other regions, though, e.g. South Asia or the Arab peninsula, mistrust and hostility between the most important countries of the region (India and Pakistan or Saudi Arabia and Iran) have served to block the emergence of a regional dynamic. In South Asia, but also in Southeast Asia and in the Gulf region, on the other hand, the smaller countries appear to be in the process of trying to engage the larger countries (like India, China, and Saudi Arabia), which prefer bilateral relationships, in a kind of cautious regionalism.

- “Balancing and bandwagoning” have, since the end of the Cold War, been and continue to be important dynamics – e.g. in Latin America or Central Asia – that have major influence on regional processes.

- More than in the past, civil society organizations are now involved in regional processes. In security policy as well – traditionally a hermetic policy field – civil society networks are gaining increasing importance – as is shown by the examples from West Africa (WANEP) or the numerous other initiatives of the Global

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Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). In other regions – as was long the case e.g. in South Asia – where intergovernmental cooperation has been blocked, track-II networks are often the only channel open for communication.

- On the whole, instances of regional cooperation are for the most part relatively complex, and they are no longer limited to free-trade areas and defense pacts. In a great array of combinations, such cooperation includes economic, security-related, environmental, humanitarian, and social aspects. As yet, however, no gradual spillover from one policy field to another has been observed in regional developments in the South. Instead, new policy fields are developed as soon as new challenges emerge or political conditions change. Renewed or intensified regional cooperation does not necessarily mean that existing projects have been deepened or completed. Nor does deepened integration or development of an additional field of cooperation – e.g. in foreign and security policy – necessarily rule out the possibility that memberships in regional organizations may be enlarged (ASEAN, SADC). What policy field is the first to be developed will depend on the region in question: In MERCOSUR, for instance, security cooperation is based in large measure on economic integration; while the GCC was founded as a defense alliance, economic cooperation is its main pillar of integration; in Africa in turn, and in particular in the AU, it is the security dimension that determines the dynamic of cooperation – because “turning battlefields into markets” is the first precondition required for stability.

- It is not only in connection with the debate over Turkey that regional identity and (supposed) cultural homogeneity is under discussion as a key condition required for integration. Beyond Europe too, geographic proximity, traditional trade patterns, similar cultures and religions have been identified as elements that may serve to advance regional cooperation. In fact, cultural cohesion is very marked in some regions (Latin America, the Arab peninsula), but the example of the GCC shows clearly that it does not necessarily have to lead to stronger ties in a region. On the other hand, pronounced cultural differences may certainly impede closer cooperation (SAARC), although they do not per se constitute an insurmountable obstacle to regional cooperation (ASEAN). On the contrary, in most conflict regions recognition of cultural plurality can be constitutive for the stabilization of a region and the success of regional cooperation.

Despite the regional security dynamics that have developed in the past decade in many regions, most regional organizations are still faced with major challenges, and the crucial factor determining how they will be met must be sought in the orientation and the stability of security-related regionalisms.
5.

Challenges facing regional security cooperation

5.1 Sovereignty

Skepticism regarding overarching political structures in a sensitive field like security policy is necessarily very pronounced. Clinging stubbornly to state sovereignty is, also in the regions of the South, one of the main obstacles to the development of efficient structures. In cases in which state sovereignty is either fragile or has been achieved only in recent years, mistrust is likely to be particularly pronounced. The weaker a country’s sovereignty is, the weaker its ability to contribute to advancing a cooperation process. National confidence, coupled with insight into the limits of national capacities, can prove helpful for integration. On the other hand, though, strong sovereignty is not always conducive to regional cooperation, particularly in cases where a region’s domestic systems are highly heterogeneous or antagonistic. But the iron principle of nonintervention – which has already been relaxed somewhat in the UN framework (the responsibility to protect) – no longer appears to be the sine qua non for regional cooperation. The charters of the AU and ECOWAS already provide for quite extensive possibilities of intervention; “democratic clauses” in the MERCOSUR and the OAS agreements (Inter-American Democratic Carter, 2001) permit a limited measure of intervention in member countries. In the ASEAN region, the principle of nonintervention continues to be constitutive for regional cooperation. Contributions to stabilizing the region by military means are achieved outside of the regional structures. To cite an example, ASEAN countries provided troops for the Australian-led mission in East Timor.

5.2 Dominant countries and regional hegemons

While insistence on state sovereignty tends to undercut the capacity for and the depth of regional cooperation, hegemons tend to misuse such cooperation – or at least to seek to dominate its political agenda. Their regional engagement is driven more by ambitions outside the region concerned or by developments at home, and they therefore contribute little to regional stability. In addition, influential countries may, in the longer term, prove to be a drag on regional developments. This is the case e.g. with North, Central, and South Asia, where, under the influence of China and India, no appreciable regional arrangements have yet developed. In regional organizations, influential countries also tend to refrain from entering into binding agreements, and at the same time to block attempts to resolve problems on the regional agenda. In the case of ASEAN e.g., Indonesia, a member country, blocked a regional initiative on the East Timor crisis. On the other hand, the case of ASEAN also goes to show how the structural asymmetry between small countries and hegemonic powers can be balanced out: In regional terms, China
appears to be seeking to underpin its claim to a global leadership role through participation in multilateral forums. With its status of a dialogue partner (beside the US, Europe, India, and others) in the ASEAN framework, China is in a position to pursue two options at once: full cooperation with the countries of the region while at the same time retaining the distance it needs to go it alone. The role played by large countries remains ambivalent. If the are deliberately left out, or if they evade regional cooperation, the security mechanisms involved will be restricted – and not only in scope. The political, financial, and manpower capacities of hegemonic states are often precisely what is needed for joint political action. To cite an example, 70% of the ECOMOG mission in Liberia was funded by Nigeria.

In many regions – and in particular in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East – no success will be achieved in building a regional security architecture unless due consideration is given to the special role played by the US. This comprehensive dominance of US power, one of the crucial structural features of today’s world order, also has ramifications for regional cooperation. The US can provide stability by settling conflicts, providing public goods, and containing external forces. But not much is left of the ‘vigorous multilateralism’ propagated in the early 1990s. In recent years the US has slipped more and more into the role of the hegemon, using its de facto unique position to forge unilateralist policies. In connection with its “war on terror” it has, ironically, reintroduced the specifically bipolar pattern familiar from the Cold War – “You are either with us or against us!” – which has a polarizing effect in many regions and thus tends to influence the development of regional structures.

5.3 Limited capacities

The limited diplomatic, economic, military, and institutional capacities of many regional organizations constitute major obstacles to the development of effective regional structures. Unlike many earlier approaches, today most instances of regional cooperation are more firmly embedded in institutional terms. Even regions – like Southeast Asia – that were in the past skeptical about regional institutions now have secretariats and commissions that coordinate regional work on an ongoing basis. Other organizations – like the African Union – have recently adopted comprehensive sets of institutional structures with a view to dealing more efficiently with pending problems. But the structures in place in most organizations are not yet sufficient to implement the – in some cases – sizable backlogs of resolutions with which they have to deal. Political prejudices, internal divisions, and competing cooperation projects in one and the same region may sometimes also prove to be a major strain on capacities. To cite two examples, SADC’s efforts to find a solution to the Congo crisis was hampered by internal political tensions between South Africa and Zimbabwe; and Nigeria and the Ivory Coast were on opposite sides in the Liberia conflict. And the rivalry between Anglophone and Francophone countries in ECOWAS may at times adversely affect the efficiency of regional structures.
The chronic underfunding of many organizations continues to present a substantial problem. There are, roughly speaking, only two types of regional organization: those that have financial resources and those that have none. Most Chapter VII organizations from the South belong to the second category. These financial constraints make themselves felt in particular when it comes to peacekeeping missions in Africa. The key factor for the success or failure of missions is less the political will than the question of whether sufficient resources are available. While it is true that member countries are often slow to pay their contributions, the only realistic way to solve the resource problem is for the UN and the North to provide support. As far as the latter is concerned, these organizations, especially in Africa, are faced with a dilemma: On the one hand, they need the limited financial and technical support they receive for work in the field of security policy; on the other, though, they fear (not without reason) the control and influence that such support usually entails.

5.4 Democratic development

As the examples of ASEAN-ARF or GCC show, security-related regionalism is not the exclusive domain of democratic countries. But it must be said that such regionalism appears to develop more effectively when it is based on democratic structures. In the Cono Sur, for instance, the democratization processes underway in the individual countries there was the sine qua non for the growing measure of agreement reached in the region. In MERCOSUR today, the thesis that democratic countries will not wage war against one another (democratic peace) is the backbone of security cooperation. A factor closely associated with this is the complex of “good governance” and in particular the development of democratic civil-military relations. Domestic democratic structures are conducive to developing the capability and the will needed to improve cooperation and to involve civil society in the process. On the other hand, however, the process of integration may, as is shown by the example of Southeast Asia, also serve to advance reforms e.g. of the security sector. It is entirely possible for autocratic regimes to work together with like-minded regimes and/or with democratic regimes in one region. However, in such cases any larger measure of integration or expansion of cooperation, difficult to achieve even among democratic countries, appears unlikely precisely in the field of security policy, the reason being that such countries tend to harbor considerable mistrust for one another.

Today we can make no more than some first, cautious assessments of regional security arrangements in the South, since most such arrangements are more or less recent developments. Still, our broad review of the structures of regional security policy has shown that the ongoing processes are more robust and more sustainable than ever before. But it is at the same time important not to exaggerate the expectations we place in regional security cooperation. The obstacles outlined will continue to be with us in the years to come. Instead of choosing European-style integration as a paradigm, it is, as experience has shown, preferable to start out by concentrating on more or less “disappointment-resistant” steps toward cooperation. These include e.g. creation of an issue-specific consensus on the

Regionalism appears to develop more effectively when it is based on democratic structures.

The ongoing processes are more robust and more sustainable than ever before.
basis of consultations and coordination among members; attempts to broaden memberships; steps – e.g. special bodies and agreements – aimed at winning the engagement of extraregional big powers and international organizations; and development of confidence-building measures. Above all in regions that have made good progress on cooperation, it is essential to strengthen the activities of civil society organizations in – among others – the field of security policy. This applies in particular for new, internal security risks. Many regional processes continue to be highly personalized and politicized. However, it is essential that any such “top-down” cooperation be given an underpinning through involvement in it of numerous civil society organizations. And finally, it is very important that regional security initiatives be firmly embedded in an effective global security mechanism, one that lays the groundwork for an efficient interplay between the United Nations and regional security organizations.
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