Many European states are making increasingly pragmatic efforts to find effective approaches to integration policy and are trying out new policy instruments to that end. Classic integration policy models, such as the exclusive, the pluralistic and the universalistic, are becoming less and less coherent, while at the national level integration policy orientations are drifting further and further apart.

For a decade or so, Germany's hitherto exclusive and assimilation-oriented integration policy has been the object of sustained reflection. This analysis examines the integration models of other Western European countries with regard to their legal-political, socioeconomic and cultural-religious dimensions. These models could be utilised, suitably adapted to German circumstances, in order to bring about a reorientation.

German social democracy also needs to make a clearer commitment to increasing cultural heterogeneity in Germany and should develop a coherent approach to integration policy. To that end, it should markedly extend its current approach, which involves the promotion of individual participation, to encompass the recognition of cultural diversity in order to integrate immigrants in all domains on an equal footing across society.
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1. Introduction

The integration of immigrants or people with immigrant backgrounds\(^1\) represents a major challenge for the societies of Western democracies. Political solutions must be found to integration problems which might arise both on the side of the immigrants and on that of the host society in order to ensure social cohesion and to take advantage of the full potential of a culturally diverse society.

A number of plans have focused on the issue of what policies could lead to successful integration in Germany, too. On the one hand, in 1999 the Red-Green Coalition was able to eliminate one of the biggest obstacles to Germany’s acceptance as a country of immigration with the reform of the law on citizenship. In addition, the law on immigration established the principle that immigration goes hand in hand with an obligation to make an effort to integrate, above all by learning the language. As a result, the CDU/CSU – or at least parts of it – shifted from a purely restrictive policy towards foreigners, and the plans initiated by the Grand Coalition, such as the national integration plan and the German Islamic Conference, were accompanied by an invigorated debate between the parties on what instruments should be deployed.

On the other hand, the Islamist inspired attacks on 11 September 2001 cast a harsh light on the position of Muslims in Western countries. To be sure, their situation is now entangled with issues of public security, as a result of which the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for domestic security, convened the German Islamic Conference. Social democratic parties in particular need to address the connection between integration, religious affiliation and security issues, which has already been established at the theoretical level and so has become a key political issue, and to pursue a policy which does not subsume integration issues under such headings as religious affiliation or security policy.

It is important to note that – despite strong SPD participation in the new integration policy orientation through the integration summit and the Islamic Conference during the Grand Coalition’s term of office from 2005 to 2009 – this modernisation of German immigration policy can scarcely be associated with the SPD, although it was then a government party. Furthermore, a coherent integration policy is not directly discernible among the Social Democrats. In future, the SPD must, in contrast, present itself in a much more transparent fashion, both personally and politically. In order to come up with a comprehensive policy and to harmonise appropriate policy instruments it would be helpful to take a look at the relevant policies in other European countries,\(^2\) but also at regional and local level. Against this background, the aim of this comparative study is to make suggestions for German policy.

It must be considered that the integration of immigrants is only one aspect of integration in society. Policies for the improvement of societal integration are aimed at diverse groups, which are not always in a position to participate in a society’s primary goods (Rawls). For example, social and labour market policy should be directed towards furnishing all members of a society with equal opportunities and possibilities for the purpose of integration. Nonetheless, in the public perception the concept of «integration policy» concerns immigrants and new citizens. To be more precise, what is at issue here is a specific integration policy whose policy instruments are oriented particularly – that is, specifically – towards the immigrant population. This should be distinguished from a non-specific integration policy which can indeed also contribute to the integration of this group, but is first and foremost directed towards all citizens in general.

2. A Normative Social Democratic Ideal Model

In the policy area of «integration» in particular it is important, if social democratic parties are to develop a coherent policy, to pay due attention to the definition

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1. The definition of migrants and immigrants used in the present contribution is based on that of the Federal Office of Statistics. Persons «with an immigrant background», according to this definition, are «all those who have immigrated to the current territory of the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949, as well as all foreigners born in Germany and all persons born in Germany as Germans with at least one parent who had immigrated to Germany after 1949 or was born there as a foreigner» (German Office of Statistics 2007). On this basis, personal experience of migration is not an absolute criterion for being regarded as a person with an immigrant background.

2. This does not include all European countries, but primarily those whose immigration situation is similar to that of Germany. Specifically, the southern and eastern European countries were excluded, which have become countries of immigration only recently (for example, Spain). Although there will be some consideration of the policy instruments which underlie the intercultural approach adopted in Quebec, overseas immigration states will not be looked at since they deviate from European countries too much (for example, with regard to the poorly developed welfare state, immigration as «founding myth» of the nation and so on).
and policy implementation of the core value of »justice« or »fairness«. What does »fairness« mean in a society which is culturally, ethnically or linguistically heterogeneous?

A renewed attempt to define the concept can benefit from the debate which has gone on for the past 20 years or so in political philosophy, which developed from the Anglo-Saxon debate on liberalism and communitarianism (for an overview, see Honneth 1993). In particular, Canadian political philosophers such as Charles Taylor (Taylor 1992) and Will Kymlicka (Kymlicka 1995) have reflected on the extent to which politics should take into consideration cultural differences between citizens and what generally recognised characteristics and values are necessary for social cohesion.

In this debate four theoretical-normative approaches have emerged with regard to how cultural differences should be dealt with (see Table 1).

In this context, both a universalistically oriented (for example, Barry 2001) and a culturally sensitive (for example, Kymlicka 1995) moral liberalism are in a position to supply starting points for social democratic policies. Both assume that there is an obligation to implement policies which ensure equal opportunities for all citizens, regardless of their ethnic, cultural or religious identities. The ideal model in this instance is participation. »Participation« means that all citizens must have the opportunity to participate in all areas of society. If some groups face obstacles in this respect the latter should be either eliminated or balanced out by group-specific policies (for example, anti-discrimination policy) in order to ensure equal opportunities.

Universalistically oriented policies do not go beyond this »difference-blind« recognition of all persons as equal citizens. Culturally sensitive approaches, however, have a more comprehensive understanding of recognition. Since the public sphere and state institutions at least partly bear the imprint of the cultural characteristics of the majority population they inevitably contain regulations which favour those belonging to the majority. Appropriate policy measures must be taken to even out this preference and to treat – that is, recognise – the cultural identity of all citizens equally. This form of recognition goes beyond purely legal equal treatment and is characterised also by the recognition of legitimate cultural differences.

### 3. A Heuristic Analytical Model for Integration Policy

National differences and commonalities in terms of ideas about citizenship and in relation to integration policy are designated in the literature by such notions as »citizenship regime« or »national models«. The basic idea behind such considerations is that a country’s integration policy is oriented towards a particular understanding of citizenship which consistently imbues the relevant policies (see, for example, Brubaker 1992; Castles/Miller

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**Table 1: Normative Approaches to the Treatment of Cultural Minorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic concept</th>
<th>Rights of cultural minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communitarianism (nation)</td>
<td>Special significance of the nation (the aim is assimilation in the national culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communitarianism (groups)</td>
<td>Special significance of cultural group membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalistic liberalism</td>
<td>Citizens are equals in moral terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culturally sensitive liberalism</td>
<td>A neutral state is not possible (only a compensatory support can enable equal rights)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors.
In general terms, three regimes can be identified among the various designations (see Table 2).

Although the relevant path dependencies can still be identified in European countries, nonetheless all countries have experienced changes and reform over the past decade, so that it is at least debatable whether at national level one ideal model is still being pursued in all aspects of integration. On this basis it makes sense to analyse the respective policies separately in accordance with three societal dimensions (see Entzinger 2000; Penninx 2005) in order to be able to situate individual instruments more precisely. Three societal subdimensions can be distinguished here:

(i) A legal-political dimension which conceives of integration in the state as a legal-political principle governing the order of modern societies, including involvement in the processes of political decision-making.

(ii) A socioeconomic dimension, encompassing all instruments pertaining to integration in societal subsystems which allocate social and economic positions on a market basis.

(iii) A cultural-national dimension which includes integration in a collective of people which shares an identification as a community of citizens. This sense of community finds expression in particular in the public sphere, as a result of which religious manifestations of various kinds are to be understood as a legitimate part of the nation.

In what follows, the integration policy instruments of European countries are examined on the basis of this conceptual differentiation.

4. Examples of Integration Policy in European Countries

4.1 Legal-Political Dimension

Outline of the Problem

Integration with regard to the legal-political dimension means, in particular, participation in political processes and institutions. Until immigrants obtain citizenship of the host country they are largely excluded from direct democratic political involvement due to their lack of voting rights, both active and passive. Conceivable substitutes for this kind of complete political equality through naturalisation include local voting rights, consultation committees and specific institutions, such as representatives.

In the European framework, Germany’s naturalisation policy and granting of possibilities for political participation of the kind already mentioned puts it in that group of exclusive states which, via naturalisation, impose strict requirements on immigrants, in particular with regard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive (also assimilationist) model</td>
<td>Germany (up to 1999), Austria, Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalist (also republican) model</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralistic (also multiculturalist) model</td>
<td>Netherlands, Sweden and the UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Henkes (2010), including brief explanations. See also Koopmans (2005).
to duration of stay. For example, citizenship can be obtained only after eight years of legal residence, together with proof of proficiency in the German language and adequate financial means. Since 2007, it has also been compulsory to take a naturalisation test. For the children born in Germany of foreign national parents the Red-Green coalition introduced – in order to obtain the agreement of the Rhineland-Palatinate FDP in the Bundesrat for reform of the nationality law – a discretionary regulation, according to which these children have to decide, between the ages of 18 and 23, whether they wish to have German or foreign citizenship. Important political actors, primarily the CDU/CSU, oppose dual citizenship, of the kind possible in several other European countries, in particular in France, Belgium and the UK.

Both with regard to the right to vote in local elections for non-EU citizens and the acceptance of multiple citizenship there is fundamental disagreement in Germany between the left-wing parties, which advocate such reforms, and the CDU/CSU, as well as parts of the FDP, which categorically reject this.

Best Practice

Obtaining citizenship

Regarding the conditions that need to be met to obtain citizenship Germany’s eight years’ legal residence make it one of the most exacting countries in Europe in this respect. Other countries have much shorter residence requirements, starting with three years in Belgium, from two to five in Sweden and five years in France and the Netherlands. Austria alone is more restrictive, granting most immigrants the opportunity to obtain citizenship only after ten years.

A particularly striking example of a policy of opening-up is provided by the reforms to the nationality law in Belgium in 1984, 1991 and 2000. The last two in particular led to a sharp increase in immigration rates. For example, the 2000 reform reduced the required period of legal residence for the so-called »parliamentary procedure« from five to three years for first-generation immigrants. A legal right to citizenship by declaration after seven years was also introduced. The success of the reforms can be seen in the fact that within ten years the proportion of the population with an immigrant background without Belgian citizenship fell from two-thirds (in 1995) to around half (in 2005).

Since voting is compulsory in Belgium, the liberal approach to naturalisation means that, at least at election time, immigrants’ political participation increases automatically. The political parties have responded to the changes in the electorate by making significant changes with regard to the candidates they put up at elections.

In most European countries, obtaining citizenship by birth or by declaration for the children of immigrants is subject to more liberal arrangements than in Germany. In Germany, such persons have to decide, in accordance with the discretionary model, within five years of attaining their majority whether they wish to have German citizenship or that of their parents – hitherto, dual citizenship has been permitted only in exceptional cases. In France, the children of immigrants receive French citizenship on their eighteenth birthday by declaration, as long as they have lived five out of the previous seven years in France. Their children automatically become French citizens by birth. In Sweden, minor immigrants obtain Swedish citizenship after five years’ residence through simple notification by their parents. In Finland, Denmark and Sweden from 12 years of age and in Austria from 14 years of age the children of immigrants have the right to make their own application for naturalisation.

In many European countries, naturalisation for the children of immigrants is made easier by the option of dual citizenship, on condition that there are no corresponding legal problems in the country of origin. For example, in

5. Although naturalisation rates have again fallen since 2003, they have remained stable at the 1997 level.
6. These »exceptions« now concern around 50 per cent of all naturalisation procedures. Dual citizenship is permitted for three groups: recognised refugees, EU citizens and persons from countries which do not permit their citizens to give up their citizenship or which interpose heavy financial or bureaucratic obstacles. An important group which is excluded from dual citizenship is the Turkish minority.
7. These »exceptions« now concern around 50 per cent of all naturalisation procedures. Dual citizenship is permitted for three groups: recognised refugees, EU citizens and persons from countries which do not permit their citizens to give up their citizenship or which interpose heavy financial or bureaucratic obstacles. An important group which is excluded from dual citizenship is the Turkish minority.
Belgium, dual citizenship is generally permitted for the children of immigrants.

Besides Belgium, France, Ireland, Portugal and the UK allow dual citizenship for the first-generation children of immigrants born in the country. After Finland decided in 2003 generally to permit dual citizenship, in 2004 it registered the highest naturalisation rate in the EU, with 6.4 per cent of all immigrants.

Many EU member states make naturalisation easier for refugees and stateless persons. After the Belgian reform of 2000 the residence requirements for these two groups were reduced to two years. The naturalisation procedures in Luxembourg and Ireland are particularly conducive to the integration of refugees because they do not impose particular conditions – such as knowledge of the language – on refugees.8

**Right to vote in local elections**

For the purpose of enabling some sort of political participation even without full citizens’ rights, which are conditional on citizenship, a right to vote in local elections for foreigners is also conceivable, which has existed since 1995 for EU citizens.

To date, six EU member states have extended the right to vote in local elections to non-EU citizens: in Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Hungary non-EU citizens with legal residence, after being entered in the electoral register under various conditions, mainly related to the length of legal residence, have the active and passive right to vote at the political level closest to citizens.9 In addition, Belgium and Luxembourg have at least an active right to vote for all third-country nationals.

To be sure, the proportion of third-country nationals who vote is low in most countries, which may be due, among other things, to the formality of entry in the electoral register. For example, the rates of registration in the electoral register in Belgium – where, as already mentioned, voting is compulsory – indicate only modest participation of between 15 and 20 per cent of potential voters. On this basis, it seems that the introduction of a right to vote in local elections is not the sole solution to the problem of improving the political participation of immigrants. Political parties must open themselves up in order to recruit

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8. This is based on the vague obligation laid down in Article 34 of the Geneva Convention on Refugees.

9. The number of countries which have introduced such a right to vote in local elections for third country nationals varies in different studies. This is mainly for two reasons: on the one hand, countries such as the UK only extend voting rights to selected groups – in the British case, to persons from Commonwealth countries – but not to all foreigners. On the other hand, there are countries which apply the principle of reciprocity, granting the right to vote only if the other country does the same for its citizens. The extent of the right to vote in local elections in that case depends on the relevant treaties. Spain is an example. The six states mentioned above have a comprehensive right to vote in local elections.
promising candidates and be on the lookout for them. In particular, existing immigrants in political parties must have access to better networks, they must be courted and encouraged to commit themselves permanently to the party, for example, by offering them the opportunity for candidacies. In addition, contacts with immigrant associations must be cultivated, while in the workplace efforts must be made to recruit successful immigrants.

Establishment of integration officers and consultative bodies

Besides these direct forms of political participation one might imagine instruments which involve immigrants in political processes at least indirectly. In all European countries positions have been established at many levels – local, regional and national – for integration officers and consultative bodies, the latter serving policy-making primarily in an advisory capacity. To that extent, integration officers and advisory councils are rather compensatory and indirect instruments of participation, intended to represent the interests of immigrants for a transitional period, via intervention and consultation, until they can be integrated in the political sphere directly. In particular, consultative bodies can play a participatory role here. Often, these bodies consist of representatives of important immigrant organisations, on the one hand, and representatives of political organs, on the other. A few bodies of this kind comprise only immigrant representatives, however, and try as lobby organisations to actively pursue their interests in society, including in relation to political actors. Three aspects are of particular importance: (i) the actual representativeness of these bodies in relation to the population they represent; (ii) their specific competences, beyond a simple right to receive a hearing; and (iii) the informal influence which not least actual decision-making bodies voluntarily grant them.

While in Germany such advisory councils have been established and are active primarily at local level, in other countries such institutions have also developed at national level. For example, in the Netherlands the »National Dialogue Structure« for ethnic minorities has provided a solid legal and financial basis for advice and information since 1997. It has also led to the establishment of an institutional consultation procedure for ethnic minorities with regard to the Dutch government, complementing the existing parliamentary procedure. In the event of differences of opinion between members of the Dialogue Structure and the government, the Dutch parliament settles the matter. As a result, ethnic minorities have been integrated to some extent into the country’s corporatist culture.

Denmark’s Council for Ethnic Minorities is also a national advisory body, which has also established platforms at regional level, in accordance with the need to debate various issues, as they arise.

In the Flemish part of Belgium, the »Minderheden For­rum« (Minorities Forum) constitutes an independent umbrella organisation of 15 associations, with more than 1,000 local immigrant organisations in Flanders and Brussels. Its function is to represent the interests of immigrants in relation to the Flemish government and is involved directly in the discussion of important issues. It is also permitted to raise issues on its own account.

In contrast, the Integration Summit in Germany – which so far has met three times – although in theory an example of national-level consultation cannot yet be regarded as an institutionalised advisory body due to its unclear representativeness10 with regard to the immigrant population and its temporary character. It does, however, represent a start.

Integration as cross-sectional task or personalisation by representatives

Another component of integration in the legal-political dimension is the adequate consideration of cultural differences in public institutions. Besides genuine diversity management, this involves a form of symbolic integration which must be applied in the first instance throughout public services. In this context, the question arises with regard to the issue of the integration of cultural minorities – as it does with regard to equal opportunities for men and women – whether there should be integration officers who represent the interests of those affected and, at the same time, function as some sort of complaints office, or whether the issue should be substantively embedded at all levels of the administration – in other words, whether it should be »mainstreamed«. Thought should also be given, again in common with gender issues – if both sets of issues are not addressed

10. Although many key actors involved in integration in Germany were represented, there was no institutionalised procedure with regard to representation. Participation was at the invitation of the German government. In some instances, it was not clear what groups participants represented.
at the same time – first and foremost to embedding by means of officers with a view to its gradual development in the direction of mainstreaming, since only in this way will the issue make its way into the heart of society via its institutions. Once the issue has truly «arrived», specialised officers will increasingly become superfluous. A first important step is the embedding of the issue at the higher levels of the administration, optimally in the form of a ministry with corresponding administrative competences and resources.

In fact, the establishment of a separate ministry for migration and integration is conceivable at the federal and regional levels. This would consolidate migration and integration, thereby demonstrating externally that immigration countries need to be proactive with regard to immigration and the promotion of the participation and integration of immigrants. France and Sweden have had ministries of this kind for a long time.

Conclusion

Germany’s restrictive citizenship law can be changed only by means of a broad social and parliamentary consensus, which would take some time to build. The discretionary rule adopted as a compromise must be improved by a greater willingness to accept dual citizenship – generally, this also applies with regard to the naturalisation procedure. Until then, participation at least in local elections for immigrants in Germany would be eminently desirable, although this too would require an amendment to the Basic Law, which at present is unlikely, given conservative reservations. Nevertheless, Social Democrats should continue to advocate the extension of the right to vote in municipal elections since this at least ensures the possibility of direct political participation at the local level and, above all, would end the unequal treatment of EU foreigners and third-country nationals, which is perceived as discriminatory.

4.2 Socioeconomic Dimension

Outline of the Problem

In many European countries, immigrants are excluded from – or discriminated against in – the central domains of socioeconomic distribution, first and foremost, work and education. As a result of this lack of participation in economic and societal life immigrants are disproportionately represented – in comparison to the population as a whole – in a stratum characterised by dependence on social benefits or low-wage employment. At the same time, there is a danger that this affiliation will be passed on from generation to generation. Subgroups of immigrants in particular on the labour market experience twofold discrimination, both as immigrants and because they belong to a certain social milieu. Only with a policy of active labour market integration and, above all, the elimination of existing discrimination on the labour market will it be possible to do something towards compensating for these disadvantages. In what follows, we shall examine a selection of programmes, specifically integration policies which, in comparison to more general policies, directly concern this often twofold discrimination against immigrants on the labour market. We shall not be looking at general policies addressing socioeconomic problems.

In order to avoid membership of disadvantaged groups being passed on to the next generation a targeted education policy is necessary. Here, too, dual ascription – as immigrant and as belonging to a low social stratum – functions in an adversely discriminatory way, and this pervades the whole of the education system. On top of this comes the added difficulty of language acquisition for the children of immigrants in kindergartens and schools. The primary task in the educational sphere, therefore, is to promote language acquisition in schools, while at the same time fostering acceptance of immigrants’ own languages. All this should be embedded in measures to open up education policy, especially by means of efforts to prevent dropping out of education early and rejection of education among young people.

Best Practice: Labour Market

Anti-discrimination on the labour market

Anti-discrimination provisions concern all phases of integrating immigrants in the labour market. As far as employment access is concerned, the primary aim is to prevent recruitment processes which are directly or indirectly discriminatory. Even after someone has been taken on, harassment and discriminatory obstacles to promotion must be eliminated. European Directive 2000/43/EC (Directive on equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin) and Directive 20078/EC
(Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation) have led, in most member states – including Germany – to the adoption of anti-discrimination laws. However, Germany lacks the broad basis of financial and legal assistance, already implemented, provided for the victims of discrimination in the UK. The British Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR), which developed out of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) in 2007, has a wide range of legal means at its disposal. A first step in this direction is the establishment of a Federal Anti-discrimination Office at the Ministry for Family Affairs.

A precondition of such an anti-discrimination policy is to take steps to boost employment among workers with an immigrant background, in particular in the public sector. First of all, there could be proactive recruitment in labour market segments in which, hitherto, few immigrants have been employed, in order to encourage immigrants to apply. This is already being done in many fields, such as the police, the fire service and other public sector domains, using advertising to increase the number of employees with an immigrant background. One successful example is the campaign »Berlin Needs You«. Advertising of this kind can involve, for example, publicising among immigrant organisations, as well as information events, especially for young immigrants. Similar advertising measures could be tried in the private sector.

A second, even bigger step would be to make job applications anonymous (without name, photograph or date of birth), which has long been the practice in the USA, in an effort to prevent structural discrimination against candidates from an ethnic or cultural minority. It is important to be clear about the benefits and disadvantages of such anonymisation. Recruitment tests must be scrutinised in case they ask for knowledge which is too culturally specific and purged of culturally tinted questions. This is particularly difficult in France, where recruitment tests have a long tradition in the public administration (Concours).

The most far-reaching measure, however, would be the establishment of an immigrant quota for the public sector (possibly also in the private sector), of the kind implemented for women, to some extent, in the 1970s. For example, in its National Action Plan for Employment in 2004, Denmark laid down that the proportion of employees with an immigrant background in the public sector should be gradually increased to 3.5 per cent. It is important for the implementation of a quota that the rules are clear: for example, in the case of candidates with equal qualifications the employment of a candidate with an immigrant background should be given preference, and the proportion of immigrants should be increased until a desired percentage figure has been reached. The laying down of such targets enables immigrants to identify more easily with measures of this kind and not regard themselves as »token immigrants«. Affirmative action is certainly the most effective of such methods, but at present it is also the most controversial.

Active labour market integration

Given the problems arising from emphasising job candidates’ formal qualifications more flexible approaches to skill assessment are needed. These include, first of all, a clear procedure for formally recognising qualifications obtained in the country of origin, both formal and in the nature of job experience. Denmark represents a good example here, issuing, at five regional centres, so-called »skills cards« for refugees and immigrants, detailing their aptitudes and, in particular, practical skills. A specific form of integration should be found, first of all with regard to formal regulation, before the conditions are created in which immigrants are able to prove themselves, especially in practice, and also establish contacts with potential employers. Forms of support of this kind, which build on one another, would help to facilitate labour market inclusion.

There are special programmes to this end in all European countries: the following are especially noteworthy.

In 2005, Sweden created two interesting programmes. The first – »Assessing Skills in the Workplace« – offers qualified immigrants a three-week training period in their occupation, in the course of which they are given an opportunity to prove their professional qualifications in the workplace. They are awarded a certificate which they can then submit with future job applications. The programme »Probationary Employment« offers immigrants without professional experience in Sweden the opportunity of three months’ employment under supervision. If this does not lead to a permanent job a certificate is awarded, listing existing and acquired skills. Half of all participants in the programme are able to find jobs in the regular labour market.

The Danish project on business-oriented integration (2003–2006) supported the incorporation of new immi-
grants in the labour market by means of a four-stage model. In the active starting phase, lasting from three to six months, immigrants received intensive language instruction and courses in Danish culture and society. This was followed by state-financed practical training, with further language teaching. In this phase, companies were able to test job applicants’ professional know-how. On that basis, companies entered into an employment contract with the immigrant, although part of their wages was still paid by the municipality. If need be, they continued to receive language lessons, as well as job-related further training. In the fourth and final stage, the new immigrant was given a regular job, initially with a specially trained mentor.

The Dutch pilot programme »Step2work« is intended to facilitate the entry into the labour market of school-leavers without qualifications, offering one year’s practical training, financed by the state, at the end of which a regular employment contract is negotiated with the employer. There is a preparatory course for the programme, as well as continuous training. It has been surprisingly successful, with 102 out of 120 participants getting a job.

Mentoring programmes are available in many other countries, including at local level, to help in the transition from education to employment. In France, volunteer retirees help school-leavers in their search for training places and jobs. At present, there are 18,000 young people under the wing of the mentoring programme and the target is 20,000. At regional level, a mentoring programme for school-leavers was launched successfully within the framework of the EQUAL project for women »Immigrants Integrating Immigrants« (2002–2004 in Ostwestfalen-Lippe), under which older female immigrants who are already in employment provide girls and younger women with support. This project is particularly interesting because it also incorporates a gender aspect. In this programme the use of role models appears to have been important. The periods of transition between school and training, and between study and work are particularly well suited to such mentoring programmes.

Best Practice: Education

State provision of education and support in early childhood plays a decisive role, particularly for children with an immigrant background, but also those from vulnerable social strata. In this area, in particular the two Scandinavian countries Denmark and Sweden can be regarded as role models, offering structured pre-school education with curricula and language assistance for children whose native language is not Danish (or Swedish), including regular language tests to check on their progress. In Denmark, so-called »support teachers« are appointed for children who need special assistance. Although there are no compulsory day-care centres in either country, over 90 per cent of all children attend such centres or pre-school. Compulsory kindergarten for all children from the age of three has also been under consideration in France and Belgium, but so far agreement has been reached only on the mandatory pre-school period.

A wide range of language and other support is provided in all European countries for the children of new immigrants. They differ only in terms of the extent to which they integrate children directly in class, with special teaching, in particular in the language of instruction, or first provide separate transitional classes which are supposed to ease the transition of immigrant children to normal classes by means of intensive lessons in all subjects, particularly in the majority language. As long as these transitional classes are not a long-term arrangement, but provide only transitional help with regard to integration in regular classes there can be no objection to such interim solutions, which may be of particular help for new immigrants. In this context the question arises of why additional teaching staff or social workers are not made available for accompanying special classes – especially language classes – with regard to direct integration in normal classes, according to age. Of particular importance would appear to be systematic – and at an early stage – language teaching (see OECD 2006).

There are very different approaches to teaching in immigrants’ own languages across Europe, ranging from traditional lessons in the native language, organised by the relevant embassy in the afternoon, to the trilingual teaching model used in, for example, Flemish pre- and primary schools in Brussels since the beginning of the 1980s, in which all children learn French, Flemish and their respective immigrant language (for example, Italian) from the first year onwards. Initially, children are taught in separate language groups and then are gradually brought together in mixed classes. This singular model has been highly successful and proves that even trilingualism can
be fostered from the outset. However, it would not be so easy to transfer it to other cities or countries. Generally speaking, however, raising the profile of immigrant languages – such as Turkish, Arabic and Russian – makes a lot of sense and it would be a good idea to make available the major immigrant languages, after English, as second- and third-language options in secondary schools, which is only sporadically available in Germany, for example, in some schools in Berlin-Kreuzberg. In France, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the UK native languages can at least be taken as optional within the framework of the regular curriculum. Traditional native language teaching outside regular school hours, offered exclusively to children from specific linguistic groups, should be regarded as out-dated, however, since it tends to result in exclusion rather than integration; if it is to be retained, it should at least be opened up to all children.

The involvement of the parents, at least in the case of small children – in other words, pre- and primary school children – is a key element of this kind of support. In this context, language courses for mothers and fathers can be provided, but joint leisure activities, in which as many parents as possible take part, are also useful. The »neighbourhood mothers« (Stadtteilmütter) programme in Berlin-Neukölln is certainly a step in the right direction. Other models include the Frankfurt project »Mum’s Learning German – Dad Too« (Mama lernt Deutsch – Papa auch), which offers 100 German-language courses to primary and secondary schools in which parents are taught, according to their needs. In particular with regard to the education of young children, focusing on parents and involving them in the provision of language support for immigrants and their children can be considered crucial.

Teachers with an immigrant background can be important role models for immigrant children and young people. In particular, more immigrants should be recruited for teacher training. The profession should be made more attractive to them, but the training of all teachers should increasingly take into consideration intercultural benchmarks. This kind of revision of school curricula in accordance with interculturally oriented teacher training is already being implemented in most European countries, including Germany.

These days, teachers are increasingly likely to encounter classes in which a majority or significant minority of children and young people have an immigrant background, for whom they should be able to function as mediators, based on their various linguistic, social and cultural needs. In addition, they should have an awareness of the key cultural characteristics of their pupils in order to be able to avoid possible conflicts. Naturally, they should also know how to defuse conflict situations. Teachers must be given continuous training in such mediation, of the kind which has been provided by the Education Ministry in the Canadian province of Quebec for a number of years. Mediation is made all the easier, of course, when a school has on its staff teachers from the same immigrant background as the larger immigrant groups among its pupils, enabling them to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers.

Of particular importance are measures to combat total failure at school and dropping out of the education system in order to reduce the high number of children of immigrants who leave without proper qualifications and thus have no chance of getting a training place. For that purpose, school social workers and school psychologists should be deployed to help pupils with major personal, family and specific social problems, since unruly behaviour is almost always the consequence of multilayered problems. France has established so-called zones d’éducation prioritaires (Priority Education Zones) which provide schools in socially deprived areas with extra resources which they use mainly for additional social care for pupils.

Conclusion

Labour market policies should take much more account than hitherto of the twofold discrimination against immigrants from lower social strata and combat it. In addition, only more flexible forms of recognition, especially of occupational skills, can help to obtain the acceptance of qualifications obtained abroad within the German system. Affirmative action, especially in the public sector, should certainly be considered as a transitional measure on the labour market.

Schools in which all children study together over an extended period promote the integration of minorities and foster the social learning of all children, regardless of origin, with lasting effect (see, for example, Wößmann/Schütz 2006: 19ff). Germany’s three-tier school system,
in contrast, is often not sufficiently permeable and thus may sometimes serve only to further exclude children from socially vulnerable families. To this end, the trend towards longer periods during which pupils of all aptitudes study together in so-called comprehensive schools (Gesamtschulen), but also through a longer period spent at primary school, as well as so-called »community schools« (comprehensive schools) is to be supported.

4.3 The Cultural-Religious Dimension

Outline of the Problem

In this dimension, integration policy is aimed at the recognition in public space of the cultural, religious and linguistic identities of all citizens – and thus also of immigrants – so that they are accepted as part of the self-image of the whole nation. This involves, on the one hand, forms of cultural and linguistic expression, but in the first place the recognition of forms of religious expression previously regarded as alien. The recognition of cultural differences is relevant primarily with regard to the politics of symbolism, as well as integration tests and celebrations, but the recognition of religious differences is more far-reaching. Besides individual religious freedom and worship which, in European countries, are guaranteed in various forms by the relevant fundamental rights, this means the embedding of collective organisation and practice in the respective historical relations between state and religion which take many different forms in European states. In fact, in Europe countries what is primarily at issue is the collective integration of Islam, with regard to which two aspects are of particular importance in Germany:

(i) Since integration has to adapt itself to existing historical arrangements between state authorities and religious communities in a country, borrowing from other European contexts – for example, from more secular countries – without adjusting for circumstances is difficult, even for old-established religions.

(ii) Although equal recognition by public institutions is important for the integration of immigrants it is important to consider that religious communities are primarily »guardians of identity« and not »pilots of integration« (see also Kandel 2004).

The following issues must be clarified in all European countries, not just in Germany:

(i) Some sort of modus vivendi must be found at national level for dealing with individual religious symbols in the public arena (and in state institutions).

(ii) Religious instruction in state schools which has developed historically should be extended, in an appropriate manner, to Islam in order to set it on an equal footing with old-established religions.

(iii) In particular in order to deal with the latter in organisational and institutional terms a contact partner is needed for the state authorities, in the context of which structures within Islam must be taken into consideration.

Best Practice

Concerning point (i): In all European societies there have been intense debates for some time about individual forms of Islamic religious expression, such as the wearing of headscarves and how this should be approached in the public arena. More secular countries, such as France and the Francophone community in Belgium have taken a path of their own in this respect. Not only have they banned the wearing of religious symbols – such as the headscarf – by public-sector employees, but they have extended the prohibition to schoolchildren while on school premises. In France, this ban applies to state schools nationwide, while in Belgium, in accordance with local juris-

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11. The acceptance of religious practices, naturally, concerns only those covered by fundamental rights. Religious and cultural practices which interfere with the well-being of other people do not come into consideration. Among other religious issues, another source of problems is the social pressure which may be exerted by a person’s surroundings and family environment.

12. Briefly, this means that the interests and motives of a religious community lie in strengthening their members’ religious convictions – which may involve separation from »outsiders« – and not in making it easier for individuals to integrate in society.

13. At local level, contacts and, on occasion, conflict resolution supervene with the building of representative mosques. This will not be dealt with here since the issue is dependent on diverse local factors. The main problems in almost all cases are a lack of acceptance in the local area and unclear financing structures.

14. There shall be no discussion here of the extent to which a headscarf is not only a religious symbol, but also a political statement of Islamist views. Opinions on this subject diverge considerably (see Oestrich 2004).
diction, in large parts of the country. In the meantime, in both countries (and also in the Flemish part of Belgium) the debate has gone so far that the burqa’s is not permitted on public premises, even for visitors, not just those employed there.

Given the strong protection bestowed on individual religious freedom by the German Constitution – and despite the recently adopted »headscarf laws« – regulations from other countries might be more relevant for Germany. In countries such as the UK or Sweden, more open ways of dealing with forms of religious or cultural expression have developed. For example, in the UK public sector employees are not only permitted to wear individual garments with religious significance, such as the Muslim headscarf or the Sikh turban, while they are at work, but such garments are integrated in the relevant service and dress codes. There are similar regulations in Sweden and the Netherlands. This enables religious people to be integrated in the public sector without having to relinquish the symbols of their religion.

Concerning point (ii): The integration of new religions on a collective basis in the state education system represents the institutionalisation of religious instruction. The extent to which this is provided for the Muslim religion depends, first and foremost, on the place of religious instruction in the school systems of individual European states.

Within Europe, three country groups can be distinguished:

(i) states which recognise confessional religious instruction;

(ii) states which have religious studies on their school curricula;

(iii) states which have no religious instruction on their curricula at all, such as France (with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine).

It is important to note that countries in the third category do not necessarily exclude religion from the education system altogether – the proportion of private (usually confessional) schools must also be taken into account. For example, although France and the Netherlands have no religious instruction in state schools, in a large proportion of private schools – recognised by the state – religious instruction may be obligatory, pursuant to private law regulations. For example, particularly in the Netherlands the founding of private Islamic schools is supported in the same way as other confessional schools. In this way, Islam is put on an equal footing with other religions, although it is, at the very least, controversial whether this reinforces tendencies towards separatism among adolescents.

In contrast are the countries in which there is religious instruction on a confessional basis. This concerns countries such as Denmark and Sweden, as well as England and Scotland in the UK – in other words, primarily countries which have (or had) an established church and in which – at least formally – there does not exist a strict separation between church and state. The English regulations provide an example: based on the Education Act of 1944 there must be religious instruction in all state schools – although, as non-confessional »religious education« it deals with all religions, the focus is on Christianity. This instruction is organised at local level, that is, under the administration of the local education authority and the Standing Advisory Council for Religious Education. Represented on this advisory body, which is also responsible for curricula and the appointment of teachers, besides the education authority, teachers’ organisations and the Anglican Church, are also other religious organisations from the school district in question. As a result, diverse arrangements are possible across the country, based on the respective religious affiliation of the local population.

In Germany, until there is some sort of (overall) representation of Islamic organisations at a higher level and its recognition by the Länder, a local approach of this kind might offer a first step towards the integration of Islam in schools.

In any case, assuming that compulsory, faith-oriented religious instruction, pursuant to Article 7.3 of the German Constitution, will continue, in particular experiences from European countries with similar regulations will be of interest. These countries are, first and foremost, Belgium, Austria and, to some extent, Switzerland.16 In Austria, there has been Islamic (Sunni) religious instruction since 1982. The teaching staff are funded by the state and selected by the Islamic Religious Community, a representa-

15. The exceptions in Bremen, Berlin and Brandenburg based on Article 141 of the Constitution shall not be addressed here.
16. Since Switzerland has extremely diverse cantonal and local regulations, Austria and Belgium will be dealt with here.
tive body (see below). For a long time it was difficult to find suitably qualified personnel, since most of the teachers came from abroad, which contributed little to integration in the host country. Only since 1998 has there been training of teachers of religion at the Islamischen Religionspädagogischen Akademie (IRPA), which has been privately run since 2007, largely with Arab training staff in Arabic. It must be stressed that the teacher training provided is very conservative and purely Sunni.

Similar problems have emerged in Belgium. After the recognition of Islam as an »official« religion, with a corresponding right to religious instruction, first of all the responsibility for appointing teachers of religion was given to the Centre Islamique et Culturell (ICC – also the Grande Mosque in Brussels). At the end of the 1980s, in particular local mayors in Brussels heavily criticised this regulation since the Centre was almost entirely dependent on Saudi Arabia for its funding and so a very strict interpretation of Islam came into play and virtually no training – and especially not in Belgium – was organised. As a result, this responsibility was taken away from the ICC. The general representative body for Muslims (see below) is to be given this task, but due to internal problems facing these institutions the regulations remain ad hoc.

The main challenge with regard to the establishment of religious instruction which is also carried out by religious communities is that these communities must be in a position to conduct the necessary teacher training in a transparent and clearly discernible manner (or be able to participate fully in what the state provides). At the same time, it must be ensured that any detrimental influence on integration which might be exercised by state or non-state actors can be prevented.

Concerning point (iii): The problems in Belgium with regard to the institutionalisation of religious instruction and the accompanying teacher training indicate the main problems facing the equal recognition of Islam in European states: the lack of a (or of several) legitimate and authoritative collective contact body, if corresponding partners from various countries of origin are ruled out. Experiences in European states – for example, France, Belgium and Austria – so far are not very promising.

In both Belgium and France the state has taken on a massive role in the organisation of the Muslim minority. For example, in 2000, the French government invited selected figures from the Muslim community to participate in the founding of a national Muslim Council (Conseil français du culte musulman – CFCM). The Council’s 41 representatives were elected by delegates of individual mosques, based on the size of each mosque, which resulted in the governing board being divided up between three organisations. In addition, the French government insisted that the chairman be the Imam of the Grande Mosquée (Great Mosque) in Paris, regardless of the outcome of the election. There are also fears, though proven, that foreign actors – for example, from Algeria and Morocco – exert some influence over the Council’s orientation and positioning.

In response to the problems related to teacher training in the mid-1990s the Belgian government launched a process aimed, more or less, at bringing into being a new contact body. Thus the Exécutif des musulmans de Belgique (EMB) was established; an election was held in the mosques in 1998 to choose the members of its general assembly. However, Muslims of Turkish origin considered themselves to be underrepresented and so, under pressure from the Minister of Justice, another election was held in 2005. This time, the Muslims of Moroccan origin boycotted the election. This illustrates the basic problem of representative religious bodies, which tend towards domination by ethnic or origin-related divisions. At the same time, there are criticisms that subsequent vetting by the state gives the latter too strong an influence over the composition of the Executive.

The Islamic Faith Community of Austria (Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich – IGGiÖ) has been a public corporation since 1979 and is both the official representative in most relations with the state and also responsible for organising religious instruction. Its position, analogous to that of the Christian churches, derives from the Law on Islam, issued by Emperor Franz Joseph I in 1912, which was enacted as a consequence of the integration of Bosnia, with its majority Muslim population. One problem with this arrangement is the establishment of the IGGiÖ based on only one of the Sunni schools of law (math’hab), as a
result of which none of the others – as well as the other strands of Islam – are represented.

The problems of organisation and related cooperation are the same in all the countries under examination. The cause is the legitimacy and decision-making authority of umbrella organisations in relation to local mosques and the Muslim population in general. If the composition of particular bodies is dominated either by one Islamic orientation or even by a specific ethnic group, this lack of representativeness leads to corresponding problems of acceptance among other groups and thus is not conducive to integration among public institutions.

Conclusion

Recognition of Islam and its incorporation in the public arena can contribute to the integration of Muslim minorities in Western democracies. To be sure, this is by no means inevitable, as the alienation of a growing minority of young Muslims from the rest of society in the UK shows. Two considerations are decisive for integration in terms of this central issue of recognition. On the one hand, social issues should not be »Islamised« and on the other hand, no solutions to social issues can be expected from the public integration of Islam. The involvement of Islam amounts to integration in the cultural-religious dimension, not the realisation of socioeconomic participation.

5. Ideal Model for a Social Democratic Integration Policy of Participation and Recognition

In this study it is possible to provide only a brief overview of the approaches taken in various dimensions of integration in Europe. Nevertheless, lessons can be learned from this for German integration policy.

In integration and citizenship policy the European countries have pursued the national models already mentioned; these path dependencies must therefore be heeded with regard to the comparison of European best practices and possible transpositions to Germany. Notwithstanding these national models, within individual countries there is an increasing diversity in the policy instruments used in the three dimensions of integration. Inside these dimensions can be categorised in terms of whether they pursue an individual approach: in other words, aim at the integration of individuals; or whether they pursue a group-oriented approach: that is, apply a certain instrument on the basis of a group-specific criterion (see Table 4).

National models, based on path dependency, often pursue only one of these approaches, in the first instance, but the question arises of whether a »successful« integration policy, depending on the specific problems, should consist of a wide range of instruments. If one takes this view, there are implications in particular for a social democratic policy, which in all three integration dimensions should be oriented towards the facilitation of social participation and cultural recognition.

With regard to the public arena, hitherto social democratic policies have displayed a clear preference for facilitating the participation in society’s arenas of allocation on a universalistic basis, while neglecting cultural differences – whether on the individual or the collective level – or regarding them as a private matter. Such a difference-blind policy overlooks relevant disparities between citizens and leaves untouched potential discrimination regardless of equal opportunities for participation, not to mention stereotypes and prejudices on the part of the majority population. Not least a lack of symbolic recognition of important group identities can lead to a lack of identification among the relevant groups with the nation and with society as a whole.

Integration presupposes a balanced relationship between the equal participation (and equal opportunity) of all and recognition of differences. This relationship varies in the respective dimensions of integration.

In the legal-political dimension, policy must be oriented towards individual participation in the life of the community. The community of all citizens and equal rights for all citizens – quite apart from other differences – are the relevant aims. The establishment of equality of political rights must, in any case, be accompanied by a symbolic politics of the commonality of all citizens – pride in the Constitution should be somehow tangible. It is precisely on this issue that the political left has some catching up to do.

The facilitation of real socioeconomic participation – emphasised by previous social democratic policy and shaped
less by ideological prescriptions than by an orientation towards dealing with specific problems – should be supplemented by group-related policy instruments in areas in which discrimination is the result of group characteristics. In this dimension in particular a balanced relationship must be constantly maintained between participation and recognition. Exemplary in this respect are the programmes introduced in Sweden and Denmark to facilitate transition to the regular labour market for immigrants, as well as comprehensive and systematic language teaching programmes.

On the other hand, in the cultural-religious dimension what matters most is to treat existing differences and group identities within a nation equally and also to afford them recognition in the public arena, since religions and ethnic groups involve group identities. A certain ambivalence should be borne in mind with regard to this dimension, however. Recognition of cultural difference should not be taken so far that it reinforces the cultural gap between communities and erodes the foundations of coexistence to such an extent that it ends up in a disconnected juxtaposition of small collectivities. It is difficult to know where to draw the line here. Two aspects are worth noting. In order to deal with all individual issues appropriately what is needed, first, is a lasting and, in the best case, institutionalised dialogue – especially with conservative religious actors (see Schiffauer 2008: 123ff). Second, all aspects which enjoy constitutional status cannot be the subject of negotiations with regard to their essential characteristics (see Bielefeldt 2003: 85ff). When it comes to determining matters of practical implementation and organisation the Federal Constitutional Court represents a decision-making level of final appeal.19

In all three dimensions of integration, but especially in the cultural-religious dimension, this tension with regard to emerging problems with participation or recognition must remain the subject of continuing discussion and policy must be adapted to the prevailing circumstances.20 When adopting policy instruments from other European contexts, therefore, they must be adapted to the relevant problem situations and path dependencies in such a way that participation and recognition can be pursued in a coherent fashion.

19. The various decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht – BverfG) with reference to religion include a multitude of relevant criteria, especially with regard to dealings with actors, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, who do not entirely share the values of the German Constitution (see Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts/BverfGE [Decisions of the German Constitutional Court] 102,370 ff. of 19.12.2000). In any case, in the case of the »headscarf issue« the Court issued a »non-decision« (see Henkes / Kneip 2009).

20. The intercultural approach taken by Quebec can be regarded as a model for such a pragmatic, egalitarian and, at the same time, culturally sensitive policy. It steers a middle course between French universalism and Canadian multiculturalism, thereby enabling it to select appropriate instruments from both approaches. Part and parcel of this integration policy is a contrat moral which immigrants must sign which, in return for extensive support with regard to socioeconomic integration, contains an obligation to learn French.

Table 4: Classification of Individual Instruments

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Legal-political</th>
<th>Socioeconomic</th>
<th>Religious-cultural</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual approach</td>
<td>Open naturalisation policy (for example, in Belgium)</td>
<td>Antidiscrimination policy (for example, the UK)</td>
<td>Public incorporation of individual religious symbols (for example, in the UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Right to vote in local elections</td>
<td>Labour market support (for example, programmes in Sweden and Denmark)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group approach</td>
<td>Consultative bodies (for example, the Minderheden-forum in Flanders)</td>
<td>Employment quotas (for example, in Denmark)</td>
<td>Religious instruction (for example, in Austria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Special labour market programmes</td>
<td>Bodies of collective representa-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minority languages in the education system</td>
<td>tion (for example, in France)</td>
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Further Reading


About the authors

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