While, under the aegis of rampant globalisation, Ulrich Beck’s admonition that »the trade unions must reinvent themselves transnationally« is more pertinent than ever, transnational trade union federations remain virtually ignored in the, by now, extensive globalisation and global governance literature.

The present article presents selected results from a larger research project which addressed the question of how the far-reaching changes in the global political order and burgeoning economic globalisation since the 1990s are reflected in the organisational policies, agenda and practical tools – in short: in a transformation of the functional profile – of the, at present, 11 Global Union Federations.

An analytical concept was used to develop these questions borrowed from political science studies of governance in multi-level systems. The categories developed there for national politics constitute the frame of reference and are applied, in modified form, to transnational trade union cooperation.
## Content

**Functional Profiles of Transnational Trade Union Federations:**
- An Analytical Framework ......................................................... 3

**Membership Growth between the »Logic of Representativeness« and the »Logic of Resources«** ......................................................... 3

**Increasing Regionalisation and Continentalisation** ....................... 6

**Transnational Problem-Solving** ................................................. 6
- Member-Oriented Policy .......................................................... 6
- Policy on Sectoral Interests ...................................................... 7
- Corporate Group Policy ........................................................... 8

**Functional Profiles Lag Behind the Challenges Faced** .................... 9

**References** ............................................................................. 11
Functional Profiles of Transnational Trade Union Federations: An Analytical Framework

The status of the transnational trade union federations as »actors« – or what that status should be – has been a recurrent issue throughout the history of trade union internationalism. Against this multi-layered background to the debate an analytical framework was developed aimed at categorising actually existing or potential functional profiles of transnational trade union federations on the basis of a multi-stage model (for more detail on the derivation of this model, see Platzer/Müller 2009: 44ff; Rüb 2009: 82ff).

This taxonomic framework can serve both the historical categorisation of a federation’s development and the (synchronic) comparison of current phases of development and functional profiles of existing federations. The multi-stage model is worked out in detail by means of indicators specific to individual areas of activity. In real terms that can mean, for example, that a Global Union Federation exhibits the characteristics of a »steering« body in the field of policy on corporate groups (»Konzernpolitik«), while in the field of sectoral industrial policy the same federation functions merely as a forum.

Table 1   Functional Profiles of Transnational Trade Unions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional profile</th>
<th>Mode and scope of transnational problem-solving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supranational federation</td>
<td>Hierarchical governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extensive competences and mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steering body</td>
<td>Lays down binding decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standardises operational objectives (for example, rules for coordinating collective bargaining and policy on corporate groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mandate on a case-by-case basis, as well as with regard to specific issues and for a fixed period of time, for transnational negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lays down mechanisms for the implementation of decisions and their monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishes obligations and transparency inside the federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination platform</td>
<td>Regular and structured coordination via joint positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standardisation of operational objectives (for example, framework agreements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination of positions through the provision of »soft« guidance to member federations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum</td>
<td>Regular exchange of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continuous coordination and mediation of positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consensus-oriented rapprochement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provider of information services</td>
<td>Exchange of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partial – or limited to specific issues – cooperation and coordination of positions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Global Union Federations have expanded since the 1990s and have grown significantly in terms of the number of member federations and the total number of members they represent. Table 2 presents the key organisational data at the time of writing.

Membership Growth between the »Logic of Representativeness« and the »Logic of Resources«

The growth and far-reaching structural transformation of the membership of all federations is due primarily to the end of the bipolar world order. The systemic transformation in the former Eastern Bloc and the emergence of trade unions independent of the state in Central and Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states of Central Asia have led, since the beginning of the 1990s, to considerable membership growth in several waves of accession.

All GUFs (Global Union Federations) have also been able to attract new members in regions in which previously they were poorly represented, in particular, the Arab world, the Middle East and Central Africa. This process of regional enlargement is the result of the closer inte-
Table 2 Global Union Federations at a Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GUFs</th>
<th>Total membership</th>
<th>Member federations</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Location of secretariat/staff</th>
<th>Regional offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education International</td>
<td>30 million</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>Brussels/61 employees</td>
<td>4 regional offices: Africa, Asia/Pacific, Latin America, North America/Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF – International Metalworkers’ Federation</td>
<td>25 million</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Geneva/42 employees</td>
<td>South Asia, Southeast Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, East Africa and Southern Africa + 1 project office in Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICEM – International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions</td>
<td>20 million</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>Brussels/20 employees</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNI – Union Network International</td>
<td>20 million</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>Nyon, Switzerland/106 employees</td>
<td>4 main offices: Europe, Africa, America, Asia/Pacific + 10 smaller regional offices: Argentina, Australia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Russia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI – Public Services International</td>
<td>20 million</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>Ferney-Voltaire, France/76 employees</td>
<td>4 regional offices: Asia/Pacific, Europe, Africa and Arab countries, Central America and Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BWI – Building and Woodworkers’ International</td>
<td>12 million</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Geneva/44 employees</td>
<td>3 regional offices: South Africa, Malaysia, Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUF – International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations</td>
<td>11 million</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Geneva/65 employees</td>
<td>6 regional offices: Africa, Asia/Pacific, Caribbean, Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITGLWF – International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation</td>
<td>10 million</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Brussels/22 employees (1)</td>
<td>4 regional offices: Africa, the Americas, Asia/Pacific, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITF – International Transport Workers’ Federation</td>
<td>4.5 million</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>London/ca. 130 employees</td>
<td>5 regional offices: Africa, Asia/Pacific, CIS, Americas, Arab world + subregional office in New Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA – International Arts and Entertainment Alliance</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Brussels/No independent office</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFJ – International Federation of Journalists</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>Brussels/22 employees</td>
<td>3 regional offices: Africa, Asia/Pacific, Latin America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the authors.
igration of these countries in the world economy due to globalization and, not least, the long-term commitment of the GUFs to building up and consolidating trade union organisations in them.

Certainly, the general membership growth trend varies considerably in individual federations. The spread ranges from fairly limited growth in total membership since the 1980s of around 300,000 in the case of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) to five million in the case of Public Services International (PSI). While a good two-thirds of ITF members (still) come from trade unions in OECD countries, in other GUFs – such as PSI or the IUF – the regional weighting has shifted considerably in the wake of membership growth. One need only look at the growth in affiliated member federations and their countries of origin. In the case of PSI, at the beginning of the 1990s it had around 300 member organisations from about 100 countries; by 2008 this had risen to 635 organisations from 156 countries. In the same period, the number of federations affiliated to the IUF increased from around 200 to well over 300, the number of countries of origin doubling from around 60 to 120.

Geographical expansion means that, for the first time in their, in some cases, over 100-year history, the Global Union Federations are truly global organisations with a worldwide membership. The state trade unions in China remain outside the fold, however.

Another reason for the growth in membership is the overcoming in the West of the split based on »Richtungsgewerkschaften« (unions with particular ideological or party political links, generally leftist or Christian democrat), which came to an end in 2006 with the amalgamation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) to form the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Individual Global Union Federations, such as the International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF) had already anticipated this move. They had long had »Christian democratic« member federations, too. Other GUFs, such as the Building and Woodworkers’ International (BWI) in 2005, emerged directly from this process of convergence between »free« and »Christian democratic« trade union internationals.

Finally, the amalgamation of formerly independent international trade union organisations to form multi-branch federations is also a factor. This corresponds to a long-term historical trend which continues to this day. From the merger of sectoral federations have emerged the IUF in 1994, the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM) in 1995, Public Services International (PSI) in 2000 and the International Arts and Entertainment Alliance (IAEA) in 2001.

Basically as a consequence of this membership growth all GUFs now find themselves caught between the »logic of representativeness and legitimacy« and the »logic of resources« (Croucher/Cotton 2009: 115). The increase in the number of members and their geographical spread serve to strengthen the representativeness of federations and enhance their legitimacy as the global voice of the interests of individual trade unions. With the ending of the division in the coordination of trade unions at the international level the present-day Global Union Federations are gaining a monopoly position in the sectors they represent.

But this increase in representativeness does not necessarily go hand in hand with increased legitimacy – whether internally, with regard to the membership, or externally, with regard to those on whom they exert influence. One reason for this is that the membership expansion has, at the same time, dramatically changed the »logic of resources« by exacerbating structural underfunding.

The problem of lack of resources has always dominated the agendas of the Global Union Federations. However, funding problems have been exacerbated by the combined effect of two factors.

First, the membership growth in all Global Union Federations has mostly involved federations characterised not only by financial weakness, but also by programmatically, organisationally and politically unstable trade union identities. Their contributions tend to be in inverse proportion to the escalation in the responsibilities of transnational federations as a consequence of membership growth. This applies to the transformed state trade unions and newly founded organisations in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc (Kohl/Platzer 2004 and 2007) and, even more so, to the newly acceded member organisations from Africa, the Arab world and Central Asia.

Second, the majority of trade unions in OECD countries, which are the main contributors to transnational feder-
ations, are confronted by the problem of declining membership. Since contributions are assessed in the first instance on the basis of the membership size of affiliated trade union organisations this has direct negative effects on financial resources at the transnational level.

The contribution systems of all GUFs are graduated in accordance with country categories and national economic indicators. At some GUFs, such as the IUF, contribution differences are so substantial that they distinguish officially between »representative membership« and »financial membership«. In recent years, all GUFs have repeatedly modified their contribution systems. The – mostly modest – contribution increases in the past two decades have even enabled the majority of GUFs to maintain the operations of their central secretariats and, to some extent, increase the number of staff (primarily at the regional offices). At the same time, their operations have become more and more dependent on external resources. In the case of some GUFs funding from various donor organisations now matches the funds provided by their own members (see Croucher/Cotton 2009: 86ff).

Croucher and Cotton (2009: 115) have put their finger on the ambivalent situation of the Global Union Federations: »On the one hand, they are politically unified, have high membership, and good levels of engagement with unions. ... On the other hand they are victims of their own success in bringing in more affiliates since demands increase as resources diminish.«

Increasing Regionalisation and Continentalisation

The GUFs have responded to their geographical expansion and membership growth with a strategy of coordinated decentralisation and regionalisation of their consensus-building structures, services and practical activities. At some federations this organisation-policy reaction goes back as far as the 1960s, when what were then known as the international trade secretariats began to expand their membership, still largely confined to Western European and US trade unions, to Asia and Latin America and later to Africa.

New to a majority of federations are the representative structures which now encompass every continent and geographical organisation at various levels, including, besides continents and macro-regions and the corresponding regional offices, also sub-regions (North Africa, West Africa and so on) and in some instances even intercountry committees (ICCs). The decentralisation trend finds expression in regular regional conferences, permanent sub-regional committees and also in growth in the full-time staff of regional offices. The federations’ key consensus-building bodies and decision-making structures have repeatedly been modified in order to ensure adequate regional representation. In statutory terms, this manifests itself in, for example, the delegation committees which make possible the »disproportionate« representation of the »peripheral regions« in bodies and at congresses.

The regionalisation tendencies which may be observed in all Global Union Federations – with the exception of the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (which, in a controversial move, recentralised its federation activities) – reflect the differentiation and pluralisation of members’ interests and needs which have gone hand in hand with geographical expansion. At the same time, they constitute an attempt, as illustrated by the case of the Transport Workers’ Federation, to moderate interregional conflicts. For example, escalating clashes of interests in the maritime sector with regard to employment and location policy between Asian emerging economies and Western industrialised countries could be headed off only through the establishment of Asia/Pacific regional committees and their close involvement in key ITF steering committees.

Transnational Problem-Solving

Member-Oriented Policy

The traditional core activities of the GUFs include supporting the organisational efforts of national member federations, implementing training and education programmes, organising solidarity actions and campaigns in individual conflicts and providing information services. Due to the enormous growth in members from developing, transformation and emerging countries and their urgent need for support services the challenges facing all GUFs have increased since the beginning of the 1990s. However, their functional profiles have changed accordingly only to a certain extent.
The resource problems described above impose relatively narrow limits on the quantitative expansion and qualitative development of member-oriented activities. The majority of GUFs have continued with traditional routines and practices. Among the innovations which have made the work of the GUFs more effective foremost, perhaps, is the systematic use of electronic media. This improves internal communications and information services for members and enhances the campaigning capabilities with regard to enterprises and governments. By means of password-protected discussion forums on the websites of global federations, virtual networks and (sub-)regional working groups the GUFs are able to create an enhanced density of interaction among member organisations, enabling the latter to input their concerns in central planning more rapidly and directly. In this way, individual global federations have managed to become vehicles for the structured coordination of joint positions and operational goals.

Policy on Sectoral Interests

The GUFs basically have two practical options available to them for promoting workers’ interests:

1. lobbying of national governments and international global governance institutions in order to influence basic political and economic conditions;

2. negotiations with the employers at the enterprise and federation levels.

Formal participation in the consultation and decision-making processes of intergovernmental organisations and informal lobbying play an important role in those sectors in which there is international funding for construction and infrastructure projects, as well as those in which international governance institutions and their regulatory activities impinge on a federation’s sphere of interests, as in the case of the Transport Workers’ Federation with regard to international transport safety. Political lobbying is particularly important for Public Services International (PSI). The global liberalisation and privatisation impetus of recent decades has presented this GUF with entirely novel challenges. In this connection, so-called »social movement unionism« (Moody 1997: 4f) has gained in significance. More than any other GUF, PSI has systematically sought to establish alliances with NGOs critical of globalisation and has adopted their action strategies.

As far as political lobbying is concerned, sceptical observers suspect that, within the framework of international trade union cooperation, national or transnational mobilisation is not on the cards even with regard to a minimal consensus on civilising global capitalism … via a merely rhetorical declaration on minimum social standards. On the one hand, the official ICFTU consensus conceals a real divergence of interests with regard to a WTO social clause … On the other hand, although internal trade union learning processes are triggered by the defeat of traditional – protectionist or social partner-oriented – approaches, they are characterised by conflict and irregularity. (Greven 2003: 349)

In bundling interests, GUFs are also often content, in the case of sensitive enterprise location and trade policy issues, with the lowest common denominator. In connection with more technical standardisation and regulatory issues, by contrast, the global federations are able to combine to such an extent that they are able to champion coherent positions in international decision-making processes and, in some cases, even get them implemented.

To sum up, since the 1990s – beyond a frequently still existing rhetoric of »countervailing power« – the Global Union Federations have pursued strategies of »pragmatic internationalism« (Reutter 1996; Müller/Platzer/Rüb 2003). This philosophy seeks consensual negotiated solutions and voluntary agreements with the employers and, in parallel with that, relies on a policy of small steps with regard to technical standardisation in order, in this way, to establish a global basis for employment policy (minimum) standards and rules of conduct. This pragmatic internationalism also, ultimately, characterises the policies of those federations which pursue a continuous – in some instances, decidedly conflict-oriented – campaign policy and like, for example, Union Network International (UNI) conceive of themselves as campaigning organisations.

Autonomous sectoral self-regulation through the establishment of dialogue and negotiations with global employers’ federations remains the exception. Sectoral framework agreements to combat child labour were reached by the IUF at the beginning of the 2000s in the tobacco and chocolate industries. Apart from that, since
October 2008 a sectoral agreement has been in place on the recognition of social minimum standards between UNI and six of the world’s largest temporary work agencies, which have combined to form the International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (CIETT). Similar efforts are under way in other sectors.

The Building and Woodworkers’ International (BWI) is now able to underpin its lobby activities with a robust bilateral social dialogue with the Confederation of International Contractors’ Associations (CICA). The employers’ federation is open to joint policy initiatives in the industry and ready to address employment policy issues. It also has a worldwide regional substructure, which creates the conditions for joint regional-decentralised initiatives.

On the other hand, two years of negotiations between ICEM and the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) on a global agreement on minimum social standards were scuppered, just when success appeared to be close at hand, by the American Chemical Council (ACC), a major ICCA member organisation.

What results are achieved by the GUFs’ sectoral social dialogue tend to be at the level of joint declarations, the first examples of which have led to framework agreements in the form of codes of conduct. Maritime shipping is a special case in this respect, in respect of which the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) has been able to conclude an international collective wage agreement with the International Maritime Employers’ Committee. Compliance with the wage agreement is ensured by means of a worldwide network of ITF port inspectors who monitor international wage norms on ships sailing under flags of convenience and, should the need arise, combine with local trade unions to take militant action to that end.

Corporate Group Policy

Against the background of the global governance architecture, which is asymmetrical with regard to the market-creating and market-correcting regulatory activities of intergovernmental organisations and the limited opportunities to reach agreement with sectoral employers’ federations, virtually all GUFs have come to attach particular importance to corporate group policy. Within corporate groups, the internationalisation of value creation, intra-group trade and intra-group location competition have grown enormously and have increased trade unions’ needs with regard to transnational information, cooperation and coordination (Müller/Platzer/Rüb 2004: 60). The Global Union Federations have responded by developing trade union networks and concluding international framework agreements.

Transnational trade union networks are self-help structures without state institutional backing or provision of government resources. They were set up by the Global Union Federations in varying proportions and levels of intensity. Bearing in mind the rather patchy information available in this area the International Metalworkers’ Federation, for example, probably has around 35 formal global corporation committees; the ICEM is engaged in transnational network activities in around 10 company groups and UNI has around 15 global and at least as many regional trade union alliances, the latter with a focus on Latin America. At all other GUFs the number of transnational networks related to groups of corporations is in single figures.

These networks extend the organisational substructure of the GUFs to encompass corporate group-related structures of within-federation communication and coordination. However this infrastructure is neither extensive nor formally anchored in the GUFs’ competences and decision-making structures, as a result of which networks have so far been formed only – as the political projects of member organisations willing and able to provide support – in selected company groups.

The main tasks of the Global Union Federations consist of providing the transnational trade union networks with an organisational framework, expertise and logistic support. Generally speaking, Global Union Federations are dependent on the commitment and the resources of network participants at decentralised levels. Given the structural funding problems, there is no sign that the GUFs will extend this area of activities.

1. The International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (CIETT) consists of 41 national federations of temporary work agencies and the seven largest individual temporary work agencies, six of which signed the agreement on social minimum standards and the establishment of social dialogue with UNI.
However, in some instances the Global Union Federations have been able to reach agreement with management on the establishment of trade union information and dialogue committees at the global corporate group level and thereby to create institutionalised corporate group-related networking structures.2

The most important and dynamic new instrument available to Global Union Federations is the international framework agreement, which they have been concluding with transnational companies since the mid-1990s. In developing this approach the trade unions have taken up the corporate social responsibility discourse and have called on companies to provide credible evidence of their social responsibility by concluding agreements on global minimum social standards with the trade unions. The GUFs’ aim is that these agreements comply with certain minimum requirements, including global validity, ILO core labour conventions,3 supplier clauses and rules on implementation. They recognise them as international global agreements only when they have been signed by or on behalf of GUFs.

The potential of global agreements for ensuring minimum social standards is far from exhausted. It must be emphasised, however, that effective implementation and monitoring are limited by the trade unions’ lack of resources. International framework agreements are necessarily a »soft«, primarily normative instrument and not a means of dealing with the problems of globalisation. Under favourable circumstances, however, they can promote the cross-border networking of employee representatives and trade unions and thereby the formation of transnational structures, and also fortify workers’ and trade union rights in developing and emerging countries.

The concentration in Western Europe of the parent companies in which it has been possible to conclude framework agreements shows that the success of this voluntaristic approach owes less to the transnational mobilisation and campaigning capabilities of global trade unions than to enterprise-specific circumstances and industrial relations cultures. This includes the ability of national trade unions and workforce representatives to conduct negotiations and whether corporate group management have an interest in utilising such agreements as a (supplementary) part of their corporate social responsibility strategies.

Nevertheless, the policy of international framework agreements implemented by almost all GUFs must be counted as a significant extension of their functions. Externally, by concluding a framework agreement companies officially acknowledge the Global Union Federations as dialogue and negotiation partners. At the same time, the GUFs make their mark as global governance actors in the laying down of employment norms. Internally, the status of the transnational federation level as a place where agreement is reached on aims, standards and procedures is enhanced. Their secretariats are thereby upgraded, becoming information service providers, (co-) negotiators and (co-)signatories of agreements, and in some instances conflict mediators between enterprise managements and federation members.

Functional Profiles Lag Behind the Challenges Faced

If we recall the analytical framework of the graduated functional profiles of Global Union Federations presented at the beginning of this article, the following general findings emerge:

Lack of uniformity: The functional profiles vary between transnational federations with regard to both agendas and areas of activity and also stage of development. From this it follows that no GUF can be categorised, as a single organisation, in terms of one of the relevant functional types and no GUF, again as a single organisation, exhibits a uniform or even qualitatively intensified direction of development in accordance with the multi-stage model of transnational Global Union Federations.

Coordination platform on technical issues: The GUFs function, in specific areas in which technical standardisation is primary, as the political level of a binding inter-federation coordination of aims, standards and instruments.

---

2. One of the few documented cases is the company SKF, at which the IMF has been able to convert the existing global trade union network – the so-called »Global Group Committee« (Weltkonzernausschuss) – into an institutionalised information and dialogue committee, the so-called SKF Global Council, on the basis of an agreement with the SKF management (Müller/Rüb 2002).

3. Elimination of child labor, abolition of forced labor, and elimination of any kind of discrimination, as well as freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.
Function as forums for sectoral interests: As far as sectoral interests are concerned, global agreement processes remain at the level of an intensified exchange of information. Little has changed in this respect since the 1990s. The transnational federations mainly perform the function of forums for the exchange of information and, in the best case, consensus-oriented rapprochement. In specific areas, they perform the function of a coordination platform which serves the purpose of harmonising conduct and, to some extent, the negotiation of resolutions, in respect of which joint implementation in the respective national arenas is incumbent on the goodwill of member federations. Globalisation dynamics have, by and large, not led to any qualitative extension of the functional profiles of transnational trade union federations with regard to workers’ sectoral interests. An exception is the ITF in the area of merchant shipping. It has grown into the role of transnational steering body, which has a certain hierarchical pre-eminence, albeit rudimentary, with regard to its member federations in the laying down and implementation of collective bargaining goals.

Development into a steering body as regards corporate group policy – with marked exceptions: at the majority of GUFs, policy with regard to corporate groups has developed into an area in which they have been able to raise their profile and now act as a coordination platform. Some federations – metalworkers, food and agriculture, chemicals, energy and mining, construction and services – have, besides, developed in the direction of steering bodies, able to agree on »binding« negotiation procedures.

Also noteworthy, besides the general tendency towards transnational intensification of corporate group-related activities, is a certain consonance with regard to the procedures and instruments developed by the GUFs. This suggests that there is mutual learning or imitation of proven practices (individual GUFs strike out as pioneers, while others follow in their path).

This development trend in the direction of steering bodies in the area of corporate group policy should be qualified in two respects, however: the stipulations on »binding« joint procedures in the negotiation of norms and structures in transnational company groups are formal in nature. That means that the logic of transnational steering is based on »framework agreements« which were concluded within the framework of the GUFs, as well as on certain rules of procedure (signing or co-signing of agreements by the chair or general secretary of the respective GUF). In practice, these standards related to contents and procedures are not complied with across the board, whether because of (unavoidable) compromises as regards contents in enterprise-level negotiations, which may be below the federation-level standards, or because of the actions of negotiating company and local trade unionists which leave out the transnational federation (represented by the secretariat). Furthermore, developments so far indicate that numerous member federations are unable to meet their commitment, agreed on within the framework of the transnational federation and therefore »binding«, to seek group-related agreements, due to their lack of leverage. In addition, some member federations, such as the majority of US trade unions, have not adopted this approach.


The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works.

This publication is printed on paper from sustainable forestry.