

European Union Security and Defence White Paper A Proposal

Borja Lasheras
Christoph Pohlmann
Christos Katsioulis
Fabio Liberti

Initiated by: _____



DIRECCIÓN GENERAL
DE RELACIONES
INSTITUCIONALES
INSTITUTO ESPAÑOL DE
ESTUDIOS ESTRATÉGICOS



January 2010

Content

About the authors	2
Preface	3
Executive summary	4
1 Why an EU Security and Defence White Paper for 2010–2020?	10
1.1 Introduction: Time to deliver for Europe’s foreign and security policy	10
1.2 Trends of the new strategic context and Europe’s role for 2020	11
1.3 The absence of strategic direction for ESDP	12
1.4 Member State level: National interests and the EU’s vital interests	13
1.5 Our goal: An EU Security and Defence White Paper	14
1.6 2010 onwards: Building momentum?	14
2 Security environment: Priorities and criteria for Europe’s security and defence engagement	16
2.1 The European Security Strategy and ESDP: Overview and achievements	16
2.2 Main limitations of the Strategy from the perspective of ESDP	16
2.3 The need to re-focus ESDP	17
2.4 Developing the Strategy: priorities for Europe’s security and defence	17
2.5 Threats and overall roles for ESDP	18
2.6 The European neighbourhood: A priority for ESDP – but not the sole criterion	20
2.7 Criteria for European engagement	20
2.8 Common Security and Defence Policy’s Fundamental Tasks	22
3 The framework for a Common Security and Defence Policy	24
3.1 Overview and achievements of ESDP over ten years (1999–2009)	24
3.2 The current institutional framework	24
3.3 ESDP Missions	24
3.4 Budget for ESDP	24
3.5 Shortcomings	24
3.6 Suggestions and recommendations	26
4 Strategic partnerships for EU security and defence	30
4.1 NATO-EU and EU-US Strategic Partnerships	30
4.2 Other strategic partnerships with security and defence implications	35
5 Capabilities and means: Civilian and military dimensions	46
5.1 The civilian dimension of EU security and defence	46
5.2 Military capabilities: European Armed Forces for the twenty-first century	52

6 Resources, defence budgets and the European defence industry	57
6.1 Overview and shortcomings	57
6.2 Need for reform and recommendations	59
Abbreviations	62
Literature	63
Monographies and articles	63
Official documents	64

About the authors

Borja Lasheras is an international lawyer specialised in security and defence. Graduated from Harvard University in 2007 (LLM), for two years he was Research Fellow in security of the Observatory of Spanish Foreign Policy, Fundación Alternativas, in Madrid. He currently works for the Spanish Mission to the OSCE, in Vienna.

Christoph Pohlmann is a political analyst at the International Policy Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the German social democratic political foundation. From 2007 until 2008 he was working at the FES Office in Johannesburg/South Africa. He is the author of »NATO and ESDP: Two security institutions between competition and cooperation«.

Christos Katsioulis is Coordinator for activities on ESDP and CFSP of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in Berlin, the German social democratic political foundation. From 2005 until 2007 he was working at the FES Office in Brussels on various issues of European integration. Before joining the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Christos Katsioulis was Lecturer for European Foreign Policy at the University of Trier.

Fabio Liberti is a research fellow at the Paris-based Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), where he is responsible for European Affairs and ESDP issues area. He is the author of several studies for the French Administration, as well as for the European Commission and the European Defence Agency.

Preface

This working paper, written by several Research Fellows of three European think-tanks, contains a proposal – ambitious but realistic – for a future White Paper of EU's security and defence.

It was first conceived between the **Fundación Alternativas** and the **Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Spanish Ministry of Defence)**, which supports this endeavour, in several meetings in Spring 2009 and as a follow-up to previous collaborations on the subject of European defence.

The goal was to produce a wholly European project, with as much ownership as possible. Thus the paper was jointly developed among the signatories above, who, between the months of July and November, set themselves the goal of taking a fresh look at European security and defence – a challenging task in itself. The resulting Working Paper thus has been developed by the **Fundación Alternativas** and **Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung**, with the participation of Fabio Liberti, from the **Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS-France)**.

Our work included a meeting in Berlin, a workshop of experts and a joint seminar of presentation of

the document, in Madrid (September-October) between the **Fundación Alternativas** and the Spanish Ministry of Defence, which gathered leading experts and policy-makers in CFSP/ESDP. The paper has therefore benefited from significant discussions throughout 2009 with various policy-makers, together with the very valuable work of a number of European centres in recent years. The authors are very appreciative of all of them.¹

In terms of its structure, usually a Green Paper precedes a White Paper. However, in CFSP/ESDP, in contrast to other fields, no such Green Paper has yet emerged. Thus, the authors decided to adopt the following procedure: with the exception of Chapter 1, each chapter contains a very brief assessment outlining developments with regard to the particular theme; then, the main shortcomings are analysed, concluding with policy proposals on a priority basis.

We hope that this document, this non-official White Paper, will be helpful to CFSP/ESDP practitioners and policy-makers, strengthening common positions in the relevant strategic questions of this age (a much needed task), and perhaps contribute to making the idea of a Union of security and defence a reality throughout the next decade.

Borja Lasheras
Christoph Pohlmann
Christos Katsioulis

¹ In particular, the authors would like to thank for their helpful comments on early drafts of this paper: Alastair Cameron (RUSI-UK), Natividad Fernández Sola (Strategic Unit, Spanish Ministry of Defence), Nick Witney (European Council of Foreign Relations), Sven Biscop (Egmont Royal Institute of International Relations), Antonio Ortiz (Office of the Secretary General, NATO), Nicolás Sartorius (Opex-Fundación Alternativas), Giovanni Gasparini, Enrique Ayala (Opex-Fundación Alternativas), Vicente Palacio (Opex-Fundación Alternativas), José Antonio Sabadell (Spanish Permanent Representation to OSCE), Ignacio García (Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, Spanish Ministry of Defence), Juan Moliner (General Secretariat for Defence Policy, Spanish Ministry of Defence), Félix Arteaga (Elcano Royal Institute).

»Five years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world. We have come a long way towards that. But the world around us is changing fast, with evolving threats and shifting powers. To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.«²

Executive summary

One Vienna-based Spanish diplomat likes to describe EU's security policy in action as a »jazz band, not a classical orchestra: musicians with different abilities and instruments participating in a permanent jam session, with a basic tune and a general idea of the kind of music they *want* to produce ... a band which finds it hard to agree on a specific arrangement, but which can eventually sound harmonious – though not necessarily completely homogeneous«. The band is well known among music connoisseurs, while the general public either ignores it or is bemused by the strange sound. Other – more successful – bands, on the other hand, praise some of their individual qualities, as well as the fact that they do play (some kind of) music, despite all the problems, whilst grinning at its lack of success.

That is a fairly good description of the EU's overall performance as an actor on the global stage during the rather unstable decade we are about to leave behind: some tactical achievements, the valuable experience of learning on the job as an EU-27, but with a pervading sense of a lack of direction.

Admittedly, the challenges since 2000 have proved daunting, from the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the continuing international intervention in Afghanistan, the Iraq war, the threats to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, stalled peace efforts in the Middle East and the ongoing financial crisis. Closer to home, the principles of pan-European security have been jeopardised by a summer war in the Caucasus, still on the brink of violence, like other »frozen conflicts« in our neighbourhood. And all this in the midst of a decade-long institutional crisis in the EU.

The truth is that with regard to many such international crises and conflicts, Europe has remained unable to hammer out a truly common position and to pull its collective weight accordingly. EU Member States have been criticised for being adept at »playing ping-pong« – merely reacting to events. From a certain perspective, this may pay off for a while and some fruitful lessons may be learned – not least how

to react coherently and in good time in the face of escalating events, with the right tools and partners. That may apply to recent EU missions, including ATALANTA, which to some was the first real strategic mission of the EU with clearly defined interests (protecting shipping lanes).

However, in a context in which all the other major powers act strategically *and* in which significant security challenges lie on the horizon, perpetuating this minimalist approach has obvious limitations for the EU's global reach and leverage, *if* and *when* it wants to meaningfully shape the twenty-first century world order. Europeans need to think more strategically in order to shape events, as the recent review of the European Security Strategy (ESS)³ concluded. And they have to come together within the EU to deal with the hard topics which, all too often, have divided them or with which they have allowed others to easily divide them (from Russia's role in European security to whether to intervene militarily in remote crises in Sub-Saharan Africa). This they must do to make good on Europe's responsibilities to maintain international peace and security, to protect the security of its citizens in a world which, unfortunately, is not at peace, to maintain its model and, lastly, to be more effective.

The EU, a shared political project of the countries of Europe, must therefore, over the next decade, try to behave as – and give itself the necessary instruments for – the **power** it potentially is, true to its nature, pursuing both a value-based agenda and defending its interests. In the field of security and defence, this translates into the idea that **the EU must develop its ambitions to become a modern security provider**, which must include both **an enhanced civilian profile and a genuine military element**: both are necessary, the EU cannot emphasize one at the expense of the other. The EU may well be Venus, but must also know how to behave like Mars when necessary.⁴

Metaphorically speaking, the band needs to talk seriously about its musical and commercial aims. The musicians need to leave their grandfathers' violins at

² Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy-Providing Security in a Changing World, December 2008

³ Throughout this paper, references to the ESS are to the 2003 document, specifying the changes and innovations brought forth as updated in 2008.

⁴ Hervé Morin, French Minister of Defence.

home, buy some new instruments and tune them to the same pitch.

Our approach and assumptions

To further these goals, in the following Chapters we offer an approach to a comprehensive strategic overview of EU security and defence, fleshing out key priorities for the future and the main steps towards making them more plausible. Our approach is based on a balance between the crude realities of security policy and deeply held political ambitions for the Union. A difficult balance, yet one which we believe carries strong potential – nothing less than a much-needed consensus among Member States on the aims of EU security and defence policy.

The strategic exercise argued for in these pages can serve as overall guidance for efforts in the different sub-areas and it is perfectly compatible with existing informal practices, more expedient sometimes than formal norms and institutions. This is not necessarily reflected in written documents (no piece of paper can solve such complex issues), which are so easily watered down in the course of EU summitry. But we believe that the whole process will be beneficial for the EU and its foreign and security policy, and its results may be embodied in an official **EU Security and Defence White Paper**.

Our initial assumptions are as follows:

Firstly, advancing towards a real **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP) must therefore be the primary objective of EU Member States in the coming decade, a policy guiding the civilian and military tools at its disposal: the **European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)**.

But ESDP is still in the making. It has no clear strategic framework, agreed by EU governments, which defines its ultimate objectives and priorities and the means for achieving them, and has been prey to short-sighted political divisions. Thus, ESDP has lacked overall effectiveness. The aims and general directions given by the European Security Strategy (ESS) are valid, but require strategic refinement in the **specific field of security and defence**, as well as in other fields. The various national security strategies of recent years (in France, the UK and Germany) are a positive development inasmuch as they foster strategic thinking in Europe.

ESDP must evolve by 2020 towards the **common security and defence policy** provided for in the

treaties (CSDP).⁵ Such a policy, we note, will be specific

- to the **nature of the EU as a potentially global security actor**, which is not a state, aims at being more than a purely military alliance (and more than just a civilian power, too) and is to be guided by a holistic approach enshrined in the ESS;
- to the **asymmetric power** it will realistically be for the foreseeable future (even with the improvements expected from the Lisbon Treaty), due to its different levels of decision-making, supranational and Member State-driven. Integration in defence will present different features from other fields (such as monetary policy).

Nation states have been living on historical capital for too much time, as a number of strategic thinkers have rightly noted. Acting on their own, the next generation may witness our countries increasingly condemned to irrelevance. Integration is in their national interest. In the area of CFSP/ESDP, with adequate institutional support, individual Member States still have a central role to play in order to make CSDP real in various ways. Member states have specific advantages at the operational level in crisis scenarios and, in terms of capabilities and commitments, the establishment of different forms of enhanced defence cooperation or **»pioneer groups«** among them.

Europe's collective potential in the field of security and defence up to 2020 must not be guided by mutually exclusive frameworks, however. Bearing in mind both scarce resources, different institutional constraints and its own guiding principles, enshrined in the Strategy, the EU will have to go multilateral and work closely with partners. By this, we mean that to implement Europe's security policy, it will be essential to foster different security partnerships.⁶ In particular, Europeans will have to find a way of getting their act together in NATO, hammering out a real EU–NATO strategic partnership, coherent with an overarching EU–US security partnership. Other partnerships – namely, with the UN and OSCE – will also be relevant for the purposes of collective and pan-European security.

The **Lisbon Treaty is central to this paper's assessments**, since it could mark the beginning of a

5 Throughout the paper we will sometimes use the terms »CSDP« and »ESDP« interchangeably. By »CSDP« we mean both the process of shaping its essential elements (missions outside the Union and internal solidarity) and outcomes.

6 As the ESS states, the EU needs »to pursue its objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors«.

new age for the EU in international relations – and the end of excuses for not delivering. At the time of sending this paper for publication, the Treaty has finally entered into force on 1 December 2009, after ratification by Ireland, Poland and the Czech Republic. The Treaty may entail more external visibility for the Union and its foreign policy, through the new posts of President of the European Council and a more powerful High Representative,⁷ assisted by the European External Action Service. In addition, new tools relevant for ESDP in particular are available, from enhanced cooperation mechanisms to clauses on mutual assistance and solidarity, characteristics of a security alliance. More coherence for the EU's external action in general is now possible. However, this will need strategic guidance and political pull, which can come only from the Member States' continuing *rapprochement*. Otherwise, the new, complex institutions could, paradoxically, reinforce current shortfalls; CFSP decision-making could even be »turned into an introverted hedgehog while the outside world remains as turbulent as ever« (Angelet and Vrilaas 2008).

The Lisbon Treaty, therefore, represents a window of opportunity – and some risks, too, if this opportunity is exploited by Member States to preserve the status quo or limit the scope of the new institutions. And there may not be many new opportunities for the Union in these testing times.

There are a number of other factors which may provide some momentum, such as **NATO's review of its Strategic Concept**, which calls for concerted European input on the basis of the revised ESS. NATO will also have its Lisbon moment – the Portuguese capital is the location of the 2010 NATO Summit which is expected to endorse the new Concept. A **Lisbon EU–NATO strategic alignment** is therefore a must, also bearing in mind the very persistent calls of the US for a more effective partner on our side of the Atlantic – including in the field of defence. Moreover, the OSCE, which encompasses regions of crucial importance for the EU, as the Caucasus and Central Asia, is discussing the future of a now increasingly Eurasian security, through the Corfu Process.

We are also very aware of other worrying trends, casting a shadow over these ambitions, such as the likelihood of public opposition to foreign military endeavours after Afghanistan, together with grim economic prospects and the reappearance of *petit(s)*

nationalisme(s), together with other European ghosts from the past.

This, in our view, all but reaffirms the need for a frank strategic review in this domain – as in other areas of the EU's external action – which could also prove beneficial in terms of the democratic legitimacy of European security policy. In addition, Europeans should not forget that the **peace model** they are fortunate to enjoy today was born, not that long ago, out of the very rubble of their collective degradation and self-destruction. The fact that other peoples do not enjoy these public goods is another reason in favour of a CFSP/ESDP which aims to contribute to a better system of global governance.

Therefore beyond coming up with more official declarations on ESDP's grand achievements and general prospects, EU leaders must go into greater detail and be willing to take a rough road to reach noble aims. Europe should reach agreement on a common strategy in this field with the 2010–2020 horizon in view: an **EU Security and Defence White Paper**. The present paper is intended as a proposal for such an EU White Paper.

Leading proposals of the paper

1. The vision of the EU as a modern, collective security provider

■ Beyond their differences, Europeans share common security interests and principles, and face similar risks. No European country can face these risks and security challenges alone. Enhancing EU countries' **strategic convergence** at the CFSP level must be a top priority, rather than perpetuating the lowest common denominator approach. All related efforts in ESDP and other frameworks, as explored in this paper, must stem from a real CFSP. In fact, the scope of this paper being security and defence, we conceive the White Paper as an element within a more **comprehensive strategic review** of Europe's role and ambitions on the global stage. Such a review – or Grand Strategy – should involve all areas of the EU's external action. It will be particularly demanding as the EU is set to provide itself with new tools.

■ The EU must increasingly become the **political centre for Europeans' security policy and decision-making**, as a comprehensive actor with potentially all means (civilian and military) necessary for dealing with modern security challenges. It must be a **global security actor**: such are its aspirations and needs.

⁷ At the time of writing, the European Council had just designated Mr Van Rompuy, Belgian Prime Minister, as its President, and Lady Ashton, EU Commissioner for Trade, as the new High Representative.

■ **ESDP, a tool for CFSP, should be more crucial for Europe's security** and its international responsibilities in the future. It can and must aspire to evolve, by 2020, towards a **common security and defence policy (CSDP)**, as foreseen by the Treaty on European Union, bearing the specific nature of the EU in mind. Importantly, ESDP must continue to build on its comparative advantage of having the full panoply of civilian and military capabilities at its disposal and should further develop its comprehensive approach on security policy: this is Europe's added value. The EU must therefore have high civilian *and* military ambitions.

■ In the next decade, **democratic legitimacy of CFSP/ESDP** must be given more prominence. The somewhat limited role that the Treaty confers to the European Parliament (EP) in this field must be asserted to the maximum extent. The EP must become the leading body for oversight and control of the future CSDP, through consultations by the High Representative (HR) and the Special Representatives in the field; debates on the missions and general lines of the policy, as well as the possibility of democratic control on the performance of the HR/Vice-President of the Commission, amongst other options available. That would contribute to reinforcing the legitimacy of this policy, the more if the commitments in the next years are to increase. Setting up a framework of relation with national parliaments, within this public debate on Europe's security, should be embedded in this process, beneficial for the EU as a whole.

2. The EU as a security provider capable of essentially guaranteeing its defence

Regarding **collective defence** proper, the manner in which the notion was understood during the Cold War is not within the scope of this paper, which is conceived for the horizon of 2010–2020 (approximately) and is mainly focused on paving the way for the first stage, CSDP. Regardless, a number of remarks are in order here:

We cannot foreclose other developments in the coming decades, including a major overhaul of existing mechanisms in Europe. Organisations cannot be based on dogma: they are meant to provide answers to the needs of states and their peoples, not vice versa, and should change, if circumstances so require. This applies to both NATO and the EU. Likewise, some Member States could opt for bilateral or plurilateral arrangements, more stringent defence commitments, to advance in defence in-

tegration among themselves at full speed which, in principle, is within their sovereign right.

This paper focuses on the EU as such: an international organisation which gathers some 30 states, which has long-term ambitions as a coherent strategic player in the twenty-first century, but which is still based on unanimity for core sovereignty issues, namely CFSP/ESDP. A formal move towards entrusting common defence to the EU would require the **unanimous agreement of the 27+ Member States**,⁸ at least twice according to Lisbon, independent of other ensuing arrangements.⁹

There is a different, viable and forward-looking alternative, which may be inferred from the following Chapters: a **Security Union**. In the mid-to long term, if the substantial progress envisaged in this White Paper were made, this is achievable. In particular, if there is

- a solid political will to develop the Lisbon clauses of solidarity and mutual assistance (potentially an EU art. V);
- a greater **strategic convergence** among the 27+ in CFSP;
- **advances in other relevant security areas**, different from traditional defence (for instance, in the so-called Space of Justice and Freedom or Intelligence), and in an EU, in principle, without the pillar structure;
- compliance with demanding objectives in terms of civilian and military capabilities – what might be called **Lisbon convergence criteria** – with related progress in defence markets, and so on.

Then the **EU would *de facto* have the means to defend its citizenry from most**

8 Throughout this paper we will use the term »27+«, in view of the expectation that the EU will encompass at least 30 member states in the coming years, including Croatia, Iceland, Norway, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Serbia.

9 Art. 42 TEU states that the CSDP »will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, *acting unanimously*, so decides, in which case it shall recommend to the Member States the adoption of such decision *in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements*«. Only the formal decision-making process would require unanimity twice: at the European Council, and afterwards, through the unanimous endorsement of that agreement, up to a probably amendment of the Treaty. This would in fact be tantamount to opening a second constitutional process within the Union, including a number of national referenda. For the time being, the wisdom of such a process (in terms of outcome, cohesion of the Union, etc.) at 30 speeds, bearing in mind the experience of last years, is most unclear.

contemporary threats. For core systemic threats, such as WMD and missiles, practical partnerships with NATO and the US would remain basic for the foreseeable future.

In this latter view, the EU as a whole would be **an autonomous, collective security actor, a modern »Security Union«** even, underpinned by a complex network of interests, political integration, means and de facto solidarity among its Member States. The Union would be capable of **defending its whole membership** (including non-NATO EU countries), all the more so, if it established the security partnerships argued for in this paper (since in a globalised world, no great power can be wholly independent). This would be perfectly compatible with and would reinforce the essence of core collective defence under Art. V of the Washington Treaty. Not only that: it would logically have profound effects on NATO's structures, together with a bigger European leverage in its decision-making process.

Such a view also has the potential to solve unproductive EU divisions on the final aims of CFSP/ESDP, since it would entail consensus among the different priorities for ESDP of neutral EU states, non-neutral, NATO members and non-NATO members.

- To really move forward on the way towards such aims with regard to CSDP, **we do not need a new St Malo** or, to put it differently, we need to implement as far as possible the goals laid out ten years ago for **an autonomous, capable policy at the service of CFSP**. The key objectives of St Malo have been achieved only on paper, for our countries have largely failed to provide CFSP/ESDP with the necessary civilian and military capability.
3. Clear priorities and criteria for EU engagement in order to respond to identified threats
 - EU action in security and defence must be based on a **clear concept of priorities and criteria** in order to react or act proactively to identified threats and challenges. This would also help to overcome the current ad-hocery of ESDP, improve the overall effectiveness and impact of CFSP/ESDP, whilst leaving some room for flexibility in a shifting security environment. This paper develops such a concept in Chapter 2, also outlining the main threats facing the EU.
 4. Concentrating on fundamental tasks in order to increase the effectiveness of ESDP
 - Fundamental tasks related to increasing the effectiveness of ESDP include both the **Petersberg Tasks** – as enhanced by the Lisbon Treaty – with respect to missions outside the Union and the **mutual assistance and solidarity clauses** in the Lisbon Treaty for potential actions within EU territory. Both need to be implemented in order to further develop the EU as a credible security actor, a Security Union.
 5. Pioneer groups in defence and effective multilateralism through security partnerships
 - A generalised effort towards the future CSDP is required of **all Member States** by the new Treaty in order to make real these objectives. All are called upon to assist other EU countries in need, on grounds of solidarity; to make available their capabilities for missions and to gradually improve their military tools, in particular through a stronger Defence Agency.
 - Within the EU, **groups of nation states** must play a crucial role in advancing towards such a future security and defence policy, the more so since simultaneous advances in all 27+ Member States will remain elusive. **Multi-speed progress** will be fundamental, and it must be construed as a legitimate process, open to others willing to assume more demanding commitments. Criteria must be objective, such as the specific added value of certain member states in given scenarios and/or their tested willingness to abide by more demanding commitments for missions/pooling of their capabilities for EU action: not only willing, but able too. **Pioneer groups** developing Permanent Structured Cooperation and Enhanced Cooperation will be essential in this process.
 - ESDP being central, the specific **framework of implementation** of Europe's security policy must be based in the coming years above all on pragmatic criteria for **European engagement** and on the **principle of effective multilateralism**.
 - In this respect, a coherent EU policy of **security partnerships** with other major powers and international organisations will prove of paramount importance. In particular, the EU must develop a more ambitious partnership with NATO, within which we envisage an enhanced **European coordination**, if an EU Caucus in NATO is not yet possible. However, the EU must go beyond NATO and advance towards a

deeper **security partnership with the US**, in view of the need to adapt the transatlantic relationship to the demands of the new strategic scenario. This should not per se require new bodies or deep institutional reforms (and certainly no more summits). It would need to encompass other security challenges, aside from the defence component. It may be translated into a joint strategic review, for which the military implications of NATO's new Strategic Partnership may be the first EU–US collective exercise.

6. Strengthening civilian and military capabilities

- The EU will fulfil its global ambitions in security and defence only if it is able to overcome persistent capability shortfalls – both in the civilian and military dimensions. This is an effort all Member States have agreed to undertake, improving current resources. In addition, synergies in the process of civilian and military capability development must be exploited, in particular, through the so-called dual use capabilities.
- Concerning civilian capabilities, the EU should develop, among other things, an EU Civilian Reserve of civilian specialists. Moreover, coherence and coordination problems within the EU Council and the EU Commission must be significantly reduced, using the European External Action Service as an instrument as well.
- To further their common ambitions with respect to **military capabilities**, Europeans will have to rationalise their defence systems and advance towards more collaboration programmes, common funding, pooling of resources and specialisation. Joint formation and training programs, including in the framework of NATO,

will be increasingly necessary with the purpose of enhancing the interoperability of European personnel (which remains a challenge).

- In terms of multinational units, rationalisation will be required as well. EU countries should build on the Battle-Groups and reinforced options, such as the idea of a Task Force 5000.
- The **European Defence Agency** will be central in this process and Member States must give it leeway to act as a watchdog of their commitments (as implicitly envisaged by the new Treaty), particularly for the implementation of the different forms of cooperation envisaged in this paper.
- Other targeted institutional reforms will also be necessary, such as the establishment of a Council for Defence Ministers and a full-fledged civilian-military integrated command structure or EU Operational Headquarters.

Main goals of an EU Security and Defence White Paper

- To **develop and implement, not substitute, the ESS in the specific field of security and defence**, providing the EU with clearer objectives and criteria for action in this particular domain, while also allowing for flexibility in practice, adapting tactics to strategy. This should make the EU more effective and legitimate as a global security actor.
- The White Paper will be a stepping stone **towards an EU common security and defence policy** in the next decade. It will also help to realise the strategic convergence of Europeans and the principle of **European solidarity** enshrined in the treaties.

1 Why an EU Security and Defence White Paper for 2010–2020?

1.1 Introduction: Time to deliver for Europe's foreign and security policy

As the European Union (EU) enters the second decade of the twenty-first century, it will do so with a **Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)**. CFSP has made some progress towards aligning Member States' foreign policies. But it has underperformed too often due to their usual tendency to let national interests stand in the way of common European positions. As a result, all European countries remain largely ineffective in dealing with the key security topics of our time – and less relevant too.

As a tool of CFSP, the EU now also has the basic elements for a **European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)**. Launched ten years ago in the aftermath of the Balkan tragedies and Europe's inability to act as circumstances required, ESDP already has some experience of crisis management in conflict-prone areas, acting in regions as different as Sub-Saharan Africa, the waters off Somalia and the Caucasus. It is a policy in the making, but much is expected of it *now* by the international community. Indeed, ESDP is increasingly in demand, as stated by the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy,¹⁰ endorsed by EU leaders.¹¹ And it will need to deliver.

Clearly, current resources are just not suitable for this purpose. But as a first step our governments have long postponed, Europe must go on with the exercise of 2008 and carry out a real and thorough assessment of the role it wants to play on the global stage. This has been termed by some a **»Grand Strategy«** (Howorth 2009; Biscop 2009), defining the EU's long-term foreign policy objectives and the basic categories of instruments to be applied, in all areas of external action. The **European Security Strategy (ESS)** and its implementation would be part of this ongoing exercise, now in its opening stages.

In security and defence, as an element within this broader strategic review, Member States, with the support of the institutions, will have to provide con-

tent for the idea of the EU's »sharing in the responsibility for global security« as the **European Security Strategy**¹² puts it. This is a step Europeans must carry out for the following key purposes:

- enhancing and making more effective their contribution to a new and better system of **global governance** based on the principles of peace, stability and effective multilateralism;
- Europe's status as a credible global, not just regional, actor;
- guaranteeing security to EU citizens, since challenges, analysed in Chapter 2, will be daunting.

It is worth highlighting that, overall, the next decade will be fundamental for European integration, for its progress or maybe serious retreat, after eight years of internal bickering which have brought very severe divisions to the fore. Arguably, it will be the decade of the Lisbon Treaty, an imperfect constitutional document reflecting a complex agreement in an enlarged bloc on where we want to go together as EU. The new Treaty provides several tools for streamlining the EU's foreign policy machinery, namely through the enhanced role of the High Representative (HR); a European External Action Service, which will also include ESDP structures under the authority of the HR; and more coherence in all policies making up the EU's external action (from development aid to the European Neighbourhood Policy, diplomacy and military resources).

Lisbon will also entail new mechanisms particularly relevant for ESDP, now renamed »Common Security and Defence Policy«, and which are treated in the following Chapters. Briefly, the Union will now have as a mutual assistance clause in the event of an armed attack on a Member State; a solidarity clause in case of a terrorist attack and civil protection situations within Europe; the possibility for a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSCoP) or even Enhanced Cooperation in these matters. Finally, although CFSP/ESDP will remain **intergovernmental** in nature and hence based on unanimous decision-making, with Lisbon a certain **»Brusselisation« of foreign policies** is nonetheless in sight (Katsioulis 2009), together with the possibility of more coherence in the overall external action. Therefore, Member States will increasingly need to come together and agree on collective policies/actions for pressing security threats and challenges (including frozen conflicts, organised crime and non-proliferation).

So, with Lisbon the EU will have to be less inward-looking and will have to look once again to the world

10 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World (December 2008).

11 The recent Ministerial Declaration commemorating ten years of ESDP reckons that »the demand for the European Union's actions in crisis management is steadily growing« (»Ministerial Declaration: ESDP Ten Years-Challenges and Opportunities«, Council of the European Union, November 17, 2009).

12 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (December 2003).

which surrounds it, reassessing its basic objectives and aims, then the means to achieve them. In a nutshell, making policy. The excuses for inaction will be (even) less easy to buy, not just by third parties, but above all by the European citizens themselves. To begin with, and with the Strategy as the general reference, a broad assessment of the security context and how it will affect Europe's security and leverage in the international system, is in order.

1.2 Trends of the new strategic context and Europe's role for 2020

In recent years, there has been no shortage of policy analysis addressing the features of the shifting global environment, and its security implications for Europe in particular. The international system is changing fast, indeed, and it is difficult to predict with certainty what the strategic environment will look like in the next ten to fifteen years. Many point to the emergence of new powers, such as China and India;¹³ to revisionist powers, such as Russia, and, overall, to a new balance of power in the making (ESS, 2008).¹⁴ A multi-polar world thus seems at hand (or even a G2 with the US and China), while to others **non-polarity** will be the true essence of an international system which has no clear centre of power, as this will be exercised by state actors, non-state actors («stateless networks») and regional players (Haas 2008). Regardless of this, potential for broader cooperation will remain, stemming from the real interdependence globalisation has created (**inter-polarity**) (Grevi 2009). There is also the grim prospect of de-globalisation, through a widespread revival of protectionism (and nationalisms).

Be that as it may, it is very likely that the global strategic context, though not necessarily more dangerous than the Cold War, will be less stable,¹⁵ prone to upheavals (we have had quite a few of them just in the recent years).

In view of the foregoing, Europe's prospects in the international system over the next ten years seem rather bleak. This assessment is often made on the basis of demographic factors; increasing energy dependency (probably up to 90 per cent for oil and 80 per cent for gas, by 2025) (European Defence Agency 2006); and comparatively low rates of economic growth and competitiveness *vis-à-vis* emerging powers.¹⁶ To sum up, the EU risks **losing clout**, as some studies put it.¹⁷ Should the Union find itself in that declining spiral, all its constituent countries, even the major ones, will lose prominence.¹⁸

In terms of defence, resources all over Europe continue to decline (1.77 per cent of GDP, almost half of which is concentrated in the UK and France) (IISS 2008), a trend which will surely go on in the next decade. The low numbers in EU defence spending overlap with a parallel 45 per cent hike in global defence expenditure between 1998 and 2008, accounted for by emerging powers such as India, China or Russia, (that is, not just by the United States). This should not be the paramount concern as long as ongoing **defence reforms** are duly implemented to correct structural deficiencies and duplications, all of which limit Europe's ability to meet its collective responsibilities and be a truly independent security actor.

13 »The world's strategic centre of gravity is shifting to Asia, where any conflicts would have vast consequences for Europe's prosperity and security« (French White Paper on Defence and National Security, June 2008).

14 »Globalization has brought new opportunities, but has also made threats more complex and interconnected, making the arteries of our society more vulnerable and is accelerating shifts in power and exposing differences in values« (2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS).

15 As Tomas Ries argues, »rather than attempting to impose an artificial and misleading clarity on our security environment we will have to accept a fuzzier and foggier perspective«, which »will be less clear, but it will also avoid the delusion that we can see what is coming« (EUISS 2009).

16 »A forecast tripling of Chinese GDP will make China the second global economy; India may have overhauled Japan, to take third place. Europe will continue to grow modestly – in GDP and perhaps membership – but with its technological advantage in such areas as IT, biotechnology, and nanotechnology being steadily eroded« (European Defence Agency, An Initial Long-Term Vision ...). Indeed, the crisis, together with the recession »have greatly damaged Western capacities. In 2009, for the first time in history, the world's emerging economies are forecast to provide 100 percent of global economic growth and within the next 10–15 years, they are expected to generate more than half of the world's output« (Daniel Hamilton and others, 2009).

17 »The drop-off in working-age populations will prove a severe test for Europe's social welfare model ... Defense expenditures are likely to be cut further to stave off the need for serious restructuring of social benefits programs« (NIC, Global Trends 2025, Nov. 2008). According to this report, Europe might become »a hobbled giant distracted by internal bickering and competing national agendas, and less able to translate its economic clout into global influence«. Interestingly, some of the conclusions are similar to the EDA's Long Term Vision document (2006).

18 According to some recent calculations based on GDP-PPP and demography, if the EU stands together, it will be a major power in the twenty-first century; otherwise, not a single EU state will make it to the top five. As Álvaro de Vasconcelos argues, »in a world of great powers come true the most powerful European states, without the backing of the Union would at best count as medium-sized players« (EUISS 2009).

As the EU leaders agreed in their update of the ESS, Europe can rise to all these challenges, provided it does more to shape events. With a concerted security policy based on real civilian and military ambitions, the Union will potentially have *all* the tools it needs to contribute to shaping a new global system and promoting **global public goods** (human security, for instance) (Biscop 2006), whilst maintaining its socio-political model.¹⁹ Together with strengthened capabilities, Europeans must think and act strategically, something they have failed to do since the launch of CFSP/ESDP.

1.3 The absence of strategic direction for ESDP

The EU has gone a long way towards establishing itself as a crisis management actor through ESDP. But this process lacks a basic underpinning: a **common vision on European security and defence**. The truth is that present and future endeavours, from ESDP missions to decision-making, operate to a large extent in a strategic vacuum.

The Union has become a crisis management actor, yes, but one that usually avoids real security debates in order to maintain consensus. The emphasis on developing tools and capabilities without first establishing priorities is a reflection of this.²⁰ The approach to ESDP missions has seemed all too often to focus on form (the fact that an ESDP mission has been launched), and less on substance (How can such a mission contribute to improving the crisis at hand? Is the mission substantial for European security?).²¹ A weak presence on the ground is usually a reflection of a weak political will: this pays lip service to enhancing European relevance as a credible actor.

Secondly, as of 2009, we still do not know what are the **grand goals and objectives of ESDP**. ESDP

has been limited to crisis management, but the Treaty on European Union (TEU) goes further, in that it says that ESDP shall include the »progressive framing of a common defence policy«, which, should all member states agree, »will lead to a common defence«. Not much serious thinking has been devoted to the potential defence pillar of ESDP and to the question of how any progress in this area could be compatible with NATO, as the Lisbon Treaty requires (Art 42 TEU and preamble of the Protocol 26 on PS Coop). Political divisions have compounded this situation: some states have been keen to block ESDP's progress, while others have sought to use ESDP to further their own political goals. Failures to match pro-European rhetoric with actual resources on the ground have been too frequent, also in relation to civilian missions.

In this respect, the new Treaty envisages a **»Common European Security and Defence Policy«**, but we must clarify (i) why we need such a policy; (ii) what its scope must be, bearing in mind a number of criteria (strategic environment, resources, and so on); and (iii) in view of the foregoing, what are the steps EU leaders must aspire to undertake, within a clear timeframe and follow-up mechanisms.

Thirdly – and relatedly – ESDP still lacks sufficient guidance in the European Security Strategy. This is a question which Chapter 2 will develop further. For now, suffice to say that the Strategy as a whole remains a general document covering the whole range of the EU's external action, with a special focus on foreign policy and security. But although the 2008 update made ESDP more salient, it still fails to specify which threats and challenges must be dealt with using civilian and military capabilities, and how (Lasheras et al 2009). EU leaders need to develop the **logical implications of the Strategy in the area of security and defence**.

Fourthly, if Europeans do want to get involved in various crises, we need to establish where, how and to achieve what purposes the EU will intervene overseas, rather than just resorting to the reaction-based approach which has characterised ESDP efforts – at odds with the principle of prevention our countries have agreed on. The ESS talks about **interventions**, including »robust ones«, and mentions as a guide to CFSP/ESDP the principle of the **Responsibility to Protect** (R2P) populations from mass atrocities. This is a positive innovation. But we need clearer **criteria for EU-led interventions** aimed at implementing such objectives and principles. This would be perfectly compatible with the »constructive inertia« and flexibility of existing political processes, developed beyond institutional caveats; practices which many

19 »The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order« (European Security Strategy, 2003).

20 As Christos Katsioulis argues, this emphasis on crisis management »lacks a coherent idea, a European profile for conflict resolution ... the capacity building being pursued with a vengeance«.

21 To Anand Menon, an obsession with »building Europe« hampers the way Europeans have assessed the effectiveness of ESDP, falling prey to the »temptation of judging process rather than outcome« (for example, as regards the observation mission in Georgia or the military mission in Chad).

EU diplomats find useful and would like to build on.²² It would make such decision-making processes more effective and the agreements reached therein more solid and with better foresight with regard to the implications of sustained operations.

Finally, EU leaders conspicuously avoid any debate on the **use of force** as an element of their security. But the scenarios which we assess in this paper, as well as the general experience of European armed forces over the past 20 years (the Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan), imply the eventual use of military force. High-intensity military operations or »robust« interventions are well within the scope of the Petersburg tasks, also after Lisbon. The EU must address the issue of when it must move from peace-keeping to **peace-making or peace-enforcement**, rather than deciding after the fact – which tends to alienate a public opinion that generally views with scepticism, if not outright opposition, military interventions abroad, other than classic peace-keeping operations.

1.4 Member State level: National interests and the EU's vital interests

To some extent, this strategic vacuum jeopardising progress of ESDP (and CFSP in general) stems from the fact that Member States still have quite different perceptions of their security. On issues such as expeditionary missions vs. territorial defence, nuclear deterrence, and so on, national views tend to differ.²³ There are EU countries with a strong tradition of interventions abroad, whilst others are more reluctant towards overseas deployments; there are neutral countries (a salient issue in the ratification of the new Treaty by certain Member States); some have emphasised NATO at the expense of a more autonomous EU, or vice versa, and so on.²⁴ In Europe, almost everything about defence still remains largely national (in terms of threat perceptions, budgets, military traditions, etc.) and all Member States remain rather averse to pooling sovereignty in this area (IISS 2008).²⁵ This will remain a reality for the next decade, too.

But beyond differences, there is also much potential for greater collective European action, since **Member States face common threats, risks and challenges**. These affect them all in similar ways; although we may disagree on the specifics, many of these so-called modern threats, together with some of the old ones, have de facto created the basis for European solidarity. EU countries do have **common values** (such as human rights, rule of law, democracy), reflected in the TEU, **and common security interests and needs** (such as the protection of trade routes and energy supplies, stability in their neighbourhood, and so on).

The **EU's vital interests**, vital inasmuch as they are essential to the continuity of our model, have been developed in parallel with the integration process, the emergence of the Union as an actor and other geopolitical movements in recent decades (Egmont Royal Institute 2009).²⁶ These factors underpin CFSP/ESDP as a project, since the vital interests of the Member States are inextricably linked: a threat to one European country's vital interests will usually affect all. Such factors are at the core of our view of the EU as both a security provider for the international order and a Security Union for its citizenry.

In addition, there is now a greater **interlocking of defence systems**. Cooperation in defence is common practice in Europe. The need to reform in order to maintain modern capabilities, increasing their force projection for multinational expeditionary missions, is accepted – even if the implementation of modern defence reform remains tricky.

By 2020, therefore, the Union will not have subsumed member states' defence systems, also bearing in mind that Lisbon will remain the limit of our common ambition for quite a number of years. But EU Member States can and must aspire to make inter-governmental cooperation much more useful for ESDP: if wholesale integration is probably not realistic by 2020, the current state of affairs, based on totally decentralized inter-state cooperation in European defence, without an effective watchdog, is not a solution either. Our countries can envisage more demanding co-operations that make them and the EU more effective in this field. National interests cannot be an excuse for hampering EU efforts, nor can frameworks be captured for the purpose of pursuing national agendas. ESDP must be a policy for the common good of EU citizens, for extending the **Euro-**

22 This was reflected in informal discussions of this paper with CFSP/ESDP practitioners.

23 »Member states remain stubbornly differentiated in terms of their approaches to security ... (having) competing views as to what the ESDP should be« (Menon 2009).

24 Interestingly, several European countries, not yet in the EU, such as Switzerland and Norway, are a »go-to« on ESDP matters.

25 The qualifications and declarations throughout the Lisbon Treaty on setting the limits of CFSP/ESDP *vis-à-vis* national policies testify to this. See, for instance, the wording of the two declarations on the ESDP attached to the Treaty.

26 An EUISS paper also described these as vital interests (such as defence of the Union's territorial integrity or economic survival) and value interests (strengthening of a rule-based international order based on fundamental norms and freedoms, for instance). EUISS 2004.

pean peace project and for meeting European obligations to international security.

1.5 Our goal: An EU Security and Defence White Paper

Having common security interests and shared normative principles, as well as facing the same risks there is a window of opportunity if a strategic Road Map for the EU's Security and Defence is adopted by EU governments: an **EU Security and Defence White Paper**.

If the ESS represents general guidance on the EU's external action, and CFSP in particular, such an EU White Paper would represent the next logical step. It would also establish a linkage between the political objectives of the ESS and ESDP operations and capability development, a link which is still missing (Biscop 2009). This White Paper would help to strengthen the bond of ESDP with the general security framework of the EU, including the Commission's economic and development policies and the Neighbourhood Policy.

The EU is not a nation-state, with entrenched interests, defence planning, and so on. Nonetheless, it is a complete – though sometimes rather under-performing – **global actor** in its own right, further enhanced by the latest round of enlargement. Moreover, the EU represents the joint long-term political project – a community, in fact, whatever term we use to define its governance system – of more than 500 million Europeans and 27 countries, with several more likely to join in the next few years;²⁷ a **peace model** which, as proclaimed by the ESS, aims to contribute to better global governance and an effective multilateralism in an unstable world.

The EU has a vast array of power tools, too, which **makes it more suited to deal comprehensively with the security challenges of this century**. In this regard, the Union has been described as a »soft power«, a »normative power«, or a »civilian power«. This might well be its main comparative advantage, but, as learned from very hard lessons of the past, such a power of attraction will fall short of achieving its goals (sometimes tragically so, as in the Balkans) if

not sufficiently backed by credible means – including defence. The debate over »hard power« or »soft power« is over: **the objective for the EU and its Member States must be to be able to project effective power collectively**, the specific means depending on the issue at stake, and behave more as a strategic player. As we said in the Foreword, the EU must be both Venus and Mars, if need be: it must have real civilian and military ambitions. And it has to provide primary security to its population too, the first obligation of every system of government.

Hence, it is time to develop the Strategy and agree on an unified vision on the level of ambition Europeans want to achieve together as EU²⁸ in the domain of security and defence. Out of 27 security policies, Europe needs to develop this Road Map for its security and defence aspirations. This would help to make EU countries **more relevant – and effective – on the world stage**, instead of being rolled over, and provide fully for the security of its citizenry.

This EU Security and Defence White Paper would constitute a real building block towards the development of the future common security and defence policy called for by the TEU. In terms of timeframe, we believe it should be approximately **2010–2020**, in keeping with the approach followed by the Helsinki Headline Goals and the perspective of most national strategies. Such a timeframe would thus allow for clearer planning and definition of objectives.

1.6 2010 onwards: Building momentum?

Lisbon has just entered into force this 1 December 2009, and decisions are already being taken pertaining to the EU's new institutional architecture, in particular those impinging on its EU foreign policy machinery, which now definitely includes the Commission.

It is still too early to judge whether EU governments are up to the test; some of the first moves are thus far not very encouraging, seemingly more aimed at preserving different means of national leverage, than enhancing our collective clout or effectiveness. Needless to say, the Treaty *per se* will not put an end of the EU bickering and power-balancing (a very logical thing, from another point of view, in every government – no less that of the US). It will be no silver bullet. It does not by itself turn the EU into a coherent bloc guided by unity of purpose, but rather keeps or

27 »With 27 members already, and more lining up in the Western Balkans, the EU cannot pose as a small huddle of vulnerable do-gooders sheltering under the wing of NATO and the United States. It has a strategic weight of its own and an external impact that can be experienced in many places as oppressive: it is moving down the road towards having potential enemies as well as competitors« (Bailes 2008).

28 »The EU as the political expression of Europe must decide on a military or civil-military strategy for ESDP, a white book that would function as a sub-strategy to the ESS ...« (Biscop 2009).

even enhances its asymmetric features, defined by different decision making bodies. And the effective setting in motion of the mechanisms/bodies of external action, together with their implications (for instance, in terms of EU external representation in international organizations), constitute challenges which will consume energies for a while.

This being said, we do believe that the new treaty coupled with political leadership and strategic implementation of *all* of these tools carries great potential, as stressed throughout this paper. In particular, beyond institutional brinkmanship, the effectiveness and impact of the different mechanisms in CFSP/ESDP should have more specific guidance than currently provided by the ESS, even after its update last year.

Politically, there are factors which would create momentum for CFSP/ESDP, but we must admit that there are reasons for concern, too. Public opinion is lukewarm; although Europeans generally support a bigger role for the EU in international security, they are very sceptical of operations of a peace-enforcement nature.²⁹ Furthermore, people attach more importance to economic policy after the financial crisis than to other endeavours. Some of the domestic trends in certain countries, based on an astonishingly parochial »anti-EU ism« together with a certain generalised retreat to nation-states (or, worse, to even lower levels of legitimacies), are not very encouraging for ESDP or for greater aspirations for an enhanced European defence, in particular – now that we need them more than ever. Plus, as the Union proceeds with its enlargement process, while retaining *sine die* the unanimity rule in CFSP/ESDP, the chances that the common denominator in this field will diminish even further and thus that agreements will remain elusive, are not exactly low.

But we need to foster this strategic debate, precisely to address some of these shortcomings resulting from short-term, ad hoc approaches to security. NATO will come up in 2010 with a new **Strategic Concept** (NSC), also to be endorsed in a summit in Lisbon. Bearing in mind that 21 EU countries are taking part in the review process, this should foster greater synergies amongst both organisations – and amongst their (very similar) membership: a **Lisbon**

EU–NATO strategic alignment is in order, based on (i) a European approach to the NSC, guided by the EU Strategy, finding essential bases for a transatlantic *rapprochement* with the American review;³⁰ (ii) a recognition of shared values and common security interests, but also (iii) the strategic autonomy and capacity of the EU as a security actor, together with (iv) pragmatic cooperation pathways, from capabilities to missions. France's reintegration into NATO military structures should offer the potential to assuage the concerns of some NATO members with regard to ESDP's purposes and definitely putting European defence on the table as a necessary component of a new transatlantic partnership. The United States, increasingly looking more towards Asia, is asking Europeans to be more ambitious and more effective partners in the field of defence.

Hence, rather than wasting time on new formal declarations or paper catalogues, EU countries should take the lead and agree on such a White Paper as a basis for future action in the next ten to fifteen years. Legitimacy is key too; EU governments must for once be bold enough and make clear to their populations why we must get more, not less, involved in faraway crises,³¹ and why defence, a subset of modern security policies, must still retain an effective military component. The strategic process argued for here may be very useful in this regard too, both in legitimizing expeditionary missions (even hard ones) and, above all, a greater role for the EU in security policy.

The process could jump-start next year, parallel to the implementation of Lisbon, and be reflected in an essential agreement in less than two years.

In the following chapters, we will offer a series of proposals concerning the topics such a White Paper should cover.

29 Eurobarometer consistently shows support for an enhanced EU role in international security, but it also shows some confusion as to what this should mean. Peace-keeping is seen positively, but not high-intensity operations (which fall within the Petersburg tasks). The last Eurobarometer of early 2009 also showed a decrease in support in this area, in the face of pressing economic priorities due to the crisis.

30 In fact, the need for Europeans to develop similar strategic approaches when developing an EU White Paper and working on a future NSC was a point raised by several defence officials in discussions of this paper.

31 Some EU countries are arguably doing that rather successfully, such as the Netherlands, Denmark (suffering many casualties in Afghanistan) and Sweden (which is revisiting its traditionally neutral stance).

2 Security environment: Priorities and criteria for Europe's security and defence engagement

2.1 The European Security Strategy and ESDP: Overview and achievements

The European Security Strategy, central in this paper, presents a general picture of relevant threats and challenges to Europe's security. Like most national defence reviews, it mostly points to the emergence of asymmetric threats (such as international terrorism, conflicts in failed states, and so on), challenges such as energy security and climate change, as well as complex relations between threats and challenges. The Strategy singles out as key threats to the EU the **proliferation of weapons of mass destruction** (WMD), the »greatest threat« to our security; **terrorism**, above all, the current religious extremist trend with global goals, together with **organised crime**; **regional conflicts**, both overseas and in the neighbourhood; and **state failure**, which has conflicts or maritime piracy as side-effects. In terms of challenges, the Strategy now covers cyber security, energy security and climate change. Others are **poverty and pandemics**, which are at the source of many conflicts and can give rise to pressing security concerns (ESS).³²

The Strategy then identifies three broad strategic objectives for the EU: i) **addressing the threats**, ii) building security in its neighbourhood and iii) fostering effective multilateralism. The 2008 document specifically associates ESDP with the first objective, in particular when calling for »an effective and capable Europe«, for which purpose a number of objectives are identified: the need to have appropriate command structures and headquarters capabilities, better training, readily available personnel for civilian missions, more efforts towards collaboration programmes, greater investment in R&D, and so on.

Within the threats proper, the Strategy specifically associates the military and civilian instruments of ESDP with failed states, regional conflicts or piracy. These, we can infer, are **ESDP-specific tasks**, largely in the realm of crisis management, with the overarching emphasis on prevention and peace-building. Last but not least, the Strategy contains some general principles guiding ESDP, such as **human security** and the **Responsibility to Protect (R2P)**. This is important for a value-based approach towards security and international missions.

³² Some of these are further detailed in the declaration »Statement on strengthening international security« (EU Council, December 2008).

The ESS does represent a useful first step towards strategic *rapprochement* among Member States. This is no small feat, bearing in mind the circumstances of its adoption, back in 2003, but also its 2008 update in the aftermath of the war last summer between Russia and Georgia.

2.2 Main limitations of the Strategy from the perspective of ESDP

However, as argued in Chapter 1, at the official level Europe still lacks an agreed policy assessment on how ESDP may contribute to furthering the broad goals of the Strategy. The Strategy talks about »robust intervention«, yet it falls short of establishing minimum criteria on when, how and for what goals EU Member States should pool their resources behind ESDP, or how to articulate ESDP with other security partners, such as the UN, NATO or OSCE, in order to fulfil multinational mandates.

The ESS is so short and yet so broad, in terms of threats and challenges, that there is no clear guidance for ESDP. In particular, not all threats and challenges described in the ESS are immediately acute with regard to Europe's security and defence, nor justify using ESDP as the framework for dealing with them. Poverty and related side-effects, such as massive illegal immigration, are clearly examples of this, a point elaborated in more detail below. In the broader strategic environment, we need to identify which ones have **pressing security and defence implications**.

In that exercise, European countries need to establish **priorities**, which would also help Europe's **effectiveness**,³³ guiding decision-making in the years to come. That is, from agreeing on specific Petersberg tasks adequate to the crisis at stake, to capability-building efforts within the framework of the Headline Goals, EDA-driven projects and so forth.

The main point here is that the Union must establish priorities for its security and defence over the next years, which entails also choices of capabilities, without discarding possible scenarios which may arise.³⁴

³³ »... if the EU is to be effective in the future, it will need a clear sense of its security priorities and what it is prepared to do«, for »it cannot cope with all potential threats« (Keohane and Valasek 2008).

³⁴ This was a point raised by British policy-makers when discussing early drafts of this paper (the need to focus on the main themes, necessary for defence planning, while leaving room for other scenarios).

2.3 The need to re-focus ESDP

In this regard, we build our analysis on a number of principal assumptions:

ESDP AS A TOOL OF CFSP. First of all, ESDP cannot fulfil self-serving tasks. In its first decade after St Malo, it has sometimes been used to compensate for failures in Europe's foreign policy. Above all, **it must be the tool of an enhanced CFSP**, that is, an instrument at the service of the EU's international role and its security.³⁵

FOCUSED ESDP. Secondly, **Europeans must avoid an overt securitisation of their policies**, preserving the EU's unique nature as a post-modern security actor, combining civil, military, economic and political instruments. Modern challenges and threats are interconnected, but a distinction must still be made between

- those having a largely societal nature (such as immigration) (Vasconcelos 2009). – and thus being handled through other EU policies, with ESDP playing, if at all, a supportive role when the drivers of insecurity materialise as actual threats; and
- those which require proper civil and/or military instruments for various tasks, inter alia, state-building purposes; high-intensity forceful operations to protect trade routes or populations from genocide or defence of the territory from attack(s) – thus being the focus of ESDP in the application of CFSP and coherent with other EU policies

DIFFERENT SCENARIOS: THE UNION'S CAPACITY TO PREVENT AND TO REACT. Thirdly, while preserving its comprehensive approach to security, the Union must become more focused in terms of future scenarios for missions and operations relevant for its civilian and military branch. Thinking in terms of the several **dimensions of security (social, functional and ecological)** would be helpful here. The notion of **»human security«** mentioned in the 2008 Implementation Report refers to the security of individuals and communities and could also serve as a conceptual guideline for ESDP, encompassing other notions of security and their impact on people (Kaldor et al. 2008). The risks and challenges raise different scenarios,³⁶ whereby ESDP will be central in some,

less relevant in others (Ries 2009). A **human approach to security** must hence be at the centre of the assessment as EU governments and institutions advance towards a White Paper.

Europe will have to be able to prevent and deactivate the foreseeable crisis and react to the unexpected (**sudden shocks** with direct security implications for us all), whilst at the same time being able to tailor our different tools/capabilities to a number of priorities.

2.4 Developing the Strategy: priorities for Europe's security and defence

Most European national strategies, such as that of the UK, and the ESS highlight the fact that modern transnational threats, challenges and/or drivers of insecurity are interacting in ever more diverse ways.³⁷ Globalisation has made them more complex and interconnected, blurring geographical boundaries. The line between internal and external security is also being eroded. For instance, **the development of the Space of Freedom, Security and Justice is as crucial to the basic defence of EU populations** as the availability of ready armed forces (if not more). Cyber attacks may damage internal infrastructures, critical for our subsistence, as much as a classic military attack on our borders, which was the great fear in the Cold War. Defence is and will be but one of several elements of an overarching security policy.

Hence, EU leaders, in the process of agreeing on a White Paper, must bear in mind, *inter alia*:

- A thorough **threat assessment**. The ESS focuses ESDP on threats and challenges, coherent with

cal system by alienated powers or regimes, which will call for enforcement actions of the more hard-power kind (say, North Korea or Burma), or to conduct state-building processes to ensure stability in struggling societies (in Africa, for instance); (ii) actions to protect transnational functional flows – which includes everything from sea lanes and basic nodes, or assistance in civil emergencies; all these being key for the very continuity of the system; (iii) policing and enforcement of norms/resources relevant for ecological security and for stemming the pending global ecological crisis – which will feature as high on the agenda in 2020 as human rights.

37 »The Cold War threat has been replaced by a diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks ... They include international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics and transnational crime ... driven by a diverse and interconnected set of factors, including climate change, competition for energy, poverty and poor governance, demographic changes and globalization« (National Security Strategy of the UK, 2008).

35 Nicole Gnesotto makes the point that, all too often, ESDP has been used »not as an instrument of a common foreign policy objective, but as a substitute for policy itself« (EUISS July 2009).

36 For instance, following Ries's approach, we may conceive the following scenarios: (i) challenges to the global politi-

other policies and aims (stable neighbourhood, and so on). We must complete the first broad description in the Strategy through an assessment of which threats and risks should constitute the main objectives for ESDP.

- **Existing institutional arrangements**, the Lisbon Treaty in particular, as a milestone of our CFSP/ESDP ambitions for the coming years, together with available partnerships.
- **Instruments for European and ESDP engagement**. ESDP is one instrument at the EU's disposal. There are several others, which can be used for different purposes, according to the situation at stake (geopolitical factors and so on). Under EU–CFSP leadership, these instruments may also be an effective way of implementing Europe's security policy. Thus, another criterion will be the framework of implementation (**form of EU engagement**).

2.5 Threats and overall roles for ESDP³⁸

The ESS outlines a number of threats which are basic for our White Paper. Further to our previous analysis, we focus on those which have direct or semi-direct defence implications, while not being oblivious to the fact that one of the biggest threats is probably the proliferation of mass poverty, endemics and, in the words of the Strategy, untold suffering in large parts of the developing world, no less than in our direct neighbourhood.³⁹

Likewise, in some of the following threats (such as failed state-related conflicts), ESDP may be central and play a **lead role**; in others (e.g. management of a major disaster inside or outside Europe), it may play a **supportive role**, assisting other mechanisms.

With this in mind, we deem the following threats to be key priorities for Europe's security in the near future:⁴⁰

Among so-called systemic threats, **proliferation of WMD**, particularly in our neighbourhood, stands as a top priority for the near future. In conjunction with the same extremist terrorism which threatens

Europe and which has shown a willingness to inflict unlimited mass casualties among EU citizens, it could become an **existential threat**. This threat is not regional since, for example, the failure of the NPT regime might trigger different arms races, whether in the broader Middle East or in Asia.

Dealing with proliferation of WMD requires, first, enhanced European diplomacy through the CFSP,⁴¹ including stricter sanctions. It would require that EU countries discuss among themselves the future of nuclear deterrence and the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. A subject for CFSP, it remains beyond the scope of ESDP in terms of implementation. It is rather related to global governance with the NPT and the UN Conference on Disarmament, NATO's policy on tactical nuclear weapons and the role of nuclear weapons in the Strategic Concept of the Alliance.

The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles in the broader neighbourhood of the EU is a rather more concrete concern for Europe.⁴² However, such a threat, again, requires that NATO maintain capacities as a system of collective defence, or EU economic and diplomatic efforts to contain the spread of missile technology.

These are threats in relation to which ESDP, as such, even after Lisbon, cannot make much of a difference in the next few years. However, the EU or »Brussels« should be the framework for political concertation at the level of security policy, as a first task in developing the Strategy, even if this policy must then be implemented and defended in other venues.⁴³ The EU-3 diplomacy with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme has illustrated the potential of some Member States conducting policies with the consent of the whole Union.

An **armed attack** against an EU member state, in the classic sense (state vs. state), does not seem imminent in Europe. Most national strategies do not rule out this scenario completely, though, all the more since the very definition of armed attack is changing. On the one hand, for 21 EU member states this would be a matter for NATO and the principle of

38 Note that our focus is on major threats, sometimes pointing out possible scenarios which they may lead to. We do not intend to – nor could we – exhaust every possible scenario (for instance, rescue of EU nationals, and so on).

39 This was a vital issue raised in the discussions in preparation for this paper.

40 We ruled out a sequential approach (= within threat priorities, an order of importance), which we thought rather inadequate, especially in light of the interconnectedness of threats and challenges, and also account taken to the perspective of the national strategies examined.

41 Bearing in mind the scope of the White Paper, we do not deal here with CFSP efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In this respect, see Christos Katsioulis and Christian Mölling (forthcoming), *Reviving the NPT. What role for the EU?*

42 By 2025, Europe will be within striking distance of a number of countries developing these weapons (French White Paper on Defence and National Security, June 2008). Cf. also Iran's missile test in September 2009.

43 A first such exercise is the European Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

collective defence of Art. V of the Washington Treaty. But on the other hand, under the Lisbon Treaty this would hypothetically become *also* a matter for EU-wide security consultations and action based on the new **mutual assistance clause** of Art. 42. This would give meaning to the **principle of solidarity** among Europeans, which is what is really needed now, beyond legal formulae and institutional issues (Katsioulis 2009). An additional benefit is that it would make it possible to cover non-NATO EU countries. So European countries could rely also on the protection and assistance of the EU, in the face of such an event, aside from the traditional guarantee of NATO.

Regional conflicts must also be at the forefront of any discussion directed towards a White Paper. These also include **inter-state conflicts**; last summer's war between Georgia and Russia was a powerful reminder of that. Further to the previous point, major inter-state conflicts and major regional wars may hopefully be declining, but cannot be disregarded at all. Overall, regional wars could affect European values and interests in several ways: from jeopardising stability in our immediate neighbourhood or even directly affecting EU countries (through the threat to supplies and energy resources, as with the first Gulf War, and so on – EUISS 2004) to endangering civilian populations.

Such scenarios require not only the crisis management and civilian and military capabilities ESDP has been about, thus far. They also demand combat-capable troops trained, for instance, for higher intensity operations; participation in an international coalition against an aggressor state or intervention in ethnic conflicts to implement a mandate to separate conflicting parties by force, through a protracted period of time (as in the DRC). That is, from low-level crises to the higher end of the Petersberg tasks, which would entrust ESDP not only with peace-keeping tasks but also **peace-enforcement**. This must be a clear military horizon for ESDP in the coming decade.

Failed states and conflicts are deeply related. Conflict is often linked to state fragility and poor governance (as the ESS assumes), a phenomenon which causes regional instability. These so-called root causes of conflicts (UN 2004) have sometimes led to devastating humanitarian conflicts of the R2P kind (as in Rwanda or Darfur). Furthermore, state failure may make some of these states safe havens for terrorism (like areas in the Sahel or in the Horn of Africa). Hence both regional conflicts, in their full panoply, and failed-state scenarios, which require multinational peace-building endeavours, must be a priority for Europe's security policy.

International terrorism is another strategic threat to Europe, both at home and in faraway regions – for instance, in the porous borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁴⁴ As already mentioned, the possible acquisition and mastery of WMD by terrorist organisations is a particularly worrying scenario. The EU must deal with it comprehensively, bringing together both its internal and its external dimensions.⁴⁵ As regards ESDP involvement, it would at least be forced to deal with the specific manifestations of terrorism characteristic of modern asymmetric wars, particularly in operations of the counter-insurgency kind (as in Afghanistan). This will require very tight Rules of Engagement (RoE) and enhanced systems of intelligence and technology.⁴⁶ Likewise, the TEU under Lisbon foresees ESDP's missions as contributing to the fight against terrorism, including in third countries. On the other hand, ESDP assets can also contribute to general efforts in response and **disaster management inside Europe** after a mass terrorist attack creates a civil emergency.

Climate change remains a real challenge as it can be expected to be a central driver of insecurity and instability in the coming decades. It must be dealt with preventively by means of other EU policies. ESDP assets may support the management of the effects of an ecological disaster.⁴⁷ We foresee two priorities: (i) **inside the EU**, as addressed in Chapter 3, where ESDP could contribute to the management of ecological disasters, as with a major terrorist attack, once there is agreement on implementing the new solidarity clause of the Lisbon Treaty; (ii) **outside the EU**, in respect of which we must take into account the comprehensive policy on disaster response overseas being developed by Brussels and which involves the Commission, the Council and its Secretariat and the

44 As the German White Paper states, »international terrorism represents a fundamental challenge and threat to freedom and security« (White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 2006).

45 For instance, through increased coordination of Member States' law enforcement policies in the framework of the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, greater judicial and police cooperation and intelligence sharing, together with preventive policies and police operations aimed at disrupting attacks.

46 »... The operations for which European forces should primarily prepare for the foreseeable future will require force to be applied in opaque circumstances, against an opponent at pains to conceal himself amongst civil populations, under tightly constraining rule of engagement and 24/7 media scrutiny« (EDA, An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Needs, 2006).

47 For instance, as was the case in the floods in Algeria (2006), providing humanitarian relief overseas, in accordance with the Oslo Guidelines.

Member States. In the latter, ESDP must be expected to play a **supportive role** in relation to the civilian response in cases of natural or man-made disaster, or also terrorist attacks with WMD (thus, civil protection scenarios and humanitarian aid).⁴⁸

2.6 The European neighbourhood: A priority for ESDP – but not the sole criterion

According to the ESS, even in the era of globalisation, geography matters – particularly bearing in mind scarce resources for dealing with all relevant threats. In this respect, policy-makers working on EU defence matters usually provide a picture of critical areas for Europe's security.

The Middle East should figure extremely high on the agenda. It presents a number of interrelated trends: nuclear proliferation and WMD in general, regional power competition, a failing peace process, and extremism committed to worldwide mass casualties. To some, the Middle East represents the most serious challenge to our security, all the more so in view of Europe's extraordinary resource-based dependence on the »world's politically most fractured region« (EUISS 2004). In the coming decade, this tension seems likely to increase.

Other adjacent regions also present security concerns for Europe. For instance, North African countries, where Europe also has strategic interests. The Balkans, embedded in Europe, is a good example of the risks of not-so-faraway past conflicts; here the EU's involvement will remain crucial as the United States focuses its attention on other regions (and in view of looming ethnic rivalries). Europe's Eastern fringe – especially the Caucasus – will also be a security priority, particularly in view of political tensions with Russia and competition with the EU for influence. Likewise, the importance of so-called Eurasia and Central Asian countries, in view of their energy resources and growing extremist groups, will surely increase.

But apart from the near neighbourhood, the truth is that there are other geographically identifiable security concerns for Europe. First, endemic violence in

failed states in Africa will be an objective for ESDP, particularly when it risks turning into dire R2P scenarios. Europe's dependence on energy resources from African countries, subject to major terrorist attacks (such as Algeria) is also a cause for concern. The Indian Ocean comes to mind, too, given the threat posed by maritime piracy there.⁴⁹ To the East, the threat of nuclear proliferation in South Asia is a worry for the EU, not just for those near at hand (ESS 2003).

Last but not least, more attention should be devoted to the security implications of the Arctic (in conjunction with the advance of global warming there) and to Latin America, which has seen both the creation of loose security structures, and more importantly for a threat assessment, the escalation of tensions between certain countries.

Europe has many strategic interests in its imminent neighbourhood, indeed, but also beyond – all the more since, as it enlarges, EU's strategic interests and reach grow exponentially. We deem it, therefore, insufficient for a future White Paper to adopt a focus based solely on specific regions.

2.7 Criteria for European engagement

The rather blurry picture of threats, spread between different actors, regions and policies raises a number of **dilemmas** for the EU:

- Europe has security interests far beyond its immediate neighbourhood and yet it is hard to imagine *now* a significant, sustained ESDP presence, for instance, in South East Asia. But again, European involvement in similar faraway crises cannot be dismissed out of hand.⁵⁰
- Likewise, in terms of principles and values, such as human rights, there are normative dilemmas, too, for the EU's foreign and security policy. The European Union supported the **R2P principle** at the level of the United Nations, and the ESS recognises **human security** as a guiding principle for ESDP. This means potentially more engagements and under difficult circumstances (Rwanda and Darfur have been mentioned before), but also different kinds of engagement, as the human security concept implies a specific approach with tailor-made instruments (Kaldor et al. 2008).

48 See, for instance, the Joint Council, Commission and Parliament document on an EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2007); or the General Secretariat's 2006 documents on the Framework for the Use of Member States' Military or Military Chartered Transportation Assets and ESDP Coordination Tools in Support of EU Disaster Response, Military Support to EU Disaster Response: Identification and Coordination of Available Assets and Capabilities, and other documents.

49 These priorities would largely coincide with those depicted in some European national strategies, such as the French White Paper.

50 »It is by no means obvious that Europe should automatically opt for a bystander position in such contingencies, in the expectation that the US alone will do the fighting ...« (EUISS, EU Defence: Proposal for a White Paper, 2004).

- Importantly, the question ultimately boils down to the **ambitions of the EU as an international security actor**. If it truly wants to assume its responsibility as a global actor, it cannot focus exclusively on its neighbourhood. Likewise, if it aims to be a strong international partner of the United States, it cannot just look to the Balkans or the Mediterranean, inasmuch as common security concerns for the transatlantic partnership also lie elsewhere. In addition, as Chapter 4 shows, the security partnerships of the EU are global in scope. So: **the EU, through CFSP, must be global in its aspirations**, and as such, it should not set itself *a priori* regional caveats.

The broad spectrum of challenges and threats and the limited resources of EU Member States point to an urgent need for clearer guidelines for European engagement. EU missions have so far been planned and conducted in an ad hoc manner, based on the political will of a few Member States and too often without having much impact on the ground. Therefore, Europeans need to reach a consensus on **criteria for European missions**, which essence could be included in the White Paper, whilst being easily adapted to different scenarios and circumstances. We propose the following:

First: Strategic assessment⁵¹

- **R2P** – as the European Union supports the R2P principle at the UN level, R2P scenarios should rank among the first reasons to act through ESDP.
- Risks and interests. Are **European interests** (including its citizens) at stake? How are European interests affected by the abovementioned threats and challenges? What are the EU's broad strategic interests and political objectives in the given region?⁵²
- Also, what are the **expectations** of the international community with regard to EU action on the ground? Requests of involvement or even a clear mandate by the United Nations should be important reasons for the EU to get engaged.

Starting with this strategic assessment, the European Union – and in CFSP/ESDP matters, this means especially the EU Member States – must decide on its level of ambition in the respective situation.

Second: Response/action assessment

What kind of response is mainly necessary to deal with the situation? Europe advocates a distributed response, meaning action spread over a wide area and shared by a number of actors at a variety of levels (IPPR 2009: 4).

In general, and together with other abovementioned factors at the level of strategic assessment, ESDP missions should also be guided by the recommendations of the **Human Security Study Group** (HSSG 2008). This approach guarantees the coherent use of the different instruments available to the EU and provides internal and external legitimacy for EU foreign policy's most contentious aspect. According to the principles of human security, action assessment has to decide which tools to apply in order to guarantee the **security of people on the ground**:

- Civil, civ-mil, military?
- If military, what kind of operation? Securing elections? Security Sector Reform-related processes? Peace-keeping and stabilisation tasks? Or operations at the high-end level of Petersberg – peace-enforcement, including against a state?
- If civilian, a civilian mission of the rule of law variety? A continued mission on the ground for security sector reform?
- Application of parallel economic involvement, maybe through Commission tools?

Third: Implementation: framework/s for European engagement

Subsequently, the decisive question on an engagement should be: **how can Europe make a difference?** The EU Member States, being at the core of CFSP/ESDP and having decided collectively on the **European level of ambition** in the respective situation, should then select the specific framework of implementation. The framework of military action should be provided ideally by a mandate of the United Nations (save probably in self-defence and in the application of the mutual assistance clause) or, if this is not possible, cooperation with regional security organisations should be sought to strengthen legitimacy.

The EU has to refrain from the self-reflective approach it has so far followed and turn to the more important issue of **how it can have a substantial impact on the ground**. Such an outcome-oriented deliberation leads to **European engagement**, where it best serves the solution of the problem, but it may not necessarily lead to an EU engagement through ESDP. The following questions are central:

51 The UK 2008 strategy adopts a similar approach to prioritising in relation to possible involvement in crises.

52 For instance, in view of the broader EU policy for the region, the European perspective of many countries in the Balkans would justify a bigger role for ESDP than in South Asia.

- Based on the foregoing, what is ESDP's comparative advantage?
- Which organisation is best suited to be in the »driver's seat«, according to its specific capabilities and/or previous presence on the ground (cost-effectiveness)?
- Are there any EU states which show a specific comparative advantage and can take the lead in the action⁵³ – based on added value, knowledge of the scenario, etc.?
- How can the principles of Human Security, including legitimate political authority, a bottom-up approach or an integrated regional approach best be applied (HSSG 2007: 3–4)? This should also include, as noted in the 2008 update of the Strategy, a consideration of human rights, gender and children-related issues in the planning and implementation of subsequent operations.⁵⁴

In some cases, these criteria will lead to a full ESDP mission; to an EU-led contribution to, for instance, an UN mission (for example, UNIFIL in Lebanon) or an OSCE civilian mission in Eurasia; and/or to joint institutional partnerships (e.g. EU-NATO operations, EU-OSCE). The EU would be autonomous as such, when defining its security policy, while working in multilateral frameworks with different partners, as called for by the principle of effective multilateralism – and the realities of security and defence policy.

Overall, in some scenarios, ESDP must aim to make a difference (in the Balkans, for instance), whereas in others, perhaps the EU-CFSP can think of different frameworks for intervention. Above all, CFSP decision-making must be central in this process, the **EU being the political centre of gravity for security policy-making** (Biscop 2008). The overarching concern for EU leaders should be to enhance Europe's role and responsibilities in collective security, not missions' visibility, as has sometimes been the case.⁵⁵

53 The Lisbon Treaty foresees similar options, such as entrusting an ESDP mission to a group of countries (see Chapter 3).

54 »We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in the field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security ... Effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and UNSCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict is essential in this context« (Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 2008). See also Council Conclusions on ESDP (November 17, 2009).

55 As A. Menon argues, »if Europeans really aspire to play a leading role in international security, they must deploy the full panoply of instruments available to them, including NATO and the UN« (Menon 2009).

Finally, the adoption of such a concept of priorities and criteria would serve as a means to increase the credibility and legitimacy of the EU as a global security and defence actor, both among the European public and in the international arena.

2.8 Common Security and Defence Policy's Fundamental Tasks

CSDP's Fundamental Tasks in the short to mid-term should be the following:

MISSIONS OVERSEAS. The **Petersberg Tasks**, as enhanced by Lisbon (Art. 43 TEU, in particular) and related documents,⁵⁶ define the level of ambition in the domain of expeditionary missions outside the Union.

In particular, the level already defined by 2010 should be at least as valid for the new decade, which means that the EU should be able to plan and conduct simultaneously:

- two important stabilisation and reconstruction missions, with a civilian component, sustained by 10,000 soldiers for at least two years;
- two rapid reaction operations, using *inter alia* the EU Battle Groups;
- a search and rescue operation aimed at evacuating European citizens in a crisis theatre within 10 days;
- a mission of maritime surveillance/interdiction;
- a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days and
- a dozen civilian missions, including one major one (up to 3,000 personnel) lasting for several years.

In other words, missions from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement and peace-making. Our caveat is that this level of ambition should be updated and re-framed as required by the changing strategic environment, new scenarios and also bearing in mind the above criteria for engagement.

Importantly, these missions should facilitate participation mechanisms for non-EU countries, particularly for those in NATO (namely Turkey or Norway), but with other European countries, too, including enhanced access to decision-making in the field.

MISSIONS WITHIN THE UNION. The ambition here would be to make EU solidarity real in extreme cases through the Lisbon Treaty clauses of mutual assistance and solidarity.

ESPD missions have essentially involved crisis management, police training and nation-building. The

56 Such as the 2008 Council Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities.

future Common Security and Defence Policy should also include this aspect, relevant for the direct security and well-being of EU citizens. Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty includes for the first time in the European integration process the idea of a potential politico-military solidarity among EU member states, by setting forth the obligation of Member States to assist, with »all means at their disposal«, any Member which has suffered armed aggression. While this clause is somehow ground-breaking, its application is also coupled with the provision which states that NATO remains the foundation of collective defence. Yet both options would seem compatible and it would be logical that EU action would be parallel to NATO action, one reinforcing the other – with this clause now also covering those countries which are not members of the Alliance. Article 42 does not specify how member states should assist another EU member victim of a military attack, so different options are plausible.

The solidarity clause (art. 222 TFEU) for terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters within the EU is even more important, given that this kind of threats seem much more realistic than that of a military invasion of a European country. In addition, the clause opens up the possibility of more coherence of different mechanisms of the Union with repercus-

sions for security – from civil protection to military assets in support of a disaster management situation – and related institutions, from the High Representative and the Commission, to the Council and the Political and Security Committee.

The practical application of this provision should be specified by the Council as soon as possible, and a European fund for preventing terrorist attacks, as well as responding to such a crisis should be created. The powers of the EU Coordinator of the fight against terrorism should be increased. Most importantly, the exchange of sensitive information between the security services of Member States should become mandatory. Extensive application of this article of the Lisbon Treaty could help the European Commission to propose an action plan on this issue.

To conclude, having these provisions as another element of the future CSDP, together with the other factors mentioned in the Executive Summary (namely, enhanced strategic convergence, serious achievements in the domain of capabilities through structured cooperations, and EU integration in the field of Space of Freedom, Justice and Security), would pave the way for the EU to be a full-fledged Security Union – not only contributing to the requirements of global governance, but also providing basic security to its citizens and peoples.

3 The framework for a Common Security and Defence Policy

3.1 Overview and achievements of ESDP over ten years (1999–2009)

The period beginning with the Franco-British summit in St. Malo and the European Council of Cologne (1998–99) has seen major achievements in the establishment of a European security and defence policy, with the necessary civilian and military tools. This was unthinkable during the Balkan crisis or even before Maastricht Treaty. The adoption of the Strategy stands first on the list, as a milestone towards a shared security culture, aimed at addressing the EU's potential role in the world and the challenges it faces.

Secondly, EU governments have established benchmarks for making this policy real, such as the **Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG)**, both for civilian and military capabilities. The EU countries do have with the HHG a »road map« of sorts for ESDP capabilities, which, if duly implemented, would enhance Europe's credibility. Twenty six member states increasingly use the European Defence Agency's criteria in their planning. There is, indeed, greater cooperation and a certain **interlocking of defence systems** in Europe, which is a notable achievement, bearing in mind sensitivities related to state sovereignty.

3.2 The current institutional framework

An institutional framework within the EU has been developed in fits and starts, with the European Council and the Council at the top, as the main decision-makers of CFSP/ESDP:

- first, the General Secretary of the European Council/High Representative (HR), entrusted with implementing the policy of the Member States;⁵⁷
- the Political and Security Committee (PSC), at the Ambassadors' level, main interlocutor of the High Representative for ESDP. The PSC has a key role in shaping the day-to-day CFSP/ESDP decisions taken

by the Council, including the strategic direction of operations;

- the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military authority of the EU; composed of the chiefs of staff of Member States, it functions as military advisor of the High Representative;
- the European Defence Agency (EDA), set up to improve the utilisation of defence budgets and to promote cooperation from the research lab to the front line (Witney 2008a).

3.3 ESDP Missions

Finally, the Union has launched a number of civilian missions – the civilian pillar of ESDP, assessed on Chapter 5. It has also set in motion five military missions so far, sometimes with the help of NATO's machinery (such as the ongoing EUFOR Althea, in Bosnia), sometimes independently (as with Artemis in 2003, RDC). All of them have largely been of a crisis management and state-building nature.

ESDP missions have made **the EU a crisis management actor**. Moreover, the European Union and its states reacted quickly to crises in which the United States or NATO, for various reasons, were unable to play a role, such as Georgia and Lebanon.

3.4 Budget for ESDP

While civilian operations of crisis management are financed out of the CFSP budget⁵⁸ of the European Commission, no ESDP action is financed out of the community budget. ESDP missions are financed essentially by EU Member States, on the basis of the principle »costs lie where they fall«. Up to now, the EU budget covers a small part of the costs (approximately 10 per cent) through the **Athena mechanism**, agreed in 2004, which is intended to be a first step towards a common funding mechanism.

3.5 Shortcomings

ESDP, as of 2009 suffers from several shortcomings. We have already emphasised the strategic weaknesses predating ESDP missions and how this affects impact on the ground, which impact has been ques-

57 Very briefly, within the Council and its General Secretariat, the General Directorate of the Council for External Affairs (DGE) is composed of the administrative services responsible for ESDP; DG8 is the directorate for Defence Affairs, DG9 the directorate for the civilian direction of crises. The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is composed of military personnel assigned by Member States to the General Secretariat of the Council. The EUMS responds to the Military Committee and ensures the functions of early warning, situation awareness and strategic planning for ESDP missions. A civilian military cell also helps the EUMS in its missions.

58 For the period 2007–2013 the CFSP budget is of 1,74 billion euros (almost 250 million euros per year, compared to 50 million euros per year in the period 2000–2006).

tioned in some cases.⁵⁹ Also, capabilities are deployed late – and sometimes never materialise – due to a lack of political will.⁶⁰ But there are also others, largely related to these questions at the bottom of ESDP's limits, which we would like to outline:

KEY CAPABILITIES' COMMITMENTS ARE NOT MET, both for the civilian and the military pillar (see Chapter 5). The Helsinki Headline Goals notwithstanding, the EU is still far from able to muster the famous 60,000 combat-ready troops to implement Petersberg tasks: **as of 2009, St Malo remains more an aspiration than a reality.** As has been pointed out, cataloguing has been used as an alibi for avoiding tough decisions. Despite the revision of the HHG in order to fulfil the capabilities shortfalls at the 2010 horizon, and the impetus by the French Presidency 2008 that the EU should reaffirm this level of ambition, it already seems clear that capabilities shortfalls in 2010 will be similar to the ones noted in 2003. Chapter 2 has shown that Member States need to have deployable military capabilities to meet their shared security needs. But, Europe's mass armies are still largely unsuitable for that purpose; not only that: EU countries deploy only a tiny fraction of their total forces for ESDP missions (less than 1 per cent, according to some estimates).

This criticism also applies to the civilian pillar of ESDP, and perhaps more: states have been slow to meet the commitments agreed on paper, such as providing sufficient personnel (judges, rule of law experts, police and so on) for such operations. This is at odds with the concept of the EU being a comprehensive actor with the preference for non-military tools which underpins the Strategy.

WEAK INSTITUTIONAL SETTING. The EU has seen its security ambitions skyrocketing without a strong institutional basis and framework for sound decision-making, guided by strategic objectives. The system of decentralised inter-state cooperation which now defines ESDP is undoubtedly a hurdle if the Union is to move towards a more ambitious and effective stage

for ESDP. Briefly, the following stumbling blocks (in Witney 2008a) should be mentioned:

- The so-called **»convoy approach«** embodied in the unanimity rule is a problem. This will be even more the case in view of the tendency of certain countries to block, or threatening to block, progress at all EU levels, even if a clear majority is in favour of action.
- The current system for the **planning and direction of EU missions** »is disjointed, unstable and plainly transitional«, as reflected by the lack of an EU command and control system, or the division between civilian and military planning (again at odds with against the very comprehensive civ-mil approach advocated by the EU).
- The **lack of funding for ESDP operations** – ESDP is supposed to be part of CFSP, yet it remains excluded from common funding, even if the number of EU missions has gone up. ESDP as a policy cannot do without a budget of its own. The principle of »costs lie where they fall«, as NATO also finds, is a disincentive for participation, the more so in the current financial crisis, and hardly efficient either. Contributors shoulder both costs and risks. The Athena mechanism, as currently designed, is insufficient: it covers very limited costs, the notion of what constitutes »common costs« being decided unanimously and ad hoc.
- The **lack of a watchdog authority**, supervising performance and compliance with objectives. New catalogues such as the EHG 2010 and voluntary benchmarks are provided, without completely meeting those agreed in the first place. Though the EDA sees its role enhanced under Lisbon, the current system (beginning with the very structure of the EDA), does not provide incentives for Member States to meet their commitments.
- The **lack of a Council of Defence Ministers** also denies ESDP a stronger political impulse and continuity. European Defence Ministers meet only twice a year, once in an informal way, another on the sidelines of the Council of their foreign affairs counterparts – although they are responsible for implementing the decisions on their portfolios taken by the latter.

59 Operation Artemis, trumpeted as a success by the EU, was criticised in other quarters for its limited scope, in terms of both space and time, making it insufficient to deal with the challenges on the ground (International Crisis Group 2006). Likewise with EUFOR Congo in 2006, or the police mission in Bosnia.

60 Adequate and timely contributions in terms of troops, resources and civilian staff is indeed one of the ongoing problems of ESDP, as the examples of EUFOR Chad and EUPOL Afghanistan have shown. This has injured the EU's credibility on the ground.

3.6 Suggestions and recommendations⁶¹

Implementing Lisbon to its full potential

Implementing Lisbon to its full potential should be the utmost priority in the timeframe envisaged in this paper, if a future CSDP is to match up to the task of the EU's ambitions, challenges and responsibilities, fleshed out in previous chapters. As we have said from the outset, Lisbon has great potential, but some risks, too, for example, if internal bickering, power struggles and policy differences cause the new institutional instruments to founder, making the EU's external action a »new henhouse with too many roosters in it« (Angelet and Vrailas 2008).

On top of all the efforts in the domain of capabilities (and coherent with them), in our view, three main goals must guide the building of a CSDP:

- above all, **stronger strategic guidance** is needed on the side of the new institutional posts, both from the President of the European Council and from the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, to foster common security policy-making among Member States and truly make CSDP a tool of CFSP;
- **policy coherence** between the different bodies and levels of CFSP/CSDP policy-making, and also with those from other areas of external action;
- last but not least, **greater legitimacy**, through development of the few tools the European Parliament is given in the Treaty, in terms of oversight and public democratic debate on CSDP.

With these broader goals in mind, we flesh out the following **proposals for the future CSDP**:

Strengthening democratic accountability and legitimacy of CSDP

A major achievement since the inception of the CFSP/ESDP has been the growing development of a specifically **European security culture**. In order to gain support from European citizens for a Common Security and Defence Policy, the process, on the one hand, should involve not only the broader security community, but also those national political institutions which have a fundamental say, for instance, when approving military operations – national parliaments, above all.

On the other hand, national governments must commit to engaging in their domestic arenas with the results of the process towards a White Paper, as part

of the efforts to mainstream the security/defence pillars of the EU. A sense of ownership is a must in most aspects of the integration process; even more so in this area, since the security challenges and needs for a CSDP will grow whilst public disaffection is dangerously high.

In order to achieve this appropriation of CSDP by European civil society, the European Parliament (EP) should be much more involved in the direction of this policy. In particular, Art. 36 of the new TEU must be developed to the point of making the EP **the leading body in oversight and debate with regard to CSDP**. Through regular consultations with the European Parliament by the High Representative, information provided by EU Special Representatives in crisis areas, or the questions/recommendations process, the European Parliament may help in bridging the gap in this area between citizens and governments. In addition, the performance of the new High Representative/Vice President of the Commission will now be subjected to the collective scrutiny of the Parliament (including possible motions of censure): Lisbon holds out the possibility of **direct democratic control of CSDP**.

For all these reasons, not only must government institutions have a say in developing a White Paper, but the European Parliament, still the only directly elected EU institution, must be involved, too.

Moreover, the linkage between national parliaments and the European Parliament, asserted in the Lisbon Treaty, will help in developing the public accountability of CSDP. A major role for the European and national parliaments could help »small« Member States to invest in ESDP politically. As Eurobarometer opinion polls constantly show, there is considerable public support for a single European voice and action in the world. On the other hand, the European Parliament should finance, if willing to do so, equipment programmes for filling capability shortfalls.

Reinforcing current bodies/institutions shaping a European security culture

Here we do not propose the setting of new institutions, yet we do propose political impetus towards defining synergies among them, and with others relevant for the realm of analysis (such as NATO's Defence College). In this respect, the European Security and Defence College is still too loose an initiative to further the goals of an enhanced CFSP/CSDP: it must become a real college, with links to policy-making bodies (so that CSDP is mainstreamed, side-by-side other EU policies), the Military School proposed

⁶¹ This section is partly based on Lasheras et al. (2009).

in Chapter 5.2, and, importantly, European universities. Substantial funding should be allocated to such projects.

A stronger linkage between CFSP/CSDP and external action through the future EEAS

The future **European External Action Service (EEAS)**, whose main elements will be gradually agreed upon in the coming months, will face a number of challenges, above all bringing about more coherence between the different policies of external action, both in Brussels and in third countries; more convergence between Member States; and generally more visibility for the EU as such, since it will be part of EU Delegations, for example, to UN agencies and bodies, and to the OSCE.

Importantly for the purposes of this paper, the future EEAS will merge not only the relevant services of the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, along with national diplomats. It will also probably include the EU Special Representatives' tasks and certainly **existing ESDP institutions**, such as the Civilian-Military Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Military Staff (EUMS), together with the Situation Centre.⁶² This will be a problematic process, and has already been questioned in some fora,⁶³ but brings with it the opportunity of greater policy coherence between EU and Member State diplomatic bodies, and their collective civilian and military tools – not least in the field, where coordination between, for instance, the EUSRs and ESDP command centres has proved difficult.

The EEAS could also play a leading role in tasks proper of conflict **prevention and mediation**, the more if it encompasses the EU's Special Representatives. Prevention lies at the heart of the Strategy and is stressed in the 2008 Report. EU influence in the field should foresee flexible frameworks of engagement with NGO's and civil society actors.

Pioneer groups in military capabilities' developments through Permanent Structured Cooperation(s) and missions, within a general process towards CSDP

In terms of practical advances towards the goal of European defence, and bearing in mind that **unanimity remains the general rule in CFSP/CSDP**, the idea of **pioneer groups** (Witney 2008a) must be to the fore. The idea of pioneer groups is enshrined, first, in the provisions for a Permanent Structured Cooperation and Enhanced Cooperation(s), and in other provisions of the Lisbon Treaty too. So, while unanimity will remain the rule, all EU governments have agreed to legitimise different speeds within the Union to achieve these goals: from developing capabilities to carrying out specific missions agreed by the Council.

The development of a CSDP will therefore require determined efforts in particular by those States most willing to realize it – and deliver according to objective benchmarks. The caveat here is that this must take place within a **decisive boost of ESDP by all Member States**, which are all obliged under the new Treaty to make available to the Union civilian and military capabilities, and also to commit to gradually improve the latter, under the auspices of a stronger Defence Agency.⁶⁴

First, and focusing on military capability development, **Permanent Structured Cooperation**, as conceived in the Lisbon Treaty, embodies this idea and has the potential to make European military capabilities more efficient without a strong integration policy, while allowing for a smaller group of Member States to advance faster and deeper towards defence integration.

One of the crucial challenges will be to specify the accession criteria to PSCoop. Those criteria should be based not on rhetoric, but importantly on measurable future performance and thus the benchmarked implementation of commitments. Member States should commit themselves to **stringent and binding criteria** if PSCoop is to make a difference, such as a minimum percentage of GDP which must be allocated to defence expenditure on equipment or R&D. The criteria must be construed ambitiously, so that the current lowest common denominator is not perpetuated, whilst allowing ample participation of those States willing to undertake sufficient commitments (through pooling, collaboration programmes, etc.).

62 See the EU Swedish Presidency proposal on the EEAS, endorsed by the European Council of October 2009.

63 EU Observer, »EU military chiefs nervous about Lisbon Treaty implications« (November 2009).

64 Several provisions of the Lisbon Treaty lead to this clear conclusion: within a general advance towards CSDP, pioneer groups must take the lead; both advances are complementary.

When a number of willing States initiate the process of establishing PSCoP in Spring 2010, the **European Defence Agency** would be well-positioned to monitor implementation of their commitments for a PSCoP, in accordance with Art. 3 of the Protocol and other provisions of the Treaty – therefore acting more like a watchdog, an authority which is needed for European defence. The EDA must be the institutional centre of gravity for the implementation of PSCoP (Angelet and Vrailas 2008); the High Representative, in her condition of Head of the Agency, must be fully associated to this endeavour, and given room for making proposals on criteria.⁶⁵

Secondly, the approach of the 2008 French EU Presidency (the idea of launching different **ad hoc, capability-oriented projects**) is still valid. Those projects are open to all EU Member States, but are launched on the basis of the «coalition of the willing» format. The idea is to obtain a cooperative programme *open to all, but without the threat of veto*, making it more difficult for participants to block any attempt to make progress.

Thirdly, some European countries participating in different pioneer groups in the area of capability-building may wish to go even further, establishing additional commitments to further the goal of a CSDP. They might create a «*vanguard*» in the security and defence area which could later be joined by other Member States. This «*vanguard*» may be developed as an **Enhanced Cooperation** (ECoop) «in the framework of common security» under the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 329, Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, TFEU). It is arguably a mechanism which sets forth more conditions than PSCoP (for example, unanimity as opposed to initial Qualified Majority Voting, an initial quorum, etc.).⁶⁶

Notwithstanding these procedural requirements, Enhanced Cooperation under the Lisbon Treaty has several advantages:

- It remains a real possibility available to willing Member States under the new Treaty, engaging both the Commission and the High Representative, to further the objectives, protect the interests and strengthen the integration of the Union.
- Moreover, it does not have to refer only to the development of military capabilities, like PSCoP;

hence interested Member States could aim for broader scope for this Treaty-based enhanced cooperation. In this respect, for instance, they could assess more demanding commitments and elements, including missions, among those outlined above or others.

- Another upside, in line with the inclusiveness idea, is that, in accordance with Art. 331, other Member States might later follow suit and adopt the commitments of this group.

Regarding **ESDP missions proper**, the pioneer group approach may as well be embodied in the **operationalisation of missions** agreed by the Council, as provided for by Art. 42 and 44 of the new TEU. This in fact resembles some of the criteria for European engagement advocated in Chapter 2, whereby some nation states can exercise operational leadership on the grounds of their specific comparative advantages. After the initial authorisation of the Council, the management of the mission would be entrusted to a few Member States, willing to assume a sustained commitment, in close coordination with the HR and the External Action Service.

This clause would, hopefully, minimise the effects of the convoy approach which has pervaded ESDP missions thus far, and pave the way for a kind of **lead-nation model** within the EU's institutional framework, which would be particularly helpful when rapid response operations are required (Angelet and Vrailas 2008). Likewise, countries within this core group of willing would find it increasingly difficult not to provide the necessary capabilities when required.

Synergies in civilian and military capability developments/mission planning

Although in Chapter 5 we address separately the civilian and military dimensions, we also note that one of the priorities in the next years will be to developing synergies in the capability work of both areas, and also in missions' planning and implementation. This is asserted both out of the EU modern approach to conflicts and crisis management, the gap between aims and resources, and the potential of dual use capabilities (for instance, in the field of technology, intelligence gathering, etc.). The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, as stressed in Chapter 5.1., can be central for these purposes.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ See the preamble on the Protocol on the PSCoP.

⁶⁶ In fact, the nuance is that the procedure envisaged in the PSCoP staves off the possibility of a Member State vetoing the decision on its establishment, admission of other members and exclusion of those not meeting their commitments. Within the core group, the actual decisions implementing PSCoP will still be taken by unanimity (thus the need of previous preparatory work).

⁶⁷ See also Council Conclusions on ESDP (November 2009).

Creating a Council of Defence Ministers

A Council of Defence Ministers should be created. It will be the forum for strategic discussions on the harmonisation of military efforts from member states as well as priorities for the CSDP, upon the guidance of the European Council and its President, supported by the High Representative. This Council of Ministers of Defence should be in permanent contact with the General Secretariat of the Council and their foreign affairs counterparts.

Increasing the role of the European Defence Agency

More progress needs to be achieved in order to dispose of a balanced institutional framework for the new CSDP. **The role of EDA should be increased.** It is a tremendous tool for strengthening European Member States military capabilities, but the Agency is still under-staffed and under financed. Some Member States see EDA as a facilitator for capability development and nothing more, while within the competency of the agency there are other possibilities too. EDA should be the catalyst for the European R&T defence research projects, and it should help in setting up a European Defence Market.

Thus the Council must give enhanced powers to the Agency and adequate resources when adopting the decision provided for in the TEU.⁶⁸ This decision must bear in mind that the Agency will assume new responsibilities, first and foremost in PSCoP, but overall in the **general improvement of European military capabilities** (including more efficient military expenditures) *all* States have agreed to when signing in the Treaty⁶⁹ -PSCoP must not be an excuse for those Member States not taking part to maintain the status quo.

Creating a Civilian and Military Command Centre or EU Operational Headquarters (EU-OHQ)

Whether we call it a Civilian and Military Command Centre, as seems the consensus now, or an Operational EU-HQ, the thrust of the idea is the same: the EU needs enhanced planning capabilities to conduct its own operations, autonomously (of course, in co-operation with field partners when necessary).

This needs to be civil-military because current ESDP missions show the importance of a comprehensive approach while in a crisis theatre. Some of the current difficulties of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan are directly related to the lack of consideration of the importance of »civilian« boots on the ground to help with the reconstruction problem. An EU-OHQ is also needed in order to avoid ending up with difficulties linked to the application of the Berlin Plus agreement. As pointed to in Chapter 4, the Cypriot-Turkish dispute creates tensions with regard to the ESDP use of the NATO command structure. In current theatres, such as Kosovo or Afghanistan, the Turkish veto on NATO protection of EU civilian or military personnel creates the absurd situation in which a French NATO soldier cannot protect an EU French gendarme. The Georgia crisis also showed the need for an EU operational planning headquarters.

Advances towards common funding of ESDP operations

The start-up fund provided for in the Lisbon Treaty (art. 41.3 TEU), based on Member States' contributions, might amount to some progress here. Although in principle its scope is limited to »preparatory activities« for ESDP missions, when taking the decisions regarding its establishment, foreseen in art. 41.3, Member States in the Council should interpret this provision broadly and provide for that fund to cover a large share of common costs.⁷⁰

A long-term solution should be a sort of **European fund for CSDP missions**, for instance, initially through a further development of the abovementioned start-up fund.

68 Art. 45.2 TEU states that the Council, upon QMV, will take a decision determining the status, seat and rule of the Agency.

69 Art. 43.3 TEU states that »(all) Member States undertake to progressively improve their military capabilities«.

70 In this task the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will have a big say, since these decisions of the Council, by qualified majority, will be taken on his or her proposal.

4 Strategic partnerships for EU security and defence

4.1 NATO-EU and EU-US Strategic Partnerships

The ties between Europe and the United States constitute the most intense and important relationship for the European Union, as reaffirmed by the 2008 update of the Security Strategy. The United States is still the most powerful global actor, being the »indispensable nation« in nearly every issue for the foreseeable future. The basis of the relationship is sound as it rests on common values as well as on common experiences and practices in NATO and other contexts.

Nonetheless, the relations between the US and Europe are far from efficient, in a shifting strategic environment which risks limiting the relevance of the transatlantic partnership and thus the possibilities for joint actions on the international stage. Concerning the United States, and specifically in the field of security policy, the EU Member States tend to preserve their national approaches to Washington. This leads to countless European delegations »camping« through the White House, State Department, and Pentagon, making it nearly impossible for the Americans to grasp a European position. The experience of US President Obama at NATO's Prague Summit in April 2009, where he had to listen to 27 interventions from European heads of state and government had been a dreadful illustration of the ineffectiveness and dissonance of EU-US relations (Witney and Shapiro 2009).

Therefore, the Union needs to shape its relations with the US in a more comprehensive manner. The EU needs to make use of the different fora and challenges on the table, bearing in mind that the United States is looking more and more towards Asia as strategic key region of the 21st century, which, according to, President Obama, will be shaped by the US-China relationship.

As a consequence, European engagement will be decisive for the future of a new transatlantic relationship. The EU needs to give Washington more incentives, making the relations useful both for Europeans and Americans and living up to the »friendly challenge« of President Obama, who said: »We are looking to be partners of Europe.« Towards this end, the **transatlantic agenda** should be shaped in a manner to serve European interests and to negotiate with the US on different views, perceptions and interests. The aim should be a unified European approach, as it can already be witnessed in trade and economic matters.

In that sense, and focusing on the particular scope of this paper, the rather difficult EU-NATO relation-

ship should be streamlined in order to enhance effectiveness between Europe and the US in the field of defence and security. The first part of the following sub-chapter is dedicated to EU-NATO relations. The second part is dedicated to the broader issues of EU-US security relations and the way the EU should handle them.

4.1.1 EU-NATO relations

Overview and achievements

Due to the cooperation and continuous involvement of the United States, the NATO alliance forms the strongest military power in Europe. With the NATO–Russia Council, the Atlantic Alliance provides a framework for security policy in terms of the United States–Europe–Russia triangle. At the same time, the EU commands the world's most diverse and powerful system of economic and development aid instruments, in addition to mission-proven civil and military capabilities in the ESDP framework. Cooperation between the EU and NATO has been a pending issue since the inception of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and even more so since ESDP was launched. The fact that 21 members of NATO are also members of the European Union has done little to enhance cooperation between the two organisations, however. This is also due to the fact, that Member States – even in NATO – try to get the better end for their countries through bilateral relations with the US. Interestingly, 15 of the 27 European Union Member States perceive themselves as having a »special relationship« with the US (Witney and Shapiro 2009).

Nonetheless, both organisations **are vital for the security of Europe** and of its Member States. NATO has been and remains the major framework of collective defence for EU Member States. The new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular, rely on NATO (especially the United States) as the ultimate provider of their national security. NATO also has cooperative security relations with more than 40 states worldwide. It has been stabilising the Balkans since the 1990s and effectively inhibits any attempts to renationalise defence in Europe (Mützenich 2008). The Treaty of Lisbon, on the other hand, emphasises this by acknowledging that NATO remains the foundation of collective defence and its implementation for Member States.

On the other hand, we have seen that both the reality and the ambitions of the European Union in the realm of security go further than crisis management. It aims to be a modern **Security Union**, with

the means of providing the necessary tools to guarantee international peace and security, and also that of its citizens. This encompasses more than protection against traditional threats, and thus traditional instruments of defence, but also other tools: from enhanced police/judicial cooperation, making Europe truly a Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, to EU development cooperation policies, which guarantee public goods worldwide, on the basis of the principle of human security.

In particular, we have argued in Chapter 2 that the Lisbon »mutual assistance clause« for EU Member States, underpinned by the principle of solidarity, must constitute a fundamental task for the future Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). If an EU Member was to fall victim to armed aggression on its territory, the other Members have an **obligation to provide aid and assistance »with all means« at their disposal**. The Treaty also takes ten years of ESDP reality into account and states that the CSDP provides the EU with instruments for »peace-keeping, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security«. The scope of missions – so-called »Petersberg tasks« – is also broader, including peace-enforcement, disarmament, and so on. And thus the chances of the Union acting in different international crises, not just in its neighbourhood.

A European Union which is developing its capabilities and widening the range and spectra of its missions, as well as aiming for a future **common defence policy** is a major challenge for those warning of the duplication of capabilities. The need for the European Union to autonomously pursue its aims, which was the goal in St Malo – supported by a European operational headquarters (EU-OHQ) or civil command centre (Chapter 3) – is but one example of this.

The progress of the EU notwithstanding, the relationship between these two organisations **is a crucial link in guaranteeing the security of the transatlantic community and its defence**. NATO will remain the first choice for missions conducted jointly by Europe and the United States. Common doctrines, many years of common exercises and cooperation, as well as more than a decade of common experiences in various theatres, make NATO the logical organisation to be used in certain scenarios, as the criteria presented in Chapter 2 may indicate (Mützenich 2008: 79). However, the EU–ESDP will increasingly be the first choice for missions and operations **conducted/led by Europeans**, as ATALANTA bears witness. This does not intend a competition between EU and US in international engagements, but to enable the Europeans to conduct missions serving their

own interests, without necessarily depending on the US.

Apart from the narrow focus on common missions, both organisations are undergoing a similar process of goal redefinition, mapping out objectives in the field of military capabilities. They also face common threats. NATO and the EU also share one of the most crucial challenges in the near future: scarce defence resources of the Member States due to diminishing state revenues in the wake of the global financial and economic crisis, as pointed out in Chapter 1. The common threats and challenges, as well as common norms and principles, thus make **effective cooperation between the EU and NATO a must!**

The achievements of EU–NATO cooperation to date are few and far between, at the institutional level. In practical terms, however, especially at the operational level, cooperation has been much better, guaranteeing the success of common missions on the ground.

The much cited **Berlin Plus agreement** is so far the only arrangement regulating EU–NATO relations. It is the result of the widespread fear of duplication between the EU and NATO and is aimed at avoiding it. One rather political aspect is NATO's »right of first refusal«, allowing the EU to intervene only if NATO has no interest in doing so. This, of course, is interpreted differently by different Member States. Some interpret it strictly, while others conclude that the EU does not formally have to ask NATO for permission if the latter has not explicitly expressed an interest in intervening, referring to autonomous decision-making within the EU/ESDP (also mentioned in the Berlin Plus agreement and other core ESDP documents). In this respect, the Berlin Plus agreement is outdated, since the EU has carried out several missions autonomously, including the military mission in Congo.

Secondly, and practically more relevant, Berlin Plus makes NATO assets (for example, planning capabilities, communication units and headquarters) available for EU crisis management operations. However, this depends on a unanimous decision by NATO members, making operational cooperation susceptible to the unilateral leanings of individual Member States. The condition of unanimity has, to mention only one example, allowed Turkey to delay Operation Concordia for months due to objections to the mission's aims.

On the other hand, **cooperation between the EU and NATO on the ground has proven more effective**. The EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina is usually mentioned as the best example of how NATO's military might and the EU's political and economic weight (combined with the pros-

pect of membership of one or both organisations) can have a joint impact. However, the success of the common mission was due more to specific situational aspects. The personal relationship of the two commanders was decisive for the smooth cooperation, rather than institutional factors. The same applies to the mission in Kosovo, where the EU and NATO cooperate successfully, despite poor institutional arrangements and a lack of overall dialogue. The personnel on the ground and the military staff in Brussels allow for informal and direct exchanges of information and thus swift decision-making, something unthinkable at the official level. The same applies to the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan: an official, comprehensive partnership is an impossibility, but there are fruitful relations in the field. Many EUPOL personnel are progressively being co-deployed with NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), also in Kandahar; at the same time, it remains impossible to sign a general agreement covering all PRTs and other issues, due to the high-level political situation. The deployment of many Europeans wearing different hats under the umbrella of one mission has proved to be a good deal less effective than would be desirable. The overall experience therefore calls for more structured relations – which can double the benefit of joint operations in the field.

Another achievement involving both organisations – although still in its infancy – is related to capabilities: the **NATO–EU Capability Group**, established in May 2003 to ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and EU capability development efforts, is the institutional framework for this purpose. This applies to initiatives such as the EU Battle Groups, developed within the »Headline Goal« for 2010, and the NATO Response Force (NRF), and efforts in both organisations to improve the availability of helicopters for operations. Following the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in July 2004 to coordinate work within the European Union on the development of defence capabilities, armaments cooperation, acquisition and research, EDA experts have been contributing to the work of the common capability group.

Shortcomings

The most striking shortcoming in the relationship between the security policy arm of the EU and NATO is the fact that, ten years after the inception of ESDP, the EU–NATO relationship is still so high on the agenda. The basic problem is that NATO and the EU are competing for Member States' resources and the

best way to spend the defence budget for their respective uses. For example, in 2005, the question of who should support the AU mission in Sudan divided the two organisations, with the effect that both established their own tiny operation, severely limiting their collective impact (Valasek 2007).

The major shortcoming of EU–NATO cooperation is the **lack of strategic dialogue between the two organisations**, hampering any effective rapprochement or even division of labour, as well as more effective European collective action. The conflict between Turkey and Cyprus has led to the paradoxical situation that two of the most important global institutions are not able to conduct a comprehensive dialogue on common threats, common challenges and the best way of dealing with them. While Turkey continues to block formal dialogue and even preventive planning for potential crises on the side of NATO, arguing that sensitive information should not be shared with non-NATO members, Cyprus uses its veto on the EU side. Together, they effectively suppress any formal contacts, except for very specific operation-focused cooperation concerning common missions.

This substantially hampers the ability of the EU and NATO to make progress in important matters of common interest. The abovementioned parallel processes of developing NATO's Strategic Concept (NSC) and the ongoing revitalisation of ESDP by successive EU presidencies are perforce conducted separately (although they both affect Europe's security resilience), due to the short-sighted policies of two Member States. The definition of common threats and challenges, deliberations on how to deal with them and, most importantly, how to apply the different resources at hand most effectively, are thus made impossible. The outcome could be even more years of parallel, partly duplicated engagement by the EU and NATO, combined with wearisome negotiations at every emerging crisis.

A related shortcoming is thus that both are unable to take advantage of the **complementarity of civilian and military efforts**. For example, forward planning for Afghanistan, where NATO is massively engaged and the EU has deployed the police mission EUPOL, is thus not possible, jeopardising the overall success of the international mission.

Concerning the opportunities NATO offers its Member States, it should also be mentioned that in recent years there has been a **clear lack of substantive transatlantic dialogue on security issues**. Quite the contrary, the United States has pursued a fairly unilateral course, trying to use NATO as a resource for worldwide missions pursuing its interests, while circumventing joint decision-making. The Euro-

peans, on the other hand, have mostly been inward-looking, absorbed in questions of security or are even at odds with each other. In addition, they have followed their idiosyncratic approaches to Washington hoping for better results through their »special relations«. The transatlantic bond, reflected in NATO's institutional setting, has remained idle. With Afghanistan representing an ever more challenging mission to both Europeans and Americans, and the return to a more multilateral approach by the new US administration, however, this has begun to change in recent months.

Suggestions and recommendations

The overall current situation between the EU and NATO cannot continue and is utterly counterproductive with regard to Europe's security (and influence). The division of the capabilities of the common 21 members between NATO and the EU tie up too many scarce resources. Likewise, the parallel but officially tacit strategy development processes are prolonging the **danger of the mere co-existence** of the two organisations.

The present situation is indeed challenging (with the outcome of Afghanistan and its impact on Euro-American relations lurking behind every assessment), but does harbour a number of positive factors. As we have previously stated, NATO is revising its Strategic Concept and the United States is pushing for greater European responsibility on the global scene, while promoting multilateral solutions. France has joined the military structure of NATO again, which, if duly focused, might help in doing away with political objections to the goal of an autonomous ESDP and European Defence (whose importance was recognised at the last NATO summits in Bucharest and Strasbourg-Kehl) (Grand 2009).⁷¹ Both NATO and the EU rely on the capabilities and the political will of Member States and have made efforts to make defence spending in Europe more effective and to promote the conversion of the European armed forces.

On the other hand, the Obama administration has once more put a **comprehensive transatlantic security agenda** on the table. In reply, Russia has proposed to discuss a Pan-European security architecture – currently being debated mainly at the OSCE through the so-called Corfu Process (with EU-NATO involvement within and without). Once again it seems that the »great powers« are negotiating the

security of Europe without Europeans really offering their own ideas on the issue. The question remains whether Europe as a whole is up to the task or will be rolled over by other powers.⁷²

This must change. The current context offers the possibility of a **strategic rapprochement** between NATO and the EU, and in the process, (i) between Europe and America, and (ii) among Europeans themselves. This needs a re-thinking of our security structures and a priori **no dogmas**, including the question of collective defence. The guiding principles must be shared values, and, bearing in mind the criteria presented in Chapter 2, sound pragmatism to make effective multilateralism a reality.

In our view, this proposal for a White Paper on Europe's Security and Defence offers an opportunity for the EU and NATO to discuss future cooperation in detail, as well as the strategic direction the organisations will take in the next century. The EU will not replace NATO before 2020 as a system of collective defence. But Europe may develop ESDP's potential as a basis for a Common Defence Policy, de facto a Security Union. This includes, therefore, truly military ambitions for the Union, not just civilian and humanitarian (although this has sometimes been dismissed outright). This step should be achievable by 2020 and the White Paper is a first roadmap in that direction. In this respect, beyond common values, there must be recognition of the fact that the EU may have different interests as a security actor, together with a comparative advantage in several scenarios (although not always). NATO cannot provide yet the broad range of instruments which the European Union can potentially deploy, necessary for dealing with the security threats and challenges fleshed out in Chapter 2. Cooperation should thus take into account the new security environment and the new policies of key actors and overcome the technicalities of the past.

For a start, at the political level, the definition of threats and challenges in NATO and the EU should overall be the same: a **joint Euro-American strategic review** is required through the process of revising **NATO's Strategic Concept**. The NSC will be endorsed by Europeans and Americans in Fall 2010, also in Lisbon, and it has opened a window of opportunity for future cooperation with the EU. The efforts of new NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to deal with this problem immediately after resuming office, illustrates how pressing the need for

⁷¹ See, for instance, the Declaration on Alliance Security issued at Strasbourg-Kehl (April 2009).

⁷² The latest proposal has come from Russia which has recently presented a draft European Security Treaty. Available at <http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml>

movement is perceived at NATO headquarters. This is reflected on the EU side, where all major statements on the future of ESDP include an emphasis on well functioning EU–NATO relations. One of the priorities of the Spanish presidency in the field of European foreign policy should be, thus, the relationship between the EU and NATO, fostering the strategic partnership and field partnerships.⁷³

The general aim should be to advance towards a **»Lisbon EU–NATO strategic alignment«**, based on

- a European approach to the NSC, guided by the EU Security Strategy (that is, EU countries must avoid parallel developments);⁷⁴
- a recognition of shared values and common security interests;
- the autonomy and capacities of the EU together with pragmatic cooperation pathways, from capabilities to missions.

Lisbon 2010 could be the point of **convergence** between the new American National Security Strategy and, on the European side, the ESS and the project of an EU White Paper. This would help in preparing a transatlantic partnership for the twenty-first century.

Departing from this EU–NATO, and above all, Euro-American potential strategic alignment, there are a number of issues on which the EU and NATO could find common solutions or agreement on a division of labour:

- To cope with these problems and be a more credible partner for the United States,⁷⁵ **Europe needs further capabilities**. The common EU–NATO Capability Group is only a start in focusing national efforts towards more interoperability. The future lies in **more capable European states**, thus a more capable ESDP and a more balanced relationship with the United States in NATO. Through the common Capability Group, the 21 Member States should be able to agree on a comprehensive agenda with regard to how to build **»dual-use capabilities«**, meaning assets that can be used in an EU as well as a NATO context.
- Closer cooperation between NATO and the EU should also be sought through pragmatic steps.

Both organisations should combine their respective **centres of excellence**, whether on civ-mil cooperation, cyber-defence, defence against terrorism or cold weather operations. They should also conduct their different partnerships in the Mediterranean or in the Neighbourhood in close cooperation, because the overlap of ENP and Partnership for Peace or the Union for the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean dialogue offer many synergies towards common ends.

- Concerning the political decisions taken in NATO and the representation of the Europeans, the 21 NATO members which are also members of the EU should try to form a more coherent European group **in NATO**, complex as this may be, since all Europeans try to foster their bilateral relations with the US.⁷⁶ Yet in other fora relevant to European security – the OSCE being an example – Europeans have shown they can act in a more concerted manner. This pillar could be more realistic if EU countries start regarding the EU as their primary political framework for discussions on security.⁷⁷ In this way, a common European position could be represented in the North Atlantic Council and thus carry more weight than 21 separate Member States, without jeopardising the autonomy of both organisations. This could lead to the necessary **»Europeanising«** (Grand 2009) of NATO, fostering sustainable transatlantic dialogue on common challenges. Such a block formation would reduce the number of voices, moderate the perpetual cacophony and thus help to promote substantial dialogue and hence cooperation.
- **The Berlin Plus arrangement should be revised**, as it poorly reflects the reality of different theatres, the very different intervention profiles of the EU and NATO, and hampers the EU's autonomy. The EU has already proceeded beyond Berlin Plus in building its own planning capabilities and pursuing military missions without NATO support. NATO must accept EU autonomy and specific profile as a security provider; such has been the recognition since the Bucharest Summit last April 2008.
- Both organisations will have to devise means of managing possible duplications (as with Darfur or Somalia), which are more probable as the EU devel-

73 »Rodríguez Zapatero avanza que la Presidencia española de la UE va a ser »transformadora«, »exigente y comprometida«. Available at: <http://www.la-moncloa.es/Actualidad/Home/2009/120209PresidenciaUE.htm>

74 In fact, the need for Europeans to develop similar strategic approaches when developing an EU White Paper and working on a future NSC was a point raised by several defence officials in discussions of this paper.

75 US officials both in the US missions to NATO and the EU have raised concerns about Europeans not meeting their capabilities commitments, whether with ESDP or in NATO.

76 This has given rise to some caution regarding France's priorities in NATO, which, to some sources, are more aimed at reinventing the old tripartite (USA, UK and France), rather than (or at least not just) an enhanced European defence.

77 See end of Chapter 2 (criteria for intervention).

ops its security branch. **No organisation should in principle have either a right of refusal or a privileged right of intervention;** engagement should be based, inter alia, on the criteria of Chapter 2, on a case by case basis.

- Finally, with regard to the broader political problem(s), it has been recommended to provide for Turkey's participation in the European Defence Agency and in ESDP operations in general, within the framework of partnerships with non-EU European countries.⁷⁸ The EU should thus institutionalise a »European Partnership for Peace« to offer Turkey and other interested countries structural involvement in ESDP, through strategic dialogue, operational cooperation and capability building mechanisms.⁷⁹

4.1.2 EU-US Strategic Partnership

Concerning the broader security relationship between the EU and the US beyond defence, it is necessary that the EU focuses on issues where it has either substantial European interests at stake, which need to be negotiated with the US, or can offer substantial input to the US, supporting common aims and purposes. The cooperation should not be organised through more institutional settings, fora or dialogues. The EU should rather seek to engage with the US on issue-specific matters, where cooperation is enhancing effectiveness and producing real outcome – as opposed to mere declarations.

However, the security relations between Europe and the US should be dealt with comprehensively in the framework of an **EU-US Security Partnership**, at different levels:

- With regard to **EU-US defence relations**, Europeans should make as much use of NATO as possible to enhance common understandings of security in the transatlantic relationship. Nonetheless, the broad range of relations between Brussels and Washington and the comprehensive understanding of security require even bolder steps. **The US is the key partner for the EU**, as the ESS recalls, so it hardly makes sense that such themes can be addressed only in NATO, which is still focused on collective defence and in which several EU Member States do not participate. Therefore, the US–EU summit, which takes place once a year, is not

enough to further develop the transatlantic security community.

- Hence – and parallel to the EU more concerted action in NATO – the comprehensive US–EU Security Partnership should be ambitious in **scope**: from CFSP topics to cooperation in ESDP civilian missions (such as Kosovo), judicial cooperation, energy, cyber security, food security, defence industry topics or the New Transatlantic Agenda which might see the light in 2010.⁸⁰ **But it would not necessarily comprise new bodies and institutions;** it would suffice to streamline current fora for common policy-making, and establish follow-up mechanisms.

For instance, the US President should be invited once a year to the European Council to discuss common policies (a joint EU–US Security Summit) and sustain the transatlantic alliance between Europe and the United States (Korski, Guérot and Leonard 2008). On the other hand, **the aim is not a new bundle of bilateral relations** – something EU countries are keen on – but **effective multilateral institutions** in which Europe and North America can work together in the years ahead.

4.2 Other strategic partnerships with security and defence implications

Since setting up the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU has established an impressive number of strategic partnerships, both bilaterally with major countries and as part of inter-regional relations with other regional organisations, such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU). Most of them have an economic focus. Nevertheless – and this is what matters in this paper – the dynamic development of ESDP has extended several partnerships to cover security and defence issues. Security and defence forms part of the EU objective of creating bilateral and inter-regional ties for **shared responsibility** concerning major global issues in order finally to achieve »effective multilateralism«. Implementing this will require that the EU further develop these strategic partnerships, taking into account the criteria outlined in Chapter 2 (such as resources, priorities, and so on).

Beyond partnership with NATO and with the US, dealt with above, the following partnerships are also of specific importance for the EU: **Russia** and **China**

⁷⁸ Some of these proposals were discussed with NATO officials.

⁷⁹ This idea was mentioned by Constanze Stelzenmüller of the German Marshall Fund at a workshop in Berlin.

⁸⁰ See, for instance, the subjects outlined in the 2009 EU–US Summit Declaration (November 2009).

stand out with regard to bilateral partnerships; the **United Nations** (UN) as the overall framework of legitimacy of ESDP missions; and the **Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe** (OSCE), **ASEAN/East Asia** and the **AU**, as the most important inter-regional partnerships.

In this respect, we are very aware of other regions or key players with which the EU should be increasingly keen to develop security partnerships, if circumstances so require (in Latin America, for instance). Yet we deem the following ones to be real priorities in the near future, on grounds of their impinging on issues particularly pressing for European security (such as its neighbourhood – OSCE and Russia); fundamental actors in international security (such as the UN) or those in regions where the EU faces threats to its vital interests and where partnering with regional powers will prove a must – such as Asia and China.

4.2.1 Russia

Overview and achievements

Negotiations on a strategic partnership agreement between the EU and Russia are still ongoing.⁸¹ To date, bilateral relations with respect to security issues have focused on counter-terrorism cooperation, which does not fall under the competence of ESDP within the EU, but of Justice and Home Affairs. In security and defence affairs, Russia is very much focused on NATO and the major individual EU Member States. Therefore, the NATO–Russia Council and bilateral US–Russian negotiations are the main fora for debate on global security and defence issues. At the same time, the EU is increasingly entering the security arena, impinging on **Russia's geopolitical security interests**, particularly in the Eastern European neighbourhood and the Balkans. The main examples are the EU's role in Georgia, the EUMM monitoring mission and Kosovo (EULEX mission).

Shortcomings

There are different perceptions of Russia among the EU Member States, particularly between the »old« and new Member States. This split within the EU concerning Russia and the direction of EU–Russia relations hampers the development of a coherent, strate-

gic relationship or even partnership with Russia, particularly in the area of security. The situation is complicated further by the major impact of the US position towards Russia on the EU's foreign policy (Shapiro/Witney 2009), now through the »reset« policy. Moreover, the Georgia crisis in 2008 reinforced fears of an increasingly aggressive Russian foreign policy all over Europe, in view of Russia's display of self-assertiveness and overall revisionist ambitions. At the same time, Russia does not view the EU as a major international actor in the security and defence sphere yet, perceiving it as mainly an economic actor. In addition, it sees the EU's post-modern claims the way »a cannibal views vegetarianism – a dangerous pathology« (Krastev, Leonard and Wilson 2009: 5).

Russia's interest in creating »effective multilateralism« on a regional and global level, as understood by the EU, is therefore fairly limited as it wants to maintain or enhance its own position in pursuit of national interests (Fischer 2008: 119), based on a multi-polar, almost Westphalian perspective on international relations. In addition, Russia is increasingly concerned by the **EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)**, particularly the newly established »Eastern Partnership«. Thinking in terms of »zones of influence«, Russia feels more and more encircled by EU enlargement, competing EU interests in its neighbourhood and NATO enlargement (Rahr 2009: 48).

Against this background, it did not come as a surprise that Russia vetoed the continuation of the UN and OSCE monitoring missions in Georgia (which were also active in Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Concerning cooperation with Russia in the OSCE, Russia and the EU have different positions and interests with regard to the organisation's structure and scope of activities. Russia is trying to shift the focus in the OSCE to more traditional security issues, away from the third dimension of human rights and democracy, something the EU cannot accept (Fischer 2008: 117; Timmermann 2008: 171; Trevi 2008: 141).

Suggestions and recommendations

Beyond diverging perceptions within the EU concerning Russia, together with substantial differences between the EU and Russia, Europe must explore different courses of action to boost the **EU–Russia strategic partnership**, based on **(1) practical forms of cooperation** built on key security interests and needs, together with **(2) options for a political dialogue on security issues**. Importantly, this reassessment must be the result of EU's own policy, but

⁸¹ See Buhbe (2007) for possible elements of a strategic partnership agreement between the EU and Russia.

should bear in mind other collective shifts substantiated at NATO,⁸² the OSCE and the United States.

Basic guidelines for this strategic reassessment would include the following:

- The EU should pursue a policy of dialogue with Russia based on what be call **»guarded engagement«** rather than containment. The Georgia crisis has destroyed a lot of trust between the EU and Russia, which was already fragile. The only remedy which will restore trust and re-establish a close working relationship is cooperation in concrete projects, parallel to a **sustained political dialogue through CFSP**, with the awareness that, as has been pointed out, merely accommodating Moscow will not work either and future crises are probable.⁸³
- The EU should intensify its efforts to explore and define **common interests** of the EU and Russia related to the main security problems in Europe and beyond (Katsioulis 2009: 9). They include the Caucasus, the Balkans, Iran, North Korea, the Middle East, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
- Relatedly, The EU should enter into an open dialogue with Russia concerning EU interests and intentions with respect to the European neighbourhood. As mentioned above, a European vision of the security architecture of Europe could be the basis for such a dialogue. It cannot be in the EU's interest that Russia feels encircled and isolated by the EU and NATO enlargement, as well as by an intensified Eastern Partnership. At the same time, Russia must accept legitimate EU interests in the stabilisation of its Eastern neighbourhood and the independence and territorial integrity of the respective states.

Frameworks for policy implementation would be, first, at EU level (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and other EU structures, including ESDP); secondly, the development of a coherent EU approach *towards Russia* in NATO and the OSCE:⁸⁴

- EU level: Negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia should go beyond economic and visa issues and establish workable fora for an EU–Russia dialogue on foreign and security policy issues. If successful, this might finally lead to cooperation with regard to crisis management operations in the ESDP framework.
- Within NATO, EU Member States should develop a more coherent approach towards Russia based on (a) what are the EU's security interests in its neighbourhood, not just national interests or bilateral relations with Russia, and (b) finding common ground with other non-EU NATO countries, such as Turkey.

4.2.2 OSCE

Overview and achievements

The OSCE is still the only institution concerned with Euro-Atlantic and increasingly Eurasian security which reaches »from Vancouver to Vladivostok«. Cooperation between the EU and OSCE is of particular relevance for two reasons:

First, at the **strategic level, it remains the main framework for security cooperation with Russia and the Central Asian states**, which will be ever more relevant for the EU's interests. In this respect, the OSCE covers both **regions** (from Moldova and the Caucasus to the Balkans) and deals with **topics** (arms control and disarmament, the Treaty on Conventional Forces Europe, and so on) in respect of which the EU (and/or the United States) and Russia still have strong differences, hindering effective cooperation.

Second, in terms of **missions/operations**, OSCE is hence a relevant framework for the EU in view of civilian ESDP crisis management missions in the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU – and beyond. In some instances **ESDP and OSCE missions operate alongside each other**, based on a division of labour. Depending on the respective circumstances, the broader OSCE membership can offer more legitimacy to a mission and may be more appropriate for cost-effec-

82 NATO's new Secretary General has called for a »New Beginning« in NATO–Russian relations, based on practical cooperation (on topics such as preventing the proliferation of WMD, the related issue of missile defence and Afghanistan); a revitalised NATO–Russia Council and, perhaps, a joint strategic review of common threats and challenges, see »NATO and Russia: A New Beginning«, speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Carnegie Endowment, Brussels, 18 September 2009. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57640.htm> (accessed 20 October 2009).

83 As the ECFR shows, there are flaws on both sides of the European debate. Realists must be aware that, »however accommodating the EU is to Moscow, the current elite will remain committed to establishing a Russian sphere of influence and weakening the influence and reach of the EU. On the other hand, they show moralists that the Putin-Medvedev regime represents the foreign-policy consensus of Russian society« (Krastev, Leonard and Wilson 2009).

84 See following section on the OSCE for suggestions and recommendations.

tive reasons, whereas in other cases ESDP missions have an added value due to the EU's decision-making autonomy. If the civilian dimension of ESDP develops dynamically, ESDP could increasingly be perceived as a competitor by OSCE.

Shortcomings

In recent years, the OSCE has been less and less present in the strategic security debate among EU Member States. First, it is overshadowed by the development of the civilian pillar of ESDP. Secondly, the EU could do better in exerting its influence within OSCE as a bloc vis-à-vis the United States and Russia (EUISS 2009:52). Although EU Member States try to coordinate their foreign policies and reflect the learning-on-the-job potential of current CFSP mechanisms, EU statements within OSCE too often reflect the **lowest common denominator**. This is mainly due to **current policy differences over Russia** and Russia's reform proposals for OSCE. The EU provides the chunk of OSCE resources and, until 2010, EU countries have held most OSCE Chairmanships, but the Union as such has failed to exercise equivalent influence.⁸⁵ In addition, there are differences between the EU in Brussels, and the EU in Vienna, with European diplomats seeing the relevance of this institution and try to develop concerted positions within it. The EU has sometimes reaffirmed its support for OSCE, but on the last years this seems to have lost momentum.⁸⁶

On the other hand, these policy differences might make it more appropriate to further expand the civilian dimension of ESDP instead of trying to realise the comparative advantages of both OSCE and ESDP. Another problem with OSCE from an EU perspective is the lack of solid common values and the existence of different interests within the organisation due to its heterogeneous membership and complicated decision-making, which sometimes outweighs the increased legitimacy of its broad membership. This is probably one reason why the EU has designed the civilian dimension of ESDP in such a way that it conducts partly the same missions as OSCE. This has led

to some criticisms, not least from the OSCE's current Secretary General, that the EU is being inefficiently unilateral, at odds with its principle of effective multilateralism.

Even if one would not go so far as to assert that the two organisations are increasingly competitors in general terms, they nevertheless compete for the deployment of a limited number of civilian personnel in the same areas of intervention. However, coordination mechanisms notwithstanding, **there is not yet a truly strategic dialogue between the EU and OSCE.**

Suggestions and recommendations

Developing a strategic role for OSCE as the paramount framework in Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security, and an EU position, from hard security to the human dimension

The EU should increase its strategic interest in OSCE, the only pan-European and transatlantic security organisation, covering **non-EU Europe** (and thus a broad neighbourhood where the EU has clear interests, from energy to stability). As a follow-up to the policy suggestions above with respect to Russia, the **EU should foster OSCE as a paramount framework in Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security.**

There is an overlap in the security agendas of both organisations, from conflicts, environmental threats and soft security issues, such as the proliferation of Small and Light Weapons, to organised crime.⁸⁷ Synergies must be exploited. Moreover, the EU has an increasingly salient interests in preserving the role of the OSCE as a forum and norm-setter, in issues such as tolerance, non-discrimination and the rule of law (the basis of the EU peace model), at a time where »shared values seem to be eroding across the continent« (Dov Lynch, 2009).

The need for the EU to agree on common positions will be crucial in the next few years, as OSCE is currently set to discuss its future. We may witness a certain shift of geopolitical centre of gravity of the organisation towards Central Asia (as the Balkans develop their EU perspective), beginning with the Kazakh Chairmanship in 2010. Pressing issues in that region are on the table (for instance, cross-border security challenges, from energy to organised crime), more acute to the States of the post-soviet space.

⁸⁵ 70 per cent of the budget, 65 per cent of voluntary funds, almost 70 per cent of seconded staff to field operations, etc.

⁸⁶ See Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions on EU–OSCE cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, 10/11/2003, or the Assessment Report on the EU's role vis-à-vis the OSCE (10/11/2004). Recent declarations of the Council do not even mention the OSCE.

⁸⁷ The strategies of both organisations, put together, »lay out an agenda to contribute to security and stability in and around Europe« (Assessment Report, 2004).

Moreover, the ongoing **Corfu Process** is a first response to the Russian proposal of a new security architecture, with negotiations proceeding through 2010 at least, and which might be substantiated in the first OSCE summit since 1999. Corfu will, in fact, overlap with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty's CFSP tools and NATO's endorsement of its NSC in Lisbon. The EU must put its weight behind its idea for an **OSCE Plus**, as a truly EU vision of the future of European security and the validity of the basic Helsinki commitments. Other actors, such as the United States, NATO and Russia, have recently recognised OSCE's central role in this security dialogue.

But beyond the success or failure of Corfu, in view of the foregoing, the EU should strengthen this partnership, and, on the other hand, put up a real policy in the OSCE. A truly **EU position at OSCE** is desperately needed, covering all of its subjects (from hard security, the Vienna Document and the CFET, to energy and the human dimension issues), whilst being flexible enough to adapt to a changing environment in the region.

In terms of operations, the EU must internally clarify the role it wants to allot OSCE in European civilian crisis management. **The civilian dimension of ESDP cannot, for the time being, fully replace OSCE in crisis management.** The EU should therefore draft a new assessment report on EU–OSCE cooperation, also taking into account recent developments in the European neighbourhood. This could serve as a basis for a new cooperation agreement between the EU and OSCE, particularly concerning monitoring and security sector reform. It would be up to EU Member States to develop a clear understanding and concept of the respective comparative advantages of each organisation in order to ensure efficient deployment of scarce civilian personnel. The criteria for European engagement presented in Chapter 2 could be useful here.

Increasing systematisation of operational cooperation

As with the UN, the EU should establish **lessons-learned mechanisms** with OSCE for crisis management missions, particularly with regard to monitoring and security sector reform. Training and operational standards should be harmonised in order to increase interoperability in the field.

Promoting the OSCE model to other world regions

The EU should promote the OSCE model in other world regions, for example, in East Asia, together with the **Council of Europe**, as a forum and tool for confidence-building and for managing inter-ethnic rivalries (see Umbach 2008: 135). This applies especially to regional conditions in which a »soft« approach to regionalisation has better prospects than a more ambitious model of integration, such as the EU.

4.2.3 China

Overview and achievements

China is a major global power, but there is still no strategic partnership agreement in place.⁸⁸ EU–China relations have, so far, been very much focused on economic issues, especially trade relations, also in the WTO context. In 2007, however, there was a strategic change in EU policy with the newly developed **strategic guidelines for East Asia**.⁸⁹ They provide a more balanced view, taking into account security and defence challenges in East Asia and the impact of China's rise on regional stability. At the same time, the guidelines outline the EU's strategic interests in East Asia, deriving the European objective of putting greater emphasis on security cooperation both with China and other countries in the region (including the United States) in order to contribute to the rise of China in a peaceful fashion. The EU intends, in particular, to increase cooperation with China on global threats and challenges, such as non-proliferation of WMD, conflict prevention and climate change. Another area of mutual – but sometimes conflicting – interests with security implications is Africa.

Shortcomings

There are two main problems with respect to a strategic security and defence partnership with China: First, **for China the EU is not a major strategic actor** in these policy areas due to the lack of EU military commitments in East Asia (in contrast to the United

⁸⁸ See also Reddies (2007) for an overview and policy options with regard to China's rise.

⁸⁹ Council of the European Union, Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, 14/12/2007, available at: <www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/97842.pdf> (accessed 14/09/2009); see also Bersick (2009), p. 6.

States) (Godemont 2008: 63). Secondly, there is a lack of coherence between the EU's strategic guidelines towards East Asia, balancing economic and security interests, and the dominant economic interests of individual EU Member States, particularly the »big three«, France, Germany and the UK (Grant 2008: 22/23; Umbach 2008: 121). Furthermore, **the EU and China are taking different approaches to global politics**: whereas the EU promotes »effective multilateralism«, China emphasises its sovereignty and wants to achieve a »multi-polar« world order by means of its economic rise, accompanied by exponential military armament (Bersick 2008: 8). In essence, **current EU–China relations, including security and defence, are neither strategic nor focused** (Grant 2008: 18), and neither partner has been able to identify concrete areas of cooperation on security and defence issues. Both China and the EU are complaining about the lack of transparency of both political-institutional systems (Grant 2008: 25).

Furthermore, there are more specific areas of conflict: China has blocked efforts towards UN reform, and China and the EU are both competing for influence and resources in Africa. Another area of conflict in recent years has been the still active EU weapons embargo on China. Currently, it is not a major stumbling block with regard to EU–China relations, but remains a potential source of disagreement, alongside the fundamentally different approaches to human rights (Grant 2008: 64).

Suggestions and recommendations

In applying a gradual approach in its relations with China, the EU should prioritise the development of a **strategic security partnership** with China by 2020, complementing economic relations. It would be unrealistic, however, to aspire to a defence component, as well. To this end, the following measures should be taken:

Exploration of common interests in security issues

The EU should enter into a dialogue with China on major global security and defence issues, particularly non-proliferation and disarmament and world-wide stabilisation efforts in conflict-prone regions (Godemont 2008: 65/66; Grant 2008: 69; Umbach 2008: 122). The EU and China share a dependence on energy-rich regions and the awareness of and ability to cope with global challenges, such as climate change. They should develop common strate-

gies to combat them or try to develop a rapprochement in multilateral fora such as the UN and G-20.

Increasing coordination in Africa policies

The EU and China offer competing models of cooperation with Africa, and some fundamental differences will probably not be resolved. But the EU should try to sensitise China to the need for at least a core set of conditionalities (Godemont 2008: 64/65) in development aid and intensify the existing dialogue on Africa at the administrative level (Bersick 2009: 24). With regard to the AU, it would be of help to win China's support for setting up APSA in order to strengthen the AU's authority in peace and security affairs in Africa.

Establishing cooperation in peace-keeping operations

The EU could offer China cooperation on training for peace-keeping operations through an exchange of training personnel – China also has a training centre for PKOs. The EU could also offer advice on joint Asian crisis management operations (Godemont 2008: 64/65). These practical steps could help to encourage China to shoulder its global responsibilities to a greater extent than at present. Furthermore, China has started to contribute soldiers to UN PKOs and has around 2,200 personnel currently deployed, all non-combat troops. ESDP may be a vehicle for a more prominent role of China in multinational peace operations.

Implementing the EU's 2007 strategic guidelines on East Asia

The EU Council's strategic guidelines on the EU's foreign and security policy in East Asia offer an accurate assessment of regional challenges and the role of China and should be implemented in a coherent fashion. This would require that **major EU Member States align their bilateral economic strategies towards China with the EU strategy**, taking into account the EU's security and defence interests in East Asia.

4.2.4 ASEAN/East Asia

Overview and achievements

East Asia has become the second most important trading partner for the EU, after the United States. The region is therefore of growing strategic importance for the EU. Regional instabilities in East Asia could have serious economic consequences for Europe.⁹⁰ The creation of the **Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM)** is an expression of the increasing interdependence of the two regions, but it has so far focused on economic issues. More promising with regard to security policy is EU cooperation with **ASEAN**, which is the EU's most developed partnership in the region.

The EU is pursuing a dual-track strategy in East Asia in order to contribute to the »socialisation« of China's rise: integrating China into ASEM and, at the same time, supporting the ASEAN integration process (Bersick 2009: 16). ASEAN plans to become a »community« by 2015 (with no supranational elements), including a »security community«. ASEAN Member States are therefore interested in cooperating with the EU on security issues, particularly the further development of confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy. However, so far there has been no concrete entry point for cooperation with respect to ESDP. The EU has played a positive role in promoting regionalisation, but without a specific security and defence component (Bendiek/Kramer 2009: 23).

Shortcomings

The EU undoubtedly has *major strategic interests in the East Asian region*, but lacks a coherent strategy and comprehensive policy towards it, also because of the already outlined inconsistencies between EU strategic guidelines and major EU Member States (Umbach 2008: 133). In general, **the EU has not been prepared for strategic challenges in East Asia, failing to deal proactively with East Asia's rise**. Furthermore, the EU has only a marginal role with regard to the security »hot spots« in the region, such as North Korea and the Taiwan Straits. Limited to an observer role, it not only lacks influence on the parties concerned, but also the political will to really get involved in these conflicts (Bendiek/Kramer 2009: 17). As a consequence, the EU has to cooperate and, at least partly, to rely on US foreign and security policy

in East Asia, at least as a fall-back position (Bersick 2009: 17).

In terms of security and defence there are major differences between the ASEAN and EU approach, as ASEAN's security culture relies on informal coordination and conflict resolution mechanisms rather than developing institutionalisation, which is clearly the EU approach (Umbach 2008: 128, 135). Another regional forum in which the EU seems to see some scope for cooperation on security issues is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),⁹¹ but it has not played any role in major regional security issues so far (Bersick 2009: 15).

Suggestions and recommendations

The EU remains a modest security actor in East Asia, notwithstanding the strategic importance of the region. Therefore, the EU should concentrate on increasing its security role in East Asia and its cooperation with ASEAN over the next ten years. It would be unrealistic, however, to aspire also to a defence role. In this regard, coordination of policies with the United States is crucial. A number of concrete proposals can be made:

Becoming a strategic player in the region and acting more coherently

The EU – that is, the EU Member States – should pay more attention to security challenges in East Asia and **implement the well-formulated strategic guidelines of 2007**. This would require a more coherent foreign policy approach, balancing economic with security interests. **Closer coordination with the US would also be key**, as the EU's foreign and security policy resources and room to manoeuvre in the region are limited (Bersick 2009: 28). The EU must, nevertheless, ensure that it follows an independent foreign policy approach and is not perceived as a US proxy.

Intensification of cooperation and gradual inclusion of security issues

The EU should intensify cooperation with ASEAN and within the ASEM process and put greater emphasis on security issues, trying to find concrete areas of co-

⁹⁰ See also Bersick and Pasch (2007) and the criteria for intervention and engagement presented in Chapter 2.

⁹¹ The ARF consists of the ASEAN Member States and the 13 ASEAN dialogue partners, including China, EU, Russia and the United States.

operation and developing common approaches to conflict resolution and crisis management. The overall objective should be to gradually **integrate East Asia into the global security architecture and to establish a system of cooperative security in East Asia** – making US military presence unnecessary in the long term (Bersick 2009: 3, 32).

Exploring the potential for security and defence co-operation within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could be an interesting format for engaging on security issues due to its broad membership structure. The EU should initiate concrete debates. It would be necessary, however, to expand discussion beyond threat perceptions and confidence-building measures. Potential issues of mutual interest and possible cooperation might include the fight against terrorism, concrete management of regional security conflicts and developing conflict resolution mechanisms (Umbach 2008: 134).

4.2.5 UN

Overview and achievements

The European Security Strategy recognises the UN as an international authority and key institution for achieving global governance by »effective multilateralism« (ESS 2003: 9). As a consequence, all ESDP military missions so far have been conducted under a UN mandate. Furthermore, ESDP crisis management instruments are explicitly designed in such a way as to be able to support or complement the UN. This applies to the EU Battle Groups, in particular. The relationship between the two organisations with respect to crisis management missions was formalised by the »Joint Declaration on UN–EU Cooperation in Crisis Management« of 19 September 2003.⁹² The Declaration established regular information and exchange mechanisms in order to facilitate cooperation. Operationally, ESDP and UN missions have, quite frequently, followed up on each other, the latest example being the EULEX mission in Kosovo, which took over some functions and personnel from the previous UNMIK mission.

Shortcomings

As the EU rhetorically attributes so much importance to the UN in order to achieve »effective multilateralism«, one would expect a clear strategy of both political and operational cooperation. But this is not the case. On the contrary, there is a **lack of vision with regard to how the relationship between the EU and UN should be organised** (Katsioulis 2009: 9). This relates to both a discussion of what »effective multilateralism« might mean in strategic terms and what role the two partners could play in practical co-operation on the ground with respect to crisis management operations, bearing in mind the respective comparative advantages of each institution, also with regard to cooperation with third institutions, such as the AU or other regional organisations, especially in Africa.

In practical terms, cooperation intensified with the crises in Congo and Lebanon, but has not progressed further since then (Vasconcelos 2009: 52). **Any ambition to expand practical cooperation seems limited.** Comparing the respective declarations of 2003 and 2007, there has been no qualitative improvement in the agreed consultation and exchange mechanisms.⁹³ No serious effort is being made to benefit from **lessons learned** and define the roles of each institution in the different phases of crisis management and conflict prevention. To summarise: **ESDP–UN cooperation seems to be ad hoc and crisis-driven.**

Suggestions and recommendations

In contrast to the partnerships with Russia and China, **the partnership between the EU and the UN could clearly have both a security and a defence component**, which should be expanded in the time-frame of this White Paper (2010–2020). In order to make substantial progress, the following steps should be taken:

⁹² Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on UN–EU Cooperation on Crisis Management, 19/09/2003.

⁹³ See Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on UN–EU Cooperation on Crisis Management, 19/09/2003; and Council of the European Union, Joint Statement on UN–EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, 07/07/2007.

Clarification of the concept of »effective multilateralism« in an EU–UN security and defence partnership

First and foremost, the EU urgently needs to clarify how its principle of »effective multilateralism« – which implies action when the rules of the game are broken (as the Strategy states) – can be reconciled with the other principle of overarching legitimacy for ESDP military operations offered by the UN Charter. As outlined in the criteria of engagement and intervention in Chapter 2, there might be instances when criteria for ESDP intervention are met (for example, in an R2P scenario), but the UN is handcuffed due to a veto in the UN Security Council (cf. Darfur between 2003–2007). The EU should be prepared for these cases and make its decision-making criteria transparent in order to be able to act with both **internal and external legitimacy**. At the same time, the EU should work hard for UN reform, in particular of the Security Council, in order to make the world organisation more credible and effective in conflict prevention and resolution.

Increasing systematisation of operational cooperation

Apart from strategy, cooperation must also be improved in practical terms. There should be a **regular exchange on »lessons learned«** in civilian and military crisis management operations, as the two organisations could benefit from one another's experiences. Furthermore, the EU and the UN should develop a set of scenarios for the handover of missions to each other in order to facilitate the process. Finally, there should be **common training and operational standards for civilian and military personnel** in order to increase interoperability, also with respect to follow-up missions.

Establishing a strategic dialogue with the African Union

The EU and the UN should cooperate more closely and enter into a **triangular strategic dialogue** with the African Union on peace and security in Africa in order to enable the AU to gradually take over responsibility for crisis management and conflict resolution in that continent. The building up of the AU should also include a dialogue on the relationship and distribution of competences between the AU and African regional

organisations, playing a central operational role in early warning and crisis management operations.

4.2.6 African Union

Overview and achievements

For the EU, the African Union (AU) is the single most important partner organisation in Africa. Relations are based on the »Joint Africa–EU Strategy« of December 2007, which is probably the most fully elaborated of all EU strategic partnerships so far. In the Action Plan for implementation of the strategy, **peace and security is clearly the most important area of cooperation** among the eight areas (Tull 2008: 11). The EU is the biggest donor to the AU, supporting its institutionalisation and the training of personnel at almost all levels out of the European Development Fund (EDF). The main goal is the firm establishment of an **African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)** in order, at last, to find »African solutions for African problems«. Although the AU has certainly a long way to go and still needs the support of the UN and other international partners in order to be able to intervene successfully in African theatres, the EU takes its commitment to the AU very seriously. It has scaled up its presence at the AU's headquarters in Addis Ababa, including appointing an EU Special Representative to the AU. The EU supports APSA in almost all its dimensions (early warning, regional stand-by brigades, decision-making mechanisms, and so on), including financing liaison officers between African regional organisations (such as ECOWAS, SADC and EAC) and the AU in order to maintain crucial communication and cooperation.⁹⁴ The AU is clearly trying to model itself on the EU (though without any supranational elements), but questions remain concerning its real effectiveness (Schmidt 2008b: 17).

Shortcomings

Generally speaking, the EU approach to Africa within the framework of the Africa–EU Strategy is an innovation in EU policy with regard to the establishment of strategic partnerships (Katsioulis 2009: 11). It remains to be seen, however, to what extent and how quickly the ambitious policy areas – with peace and security at the forefront – can be implemented (Mair

⁹⁴ See the study by Vines and Middleton (2009) for a thorough assessment of EU–AU cooperation on security and defence.

and Tull 2009: 17). Having put all its weight on supporting the AU integration process and »making the AU work«, especially the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the EU has also made the core of its Africa policy strategically dependent on the functioning of the newly established institution (Schmidt 2008a: 3). This carries risks as the AU is still weak in terms of political power and unity, as well as in terms of institutionalisation and operations (Schmidt 2008a: 6). Moreover, concentrating on the AU should not lead the EU to forget that it is equally important to coordinate its AU cooperation with the UN. Only through this »**security triangle**« will it be possible to make use of the comparative advantages of each institution. So far, however, EU–UN cooperation lacks this strategic approach, also with regard to the AU (Pabst 2008: 32, 41). Finally, there are fundamental disagreements between the EU and at least some AU Member States concerning human rights violations and state sovereignty.⁹⁵

Suggestions and recommendations

The **Africa–EU partnership should have both a security and a defence component**, to be stepped up gradually in the period up to 2020. A number of concrete recommendations can be made:

Implementing the Action Plan 2008–2010 of the Africa–EU Strategy

The EU should implement the **Action Plan 2008–2010** of the Africa–EU Strategy, in collaboration with the AU. The Action Plan is highly elaborated and inclusive, covering the most important aspects of EU–AU cooperation. It also acknowledges the potentially substantial role parliaments, civil society and NGOs can play in contributing to peace and security in Africa.

Developing and implementing updated Action Plans for the periods 2010–2015 and 2015–2020

The AU and the EU should jointly develop and implement **follow-up Action Plans** for the periods 2010–

2015 and 2015–2020, aimed at reaching full operational capability for APSA by 2020. That would mean that, by 2020, the AU would be able to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management missions across the full spectrum, ranging from civilian and peace-keeping missions to high-intensity peace-enforcement missions, supported primarily by the EU, the UN and non-African states. This is an ambitious, but necessary and realistic time-frame. Key would be the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System and the regional components of the African Standby Brigade, as well as the development of a detailed roadmap, with benchmarks. The current Africa–EU Action Plan provides a workable framework and starting point.

Integrating UN and African regional organisations into the process

The EU should actively **involve the UN and African regional organisations** in the implementation process of the Action Plan. The objective should be to increase the cohesion and strategic development of the AU's role in security and defence, also with regard to the division of competences with African regional organisations. The EU should offer its support, but make it dependent on concrete benchmarks in order to ensure that the AU's development is solidly based.

Increasing EU support for AU crisis management operations: funding and training

The EU should set up a fund – if possible in cooperation with the UN or the United States – to finance AU military crisis-management operations, as this is currently not possible through the African Peace Facility (APF).⁹⁶ If that is not possible, the EU should set up a coordination mechanism among Member States in order to organise efficient bilateral support (Vines/Middleton 2008: 29). This could also consist of technical and logistical support to AU forces (Pabst 2008: 38; Vines/Middleton 2008: 17). Training of African forces in the specifics of peacekeeping operations will be crucial here, particularly through the EURO RECAP–Amani Africa initiative and necessary follow-up mechanisms.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ A prominent example is the International Criminal Court arrest warrant for the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, and the AU decision not to cooperate with the ICC on al-Bashir's arrest and surrender. See AllAfrica.com: »AU opposes arrest warrant on Sudan's President« – available at: <<http://allafrica.com/stories/200907040001.html>> (accessed 21/09/2009).

⁹⁶ It is not possible to finance anything with potentially »lethal implications« out of the APF – see Vines and Middleton (2008), p. 26.

⁹⁷ See the EU factsheet on the initiative for further background information. Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090703-Factsheet_EUORECAMP-version3_EN.pdf> (accessed 20 October 2009).

Ensuring better donor coordination

The EU, as the AU's biggest donor, has a special responsibility to ensure better donor coordination in order not to tie up too many scarce AU administrative resources and to comply with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This applies particularly to EU Member States, but also other international donors. The EU Donor Atlas is a first step in enhancing transparency inside the EU.⁹⁸

Challenges and the need for reform

The current state of EU partnerships with respect to security and defence reflects both the level of development of ESDP and the limited role of the EU in international affairs. So far, **the EU has not been able to establish any meaningful security and defence partnership.**⁹⁹ However, security and defence partnerships with other regional organisations, such as the AU and – to some extent – ASEAN have had some positive impact. In contrast, partnerships with major powers such as Russia and China suffer from the general problem of lack of coherence of EU foreign policy. In particular, major EU Member States are often not willing to subordinate – or at least coordinate – their bilateral relations under a common EU approach, despite overwhelming strategic interests. As a consequence, EU partnerships in the area of security and defence exhibit the same deficits as the »strategic partnership« approach of CFSP as a whole: lack of coherence, lack of prioritisation, lack of coordination between bilateral and inter-regional partnerships and a lack of transparency of EU interests and decision-making procedures.¹⁰⁰

However, this rather sober assessment should not give rise to a generally pessimistic conclusion con-

cerning the potential of EU security and defence partnerships. The EU is increasingly developing strategies with a security and defence component, the Africa–EU Strategy and the strategic guidelines for East Asia of 2007 being good examples. But it has become clear that the more the EU touches on the national interests of Member States, the more sensitive and protracted consensus-building becomes, especially in the area of security and defence.

What is therefore needed is a pragmatic, gradual approach in order to make full use of cooperation and comparative advantages in security and defence partnerships. Concerning policy formulation in all partnerships, **EU Member States must increasingly use the EU as the principal forum for coordinating their bilateral relations with the respective partnership countries or institutions** (Katsioulis 2009: 11). An important part of these strategic discussions must be to focus on the question of *prioritisation*: which partnerships are the most important ones, and what should be their paramount character: security, or also defence? It seems sensible to recommend that, in the next ten years, apart from US/NATO, only the EU–UN and EU–AU partnerships and OSCE (on the civilian side) should have both a security and a defence component.

In the end, these bilateral and inter-regional partnerships should form a web of »effective multilateralism«, a concept which must, in turn, be further defined in order to acquire proper strategic significance. Particularly, the EU should resist the temptation to focus solely on ESDP to pursue its security and defence interests, both regionally and globally.

The EU should pursue an active policy of strengthening the existing »strategic« partnerships and of scaling up their security and, if applicable, their defence component.

98 <http://development.donoratlas.eu/>

99 This also applies to NATO as mentioned above. Although the Berlin Plus agreement has established close operational cooperation, the relationship between both institutions lacks strategic substance.

100 See Bendiek and Kramer (2009) for a thorough assessment.

5 Capabilities and means: Civilian and military dimensions

5.1 The civilian dimension of EU security and defence

Overview and achievements

The civilian dimension of ESDP was not part of the initial ESDP framework agreed on at the founding European Council Summit in Cologne in 1999. One year later, at the Council Summit in Feira, it was added as a second dimension, alongside the military one. In the civilian dimension, the EU has concentrated, in the first instance, on **four priority areas** with regard to civilian aspects of crisis management: **police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection**.¹⁰¹ The European Security Strategy of 2003 emphasises the importance of applying a variety of instruments to conflict prevention and crisis management, ranging from economic and development policies to civilian and military crisis management (ESS 2003).

Since its inception, the civilian dimension has developed into a very dynamic aspect of ESDP: of the 22 ESDP missions so far, 13 have been civilian ones, six military and three civilian-military, ranging from the European neighbourhood to Africa and Afghanistan. Currently, the EU is deploying an almost equal number of civilian experts and soldiers in the field (approximately 7,800, total civilian and military personnel). The largest civilian mission so far is EULEX in Kosovo, with 2,550 personnel, which started in December 2008.¹⁰² EU Member States have registered and trained more than 13,000 civilian experts who, in theory, are available for civilian missions.¹⁰³

Following the European Security Strategy, the EU has refined and broadened the scope, capabilities and instruments of the civilian dimension. In the wake of the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP of June 2004,¹⁰⁴ the EU Council in December 2004 defined **two more civilian priority areas** of ESDP:

monitoring and strengthening of the offices of EU Special Representatives.¹⁰⁵ These and other measures to increase civilian capabilities and the coherence of EU conflict prevention and crisis management instruments form part of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 which, in December 2008, was further developed into the Civilian Headline Goal 2010, running parallel to the military Headline Goal 2010.¹⁰⁶ At the European Council Summit in December 2008, the Council set more ambitious goals concerning the future scope and number of military and civilian missions. With regard to civilian missions, the EU should become capable of conducting around a dozen missions at the same time (including police, rule-of-law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector reform and observation missions) and in various formats. They include rapid-response situations, together with a major mission (possibly up to 3,000 experts) which could last several years.

In contrast to the military dimension, the civilian aspects of ESDP in the Council Secretariat are not the only civilian capability of the EU in crisis management and conflict prevention; the EU Commission also has a broad range of instruments at its disposal, including the necessary funding. Therefore, coordination and coherence within the EU pose a particular challenge to civilian crisis management and conflict prevention policies and operations.

Turning more specifically to achievements of the civilian dimension of ESDP, as far as **strategic level** is concerned, the dynamic development of the civilian dimension underlines that the EU is trying to follow a comprehensive security concept instead of concentrating solely on military force. Both the ESS and the 2008 ESS implementation report, as the key strategy documents for ESDP, spell out the comprehensive security concept of ESDP, preferring a holistic and civilian-military approach towards conflict prevention and crisis management.¹⁰⁷ This reflects a strategic consensus among EU Member States that ESDP's combination of civilian and military instruments is a comparative advantage of the EU in security and defence.

¹⁰¹ European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria de Feira, 19–20 June 2000.

¹⁰² See ESDP website for regularly updated information: <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=DE>> (accessed ...2009).

¹⁰³ See European Council, Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, 17–18 June 2004; Ministerial Declaration, Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference, 22 November 2004; European Council, Civilian Headline Goal 2008, 7 December 2004; Rummel (2006), pp. 7–8.

¹⁰⁴ European Council, Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, 17–18 June 2004.

¹⁰⁵ See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 16–17 December 2004, and Ministerial Declaration, Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004.

¹⁰⁶ See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 11–12 December 2008, and European Council, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, 11 December 2008.

¹⁰⁷ See European Council, European Security Strategy 2003, and European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World, 11 December 2008.

On the **institutional level**, there has been a constant development and sophistication of the institutional aspects of ESDP's civilian dimension with regard to planning and command and control capabilities in the Council Secretariat. This finds expression in the subsequent creation of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), working parallel to the EU Military Committee on the military side, the Civilian-Military Cell (CivMilCell) to increase civil-military planning and coordination within ESDP and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), headed by the EU Civilian Operations Commander. Moreover, the recently developed Civilian Capability Management Tool should give the Secretariat a better overview of national contingents of civilian personnel and therefore make planning and deployment more efficient.

With regard to civilian and military planning and joint civilian-military missions, development of unified civilian-military planning and command structure, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), is under way.¹⁰⁸ It has the potential for a more coherent approach to crisis management operations in all their aspects and to increase the effectiveness of ESDP missions, particularly joint civilian-military ones.

Finally, on the **operational level**, the evolution of institutional planning, as well as command and control structures, has also had a positive impact on the civilian operational level. Furthermore, there have been some improvements in the availability of national contingents of civilian crisis management experts due to increased national and European training and management capabilities. Moreover, the Civilian Response Teams (CRTs)¹⁰⁹ are generally an innovative instrument, providing a nexus between early warning and early action, contributing to the timely development of a crisis management concept and speeding up deployment of the actual civilian mission

(Ehrhart 2007: 19/20). The Secretariat itself states, however, that CRTs have not been used as often and as coherently as first envisaged.¹¹⁰

Shortcomings

The main shortcoming hampering the civilian aspects of ESDP on the **strategic level** is the lack of strategic guidelines for CFSP as a whole (HSSG 2008: 21/22; Vasconcelos 2009: 21; Katsioulis 2009). The absence of concrete strategic guidelines reflects the difficulties between Member States in finding a strategic consensus – derived from a political vision for CFSP and ESDP – which is more concrete than the rather general existing strategic core documents. A general consequence is that, in many cases, civilian missions have been fairly miniscule, with a very limited number of personnel, due to a lack of real political will. Therefore, success in more ambitious missions, such as EULEX in Kosovo and EUPOL in Afghanistan, is even more crucial for the future development of ESDP.

As another consequence of the lack of general strategic agreement, one can observe a **lack of strategic coherence** between Council Secretariat and European Commission with regard to the civilian dimension of ESDP. This applies both to the conflict prevention and crisis management activities of both organs and to the nexus between the security and development policies of the EU – even though the interdependence of security and development are explicitly part of the European security concept outlined in the ESS.

Despite progress on the **institutional level**, there is still one basic problem with the civilian dimension of ESDP: the **overall lack of coherence**. This can be observed both within ESDP and between ESDP and the EU Commission, hindering the civilian dimension of ESDP from reaching its full potential (HSSG 2008; Vasconcelos 2009: 11–21, 29; Katsioulis 2009).

First, within ESDP there are coordination problems between the civilian and military dimensions, the main reason being the different professional cultures of the respective personnel (Vasconcelos 2009: 29). Nevertheless, the situation has already improved, and a fully operational Crisis Management and Planning Directorate might produce positive results as well. In addition, and also within the Council Secretariat, there have been constant coordination problems between the Secretariat and EU Presidencies and

108 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 11–12 December 2008, Annex 2, Article 6, and European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), EPLO Statement on Civilian-Military Integration in European Security and Defence Policy, 2009.

109 A Civilian Response Team (CRT) is a civilian crisis management rapid reaction capability of flexible size and composition, which can be deployed within five days for a time period of up to three months. A CRT consists of a multinational group of specialists of up to 100 personnel, deployed in all kinds of ESDP missions. It has three main tasks: situational and needs analysis, preparation of a regular civilian ESDP mission in the field and support for an EU Special Representative in an ongoing mission. See EU Council, General Secretariat Document, Multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management Resources in an Integrated Format – Civilian Response Teams, Doc. 10462/05, 23 June 2005, and Ehrhart (2007), pp. 19–20.

110 See EU Council, Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, 19 November 2007, pp. 6, 10.

between the Secretariat and Member States, also because of institutional fragmentation and ministerial quarrels over crisis management competences at national level.¹¹¹

The biggest coherence deficit, however, exists between the Council Secretariat and the EU Commission, and this applies to the civilian aspects of ESDP in particular (HSSG 2008; Vasconcelos 2009: 11; Katsioulis 2009: 13). Both the Council Secretariat and the Commission are active in risk management operations, with overlapping instruments¹¹² in need of coordination. But although the Commission is represented in all planning and management organs of ESDP (Björkdahl and Strömvik 2008: 19/20), **coordination problems** have not been overcome, often leading to a duplication of efforts and diminished effectiveness of the EU as a unitary actor on the ground. The main reason for this lack of coherence between the first and second pillars of the EU¹¹³ is a different security policy approach between the Council Secretariat and the Commission: whereas the Council Secretariat – within the overall CFSP framework – has the explicit mandate to conduct civilian and military crisis management operations with a fairly short-term and reactive character, the Commission generally follows a more long-term, structurally-oriented approach (Ehrhart 2007: 15; Vasconcelos 2009: 29; Rummel 2006: 19). Of course, and irrespective of the overlaps of crisis management instruments, the holistic security policy approach of the EU, as defined in the ESS and the implementation report, needs the capabilities of the Secretariat and the Commission in a complementary manner, but coherence does not come automatically or by official declarations alone.

Due to these institutional deficiencies, the EU currently is **not making full use of its comparative advantage** with regard to effectively linking security and development policies and strengthening both long-term conflict prevention, and, where necessary, rapid and effective crisis management. In the end, the already mentioned lack of strategic coherence between the Council Secretariat and the EU Commission, as well as the lack of institutional coherence are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.

Finally, inter-institutional coordination between ESDP and the third pillar of the EU, Justice and Home

Affairs, also needs to be improved, as it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate between the internal and external dimensions of security, particularly with regard to transnational terrorism.

On the **operational level**, quantity, quality and availability of national civilian contingents to be deployed in civilian ESDP missions remain problematic, especially if one applies the newly formulated objectives with regard to the scope of ESDP missions (Korski 2008). Despite progress in some Member States, there remains considerable room for improvement with regard to setting up national training facilities, as well as establishing and keeping up to date databases of available personnel. The Secretariat has identified particular shortfalls in certain police and rule-of-law categories.¹¹⁴ One must be very clear that the ongoing problems with supplying pre-committed personnel to civilian ESDP missions hampers the very approach to crisis management and peace-building the EU aspires to uphold. Institutional reforms, as important as they are, cannot replace the political will, first, to reach a strategic consensus and, second, to make available the necessary personnel. This applies, in particular, to larger civilian ESDP missions, such as EUPOL and EULEX; very small missions, especially, do not represent a real challenge for Member States and cannot be the principal benchmarks for the overall success of ESDP's civilian dimension.

The other identified problems on the strategic and institutional level – notwithstanding the progress achieved – have an impact on the operational level. With regard to coherence deficits between the Council Secretariat and the European Commission, apart from coordination problems on the ground, **problems begin before operations actually start**. There is neither joint situational analysis nor needs assessment (Ehrhart 2007: 11), which increases the likelihood of different and even contradictory conclusions and policy responses.

Another operational problem is the financing mechanism for civilian ESDP operations. It is not sufficiently developed, neither within ESDP nor in cases in which cooperation with the Commission, as administrator of the CFSP budget, is needed. There have been instances where the Commission has responded too slowly to demands from ESDP for mission financing (Ehrhart 2007: 23/24). In addition, conflicts over competence between the Council Secretariat and the European Commission concerning concrete crisis management operations often spill

111 This can also be caused by the different security concepts of Member States or between different ministries within certain Member States, see Rummel (2006), p. 22.

112 The respective instrument within the Commission is the Stability Instrument, a follow-up of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism.

113 The »pillar structure« of the EU, which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, will be abolished when the Lisbon Treaty enters into force.

114 EU Council, Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, 19 November 2007, p. 15.

over to the budgetary area, too (Björkdahl and Strömvik 2008: 30).

Suggestions and recommendations

The general strategic objectives the EU has set for itself with the recent expansion of the number and scope of civilian (and military) missions can, in theory, be considered sound, reflecting both the ambition of the EU to become a truly global actor and the increasing external demand for ESDP deployments. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the current shortcomings of the civilian dimension of ESDP, especially concerning the lack of concrete strategic guidelines, institutional coherence and capabilities, together with a worrying lack of commitment by several Member States, there is the danger of an **increased expectations–capabilities gap** with regard to the actual performance of ESDP. This could cause disappointment and frustration among EU Member States, external partners – especially the UN – and countries in need, and lead ultimately to the delegitimisation of the EU as a global actor and civilian power. The Strategy regardless, the EU has thus far not been a very credible nation-builder. It has not been Mars, but Venus either.

What is needed, therefore, is further strengthening of the civilian dimension on all levels – strategically, institutionally and operationally.

This is all the more important as the security environment requires, first and foremost, an EU foreign and security policy concept based on an integrated, civilian-military approach to conflict prevention and crisis management. The core challenge for the EU, therefore, is to develop a **truly integrated, civilian-military security policy and the respective operational capabilities** in line with more concrete strategic foreign policy guidelines. Otherwise, the often-mentioned »unique added value« of ESDP's combination of civilian and military instruments simply cannot deliver its full potential.

In this respect, it has been a serious failure in the past to neglect the civilian dimension of ESDP, be it with regard to EU communication policy, the attention of the Member States or academic analysis and public discourse. Civilian missions do have a structural disadvantage with regard to attention – especially on the part of the media – as they are not as »visible« and »impressive« as military ones (HSSG 2008: 9). On the contrary, most successful civilian missions do not make any noise – in stark contrast to a large military deployment. Moreover, civilian ESDP missions do not lead to as much controversial debate, either in domestic political discourse within Member

States or between Member States, as they tend to be consensual and do not impinge on the core of national sovereignty, namely control over military resources and the use of force.

However, civilian missions are important for maintaining and increasing the currently high level of public support and legitimacy of CFSP and ESDP (in the future, a CSDP), both among EU citizens and abroad. The EU's power as a global actor derives from having both »soft« and »hard power« at its disposal; it does not rely primarily on military means to pursue its foreign policy interests. Member States and EU officials, therefore, should **resist the temptation of the exclusive militarisation of ESDP**. Both the civilian and the military aspects of ESDP require equal attention and sufficient resources and capabilities in order to make it work more effectively and to promote security in a comprehensive manner.

In what follows, concrete reform proposals and recommendations are outlined with regard to the strategic, institutional and operational levels of ESDP's civilian dimension.

On the **strategic level**, and as for the EU's foreign and security policy as a whole – CFSP and ESDP – Member States need to agree on **clearly defined strategic guidelines and priorities** for the civilian aspects of ESDP. They could consist of the following elements:

Policy approach

The EU as a whole should favour a long-term, integrated approach on development, stabilisation and reform of crisis- and conflict-prone areas. Therefore, also within ESDP, it should resist a »fix-and-go« concept of short-sighted crisis management. In order to develop a comprehensive and coherent concept of economic, development, neighbourhood, conflict prevention and crisis management policies, fragmented and compartmentalised thinking in the EU within »pillar structures« needs to come to an end. This applies particularly to the civilian aspects of ESDP concerning the relationship between the Council Secretariat and the European Commission. A good starting point would be for the Council Secretariat and the Commission to develop a common, overarching and complementary concept on security sector reform (SSR), which, so far, has arguably been the most important area of civilian ESDP missions.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ See Brzoska and Maras (2007) for more detailed suggestions.

Strategic priorities

Bearing in mind the general criteria for ESDP intervention, as developed in Chapter 2, the EU should further develop the civilian dimension of ESDP in a way that allows for flexibility for the whole spectrum of possible ESDP intervention, be it in the European neighbourhood, in more distant areas or by EU action through other organisations, such as OSCE or the UN.

Further developing integrated operational concepts

In many crisis management situations, joint civilian-military missions promise more effectiveness in stabilising the security environment and protecting the local population and civilian ESDP experts. This approach also reflects better the requirements outlined by the Human Security concept. Therefore, the Council Secretariat should further develop its conceptual approach to joint civilian-military missions and design the future Crisis Management and Planning Directorate accordingly.

Limit the scope of civilian missions

The current scope and mandate of civilian ESDP missions include six priority areas.¹¹⁶ The EU should, for the foreseeable future, concentrate on strengthening its capabilities in these areas and continue conceptual evolution, but not add further priority areas. Coordination and better coherence with the Commission is of particular importance, but also coordination with external actors, such as the UN and OSCE must be improved.

Division of labour: Council Secretariat–Commission

There needs to be a strategic decision on a clear division of labour between the Council Secretariat and the European Commission. The baseline should be that each organ does what it can do best. This would mean that the Commission gives up those crisis management instruments from its Stability Instrument which are short-term and reactive in character in order to avoid duplication. At the same time, longer-term civilian ESDP missions should gradually be handed over to the responsibility of the Commission

in order to make use of the Commission's expertise with regard to structural stabilisation and development policies. This kind of division of labour should not lead to the conclusion that it would reduce the need for coordination: on the contrary, more sophisticated coordination mechanisms should be developed, but based on a more sensible framework of competences.

On the **institutional level**, despite the steady progress in the institutionalisation of ESDP, the coherence problem and other deficiencies require more ambitious measures, as outlined below.

Making the Lisbon Treaty work in practice

If the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, it will certainly have a positive impact in strengthening coherence between the Council Secretariat and the Commission. This should be ensured by means of the so-called »double hat« of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who would also be Commissioner for External Relations and one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. Moreover, the External Action Service, staffed by personnel of the current EU delegations of the EU Commission and diplomats of the national foreign services of Member States, should serve as a vehicle to instil greater coherence. Nevertheless, the general provisions of the Lisbon Treaty cannot substitute detailed sets of arrangements between Council and Commission which would still be needed in order to increase the coherence, effectiveness and accountability of EU foreign and security policy (Björkdahl and Strömvik 2008: 36).

A real EU Operation Headquarters (EU OHQ)

As argued in Chapters 3, the future CSDP needs a real, fully capable Operation Headquarters in Brussels, serving both civilian and military (and joint civilian-military) missions (Vasconcelos 2009: 56; Lasheras et al 2009: 7; Witney 2008a). e With an EU OHQ in place, strong consideration should be given to the idea of granting NATO access to ESDP civilian planning and operational capabilities in missions of common interest, modelled after the Berlin Plus agreement.

Increasing coherence between external and internal action

In addition to increasing coherence between the Council Secretariat and the European Commission,

¹¹⁶ Police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration, civil protection, monitoring and strengthening the offices of EU Special Representatives.

the EU should set up a coordination framework for better coherence and complementarity between the external and internal dimensions of security policy, namely between the Council Secretariat, the Commission and Justice and Home Affairs. It should reflect the increasingly blurred divisions between the two security dimensions.

Strengthening the link between early warning and early action

The EU should use the institutional reforms furnished by the Lisbon Treaty – especially the establishment of the External Action Service – to develop a systematic institutional approach in order to strengthen the link between early warning and early action (Vasconcelos 2009: 51). This would include a joint situational analysis and needs assessment by the Council Secretariat and the Commission.

Balancing civilian and military planning

The future Crisis Management and Planning Directorate should, in order to increase civilian-military coherence, reflect the ratio of civilian and military missions and deployed personnel with regard to its planning and leadership staff. Moreover, all senior managers, including military ones, should have expertise in peaceful conflict transformation and undergo constant training on all aspects of crisis management in line with EU strategic guidelines (EPLO 2009).

In the end, improvements at the strategic and institutional levels must play out at the civilian **operational level** of ESDP in order to have an impact. The following elements could be part of operational reform:

Adaptation of capabilities

Civilian capabilities should be constantly adjusted in line with the more concrete strategic guidelines and priorities, as outlined above. These adjustment processes should also follow regular assessments with regard to the changing security environment. In particular, training schedules for civilian personnel, as organised and mainstreamed by the EU Training Group (ETG), should fully reflect the security–development nexus in order to increase coherence with Commission activities.

Setting up an EU Civilian Reserve (EUCR)¹¹⁷

In order to increase the quality, quantity and availability of its civilian ESDP capabilities, the EU should set up an **EU Civilian Reserve (EUCR), which would be a reserve corps of at least 2,000 civilian specialists**. Experience has shown that, despite improved training facilities in some Member States and mainstreaming and standardisation of curricula by the EU Training Group, there is still a considerable problem with regard to the availability of civilian personnel for civilian ESDP missions. For those willing and able, there is often a time lag between training and deployment. An EU Civilian Reserve would function like a military reserve: civilian experts would sign a contract with the government of an EU Member State to be on stand-by for a certain period of time for civilian ESDP missions. They would, therefore, act like government staff without being full-time employees. Civilian reservists would undergo regular, standardised training at EU level, including specialisation with regard to the phase of response of a crisis situation. As a consequence, an EU Civilian Reserve would combine the advantages of standing government staff (high level of training, flexibility, standardisation of training and clarity of mission) with more cost-effectiveness. In particular, the Crisis Response Teams (CRTs) could benefit from this capability, allowing for a more systematic application of the CRT instrument and deployment, beyond fact-finding missions. Preliminary calculations show that maintaining a civilian reserve of 2,000 experts would be both cost-effective and have a considerable impact on EU civilian capabilities.¹¹⁸ Member States would have to make sure, however, that national labour laws and regulations allow for flexible deployments and should continue to train civilian experts apart from the EUCR format in order to increase EU civilian capabilities as a whole.

Adjusting the finance mechanism of civilian operations

In line with the proposed clear division of labour between ESDP and the Commission concerning civilian crisis management operations, parts of the budget of the Commission's Stability Instrument have to be transferred to the CFSP budget. Furthermore, the start-up fund for »preparatory activities« of ESDP missions (Art. 41.3 of the Lisbon Treaty) might make

¹¹⁷ This section follows a proposal by Korski (2008).

¹¹⁸ See Korski (2008) for a detailed analysis.

some progress with regard to speeding up the deployment of civilian and military personnel. Member States should interpret the provision of »preparatory activities« as broadly as possible so that the fund can cover a significant portion of common costs. Nevertheless, the start-up fund should be seen only as a first step towards a European fund for ESDP missions, both civilian and military (see Lasheras et al 2009: 23/24). If the EU takes its ambitious Headline Goals seriously, this should be reflected by the establishment and sufficient size of such a common fund.

Pooling of civilian training facilities

Some EU Member States have progressed much further than others in setting up training facilities for civilian crisis management and conflict prevention operations. Particularly for smaller Member States, it might not make sense to establish training facilities of their own. Therefore, **Member States should establish a pooling mechanism for civilian training facilities:** existing facilities should be scaled up and made accessible to civilian personnel from countries without training facilities in a systematic way and in accordance with previously agreed quotas. Financing would either come out of the CFSP budget or directly from the Member States of origin without training facilities of their own.

Common situational analysis and needs assessment

In order to increase the coherence of EU foreign and security policy, Council and Commission should conduct joint situational analysis and needs assessment. This would ensure a coordinated and, ideally, coherent approach to crisis situations from the beginning, based on a clear division of labour and strategic orientation, as outlined above.

Making use of the European External Action Service (EEAS)

The European External Action Service, which will be established under the Lisbon Treaty, should be integrated into the operational concept of civilian (and, where applicable, military) ESDP missions from the beginning. EEAS staff should be trained to fulfil early warning functions, particularly in crisis-prone countries and according to the strategic priorities of ESDP. It should, furthermore, pay attention to the security–development nexus of CFSP and contribute to in-

creasing coherence between Council and Commission in this regard. Therefore, **Council Secretariat and Commission should develop a common concept on the role of the European External Action Service in EU development and crisis management policies.**

Further development of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms

The Council Secretariat should further develop the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of civilian ESDP missions. They should, in particular, identify lessons learnt, based on previously agreed criteria and indicators. Monitoring and evaluation should indicate what the actual impact of ESDP on the ground has been and whether the mission achieved, or the extent to which it contributed to, the EU's broader political objectives.

5.2 Military capabilities: European Armed Forces for the twenty-first century

5.2.1 Overview and shortcomings

National Forces

EU countries are suffering from serious capabilities shortfalls. This simple statement was first delivered at the European Union level on the launch of the Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG) 2003, then transformed in the more quality, less quantity oriented Helsinki Headline Goals 2010. A series of capabilities projects were launched during the French EU Presidency 2008 for force projection, protection, information and intelligence. The military Erasmus project, a strategy for pooling capabilities, and a planning cell within the EU Council were also agreed upon.

While these decisions are steps in the right direction, we should affirm that HHG 2010 has been revealed to be a complete failure. The European Union Rapid Reaction Force is still a mirage, as is the NATO Reaction Force (NRF). Given that the EU Member States have almost two million soldiers at their disposal, its inability to build up such a force in the space of eleven years is puzzling and raises serious questions concerning the true political will of the member states.

This reveals the true nature of the capabilities shortfalls which remain in Europe. While some Member States have invested large sums in transforming their armed forces to provide well trained and

equipped soldiers for EU Battle Groups, they have never been used. On the other hand, some large EU countries, such as Germany, are still in the middle of transforming their armed forces.

Multinational forces

Many multinational units have been developed in the history of European integration. The best example of those kind of units is probably the Eurocorps, built on the Franco-German brigade, set up in 1987. The **Eurocorps**, set up on the premises of the Western European Union, includes currently units of many Member States (Belgium, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain). While the Eurocorps pledges to be able to deploy 60.000 soldiers, for NATO or EU missions, the reality is quite different. The Eurocorps, as well as many others multinational units being developed afterwards (Euromarfor, the EU Rapid Reaction Force, but also the NATO Response Force) are much more a political symbol than an operational reality.

For those units, the assembly of national units have never reached the state of a real integrated, multinational force. While formations as the Franco-German Brigade are historical by a political point of view, the practical impact on the ground is quite different from the one expected. The Eurocorps has been deployed in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, with all the difficulties linked to the state of national military forces. Still, a resolution of the European Parliament called for the Eurocorps to be the core of a future European Army. Once again, symbolism is quite strong. In reality, the success of this kind of initiative (as for Eurocorps to be the core of a European Rapid Reaction force) depends on the transformation of national armies in an expeditionary and joint way. This is a crucial task which still needs to be implemented.

EU Battle Groups (BG)

A different experience can be considered the setting up of **European Union Battle Groups**. Since the 1st of January 2007, the European Union disposes of high readiness, small operation capabilities via the Battle Groups 1500.

This initiative, mentioned for the first time at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, was officially launched at the Franco-British forum of Le Touquet in 2003. The idea was to dispose of an initial deployment of sea, land and air forces in a short time scale, capitalising on experiences of other multinational units. Officially, the EU Battle Groups have to be de-

ployable within 5 to 10 days from EU Council approval, and they must be able to sustain from 30 to 120 days in the given theatre. Today, 15 national or multinational Battle Groups exist. In some cases, the creation of such a multinational Battle Group, such as the Nordic one, formed by Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Ireland and Norway, has been a tremendous tool for improving readiness capability, deployability, interoperability and to develop common procedures.

Still, some problems persist. First of all, the limited scale of the operation. 1500 soldiers can be considered excellent for an entry force, especially considering the combination of land, air and sea forces, but we have seen in Chapter 2 that **CSDP Fundamental Tasks** for expeditionary missions are more ambitious than just small, rapid response operations. At the same time, a stabilisation force has to be ready within a short period of time to replace the BG. Secondly, the BG 1500 has never been used, creating frustration with some Member States having invested hugely in the instrument. As a consequence, no operational return of experience exists on the strengths and weaknesses of such a tool. In this respect, the political pull behind the very idea of BGs – and using them – seems to be fading.¹¹⁹

5.2.2 Recommendations and the need for reform: Lisbon criteria for defence capabilities

What should the EU's armed forces look like in the twenty-first century? The lack of resources for defence is a reality which will become more and more urgent, not only for the duration of the current financial and economic crisis, but also due to demographic developments in European countries, as highlighted in Chapter 1. **EU member states need to spend better**, not more, and to focus on key issues such as deployability and sustainability in the field of operations.

A conceptual framework for this European revolution in military affairs already exists, with the EDA work on transformation and the Capability Develop-

¹¹⁹ In a recent declaration, the Council noted with concern already vacant slots for the first semester of 2012. To particular dismay is its conclusion that the use of EU Battle Groups »in a more flexible manner«, upon a »voluntary approach«, and be applied »on a case-by-case basis«, when they »are unanimously considered the best instrument for the given situation« (Council Conclusions on ESDP, November 17 2009). It seems difficult to find so many caveats in just a paragraph on the EU's purportedly best military tool.

ment Plan. The current peace-keeping »blues« which has been fostered in order to maintain public opinion's support to ESDP and NATO missions will not help. Now it is up to EU Member States to make sure that defence budgets are being spent efficiently to build up the security and defence of European citizens. The political agenda may help, with the persistent calls from the new American administration for better burden sharing between allies, the call for a pro-active ESDP, as well as the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

The Treaty will be crucial here, offering a number of tools for **a pragmatic approach to the future CSDP** with the objective of developing military capabilities that will benefit, at the end of the day, EU citizens' security. As argued in Chapter 3, PSCoP should be used to create »pioneer groups« to develop better security and military capabilities, and to implement the capability pooling strategy defined in the second semester 2008. Moreover, we have already noted that all EU countries are required under the Treaty to improve their military capabilities and put them at the service of ESDP/CSDP.

Starting from the fact that EU Member States spend a consistent part of their budget to procure the same type of equipments per 27, this strategy was suggested by the French presidency.¹²⁰ The implementation of such a strategy would avoid duplication in member states procurement by pooling existing and future defence assets.

Rationalisation of multinational units

In terms of multinational units which should be at the disposal of CFSP/CSDP, we can reasonably consider the Battle Group experience as a step in the right direction. Other paper multinational units should be scrapped or regrouped within the former. EU member states should build more extended multinational units, starting with the BG concept. The goal of mobilising Battle Groups of 10,000 soldiers within a short timeframe should be studied by member states, as well as the idea of a **Task Force 5000** (combining air, sea and ground components).

The Battle Group format also offers another advantage: the creation of sub-regional armed forces. While for »Nordic« soldiers it is easier to work together, based on language skills, doctrines and op-

erational engagement rules, the situation can be different for an Estonian soldier having to comply with Spanish doctrines. The BG has favoured a sub-regional military integration that could lead to important results.

More common training/joint exercises

Harmonisation of military and defence cultures must be carried forward to enhance interoperability, all the more since it concerns the ability of European militaries to operate together in difficult environments, where their lives might be at risk. The European Defence Agency highlights this point: interoperability is key not only for equipment, but *to all European capability development work*, from language to procedure to training (EDA, 2006). This is an utmost priority if EU countries are to advance towards CSDP, which, as seen in Chapter 2, will include forceful scenarios. Otherwise creating joint units which are not accustomed to working together in difficult circumstances amounts to putting the cart before the horse.¹²¹

Current initiatives, such as the idea of the exchange of young officers modelled in the Erasmus program, are positive, but fall well below the needs of a CSDP. Common programs and joint exercises in Europe and overseas must increasingly be the rule. The creation of an **European Military School**, with a specific budget and linked to a real European Security and Defence College, would be a logical next step, also relevant for addressing lessons learned from ESDP operations.

Lisbon convergence criteria for defence capabilities

More generally, we need some **»Lisbon convergence criteria« for defence capabilities** within the PSCoP framework or on a voluntary basis.

These **defence capabilities criteria**, which should be reflected in the White Paper, could be as follows:

- A higher percentage of **spending on equipment in the defence budget**. It is clear that the current

¹²⁰ On the pooling issue, see Fabio Liberti, Jean Pierre Maulny, »Pooling of EU member states assets in the implementation of ESDP«, Policy Department External Policies, European Parliament.

¹²¹ A criticism sometimes put forward as regards the design of multinational Battle Groups (BGs), for the current heterogeneity in the EU BGs could have »disastrous consequences in combat situations«. See Yves Boyer, »The Battle Groups: Catalyst for a European Defence Policy«, Policy Department external policies, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (October 2007).

share of equipment in the defence budget is too low. There are approximately two million soldiers in the EU, in contrast to 1.5 million in the United States. There are overlaps in research and development, procurement, logistics and many other areas. Dedicating 25 to 35 per cent of the total defence budget to procurement would be a productive goal.

- An objective in the area of **R&D expenditures**. This proposal was made during the French EU Presidency, with the objective of spending 2 per cent of global defence expenditure on R&D.
- The percentage of **deployable forces** out of total military personnel, bearing in mind NATO's sustainability ratio of 8 per cent. An additional point on the financing of the common costs of EU operations is the implementation of the abovementioned Athena mechanism, which sets forth that states providing a high percentage of troops to a mission would contribute less to the common costs. We can add the idea of having a system of decreasing common cost sharing in the Athena process for those Member States which have a higher percentage of deployed forces out of total military personnel.
- The mandatory **opening up of national defence and security markets** by 2015 (except in specific sensitive technology areas, such as nuclear deterrence covered by the exception of the Article 296 1a).
- The realisation of cooperation programmes with the aim of filling the gaps in **key capabilities** identified by the EDA, such as strategic airlift or space assets; this obligation will go further than what was specified in Article 1 of the Protocol annexed to the Lisbon Treaty defining PS Coop.
- The creation of a sub-group working on the convergence of operational needs within the EDA; such a group will be open at all times and to all countries, its objective being to systematically define the common needs for all equipment in contrast to what currently exists.
- The **free circulation of defence products** within the **»pioneer groups«** (this mechanism will be more detailed than the European Commission directive on intra-EU transfers of defence products). This is linked to the necessity for a common process controlling arms exports.
- The constitution of **multinational military units** as a criterion in its own right and bearing in mind the ideas discussed above on Battle Groups and the rationalisation of existing structures. The objective of this measure is to establish a kind of **Capability Development Plan for multinational**

units. The EU Member States participating in the pioneer groups would create specific objectives for themselves. The final goal is to put European armies within a harmonised framework. We can logically expect that this project will lead to the creation of common means of support and logistics, as well as areas in which capabilities are in surplus.

- The **pooling of capabilities**. The pooling of capabilities more than ever represents the possibility of having common procurement for capabilities, based on a common logistical and through-life approach. It must be coordinated with what is being done at the EU level. As a second step, Member States should realise a strategy for capability specialisation that could better valorise niche capabilities of small member states.
- The coordination of **strategic national defence planning** (concerning periodicity, nomenclature and content), to put in place an overarching strategic plan for the pioneer groups by 2020.
- The creation of a common communications, command and control (**C3**) structure. Pioneer groups in the capabilities areas would be formed on a voluntary basis. In order to encourage Member States to participate in a common capability pioneer group and to cooperate effectively, incentives such as reducing the common costs of EU operations could be made available for certain participating states. In this case the Council will have to approve specific cooperation on a majority basis. The lesson learned from the French Presidency is that it is easier to maintain progress on ESDP by implementing this sort of **»case by case« PS Coop**.

Indeed, these criteria for different pioneer groups might serve as a useful toolkit for a number of Member States to agree on establishing the Lisbon Treaty-based PS Coop, on the lines of Chapter 3, and admitting other States subsequently which meet the thresholds. On the other hand, it should be noted that Lisbon also envisages the establishment of »specific groups within the European Defence Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects« (Art. 45.2 TEU).

European armed forces are confronted by serious challenges: the huge effort involved in structural transformation, popular fatigue with regard to overseas deployments in which the national strategic interest is doubtful or non-existent, budget constraints and a lack of crucial capabilities on the ground. As far as the transformation process of the armed forces is concerned, the European Commission should draft a strategic plan for helping Member States to reform. Financial means should be included into this package that should help to comply with the most damagea-

ble side effects of restructuring (desertification of territories, revitalisation of regions etc.) as this has been done with the Konver funds in the early 1990s for helping arms industry to restructure.

An urgent solution needs to be found to change the general capability situation of EU member states. The price of inaction could be the decline of European military capabilities in a short timeframe. Some absurd capabilities duplications must be erased. New cooperative programmes – better managed and respecting time and budget constraints in order to make up capabilities shortfalls – should be launched. Harmonisation of practices at the European level also seems essential. The European Commission, working

on the security aspect and financing via the FP 7 essential security research programmes, as well as the European Parliament – to confer democratic legitimacy – should be involved in the EU capability development effort.

EU armed forces in the twenty-first century should be able to defend EU Member States' strategic interests. They have to be expeditionary and be sustainable, joint and interlocked with civilian crisis management actors. To achieve this does not necessarily require significantly more financial resources, but political will concerning deeper cooperation most EU Member States have not sufficiently shown so far.

6 Resources, defence budgets and the European defence industry

6.1 Overview and shortcomings

The often heard comment that Europeans are not spending enough on defence is a myth based on the assumption that *the amount* spent (the total budget) is more important than *the manner* in which it is spent. In fact, the 27 Member States collectively spend around 180 to 200 billion euros per year to maintain their separate military structures, involving some 1.8 to 2 million people in uniform. Despite EDA efforts to establish significant data for comparison, the lack of a common methodology makes even these fundamental elements uncertain and debatable.¹²²

It is true that the total sum is only about one-third of the US defence budget,¹²³ but the comparison is highly misleading, as the level of global commitment is much smaller and the United States is Europe's closest ally; a direct comparison is therefore somewhat far-fetched. Nonetheless, it is worth monitoring practice in the United States in order to adjust the current European approach. It is also interesting to note that European expenditure is the second largest after that of the United States, far outstripping potential competitors, such as China and Russia (Stalenheim et al. 2009). This comparison reveals that Europe does not necessarily need to spend more, but rather to spend better.

However, the perception that the Europeans are not spending enough on defence prevails. The reason lies mainly in the rather modest outcome, compared to the huge input. A few tens of thousands of troops are effectively deployable for operations abroad. With slightly over 80,000 soldiers in May 2008, the Europeans were stretched to the limit, but that figure amounts to less than 5 per cent of the total personnel of European armies (Dempsey 2008). Europeans still invest too much in too many »under equipped soldiers who are incapable of operating outside the national territory« (Witney 2008a: 31). There are two main reasons for this enormous inefficiency and waste of resources. The first is the manner in which

national planners spend their budgets; a closer look reveals that the **true reason for national military structures seems to be the preservation of personnel** rather than the provision of security. European armies spend most of their funds on personnel. Defence represents, in nearly all European countries, a prominent public employer, devoting the largest chunk of resources to paying wages. In some countries, more than 70 per cent of the entire defence budget is dedicated to personnel (for example, Greece, Italy and Ireland), although the average for the 26 EDA members in 2006 was 55 per cent. France and Germany, at 55 per cent and 57 per cent, respectively, are near the European average, while the UK spends 40 per cent of total defence expenditure on personnel (Witney 2008a: 63). These high percentages are partly owing to the fact that European armies are undergoing a process of professionalisation. By the time this process is completed, the proportions will be different, closer to those of the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden, all of which dedicate less than 50 per cent of the budget to personnel.

Personnel expenditure is rather disproportionate. The ratio of personnel to equipment, in most European countries, is about 3:1, with the notable exceptions of the UK, Spain and Netherlands. However, some countries have ratios of 6:1, such as Italy, Belgium or Romania. The ratio in the United States is around 1:1.¹²⁴

The second reason for the modest outcome is the abovementioned structure of European defence spending. The fragmentation of budgets into national structures creates enormous overlaps and losses due to a lack of economies of scale and experience. A glance across the Atlantic reveals some **striking duplications**. Whereas the United States has a single Main Battle Tank, the Europeans have four. In Europe, the navies have 25 harbours, while the United States has only four. This is comparable to each of the 50 American states organising their own defence. While the absurdity of this model is clear to everybody, including the most radical Eurosceptics, it still remains taboo in Europe to urge stronger communitarisation including defence, notwithstanding the fact that the security of each and every European citizen is strongly linked with the security of the other European states. However, the level of solidarity between allies, as far as expenditure is concerned, remains minimal, and free-riding is well rewarded, also thanks to a system of financing international missions which puts the onus on the participating countries only. The Athena mechanism, which allows for the common financing

122 The EDA data can be found at <http://www.eda.europa.eu/defencefacts/>. The exact numbers for 2006 and 2007 are taken from the document »National Defence Expenditure in 2006 and 2007«. Another source is the *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*: P. Stalenheim et al. (2009), Appendix 5A, »Military Expenditure Data 1999–2008«, in *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*, pp. 212–46, 219.

123 If one takes US expenditure on Homeland Security, as well as on Iraq and Afghanistan into account, the proportion is about one-fifth.

124 For the exact numbers, see Stalenheim et al. 2009b.

of some non-military costs of EU missions, is better than nothing, but in terms of defence budgets, the amounts involved are trivial. Its impact is very limited (about 10 per cent of total costs); moreover, the most challenging and expensive military operations are always tackled outside the EU framework.

On top of this already diffuse picture in Europe, there is an enormous disparity between Member States, with the United Kingdom and France leading in terms of both total budget and effectiveness, while the others (with the notable exception of the Netherlands and Sweden) are struggling to reform 20-year-old Cold War structures. The process of **transformation in Europe is proceeding at a »tortuously slow pace**. EU member states have not met their initial »headline goal« – a list of military capabilities that EU governments agreed to acquire by 2003, and on current trends they probably will not meet the revised 2010 goal either« (Valasek and Keohane 2008).

The European Union as such does not have much of a say as far as defence budgets are concerned. However, in the past ten years there have been some intergovernmental initiatives to tackle the evident loss of effectiveness and efficiency of the national model. European advances are taking place despite the strenuous interference of national defence structures which are preserving their sovereignty in a way that is incomparably stronger than their central bank colleagues during the euro convergence process. »Defence reform is like riding an exercise bike – resistance and inertia are built into the machine« (Witney 2008b).

However, entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty provides some hope, as the institutions in Brussels dealing with the defence process will be reinforced, thus allowing some room for the European Commission and European Parliament budgetary authorities to launch some funding of military-related acquisitions. There are two possible openings for furthering the defence procurement process in Europe:

- The end of the pillar structure of the European Union could allow the 8th Framework Programme for R&D to finance defence research. The current objection from some member states that current rules on Intellectual and Property rights regulation do not allow such a move from the Commission should be rejected. The European Commission can help shaping a true European demand side on security and defence, restricted to capabilities linked to the Petersberg missions. A new regulation on IPRs can easily be developed, thus allowing the EC to co-finance with industry and member states willing to do so defence research. The Lisbon Treaty states clearly that EU member states should

improve their military capabilities and that the European Defence Agency should act as a key actor for facilitating this process. The EDA activity in the R&D area should logically be more connected with the Framework Programme, and some form of co-financing should be found.

- a possibility for the European Parliament to finance capabilities shortfalls for ESDP missions seems real, although there will be strong political pressure against it;

The current state of national separation of defence budgets and resources, only slightly improved by the abovementioned intergovernmental initiatives, is clearly unsustainable and an inadmissible waste of taxpayers' money which endangers the role and effectiveness of Europe in the world. Moreover, the way in which defence budgets are spent reflects directly upon the structure and competitiveness of the defence industry in Europe. To illustrate this point, in Europe there are three competing combat aircraft (Eurofighter, Rafale and Gripen) which are committing »fratricide in export markets« (Witney 2008a: 36). Even more striking is the European fragmentation in the field of armoured vehicles, which are particularly important for missions in dangerous theatres: several European companies are trying to develop the same new technology, wasting resources and inflating prices, which makes them vulnerable and easy to take over. On the ground, this fragmentation entails a need for different spare parts, different ammunition and different communication systems, making cooperation between Europeans ever more difficult (Witney 2008a: 37).

Hence, **a strong and competitive European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base** will be necessary if the ESDP is to reach its full potential and become a CSDP. The Council, with its declaration on European capabilities in December 2008, has made this link clear. The situation in the field of aerospace, helicopters, missiles and electronics illustrates the potential for industry consolidation. Here, Europe, with companies such as BAE systems, EADS, Finmeccanica and Thales, are still world market leaders, producing competitive and interoperable systems.

As far as defence industry policy is concerned, the new European Commission Directives on intra-EU transfers of defence goods and on Defence and Security Procurement, finally adopted in August 2009, are a step in the right direction. The Directives must be adopted within two years by Member States. They will establish more and more sustainable competition in the field of defence, by easing restrictions on this market allowed by Art. 296. However, the European defence market must also be coupled with the need

to ensure security of supply of assets and strategic technology. The EDA and the European Commission must establish a good balance between a true European Defence Market and the need for a European industrial defence policy.

6.2 Need for reform and recommendations

Whether in economic, political or strategic terms, the incrementally implemented intergovernmental solutions proposed today are merely transitional provisions in an attempt to overcome the abyss between input and output in the defence sector in Europe. The situation is quickly deteriorating as the planning cycles of defence spending are long and thus the course for the future is, in large measure, already set.

Realistically, a step-by-step approach to further integration and more synergies among the willing and able is the path to follow. One way forward may thus be found in the variable geometry architecture or **»multi-speed« process**, with participation by a restricted number of Member States, with the others able to join later. More importantly, they would not be able to stop the others from advancing. The Lisbon Treaty allows this, thanks to the mechanism of **Permanent Structured Cooperation** and the establishment of **EDA** as a Treaty-based agency (today it is only an initiative approved in a Common Action). As pointed to in Chapter 3, the Agency would then be well positioned to judge compliance with the commitments of the Member States, in accordance with Art. 3 of the Protocol – therefore acting more like a watchdog, a form of authority which is needed in European Defence.

European countries will definitely have to find best value for money in defence. The European defence ministers acknowledged this fact in 2007, declaring that a point had been reached at which the member states must fundamentally change the way in which the business aspect of defence is managed in Europe. They also stated that the change would result in a **European Defence Technological and Industrial Basis (EDTIB)**, representing more than the sum of its national parts, because a fully adequate EDTIB would no longer be sustainable on a national basis.¹²⁵ Thus, the ministers admitted that internal divisions in Europe are the principal factor limiting the effectiveness of Security and Defence Policy. Governments, therefore, need to proceed more boldly towards a pan-European defence equipment market, allowing

them to procure collectively. **The lessons from the European Single Market must be partially applied to the defence market** (with due exceptions according to the sensitiveness of the area), in which the national security »exemption« has led to national protectionism and a fractured and uncompetitive industry.

The Member States have thus agreed to open up the defence market in Europe step-by-step, starting with the »electronic marketplace« at the EDA, which works on a fully voluntary basis. This is only a first step. The EU Commission directives on Defence and Security Procurement and on inter-community arms transfer will probably be effective by 2011–2012, when Member States will have transposed their provisions into national law. At that time, the slowing pace of defence budgets, as well as the internationalisation of defence will probably provoke new needs for the creation of a **European defence market**. For those reasons, this market **should be created by 2015**. This goal is certainly ambitious, but it looks essential in order to strengthen EDTIB, as well as realistic, if it is supported by a strong political will.

Industry consolidation in defence sectors needs to be pushed more strongly by European governments. The case of the US »Last Supper« for defence, cited by Nick Witney, offers a good example of how government intervention can promote consolidation of the defence sector (Witney 2008a: 38). Hence, European governments, together with EDA, should follow the same road and call for a **»European Last Supper«**, delivering the same message to European defence industry leaders as the Americans did in 1993: **consolidate or liquidate** (Witney 2008a: 38). An agreement of this kind would be more than politically important.

The European level could support such a consolidation by means of a number of smaller-scale actions. The European Union Military Staff, EDA and the Member States should **define a long-term plan for European defence needs**, stemming from the European Security and Defence White Paper proposed here, thus updating and developing, as necessary, EDA's document, »An initial long-term vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs«. A **Pan-European Security of Supply agreement** should be signed in order to facilitate the mutual dependencies created by further consolidation.

A functioning EDTIB also requires significant **changes at the level of national legislation**. The companies producing and investing in Europe are currently subject to different regulations of the different Member States, which only serve to complicate cross-border cooperation. The necessary industry

¹²⁵ Available at: <http://www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=198>

consolidation therefore also needs a European legislative rapprochement:¹²⁶

First of all, it is necessary to **harmonise the legal framework in which European companies evolve**. For instance, the harmonisation of the legislation on the control of foreign investments is crucial. A list of defence-related and dual-use technologies which are crucial for the development of a strong, independent and efficient DTIB should be drafted. This list should be frequently revised and technology-oriented. What is important is to maintain European technologies on EU soil, not necessarily to directly control the national origin of the investment. EU Member States should remain open to foreign investment, but may introduce some caveats concerning the ownership of crucial technologies. The European Commission should drive the process of drafting a crucial technology list, as well as elaborating legislative proposals.

Secondly, it seems necessary to draft a **European Code of Conduct on public/private shareholding in defence companies**. Different models still exist in Europe with regard to the ownership of defence equipment manufacturers. The result is diverging company cultural models and national legislations, which could slow down transnational cooperation and mergers at the European level.

This Code of Conduct should stipulate that:

- Public investments in defence companies should not exceed 50 % of their capital. Only vital problems due to the economic crisis would allow an exemption.
- There should be no public interference in the private business strategy of privately owned companies.
- Member States should be able, by contrast, to take pre-emptive action in case of a hostile takeover of a defence company, if there is a risk of losing control of key technology.

Third, a common European position should be laid down on the issue of **arms exports and related subsidies**. Today, cultural, legislative and ethical differences between Member States distort the normal process of competition in this sector. The **European Defence Agency should take further initiatives to harmonise arms export aid**. This has already been done in relation to the offset, with the Code of Conduct adopted on 24 October 2008: now, the offset cannot represent more than 100 per cent of the contract value. The EDA needs to (i) harmonise European legislation on arms export subsidies and (ii)

avoid competitive distortion with regard to the United States on arms order subsidies. Furthermore, the European Council must work out **common political directives on arms exports**, defining export countries/regions for commonly produced defence equipment, in order to have, beyond the arms export Code of Conduct, a common arms export policy defined within the CFSP framework.

With regard to **research and technology**, a common European effort is required. In order to bring into being a more competitive defence industry and to spend national defence budgets more efficiently, European action should be taken in this area. According to the EDA, EU Member States spend €2.6 billion on R&D. The United States, by contrast, spends €13.6 billion (that is, five times more, although the defence budget is only three times more). Investing in R&D today means having at our disposal state-of-the-art technologies tomorrow. A defence R&D spending increase looks extremely advisable. The current transformations of armed forces at national level should free up some resources. A €1 billion increase (just 0.5 per cent of total EU defence spending) would have a major impact on R&D results and strengthen EDTIB.

Again, the way towards a European R&D effort would be through the Member States. However, 26 countries (or more, in the future) cooperating on R&D projects seems a daunting prospect. However, a number of bilateral forums have been created, such as the Franco-British High Level Working Group. Such initiatives can help to significantly improve cooperative R&D spending, but they will remain linked to multilateral initiatives in order to avoid duplication. The European Union Framework Programme on Research and Development and the EDA R&D joint investment programme promise good results. Member States which have greater experience in R&D should take the lead. The creation of a European R&D fund, outside CFSP structures, agreed at the 12 December 2008 European Council, open to willing member states, is a good innovation in this area.

- In order to make multilateral cooperation easier, a **common European strategic technological capabilities list** should be drafted. UK and France experience on this issue needs to be shared.
- **Common Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) standards** seem fundamental to improve multilateral cooperation. The EUROPA protocol drafted by WEAG is a good starting point, but national legislation still varies considerably. Moreover, IPR rules governing the Commission Framework Programme and the EDA R&T projects should be harmonised.
- A **common future forecast** with a horizon of 2030 is essential. EU Member States should agree

¹²⁶ The following sections are based on our previous paper, Lasheras et al (2009).

on a list of crucial technologies to manage by this date, and put in place joint efforts to achieve such a result.

Again, several of these proposals might be implemented within the framework of the EU; others in ad hoc cooperation; and the most challenging ones in pioneer groups, based on Permanent Structured Cooperation, as seen in previous Chapters.

The process of **transformation of European armies** offers promising opportunities to achieve more synergies and interoperability in the medium term. In order to galvanise the different processes of military transformation of EU Member States into a common European transformation process, it should be guided by a number of benchmarks:¹²⁷

- European defence budgets should be oriented in terms of more favourable ratios between personnel, equipment, operations and the maintenance of 50/25/25 in the medium term (by 2020). This could be achievable on the way to the optimum ratio 40/30/30.
- Europe needs a **strategy for the pooling of equipment**. The first step would be to commonly procure »non-strategic equipment« with a low technological content and no security of supply issues by 2015, followed by the pooling of higher level and higher cost capabilities by 2020.
- To make procurement in Europe more transparent and to bolster competition between different European companies, the European Commission should present a **proposal for standardisation of the classifications of defence goods**.
- Moreover, the European Commission should act for **standardisation of defence and security equipment**. NATO STANAg standards offer a comparative advantage to US industries. On sectors where European industry is still world leader, an effort for creating norms and standards at the international level starting from the Europeans one would allow defence industry to strengthen their positions. Moreover, European standards would naturally create a European market.
- The **creation of European centres of excellence**, spread all over Europe, is essential for the development of common procurement in the EU. National parliaments finance defence procurement with taxpayers' money, and there is a legitimate need for a substantial industrial return on investment. European centres of excellence would offer a return on investment, while being competitive in relation to the United States. Thus, huge European R&D projects related to local industrial capacity could be a viable option for serving national and European industrial and defence interests.

¹²⁷ This idea was mentioned by Franz H. U. Borkenhagen, the former head of the Policy Planning Staff in the German MoD, at a workshop in Berlin.

Abbreviations

AU	African Union
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
C3	communications, command and control
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CivMilCell	Civilian-Military Cell
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CRT	Civilian Response Team
EAC	East African Community
EAS	External Action Service
Ecoop	Enhanced Cooperation
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDF	European Development Fund
EDTIB	European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base
EP	European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
ETG	EU Training Group
EUCR	EU Civilian Reserve
EUMC	Military Committee of the European Union
EU-OHQ	European Union – Operational Headquarter
FP7	Funding Programme 7
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HHG	Helsinki Headline Goals
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSC	NATO Strategic Concept
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSCoop	Permanent Structured Cooperation
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
R&D	Research and Development
RDC	Democratic Republic of Congo
RoE	Rules of Engagement
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
WEAG	Western European Armaments Group

Literature

Monographies and articles

- Alyson J.K. Bailes (2008), The EU and a »Better World«: What role for the European Security and Defence Policy, in: *International Affairs* 84 (1), pp. 115–130.
- Bendiek, Annegret and Heinz Kramer (2009), *Die EU als globaler Akteur*, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), April.
- Bersick, Sebastian (2009), Die Rolle der EU in der Sicherheitsarchitektur Ostasiens (Arbeitspapier), Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).
- Bersick, Sebastian and Paul Pasch (2008), Southeast Asia: the future of German foreign relations, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Compass 2020 series.
- Biscop, Sven (2009), Odd couple or dynamic duo? The EU and strategy in times of crisis, in: *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 14, 2009, No. 3, pp. 367–384.
- Biscop, Sven (2008), Permanent Structured Cooperation and the future of the ESDP: transformation and integration, in: *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 13, 2008, No. 4, pp. 431–448.
- Biscop, Sven (2006), The International Security Engagement of the European Union – Courage and Capabilities for a »More Active« EU. Report from the 1st European Strategic Forum, Warsaw 2006, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, International Policy Analysis.
- Bjorkdahl, Annika and Maria Strömvik (2008), EU Crisis Management Operations. ESDP Bodies and Decision-Making Procedures, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
- Bzroska, Michael and Isabelle Maras (2007), Säulenübergreifende Zusammenarbeit von Rat und Kommission der Europäischen Union zur Unterstützung von Reformen im Bereich der Sicherheitssektorreform, Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion.
- Buhbe, Matthes (2007), The main features of a German strategy towards Russia, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Compass 2020 series.
- Dempsey, Judy (2008), EU defense spending may clash with military goals, in: *New York Times*, 22 May 2008.
- EDA (2006), An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence and Capability and Capacity Needs.
- Ehrhart, Hans-Georg (2007), Sicherheit + Entwicklung = Frieden? Zur Rolle der Entwicklungspolitik in der zivilen ESVP, Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, March.
- EUISS (2004), European Defence – A proposal for a White Paper, Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, July.
- European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) (2009), EPLO Statement on Civilian-Military Integration in European Security and Defence Policy, Brussels.
- Fischer, Sabine (2008): The EU and Russia: a contested partnership, in: Grevi, Giovanni and Álvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.), *Partnerships for effective multilateralism*, Chaillot Paper no. 109, Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, pp. 115–132.
- Gnesotto, Nicole (2009), The need for a more strategic EU, in: Vasconcelos, Alvaro de (ed.), *What ambitions for European Defence in 2020*, Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, July, pp. 29–38.
- Godement, François (2008), The EU and China: a necessary partnership, in: Grevi, Giovanni and Álvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.), *Partnerships for effective multilateralism*, Chaillot Paper no. 109, Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, pp. 59–76.
- Camille Grand (2009), Sarkozy's three-way NATO bet, in: *Europe's world*, Autumn 2009.
- Grant, Charles (2008), Can Europe and China shape the new world order? London: Centre for European Reform.
- Grevi, Giovanni (2009), The interpolar world: a new scenario, Occasional Paper No 79, June.
- Haass, Richard N. (2008), The Age of Nonpolarity. What will follow U.S. dominance?, in: *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008.
- Hamilton, Daniel et al (2009), Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century, January 2009
- Howorth, Jolyon (2009), What Europe badly needs is a »Grand Strategy«, in: *Europe's World*, Autumn 2009.
- Human Security Study Group (HSSG) (2007), A European Way of Security, The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group.
- Human Security Study Group (2008), Ein europäisches Sicherheitskonzept, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, International Policy Analysis, February.
- IISS (2008), European Military Capabilities, Strategic Dossier, International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- IPPR (2009), Shared Responsibilities. A National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom.
- Kaldor, Mary, Mary Martin and Sabine Selchow (2008), *Human Security: A European Strategic Narrative*, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, International Policy Analysis.
- Katsioulis, Christos (2009), European Foreign Policy on Trial: A Global Actor in the Making?, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, International Policy Analysis, March.
- Keohane, Daniel and Tomas Valasek (2008), Willing and able? EU defence in 2020, London: Centre for European Reform.
- Korski, Daniel (2008), Time for a European Civilian Reserve, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, October.
- Korski, Daniel, Ulrike Guérot and Mark Leonard (2008), Rewiring the US–EU relationship, European Council of Foreign Relations, December.
- Lasheras, Borja, Enrique Ayala, Christos Katsioulis, Fabio Liberti, Jean-Pierre Maulny and Sven Biscop (2009), A Future Agenda for the European Security and Defence Policy (Fundación Alternativas, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, IRIS, and others) February.
- Lynch, Dov, ESDP and the OSCE, in *European Security and Defence Policy, The First Ten Years (1999–2009)*, European Institute for Security Studies, October 2009.
- Menon, Anand (2009), Empowering Paradise: the ESDP at Ten, in: *International Affairs* 85 (2), pp. 227–246.
- Mützenich, Rolf (2008), 60 Jahre NATO. Zwischen Irrelevanz und Überforderung, in: *WeltTrends – Zeitschrift für internationale Politik*, 68, 17, pp. 75–85.

- Pabst, Martin (2008), *Building Peace and Security – An Assessment of EU Efforts of Capacity-building and ESDP Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa*, in: *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* (Overhaus, Marco, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch; eds.): *Perspectives and Strategies of the European Union's Africa Policy after the Lisbon Summit*, Vol. 8, Issue 24, pp. 29–41.
- Rahr, Alexander (2009), *Kein Europa ohne Russland*, *Internationale Politik* 64 (1), pp. 45–50.
- Reddies, Bernd (2007), *China: its struggle for stabilization and equal status*, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, *Compass 2020* series.
- Ries, Thomas (2009), *The globalising security environment and the EU*, in: Vasconcelos, Alvaro de (ed.), *What ambitions for European Defence in 2020*, Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, July, pp. 61–74.
- Rummel, Reinhardt (2006), *Die zivile Komponente der ESVP. Reichhaltiges Gestaltungspotential für europäische Krisenintervention*, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), July.
- Schmidt, Siegmund (2008a), *Die EU als Retterin der AU?*, *GIGA-Focus* 5/2008.
- Schmidt, Siegmund (2008b), *Towards a new EU-African Relationship – A Grand Strategy for Africa?*, in: *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* (Overhaus, Marco, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch; eds): *Perspectives and Strategies of the European Union's Africa Policy after the Lisbon Summit*, Vol. 8, Issue 24, pp. 7–14.
- Stalheim, Peter et al. (2009a), Appendix 5A, »Military Expenditure Data 1999–2008«, in *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*, pp. 212–46.
- Stalheim, Peter et al. (2009b), Appendix 5B, »NATO military expenditure by category«, in *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*, pp. 247–52.
- Timmermann, Heinz (2008), *EU-Russland: Hintergründe und Perspektiven einer schwierigen Beziehung*, *Integration* 21 (2), pp. 159–178.
- Trenin, Dimitri (2008), *Russia and the European Union: redefining strategic partnership*, in: Grevi, Giovanni and Álvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.), *Partnerships for effective multilateralism*, Chaillot Paper no. 109, Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, pp. 133–144.
- Tull, Denis (2008), *China in Africa: European Perceptions and Responses to the Chinese Challenge*, *SAIS Working Papers in African Studies*, 02/2008.
- Tull, Denis and Stefan Mair (2009), *Deutsche Afrikapolitik*, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), March.
- Umbach, Frank (2008), *Asian-European relations: more security through inter- and transnational relations?*, in: Rüdland, Jürgen, et al. (eds.), *Asian-European relations: building blocks for global governance?*, London: Routledge, pp. 114–142.
- Valasek, Tomas (2007), *The roadmap to better EU-NATO relations*, London: Centre for European Reform, Briefing Note, 20 December 2007.
- Vasconcelos, Álvaro de (ed.) (2009), *The European Security Strategy 2003–2008: Building on Common Interests*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, February.
- Vasconcelos, Álvaro de (ed.) (2009), *What ambitions for European Defence in 2020?*, Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, July.
- Vines, Alex and Roger Middleton (2008), *Options for the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture*, Brussels: European Parliament.
- Nick Witney (2008a), *Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy*, European Council of Foreign Relations 06, July.
- Nick Witney (2008b), *European Defence – now with added élan?*, European Council of Foreign Relations. Available at: http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_nick_witney_ecfr_european_defence_summit/.

Official documents

- ESS 2003, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, European Council, December 2003.
- European Council (2000), *Presidency Conclusions*, Santa Maria de Feira, 19–20 June.
- European Council (2003), *Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation on Crisis Management*, 19/09/2003.
- European Council (2003), *Draft Council Conclusions on EU-OSCE co-operation in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation*, 10/11/2003.
- European Council (2003), *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*, Brussels, 12 December.
- European Council (2004), *Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP*, Brussels, 17–18 June.
- European Council (2004), *Presidency Conclusions*, Brussels, 16–17 December.
- European Council (2007), *Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia*, 14/12/2007.
- European Council (2008), *Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities*, Brussels, 11 December.
- European Council (2008), *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World*, Brussels, 11 December.
- European Council, (2008), *Presidency Conclusions*, Brussels, 11–12 December.
- EU Council (2004), *Assessment Report on the EU's role vis-à-vis the OSCE* (10 November).
- EU Council (2004), *Ministerial Declaration, Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference*, Brussels, 22 November.
- EU Council (2004), *Civilian Headline Goal 2008*, Brussels, 7 December.
- EU Council (2005), *General Secretariat Document, Multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management. Resources in an Integrated Format – Civilian Response Teams*, 23 June.
- EU Council (2007), *Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008*, Brussels, 19 November.

Imprint

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
International Policy Analysis
Division for International Dialogue
D-10785 Berlin

www.fes.de/ipa
E-Mail: info.ipa@fes.de

ISBN 978-3-86872-243-7

Orders

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
International Policy Analysis
Nora Neye
D-10785 Berlin

E-Mail: info.ipa@fes.de
Fax: +49 (30) 2 69 35-92 48

All texts are available online:

www.fes.de/ipa

The views expressed in this publication
are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for
which the author works.