Diversity and Tolerance in Ukraine in the Context of EURO 2012

Tolerance and diversity issues are integral constituents for democratic development and European integration and so crucial for the preparation and success of a European level event, the EURO 2012 in Ukraine.

Intolerance in Ukraine is manifested in inter-religious, inter-ethnic dialogue, in politics of communication, as well as in radical ideologies, youth sub culture including football fan movement.

Growth of inter-ethnic, inter-religious and overall intolerance is the result of socio-economic crisis, growing unemployment, lack of economic and social reforms, absence of equal opportunities, lack of transparency and weak integration of ethnic minorities. This has the potential to affect the human rights and social dimensions of preparation for EURO 2012.

The challenge is to promote tolerance in the existing difficult economic conditions and at the same time to adhere to Human Rights.

Enforcement policies through banning of hate ideologies alone will not be enough. A coherent strategy through dialogue with all stakeholders should aim at harmony and should be based on Ukraine’s adherence to major international obligations.
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Executive Summary

Ukraine’s 20-year old independent democratic state faces the test of further development challenges on its way to opening doors to the world for the European Football Championships of 2012. Prior to this event, the country is fraught with socio-economic, infrastructural and human rights problems. In addition, like never before, the issues of tolerance and diversity are gaining importance in the light of these preparations. The present analysis throws light on the current debate on growing intolerance and discusses ways of promoting diversity and tolerance.

Since Ukraine became independent, the debate with regard to the definition of who is a Ukrainian has been marred with political realities of the past history of Ukraine, its relations with Russia and the western neighbors. An inward focus revealing the identity of a Ukrainian was not based on the ethnic model, but more on the citizenship model. Presently there are attempts by certain circles to revert the concept of being Ukrainian to an ethnocentric model, which has raised concern among human rights activists, representatives of the civil society and international community.

Despite the fact that the ultra-nationalists and far right extremist organizations in Ukraine have drawn significant attention to themselves, after some of their sympathizers and supporters have won seats in the local councils and governments, political extremism, especially far right extremism is yet to be a problem of national dimension in Ukraine. Ultra left extremists have limited presence on the political mainstream, and they have marginal youth protagonists within their fold. However, the hidden threat is when these radical movements get intertwined with the internal and external problems of Ukraine and infiltrate into organizations of football fans. In the absence of further political, economic and social reforms, in the absence of discussions about tolerance, far-right extremism will be fuelled. Hence there is the need for Diversity and Tolerance.

Intolerance is manifested by religious, ethnic and political dissensions in Ukraine and is fairly monitored. State policies and actions to prevent intolerance are also there, but some of them have been made redundant under administrative reform. Now the need is to strengthen the functions within the systems that were in place (not necessarily re-establishing the units) and have a holistic and transparent approach to tackling a range of issues – human rights, social inclusion and youth programs, fighting corruption, more inclusive corporate social responsibility strategy for EURO 2012, improving immigration policy, highly professional law enforcement, preventing hate speech as well as development of fan-friendly football.

As diverse as languages are, more than one term and words describe the concepts Diversity and Tolerance in Ukrainian, but their content is universal. Therefore, tolerance-friendly strategies prior to the historic event of EURO 2012 will have to follow and apply already successful experiences of other European states and in South Africa. Thus, partnership with the international community is also a pre-condition for enhancing tolerance and diversity in Ukraine.
Introduction

Fifty years after the end of the World War II, the breakdown of the communist bloc in 1989 and the USSR in 1991 led to unprecedented population movements in Europe. This new systemic transition from a centrally planned, totalitarian system to a democracy and market economy brought newer realities such as globalization, diversity and tolerance. However, in just two decades, if Western Europe successfully restored European unity in diversity, widened the EU in 2004, the non-EU states of Eastern Europe, such as Russia, Ukraine, rest of the CIS, are still facing the challenges of managing diversity and promoting tolerance. Tolerance is a key requirement for the universal model of any secular democracy, aiming for integration with Europe, such as Ukraine.

Tolerance and diversity in Ukraine are related to how the internationally accepted connotation is adapted to the local socio-political context. The more widely used noun diversity, is referred to as rozmaïtya and riznomanîtya (synonyms) in Ukrainian, and implies ethnic and cultural diversity. It is applied less in the context of gender, age and disability criteria. The term tolerance is used less and is related to liberal political and economic ideology. Derived from the Latin tolerantia, to withstand, endure, dictionaries define the Ukrainian word Terpymist (less used) or Tolerantnist, as the act or capacity of enduring or endurance, or a fair, objective, and permissive attitude towards those whose opinions, practices, race, religion, nationality, etc., differ from one’s own, as well as an interest in and concern for ideas, opinions, practices, etc., foreign to one’s own. It also means a liberal, non-dogmatic viewpoint.

Evolving from the domain of inter-religious relations, tolerance, in modern parlance, is also used to denote interethnic tolerance. However, there are debates among experts with regard to the limits of tolerance. Some note that, most minority religious groups as beneficiaries of tolerance are themselves intolerant, at least in some respects. In a tolerant regime, such people may learn to tolerate, or at least to behave »as if they possessed this virtue«. However, all conclude that, the society has a reasonable right of self-preservation that supersedes the principle of tolerance, especially when the institutions of liberty are in danger. The overriding unanimity is seen in not tolerating unjustified religious beliefs about morality, spirituality, politics, and the origin of humanity, especially beliefs which promote violence.

UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of Tolerance adopted in 1985, reiterates tolerance as »respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human«. It also states that »tolerance is not concession, condescension or indulgence«, and that it is the »responsibility that upholds human rights, pluralism (including cultural pluralism), democracy and the rule of law«. It adds that »the practice of tolerance does not mean toleration of social injustice or the abandonment or weakening of one’s convictions«. This above mentioned connotation of the term tolerance is used, in a limited way in the Ukrainian political and policy discourse. Use of the words diversity and fair play are wider. It is in this context that the terms tolerance and diversity are used in this paper as well.

Description of Development Trends and Situation with Tolerance and Extremism

Ukraine, with its unique geographic location, fairly educated labour force, natural resources, and industrial base, ranks 69th out of 169 countries, according to the UNDP Human Development Index for 2010. The private sector is the principal engine of Ukraine’s positive economic performance and has helped in consolidating Ukraine’s market economy, by attracting an average of USD 10.0 billion in foreign investments per year, although a bulk of it constitutes import of exported capital via offshore zones. In fact, for many years, Ukraine has focused on attracting foreign investment as an integral part of its foreign policy strategy. Ukraine is a member of the World Trade Organization since 2008. It also negotiates an expanded free trade agreement with the European Union and looks towards closer economic integration with neighbours. Ukraine signed the Millennium Declaration in 2000, and adapted the Millennium Development Goals to its national development priorities.

4. Harris, Sam, The End of Faith & Ibid.
in 2003. Ukraine is a party to all the United Nations basic conventions and most other multilateral European documents in the field of human rights. International law is an integral part of the legislation of Ukraine. Its international obligations and adherence to international law has been regarded as an absolute priority of successive governments.

Given this background, issues of tolerance and diversity are very important for Ukraine, in order to 1) achieve necessary growth and development levels, 2) adhere to its international human rights obligations and also 3) to sustain higher economic growth rate by attracting human capital (of various ethnic background) under conditions of decrease in labour force and negative population growth. Ukraine suffered from a steady population decline from 52 million in 1989 to estimated 45.8 million as of 1.5.2010, as a result of low birth rates, falling life expectancies and high mortality rates, emigration and aging population. Population during January – April 2010 alone declined by 74.6 thousand people, which is 4.9 persons per 1,000 people. Migration rate during the period January – April 2010 remained almost the same as that of last year, – 0.4 persons per 1,000 persons.

The state statistical sources maintained that an upward trend in immigration is noticed even in 2010. Thus, according to the State Statistics Committee data, during the period January-May 2010, 5,304 persons emigrated from Ukraine, while 12,472 immigrated to Ukraine, leading to a rise in number of immigrants by 7,168 persons. Analytical policy notes of government-based think tanks, like the National Institute for Strategic Studies point out that for compensation of this demographic decline and stabilizing the number of people of working age, immigration needs of Ukraine reach 340 thousand people annually, citing labor need statistics of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy.

Despite some progress in economic and social reforms in the past two decades, according to the 2009 review of the World Economic Forum, Ukraine, a middle-income country, lags behind other transition economies in specific areas covering macro, meso and micro levels, for example: macroeconomic stability, market efficiency, small and medium business, development of middle class, trade union movement, non-governmental sector, migration policy, among others. One of the deeper impacts on the society as an aftermath of this lop sided
development has been overall intolerance and insensitivity to diversity, expressed through political, inter ethnic and inter faith debate.

In public discourse and media, intolerance in Ukraine is first and foremost associated with the inter-faith difference among the Moscow and Kyiv patriarchies of the Slavic Orthodox church itself (see paragraph below). Scholars maintain, that »The issues that divide the churches stem both from theological and ecclesiological differences and from conflicting historical interpretations of national identity. Thus have religion and nationalism become inextricably intertwined in the current confrontations«. 11 Apart from that, intolerance also involves cases of vandalism targeting religious symbols, cases of vandalism and anti-Semitic graffiti on Jewish (17 cases) and Muslim (6 cases) places of worship, cemeteries or other facilities. 12

Excursus: The rebirth of religion during 1988-1996: cohesion or division?

Despite decades of official atheism, the practice of religion was never wholly eradicated. Significant numbers of people continued to perform religious rites in churches and in their homes. In the context of transition, when relations between the individual and the society are in transformation, religion can play a significant role in rebuilding decaying social capital and augmenting social cohesion. However, stronger religious affiliations can lead to more, not less, divisiveness. Since 1988, following the celebration of the millennium of Christianity on the Ukrainian soil, the right to freedom of conscience and religion has been exercised more freely, followed by institutional boom during 1988-1990. In 1996, there were 70 different faiths and cults and 18000 religious organizations publishing more than 60 religious periodicals. Of all sets of beliefs, Orthodox Christianity prevails, 70 per cent of the communities belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchy (UOC-MP), 20 per cent to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchy (UOC-KP) and seven per cent to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). Others include Ukrainian Greek Catholics, Protestants, and relatively smaller groups as the Roman Catholics, Reformists (Transcarpathian Hungarians), Jews and Muslims. Unanimity within Orthodoxy is under question. The principal bone of contention is the issue of full canonical independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The debate continues within the UOC-KP, UOC-MP and UAOC about the wisdom and necessity of autocephalous status. This raises the historical polemics of the »Ukrainian case« between Constantinople and Moscow orthodoxies. The current state of the debate seems to have exhausted all possibilities of compromise, with the ever-present danger of more open conflict. This is important for the integrity of Ukraine, as schisms in the Ukrainian orthodoxy could lead to regionalization and separatist tendencies within the country. 13

Another form of manifestation of intolerance is the relation and communication between the radical left and the radical right (extremes) of the political spectrum. For example, on 22.3.2011, the Communists accused Kharkiv Mayor of supporting the Neo-Nazis because the memorial plaque of Josif Slipy (cardinal of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, championing the cause of Ukrainian independence, who was in exile in Vatican and died in 1984), initially installed in 2005, removed in 2010, was again reinstated in 2011. The same accusation was used during the debate around installation of Stalin’s statue in Zaporizhia in May 2010 14, and later in 2011 when it was beheaded on 28.12.2010 15 and then destroyed by explosion on 31.12.2010 by the organization Tryzub. 16 A fierce debate also was seen when, in Odessa, in October 2007, a monument to Catherine II, one of the city’s founders, was installed, and was later desecrated by unidentified groups on 2.2.2010 by pouring paint on it and writing »Killers of Ukraine«. 17 Ukrainian nationalists wanted to have their leader Stepan Bandera’s statue in that place. 18

18. Ibid.
the ethnic Ukrainians emerge, which, on first glance, seems to constitute the core of the inter-ethnic debate and related to it issues of intolerance. Scholars have noted that amidst this heated debate, there is no actual ethnic «conflict» between the Russian and Ukrainian speaking people in Ukraine. But, a number of sociological researches show a growing trend within the Ukrainian society to harbor biased attitude towards ethnic (non-Slav) and visible minorities as well as foreigners, which indicate the level of tolerance in the fullest sense of the term.

A sociological research «Estimating the level of Tolerance in Ukraine» shows that only 12 per cent of the respondents view the current situation as tolerant, while more than 67 per cent think it is tense and conflicting. Respondents were highly tolerant towards Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, i.e. people with whom they shared common history. The same was true for East Europeans, with regard to Moldovans and Crimean Tatars, they were cautious but tolerant. People from Asia and Africa were not even considered by respondents as inhabitants of Ukraine. Thirty per cent think that people from the Caucasus region should not be allowed to come to Ukraine, 39 per cent are against Roma and 29 per cent against Afghans. More than half were negative about migrants of various ethnic groups, making the integral index of xenophobia rise to 4.46 on a seven point scale. Monitoring of the index of distance of local population from various ethnic groups (Bogardus scale from 1-7) by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences from 1994 to 2006 show a steady increase in intolerance from 4.4 to 5.3.

In addition, Ukrainian component of the European Social Survey, conducted on the samples of around 1,700-2,000 persons in 2005 and 2007 also show an increase in public skepticism (along a 0-10 scale, where 0 is bad and 10 is good) regarding the impact of foreigners on national economy (decrease from 4.81 in 2005 to 4.42 in 2007), cultural life (4.90 in 2005 and 4.55 in 2007) and living standards (4.85 in 2005 and 4.23 in 2007). It should be noted that in Ukraine and another European state, Hungary, declines were significant for all three aspects. Data of hate crime and offences against foreigners prove the above research results. During 2002-2007, there was a two fold rise, but government steps helped it ebb.

![Figure 2: Hate Crime and Intolerance against Foreigners 2002-2009](image)


20. Ibid.
down to 1,054 in 2008 but again it rose to 1,249 in 2009. 22

Majority (61.8 per cent) of the victims were CIS nationals and 38.2 per cent from other countries. For the past three years, cases of theft and murder have increased while, that of hooliganism and physical attacks have remained the same (see table below).

Since 2006 onwards, reports and monitoring by the international community were also pointing towards an increase in intolerance, xenophobia and extremism in Ukraine, such as the report »Ukraine: Human rights in 2006« of the UN Committee on liquidation of all forms of racial discrimination in 2006, Human Rights Report of the Office of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor of the US State Department for the year 2007, OSCE/ODIHR Hate Crime Report for 2008 and 2009, Council of Europe (ECRI report for 2008), as well as international and national non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights First, Ukraine offices of the IOM and UNHCR and others.

However, official statistics alone does not fathom the depth of the problem. Many cases go unreported, due to unwillingness of the victims to report to the police, and many cases of racial intolerance are classified as hooliganism. It is curious to note that, the above table does not show any allegation as per article 161 of the Criminal Code, which relates to racially motivated crime. A survey of migrants in three cities with high concentration of foreigners (Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odessa)23, showed that 59 per cent believed that their human rights and freedoms were observed to a lesser extent than in the case of Ukrainian citizens. Even higher percentage (62 per cent) stated that foreigners were less protected with regard to their personal security, from 79 to 84 per cent of the respondents admitted that they or their family members or friends had been victims of violent assault and did not report. 24 The same research showed that 40 per cent of the surveyed foreign students reported that they or their friends had been victims of attack, which were never reported to the police – as three-quarters thought that »it was no use« to make official complaints. Those who reported claimed that police reports were written only in Ukrainian and were not translated into their language. Moreover, as many as 85 per cent of the respondents reported harassment by the police during document checks and in two-thirds of the cases they needed to bribe the police to retrieve their documents or end the case. 25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Crime</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premeditated murder (Article. 115 of the Criminal Code)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy physical injury (Art. 121 of the Criminal Code)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium physical injury (Art. 122 of the Criminal Code)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hooliganism (Art. 296 of the Criminal Code)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary (Art. 186 of the Criminal Code)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery (Art. 187 of the Criminal Code)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theft</strong> (Art. 185 of the Criminal Code)</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape (and attempt to rape) (Art. 152 of the Criminal Code)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swindling (Art. 190 of the Criminal Code)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal acquiring of automobile (art. 289 of the Criminal Code)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
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24. Ibid., p. 71.

IOM and UNHCR expert’s estimates show that during the past two years, foreigners from non-CIS countries faced 126 attacks solely on racial grounds, 14 of which were murders. Community leaders of Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Nigeria, Tunisia, Vietnam, India, Afghanistan and Syria unanimously confirm a 5-6 fold rise in intolerance and attacks on part of far-right extremist groups, encompassing all categories of visible minorities – foreign students, refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants, businessmen, diplomats and their family members. This fact, as well as inadequate response to reported violations by law enforcement officials as well as regular police harassment is mentioned in the ECRI country report on Ukraine.

Reasons Behind the Growth of Extremism and Intolerance

Social and economic factors behind the growth of extremism and intolerance may be grouped into two: certain objectively verifiable conditions and certain perceived threats based on limited data and exaggerated into myths. They are enumerated as follows:

- Growing unemployment and the economic crisis: Ukraine’s economy suffered as a result of the economic crisis, GDP declined by 15 per cent in 2009, annual inflation accounted for 13.42 per cent. Experts estimates show that, the labor market in Ukraine is not balanced and developed, official levels of unemployment rose to 3.4 per cent of economically active people of working age in 2009, as of November 2010 officially recorded unemployment level was 2.7 per cent. During the first half of 2010, partial unemployment among people of 15-70 years of age by ILO methodology accounts for 8.5 per cent (in 2009, it was 8.8 per cent). In addition, with more than 39 per cent of the GDP produced by the shadow economy in 2009, informal and part-time employment sector consists of 21.8 per cent. As of June 2010, the State Centre for Employment recorded 411.2 thousand people in its list as unemployed, showing disguised unemployment to constitute 12 per cent of the workforce according to the Council for Study of Productive Forces. Highest level of unemployment is seen among youth between 15-24 years of age, accounting for 13.3 per cent.

- Disparity in wealth and resources distribution: Economic growth has not been translated into growth of employment or income. Until today almost 20 per cent of the population lives below the approved poverty line.

- Failure to reform the labor, taxation and small business sector: Not enough is being done over the years to streamline the process of organizing small businesses, or employing labor into medium enterprises. Tax levels have been high. This situation did not facilitate the growth of socially responsible entrepreneurship, the middle class and trade unions.

- Corruption and non-transparent immigration procedures: In addition, corruption has been endemic to the system and above all, in the absence of a sound immigration policy, led to misbalanced labour market, wherein surplus labour is not employed in the formal sector but is hidden in the shadow economy.

27. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. http://openukraine.org/ua/programs/migration/research-program/. Study by Ella Libanova, Director, Institute of Demography of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.
Largely due to the above conditions, several changes and transformation took place in the society, which have been perceived and portrayed as threats, without serious attempts of deeper analysis. They have been the main cause of ethnic intolerance. Among them the most important is how the declining Slavic population is being told the myth of their extinction and the onslaught of the non-Slavs into Ukraine, such as:

- Perceived changes in the ethnic communities and minority groups:
  Estimates by the National Institute for Strategic Studies state, that the number of communities traditionally inhabiting Ukraine, such as Bulgarians, Moldovans, Belarusians, Jews, Tatars, Roma, ethnic Germans, are decreasing, while number of ethnic groups not typical for Ukraine are on the rise. Citing data from the Population Census of 1989 and 2001 they show that there is a 20 per cent increase in the number of Azerbaijanis (45 thousand), two fold increase in the number of Koreans (20 thousand) and Arabs (from 1,240 to 6,575). Some increase is also seen in the number of people from South and South East Asia.

- Repatriation of the formerly deported peoples, especially the Crimean Tatars:
  Crimean Tatars constitute 12,1 per cent of the population of Crimea, compared to that in 1989, their number increased by 6.4 times. Cultural and religious differences make their integration into the Ukrainian society difficult and impacted the level of tolerance in Crimea. Crimean Tatars are not well represented in the bodies of power, their problems of resettlement; especially the land issue has not been solved.

Xenophobia of the local population vis-à-vis the Tatars in Crimea is taken up by radical groups of Pro-Russian Crimean Cossack Union, Bakhchisaray unit of Zaporizhia Soldiers. Both the Crimean Prosecutors office and experts of the Kyiv-based Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy think the activities of these groups to foment hatred and intolerance in Crimea.

- Weak integration of the Roma people into the Ukrainian society, numbering 47.6 thousand as per the 2001 Census, is a reason for intolerance towards them. However, in a release on 8.4.2011 on the 40th International Roma Day, the Roma Council of Ukraine and the Charity Foundation for Roma Women Chirici as well as analysis by Roma experts stated that their number is estimated to be around 400 thousand; many are encouraged to respond «Ukrainian» in their nationality column during the Census. Many of the Roma do not have passports and face a high level of intolerance in accessing their basic needs, health, education, housing and social protection as well as from the police.

- Rise in irregular migration:
  Ukraine as a transit territory lying between the crossroads to Asia and to the Schengen border is a convenient root for people being trafficked to Europe. There has been certain rise in irregular migration, mostly due to the non-transparent immigration rules and also due to the fact that Ukraine has visa free regime with all CIS and the West European countries. Statements by politicians manipulate demographic estimates and spread myths that immigrants bring diseases, take up jobs of Ukrainians, transfer their income abroad, draining wealth from Ukraine, which inspire the far right groups and youth groups with Neo-Nazi inclinations to use these arguments in favor of their propaganda.

Another half-truth is that the visible minorities do not like to integrate and live compactly within their own communities.

- Weak integration of foreign students mainly from Asian, African and Latin American countries (consisting of visible minorities) during their 5-6 years of study in Ukraine was also observed in a survey undertaken in 2008 in 11 Ukrainian cities, showing insufficient language proficiency and knowledge about Ukraine. With «all their security vested on the university authorities and no independent authorities to appeal in case of any violation», students were concerned with their physical safety. Students also reported that original copies of certificates, medical forms and other vital documents are taken away from them, thus making them unable to verify personal information or take legal action. They

37. Fans speaking at a program «Pro shcho kino» on football violence, at the Savik Shuster Studio, recorded on 20.4.2011.
had mistrust towards law enforcement institutions, and 45 per cent of respondents did not know what rights Ukrainian citizens enjoyed. These problems start at the recruitment process during which students sign a contract in Ukrainian and are not given any briefing materials, which may introduce them to the way of life, rules, customs and cultural aspects of the Ukrainian society, not to speak of the rights and duties of foreigners. As noted in the ECRI report, Ukrainian universities often focused on earning revenue (the ECRI report estimates an earning of about 73 million Euro in 2006), rather than providing integration assistance to the students. EEDI reports show that, the process of arranging invitations and providing accommodation has been prone to abuse. Universities resort to services of commercial agents (often consisting of graduates who came from students’ country of origin), which results in a process that is insufficiently transparent.

- Weak integration of migrants: Due to weak level of integration and negative perception of the attitudes of local government officials, migrants do not report cases of intolerance and rights violations. Between four and seven per cent of respondents in three surveyed cities regarded them as friendly while from 10 per cent (Kharkiv) to staggering 36 per cent viewed them as either unfriendly, suspicious or rude and hostile. It is hard to expect migrants to turn to local governments for assistance when as many as between 27 per cent (Kyiv) and 53 per cent (Kharkiv) view officials as indifferent. An earlier research in 2004 compared the levels of integration of two batches of Asian and African immigrants to Kyiv – those arriving between 1991 and 1998 and in the period from 1999 to 2001 also suggest a widening gap between migrants and the host community. As many as 41 per cent among those arriving in the period between 1991 and 1998 found extensive integration a viable option and only fewer than seven per cent favoured separation from the receiving community, the ratio reversed with the group arriving in 1999-2001, with only nine per cent reporting integration, and over 36 per cent declaring preference for separation from the majority. Thus, the share of those reporting cultural marginalization rose from three per cent during 1991-1998 to 23 per cent by 1999-2001. Survey results showed great interest and willingness among all respondents to learn Ukrainian and Ukraine as well as the fact that they are even ready to pay for them. Even students, who come to study on paid bases, are not given due attention and help to access cultural and language training in Ukrainian. A myth related to the above is that these communities are breeding grounds for terrorism. So far in Ukraine there has not been a single case of terrorist plots hatched or planned, not to speak of being executed. However, if integration efforts of the state and the society are not extended and visible minorities not encouraged integrating, such a policy of separation and seclusion lead to alienation, leading to fractured communities.

- Last but not the least is the role of the media in propagating intolerance. Monitoring by NGOs show that use of hate speech, tendentious reporting, ethnic profiling of persons in stories, reinforcing of stereotypes are widespread among the Internet media (including the neo-Nazi web sites, such as reactor, spalakh natsii, patriot, etc.), the situation with regard to TV and print media is also critical, as comprehension of the hate speech concept, and its legal implications are lacking. So far, very few cases (except in relation to the journal Personal-plus of the Interregional Personnel Academy and some other anti-Semitic graffiti in Odessa) were filed under article 161 (incitement of racial and interethnic hatred) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

Evolution of Political and Other Groups Promoting Intolerance in Ukraine

During the years of Ukrainian independence and before – between late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s – political extremism was never characteristic for Ukraine. Leaders of the national democratic movement and the political elite always took pride that Ukraine had no armed conflicts unlike most of the republics of the former Soviet Union. They were well aware of the fact that «Ukraine for the Ukrainians» should never be a slogan and the prospects opened by the 1991 referen-

40. ECRI Third report on Ukraine, op. cit. p. 17.
42. Braichevska O., Volosuk H., Malynovska O., Pylynsky Y., Popson N., Ruble B. A., Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv, Woodrow Wilson Interna-
dum to build a democratic state will not be achieved if equality and national tolerance for all ethnic groups in Ukraine are not guaranteed. Several laws (on language in 1989, on citizenship in 1991, on ethnic minorities in 1992) that were adopted laid the foundations of Ukraine as a political nation.

However, after two decades of state building process, lack of economic and social reforms led to fragmentation of the democratic bloc and simultaneous strengthening of conservative forces. Economic crises, sharp differences with Russia over energy supply and decrease in living standards of people, threatening the very bases on which Ukraine as a state was built. Social, ethnic and religious differences are becoming vocal and less tolerant. To add to that are the regional differences. These are good breeding grounds for political extremism, which is becoming very active in Ukraine. Although there are both far right and far left extremists in Ukrainian politics, as in Russia, far right groups have attracted more attention. The Ukrainian far right is historically associated to a greater extent with the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) and its armed wing Ukrainian National Self Defence (UNSO), and to a lesser extent with the State Autonomy of Ukraine (DSU).

Ultra right ideology in Ukraine draws on strong traditions of nationalism in West Ukraine, developed at the time between the two World Wars, when Ukrainians fought Polish and then Bolshevik domination, under the leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Organization and then from 1929, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Both espoused terror, were ethnocentric, authoritarian, unifying fascism, bolshevism and what they called integral nationalism. Their ideological guru was Dmytro Dontsov. In 1940 OUN broke into a moderate (Andriy Melnik) and a radical group (Stepan Bandera). Dire political realities of Nazi occupation and non acceptance of their ideology in the East and South regions of Ukraine, led to the orientation of these regions to democratic ideas. At this time the armed wing Ukrainian Rebel Army (UPA) resisted the Nazi occupants and then the Soviets. During the Soviet era, emigrant leaders of the moderate part of OUN based in Munich continued lobbying for an independent Ukraine, and with the coming of independence supplied with erstwhile banned nationalist literature for the youth.

Initial enthusiasm with integral nationalism was seen in such organizations as Union of Ukrainian Youth, but later, its active propagators such as Oleg Vitovich, Anatoliy Shcherbatyuk and Volodymyr Yavorskiy were condemned. Radical nationalism found its place in Dmitry Dontsov’s Fan Club and the Ukrainian Nationalist Union, whose leader in Kyiv was Dmytro Korchinskiy. Formation of smaller nationalist parties (such as Ukrainian National Party, DSU) followed which refused to cooperate with national democratic leaders such as Vyacheslav Chornovil, Myhailo and Bohdan Horyn, Levko Lukyanenko and others and also participated in elections. An inter party assembly of these smaller parties was set up for coordination, led by Yury Shukhevych, the son of Roman Shukhevych, head of the UPA. But this did not stop their marginalization and they could not propagate radical ideas in the mainstream of Ukrainian politics.

After the failed coup of 1991 and the collapse of the USSR, this inter party assembly was renamed Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) and its armed wing Ukrainian National Self Defence (UNSO) and started to take part in active politics, by using violence, going to Crimea, Moldova and Georgia and taking part in conflicts and organizing actions.

Since 1993, DSU under the leadership of Roman Koval and Ivan Kandyba started getting openly fascist and used the slogan »Ukraine for Ukrainians«, banning mixed marriages and entry of non-Ukrainians into Ukraine, returning all Jewish people and Russians to their homelands. One of the headlines of their newspaper Unsubmissive Nation at that time read, »Ukraine urgently needs Adolf Vissarionovich Pinochetenko«. At the end of 1993, they set up the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which openly declares themselves as anti-Semitic, anti-Russian. Polls showed the ultra nationalists such as UNA-UNSO in 1994, despite their nationwide network, enjoyed only 2-3 per cent support – mostly in West Ukraine. This situation led to the existence of various small ultra right parties and groups in Ukraine during the late 1990s and the beginning of 2000.

An analysis in 2008 stated that, police investigation reports of the growing number of hate crimes after
the year 2005 against foreigners and visible minorities showed that in the majority of cases the perpetrators were radical youth groups. The analysis covered such groups as Patriot of Ukraine, Ukrainian Peoples Labor Party, Ukrainian Alternative, National Action »RID«, Sich, Character Kozatstvo, Svyato-Andriyivsky, Kozachiy Kurin and others. Police patrol in Kyiv alone revealed 86 spots and 55 meeting places of far right groups.47 As of 2010, police list consists of 1,200 persons (60 in Crimea, 150 in Zaporizhzhia, 105 in Odessa, 60 in Kharkiv, 126 in Chernihiv and 793 in Kyiv). Apart from that, Kyiv also has 263 football hooligans of the clubs Dynamo-131, CSKA-Chernihiv and 793 in Kyiv). Another party SPAS – Social Patriotic Assembly of the Slavs – even though demanding Ukraine for the Ukrainians, finally professes Slavic unity and building a socialist state of Slavic brotherly people, where only Slavs should hold power and wealth. They are anti-American and against European integration. SPAS members had protested against an anti racist march in Kyiv in June 2007, threw bananas at an African pastor, supported Russian position in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, etc. Recruiting members from higher educational institutions, SPAS works with disillusioned youth and also attempted to set up a fighter unit, Chornaya Sotnya.

Selective content analysis of 50 web resources propagating hate showed that, the names of the sites do not suggest hate or ultra right ideology, (in rare cases the site url contained such overt words as unazi, nsportal, slavnazi or code words such as hurch18, ss88), but overall they contain anti-Semitic, racist and xenophobic articles.

Overall spirit of non-conformism that pervaded the radical fan movement in the former USSR, made the most committed fans appeal to non-left (non-Communist) and banned ideologies, such as nationalism. Thus, most radical fans (ultras) take pride in the fact that they believe in right political ideologies50. In their search for young people, who are adventurous, bold, have a black and white view of the world, can easily enter into fight and are not afraid of the police, radical football fans or ultras are a very good ground for recruiting new members to the far right groups in Ukraine. Although percentage of such far right people are not too many, their presence in any fan group is sufficient to trigger spontaneous upheavals,

48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
mobilize otherwise less violent and softer sections of the fans, and catch media attention.

Another group is the football hooligans, whose primary intention is to fight their own rivals outside the stadiums. Police estimates show that, in general, there are more than six thousand such hooligans and ultras as fans in Ukraine. This number is also constantly rising. Clubs with ultras and hooligans as fan groups (these fan groups are underground, with no publicly available information about the number of members and the latter are not ashamed to show their racism, as the names of these fan groups suggest) are – Dynamo Kyiv (groups have such names as: Mobi Capitals, Young Hope, Kefirs Crew, Trudovuy reseryv, U27, Terror Family, Kids of Capital, Ultra’ Fazione etc.), Karpaty of Lviv (fan groups of this club are named as Green Lions, West Boys, Werwolf, Lviv City Firm, The Pride), Dnipro of Dnipropetrov’sk (fan groups are named as River Sharks Firm, Barracuda’s, Avangard Fight Club), etc. Patriot of Ukraine also conduct advocacy campaigns in the stadia, distributes literature, especially in the sectors where ultras are located.

»People enter the mob to fight. May be for the first time in their lives. For us a fight – is a means to be stronger. Physically and spiritually... majority of us are members of the Straight edge – a movement to purify our blood, will and reason. So, you will not see any of us drinking in every nook and corner, lying down somewhere, or entangled into a drunken brawl. You will never see or hear that we have behaved indecently and irritated anyone just like that. We do not think that others treat us as a piece of crap. We are able to say, that we discriminate races, in the direct sense of this term... We are not against other races – we are just in favour of that our race does not die. We just want that our children live in a dignified world. This is our racism!«

Posted at the fan site of the football club »Veres« (Rivne)51.

Ultras sites also contain improper references to gays and lesbians, Roma and Jewish people. However, at the same time, many ultras are only interested in supporting their teams and are not interested in anything else and have web sites with publicly available information, such as the Kyiv City Supporters52, Viva and Bad Boys.53

It may be said that extremist and right radical groups in Ukraine are dispersed, not well organized and the few with political ambitions seek to carefully hide any overt, direct and public call to racism, discrimination, anti-Semitism and thus formally abide by the law. However, by explicitly stating their support to ethnic Ukrainians in their programs, they imply discriminating others. Thus the notion of racism and xenophobia is innate in their ideology.

The Challenges of EURO 2012 Preparation in the Light of Preventing Intolerance

The analysis above shows a marked growth in the political groups spreading intolerance in several regions of Ukraine. One of the main challenges in the light of promoting tolerance is to take necessary measures to prevent the infiltration of radical and extremist views and ideologies into the football fan movement, and to prevent it from becoming easy channels for spread of intolerance.

An additional reason for this is the presence of xenophobia, anti-Semitism and racism in Ukraine, which is often manifested through anti-immigrant rhetoric, hate speech in public statements of the politicians of radical parties and groups. Public show of hate signs has been recorded in Ukraine, during processions and mass gatherings of hate groups, as well as desecration of Jewish and Tatar memorials with Neo-Nazi signs, hate graffiti drawings etc.

The phenomenon of immigration is used in politics by all, especially the radical right and the left alike. Politicians manipulate demographic estimates and state that by 2050 one third of Ukraine will be inhabited by Asians and Africans if the authorities do not do anything».54 The media and several analysts also

52. http://kcs.kiev.ua/about_us/
spread myths by politicians that the immigrants are ready to work for low pay for extended work hours and therefore their massive onslaught will lead to »catastrophic consequences« for the living standards of Ukrainians; that immigrants’ employment is bad for the economy as they transfer a large part of their earning abroad; that they are the sources of »exotic« and infectious diseases in Ukraine; and that the visible minorities do not like to integrate and live compactly within their own communities55 and are future terrorist hubs. Research and field survey data of several national and international institutions, such as the authoritative Kennan Institute, Ministries of Health, Labor and Social Policy data and EEDI survey results refute all these myths.

In terms of use of intolerance in football and in the upcoming preparations for the EURO 2012 championship, it should be borne in mind that there are several international and European documents that set the rules in this area. UEFA regulations strictly forbid any visual demonstration of Neo-Nazi and hate signs used by radical extremists groups in the stadium and in the vicinity. Teams, whose fans show such signs are fined and warned. Chanting of racist slogans by any fan or group will envisage stopping of the game for 10 minutes and the concerned team (whose fan or group engage in such activities) will be fined, its points will be reduced or it has to play in an empty stadium. These strict rules are meant to minimize the use of hate signs and slogans to a negligible level.

However, monitoring undertaken in Poland and Ukraine from September 2009 till March 201156 has shown that out of a total of 62 cases in Ukraine, 51 were demonstration of racist or fascist symbols, in two cases it was anti-Semitic, in seven cases it was anti-Muslim and two pertained to other hate category. It included show of major hate signs, the Celtic cross, totenkopf, zig runes, white power fist, and other Neo-Nazi signs.

The monitoring also makes note of a march held by the far-right Svoboda party on 7.9.2010 in favour of what they called »Ukrainian football«, and used anti-immigrant and racist rhetoric, holding a banner »Ukrainian football is not an asylum for immigrants«, demanding that the Football Federation of Ukraine expel the »immigrants« players from clubs, stop hiring »foreign legionnaires« for clubs, and called for racial purity of Ukrainian football. According to the report, the march drew some few thousand party activists, only five per cent were right wing football supporters. Another anti-immigrant demonstration gathered some autonomous radicals and Dynamo Kyiv fans on 24.12.2010 to protest against a Russian youth, Egor Svirodov’s murder in Moscow, but also demanded freedom of the Caucasus states in return for the deportation of the Caucasus people from Russia.

The above events clearly show the existence of interaction and the potential danger of further infiltration of intolerant political groups with their agenda into the fan movement. Fan movement in Ukraine is new, compared to that of the West European countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the major fan groups in Ukraine are structured around individual clubs into officially recognized fan clubs as part of the club itself. Apart from that, there are various informal groups of fans, organized along their lines of passion, from sympathizers, supporters, to fans, and then to ultras. All these groups are open to external influence, but they are usually helped by clubs, and communicate with the police.

Of all the groups the ultras are the most devoted, patriotic and committed among the fans in general. Appearing after the end of the era of football hooliganism in Europe, their common features in all countries of Europe, as analyzed in a study57 shows, that they are against the commercialization of football and do not seek police help or help from the clubs they support. Although Ultras are fans who are organised to varying degrees, they do not see themselves as »members« of a new fan club. For them, »being an Ultra« means having a new attitude to life (their Ultra identity), being


56. Pankowski, Rafal. Hateful Monitoring racist, discrimination and hate crime in Polish and Ukrainian football 2009-2011, Publication of FARE Eastern European Development Project, supported by UEFA.

extreme», having fun and being part of a separate new football fan and youth culture.58

According to information obtained in Ukraine, ultras have a similar identity to that of their counterparts in Europe.59 However, monitoring reports mentioned persons from ultras are among those who have attended racist marches and put up hate signs in Ukraine.60 In addition, there have been repeated clashes with the police in stadiums in Ukraine with ultras, who are seen as football hooligans. The ultras and fans harbour a very negative attitude towards the law enforcement. The police, in their turn, consider ultras as a problem in their duty of keeping law and order.

Policy to tackle these «problems» has been based on enforcement and policing. Prior to the EURO 2012, photo banks of «problem» fans and football hooligans have been created by Kharkiv department police. The Justice Ministry of Poland has proposed to use surveillance bracelets for radical fans in Poland and Ukraine during EURO 2012, to monitor their movements and keep them away from stadiums.61

On the other hand, a positive development has been that, the Donetsk based football club Shakhtar has initiated the practice of less or no police inside the stadium, the work of fan management thereby is vested on stewards. Other clubs are following suit. However, to have absolutely no police in the stadium may be potentially dangerous, as eye witness accounts point out to spontaneous fights between rival groups (for example, severe fight broke out when a handful of Libyans, who were carrying flags and voicing support for the uprising in their country were attacked by a group of ultra radical fans from Ukraine in a recent match between Ukraine and Italy on 29.3.2011 in Kyiv62. No police was present and this caused the Libyans to be severely beaten, until when the police came lately). Thus the art of the possible is to draw a fine line, to have police present but keeping the level of intimidation to a minimum for fans.

Another issue within the fan movement is the inclusion of ethnic and visible minorities in fan clubs and groups. Initiatives of organizing friendly tournaments with involvement of foreign students, ethnic communities have raised awareness on this issue, but coherent strategies of fan clubs are yet to be seen. Ethnic minorities are not part of the ultra groups, seldom are they part of the official fan clubs as well.

Thus, the main challenge is how to take the best from the fan culture and also ensure tolerance in football. The ultras are often viewed as part of the problem. But by starting a dialogue between the football authorities, police and the fans (especially the ultras), the ultras might be part of the solution. Thus the challenge is – can fans stop being viewed as part of the problem and be treated as part of the solution? Secondly, the problem of politicization of football and how to prevent the far right groups from using football as a mode of their expression is also another challenge. Thirdly, the issue of inclusion of ethnic minorities is also another challenge to be addressed.

Need for Tolerance-Friendly Strategies During the Organization of the EURO 2012

The situation described above needs both general and targeted strategies to promote tolerance and diversity in Ukraine. In relation to football, the need for preventing intolerance consists in more targeted interventions, such as enhanced dialogue, training and raising awareness among the fans, the law enforcement and football authorities. The overarching need for tolerance-friendly strategies for the whole society, beyond the stadia and arenas prior to the EURO 2012 are based on the following:

1. Human Rights, Environment and Social Dimensions of Projects:
There is the urgent need to emphasize on the social, human rights and the ecological dimension of EURO 2012. On issues of labor and social policy, human rights, environment, healthy lifestyle, transparency and accountability, clear standards and benchmarks should be announced, based on which, performance will be evaluated. This is related to the social and human dimensions of all infrastructural, economic, investment and commercial projects of EURO 2012.
2. Improved Law Enforcement and Human Rights:
The Human Rights dimension should not be overlooked in policing aspects of the EURO 2012 and preparing the law enforcement bodies, to minimize abuse of power with fans and guests. The need to improve the policing culture will also be addressed.

3. Political Tolerance:
The issue of policy consensus at the national level on topical issues need to be achieved, irrespective of party, group or political affiliations. Political tolerance is needed to also neutralize the partisan nature of the debate on issues of preparations to EURO 2012.

4. The Need for Openness and Transparency and Involvement of the Communities and People (participatory governance):
To improve the general climate of political intolerance, a certain level of openness is necessary for trust building. Such openness is needed to also involve local communities and people in the preparation process. Among the radical fan groups and beyond, there are questions with regard to the issue of transparency in the use of resources for EURO 2012\(^\text{63}\) and they contend that showing »hate signs is a form of protest«\(^\text{64}\) during economic crisis and unemployment.

5. Corporate Social Responsibility of the Private Sector:
Although EURO 2012 is more a state-guided and regulated effort, companies and the corporate sector play very significant role in implementing state contracts in building and construction, public utility, tourism, transportation and providing other services to consumers. Corporate social responsibility as integral part of investment and entrepreneurship is becoming more significant for the Ukrainian emerging private sector. According to a study conducted by the CSR Ukraine Community (a non-profit organization that promotes the issue in Ukraine), commissioned by the Ukrainian network of United Nations Global Compact, to date, 38 Ukrainian companies have published 55 non-financial reports.

Considering the short history of corporate social responsibility reporting in Ukraine, companies are disclosing information on their non-financial performance cautiously. Health and safety, human capital development, environmental protection, philanthropy and local community development are the issues most commonly disclosed in the reports. Description of one-off initiatives and projects prevail, often not linked to material issues for the reporting companies. It is notable that the majority of companies that issue non-financial reports have Ukrainian capital and work only on the Ukrainian market. No large multinational company has produced a report for its Ukrainian operations, though many have a large presence in the country with significant financial and non-financial impact. Still, only 10 per cent of the top 100 Ukrainian companies issue non-financial reports, compared with 80 per cent in developed countries. Many large Ukrainian companies with a significant impact on the economy show no signs of any tangible social responsibility.

Yet the future of corporate social responsibility depends on the ability of the Ukrainian non-governmental organizations, media, consumers, academia, think-tanks, trade unions and the state to demand from business a proactive role in finding solutions to the country’s problems. International financial institutions and international financial markets are becoming the drivers behind the growth of corporate social responsibility in Ukraine, too. In this context, EURO 2012 is a be-fitting occasion to enhance cooperation between the state and the non-state sectors.

6. Regional Developmental Disparities Within Ukraine Affecting Tolerance:
Bridging the continuing socio-economic disparity of the regions is required. However, in doing that, it should be borne in mind that there are certain specific cultural identities and realities that are rather unique to each region of Ukraine. Bridging disparities do not mean to make all regions look alike. Unfolding the rich diversity capital of each region could unlock a better economic and social development for each region, leading to rise in overall tolerance.

7. Participation of the International Community:
Prior to EURO 2012 there are assistance available from the donors and international organizations. The need is to galvanize international assistance and use it judiciously to build capacity of the country’s state and non-state sectors. Here again, tolerance is a core requirement of all such projects.
8. Modernize Fan Culture:
Last but not the least is the need to shift away from the post-Soviet standards and discipline of the officially registered fan clubs and harmonize the spontaneously growing fan movement, bring in standards of modern fan culture.

To sum up, the need for tolerance friendly strategies have two aspects - internal and external. Internally the task is how to unify the country and turn the page after the division of 2004; externally the task is how to make Ukraine a modern European state and break the stereotypes related to it.

Conclusions and Proposed Solutions on Promotion of Tolerance and Prevention of Extremism

It may be concluded from the above that intolerance and far right extremism is growing in Ukraine. Yet experts for a long time did not think it to be a problem of a serious scale in Ukraine. However, being a party to major international instruments of Human Rights, Ukraine took several decisive steps.

To recall, Ukraine is party to numerous international treaties, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Amnesty International noted in its 2008 report, the international treaties place on the Ukrainian government an obligation to protect foreigners also against violent assaults perpetrated by non-state actors.65 Ukraine took action against intolerance, address its root causes, in 2007 Ministry of Interior approved the Action Plan on countering racism until 2009, which concentrated on policing - tracking the activities of radical youth organizations and increasing security of areas where foreigners concentrate. A biannual Action Plan for countering xenophobia, racial and ethnic discrimination in Ukrainian society was adopted by the Ministry for the Family, Youth and Sport.66 To coordinate activities of Ukrainian state bodies, an Inter-Departmental Working Group on Countering Xenophobia, Inter-ethnic and Racial Intolerance was launched and the post of a Special Ambassador on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination was set up within the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Several organizations held trainings for the police, NGOs, fan clubs on the use of hate rhetoric and signs.

The above analysis shows that even after the steps taken significant improvement is not being achieved. The legal framework related to protection from discrimination is rooted in the guarantees, set out in the Constitution of Ukraine. Articles 24 and 26 refer to equality of rights between nationals and non-nationals and prohibition of discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, race, ethnic origin or language. However, as ECRI report noted in 2002 and 2007, wording of Article 24, guaranteeing non-discrimination to »citizens« (hromadyan), understood to cover also foreigners and stateless persons, to be ambiguous. It was recommended that the state’s commitment to protection from discrimination could be more strongly expressed in the Constitution.67 In 2006 Ukraine ratified Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights.68

Effectiveness of these above measures will to a great extent show to what extent the far right extremism and hatred may be kept marginal and on bay. The danger of keeping the ultra nationalist as the only alternative to the dominant party of the ruling coalition, Party of the Regions, will provoke unprecedented changes in the political spectrum. It may radicalize the already intolerant Ukrainian politics and will also destroy the possibility of centrist and left centrist alliances. In the past, in the same way the Communist party was shown as the only alternative to the pro-market ruling alliances, thus killing the possibilities of development of social democratic alternative.

Political intolerance will be not as turbulent as the football fan movement prior to the EURO 2012. As the monitoring reports suggest, the number and scale of hate signs used by radical fans clearly point to their alignment with the far right ideology.69

In the light of the above, the following recommendations may be made:

Ukraine needs to institutionalize a system of monitoring and training on the hate signs and pass appropriate legislation and put ban on their use. Such system of mentoring should also include exchange of experience between law enforcement, fans and volunteers of countries which hosted the European and World championships in the past, such as Portugal, Germany, Austria and Switzerland.

Consensus on the issue of banning all hate signs and full adherence to UEFA guidelines between clubs, fan clubs and the football federations should be achieved. This should also be supported by a system of citizens’ monitoring within the stadiums and their periphery, and data base of fans and clubs who violate these agreements. Even without institutional bans, a level of self regulation and control among fans and clubs is needed not to be tempted to use hate signs.

Promoting a fan friendly police culture in the stadia, promoting tolerance within clubs and fan groups, inclusion of ethnic minorities as well as the domiciled ethnic minorities in the host cities will help show the potential of diversity capital that each site possesses and will raise tolerance.

Serious training of journalists on how to prevent hate speech and the know-how of reporting such big events (not only sports journalism) will enable them to handle issues of tolerance and diversity with professional care.

Parallel to temporary provision for courts to have speedy disposal of cases of administrative violation by fans and guests (passed recently), integration of immigrants, foreign students and visible minorities is needed to break the stereotypes of Ukraine as a police state with less regard for visible minorities.

Exchange of experience and dialogue between the regions should also be enhanced, at least between the host cities located in all the major regions of Ukraine. This could be a be-fitting way of bridging the regional disparities, so often appealed to by the far right and the politically intolerant circles.

Last but not the least is the need for a pro-active corporate responsibility strategy, which is based also on tolerance and diversity. This would highlight the human and social dimension of the EURO 2012 preparations in Ukraine.

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69. Fans speaking at a TV programme «Pro shcho kino» on football violence, at the Savik Shuster Studio, recorded on 20.4.2011.
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### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>DSU</td>
<td>State Autonomy of Ukraine (Derzhavna Samostiynist Ukrainy)</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECI</td>
<td>European Commission against Racism and Intolerance</td>
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<td>EED</td>
<td>East European Development Institute</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EURO 2012</td>
<td>European Football Championships to be held in 2012, co-hosted by Ukraine and Poland</td>
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<td>FARE</td>
<td>Football Against Racism in Europe</td>
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<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Friedrich Ebert Foundation)</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine</td>
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<td>MES</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MOH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUN</td>
<td>Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Organizatsiya Ukrains'kykh Nationalistiv)</td>
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<td>OUN (m)</td>
<td>Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (moderate)</td>
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<td>OUN (r)</td>
<td>Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (radical)</td>
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<td>SBU</td>
<td>Security Service of Ukraine</td>
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<td>SPAS</td>
<td>Social Patriotic Assembly of the Slavs (Sotsialno-Patriotychna Assambleya Slovyan)</td>
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<td>UAH</td>
<td>Ukraine's national currency Hryvnya</td>
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<td>UEFA</td>
<td>Union of European Football Associations</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNA</td>
<td>Ukrainian National Assembly (Ukrains'ka National'na Asambleya)</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNSO</td>
<td>Ukrainian National Self Defence (Ukrains'ka Natsional'n a Samo Oborona)</td>
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<td>UNTP</td>
<td>Ukrainian National Labour Party (Ukrainska Natsional'na Trudova Partiya)</td>
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<td>UPA</td>
<td>Ukrainian Rebel Army (Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya)</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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About the author

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