

A stylized map of Ukraine composed of a grid of grey dots, with several dots highlighted in red to indicate specific locations or regions.

Left and Center - Left Parties in Ukraine

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- Ukrainian politics lacks a genuine and strong social democratic party. The formerly influential Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) represented oligarchic interests and was marginalized since the Orange revolution while several other social democratic parties are insignificant.
- Despite electoral successes in 1990s, support to non-modernized Communists declined from 20 per cent in 2002 to 3-5 per cent in 2006-2010. Most of the Communist electorate was seized by Party of Regions which represents large business groups but simultaneously plays with populists slogans.
- In contrast to the orthodox Communists, the Socialist Party gradually evolved to the left social democracy but it was discredited by its 2006 defection from the Orange camp to coalition with Party of Regions.
- The Left claimed they would »defend 'workers' rights«. However, their programs contain only slogans. Therefore, the left also actively exploit cultural, language, and foreign policy slogans which serve as a »marker« to attract their non-orange electorate.
- The active use of traditional »left«, social slogans by all mainstream parties in electoral campaigns indicates that the current crisis of the Ukrainian left is not one of social-democratic ideology but of the left parties.

What does »left« mean in the Ukraine?

In the Ukrainian political lexicon, the term »left« usually refers to parties that are to the left of both social democracy in its traditional understanding and to the left of several Ukrainian social democratic parties. In fact, Ukrainian politics lacks a genuine and strong social democratic party; the formerly influential Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united), SPDU(o), has been marginalized since the Orange revolution. It represented oligarchic interests while several other social democratic parties are insignificant. The main left parties after 1991 were the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), re-legalized in 1993 (after the 1991 ban), the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) established in fall 1991, the Peasant Party of Ukraine (SelPU) established in 1992 and the ultra-populist and extremely pro-Russian Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU) that broke away from the SPU in 1996. (As PSPU harshly criticized »opportunistic« CPU and SPU, it was actively used by administration of president Leonid Kuchma to split and weaken the left, especially the Socialists). The SelPU and Progressive Socialists had become marginalized by the 2002 elections, thus, leaving only two main parties on the left, the Communists and the Socialists.

All these parties of the Ukrainian left were connected historically and, to a great extent, ideologically to the CPU which was a sub-section of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). After World War II, Ukraine's communist elites were among the most conservative of the Soviet Union and strictly controlled by Moscow because of Ukraine's vital importance for the USSR. Only with perestroika, three groups emerged within the CPU: pro-Soviet imperial, national-communists and the so called »democratic platform«, but there were few system reformers in the leadership of the CPU.

Institutional pluralism emerged when the CPU's second secretary Leonid Kravchuk became chairman of the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada). Kravchuk increasingly shielded the parliament from party influence and adopted several key points of national-democratic opposition's program. In fact, the collapse of central institutions and the survival strategies of republican elites led them to fall back on a variant of »national communism« to remain in power but they never fully became national communists as did their counterparts in the Baltic states. After the failed putsch in August 1991,

Ukrainian parliament (where the Communists were in majority) declared independence on 24.8.1991. When the CPU was banned in August 1991, many relevant members had already left the party along with their inside knowledge and contacts to pursue their private interests. The Communists had tacitly agreed to the ban of the party in exchange for individual retention of key positions in the bureaucracy and economy. Therefore, the bulk of the former Communist elite remained in power after independence. They formed informal networks and constituted »the party of power« which was later formed into various versions of centrist parties, including Party of Regions (created in 2000-2001 by large business groups associated with authorities). These new centrist parties lacked a clear ideology.

Comparing the situation of the left flank in Ukraine with that in other former Soviet republics, the Communists had a strong partner and rival in the Socialists. They had also emerged as a communist »successor party« but which was politically to the right of the Communists. There are no leftist parties with historical roots. That is, no parties that were destroyed by the Soviet regime and then reemerged, thereby making Ukraine more typical of other post-Soviet countries than the Baltic states or Central-Eastern Europe. All four leftist »successor parties« had their base within the banned Communist party, but the term »successor party« can only partially be applied to them since material and organizational resources of the former Communists went to that part of the *nomenklatura* that became the non-institutionalized »party of the power« and transformed into centrist parties in the late 1990s¹. According to Herbert Kitschelt's classification, the Communist party combined both ideological (party program) and clientelistic types. A similar combination characterizes the Socialist Party of Ukraine, although ideological principles were not clearly outlined for a long period of time. The Socialists had a charismatic leader, Oleksandr Moroz, who was parliamentary speaker from 1994 to 1998.

1. For more on »successor parties«, see Zimmer, K., and Haran, O. »Unfriendly Takeover: Successor Parties in Ukraine«, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, N 41, 2008, pp. 541-561. Olexiy Haran is thankful to Kerstin Zimmer for permission to reproduce parts of this joint article. See also, Haran, O. »Can Ukrainian Communists and Socialists Evolve to Social Democracy?«, *Demokratizatsiya. The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, V. 9, 4 (Fall 2001), pp. 570-587; and Ukrainian-language book *Ukrainian Left: Between Leninism and Social Democracy /Ed. by Haran, O., Maiboroda, O.* (Kyiv, 2000) published with support of Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

The Communists

In contrast to newly founded parties, the Communists did not have to start from scratch their local branches which to a certain extent remained intact despite the 1991 ban. Hence, after it was re-legalized in 1993, the CPU enjoyed the advantage of not having to engage in a simultaneous development of both ideology and organization. Furthermore, the left's electoral successes in the 1994 and 1998 (during a period of massive economic downturn) contributed to the fact that unlike the forced reform of the left »successor parties« in Romania and Bulgaria (following their electoral defeats in 1996 and 1997) the CPU remained ossified in its ideological orientation, a factor that contributed to its decline in the 2006 and 2007 elections.

The Communist Party of Ukraine formally adheres to Marxism-Leninism. In spite of its own program supporting small and medium business, the CPU placed emphasis on safeguarding the state ownership of basic branches, land and on the monopolization of foreign trade. Only in its 1999 electoral campaign platform was its stance on »nationalization of the banking system« removed. Also, the CPU adheres to the traditional Leninist interpretation of the relationship between national self-determination and class struggle. Yet only a small number of extreme leftists in the Communist party called for the restoration of the Soviet Union. The majority leaned de facto toward a union of Eastern Slavic countries supporting the Belarus-Russia union which developed in mid-1990s.

The SPU

In contrast, SPU leader Moroz's statement on the eve of the 1994 presidential elections succinctly explained the fundamental difference between the *derzhavnyk* (in favor of Ukrainian statehood) SPU and Soviet nostalgic CPU: »Those who do not have a care as to the disintegration of the USSR do not have a heart – those who advocate its restoration do not have brains«. During the 1999 presidential election campaign Moroz did not openly advocate strengthening the Commonwealth of Independent States but instead emphasized Ukraine's nonaligned status, drawing the SPU closer on this geopolitical question to Ukraine's centrists.

The SPU has experienced some »social-democratization«, beginning in 1993, after the more radical members led by ultra-populist Natalia Vitrenko had left the party creating Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. Andrew Wilson claims that social-democratization came after nationalization, i.e. after the SPU's commitment to Ukrainian statehood, which became obvious during the adoption of the 1996 constitution. Unlike the CPU, the Socialist Party opted to expand its social base at its 2000 congress. There it adopted a new version of its program and the SPU described itself as a »left-centrist« force. The SPU claimed that it was in solidarity with entrepreneurs and managers who obey the law and work »on legal grounds«. By its own self-identification, the Socialist party placed itself in an intermediate position between the orthodox Ukrainian Communists and the European social democratic parties, tending more towards »democratic socialism« than »social democracy«.

The Performance of Left and Center - Left Parties between 1999 and 2004

During the 1999 presidential elections, the left candidates (Symonenko, Moroz, and Vitrenko) obtained 44.5 per cent of the votes in the first round. However, in the second round incumbent Leonid Kuchma achieved a landslide victory over Communist leader Petro Symonenko attracting many negative voters against the »Communist threat« (56.25 against 37.8 per cent). After 1999, Symonenko never gained such an electoral harvest.

The Communists claimed to advocate ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine. In the 1999 elections, however, ethnic Russians were almost equally divided between Kuchma and Symonenko (48 to 46 per cent). But Kuchma led among ethnic Ukrainians (63 to 32 per cent) and minorities (62 to 35 per cent). A comparison of sociological polls conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on the eve of the 1998 and 1999 elections showed that following the 1998 parliamentary elections the center-left electorate had included as many young people as the center-right, making the center-left different to the CPU whose electorate was dominated by the elderly. In the center-left electorate the ethnic Ukrainian group was growing and its ethno-political characteristics were becoming almost indistinguishable from that of the center-right electorate. It reflected changes in the SPU's orientation towards left center and *derzhavnyk* position.

The main base for the SPU was rural and small town Central Ukraine, while for the CPU it was Eastern Ukraine, the industrial and urban core of Soviet Ukraine. Thus, the regional bases of the CPU and SPU overlap only partially. According to Wilson, this factor partially explains why the CPU's modernization was hindered as a drift to the right would have created a vacuum and strengthened ultra-radicals, such as the Progressive Socialists, within and outside the Communist party. Initially, the left benefited from the Ukrainian electoral system. In 1994, the preservation of single mandate voting and in 1998 the mixed system with a four per cent barrier proved to be advantageous as »red directors« entered parliament within the left parties. This changed by the 2002 elections when local economic directors had largely joined various emerging parties of power and later the »presidential majority« in parliament. Therefore, since 2002 the left favored purely proportional electoral system.

In fall 2000, Moroz made public the audiotapes allegedly confirming president Kuchma's involvement in the murder of journalist Georgi Gongadze enhancing Moroz's image as an »honest« politician and true oppositioner. In contrast, the Communists continued de facto to support the Kuchma regime, for example during the April 2001 vote of no confidence in the Viktor Yushchenko cabinet (unlike the Socialists which did not support the vote). The Communist party also gave only ambivalent support to the »Ukraine without Kuchma« movement in 2000-2001 and to the »Arise, Ukraine!« protests of 2002-2003, both of which the Socialists supported. In reality, the CPU was prone to choose what it viewed as the »lesser of two evils« (Kuchma and the Party of Regions) over what they regarded as the »nationalist«, pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko and his national democratic allies.

In the 2002 parliamentary elections all left forces received a combined one-third of all the votes. For the first time the Communist party lost its first place in the parties and blocs who made it into parliament to Yushchenko's bloc Our Ukraine which obtained 24 per cent (the CPU obtained 20 per cent). The Communists won only in six single member districts, down from 37 in 1998. The Socialist party gained seven per cent and also won three seats in single mandate districts. Many voters who had supported the Socialists as the only viable opposition in the past, voted for Yushchenko's Our Ukraine

bloc instead. So, while Moroz was trying to move his party more to the political center he nevertheless had to simultaneously win votes on the left flank.

Nevertheless, in the first round of the 2004 presidential elections Moroz for the first time received a greater number of votes than the CPU leader Petro Symonenko (5.82 against 4.97 per cent). It was a symbolic result for their long-time competition. Following the first round of the 2004 presidential elections in which Moroz came third, Yushchenko and Moroz signed a political agreement: in return for support in the run-off, Yushchenko agreed to carry out the constitutional reform which would increase the role of the parliament (it was long-time demand of Moroz, former parliamentary speaker). Also, after the Orange revolution, the SPU received ministerial posts in an orange government (with president Yushchenko's Our Ukraine and prime minister's Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT).

In his turn, during the 2004 elections, Symonenko backed up claims by the Viktor Yanukovych campaign of a »US conspiracy« supporting Yushchenko. The CPU formally did not support any candidate in the repeat second round but most CPU members campaigned for Yanukovych. The CPU followed hard-line centrists (the Party of Regions and SDPU(o) into opposition to the orange regime.

The Situation after the Orange Revolution

The Orange revolution became a blow to Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) led in 1998-2007 by Viktor Medvedchuk (president Kuchma's chief of staff in 2002-2004). This party was created in 1995-1996, seized soon by the so called »Kyiv oligarchic group« and became part of Kuchma's »party of power«. Its activity had little in common with social-democratic ideas. Despite huge financial support and administrative resources, it barely overcame the four per cent threshold in 1998 elections (4.01 per cent), and in 2002 gained 6.3 per cent. Discredited by Medvedchuk's policy, SDPU(o) received only one per cent in the 2006 election.

In protest to the takeover of SDPU(o) by oligarchs, its several regional organizations proclaimed in 1998 creation of Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP). In 2002, this small party joined Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc

(BYuT). Although they received only six seats among 129 deputies elected on BYuT list in 2006, their leader Vasyl Onopenko, former minister of justice, became the head of the Supreme Court of Ukraine. Afterwards, the party was led by his son-in-law Yevhen Korniiuchuk.

In the 2006 parliamentary elections based on pure proportional system with three per cent threshold the Socialists again gained more votes than the Communists (fourth place with 5.7 per cent compared to the CPU's fifth place with only 3.6 per cent). However, following the 2006 elections the Socialist party suddenly left the orange coalition, over its insistence that Moroz become parliamentary speaker. In 2006-2007 it was part of the »Anti-Crisis coalition« with Party of Regions and the Communist party. Moroz once more received the position of the parliamentary speaker. However, as a result of this »betrayal« the Socialists failed to enter the parliament in 2007 during early elections when it received only 2.86 per cent. Thus, the CPU which in 2007 gained 5.4 per cent remained the only left parliamentary party. Nevertheless, since 2004 the Communist party attracted only between 3-5 per cent compared to its 20 per cent in the 2002 parliamentary election or 37.8 per cent in the 2009 presidential election.

Crisis of leftist parties and attempts to revive the left party spectrum

The current crisis of the left is more related to the policies of the left parties and its leaders than to a lack of society's interest in social-democratic ideology. The reasons for slow progress in the evolution of center-left parties are: the loss of social democratic traditions after seventy years of Soviet rule; independent trade unions remained weak; Ukrainian society distrusted parties; and there was a small (although growing) middle class. Andrew Wilson observed that because the Communists appeared to be the strongest force on the left, the restructuring of this flank depended on the CPU's position. As the post-1993 CPU incorporated hardcore orthodox pre-1991 CPU members it could not become a party that could modernize itself as did »successor« parties in Central-Eastern Europe. Also, Ukraine's left parties only entered the government in 2005 (the Socialists) and 2006 (the Communists), thus mitigating their need to moderate their ideological positions upon assuming governmental responsibility.

Even though the CPU had a relatively large number of members, what bound them to the party was the existence of patron-client ties. But during the first decade after independence the left parties lost their state clientele. Their opposition status during the Kuchma era limited their ability to use patronage and other government resources. Moreover, the advocacy role for Russian-speakers was taken over by oligarchic parties (especially the Party of Regions).

A large proportion of the votes that the Party of Regions gained in the 2006 elections (compared to 2002) came from the former Communist electorate. The common home base of the CPU and the Party of Regions in the Donbas and Crimea assisted in the merger of their voters. In terms of program the Party of Regions, like the CPU, positioned itself in opposition to Yushchenko and Tymoshenko in the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections promoting Russian as a second state language, favoring de-facto a federal system and promoting stronger ties with Russia. Both the Communists and the Party of Regions were attractive to voters who oppose Ukrainization and Westernization. Both programs emphasized socio-economic issues. Thus, the Party of Regions promoted many of the same issues as the Communist party, albeit without the »ideological ballast« and the CPU's explicit Soviet nostalgia². In addition, the Party of Regions was financially more viable than the left parties and had access to both administrative resources and patronage to draw voters. Therefore, the Party of Regions could provide more material benefits in a clientelist exchange to traditionally left voters who are mostly elderly, female and have less formal education (see the table 1)³.

Elderly people dominate among the left's electorate. In 2006, the CPU managed to overcome three per cent threshold only due to the support of people over 50. Only in 2007, did the Communists try to appeal to a new younger electorate (table 1.) Their support initially improved but then declined during the 2010 presidential elections (table 2).

In 2006, the left's electoral support was more or less evenly spread throughout Ukraine, mainly due to the

2. According to the 2007 polls of the Razumkov Center, 47 per cent of the CPU supporters associated themselves with the »Soviet cultural tradition«, 18 per cent with the Russian one, and 30 per cent with the Ukrainian one (while for supporters of the Party of Regions respective figures were 29, 18 and 44 per cent) (see, www.uceps.org/ukr/article.php?news_id=677)

3. For more on that see, Zimmer, K., and Haran, O. Op. cit.

SPU which had significant support in the center and the west. In 2007, part of the rural and small town electorate of the discredited SPU was attracted by BYuT. Therefore, support for the left parties concentrated in south and east, mainly due to the CPU. But support for the Communists drastically declined: from 39 per cent in the east in 1998 to 7.6 per cent in 2007 (!). It was difficult for the left to compete with BYuT and Party of Regions which started to look like »catch-all-parties«.

Attempts at reuniting the left in 2010 presidential campaign under an orthodox CPU leadership were not very successful. The left founded a »Bloc of Left and Left-Center Forces«, which supported the Communist leader Symonenko for president. This bloc included the CPU, the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united), SDPU(o), and two small parties led by defectors from the SPU – the Justice Party (created in 2000 and now led by Stanislav Nikolayenko) and ultra-populist Union of Left Forces (created in 2008 by Vasyl Volga). The SPU and Progressive Socialists did not join the bloc. The SDPU(o) and Justice Party, that declared themselves to be center-left and joined the bloc, accepted the orthodox Communist slogans and, therefore, appeared in the CPU's shadow. This only further discredited social-democratic ideas.

Formation of the bloc did not help. Compared to the 2007 elections, the Communist electorate decreased in every region (see table 3), and in total almost by 400,000. Despite Symonenko's low performance of 3.5 per cent, the Communists (which supported Yanukovich in the run off of the presidential elections) subsequently joined a coalition with the Party of Regions and the small Lytvyn bloc (led by parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn). The Party of Regions represents big business and the Communists claimed they would »defend 'workers' rights«. However, one of the main problems for the Ukrainian left is that their programs contain only slogans. It is no secret the CPU is itself supported by capitalist »oligarchs« (namely Konstantin Grygoryshyn). Therefore, the left also actively exploit cultural, language, and foreign policy slogans which serve as a »marker« to attract their non-orange electorate. These slogans were also used as justification to join the coalition »against the orange nationalists«. In general, it looks like the Communists, at least now, does not have the potential to change and modernize. They have become the so

called »niche party« and can solely rely on support of 3-6 per cent of voters.

Whatever their rhetoric might be, the Communists did get government portfolios and that gave them access to public funds. Specifically they have the customs service, economics ministry, and the state property fund (responsible for privatization of state property!). Communist Adam Martyniuk became again the first vice speaker of the Ukrainian parliament. And finally, Symonenko's son became the first deputy head of the state agency for innovations and development. This kind of nepotism is widespread and testifies that the CPU, despite its slogans, is well integrated into the new regime.

But these gains create dangers for the CPU. In particular, it could alienate their traditional voters if the government takes unpopular measures such as increasing the pension age, or gas prices. The new government cooperates with the IMF, which is supposed to be an object of Communist attacks. For this reason, on the eve of the 31.10.2010 local elections, we see the CPU increasing its criticism of the Party of Regions. This criticism is especially strongly expressed in Crimea by Leonid Hrach, the leader of Crimean Communists, as the local elites are afraid of the methods used by the new team sent by the Party of Regions to govern Crimea.

Nevertheless, ironically, this criticism can serve the interests of the Party of Regions. On the one hand, Party of Regions can use it to weaken vice prime minister Serhiy Tihipko (leader of the centrist »Strong Ukraine« party) who is responsible, at least formally, for unpopular reforms. On the other hand, the Party of Regions can also blame the Communists for delaying reforms.

In general, the Party of Regions is interested in keeping the left fragmented. The changes in the electoral law to local councils from a proportional to majority system weaken left parties whose candidates cannot compete with the local bureaucracy and businesses. As a compromise, a mixed system was introduced. On the positive side, the Communists (as other left parties) are against concentrating power in the hands of the president. However, this does not change the fact that the Communists, like the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, have always been a »comfortable opposition«. After the dubious decision of

the Constitutional Court on 1.10.2010, to restore the 1996 Constitution, the influence of parliament is diminished. This means that the influence of small parliamentary factions, including the Communists, is also diminished although their votes would still be needed for certain issues.

The SPU for its part, interrupted its modernization in 2006-2007, did not enter the parliament, and almost collapsed. Nor did it get full member status in the Socialist International (the SPU and small Social Democratic Party of Ukraine created in 1990 have »consultative status«). In the 2010 presidential campaign the Socialists could not decide between three options:

1. joining a Left bloc with the Communists and supporting Petro Symonenko for presidency;
2. supporting businessman Serhiy Tihpko, leader of the »Strong Ukraine« party which proclaims itself to be centrist and »liberal« (before 2009 the party was called »Labor Ukraine« and declared itself to be center-left);
3. or, putting forward their own candidate for president.

At the end of the day, the Socialists again put forward Moroz. This time he received a humiliating 0.38 per cent of the votes. The Socialists desperately need new faces with a social-democratic orientation to return the reputation they once had as a respectable center-left party. This will not be done by Vasyl Tsushko, the new head of the SPU elected at XVI extraordinary congress in July 2010, because as economics minister (on Communist quota!) he is for all intents and purposes part of the Yanukovych government. Tsushko even called »to repent the SPU's support for the Orange revolution«. Moroz remained as the honorary head of the party. He supported cooperation with present authorities, although in fall 2010 harshly criticized cancellation of the constitutional reform and return to strong presidency.

The small Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP), part of BYuT, after Tymoshenko's defeat in the 2010 presidential elections appeared in the opposition. It joined the oppositional government created by BYuT and part of Our Ukraine after the 2010 elections. However, the new authorities are trying to win over the leader of the USDP, Yevhen Korniiuchuk, to their side.

Other forces which declare their center-left status like Justice Party and »People's Power« (created in 2010 and led by Yosyp Vinskiy, another defector from the SPU and later from BYyT) are too weak to play an independent role. Although they have few young energetic politicians (like Yevhen Filindash, former MP from the SPU, now Vinskiy's deputy).

To sum up, the active use of traditional »left«, social slogans by all mainstream parties in electoral campaigns indicates that the current crisis of the Ukrainian left is not one of social-democratic ideology but of the left parties. It is not excluded that during local elections on 31.10.2010, left parties can perform well in some regions or districts and, therefore, play a role in local politics. On the positive side, there are young, promising politicians in almost every party on the left and center-left. There is also an older (Myroslav Popovych, Valerii Khmelko) and middle-age generation of intellectuals (Yuriy Bauman, Kostiantyn Maleev, Oleksiy Mustafin) who espouse social-democratic ideas. A social-democratic niche exists (about 20 per cent of those polled support such an option) but it is far from evident who will lead genuine social-democratization process. The threat of big business buying-off potential social-democratic leaders with promises of huge financial backing could de-rail the emergence of such a party as well as marginal populist groups (like Union of Left Forces) who would try to win popular backing using social demagoguery. Tihpko's »Strong Ukraine« can also try to win at least part of the votes of center-left electorate, although now the party positions itself in centrist, liberal niche.

Under these circumstances, it seems that international social democracy and its foundations should not concentrate on one-two forces from Ukrainian center-left spectrum. They should continue educational work with young generation from all forces of this spectrum as well as distinct social and professional groups such as students, young scholars, journalists, trade union activists etc.



Appendix

Socio-demographic characteristics	CPU			SPU			Party of Regions	
	2002	2006	2007	2002	2006	2007	2006	2007
Gender								
Men	22.0	4.2	6.3	7.7	6.5	2.4	28.1	32.7
Women	24.8	2.7	4.0	6.8	5.0	2.4	32.8	36.8
Age								
18-29	8.5	0.9	1.8	3.7	4.0	1.6	31.9	35.4
30-39	12.7	1.1	2.1	5.9	5.2	2.2	27.5	30.9
40-49	17.4	2.2	3.8	6.9	5.3	2.4	27.7	32.8
50-59	25.0	3.6	5.6	7.2	5.8	2.8	31.6	35.5
More than 60	36.2	8.3	10.3	7.1	8.0	2.9	33.8	38.8
Education								
Incomplete secondary	33.2	6.5	5.2	6.8	7.4	2.1	32.1	38.9
Secondary	23.3	3.4	5.2	7.2	6.2	2.7	32.1	37.6
Specialized secondary	19.9	3.1	4.5	5.6	5.0	2.5	33.3	36.0
High and incomplete high	14.8	2.7	5.5	5.2	5.6	2.2	26.5	31.5
Place of residence								
Town	23.3	3.2	5.3	4.2	4.2	2.3	35.5	40.3
Village	17.4	3.8	4.4	10.0	9.1	2.6	20.4	22.0

Table 1. Dynamics of voting according to the exit polls for the parliamentary elections 2002-2007 (conducted by consortium of Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, and The Razumkov Center), (in per cent).

(Natzionalnyj exit poll: pozachergovi parlamentski vybory 2007. Kyiv, 2007, pp. 102-108.)

Socio-demographic characteristics	2007 parliamentary elections	2010 presidential elections
Gender		
Men	6.3	3.2
Women	4.0	2.3
Age		
18-29	1.8	0.8
30-39	2.1	1.2
40-49	3.8	1.3
50-59	5.6	3.1
More than 60	10.3	6.6
Education		
Incomplete secondary	5.2	3.6
Secondary	5.2	3.5
Specialized secondary	4.5	2.5
High and incomplete high	5.5	2.0

Table 2. Dynamics of voting for the Communist party according to the exit polls for the 2007 parliamentary and the 2010 presidential elections (conducted by consortium of Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, and The Razumkov Center), (in per cent). For exit poll of the first round of the 2010 presidential election, see <http://exitpoll.org.ua/ua/novini/1216.htm>

	West	Center	South	East
Symonenko (the Communists)	1.39	3.81	5.66	4.63
Moroz (the Socialists)	0.55	0.64	0.22	0.22

Table 3. Regional distribution of votes for the left candidates in the 2010 presidential elections (in per cent).



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