Partnership with Russia in Europe
A fresh look at EU-Russian-Relations
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Seventh Roundtable Discussion
February 8th to 10th, 2009
Potsdam
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Reinhard Krumm / Vyacheslav Nikonov

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Katinka Barysch

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Europe needs Russia and Russia needs Europe – this conventional wisdom has held true for centuries. And for the same time period there have always been critics on both sides, wondering if either could live on its own. Wars have been fought, millions of people killed, but the conclusion is inescapable: each side is dependent on the other. The main question remaining is how to convince one another of this fact through realistic and successful cooperation. With this in mind, the Unity for Russia Foundation and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung chose the topic “A Fresh Look at EU-Russian-Relations” for the 7th roundtable of the Partnership with Russia in Europe.

And a fresh look is definitely needed. The Five-Day-War in South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia in August of 2008 and the gas conflict between Russia and the Ukraine at the beginning of 2009 made it clear once again to both sides that the prevailing stereotypes remain in force. On the one hand, the so-called permanent aggressor, Russia. On the other hand, the ever-righteous European Union, unable to look at Russia objectively and intent on dictating its view of governance and enlarging its sphere of influence.

One of the priorities for cooperation could be a European model for new common security institutions. A proposal on that matter is already on the table. One year ago, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev proposed a new European security structure which would not exclude Nato but rather cooperate with the Transatlantic Alliance. This would mean that the United States of America would be part of the new structure, broadening even further the “common European house” once envisioned by Mikhail Gorbachev.

Another field of cooperation could be the search for new global economic governance. The financial crisis has affected the EU as much as Russia, China, Japan and the United States. More state control, enforced internationally, could be a way to avoid future crises. But who will be able to implement those measures? At the moment, social division within the EU and Russia remains a potential threat to stability. Further improvement in trade and business between Russia and the EU would certainly reduce some of the risks, especially if the exchange of goods could go beyond the transfer of money for energy.

The Unity for Russia Foundation and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, as joint organizers, are proud to present the report of the seventh round table with three articles on the theme of new ideas for a strong relationship between Russia and the EU. They highlight the views from Russia, Europe and Germany. The practicality of these new approaches will be discussed during the next meeting, scheduled for spring 2009 in Brussels.

Vyacheslav Nikonov / Reinhard Krumm
The hosts of the roundtable "Partnership with Russia in Europe": Dr. Roland Schmidt, Reinhard Krumm and Vyacheslav Nikonov.
Report on the 7th EU-Russia Roundtable
Katinka Barysch

1. Overall impression

The 7th roundtable promised “A Fresh Look at EU-Russia Relations”. And indeed, after the war in Georgia in August 2008 and the gas crisis in Eastern Europe in January 2009, the need to reassess EU-Russia relations has become all too obvious. The global financial and economic crisis – which hit both the EU and Russia hard – has also meant that both sides have urgent priorities to address at home and would prefer foreign policies without complications. Finally, the advent of the Obama administration in the US offers new opportunities for East-West cooperation in areas ranging from disarmament to the frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasus.

Participants from both the EU countries and from Russia were therefore keen to adopt a results-oriented approach and leave the mutual recriminations of previous years behind. As one German think-tanker put it: “We need a spirit not only of ‘Yes we can!’ but of ‘Let’s do it!’”

Some participants struggled to quell the old habit of apportioning blame and highlighting differences rather than commonalities. On the whole, however, the 7th roundtable proceeded in a sober and often constructive spirit. Unlike previous meetings, its focus was less on the details of the EU-Russia relationship; indeed, the new partnership agreement being negotiated by the EU and Russia was hardly mentioned. Instead, the discussions revolved around security in wider Europe, and in particular in the volatile Caucasus region; burning global issues, such as how to reform global governance; and, of course, the implications of the global recession.

Although various experts made useful suggestions as to how the EU and Russia could work together on European security, UN reform and other issues, optimism was in short supply: hardly anyone expected that the EU and Russia could make much progress on the topics under discussion. Perhaps spirits were dampened by the bleak economic outlook; or perhaps Europeans and Russians were inadvertently waiting to see what the Obama administration would do before more concretely considering their own contributions.

2. The state of EU-Russia relations

Rather than discussing the minutiae of the EU-Russia relationship, participants focused on the overall mode of cooperation between the two sides. The Georgian war and the gas crisis had highlighted the weakness of Europe’s security architecture and the ineffectiveness of the EU-Russia energy partnership. In many other areas, such as trade and the idea of a common economic space, there has been very little progress in recent years.

There was agreement that the EU and Russia needed each other: the EU remains by far Russia’s largest market and the single most important source of foreign investment. The EU relies on Russia for over a fifth of its energy. The two have 2,000 kilometres of common border and share an unstable East European neighbourhood. More than ever, EU-Russia cooperation is also needed on international issues, from the quest to stabilise Afghanistan to preventing Iran from building a nuclear bomb to reforming the global systems of economic governance.
a) Less is more

However, participants also agreed that the traditional model of EU-Russia relations has not worked. This model was based on two assumptions. The first was that Russia should integrate with the EU on the basis of the acquis communautaire and align itself with European policies. Russia, however, has rejected EU rules as unsuitable and views the idea of a unilateral convergence to EU norms and standards as a violation of its sovereignty. The second assumption was that ever closer cooperation would build trust and familiarity between the two partners, facilitating the resolution of any disagreements. Cooperation became an end in itself, as the number of working groups, exchanges and meetings proliferated, not only between Russia and the EU, but also with NATO, the OSCE and the individual EU members.

Enough time has now passed to acknowledge that the old approach has not worked. Greater interaction has not automatically led to trust and to a common understanding of shared challenges. Instead it has often resulted in friction and frustration and sharply highlighted the differences between the EU and Russia.

One Russian expert explained that the integration paradigm could not work because the EU and Russia were not similar but rather complementary: “What the EU lacks to become a super-power is strategic depth and vision, as well as natural resources. Russia has all these things but it lacks technology, a diversified economy and soft power. These are the things that the EU has to offer.”

Now the EU and Russia are looking for a new paradigm, a new modus operandi. Among the terms used to describe this new model were convergence and equality. One EU official advised that the EU and Russia should stop focusing on their interdependence, which often fuelled fear on both sides: “Cooperation should not occur because we have to but because we want to.” A Russian think-tanker added that the EU needed to stop presenting Moscow with faits accomplis. It needed to move to joint decision-making with Russia. Another Russian expert counselled that Russia and the West should only do things together if the political will to achieve
results was actually there. “Less is more” in Russia-EU as well as Russia-NATO relations, she said.

b) Ideas of past grandeur

West European participants did not dispute that a new modus operandi needed to be found but they questioned whether Russia’s quest for an “equal partnership” was not a sign that the country was overestimating its power and potential. One expert thought that the economic crisis should have humbled Russia: “Until August, the Russians were saying, ‘We have oil, we have a functioning farm sector and stable finances, so we do not need the outside world’.” Since then, however, the Russian economy has been very severely affected by the global economic and financial crisis. Russia, too, has felt itself vulnerable.

As a result, one German participant speculated as to whether Russia might now seek an international role more in line with its economic, military and soft power capabilities. “Russia has ideas based on past grandeur, not current realities”, he argued.

An EU official added that the main problem in EU-Russia relations was that both sides were still searching for an identity. The EU has been enlarging in a fitful way and has had trouble with internal reform. Russia is still seeking a post-Soviet identity. As a result, both sides have found it impossible to envisage what their relationship could look like in, say, 2020. Instead they have been focusing on the short term. But immediate problems can be difficult to resolve without a positive long-term vision.

c) The basis for cooperation

Among the short-term issues currently under focus are trade, military cooperation and visas. Russian participants stressed that visas were the single most important EU-related issue for the Russian people. EU enlargement was seen mainly as a process that has led to further restrictions for Russians wanting to travel to the new member-states. For a people that had fought Communism partly to gain the freedom to travel abroad, that was very hard to accept. Visa facilitation was also seen in Russia as a litmus test for EU-Russia cooperation. One
Russian parliamentarian said that the absence of any progress towards visa-free travel meant that the EU was not serious about a partnership with Russia. In particular, the EU should make it much easier for students to travel to the EU. An increase in resources for student exchanges and further alignment in European and Russian curricular and course structures could help here. One Russian expert, however, warned that Russia should not “blindly” join the EU’s Bologna process. This would create problems in the context of Russia’s higher education structure, such as the growing gap between professionals with a Master’s degree and those with only a Bachelor’s.

Participants questioned more generally whether EU rules and policies were the optimal basis on which to bring about more cooperation between the EU and Russia. One Russian participant argued that – although EU rules were well suited to the EU’s member-states – they did not suit Russia at its current stage of development. “The acquis is too socialist for us”, he said, “it would stifle our economic development and force us to allow our banks and resources to be controlled by foreigners.” Another Russian expert disagreed. He described the EU economic system as a “humane” one that combined open markets with solid social security and high living standards. “Russia’s system is Manchester capitalism”, he said. So Russia should aspire to adopt the EU’s rules and institutions, even though the economic crisis had placed these under strain.

3. Conflict prevention

One area in which the EU and Russia clearly need to improve their interaction is in conflict prevention in the Caucasus and in wider Europe. The EU has sought to play a larger role in trying to resolve the “frozen” conflicts in the Caucasus for some time. But the fact that the dispute over the status of South Ossetia (“an unimportant local conflict” in the words of one Western security expert) turned into a major international confrontation within a matter of days in August 2008 highlighted just how unsuccessful these attempts have been. One Russian expert acknowledged that the EU did play an important role in de-escalating the Georgian conflict, but he ascribed that success more to the pro-active role of President Sarkozy than to any formal EU-Russia talks.
Moreover, security experts at the roundtable thought that there remained a risk of further instability in Georgia, and that the stakes may even be higher now that outside involvement in the country was more pronounced. Other immediate security threats discussed by the participants were the prospect of economic meltdown and a political crisis in the Ukraine, and the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

There was agreement that realities on the ground had changed significantly since the Georgian war. First, although Moscow still insists that it should take the lead in any attempts to resolve frozen conflicts and be the sole provider of peacekeeping troops, it is a fact that EU monitors are now stationed in Georgia and that the UN has a role in South Ossetia (although the OSCE mission has been forced to start winding up). Second, the international environment for conflict resolution has changed with the departure of the Bush administration, which had been strongly supportive of pro-Western regimes in the former Soviet Union. The advent of the Obama administration presents opportunities not only for US-Russian cooperation but also for improved EU-Russian cooperation in post-Soviet territories. Third, Turkey’s initiative of a Caucasus Stability Platform, launched in September 2008, has facilitated a cautious rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Fourth, after the Georgian war, Russia has been keen to show that it can act as a constructive mediator in the other frozen conflicts, namely Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh. For example, in November 2008, President Medvedev and his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts signed the Moscow Declaration, highlighting the importance of a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and confirming the role of existing mediation structures (the OSCE’s Minsk Group).

However, participants also presented a formidable list of obstacles that stand in the way of the EU taking a more pronounced and effective role in helping to preserve stability in this region. First, Russia remains reluctant to allow international organisations or Western powers a stronger role in what it considers its strategic backyard or – as a couple of Russian participants
were not shy to call it – sphere of influence. “If it was not for Russia’s influence”, argued one Russian politician, “there would be total mayhem in the Caucasus, just as there was in the Balkans.” Second, the EU is not necessarily seen as an independent arbiter. The people in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for example, perceive the EU as too supportive of the government in Tbilisi, and they therefore resent the EU monitoring mission. Third, the EU has not put in place a coherent strategy for this region. Nor has it provided the resources necessary to play a stronger role there. The EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative (to reinforce the European Neighbourhood Policy in the East) is aimed at helping to stabilise countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. But it does so through encouraging these countries to converge towards EU norms and policies. “When it comes to foreign and security policy”, explained one think-tanker, “the Eastern Partnership is blind.” Meanwhile, the EU itself is not represented in existing forums for negotiations, such as the Minsk Group (where only individual EU countries are represented).

The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, in particular, was judged to have the potential to destabilise the entire region because of the stake of neighbouring powers in this conflict (Russia has a strategic partnership with Armenia through the CSTO, Turkey sees itself as a traditional ally of Azerbaijan, and Tehran takes an interest because of the large number of Azeris living in Iran).

Participants urged the EU to allocate more resources to conflict resolution while at the same time adopting a realistic attitude to what can be achieved. One expert noted that outside actors could seek to influence the situation, but peace needed to be achieved by the countries directly involved.

4. A new European security architecture

Security experts remained sceptical, however, as to whether a more direct involvement of the EU in conflict prevention and resolution would have much effect, as long as trust between the EU and Russia – the major power in this region – remained so low. Some participants argued that ad hoc arrangements and observer missions
would achieve little without an overarching framework for security on the Eurasian landmass.

The summer war in the Caucasus revealed one thing very clearly: Europe’s existing mechanisms for guaranteeing security are inadequate. Until August, most Europeans had considered it impossible that conflicts would be addressed militarily and borders redrawn unilaterally. The proposal for a new European security architecture that President Medvedev had put forward at the beginning of his presidency suddenly appeared in a new light.

The Russian government started to clarify its ideas at a conference in Evian in October 2008 and at the OSCE ministerial meeting in December. It suggested a new European security treaty that would enshrine a commitment to avoid the use of force and to work towards arms control. Medvedev also insisted that security arrangements should not come at the expense of any one state and should not be dominated by any state or grouping.

The reaction of European governments to this proposal ranged from sceptical to cautiously welcoming. They appreciated the Russian idea of launching a broader dialogue on security in Europe but stressed that this must not impair existing security arrangements, in particular NATO, or weaken the security bond between the US and its European allies. The statements of roundtable participants from the EU countries reflected this reaction. They also highlighted the hope that the change of administration in Washington would facilitate a genuine debate. Russian participants thought that Obama’s suggestion that his government would go slow on installing missile defence systems in Eastern Europe and on expanding NATO to Georgia and the Ukraine created an opening for a genuine talks.

a) Russia and the OSCE

While the discussion reflected the willingness to talk that is apparent on both the EU and the Russian side, there was no consensus as to where these talks should take place, among whom and with what exact purpose. Most EU participants said there was no need for a new institution and that instead the talks should take advantage of existing organisations such as the OSCE and
NATO. The OSCE is unique in that it includes all the EU countries as well as Russia and the US. However, one EU politician thought that Russia had shown no respect or support for the organisation – an assessment that seemed to be confirmed when one Russian participant called Odhir (the OSCE’s election monitoring office) an “organisation for the falsification of elections” while another defended Russia’s refusal to prolong the OSCE monitoring mission in Georgia.

The idea of convening an OSCE summit (initially put forward by Nicolas Sarkozy) was also questioned. It was not clear whether such a summit would serve to provide security debates with political momentum or whether it should be left to a later point when the assembled leaders could already make decisions.

Participants were even more sceptical as to whether the NATO-Russia Council would be a good platform for the talks. Russians pointed out that their government remained suspicious of NATO as a left-over from the Cold War and that the NATO-Russia Council had not lived up to the promise of drawing Russia closer to NATO. Moreover, the NATO-Russia Council was suspended during the Georgian war – precisely the kind of security emergency that it was designed to address. Participants also said that the EU should be involved, as well as the UN: not least since any military mission that might be created as part of the new framework would require a mandate from the UN Security Council.

Participants also discussed which subjects such a security dialogue might include. Many identified arms reduction talks as a key element. Others proposed such topics for debate as: spheres of influence in Europe; cooperation between existing organisations, notably NATO and the CSTO; the role of international law in security; the socio-economic conditions for stability in Eurasia; as well as energy security. Further disagreement ensued over whether the ultimate aim of security talks should be a legally binding treaty (often referred to as Helsinki Plus), a series of agreements (some binding, some not), a confidence-building platform or simply a mechanism to identify the common challenges faced by Russia and the Western countries.

b) Focus on substance, not process!

One Russian expert said that the entire debate was focused too much on process, institutions and structure. She suggested that such debates should be left to experts while politicians should seek to identify “security synergies” in a small number of areas where cooperation between Russia and the West appeared most urgent. These areas were: new arms control arrangements; regional security threats in Eurasia, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; how to enhance the security of Ukraine and Georgia without expanding NATO; Iran and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and Afghanistan. As for the mechanism, both the Russian and Western side should remain as flexible as possible.

5. UN reform and global governance

Not only Europe’s security architecture, but the entire system of global governance, and in particular economic governance, needs to be adjusted to new realities. Both Russian and EU participants agreed that the UN would remain at the heart of world diplomacy but that it needed to be reformed to retain its efficiency and legitimacy. One expert pointed out that unlike its predecessor, the League of Nations, the UN was universally accepted, it had grown from 55 to over 190 countries so is truly representative, and it had taken on new tasks as they emerged. He added that although the UN was not, and should not be, a supranational organisation (“a world government”), it was needed more than ever in an era of “transnational problems” such as climate change, international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons and the spread of contagious diseases.
However, participants also listed the myriad of challenges that the UN faces: The UN Security Council is too often paralysed by the supremacy of national interests. The General Assembly spends too much time on declaratory politics and not enough on results-oriented work. The various UN Agencies are often inefficient and corrupt. In some areas, such as climate change, the UN may require new institutions. Some existing institutions, such as the Human Rights Council, have lost much of their legitimacy and usefulness and should be radically reformed.

Russian and EU participants agreed that the membership of the UN Security Council needed to be adjusted to reflect the emergence of new powers such as China. However, Russian experts in particular expressed scepticism as to whether a consensus on the optimal composition of the Council could be reached before 2020. Russia’s official position is that the UNSC should remain small. Instead, the number of non-permanent members should be expanded. Participants also agreed that the norms and values that underlie the UN system needed to be debated. One diplomat questioned whether the idea of universal human rights was still valid in a world where Asian, Arab and other powers defended their own value systems. Another debate surrounded the proper balance between the right of national self-determination and that of territorial integrity. One think-tanker said the simple fact that the number of countries had grown so much since the Second World War showed that the right of self-determination prevailed. A German official countered that a functioning system of global governance was only possible on the basis of effective states, not failed ones or tiny quasi-states that depend on outside help for their survival.

a) G8, G20, G?

Participants agreed that the need for new rules and institutions was most urgent in the area of economics and finance. They discussed ongoing attempts to change international rules, institutions and supervision structures in such a way as to prevent future financial and economic crises. Although the traditional forum of the G7/G8 had proved its usefulness in the immediate crisis response, experts pointed out that the broader G20 was the right framework in which to discuss a new global economic order. One diplomat warned that these various forums should not compete but complement each other. He described the ideal system as “multi-layered multilateralism” where the different levels (UN, G20, G7) would work together in a constructive way. They should also increase cooperation with non-governmental organisations and representatives from business and finance. The proposal by Angela Merkel (made in Davos) for a UN Economic Council (modelled on the UN Security Council) attracted some scepticism among the roundtable participants. One economist warned that setting up new institutions would by necessity weaken the existing ones. This would be bad in a time of crisis, when the world needed to be able to resort to tried and tested institutions.
Russia first put forward a proposal for a new pan-European security architecture back in June 2008, calling for an international treaty to be signed by all countries from “Vancouver to Vladivostok”. In view of the continent’s unresolved security issues, there is certainly a need to discuss potential means of improving the situation. Although the idea of the treaty initially met with a muted international response, it has attracted increased attention since the war in Georgia. Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Germany and especially France have indicated that they are willing at least to discuss it. At the Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers on 3 December 2008, NATO also declared itself open to a discussion of the issue.

What exactly is Medvedev proposing? Which issues are worth debating and where are the stumbling blocks? And what are Russia’s motives in putting forward this proposal? The Russian President justifies his initiative by pointing out that the existing European security architecture has proved unable to implement the goal of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, namely the creation of a united, free and secure Europe. To accomplish this, he suggests holding a pan-European summit with all countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok, with the goal of preparing and adopting a security treaty that would be binding under international law. Alexander Medvedev’s proposal for a new European security model continues a good Russian and Soviet tradition: from Gorbachev’s “Common House” to Yeltsin’s proposals for a pan-European security order within the framework of the OSCE, to the many years of discussion within the OSCE of a “European security model for the 21st century”. These models all had and have one thing in common, namely that the European order they are aiming to establish should be neither antagonistic nor discriminatory. Such a system of collective security thus
differs from a defence alliance like NATO, particularly given that organisation’s domination by the United States.

From Moscow’s perspective, this emphasis is perfectly understandable. As a resurgent NATO has increased in influence, the ideals of a common European foreign and security policy have faded into the background. The rhetoric of the “Common House” of Europe of the brief Gorbachev era has fallen into oblivion in much the same way as the Charter of Paris. The Central European countries of the former Warsaw Pact, in particular, have retained their historical prejudices against Russia and continue to regard the United States and NATO as the only guarantors of security against Moscow. As a result, Moscow is seeking to establish new alliances and new partnerships that would have seemed unthinkable just a few years ago.

One such example is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which comprises such a complex group of states as Russia, China, and the Central Asian countries, yet also hopes to win over India, Afghanistan and Iran. The organisation remains dominated by functions and inter-governmental agreements, without any jointly coordinated or regulated methods of procedure. Furthermore, it is still unclear who will derive the greatest benefit from this constellation of powers in the future: Beijing or Moscow? Such efforts, however, cannot hide the fact that Moscow is currently in an uncomfortable position, with the CIS crumbling around it. Some countries are seeking their salvation by orientating themselves to the West and turning their backs on Moscow. Others are clinging to an authoritarian, despotic status quo in an unscrupulous attempt to safeguard their own interests on all sides, which is tantamount to the retention of power by the ruling classes. Moscow’s influence on the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia is waning, and the Kremlin is now competing with the EU and China when it comes to the supply and transmission of energy through these states. And then there is the rapid fall in energy prices as a result of the financial and economic crisis, which has, in turn, particularly affected Moscow. Provided that Medvedev’s comments are not simply old political reflexes, they represent an opportunity to once more integrate Russia into an institutional structure, with particular norms and rules. That is why we should take the suggestion seriously and follow it up.

It is clear in my opinion that a new security policy organisation like the European Security Community (ESG), developed by Egon Bahr, would have no chance of being realised, much less of being a success. This is why one should fall back on the existing European security architecture within the context of interconnected institutions (NATO, EU, OSCE). The OSCE already provides an institutional framework that can accommodate Russia’s legitimate interest in being involved in a European security organisation on an equal footing. However, it would first have to be resurrected as a pan-European security policy organisation, since its operative significance has unfolded mainly in the Eastern part of the continent – where, in Russia’s eyes, it has focused too heavily on the democratic principles of the Charter of Paris. A revived OSCE neither could nor should replace the EU or NATO. However, it could establish rules and procedures to serve as a basis for the actions of these two organisations when they try to reach beyond their purview. It would thus, on the one hand, be conceived of as a European collective security organisation and, on the other hand, as an organisation that acts as a platform for global action. There are a number of difficult issues facing Europe – and not only terrorism. The five-day war in Georgia, for example, reflects a manifest crisis within the system of cooperative security in Europe. The EU and, above all, NATO are having difficulty coping with this crisis, given that they are increasingly in disagreement with the key player, Russia. By suspending the NATO-Russia Council, NATO managed to rob itself of a body that would have been almost predestined to deal with the crisis in Georgia. In addition, the war in the Caucasus made it clear that secession conflict management issues and
resolutions of conflicts between national self-determination and territorial integrity have not yet been resolved, either in Europe or beyond its borders.

1. Options for a new European security order

It is clear that the existing European security organisations and institutions – NATO, the EU and the OSCE – will have to be included as the building blocks of any agreements. At the same time, it is neither possible nor desirable to establish new institutions quickly, since that could weaken the EU, thereby leading to security risks. This danger becomes clear when one considers the resistance to any change in the status quo on the part of the United State’s European allies in Old and New Europe. This was at least partly evident at the Helsinki Conference of the OSCE in December 2008, where not only the United State’s Deputy Secretary of State, Matthew Bryza, but also the majority of the representatives of European NATO Member States showed little enthusiasm when it came to Russian plans to rethink Europe’s security architecture. For these reasons, I suggest the following concrete options or scenarios towards a new pan-European security architecture:

a) Upgrading the NATO-Russia Council or Russia’s accession to NATO

The idea of accepting Russia into NATO was raised in Moscow once before, in the early 1990s, but was then blocked in 1994 by the first wave of NATO enlargement to the East. This option has not been completely abandoned; it is simply that the conditions and prerequisites are not made in Europe. The 2001 coalition against international terrorism provides an interesting analogy of “informal alliances”, similar to the United States’ way of dealing with NATO Member States with regard to the Iraq issue. This option could be implemented in the medium-to-long term via a gradual increase in the NATO-Russia Council’s consultation and decision-making mechanisms. Although this construct does not correspond to Russia’s idea of a formal treaty concluded between NATO and Russia, its hallmarks include greater trust and reassurance through the continuing transatlantic dimension. The European Member States’ guaranteed security situation would not change in the least. In addition, the United States would remain in the alliance as a partner.

b) Concluding contractual agreements between the EU and Russia concerning peace-keeping in Europe

The EU and Russia would agree on a common peace policy based militarily on the ESDP, which in turn would not deploy its own military contingents according to the old “double hat” construct, but would utilise integrated parts of NATO. These military contingents, together with Russian units, would be placed under a common supreme command and led by new institutions through political consultation and decision-making mechanisms (that would still need to be established) and, when needed, would be jointly deployed.

c) Upgrading the OSCE and/or developing the Charter of Paris

The same procedure could be applied to the OSCE. The EU and Russia would agree to a joint peace-keeping mechanism based politically on an upgraded and reformed OSCE with decision-making powers. The reformed OSCE would be given operative capabilities, including military resources for peace-building missions both by NATO or the ESDP and by Russia. Ultimate responsibility would and should still rest with the United Nations Security Council, which would have to legitimise the OSCE as a sub-contractor and regional organisation. Territorial restrictions on such missions would have to be ruled out for the OSCE area.
2. New impetus for arms control

Medvedev’s “Helsinki II” idea should not be the only basis for discussion concerning a cooperative security order in Europe. It is more important that European countries develop their own suggestions and demands, so as to be able to test Moscow’s willingness to cooperate. Along with regional conflicts, the crisis in arms control and disarmament is one of the continent’s key, unresolved security issues. In December 2007 Russia suspended its cooperation in protest at the pending ratification of the amended CFE Treaty by NATO Member States. Since then it has reported neither exercises nor troop movements, nor is it allowing any inspectors into the country. Although European countries are not directly involved, they are also affected by the crisis in nuclear arms control and disarmament between the United States and Russia. And then there is the issue of the US missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic and the fact that the START I Treaty expires in December 2009. A pan-European summit would thus also, as a matter of urgency, need to provide new impetus for conventional arms control and disarmament. This will not be easy, regardless of whether the objective remains the ratification of the amended KSE Treaty or the negotiation of a new treaty – a KSE II Treaty. Until then it would be important to renew the transparency required under the Treaty. Bilateral security arrangements would have to be reconsidered and transferred to a common security system. The planned deployment of US defence missile systems should therefore be suspended for the time being. A coordinated approach could then be agreed with Russia, incorporating the Bucharest NATO resolution. A new treaty limiting missile defence would make sense in that respect. All the signs point to change: Disarmament and arms control appear to be on the brink of a revival, especially since the economic crisis now weighs heavily on the United States and Russia. These are bad times for expensive and strategically questionable arms projects. In addition, Russia and the United States need each other; that is the pragmatic side to the new friendly dialogue. The change in leadership in Washington provides the opportunity to clear away the mess left over from the Bush era and to freely improve relations or even to place them on a new, cooperative foundation.

3. Conclusion

The Russian diagnosis – namely, that the objectives of the Charter of Paris have not been achieved and that there are security deficits in Europe – is in principle perfectly accurate. There is indeed a need, therefore, to discuss the gaps in the European security system. The idea of holding a pan-European summit conference to that end also seems sensible. The suggestion that a binding security treaty could be agreed at that summit can also hardly be criticised per se. The content of such a treaty would be decisive, however. Principles and rules require institutions that help with their implementation. Which institutions should take on that task in Europe? Along with a revival of security policy in the OSCE, stronger institutionalised cooperation between Moscow and Brussels would be of great benefit to European security. The conclusion that remains is that without incorporating existing building blocks, any attempt at reform would fail, achieving the exact opposite of what was intended, which is the establishment of a pan-European peace order on the basis of trust and security guarantees, able to overcome the new factual division of Europe. Ideally, the pan-European security conference that Medvedev has suggested holding could lead to a “Helsinki II” and a new Charter that is operatively enhanced by security policy.
Russia is often called a revisionist power. The reasons for this are obvious. Firstly, Russia itself has undergone substantial transformations. The current economic crisis notwithstanding, Russia’s economic, political and to some degree military power has increased significantly in the past decade, in comparison with the state of the country in the first 10 years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now Russia wants the world not only to acknowledge its successes but also to afford it the respect and admiration these successes demand. Any speculations that the economic crisis will significantly change Russia’s foreign policy have so far shown little tangible evidence, which is in fact also the case for the other global players affected by the crisis.

Secondly, twenty years after the end of the Cold war, Russia has still failed to find its place in the "western", or Trans-Atlantic, community. Russia is of course a member of the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the UN Security Council. It has developed close ties with NATO though the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and with the EU through multi-layered dialogues and agreements on four common spaces. However, these agreements have not given Russia an effective veto over NATO and EU decisions and have thus reinforced its sense of exclusion and isolation when these organizations, and NATO in particular, make decisions which Russia sees as contradicting its own national interests, such as the Bucharest NATO summit’s commitment to one day grant membership to Ukraine and Georgia.

Russia’s Proposals for the European Security Treaty: The Way Ahead

Oksana Antonenko
Thirdly, Russia feels increasingly isolated and insecure in its own neighborhood, post-Soviet Eurasia. Russia still views security in geographic terms. It wants to establish what President Medvedev called the zone of privileged interests along its borders, where Russia is accepted as the key player. These ambitions are based not on strength, but on weakness and insecurity. Russian decision-makers feel that if Russia’s interests are challenged in Eurasia and Russia is seen to be unable to defend them, then Russia’s own internal cohesion, stability and security will be undermined. This perception is rooted in many centuries of history and is rarely challenged by Russian elites or the Russian public.

However, Russia’s ability to exercise its influence – be it soft or hard power – in the neighborhood has become increasingly limited, as others engage in the region in defense of their national or collective interests. In Central Asia both the US and China are now important players; in the Ukraine and recently in the South Caucasus the EU and the US are increasingly involved. The recently launched EU’s “Eastern Partnership” will include some of Russia’s closest allies, Belarus and Armenia. As long as Russia rejects integration with either the EU or NATO, it will always face the dilemma of how to retain its prominence in Eurasia when others – such as Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and possibly someday Belarus – seek such integration.

The fourth reason behind Russia’s revisionism is an attempt to maintain the status quo in a rapidly changing world. Russia does not agree with the legacy of the Cold War as it has been interpreted in the West: it does not accept that it lost. It has been unable to reconcile its own claims to the Soviet legacy. Russia feels uneasy that the EU is launching its Eastern Partnership (EP) without it, but refuses to participate in any program – including EP’s predecessor the European Partnership Program (ENP) – which fails to recognize Russia’s uniqueness and power. These contradictions are unlikely to be reconciled any time soon.

So is Russia’s revisionism good or bad? Should it be encouraged or rebuffed? Should Russia’s proposals serve as a basis for constructive discussion and as an impetus for changing the European security order, or should they be used simply to expose Russia’s own contradictions and hold it accountable for commitments it has made but failed to implement? The answer to this question often depends on the geographic point of reference. Some European states view Russia as perennially hostile and consider any attempt to compromise with Russian demands as appeasement. Other states, in contrast, see Russia’s proposals as necessary building blocks of trust for developing long-term security and stability in Europe.

1. Opportunities and challenges

President Medvedev’s proposal to conclude a new European Security Treaty, which was first articulated in Berlin prior to the August war and steadily expanded thereafter, represents both challenges and opportunities for Russia, Eurasia (NIS) and the Euro-Atlantic community.

The opportunities are obvious. Such a treaty could help to overcome the dangerous drift towards Cold War thinking both in Russia and in Europe, which has been amplified by NATO enlargement, the Bush Administration’s unilateral interventionism around the globe and Russia’s use of force in Georgia in August 2008. Almost any dialogue by definition could be seen as a confidence-building measure, let alone a frank and comprehensive dialogue of the kind which could be branded a “Helsinki plus” process (as proposed by OSCE and the EU officials). For Russia this dialogue is an opportunity to overcome geo-political marginalization within a wider Europe, to develop a modus vivendi with the West in Eurasia and to assert its credentials as a constructive power in the sphere of European security, which has been eroded by recent tensions with NATO and the EU.
For the Euro-Atlantic community the opportunities could be equally significant. On the one hand, it could discourage Russia’s aggressive and unilateralist behavior, obtain reaffirmation of the key principles of the Paris Charter which have recently been sidelined, and could also seek to obtain official acceptance from Moscow of the other powers’ legitimate engagement in the common neighborhood of post-Soviet Eurasia. Moreover, such dialogue could even lead to cooperation with Russia on such issues as the resolution of frozen conflicts or conventional arms control, not to mention bringing the European security agenda to the attention of the US, which may be focused elsewhere in light of other formidable economic and global challenges faced by the Obama Administration. The dialogue could serve as a vehicle to reinvigorate the OSCE and to develop a clearer division of labor among various regional institutions, including NATO, the OSCE and the EU, with regard to the old and new security agendas.

For Eurasian states, particularly those which aspire to European and Euro-Atlantic integration, the benefits could be also significant. On the one hand, their presence around the table will assure that no deals are made over their heads. Moreover, any new agreement could help to reduce the zero-sum dynamic in relations between Russia and the West in Eurasia. On the other hand, any potential softening of Russia’s opposition to EU and NATO enlargement could increase their chances for closer integration within the broadly defined Euro-Atlantic community.

Despite the clear benefits, the potential costs are also significant. Firstly, entering into an open-ended comprehensive discussion will only expose differences. Secondly, there is no chance to aspire to a new legally binding Treaty, as no such treaty has any prospect of being ratified by all members of the Euro-Atlantic community. Thirdly, entering into a discussion of principles, which have been continuously violated, will deliver no consensus and threaten to further erode trust in the existing mechanisms. Fourthly, any discussion of narrowly defined European security (or security in Europe) could expose the growing marginalization of the European role in the global security agenda. Fifthly, any discussions of post-Cold war history and the Soviet legacy will be extremely divisive for the European states themselves. Finally, any attempts to change the European security architecture could further weaken the credibility of its institutions at a time when these institutions are required to deliver results in Afghanistan and other regions. Moreover, there are still lingering suspicions among some European states that Russia’s proposals are essentially designed to weaken NATO and the US role in Europe or to claim a de facto veto on NATO and EU decisions.

2. Pragmatic approach

The way to reconcile opportunities and challenges with regard to President Medvedev’s proposals is to adopt a pragmatic forward-looking approach. The discussions should focus on concrete problems for European and Eurasia security and approach them not through a theoretical, norm-setting dialogue, but in the spirit of problem-solving. In other words, the success of this exercise – which is likely to take years – should be measured not in terms of fostering Russian-Western reconciliation, or correcting the legacy of two post-Cold war decades in Russian-Western relations, or reforming the European security architecture (or creating new institutions such as the European Security Council), but rather by developing new approaches and new instruments for addressing the tangible and urgent problems facing Europe and Eurasia. Such an approach is likely to achieve consensus, create added value and promote real confidence-building processes in Russian-Western relations. However, it is also the most difficult approach to take, compared for example with open-ended discussions of general principles and norms.
Such norms and principles are nonetheless more likely to be accepted by all states if they emerge from the successful resolution of actual problems faced by Russia and other members of the Euro-Atlantic/Eurasian region.

The Russian-Georgian war in South Ossetia in August demonstrated that Europe’s security challenges did not end with the conclusion of the Cold war and the Balkan wars. In fact, both the scale and the geographic scope of problems which directly impact Euro-Atlantic/Eurasian security have been growing in recent years. Today we live with a sense of growing crisis. The issues which need to be addressed as part of the European Security Dialogue proposed by President Medvedev include the following:

1. The August war demonstrated that we need new multi-institutional conflict prevention mechanisms as well as completely new approaches for resolving protracted regional conflicts in the Caucasus and in Moldova, not to mention Kosovo and Cyprus. Within this basket of issues new approaches could be developed for engaging with partly recognized entities/states without undermining respect for the sovereignty of recognized states.

2. Russia’s decision to suspend its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, following many years of non-ratification of its Adapted version by other signatories, has created a major crisis in Europe’s conventional arms control mechanisms. It was these mechanisms, including the CFE, which prompted the “post-modern” definition of Europe. Now we need to return to the drawing board and decide whether the CFE can be saved, and if not, how it can be replaced to promote predictability, transparency and confidence-building.

3. The global economic crisis has had a major impact on Europe, the US, Russia and Eurasia. It is important to assess the nature of this impact and to develop regional mechanisms to address its consequences, as well as to examine potential contributions of the Euro-Atlantic family to finding global solutions.

4. The “human dimension” offers new challenges, with democratic processes being to a large extent suspended outside of the enlarged EU area of Europe and Eurasia. It is important to examine new engines for political change in the absence of EU membership incentives and to promote good governance and fundamental rights in what have emerged as only superficially democratic states.

5. New challenges – from the environment to energy security to global pandemics – require new multi-institutional solutions in broader Europe and Eurasia.

6. Migration, organized crime, border security and freedom of travel within broader Europe have to be examined and resolved within the wider context of regional and global trends.

7. Finally, Europe’s contribution to addressing global security problems such as non-proliferation, terrorism and the problems of Afghanistan and the Middle East can be discussed and reassessed.

This is by no means an exhaustive list, as other problems exist and each of the abovementioned categories can be broken down further. However, this list serves as a fairly accurate indicator of the scale of the problems we face. In order to address these threats a number of strategically important questions need to be answered:

1. What will a win-win approach for Russian-Western engagement in post-Soviet Eurasia look like? Is Russia prepared to accept EU, NATO and the EU as constructive players and partners in Eurasia? And vice-versa: Can the West accept Russia as a force for good in Eurasia?

2. How can we redefine the notion of indivisible security in the current environment, where no rapid future enlargement of the EU or NATO is likely to take place and where any such enlargement is viewed by Russia as a strategic threat?
3. How can we move from a “semblance” of resolution of protracted conflicts to effective conflict management and conflict transformation?

4. How can we integrate Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and other partially recognized entities into regional security mechanisms, assuming that they will not receive full recognition in the foreseeable future or that their partial recognition will be revoked in the short- to medium-term perspective?

5. How do we redefine the notion of comprehensive security in the modern world by both expanding the traditional definition of security and by applying a comprehensive multi-dimensional approach to finding solutions to traditional security challenges?

6. Where do the boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic region end, and who should sit at the table when discussing the security of wider Central Asia or the wider Middle East? What type of interaction can be developed with other regional organizations – such as the SCO or CSTO – which are rooted in a different value system, yet can offer real instruments for solving problems on Europe’s periphery?

7. How can we get the European public interested in security at a time of economic crisis? In what capacities must Europe address the crisis? Can Russia offer solutions for certain capability gaps and under which circumstances?

8. How far can Russia-NATO relations evolve? Can we think about a possible path towards integration? Can more substantial cooperation and a fundamental change of perceptions, particularly on the Russian side, be achieved without opening the door towards closer integration at a later stage? Can NATO afford to ignore Russian perceptions indefinitely?

9. How would a more positive US-Russian relationship impact Russian-European relations? What role can Europe play in supporting and expanding US-Russian strategic arms control commitments? What new approaches can be proposed for dealing with nuclear proliferation challenges?

Again, these are just a few of the questions which require new strategic thinking and political will for finding solutions. Thus far, such solutions are not yet on offer. Instead, most of the attention has focused on defining the process for discussing Russian President Medvedev’s proposals. It appears that there is a broad consensus, further reinforced by the active engagement of the Greek Chairmanship, that most of the discussions will take place within the OSCE and that even if the OSCE cannot offer answers to all questions it should at least act as a clearing-house for ideas and proposals. At the same time, other regional organizations such as the EU and NATO will be formulating their own positions, as will individual states. The next major milestone in discussions will be the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Corfu, organized by the Greek OSCE chairmanship. Its recommendations could be further developed at the OSCE summit in Athens in December. However, given the complexity and the ambition of the initiative, the official process should be supplemented by expert discussions, which could produce more forward-looking ideas and proposals for consideration.
The Partnership between the Russian Federation and the European Union

Sergey Kulik

The development of relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union is one of the priorities of Russia’s foreign policy and economic diplomacy. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by the President, states that our country “shall develop its relationship with the European Union as one of its main trade, economic and foreign policy partners, and advocate all possible means to strengthen the mechanisms of cooperation, including the corresponding formation of common spaces in the spheres of economics, external and internal security, education, science and culture.”

Russia regards the European Union as a natural strategic partner, bound by economic complementarity, centuries-old trade and economic relations, shared socio-cultural roots, common civilized principles and values, and an intertwined history and future.

We are presently experiencing a rather complex period in our relations. In this regard it is clear that cooperation between Russia and the European Union must be improved in the near future in line with true partnership principles. Furthermore, it is necessary to prevent a return to the master-and-servant stereotype and to proceed based on the expediency of a pragmatic mutual understanding.

In political dialogue, the most serious problem is the inability of the parties to formulate a common strategic purpose and a corresponding direction for the further development of relations. This is partly conditioned by the excessive dependence of EU–Russia relations on the influence of external factors, above all, on the condition of Russia-US relations. In these circumstances, the countries of the European Union often seek to play the role of an independent center of power, quite possibly encouraging a degree of “soft” conflict between Russia and the US.

In the sphere of economics, cooperation between Russia and the European Union is hampered by the unconstructive position of the EU concerning the accession of Russia into the WTO and the constant introduction of new unilateral requirements from Brussels. At the same time, the individual member states of the European Union have taken practical steps to restrict the access of Russian investments and business to their markets, while the European Union remains reluctant to engage in a constructive discussion of a mutually beneficial and predictable investment regime.

With the current conceptual deficit and difficulties in Russia-EU relations, as well as the contradictions among EU countries as they seek to form a common constructive position, the realization of an officially declared purpose of relations – a strategic partnership – cannot move to a qualitatively new level. The conflict in the Caucasus has contributed to this, but it does not prevent the initiation of a serious and specific dialogue about the prospects of cooperation between Russia and the European Union.

It is necessary to profoundly reconsider the philosophy and strategic orientation of EU–Russia relations, to define and conceptualize the mutual interests of Russia and the countries of the European Union, and to develop appropriate plans for long-term rapprochement. Key issues for the normalization and enhancement
of relations include such topics for discussion as: the role of Russia and the EU in the world; the presence of common strategic interests among the parties and foundations for their joint realization; and the definition of specific mechanisms for increasing mutual trust and cooperation, including political and legal aspects.

An important stage along the path to the conceptualization of a new model of relations is the promotion of Russia’s own vision of the format and contents of the strategic agreement that should replace the PCA. At the same time, the new agenda of relations with the European Union proposed by Russia requires further detailed elaboration. This is complicated by the fact that Russia has not conclusively defined the content or scope of a future strategic partnership with the European Union. For its part, the European Union has been even less forthcoming with a vision of a future partnership.

In this regard, it is not necessary to focus on excessive negotiations “at all costs” to establish a new base document, but rather to take the opportunity for adequate assessment of the aims and issues for the foreseeable future: to enhance our relations to a qualitatively new level of cooperation in all possible areas, while simultaneously intensifying the search for innovative forms of cooperation.

At the same time, current complications in EU-Russia political relations and ambiguities in the international situation necessitate more active political dialogue with the EU and bilateral cooperation with the individual states of the European Union, especially the leading ones – as well as expanded cooperation among the institutions of civil society, including business and expert communities.

For Russia and the countries of the European Union, the preservation of positive elements in our relations and their transition to a qualitatively new level is of vital importance and cannot be sacrificed. Both parties must understand that only a genuine strategic partnership – and probably subsequent union – based on equality and global responsibility can prevent the potential marginalization of the European Union and Russia in the world and promote their accelerated development and preparedness to meet challenges and threats in the future.

Russia is interested in the most positive possible atmosphere for relations and further
cooperation with the European Union and is ready to take into account the global and regional interests of the EU member states. Such a policy, however, in no way implies a return to the practice of concessions to the West on important economic and political issues. Such concessions are particularly senseless as a tool of “mollification” of the position of the EU on unrelated political and military issues.

One important mechanism for strengthening positive elements in Russian-EU relations could be the continuation and even intensification of work within the framework of branch dialogues aimed at preparing cooperation agreements in individual sectors.
Programme

Sunday, February 8th, 2009

Afternoon Arrival of participants

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<td>20.00 – 22.00</td>
<td>Dinner at Inselhotel Hermannswerder</td>
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<td>Speaker: Manfred Stolpe, former Prime Minister of Brandenburg and Federal Minister of Transport</td>
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Monday, February 9th, 2009

9.30 – 9.45 Opening of the conference

Vyacheslav Nikonov, President, Unity for Russia Foundation, Moscow
Reinhard Krumm, Head, Office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Russia, Moscow

Morning Session New Security Structures in Europe

9.45 – 13.00 Chair: Reinhard Krumm, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Moscow

9.45 – 11.00 A European Model for New Common Security Institutions

Rolf Muetzenich (MP), Spokesman on Disarmament and Nonproliferation of the Social Democratic Group in the German Parliament, Berlin
Sergey Kulik, Director for International Development, Institute of Contemporary Development, Moscow
Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow (Russia and Eurasia), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

11.00 – 11.30 Coffee break

11.30 – 13.00 Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention in the Caucasus – Improving EU-Russian Cooperation

Hannes Swoboda (MEP), Deputy Chairman of the Socialist group in the European Parliament, Brussels
Andrey Zagorsky, Leading Research Fellow at the State University for International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow
Sabine Fischer, Senior Research Fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris

13.00 – 15.00 Luncheon
Afternoon - A New EU-Russian Approach to International Institutions

15.00 – 18.30  Chair: Vyacheslav Nikonov, President, Unity for Russia Foundation, Moscow

15.00 – 16.30  **United Nations 2020 – Effective and Efficient**

Vasily Likhachev, Member of the Federation Council (Senator), Deputy Head of the Committee for International Affairs, Moscow

Peter Wittig, Head, Directorate-General for the United Nations and Global Issues, German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

16.30 – 17.00  Coffee break

17.00 – 18.30  **Global Economic Governance 2020**

Ruslan Grinberg, Director, Institute of Economy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Sergey Afontsev, Leading research fellow, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Moscow

Wolfram Schrettl, Professor, Department of Economy, Free University Berlin

Gilles Lelong, Eastern European Department, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris

19.15  Transfer to Schloss Cecilienhof

20.00  Dinner at Schloss Cecilienhof

Guest Speaker:

Prof. Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin

*Member of the German Parliament, Chairwoman of the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid, former German Minister of Justice, Berlin*

Host:

Dr. Roland Schmidt

*Secretary General of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Berlin*
**Tuesday, February 10th, 2009**

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<td><strong>Social Division – A Threat to Stability in Europe?</strong></td>
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<td>Chair: Robert van de Water, Special Advisor on Enlargement and the Wider Europe, Socialists Fraction in the European Parliament, Brussels</td>
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<td>Angelica Schwall-Düren (MP), Deputy Chairman of the Social Democratic Group in the German Parliament, Berlin</td>
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<td>Vitaliy Tretyakov, Chief Editor of the Journal „Political Class“, Author and Chair of the weekly programme “What to do? Philosophical Discussions”, Moscow</td>
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<td>Bartosz Cichocki, Project Coordinator on Eastern Europe/Eurasia, PISM, Warsaw</td>
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<td><strong>10.30 – 11.00</strong></td>
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<td><strong>11.00 – 12.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Future of EU-Russian Cooperation</strong></td>
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<td>Chair: Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow (Russia and Eurasia), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London</td>
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<td>Hans-Henning Schröder, Head of the Research Unit Russia/CIS at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin</td>
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<td>Aleksey Gromyko, Head of the European programme, “Russkiy Mir” Foundation, Moscow</td>
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<td><strong>12.30 – 14.30</strong></td>
<td>Luncheon</td>
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**Afternoon**

**Departure**

**Russian Delegation: SU-112, 11th February, 09.50 Uhr Schoenefeld**
List of participants

Afontsev, Sergey
Leading research fellow, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Moscow

Antonenko, Oksana
Senior Fellow (Russia and Eurasia), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

Barysch, Katinka
Chief Economist at the Centre for European Reform, London

Buhbe, Matthes
Head, Department of Central and Eastern Europe, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Berlin

Bungarten, Pia
Head, Division for International Dialogue, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Berlin

Cichocki, Bartosz
Project Coordinator of Eastern Europe/Eurasia, PISM, Warsaw

Cleutinx, Christian
Director, Directorate General Energy and Transport, European Commission, Brussels

Däubler-Gmelin, Herta
Former Federal Minister of Justice, Member of the German Federal Parliament, Chairwoman of the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid, Berlin

Ms. Dachina
Russian Embassy, Berlin

Ernecker, Robert
Senior Officer for European Affairs, Office of the Deputy Chairwoman of the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group, German Federal Parliament, Berlin

Fischer, Sabine
Senior Research Fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris

Grinberg, Ruslan
Director, Institute of Economy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Götz, Sascha
Desk officer, Office of Günter Gloser (MP), State Minister at the Foreign Office, German Federal Parliament, Berlin

Gromyko, Aleksey
Head of the European Programme, „Russky Mir“ Foundation, Moscow

Hahn, Ottokar
Former Ambassador of the EU

Huterer, Manfred
Member of the Policy Planning Staff in the German Federal Foreign Ministry, Berlin

Ilyin, Archpriest Antoniy
Secretary of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Representation of the European Institutions, Deputy Chair of the European Russian Alliance
Kulik, Sergey  
Director for International Development, Institute of Contemporary Development, Moscow

Kretz, Jürgen  
Desk officer, Office of Gert Weisskirchen (MP), German Federal Parliament, Berlin

Krumm, Reinhard  
Head, National Office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in the Russian Federation, Moscow

Lelong, Gilles  
Eastern European Department, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris

Likhachev, Vasily  
Member of the Federation Council (Senator), Deputy Head of the Committee for International Affairs, Moscow

Lippert, Barbara  
Vice Director of the Institute for European Policy, Berlin

Lucas, Hans-Dieter  
Commissioner for Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

Markov, Sergey  
Member of the Russian Parliament

Meuser, Stephan  
Desk officer for Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Department of International Dialogue, Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, Berlin

Mützenich, Rolf  
MP, Spokesman on Disarmament and Nonproliferation of the Social Democratic Group in the German Federal Parliament, Berlin

Nikonov, Vyacheslav  
President, Unity for Russia Foundation, Moscow

Reichel, Ernst Wolfgang  
Head of Division for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

Schmidt, Roland  
Executive Director, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Berlin

Schrettl, Wolfram  
Department of Economics, Institute for East European Studies, Free University, Berlin

Schröder, Hans-Henning  
Head of the Research Unit Russia/CIS at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin

Schwall-Düren, Angelica  
Member of the German Parliament, Deputy Chairwoman of the Social Democratic Group in the German Parliament, Berlin

Swoboda, Hannes  
MEP, Vice President of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, Brussels
Stolpe, Manfred
Former Prime Minister of Brandenburg and Federal Minister of Transport

Tretyakov, Vitaliy
Chief Editor of the Journal “Political Class”

van de Water, Robert
Special Advisor on Enlargement and the Wider Europe, Socialists Fraction in the European Parliament, Brussels

von Hoerschelmann, Axel
Head of Division International Relations, State Chancellery, State of Brandenburg, Potsdam

Wittig, Peter
Head of Unit United Nations and Global Questions, German Federal Foreign Office

Zagorsky, Andrey
Leading Research Fellow at the State University for International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow

Zotova, Yekaterina
Head of the International Program, Unity for Russia Foundation, Moscow