European Integration in the Politics of the Accession Countries

In December 2002 the member states of the European Union agreed accession conditions with the candidate countries in Copenhagen; they signed the accession agreement in Athens in April 2003, and on 1 May 2004, 10 more states will enlarge the EU.

In most member states enlargement is bound up with hopes that Europe, together with the increase in states, people, and territory, will also acquire more economic and political power. Recently, however, the Iraq war revealed that diversity, also diversity in terms of different interests, identity-related attitudes and ideas will not necessarily be entirely beneficial to the EU or to its decision-making power. The EU did not speak with one voice and lost credibility as a partner of the USA which could be taken seriously, although it had just agreed its first Common Security and Defence Policy. From a party-political standpoint it was indicative that among the signatories of the letter from eight European leaders on Iraq there was one – although himself non-party – prime minister of a socialist-led government (Hungary) and one social democratic prime minister (Poland).

Transformation and Integration in Party Competition in the Accession Countries

With no longer 15 but in future 25 states this diversity will increase – and of the 10 accession countries 8 are East European, which just over a decade ago began in their foreign policy to strive for a “return to Europe” and not least therefore began to adapt to a social, economic, and political system which the European Union defined as one of the most urgent criteria for accession: democracy, the rule of law, a functioning market economy, and the adoption of community rules, standards, and policies, and so on – in short, the acquis communautaire.

With that, accession preparations continued the threefold post-communist system transformation from party dictatorship to democracy, from a planned to a market economy, and from the Eastern bloc to the open, global and European economy. Less smooth has been a fourth system transformation, the construction of a nation state, which six of the eight accession countries had to carry out from 1991 or 1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union (the three Baltic states), Yugoslavia (Slovenia), and Czechoslovakia (to a lesser extent the Czech Republic, more so Slovakia).

This difficult process of adaptation required a social consensus in the post-communist accession countries which had to be maintained in the face of costs and disappointments which were at first disregarded, but later became palpable. The political parties in Eastern Europe, including those on the Left, many of which emerged from the former state socialist parties, had to help to carry this consensus (or to break it). Although the frustrated electorates in Central and Eastern Europe punished and voted out almost every government after only one term of office, after every transfer of power there were only minor corrections to the policy of reform, system transformation and preparations for accession. In the case of the left-wing parties this was particularly striking, since transformation was basically a liberal project for the introduction of capitalism. The left-wing parties too now had to give their view on the “new” values and requirements of the EU, if they had already included them in their programme or – more in the case of parties still committed to communist objectives – had turned against the EU in its current form. The multipartisan consensus is also visible in the fact that the applications for membership were filed by governments of both liberal-conservative and left-wing orientation.

* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
The stance towards European integration unfolds along both of the axes which typically structure electoral competition: first, the socio-economic axis in respect of which the left-wing parties stand for stronger market regulation and redistribution, and second, the politics of identity axis in respect of which left-wing parties are against authoritarian-nationalist projects.  

Doubts concerning the European agreement can stem from fears concerning their distribution effects (strong in the case of Polish farmers and orthodox communists) or their consequences for the survival of national values (strong, for example, among the religious right in Poland). Regarding economic interests in respect of protection and distribution, however, the Left can hope, in relation to integration and globalisation, to regain some of the declining influence of the nation state at the European level. A further motive is the choice of a specific variety of capitalism (for example, Rhineland capitalism) by excluding those not compatible with the EU acquis. In this connection the left-wing parties are striving to protect the social components of the market economy, while liberals wish to avoid a feared return of elements of a planned economy.

Western European parties in the member states, particularly social democratic ones, have tried to direct their partners in the accession countries towards compatible development paths. For this purpose, particularly within the framework of the Socialist International (SI) or the Party of European Socialists (PES), the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity was useful, particularly within the framework of the Socialist International (SI) or the Party of European Socialists (PES), the European Framework for Democracy and Solidarity was useful, which for its part cooperated with foundations close to national political parties (for example, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Alfred-Mozer-Stiftung, Karl-Renner-Institut, Olof-Palme-Center, Fondation Jean Jaurès). The radical Left (for example, the German PDS through its Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung) too, sought to bind its European partners, even if this was difficult on account of their Euroscepticism (for example, in the case of the KSCM).

If one looks at the course and outcome of the accession negotiations it becomes clear from the host of conflicting demands and transitional regulations agreed in the end that the acquis and the structures and interests of the accession countries are not congruent. It is beyond the scope of this investigation to seek to understand which parties raised which demands and which ones were finally carried through or withdrawn at the conclusion of the negotiations.

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Connected with this are ideas concerning the further shaping of integration, the “future of Europe”, in both dimensions: first, in terms of the relationship between national sovereignty and supranational European competence, and second, in terms of the extension of “positive integration”, that is, the control and regulation of transnational markets which emerged due to “negative integration”. The Eurosceptical attitude of the former Czech prime minister and current state president Václav Klaus of the liberal-conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS) was founded on his economic-liberal rejection, for example, of the Common Agricultural Policy, as well as his desire to defend Czech sovereignty from attacks by “Brussels bureaucrats”. Figure 1 depicts this situation.

Figure 1: Accession-country political parties in the European political field

The grey circle represents the political positions permissible within the framework of the acquis and the Copenhagen Criteria. It leans towards a market-liberal orientation, since the EU is at present characterised more by market integration than by supranational market control and redistribution. Before the Amsterdam Treaty the position of the EU circle was even more inclined in this direction. The elected parties have exemplary positions which are either fully EU compatible (for example, the Polish Freedom Union UW, the Czech Social Democrats CSSD, the Hungarian Socialist Party MSzP) or more or less in conflict with European positions in one direction or the other, such as the Hungarian FIDESZ, the Czech ODS, Meciar’s HZDS in Slovakia, the Czech communists, or the Estonian Center Party EK – which before the referendum called on the voters to reject accession – or which lie well outside the EU consensus, such as A. Lepper’s Samoobrona in Poland. All these and many other positions will enrich European politics after accession.

The extent to which parties attempt to enhance their profile with a Euro-policy position, and particularly with a stance on EU accession, also depends on the importance of this theme in the society and politics of their country. A big party will not stand out directly against a broad consensus in favour of integration (see Tables 3 and 4), while in a more sceptical environment this can certainly be an option (for example, Estonia). Also important here is whether the parties in question form part of the government or not.

In this respect Central and Eastern Europe is not so different from current EU member states since the question of European integration plays a relatively minor role in current electoral competition. No really important and large party is against EU membership or accession. Even in countries whose population is relatively Eurosceptical, such as the UK, Sweden, and Denmark in the current EU, or the Baltic states among the accession countries (see Tables 3 and 4) the big parties are not totally against membership, but rather reject particular policies (for example, the single currency) or the further restriction of national sovereignty.

Table 3: Support for EU accession in the candidate countries (as a % of all responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer.

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6 It was the Common Agricultural Policy which caused Václav Klaus to demand that the EU revise its policy rather than force the candidate countries to adopt it. At which EU Commissioner van den Broek replied that it was the Czech Republic which wanted to join the EU, not the other way round.
Table 4: Evaluation of EU membership in the accession countries (autumn 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Neither-good nor bad</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Net positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oskar Niedermayer: Die öffentliche Meinung zur zukünftigen Gestalt der EU. Bevölkerungsorientierungen in Deutschland und den anderen EU-Staaten [Public opinion concerning the future of the EU. People’s attitudes in Germany and the other EU states], Bonn 2003, Table A13.

Although the advocates of accession achieved satisfactory, often massive majorities in the referendums, turnouts were often very low. The “yes”-vote as a proportion of all those entitled to vote therefore exceeded 50% only in Lithuania and Slovenia (see Table 5).

Table 5: Result of EU-accession referendums in the candidate countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (all 2003)</th>
<th>In favour</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>In favour (as a % of all those entitled to vote)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>64.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>10/11.5</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>7/8.6</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>16/17.5</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>13/14.6</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.mdr.de/eu/aktuell/938582.html

From the accession applications (Table 1) through the accession agreement (Table 2), up to the shaping of the future of the EU at the Convention (Table 6), the most important political parties in the accession countries have cooperated in European integration. The Left provided five of the members and five of the alternates at the Convention (out of 24+24 representatives in all), not including non-party representatives sent by left-wing governments.

Finally, the political system of the enlarged Europe will be constructed from the political systems of its member states. Only if the respective societies have reasonably compatible ideas concerning the nature and aims of Europe can European enlargement also entail greater political effectiveness. This short study attempts to examine, by way of their programmes and policies, how “amenable” the left-wing parties in the post-communist accession countries are in this respect.

Selection of Parties, Methodology and Sources

In order to get closer to answering this question we investigate the policies, as well as the statements and – if available – programmes of left-wing parties in the Eastern European accession countries (first round): Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Hungary. These parties constitute a channel for social communication, serve as vehicles for the most diverse interests and lines of reasoning, transform this into political action and so integrate their electorates in the political system overall. Parties compete – according to Stöss and Neugebauer – “by articulating values, and policies based on those values, which characterise their respective societies”. Beyond that, parties exercise significant influence over the result of a referendum – in our case the referendum on EU accession.  

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### Table 6: Representatives at the Convention and their party-political affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Government 2002</th>
<th>Government representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Centre-left</td>
<td>Jan KOHOUT (CSSD) Lenka Anna ROVNÁ (non-party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Centre-right</td>
<td>Leenart MERI (Samaalit/ non-party) Henrik HOLOLEI (Möödukad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Centre-left</td>
<td>Péter BALÁZS (M SzP) Péter GÖTFRIED (close to the M SzP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Centre-right</td>
<td>Sandra KALNIE-TE (LC) Roberts ZILE (TB/LNNK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Rytis MARTKONIS (non-party) Oskaras JUSYS (non-party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Centre-left</td>
<td>Danuta HÜBNER (non-party) Janusz TRZCIŃSKI (non-party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Centre-right</td>
<td>Ivan KORÉOK (non-party) Juraj MIGAŠ (non-party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Centre-left</td>
<td>Dimitrij RUPEL (LDS) Janez NAREIE (non-party)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What do we mean by “left-wing parties” or what parties are we talking about? Those investigated here are partly the successor parties of the former state socialist parties whose character is now overwhelmingly social democratic, for example, the SLD in Poland, the SDL in Slovakia or the MSzP in Hungary. Partly we are also describing parties which are not “successor parties” in origin, for example, the historical Czech social democratic party (CSSD) which was founded as early as 1878, was merged with the Communist Party in 1948 and in 1990 re-emerged as an independent party; or the Polish Union of Labor (UP) which resulted from a split in the Solidarnosc movement. The KSCM in the Czech Republic represents something of an exception, since it retains the word “Communist” in its name and is committed to corresponding aims. There are a number of other, smaller and de facto less significant parties in Hungary (MSZDP) and Slovakia (SSSD) which we shall not take into account. Table 7 constitutes a list of the parties with which we are concerned.

As regards the sources of this work we tried in the first instance to get to grips with the parties’ European policies by means of primary sources, such as party programmes, statements made by senior party figures, interviews, and so on. Whenever the sources were very sparse we had to resort to secondary sources. In general the material was – both qualitatively and quantitatively – very variable, particularly with reference to size and organisational structure and whether they participate in government or are represented in parliament.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Representative of the national parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Jan ZAHRADIL (ODS) Josef ZIELENIEC (US-DEU) Petr NE EAS (ODS) František KROUPA (KDU-ČSL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Tunne KELAM (BSamaalit) Rein LANG (ER) Liina TÖNNISSON (EK) Urmas REINSALU (ResP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>József SZAJER (FIDESZ) Pál VASTAGH (M SzP) András KELEMEN (MDF) István SZENT-IVÁNYI (SZDSZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Riikards PIKS (TP/Lienerie) LIEPINA (LP) Guntars KRASTS (TB/LNNK) Arturs KRISJANIS KARINS (LP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Vytenis ANDRIUKAITIS (LSDP) Algirdas GRICIUS (Union of Liberals and Centrists) Gintautas ŠIVICKAS (NS) Eugenijus MALDEIKIS (Liberal Democrats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Jozef OLEKSY (SDL) Edmund WITTBRODT (Senat 2001 Bloć*) Marta FOGLER, (PO) Genowefa GRABOWSKA (Klub Senacki SDL-UP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Jan FIGEL (KDH) Irena BELOHORSKÁ (HZDS) Zuzana MARTINAKOVA (SDKU) Boris ZALA (Smer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Jelko KACIN (LDS) Alojz PETERLE (Ns) Franc HORVAT (ZLSD) M Ihael BRECE (SDS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decision to rely also on primary sources was based on the one hand on the fact the European policy of post-communist or left-wing parties in Eastern Europe has so far been dealt with in only a rudimentary fashion in the literature, and on the other hand our conviction that societal European-policy discourse was mirrored in the programmes and speeches of the parties and party elites or that they influenced one another and so express the basic position of the electorate. The objection that such sources amount to little more than “cheap talk” and that their investigation does not add to our knowledge can be refuted by the fact that it is not the motives of the speaker but the addressee’s interpretation of a speech act which counts. “The motive of the ‘perpetrator’, of the discourse participant, therefore, strictly speaking plays no role as regards the outcome of discourse”. 11

Alongside the primary sources we relied on sources which describe the European policy of the accession countries in a general fashion. Particularly when the left-wing parties under investigation here participate in government, government actions count as an expression of a position shared or at least tolerated by these parties.

**Comparison of Accession Candidates**

In what follows we will describe the parties listed above, their embedding in the party system of their respective country and, in particular, their European policy stance. We start with an overview of the composition of parliament, the government parties and the results of the EU accession referendum. Our second step will be to analyse the available statements and programmes of the individual parties.

**Poland**

Both of the parties examined here – the “Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej” (Union of the Democratic Left – SLD) and “Unia Pracy” (Union of Labor – UP) have formed a ruling coalition since September 2001, having won 41% of the votes and 193 of the 460 MPs in the Sejm or Parliament, as well as 75 of the 100 Senators. 11

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The SLD is the social democratic reformed successor party of the old state socialist party. It won the election in 1993 and the government which it led together with the Polish Peasant Party made the Polish accession application in 1994. During its 1993–97 term of office and also since 2001 it has decisively driven the Polish reform and EU preparation process. The SLD prime minister (1995–96) Józef Oleksy sat as representative of the parliament in the European Convention. During the accession negotiations the party was better able to reach agreement with the EU than its conservative predecessor, since unlike them it did not have to take account of strong Eurosceptical forces within its own camp.12

In the EU Accession referendum on 7 and 8 June 2003, 77.45% voted in favour of accession to the European Union and 22.55% against. The turnout was 58.85%.13 Before the referendum four of the parties represented in parliament had backed accession – the SLD, the “Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe” (Polish Peasant Party - PSL), the “Platforma Obywatelska” (Citizens’ Platform - PO) and “Prawo i Sprawiedliwość” (Law and Justice – PiS). Among the opponents of accession were the two national-conservative parties, the “Liga Polskich Rodzin” (Polish Families League – LPR) and the “Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej” (Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland - ŻS).14


The SLD was founded before the parliamentary elections in 1992. It consists of around 30 groupings, including the “Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej” [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland – SdRP] and the “Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych” [All-Polish Accord of Trade Unions – OPZZ].15 The SLD is an alliance of successor parties of the former Communist Party, but it no longer describes itself – in contrast to the Union of Labor (UP) – as openly left-wing and clearly distances itself, particularly in terms of economics, from its former socialist objectives.16 The SLD has even been criticised as “crypto-liberal” by its current coalition partner, the UP, which on account of its trade union past (Solidarnosc) represents a stronger social-protection orientation.17 In the Polish party spectrum, however, they represent – just like the weak liberal Right – pro-European positions, while a large part of the religious Right and rural parties range from sceptical to positively anti-European. The Alliance called on its voters before the referendum to vote in favour of accession.18

Our description of the SLD’s European policy stance is based on statements by the Polish Foreign Minister, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (SLD), and the President of the Sejm’s [lower chamber of parliament] European Committee, Józef Oleksy (SLD). These statements concentrate above all on security and the EU’s Eastern policy. They emphasise the significance of the EU as a community with shared values, but this – both quantitatively and qualitatively – plays a comparatively minor role.

Three “institutions of security” in particular are associated with the security aspect: the USA, NATO, and both the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the common European security and defence policy (ESDP). Foreign minister Cimoszewicz makes it clear that the security of Poland is the principal goal of Polish foreign policy and that the guaranteeing of this security is directly linked to NATO membership. He also supports the development of the CFSP and the ESDP, while underlining that one aim of this development should be support for the USA. That is, Europe should not become “stronger” for its own sake or a counter-weight to the USA, but rather in order to be a stronger

Fallstudien [Communist and post-communist parties in Eastern Europe. Selected case studies], München 2002, pp. 70f.
18 According to Mildenberger within the leadership populist anti-Western voices occasionally make themselves felt; see Markus Mildenberger: Der Europäische Integrationsprozess aus Sicht der Beitrittskandidaten Polen, Tschechien und Slowakei [The European integration process from the view point of accession candidates Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia], DGAP-Jahrbuch 2000, p. 187.
partner of the USA, because Europe's security in turn depends upon the USA and the transatlantic cooperation.\textsuperscript{19} For this reason a European security and defence identity should be kept within NATO structures and not detached from the alliance.\textsuperscript{20} Cimoszewicz makes it clear that Poland is striving to become the main partner not of the European countries but of the USA:

“Through cooperation and dialog with the USA we will strive to exert adequate influence on decisions concerning the policy of NATO towards the states of Central and Eastern Europe, especially on the issues regarding the further enlargement of the Alliance and its partnership with Russia. In this way we would like to consolidate the image of Poland as the main partner of the United States in the region and one of the most important partners of the USA in Europe.”\textsuperscript{21}

This verbal confirmation of Polish solidarity was shortly followed by deeds when Prime Minister Leszek Miller (SLD), with seven other European leaders, signed the letter “Europe and America must stand united”, which supported the US position on Iraq.\textsuperscript{22}

The second main emphasis of Polish European policy is the relationship with the non-EU-accession countries of Eastern Europe. For all the importance which Poland attaches to its relationship with the West it has a strong interest in not shutting out “the East” and once more having to endure a division of the continent. Asked what it meant when the President of the European Commission Prodi on a number of occasions mentioned that Poland was important for the EU in relation to influence in the East Cimoszewicz replied:

“We attach particular importance to building a civic society - a fundamental guarantee that all democratic tendencies will be lasting, […] Poland’s task will consist in explaining, motivating and directing our European partners to define the policy toward Eastern Europe exactly in this fashion”\textsuperscript{23}

There are no developed ideas concerning the future structure or “finality” of the EU in the statements of SLD members. Only the President of the Sejm’s European Committee, Józef Oleksy (SLD), has anything to say on that subject within the framework of a debate on the future of Europe. Here too, however, he only vaguely endorses a federal system, while the details will only be discussed after Eastern enlargement.\textsuperscript{24}

Unia Pracy – Union of Labor (UP)

The UP was founded in 1992 after the merger of some smaller parties belonging to the left wing of Solidarity. It describes itself as the only Polish party which is openly left-wing and is oriented towards Western European social democratic and socialist parties. Its economic policy orientation differs markedly from that of the SLD, and the UP feels itself - in keeping with its name - to be committed to the interests of the workers. In 1996 it was admitted to the Socialist International (SI) along with the SDRP.\textsuperscript{25}

Only half a page of the UP’s programme is devoted to European policy. The UP endorses EU accession but only on condition that Poland’s importance – in comparison with the other accession countries - is also taken into consideration in the EU, that Poland is not treated as a second-class EU member, and is not overburdened materially or financially.\textsuperscript{26} Its attitude is neither that of a Eurosceptic nor that of a Euroenthusiast.

Czech Republic

The current Czech government was elected in June 2002. It is a coalition between the “Česká strana sociálně demokratická” (Czech Social Democratic Party - CSSD), the “Křesťanská a demokratické unie – Československá strana lidová” (Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovakian People’s Party – KDU-CSL), and the “Česká strana sošeď” (Czech Social Democratic Party – CSSD), the “Křesťanská a demokratické unie – Československá strana lidová” (Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovakian People’s Party – KDU-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} See Center for International Relations: The Future of Europe in the Opinion of Polish Politicians. Transcript of a Debate, Reports & Analyses 1, 2002.
\end{footnotes}
\end{footnotesize}
and the “Unie Svobody – Demokratická unie” (Freedom Union – Democratic Union – US-DEU). The Social Democrats emerged from the election as the strongest party with 30.2% of the vote, in front of the conservative “Občanská demokratická strana” (Civic Democratic Party - ODS) with 24.47%, and the neo-communist “Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy” (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia – KSCM) with 18.51%. The KSCM is the only Czech party which increased its share of the vote.

In the referendum on EU accession on 13 and 14 June 2003 the Czech people returned a clear majority in favour: 77.3% of the voters said “yes” to the EU with a turnout of 55.2%. The share of “yes”-votes by individual party was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Share of “yes”-votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDU-CSL</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSD</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSCM</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (non-party.)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high proportion of “yes”-votes among ODS voters is astonishing given the frequent statements of long-time ODS president Václav Klaus criticising Europe and also the distance which the ODS maintains in relation to many European policies and structures. Presumably most opponents abstained.

Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD)

The CSSD is pursuing an unequivocally pro-European course. This also gives it a favourable position in relation to its main opponent, the ODS. Within the framework of speeches given by high-ranking party members, party resolutions and election programmes the party takes a position on the European value system, European identity, economic and political integration, and the institutional character of the EU. The Czech prime minister Václav Spidla (CSSD) favours stronger integration in such areas as common foreign and security policy and environmental policy and at the same time emphasises the need to strengthen the supranational element of the EU:

“the Czech Republic […] will support that the future European Community will continue […] integration in areas of vital common interest (common foreign and security policy, refugee and immigration policy, solutions of environmental problems, protection of outer borders, [the fight against crime] and the fight against terrorism). […] Therefore we support the preservation of the strong, initiative[-taking] role of [the] Commission […]”

At the same time, his party emphasises – and this can appear in one respect complementary and contradictory in another – the strengthening of the European Parliament and of the national states, which should have equal weight with the EU, the national and cultural identities of the individual states, and the principle of subsidiarity.

“The CSSD supports a deepening of economic and political integration in Europe [through] a gradual strengthening of the democratic and federative elements in its development and the respecting of the national and cultural independence of individual states and regions. […] The CSSD presumes that it is necessary to strengthen the status of the European Parliament and the European Commission in a system of EU bodies.”

It is not easy to trace a clear line between the endorsement of stronger integration and supranational elements and the strengthening of nation states against the European Union. On the one hand, the CSSD regards as positive the development of economic integration along the lines of the single currency and also political integration, such as the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the common European security...
uality and defence policy (ESDP), considering them to be absolutely necessary for the formation of a European identity. The advent of the EU as a more united, stronger actor alongside the USA and the urgency of its intervention in international conflicts are also stressed. On the other hand, the CSSD wants to see the influence of the nation states - whether politically, culturally or identity-related - guaranteed and pleads this cause vehemently: "The party will never advocate entry to a community in which the voice of the Czech Republic would not be heard and in which it couldn't influence the range of issues that directly concern it."

The equally strong emphasis on the national and the European identity must by no means be taken as contradictory: on the one hand, it could be a matter of the construction of "multiple" identities, and on the other it can be attributed to the fact that the Czech identity is very closely linked to the European one. It is continually stressed that the Czechs have always been part of the European family, that the Second World War "ripped the Czech lands out of Europe", and that the opportunity had now offered itself to return to Europe, and to declare loyalty to the principles of "human rights, legal order and social justice". It appears that the socialist period is regarded as something of an intermezzo which divided the Czechs both historically and culturally from their European roots. In this connection, however, the CSSD always adds that the Czech Republic's accession to the EU is a matter of mutual "give and take", Western and Eastern Europe depend on one another, a merger is in the interests of both sides, and the Czech Republic is not coming as just a "recipient-country" to the EU, but:

"The CSSD is convinced that the Czech Republic will not enter the EU only with open hands but will contribute to the development of the EU by means of its dynamically blossoming economy, advanced agriculture, educated and creative workforce, rich and diverse culture, the rapidly improving state of its environment and high consumer protection standards." The CSSD leaves no doubt concerning whether the Czech Republic will be a "self-confident and independent" EU member, as Spidla put it after the positive outcome of the EU referendum in June 2003.

The protagonists of the CSSD's foreign policy, former foreign minister Kavan and former prime minister Zeman, in 2003 represented unequivocally federal positions as regards the future of Europe. They wanted an economically and socially strong Europe with both social justice and ecological sensitivity. They supported the "Community method" and rejected resort to flexible integration for the creation of an "exclusive hard core". The Czech Republic's Neo-Communists (KSCM)

The KSCM advocates European integration but is strongly opposed to the EU in its current form. The KSCM expressly emphasises that the Czech Republic's future does not lie in isolation; that integration, both economic and political, is one of its central issues; and that the development of this integration will lead to both greater economic efficiency and cultural enrichment. At the same time, it takes the view that the European Union is not capable of handling this development in the right way:


41 See Kai-Olaf Lang, op. cit., pp. 20-22.

“However, it [the KSCM] does not overlook the harsh pressures in the present European Union, which are aimed at restricting social certainties, or the mushrooming bureaucracy and rising profits of the biggest transnational monopolies, made at the expense of wide sections of the population. We reject the EU in its current form.”

Although the project of economic and political integration should not be in the hands of the EU as currently constituted the KSCM does accept, for example, the Social Charter, EU environmental policy, and aid programmes for regional development. However, the party rejects the European Central Bank. One area which according to the KSCM should not be integrated into the EU - and definitely not in NATO - is security and defence policy. The Communists regard the OSCE as an alternative which could constitute “a realistic and efficient structure of European security”: 

“The KSCM emphatically rejected NATO membership and promoted the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as an alternative.”

The KSCM pleads consistently against the further “Americanisation” of the European continent and for the creation of an alternative to the EU, for a “common project for a socialist Europe”. In so far as the common European security and defence policy (ESDP) serves the purpose of developing an independent European policy separate from the American line the KSCM supports it.

As regards the referendum on EU accession, to begin with it was mainly the Communists who came out strongly in support of the people being given the opportunity to decide. In the course of the national debate on EU accession the KSCM’s formulations became increasingly clear and ended up by calling for the rejection of accession. In the International Herald Tribune the KSCM president was quoted as follows on the outcome of the referendum:

“People can expect to be disillusioned. The conditions we negotiated for our country are bad.”

Deputy leader Václav Exner expressed himself in similar fashion at a press conference at KSCM party headquarters:

“We continue to take the view that the accession conditions negotiated by the Czech government, like the accession conditions negotiated by the new member states in general, are unfavourable. The outcome of the referendum has done nothing to change that.”

Slovakia

Since the last general election in September 2002 Slovakia has been governed by a coalition consisting of the centrist “Slovenska demokraticka a krestanska unia” (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – SDKU), the Hungarian minority party “Strana madarskej koalicie” (Party of the Hungarian Coalition – SMK), the Christian-Democratic “Krestanskodemokraticke hnutie” (Christian Democratic Movement – KDH) and the liberal “Aliancia nového obcana” (Alliance of a New Citizen – ANO).

This broad coalition was necessary in order to prevent the return to power of Vladimir Meciar and his populist “Movement for a Democratic Slovakia” (HZDS), which, despite heavy losses was, with almost 20% of the vote, still the strongest party at the 2002 election. Meciar, with his nationalist-authoritarian policy, had long blocked further EU integration. As a result Slovakia was not included in the Luxembourg group of first candidates in 1997. In 1998, however, a broad democratic coalition managed to remove Meciar (as had previously been achieved in 1994, but only temporarily). The SDL was part of both coalitions (1994 and 1998).

At the referendum on 16 and 17 May 2003 the Slovaks showed that they were to some extent weary of voting: only 52% of the electorate, a mere 2% above the minimum 50% required for the vote to be valid,
found their way to the polling booths, although they came out surprisingly strongly in favour of accession: 92.5% of voters backed EU accession. According to surveys the Slovak people associate the EU with “prosperity” and hope to find a solution to their economic and social problems through EU accession.

In Slovakia the Left is deeply split and weak, not least because their electoral potential was for a long time drawn off by the HZDS. The two Socialist International member parties, the historical Social Democrats (SDSS) and the successor party of the former Communists, the SDL, are no longer represented in parliament. The SDSS has never achieved an important political role in its own right, but only as part of a coalition, for example, with the SDL. In parliament the Left is represented by the orthodox Communists (KSS) and a new party, “Smer” (“Direction”).

The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL)

Since the 2002 election the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), whose share of the vote fell from over 13% to 1.4%, is no longer represented in parliament. However, the SDL was prominently represented in both anti-Meciar coalitions, in 1994 and 1998. Up to 2002 the party provided the finance minister, Brígita Schmögnerova, who drew much criticism for her reform-oriented austerity measures, and the defence minister. Internal party conflicts led to the resignation of Schmögnerova and ultimately to electoral defeat. The SDL was always one of the driving forces behind Slovakian EU accession. At the first meeting of the National Convention on the Future of Europe both Jozef Migaš, at that time Speaker of the Parliament and SDL party chairman, and Peter Weiss, at that time chairman of the parliament’s foreign policy committee and SDL founding chairman, spoke. Migaš was in favour of a Europe of citizens, federal structures, and a strengthening of the European Parliament. Weiss underlined the political significance of European unification and of the European Social Model and called for the incorporation of the Charter of Human Rights in the European Constitution.

The SDL called for the direct and general election of the EU President, transformation of the Council into a chamber of nations, strengthening of the European Parliament’s co-decision-making rights, and a European Constitution which would contain fundamental rights and the division of powers between the institutions. The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which must be incorporated in the Constitution, must be binding and reflect the European Social Model. The SDL was against an additional chamber of national parliaments since institutionally it would represent a retrograde step.

The New Left – Smer

“Smer” (Direction) was founded only in 1999. Party Chairman Fico regards Blair and Schröder and their “Third Way” as his models and accordingly sees his party as centre-left or “modern social democratic”. The party has also been known as “Smer – tretia cesta”: Smer – The Third Way. Smer was the third placed party in the 2002 election, with 15% of the vote. Former chairman of the SDSS Boris Zala joined Smer and is a deputy member of the European Convention.

Smer’s foreign and European policy are outlined in a party document as follows:

“SMER is oriented towards the European system of values and is committed to the Slovak Republic becoming a firm part of European value space. Smer’s foreign policy aims are good bilateral relations with individual states and an effective position in multilateral relations on the basis of international organisations and associations of states. In this connection, SMER fully supports purposeful and effective integration of Slovakia in the European Union and NATO.”

With particular reference to EU accession Smer’s position is as follows:

58 See ibid., synoptic table.
59 Smer-Bulletin, Ms., provided by FES’s Bratislava office.
“Fulfilment of the fundamental requirements for the accession of the Slovak Republic to the European Union pursuant to Smer's foreign policy programme is a key medium-term priority in respect of Slovak foreign policy. Since 2000, EU accession negotiations and further preparations for membership have been under way simultaneously - these two processes are complementary. The negotiations themselves strongly emphasise the connection between the negotiations and candidate country accession preparations. In tandem with the accession negotiations the candidate country’s progress is closely monitored. As a result, it is Smer’s view that efforts must be stepped up in all areas as regards preparation for EU membership.”

60 Ibid.

The Orthodox Communists (KSS)

With ratification of the accession agreement after the referendum all the parties with parliamentary representation voted in favour of EU accession - only the Communists (“Komunistická strana Slovenska” - KSS) decided against ratification, since they would have liked better accession conditions for Slovakia and warned of a loss of Slovakian sovereignty and identity.41

On its website - www.kss.sk - the Party has nothing to say about European policy. It attempts to show that capitalism has set Slovakia back in comparison with socialism (employment, household income, various production indicators, foreign debt, and so on). On foreign policy it criticises international organisations such as the WTO, IMF, OECD, and so on, as lackeys of global capitalism (without mentioning the EU) and regards the “war against terrorism” as an imperialist conspiracy.

Estonia

The most recent parliamentary election in Estonia took place on 2 March 2003. A liberal-conservative ruling coalition was formed from “Party Union of Republic - Res Publica” (ResP), “Eesti Reformierakond” (Estonian Reform Party - ER) and the “Eestimaa Rahvalit” (Estonian People’s Union – Rahvalit). The social democratic party “Mõödukad” (the Moderates) got 7% of the vote and was able to send 6 representatives to parliament. The direct successor party of the Communist Party of Estonia, the “Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Tööpartei” (Estonian Social Democratic Labor Party – ESDTP) received a mere 0.4% of the votes.

The referendum on 14 September 2003 resulted in a “yes” vote of 66.8% – with a turnout of 64% – which clearly exceeded earlier public opinion polls. In June 2003 EU euphoria was still restrained: 48% favoured accession in an opinion poll, 44% were against, and 7% were undecided.62 The Estonian Centre Party had mobilised against accession before the referendum, although previously it had participated in accession preparations, because it believed that Estonia’s interests were not being adequately protected.

Estonia’s Social Democrats - Mõödukad

Mõödukad has existed as a party since 1996, although as an alliance of parties – comprising the “Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Partei” (Estonian Social Democratic Party - ESDP) and the “Eesti Maa kekeskerakond” (Estonian Rural Center Party - EMK) – it made its debut in the parliamentary election of 1992. In the previous government Mõödukad held five key positions, including the foreign minister, Toomas Hendrik Ilves.63 His European policy views are described here in detail as being representative of his party.

Three areas are of particular significance in the statements of the former foreign minister: EU security policy, enlargement, and the canon of common values. He emphasises, for example, that he is above all interested in institutionalised membership of NATO and the EU in order to strengthen Estonia’s security – and protection from Russia. It is striking that whenever he talks about EU security policy he mentions NATO in the same breath and would also like to see the military development of the EU take place only in a “transatlantic context”.64 In fact, Ilves also underlines the significance of European culture, Estonia’s belonging to “European

63 In more detail in: Crook, Dauderstädt, and Gerrits 2002, pp. 75f.
cultural space”, and the return to “old European roots”, 65 and calls accession a form of “self-colonisation”, 66 although here too he makes the connection with the USA in that he qualifies these values as transatlantic. 67 Apart from that he clearly subordinates the community with shared values, with reference to EU accession, to the security aspect:

“A quick glance at the cards shows that a common cultural past is not a satisfactory guarantee of a secure future. On this basis we are striving for the institutionalisation of the return of Europe to Estonia through our membership of the European Union and NATO.”

Compared with the standpoints of other Eastern European states a strong USA- and NATO-centred orientation is revealed here. 68 In this way the EU is not fundamentally devalued, but it does lose at least legitimacy and significance among the population, which the opinion polls on EU accession of June 2003 clearly demonstrate (see above).

The third aspect is enlargement. Ilves draws a line in the sand between the countries which will join the EU in 2004 and “the rest”. He strongly contrasts the successes and reforms of the current accession countries, the result of a motivation enhanced by the prospect of the EU, with the problems of the non-EU-accession countries (“metastizing corruption, [...] organized crime, illegal immigrants”). 70 In order to prevent these problems from spreading to the EU he again calls for a tight security net, strong borders, and rapidly developed strategies on how the EU will deal with its “new” neighbours in the East. 71 This is obviously not an appeal for increased EU enlargement but motivated by a sense of the strong need for security.

The ESDTP has no government responsibilities, having been unable to get even one representative elected to parliament. It describes itself as the last “openly leftist political party” in Estonia, and as a “social democratic left-wing party”, 72 and identifies its own party programme with that of the New European Left Forum (NELF). Therefore, also due to the lack of sources, a brief look at NELF’s European stance would be useful here. This too is quite vague on the subject of European policy; in sum it demands the following, among other things: 73

- a non-military security concept in the common European security and defence policy (ESDP);
- to strengthen democracy by enshrining the right to Europe-wide referendums and Europe-wide petitions in the Constitution.

Latvia


The Social Democrats (Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party: “Latvijas Socialdemokrātu Stradnieku Partija” – LSDSP) originated in the merger of the reformationist “Latvijas Demokrātiska Darba Partija” (Latvian Democratic Workers’ Party – LDDP) and the “Latgales Demokrātiska Partija” (Latgallian Democratic Party - LDP). Since the 2002 election they have not been represented in parliament, having received only 4.8% of the vote, below the 5% cut-off point.

The referendum on EU accession was held on 20 September 2003. With a very good turnout of 72.5%, 67% voted in favour of EU accession. According to Schmidt, the main aim of Latvian foreign policy is EU and NATO accession. Riga expects above all protection of its sovereignty against a possi-
ble Russian “desire for revenge”. Separate sources or statements concerning the LSDP’s standpoint, which would be particularly valuable in this context, are not available. As a result, we cannot say anything on the subject.

**Lithuania**

The most recent parliamentary election in Lithuania took place on 8 October 2000. The coalition led by current prime minister Brazauskas emerged as the winner, consisting of the “Lietuvos demokratine darbo partija” (Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party – LDDP), the “Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija” (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party – LSDP), the “Naujosios demokratijos partija” (New Democratic Party – NDP) and the “Lietuvos ruso sąjunga” (Union of Russians in Lithuania – LRS). The coalition won 31.1% of the vote and provides 51 of the parliament’s 141 MPs. It forms the government together with the social-liberal “Naujoji sąjunga” (New Union – NS), which won 19.6% of the vote.

The Lithuanian voters’ endorsement of accession in the referendum on 10 and 11 May 2003 was surprisingly unequivocal. More than 90% of the vote was in favour, and only 9% against. Opinion polls had predicted a “yes”-vote of only around two-thirds. Even the worry that the 50% turnout required by the Constitution would not be achieved proved to be misplaced: around 64% of Lithuanians took part in the referendum. 

The Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP)

In the wake of the last election the socialist LDDP and the social democratic LSDP merged into a single party, though still bearing the name of the social democrats, the LSDP. The LDDP was the direct successor organisation of the Communist Party, while the LSDP was founded much earlier, in 1896; it was prohibited in the wake of the Putsch in 1926, and from 1944 onwards operated in exile. The official refounding of the Social Democratic Party took place in August 1989.

The LSDP’s statements on European policy – here drawn from speeches by Prime Minister Brazauskas (LSDP) and Defence Minister Linkevičius (LSDP, formerly LDDP) and from party and government programmes – are almost without exception related to security policy. The advantages which the European Union might expect from Lithuania’s accession are briefly listed – all in the field of military “know-how” from many years of cooperation with Russia – otherwise security is even more in the foreground than in the case of its Baltic neighbour Estonia. In this respect Lithuania puts its trust not in European security and defence policy but in that of NATO. Similar to the Polish SLD the LSDP argues that the common European security and defence policy (ESDP) should not be developed as a counterweight to NATO, that it should not lay the foundation stone of a Euro-Atlantic security system, but that this task should remain with NATO, underpinned by ESDP. Consolidating American engagement on European soil is one of the central objectives of LSDP foreign and defence policy.

In this connection the LSDP’s website is also interesting. This contains a section on the European Union whose contents – the future role of Lithuania in the world in general and in Europe in particular – are wrapped in the mists of obscurity while the following section on NATO cites concrete advantages and interests for Lithuania. For example, Lithuania’s interest lies in “defending oneself against potential, although not presently expected, dangers”; the advantages would be as follows:

“Integration into NATO [has] many [advantages]. NATO grants its members substantial security guarantees that lead to a more desirable and active investment environment since [it is] safe and [characterised by] higher security. Thus it is evident that NATO improves a country’s economic growth [prospects].”

Even in the otherwise very detailed government programme Lithuania’s integration in the European

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Union is not given proportionate attention. Here too “transatlantic relations” are regarded as the mainstay of European security, and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the common European security and defence policy (ESDP) serve to support these relations.\(^8\)

Such themes as European identity, enlargement, deepening political integration, and even the significance and nature of the European community of shared values are either not taken up at all by the LSDP or only casually.

**Slovenia**

The current Slovenian government was elected in October 2000, a four-party coalition consisting of “Liberálna Demokracija Slovenije” (Liberal Democrats of Slovenia – LDS), the “Združena Lista socialnih demokratov” (United List of Social Democrats – ZLSD), the “Slovenska Ljudska Stranka” (Slovenian People’s Party – SLS + SKD) and finally the “Demokratična stranka upokojencev Slovenije” (Democratic Party of Slovenian Pensioners – DeSUS). The United Social Democrats were the third-strongest party after the LDS and the conservative SDS (“Socialdemokratska Stranka Slovenije”, Social Democratic Party of Slovenia). They have three ministers in the cabinet, the minister of the interior, the minister for labour, the family and social affairs, and the culture minister.

The referendum on EU accession took place on 23 March 2003 and resulted in a surprisingly clear majority in favour of Slovenia’s entry into the EU. With a turnout of around 60% just under 90% voted “yes” and only 10.4% were against. The referendum on Slovenia’s entry into NATO took place at the same time, resulting in 66% of the votes in favour and 34% against: although the outcome clearly favoured joining NATO it expressed a certain lack of enthusiasm, heightened by the war in Iraq, which the majority of Slovenians opposed.\(^9\)


The United List of Social Democrats – ZLSD

The ZLSD is an amalgamation of the Social Democratic Union, the Party of Democratic Renewal, and part of the Socialist Party and the Workers’ Party.\(^8\) It was established in May 1993 and is also a member of the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists (PES). In the absence of ZLSD statements we shall draw on corresponding PES and SI sources in describing the ZLSD’s position on European policy. In our view this is a justifiable modification of our approach, particularly because the ZLSD itself within the framework of its last congress referred to the resolutions of the PES and SI congresses.\(^8\)

The ZLSD is unequivocally pro-European and one of the strongest advocates of Slovenia’s EU accession. At the same time, it regards itself, more than any of the other post-communist or left-wing parties discussed in this paper, as duty-bound to stand up for a socially just, democratic and transparent EU. The ZLSD considers itself to be “the only messenger of European social democracy in Slovenia”.\(^8\) Its policy priorities – which were also represented at the last PES congress in Berlin – therefore lie in the strengthening of the EU’s democratic structures, that is, strengthening of the European Parliament at the expense of the Council, implementation of the subsidiarity principle and of the participatory element through more citizen participation in decision making, more rights for workers and socially disadvantaged groups, and so on. Alongside this the party always emphasises that individual states or societies are no longer in a position to meet these challenges alone in the face of globalisation and the meshing of traditional policy fields (foreign, security, economic, environmental and development policy). Europe must therefore become a strong and united actor in order, on the one hand, to be able to cope with current political and societal problems in Europe, and on the other, to be an equal partner to the USA, international organisations and transnational actors.\(^8\)

The ZLSD also constitutes an exception in that it does not give priority to either the economic or the security policy benefits of EU accession, but rather – alongside “Social Europe” – accords “Europe as a community with shared values” qualitatively higher worth than “Market Europe”. The slogan “multiplicity


84\(^{\text{Ibid.}}\)

in unity” is important in this connection - the identity of individual nations should be maintained in or alongside the European identity, though not to the detriment of citizens' identification with the EU. However, to this end, according to a meeting of the Socialist International's Committee for Central and Eastern Europe, the EU should establish appropriate democratic decision-making structures in order to facilitate such identification:

“[…] the Committee underlines [how important it is] that citizens fully identify with the process of European integration and urges the EU to equip itself with the instruments of participation which will confer full democratic legitimacy on the process of European integration.”

Hungary

In April 2002, 41.1% of the Hungarian electorate voted for the coalition consisting of the “Magyar Polgári Párt” (Hungarian Civic Party – FIDESZ) and the “Magyar Demokrata Fórum” (Hungarian Democratic Forum – MDF), 42.1% for the “Magyar Szocialista Párt” (Hungarian Socialist Party – MSzP) and 5.5% for the “Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége” (Alliance of Free Democrats – SzDSz). The government was formed from the M SzP and the SZDSZ, which accounted for 198 out of 386 MPs. The Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy ran as a non-party candidate on the M SzP list. Medgyessy was one of the eight European leaders who signed the letter on preserving US–European unity in the face of the Iraq issue, which in the meantime has become a cause for regret in MSzP circles.

The Hungarian referendum on EU accession took place on 12 April 2003. While the 45.62% turnout was disappointingly low, the “yes”-vote was unexpectedly high: just under 84% voted in favour of EU accession. In advance of the poll every party with parliamentary representation had endorsed accession, with the exception of the extreme-right “Magyar Igazság és Elet Pártja” (Hungarian Truth and Life Party – MIÉP), although it was in parliament only until the 2002 election.

The MSzP’s statements on European policy encompass the full spectrum, from common security policy conception to European identity and community of shared values. Decisive are the statements made by foreign minister Kovács (M SzP), Hungary’s EU Integration website set up by the Foreign Ministry, Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament Katalin Szili (M SzP) and the MSzP’s party programme.

On Hungary’s EU Integration website one finds a FAQ or list of Frequently Asked Questions, one of which concerns why Hungary should join the European Union:

“First of all, it means security in the external environment. After long centuries of foreign rule, independence and security are treated as fundamental values by the Hungarian nation.”

Two aims are fundamentally connected - according to the MSzP – with the striving for security: strengthening Hungary’s Social Democrats - The Hungarian Socialist Party (M SzP)

Support for the European Union in Hungary is founded on a broad national consensus which encompasses all serious political parties and the general public. The MSzP – in coalition with the SZDSZ – therefore encounters no significant opposition in this area. However, Viktor Orbán (FIDESZ) after his election victory in 1998 announced that he would represent Hungary’s national interests in relation to the EU more decisively than the preceding centre-left government of the MSzP/SZDSZ coalition. Although he quickly made the necessary legal amendments he once remarked that it would not be a catastrophe for Hungary if it did not join the EU.

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86 Socialist International Committee for Central and Eastern Europe, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 12-13 July 2002, http://www.w-socialistinternational.org/6MmeetingsSIM EETING56ICCEU/July02ljubljana-e.html, on: 07.07.03.
87 For further information on the referendum, see: http://www.valasztas.hu/outroot/de/10_0.html, on: 16.07.2003.
of the common European security and defence policy and cooperation between the USA and the EU. However, the Hungarian MSzP takes a different direction from the Polish SLD in its arguments. While the SLD would like to see Europe developed as a strong partner of the USA the MSzP calls for a united and strong EU in order to develop an efficient European crisis management system on the European continent. At the same time, it sees that there is a considerable quantitative and qualitative discrepancy between US and European defence resources and recognises the need for American engagement on European soil.

"the Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) [...] is expected to provide benefits as well as new responsibilities for Hungary. Due to its geographical location, Hungary is deeply interested in establishing an efficient European crisis management system. This will bring effective and fast answers to possible challenges."\(^{92}\)

Besides this, Hungary declares itself ready to cooperate actively in the implementation of European Security and Defence Policy.\(^{93}\) However, the concrete form of this cooperation remains open. According to Kovács, the European security dimension is not sufficient to ensure global security and so transatlantic cooperation is inevitable.\(^{94}\)

Ideas on the structural constitution of the EU among MSzP members are still very vague. However, it is interesting that, in contrast with almost all other states, the MSzP says that it is ready to surrender rights of sovereignty in favour of European institutions.

"In the view of the Socialists, there is no other way of modernisation for Hungary and more broadly Central Europe than joining the process of European integration as soon as possible, voluntarily giving up part of sovereignty and transferring that to the institutions of European integration."\(^{95}\)

Foreign Minister Kovács, on the other hand, simply emphasises that the EU is an organisation of a "peculiar kind" and that the challenge for the future consists in establishing meaningful cooperation between intergovernmental and supranational institutions.\(^{96}\) Asked what kind of EU Hungary hopes for, the EU Integration website answers - without coming up with constructive ideas which actually might have to be implemented - that Hungary wants an efficient, transparent, and open EU.

In her speech at the Hungarian Embassy in Berlin on 9 May 2003 the Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament, Katalin Szili (MSzP), emphasised not the "technical" - as she called them - details but the idealistic ones. It is time that the accession countries identify with Europe’s new character. At the same time, however, she reminded the current EU member states that they too should take care not to lose sight of the ideal of a united Europe.\(^{97}\) However, she stopped short of going into detail concerning the identity of Europe and its characteristics; in common with Kovács, who also speaks of cooperation and the independence of national and European identities, without even explaining these concepts in outline:

"The enlargement of the Union will further enhance the national, ethnic and cultural diversity within the organization. Rather than being in contradiction, national and European identities complement each other. We are for a European Union where each and every nation is able to preserve its identity."\(^{98}\)

**Conclusion**

In terms of the electoral competition within the accession countries’ political systems the parties of the democratic Left are the clearest advocates of European integration. Opponents on nationalist grounds are to be found overwhelmingly on the Right, although the orthodox Czech and Slovakian Left link arguments about sovereignty with left-wing ideological positions.

92 Ibid.


(against “international capital” and “imperialism”). However, in the latter field the orthodox communists see that only a united Europe would have a chance of going its own way, which is simply no longer possible for individual countries. The social objective of all left-wing forces is to preserve a European welfare-state model from the forces of globalisation.

If one looks at the foreign policy standpoints of individual parties more closely one may discern a clear dividing line between – roughly speaking – “Atlanticists” and “Europeans”. The first put the security issue in the foreground and emphasise the need for American engagement on European soil, the integration of European security structures in NATO, and cooperative transatlantic relations, essential for Europe’s security. In this group we find above all the Polish SLD, the Lithuanian LSDP, and also – more moderate – the Estonian Mõõdukad party. What they all have in common is the absolute priority of national and European security; their belonging to Europe’s community of shared values, or the aim of reinforced political integration are of marginal concern or do not come up for discussion. It is interesting in this connection that both communist successor parties, the SLD and the LSDP, are among the Atlanticist “hardliners”, having fully distanced themselves from their earlier aims, and compared with the current members of the EU no longer belong on the Left, but rather among the conservatives.

On the other, “European” side are found the Czech CSSD and the Hungarian MSzP. Their party programmes are markedly different from the other parties. Both make political integration the main emphasis and advocate the reinforcement of supranational structures with the European Union – even, in the case of the MSzP, at the expense of national sovereignty. The second point of emphasis on their EU agenda is European identity, to which the Czechs and the Hungarians apparently feel more strongly bound than the Poles or the Baltic states.

The Slovenian ZLSD and the Czech KSCM are exceptions. The first is the only party to emphasise a socially just, democratic Europe, and classical social democratic objectives. The KSCM, on the other hand, is in favour of deeper European integration but is opposed to the EU in its present form and in that way - in fact it is the only one to do so – declares its loyalty to the communist ideas which stem from its past as a state party. At the last elections both the ZLSD and the KSCM were among the most successful parties in terms of percentage of votes. The ZLSD is part of the government, while the KSCM is enjoying increasing popularity among the electorate.

Thus the attitudes of the post-communist or left-wing parties in Central and Eastern Europe reflect the conflicts which the current EU has to cope with; these conflicts will continue due to the size of enlargement – an additional ten states - not to mention its heterogeneity. It may prove difficult for EU integration that only two of the eight parties under examination here identify it as a central theme, and even then in an area which, for example in comparison to economic integration, in any case has a long way to go. The hope of the Left that the accession of the post-communist states will strengthen ideas of this kind in the EU must rely solely on the Slovenian ZLSD, and will, because of the latter’s minor importance, in all likelihood be disappointed.
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANO</td>
<td>Aliancia Nového obcana (Alliance of a New Citizen) (Slovakia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSD</td>
<td>Česká strana sociálně demokratická (Czech Social Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeSUS</td>
<td>Demokratiēna stranka upokojencev Slovenije (Democratic Pensioners’ Party of Slovenia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>Demokrātiska Partija „Saimnieks“ (Democratic Party Māster) (Latvia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EK</td>
<td>Eesti Keskerakond (Estonian Center Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM E</td>
<td>Eesti Maarahva Eerakond (Estonian Rural People's Party) Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM K</td>
<td>Eesti Maa Keskerakond (Estonian Rural Center Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>Eesti Reformierakond (Estonian Reform Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>Eesti Sotsiaalsdemokraatlik Partei (Estonian Social Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDTP</td>
<td>Eesti Sotsiaalsdemokraatlik Tööpartei (Estonian Social Democratic Labor Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td>Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Párt (Alliance of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>Független Kisgazda Fődmunkás és Polgár Párt (Independent Small-holder’s Party) (Hungary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GASP</td>
<td>Common foreign and security policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GESVP</td>
<td>Common European security and defence policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HZDS</td>
<td>Hnutie za Demokraticke Slovensko (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JL</td>
<td>Jaunais laiks (New Era) (Latvia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Jauna Partija (The New Party) (Latvia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDH</td>
<td>Krestnokademokratichna Hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement) (Slovakia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People’s Party) (Hungary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDU-CSL</td>
<td>Krest’anská a demokratické unie – Ceskoslovenská strana lidova (Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovakian People’s Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSCM</td>
<td>Komunistická Strana Cech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) (Czech Republic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>Latvijas Ceīš (Latvia’s Way)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDDP</td>
<td>Latvijas Demokratiskā Darba Partija (Latvian Democratic Workers’ Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDDP</td>
<td>Lietuvos demokratine darbo partija (Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Latgales Demokrātiska Partija (Latgalian Democratic Party) (Latvia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Liberalna Demokracija Slovenije (Liberal Democracy of Slovenia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPP</td>
<td>Latvijas Pirmā Partija (Latvia’s First Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>Liga Polskich Rodzin (Polish Families League)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRS</td>
<td>Lietuvos rusų sąjunga (Union of Russians in Lithuania) (Lithuania)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSDP</td>
<td>Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSDSP</td>
<td>Latvijas Socialdemokrātiskais Stradnieku Partija (Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZP</td>
<td>Latvijas Zala Partija (Latvian Green Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LŽS</td>
<td>Latvijas Zemnieku Savieniba (Latvian Agrarian Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MieP</td>
<td>Magyar Igazság és Elet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSzP</td>
<td>Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>Naujosios demokratijos partija (New Democratic Party) (Lithuania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NELF</td>
<td>New European Left Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Naujoji sąjunga (New Union) (Lithuania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nsi</td>
<td>Nova Slovenije (New Slovenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>Obcanská demokratická strana (Civic Democratic Party) (Czech Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPZZ</td>
<td>Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych (All-Polish Accord of Trade Unions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSZE</td>
<td>Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>Party of European Socialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) (Poland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Platforma Obywatelska (Citizens’ Platform) (Poland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peasant’s Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahvaliit</td>
<td>Eestimaa Rahvaliit (Estonian People’s Union)</td>
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