Since the last parliamentary elections in October 2019, Kosovo has had three governments and — with upcoming elections scheduled for February 14, 2021 — is currently expecting yet another reshuffle.

What happened during this time? How could the voice for change that was expressed so vociferously have been diverted? And how did the old ruling elite manage to claw its way back to power?

»A Drama in Five Acts« reports on one of the deepest and most complex crises of the young country. The cause can be found, apart from the Kosovo-Serbia dilemma and the COVID-19 pandemic, above all in domestic power issues.
A KOSOVO DRAMA
IN FIVE ACTS
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ACT I: THE KURTI GOVERNMENT AND HOPE FOR CHANGE

The snap elections held on October 6 saw leftist Vetëvendosje — a more unconventional political movement — come out ahead of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) — a party that has previously twice governed in coalition with Hashim Thaçi’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). The results of the October elections were considered a major turning point for the country’s democratic reforms, not only because the opposition won, but also because for the first time since Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, none of the winning parties had emerged from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Fazliu 2019). The voters delivered a clear and heavy rebuke to the outgoing government that was led by the »war wing« and characterised mainly by widespread corruption, state capture, inequality, and poverty. The high voter turnout, paired with young registered voters born after the year 2000, contributed to the sense of detachment from the war narrative and a growing focus on building a democratic country.

The October elections were considered the most democratic and well-organised elections administered by Kosovo, despite some minor issues in the counting process. In addition to the procedural and technical part of the process, the election results indicated major political changes. With Vetëvendosje (26.27 per cent) winning the election, the mandate to form the government belonged to party leader Albin Kurti. The first challenge for Kosovo’s new Prime Minister elect was the erratic communication with President Thaçi. While the mandate to form the government must legally be given by the President, the tense relations between the two leaders had a detrimental impact not only on the process of forming the government but also on the future cooperation of the two individuals leading Kosovo’s key institutions. Tense communication between Kurti and Thaçi, combined with challenges in the negotiation process between Vetëvendosje and LDK, prolonged Thaçi’s decision to formally offer the mandate to Kurti.

After the elections, LDK stood at a critical juncture. Frustrated by the fact that Vetëvendosje had won the elections, thereby giving Kurti the legal mandate to form the government, LDK created many barriers in the negotiation process. Firstly, for a party who had governed with PDK — the former party of Thaçi — and that shared common interests in state capture, LDK was reluctant to work under the leadership of a party generally seeking to fight state capture. Secondly, coming from a state capture mindset — in which political programmes and priorities was a rather new approach to LDK. Thirdly, LDK insisted on attempting to negotiate for the position of President — even though Thaçi was still actively serving as the President of Kosovo at the time. This was widely criticised by citizens as it reflected elements of the state capture approach inherited from the past.

Consequently, the hope for change gradually started to fade away as the old problems remained. The turbulent negotiations between Vetëvendosje and LDK over the formation of a coalition government prolonged the anticipated change. The challenges — mainly driven by internal fissures between the old and new generations within LDK — had a detrimental effect on the negotiation process between Vetëvendosje and LDK. Besides the ideological differences between leftist Vetëvendosje and the centre right LDK, clashes over filling high-ranking political positions — such as Minister of the Interior as the key to the fight against corruption — and later the debate over the position of President of Kosovo marked the first red flag for what was considered to be the »coalition of hope« (Bami 2019).

Four months after the turbulent negotiation process began, Vetëvendosje and LDK reached an agreement on the formation of a new government and agreed on a joint programme. A deal signed on February 2 made Vetëvendosje leader Kurti Prime Minister in a governing coalition with LDK and parties representing minority communities — including Serb List — as guaranteed by the Constitution of Kosovo (RFE/RL 2020). However, the first indications of internal instability were evident immediately. Pressured by LDK, Vetëvendosje removed Glauc Konjufca from the position of President of the Assembly — a position that by law belongs to the winning party/ietny. This shuffle came as a result of LDK’s insistence on holding one of the country’s top three positions — Prime Minister, President or President of the Assembly — and was partly driven by the President of the Assembly’s strategic importance in the process of electing the President. The position of President of the Assembly is particularly important because, according to the Constitution, if the position of President of Kosovo becomes vacant, it is filled by the President of the Assembly for a period of six months — if the parliament fails to elect a new president in this time, new elections are declared. Thus, this position was taken by LDK as a safeguard measure and as part of a desire to control the process of electing the new president. Furthermore, this approach reflected the lack of trust between the coalition partners, shaking the foundations of what citizens expected to be a solid government guiding the country towards reform and democratisation.

KURTI’S REFORMIST MANDATE

Despite the rocky start, the new coalition government was generally praised for having a reformist agenda. Kurti’s gender-balanced cabinet consisted of young professionals with vision and included ministers from both Vetëvendosje and LDK appointed based on their expertise and willingness to work actively on the political programme agreed by the two parties.

Setting up a rather ambitious programme, the Kurti government was initially focused on undoing the decisions undertaken by the previous government, led by Ramush Haradinaj, that had been criticised by the international community and Kosovo’s civil society. Firstly, the structure and size of the
### Timeline of Main Events

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<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>6. Snap Elections</td>
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<td>NOVEMBER</td>
<td>27. Certification of Election Results lists Albin Kurti as the winner</td>
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<td>2020</td>
<td>FEBRUARY</td>
<td>2. VV and LDK agree to form the government</td>
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<td>MARCH</td>
<td>3. Inauguration of Kurti Government with 66 out of 120 votes</td>
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<td>10. LDK delegation meets Grenell — internal fissures between LDK and VV</td>
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<td>13. First COVID-19 cases confirmed — total confinement</td>
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<td>18. Kurti dismissed Veliu triggering non-confidence motion by LDK</td>
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<td>25. Kurti Government Overthrown by 82 votes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>APRIL</td>
<td>23. Thaci passes mandate to Hoti to form the government</td>
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<td>MAY</td>
<td>29. Constitutional Court paves the way for the Hoti Government</td>
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<td>JUNE</td>
<td>3. Hoti Government has been formed</td>
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<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>24. Specialist Court publishes unconfirmed indictment against President Thaci</td>
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<td>4. Washington Summit; signature of the letters of intent between Kosovo and Serbia</td>
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<td>DECEMBER</td>
<td>5. Thaci resigns due to confirmed indictment, mandate passed to Vjosa Osmani</td>
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<td>21. Constitutional Court declares election of Hoti government illegitimate</td>
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<td>2021</td>
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<td>6. Announcement of new elections for February 14</td>
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new government differed greatly from Haradinaj’s enormous government that had included 21 ministries and up to 90 deputy ministers and national coordinators. Secondly, the Kurti government reversed Haradinaj’s infamous decision to increase ministerial salaries by roughly 100 per cent, thereby restoring wages to their previous level. In order to implement reforms in the justice sector, this decision did not apply to salaries that had previously been increased in the justice system and the Constitutional Court (Kosova Press 2020b).

Kurti’s approach of prioritising internal issues and reforms over foreign policy and dialogue with Serbia made his position in the government challenging and further intensified the already existing divisions with LDK. In addition to focusing on issues at home, it was therefore imperative for Kurti to deal with the question of rebooting dialogue with Serbia. But neither Kurti nor Osmani had sufficiently deconstructed their vision for the dialogue process during the election campaign and the government programme was not clear on Kosovo’s strategy towards it, thus leaving gaps for fundamental differences in approach between the two governing parties.

**ACT II: TRIGGER EVENTS BEFORE THE OVERTHROW**

Dialogue with Serbia has traditionally been used as a process for triggering political crises and changes in government. Evidently, Kurti shared the same destiny.

In contrast to his focus on internal reforms, the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue was a rather unknown and challenging process for Kurti. Firstly, it undermined his domestic political reform project and his approach of “fixing the country internally and then dealing with Serbia”. Foreign policy and geopolitical issues strongly linked to the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia seemingly required Kurti to engage on two very ambitious fronts, which his government lacked the capacity to deal with simultaneously at such a fast pace. Secondly, the newcomer Kurti had to assert his own presence in the dialogue process that had long been controlled by Thaçi.

By the time Kurti joined the dialogue process, it had hit a critical point. A series of events had left the Brussels dialogue in limbo — some even doubted the process could be revitalised. While the election period within the EU, followed by the change of EU leadership, has been cited as one of the key factors behind the stalled dialogue, one of the biggest negative turning points was the acceptance by President Thaçi of the “land swap” idea as a potential solution to the ongoing political tension between Kosovo and Serbia. The idea, first publicly raised during the 2018 Alpbach Forum, found implicit support in the EU Commission (specifically from then High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, who was eager to seal the big deal under her facilitation). Kurti found the dialogue halted by a 100 per cent tariff on Serbian products, a measure that had been imposed by Haradinaj in an attempt to stop the “land swap” idea pushed by Thaçi.

The fertile ground created by the “common vibe” between Thaçi and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić was also seen as a unique opportunity by the unconventional US Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell, who began to take a leading role in the process of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia — a process in which the EU had been unable to deliver. The appointment of Grenell as the US Special Envoy for the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue signalled renewed US interest in the Balkans, however, the approach was rather different and more complex under the Trump Administration. Creating another track of the dialogue, separate from Brussels, the Grenell-Thaçi-Vučić trio actively worked to pave the way for a final deal between Kosovo and Serbia. With Grenell eager to strike a deal as a personal win for himself and a major win for the Trump administration and its foreign policy agenda — which would later seemingly link the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process to the Middle East — the pressure towards Kurti, a strong opponent of the “land swap” idea, dramatically increased.

As Kurti was dealing with the immense pressure to lift the tariffs on Serbian goods and pave the way for the dialogue with Serbia to restart — thereby following the agenda set by Grenell and Thaçi — the EU made yet another attempt to
regain control over the process. The appointment of Miroslav Lajčak as a special EU envoy for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue marked a vague comeback in the dialogue that had already been diverted by Grenell. The sidelined Prime Minister Kurti showed tremendous political will to strengthen the role of the EU in the process as a response to Grenell and the potential «land swap» idea, building the new leadership’s rejection of the quick-fix solution.

Kurti lining up behind the EU and Thaçi pushing for the Grenell-led US agenda created what is widely seen to be the biggest transatlantic fissure in relation to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. Kurti and Thaçi’s inability to align their approaches on an issue of national interest opened a rather unprecedented debate in relation to Kosovo’s strategic partners. This debate has been vastly supported by intense media campaigns, which have gradually seen media outlets develop different narratives related to Kosovo’s strategic orientation.

**ACT III: A POLITICAL PANDEMIC AND THE OVERTHROW OF THE KURTI GOVERNMENT**

The overthrow of the Kurti government marked the beginning of one of the biggest and most unprecedented political crises in Kosovo. Furthermore, it showcased how the emergency situation around the COVID-19 pandemic created the perfect storm for authoritarian leaders to further tighten their grip. In Kosovo’s case, Thaçi, in his position as President — which should be a role of political unity — contributed to diverting the will of citizens that had been expressed in the October 2019 elections by facilitating the overthrow of the Kurti government and paving the way for the old ruling elite to continue the trend of state capture while seriously harming Kosovo’s already fragile democracy.

A month after becoming Prime Minister of Kosovo, Kurti was dealing with multi-frontal crises, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. The challenges were further highlighted as a result of a lack of internal cohesion between coalition partners. The differences between the attitudes of Vetëvendosje and LDK on various issues of importance were showcased publicly. While Kurti chose communication with the public through video recordings and press conferences, Deputy Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti used social media channels to show his party’s opposition towards Kurti. This sent worrying messages of a lack of internal communication between the coalition partners leading the country.

In addition to the diametrically opposed stances on the dialogue elaborated in the previous section, the internal divisions were further highlighted when the country was faced with the health crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 13, Kosovo registered its first two cases of COVID-19, marking the beginning of its biggest health crisis and subsequently its biggest socio-economic and political crises as well.

The domestic power struggle and disputes over how to tackle COVID-19 were further amplified as the world and Kosovo headed into a very strict lockdown. Following the trend in the Western Balkans, the authoritarian leaders used the emergency situation to strengthen their ruling positions. While Kurti, as the leader of the government, put other issues on hold and directed the government’s focus towards managing the COVID-19 situation, Thaçi utilised LDK to strengthen his own already weakened political position. Using the growing number of infections as an excuse — despite Kosovo recording an average of only 13 cases per day and Kurti showing effectiveness in handling the outbreak — Thaçi stressed the need to declare a national state of emergency, under which the President takes on substantial additional powers. With the dialogue with Serbia in the back of his head, Thaçi used Agim Veliu — the LDK Minister of Interior — to ask in the name of LDK for a state of emergency to be declared, although Thaçi presented no clear strategy or plan on how to deal with the pandemic. Triggered by the orchestrated Thaçi-Veliu move, Kurti dismissed Veliu over the state of emergency debate that had pitted the country’s top political leaders against each other. This decision, which was uncoordinated with Veliu’s LDK party, would ultimately push LDK into initiating a vote of no-confidence in the government — despite the fact that this would mean bringing down the coalition government in which LDK was an integral part.

Nevertheless, little about these political maneuvers was undertaken to alleviate the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. All events were tightly linked to the need to deliver on the dialogue with Serbia. Conscious of the situation with the dialogue and the pressure around it — mainly from Grenell in relation to the tariffs and the upcoming Washington Summit — Kurti was also aware of Veliu’s political weight within LDK when he dismissed him.

Unable to convince Kurti to join the Grenell-led process and the potential final agreement looming on the horizon, Thaçi used his influence over LDK (especially his close personal ties with party leaders Isa Mustafa and Veliu) to initiate instability within the government. A Thaçi-facilitated meeting between Grenell and LDK leaders further highlighted the differences between the coalition partners when it came to the dialogue. Deep polarisation took place as Kurti presented his incremental plan for revoking the tariffs (deemed unacceptable by Vučić) while LDK’s Hoti publicly opposed the plan and pushed for a US-facilitated deal.

Under such circumstances and political tension between coalition partners — even in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic — LDK, the junior government partner, initiated a no-confidence motion to overthrow the Kurti government. The no-confidence motion found keen support from the opposition parties, PDK, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), NISMA and the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR). After all, the old political elite responsible for state capture — once again — were being given the opportunity to be in power. This would most likely be the last chance, given the growing trend of support towards Vetëvendosje and Kurti. Joining forces to bring down the Kurti government also showcased
the level of capture of the Assembly — a worrying trend given that Kosovo is a parliamentary republic.

Foreign actors were also peripherally involved in the process of overthrowing the Kurti government. While the US showed support for the Assembly session set to oust Kurti, Germany and France asked for political unity and more focus on the COVID-19 pandemic, thereby supporting the Kurti government. This declaration was ignored by LDK, which promptly mobilised other political parties to secure 82 votes against Kurti in the March 25 session, ousting the government that had not only had a reformist agenda but also been successful in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic (Walker 2020).

ACT IV: THE OLD PARTIES STRIKE BACK — THAÇI BRINGS HOTI TO POWER

Following the overthrow of the government, debate sparked over the establishment of a new government. Elections were ruled out as a solution given the circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic, however the reluctance to declare new elections was deeply rooted in the fear of massive public support for Kurti and Vetëvendosje. President Thaçi exerted tremendous political pressure to form a new government without new elections via whichever coalition could secure a majority in the Assembly. Kurti and Vetëvendosje, on the other hand, constantly pushed for renewing the political legitimacy of the Assembly through new elections — as soon as the pandemic situation allowed. This, of course, was backed by the fact that many regional countries have held elections during the pandemic.

With Thaçi under pressure to form a government — as the debate over a US-facilitated deal with Serbia loomed — he initiated talks with political parties to do just that. This initiative was rejected by Kurti, who as the winner of the last elections had the first right to try and form a government. The outgoing Prime Minister communicated with the President through public letters and interviews — avoiding in-person meetings to discuss the political deadlock as two heads of institutions (Office of the Prime Minister 2020). The cold and distant exchange of letters continued until April 22 when Thaçi announced that he was formally passing the mandate to whoever could command a majority in the parliament; although it was widely known that a potential agreement had been reached between LDK — which had come second in the October 2019 elections — former premier Haradinaj’s AAK, the NISMA-AKR coalition and parties representing minority communities. LDK announced their coalition led by Avdullah Hoti, but Thaçi’s decree paving the way for the Hoti government to be formed was challenged by Vetëvendosje, who on May 1 sent the decree to the Constitutional Court for review. The Court suspended the decree until May 29, the date by which a more comprehensive decision would be published. All parties meanwhile exerted tremendous pressure on the Court, pushing it to react publicly (Constitutional Court 2020b).

On May 28, the Constitutional Court issued its decision, which cleared the way for the new government to be formed without new elections (Constitutional Court 2020a). As expected, the decision was heavily criticised by Vetëvendosje, which called the Constitutional Court an instrument in the hands of Thaçi that was conducting legal gymnastics to bring the old elite back to power. Meanwhile, Vetëvendosje remained stuck in limbo as a winning party but in opposition, therefore unable to return to its out-and-out approach to opposition of the past.

The Assembly session held on June 3 resulted in LDK’s Hoti being elected Prime Minister of Kosovo as head of a multi-party minority government. Moreover, Hoti re-established the power of the old political elite — a major backward step for Kosovo and a reversal of the changes made in the October 6 elections. For instance, the judiciary vetting process was put on hold (Qenaj 2020), while the anti-corruption task force operating within Kosovo Police was dissolved without any strategic plan on how to ensure continuity in the fight against corruption (EWB 2020).

During the following six months of the Hoti government, a string of scandals took place. More than 2 million euros was...
stolen from the state budget (Bami 2020), and a 5 million euro tender was reportedly won by the company owned by the Minister of Economy, Blirim Kuçi (Murtezaj 2020). While the 2020 EU country report explicitly mentioned that corruption is widespread (European Commission 2020), the actions of the Hoti government to fight against corruption have been inexistant.

As the country continues to face a devastating crisis, Kosovo has been set back both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. However, a return to the status quo cannot and should not be considered a positive step. Such a move would bring benefits and power to the ruling elite who have little interest in reforms and the rule of law. Seemingly, the efforts to avoid elections throughout 2020 by the old ruling elite responsible for state capture best reflects the level of convenience and comfortability the status quo brings to these parties. While avoiding elections might have given a sense of political stability, the consequences were detrimental to Kosovo.

Any trade-off between stability and reforms would have a harmful impact on the future of the country. Political stability — especially in dealing with the narrow majority in the Assembly and the vacant position of President — a genuine approach to managing the pandemic, and a vision for economic revitalisation is imperative for the country to be resilient in times of unprecedented crisis. The political elite should overcome the internal polarisation and differences to serve their citizens and move the country forwards. Long term political stability can be achieved by renewing the legitimacy of the Assembly, the government and subsequently the President. In October 2019, the people of Kosovo spoke vocally in support of reforms and challenging the existing state capture by elites. One year later, the results of extraordinary local elections in Podujeva confirmed the need for change. LDK losing its traditional political stronghold speaks volumes about the wider frustration with how LDK diverted the will of the voters through unscrupulous political maneuvers under the influence of Thaçi.

**ACT V: THE RETURN OF KURTI?**

The Hoti government’s short time in office has sparked many debates on its legality and legitimacy of which three aspects are particularly crucial: Firstly, active lobbying by Thaçi and Haradinaj was conducted through direct influence over members of the Assembly. This was explicitly revealed by MP Haxhi Shala, who was persuaded to vote for the Hoti government the night before the voting took place (KDI 2020). On November 25, Shala’s son was appointed Consul General in Prague. This sparked debates over a potential reward in a trade-off between Shala and Thaçi; the vote for the Hoti government in exchange for the Consul General position in Prague (Kosova Press 2020a).

Secondly, the legitimacy of the Hoti government was not only shaken by the political maneuvers that brought it to power, but also by its fragility in the Assembly. The Assembly has been dysfunctional and unable to pass vital laws with immense importance during the pandemic. This political debacle is best reflected in the debate over the Law on Economic Recovery, which failed to be voted on nine times, making the role of the government in times of crisis almost redundant. The LDK government ultimately required support from PDK to pass the law, sparking a debate over a potential government reshuffle and expansion to include PDK. This would have solved the challenges in relation to «legitimacy in numbers» and could potentially have avoided new elections, which are not convenient for any political party except VV.

Thirdly — and ultimately decisively in the fall of the government — is the case of Etem Arifi. A member of the Assembly who secured Hoti’s thin majority, Arifi had been convicted of fraud in 2018 and was due to begin his sentence on March 9. This had been postponed, however, on health issues grounds. Only in September 2020, Arifi was arrested, leaving the Hoti government without a majority in the Assembly (Prishtina Insight 2020). Eventually, the Constitutional Court declared the Hoti government’s formation illegitimate on December 21, 2020, and on February 14, 2021 early parliamentary elections will be held.

* * *

In summary, Kosovo has had three governments in the space of one year: The outgoing Haradinaj government, the short-lived Kurti government and the unstable Hoti government. The political instability and constant changes in government have kept reforms on hold and jeopardised the progress made to date in the democratisation of the country.

The elections of October 6, 2019 provided a glimpse of hope for change. Albeit short-lived, they sent a clear message that free, fair and democratic elections can bring changes in the political elite, thereby empowering citizens and their ability to influence how their countries are governed (Zivanovic & Isufi 2019). The political turmoil orchestrated to overthrow the Kurti government is a worrying signal that disentangling state capture is a rather complex endeavour, and the old political elite that ruled the country will not simply cease to exist with electoral defeat. Further, it sent a concerning message that the deeply entrenched state capture can reverse election results and hinder the democratic transformation (Emini 2020).

Since March 2020 when the Kurti government was overthrown, Kosovo has been plunged into deep political crisis and internal polarisation. The complexity is added to by Thaçi’s resignation as a result of his confirmed indictment at the Specialist Chambers. With the calling of new elections for February 14, there is a growing eagerness and will for change among citizens. It remains to be seen whether the outcome will bring a solution to Kosovo’s domestic crisis or whether the old conflicts will continue — as possibly the next act — to remain in political stalemate.
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Since the last parliamentary elections in October 2019, Kosovo has had three governments and — with upcoming elections scheduled for February 14, 2021 — is currently expecting yet another government reshuffle.

The country finds itself in the midst of significant and multi-dimensional crises: Increased activity of the Specialist Chambers, which has led to the resignation of the President, Hashim Thaçi; the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic; and a devastated economy.

At this critical juncture, the political elite is deeply polarised, leaving little room for hope for the citizens of Kosovo. A little over one year since the 2019 elections, it begs the question: How can the voice for change that was expressed at that time have been diverted to this extent by the old ruling elite clawing its way back to power? A Drama in Five Acts.

Further information on the topic can be found here: https://www.fes.de/referat-mittel-und-osteuropa/