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YOUTH STUDIES SOUTHEAST EUROPE 2018/2019:

“FES Youth Studies Southeast Europe 2018/2019” is an international youth research project carried out simultaneously in ten countries in Southeast Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia. The main objective of the surveys has been to identify, describe and analyse attitudes of young people and patterns of behaviour in contemporary society.

The data was collected in early 2018 from more than 10,000 respondents aged 14–29 in the above-mentioned countries who participated in the survey. A broad range of issues were addressed, including young peoples’ experiences and aspirations in different realms of life, such as education, employment, political participation, family relationships, leisure and use of information and communications technology, but also their values, attitudes and beliefs.

Findings are presented in ten national and one regional study and its accompanying policy papers, which have been published in both English and the respective national languages.
Young people comprise a fifth of the population of Montenegro. Decision-makers often lose them from focus, although young people should be at the centre of every politically important and strategic move. Consequently, young people are also distancing themselves from politics in the broadest sense, and they have the least trust in political institutions and holders of political functions. And the success of the democratic transition of society is also measured by the extent to which young people are ready and motivated to assume the responsibility of helping shape social development via official as well as unconventional forms of political engagement and volunteerism. The vast majority of young people have not even performed voluntary work, and voluntary engagement and youth activism account for a worryingly low percentage of activities occupying the leisure time of young people.

Young people grow up in a society burdened by corruption, nepotism and other phenomena that undermine meritocratic principles that should govern access to employment and career advancement, but also in education. Such a context develops attitudes in young people that justify procedures for acquiring jobs through relationships and corruption, as well as the perception that social mobility and advancement depend more on political connections and power, and less on knowledge and one’s own efforts. A society that promotes ‘taking shortcuts’ as an approach to achieving goals in the area of education and employment educates young people to adopt such a pattern of behaviour and believe that it is right without being aware of the unforeseen adverse consequences that it has for the whole of society and its sustainable future.

The socio-economic status of young people, according to all criteria, renders this group of people extremely vulnerable. Economic marginalisation and exclusion are reflected in the high rate of structural unemployment, generated by a disjuncture between the supply side (educational system) and the labour market, but also by the general economic crisis. Young people are exposed to de-professionalisation of work as well, and often persons highly educated in areas for which there is no demand or application in the labour market seek and find jobs that are below their qualifications. The widespread phenomenon of temporary jobs is just one of dimensions of precarious work, rendering the prospects of young people insecure, extending the period of their economic and residential dependence on their parents, and hindering the process of transition into adulthood. There is an important link between the higher social and economic position of young people in society and the higher level of cultural and material capital of the family of origin.

Montenegrin society is characterised by a constant threat of a ‘brain drain’ due to the strong desire of the most educated young people to move out of the country, which poses a dangerous challenge for a small country urgently requiring a systematic approach, which has unfortunately been lacking so far. The reasons for leaving the country are predominantly economic in nature, such as the hope of finding a job based on merit and the quest for better economic conditions.

The attitudes of young people conditioned by the general social climate of a disorganised society, unconsolidated democracy and prolonged transition period reflect the still strongly manifested attitudes of authoritarianism, traditionalism and intolerance towards differences (especially as
expressed in homophobia). The level of social and ethnic distance recorded in the survey of young people’s attitudes towards different groups in society, and trust, which is still greatest in the primary groups to which they belong (family and friends), as well as the lack of trust in political institutions and actors, points to the low potential young people have to offer as pillars of social cohesion.
Research on young people and their needs, situation, and prospects is the key instrument every society should use to ensure adequate formulation and monitoring of youth-related policies, but also to set objectives that most effectively advance the social position of this group. Finally, analysis and study of various aspects of the position of young people in a society can provide valuable insight into the future development of the society.

According to the latest census (2011), Montenegro has 620,029 inhabitants. Of this, 132,702, or 21.4 % of the total, are young people aged 15 to 29. The share of young people in this age group is higher in Montenegro than in the European Union, where they make up 17.4 % of the population.

The total youth population is 51.39 % male and 48.61 % female. Demographically speaking, 66.1 % of young people live in urban, and just about half of this number (33.9 %) in rural, settings. This structure is fluid, however, due to high levels of internal mobility for reasons of schooling and employment, and the real concentration of youth in urban settings is most likely higher.

Apart from the official census that takes stock of the number of young people overall and their place of residence, youth in Montenegro are effectively “invisible”. So far little has been invested to address the needs, problems, interests, and goals of young people through research, and relevant information on this population is sparse. Available data provide only very modest information about their status and the challenges they face in the society. This study therefore represents a significant contribution to data available on the Montenegrin youth, and also provides directions for further analysis that could illuminate new dimensions of youth’s current status and assess their future prospects.

The findings reveal that young people constitute one of the most vulnerable social groups in the Montenegrin society. In the long run, their vulnerability translates into vulnerability of society as a whole. Young people should be the drivers of development, and their situation largely determines the overall prospects of the society, sustainability and functionality of the system. A large proportion of young people in Montenegro are unemployed, though an equally high proportion hold degrees in higher education, although they are apparently not sufficiently literate or possess the skills and competences required by life in the 21st century. The lack of alignment between the educational system and the demands of the labour market has multiple consequences, among which are long spells of unemployment and a delayed transition of young people into the adult world.

System-wide support for youth development is highly uneven. Certain programmes and services are available in the domains of formal education, health, and employment. Participation, information, and leisure are entirely neglected. In the areas of informal
education and youth work, there is a remarkable lack of functioning infrastructure, institutional and human resources, or quality control. The mismatch between education and the labour market also leads to long-term dependence on parents, as young people lack the resources to become independent and take on adult roles.

The past three decades of social, political, and economic turbulences that have permeated all societal domains have inevitably also affected young people, their development and formation, as well as their (lack of) integration into society. Young people have remained a marginalised group and rank low on the state’s and society’s list of priorities, and are equally neglected by the academic community, which rarely studies them. Montenegro has a much shorter tradition of university education, and has long lagged behind other post-Yugoslav societies on a number of other indicators of economic and social development – which partly explains the lack of analytical attention towards youth. This to some extent changed at the turn of the millennium. Different approaches have been introduced and developed, above all in informal education programmes offered by civil society organisations. The growth of civil society and youth organisations has placed various social issues on the agenda, including the situation of youth. As a consequence, the first initiatives have emerged with the goal of improving the status of young people in society.

In early 2000 reforms in the field of education identified a need to channel the potential of young people and strengthen their participation in the social and political life of the community. This marked the beginning of the initiative to introduce civic education into the formal educational system, as indeed happened in 2005. The first national document targeting youth policy, the National Action Plan for Youth (NAPY), was created in 2006 and implemented up until 2011. The evaluation process of the NAPY produced new initiatives to create a strategic approach to issues, culminating in the Youth Strategy for 2017–2020. It should be noted that the Strategy was preceded by a Law on Youth in 2016 regulating the measures and activities implemented by the state and local governments to improve the social situation of young people. The Law stipulates that youth policies are to be developed and implemented in accordance with the real needs of youth, based on empirical and practical insight into their situation, studies, and regular monitoring, with active involvement of youth in the policy-making process. In this context, this study is an important source of information for the assessment of the current situation as well as for development of benchmarks for future measures and policies directed towards improving the position of youth and their integration into society.
The study presents and has analysed data collected during field research on the situation, attitudes, expectations, and aspirations of youth in Montenegro. The study is part of a larger regional research project initiated and supported by Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) as part of its project Youth in Southeast Europe 2018.

Other participants in the research included research agencies and institutions from Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Bulgaria, and Romania.

The field research and data collection were conducted in early 2018 by means of face-to-face interviews. The research was carried out by the non-governmental organisation CeSID (Centre for free elections and democracy) from Belgrade. Petar Đukanović, sociologist and coordinator of human rights projects at the NGO Centre for Civic Education (CCE) from Podgorica, analysed the data collected and wrote the report.

The initiative emerged out of a need to produce an analysis of the situation and attitudes of young people in Southeast European societies, all of which have been experiencing radical social changes, and to identify key challenges facing young people under the influence of both the national and wider European contexts.

The aim of the study is to identify the needs, attitudes, and perceptions of youth regarding ways to transform them into drivers of social change. The study hopes to stimulate the public debate by analysing in detail the circumstances in which young people in the region are living and building their futures, as well as their behaviour, attitudes, and hopes.

The study also aims to contribute to the democratic development of Southeast European societies; to the better understanding and strengthening of the European identity among young people, and the strengthening of their role as drivers of democratic development of their societies. The study provides up-to-date, relevant information, and thus contributes to an accumulation of empirical material about youth in Montenegro that must be the basis of any policy that aspires to improve the situation and prospects of young people with regard to education, mobility, prevention of the brain-drain, employment, family transition, equal opportunities, and the fight against discrimination.

As the study is part of a broader project and the same methodology has been used in all participating countries, this study was also able to draw on comparative information in order to provide a perspective on the position of Montenegro’s youth.

CeSID’s research team drew a random, stratified, nationally representative sample of 711 respondents aged between 14 and 29. The research was conducted between 10 February 2018 and 6 March 2018 in 15 Montenegrin municipalities (Bar, Berane, Bijelo Polje, Cetinje, Danilovgrad, Herceg Novi, Kotor, Mojkovac, Nikšić, Pijevlja, Podgorica, Rožaje, Tivat, Ulcinj and Žabljak). Data analysis was conducted with assistance of IBM SPSS Statistics 20 software. The analysis included measures of correlation (Pearson’s R and Spearman’s Rho) and association (Chi-square and t-test). Coefficients were only reported for measures that showed levels of significance between .05 and .001.
The aim of this youth study is to identify the key features that summarise the position of youth in contemporary Montenegrin society. In order to better understand the situation of youth, it is first necessary to explain their position in the system of education and in the labour market as the key elements that drive, or obstruct, social mobility.

A study of the social and economic position of youth helps us understand how open and mobile a society is, i.e. to what extent and through what mechanisms does the system offer equal opportunities for advancement for all, regardless of background. We therefore focused on factors that determine differences in social status and drive differentiation among young people with regard to education and employment.

In modern societies education plays a key role in creating opportunities for youth social mobility. Equally, though, education is also the key mechanism for the reproduction of social differences and class position (Džuverović, 1987: 121).

Theories as well as empirics point to the fact that the youth's social origin determines to a large extent their goals and ambitions in education, as well as their understanding and valuation of education, possibilities for access, and consequently opportunities to attain certain social positions. Socio-economic status of their families, cultural capital, density of social contacts and networks all affect the level of educational achievement in children (Duncan, Brooks-Gunn, 1997; de Graaf et al. 2000; Ianelli, 2002; Johnston et al., 2005; Güveli et al., 2012).

Any analysis of education, inter-generational educational mobility and its consequences for the status of youth in society must take stock of the theories of Bourdieu, which point to the crucial role played by family’s cultural and social capital in the reproduction of educational and social status.

Cultural capital theory is especially influential in studies of educational inequality in contemporary societies. Numerous empirical studies have confirmed the positive effects of cultural capital on student competence and achievements (Aschaffenburg & Mass, 1997; DiMaggio, 1982; DiMaggio & Mohr, 1985; Dumas, 2002; Sullivan, 2001). They showed, among other things, that students in possession of cultural capital grow up in a stimulating, educational environment, which then contributes to development of the personal characteristics necessary for an expansion of competences, or even directly to development of key competences in different areas (Burke et al., 2000; Earley et al., 1999; Hatlevik et al., 2015; Pajares, 2009). For this reason, research into the effects of cultural capital on access to education and achievement of young people is essential for development of educational policies aimed at “ironing out” social inequality and creating an educational system that fosters equality of opportunity and high levels of social mobility.

**EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF YOUNG PEOPLE**

Out of the total sample surveyed in this study, 66.4% of respondents were still undergoing education, while 33.6% said they were not at present pursuing any education or training.
Of those undergoing education, nearly one-third (28.8%) were at university, every fourth respondent (26.8%) was involved in primary or secondary education, and every tenth young person was undergoing doctoral or post-doctoral training (8.2%) or pursuing another form of professional education (2.6%).

Among those not currently enrolled in a studies programme, the majority had completed secondary vocational schooling (49.3%), followed by those with university degrees or other tertiary-level degrees (27%). The same share of respondents (9.5%) reported having graduated from an upper-level secondary school or possessing graduate-level degrees. Only 0.5% of respondents had no formal education, and 3.8% had only finished primary school.

In the oldest cohort of respondents (25–29), an age by which an average young person has usually completed his or her education, the structure of educational achievement is as follows: 39.02% have a secondary vocational degree, 33.74% a university degree or other tertiary-level degree, 12.9% an MA or a specialist degree, 11.79% a general secondary degree (upper-level secondary education: Gymnasium), 1.22% a PhD, and 2.03% only a primary school degree.

A secondary vocational degree is the most common form of education among parents of respondents: two-thirds of young people have parents who graduated from a secondary vocational school. Roughly every fifth respondent had at least one parent with a tertiary degree.

Fathers’ education is somewhat higher than that of mothers: a slightly larger percentage of fathers have completed some form of tertiary training, including Master studies, specialised studies and PhDs. Among those parents with no formal education, mothers with only primary education, or with general secondary education, are slightly more prevalent. The educational achievement of parents is correlated (Rho = .452, p < 0.001).

**CULTURAL CAPITAL OF YOUTH**

There is some correlation between the educational achievement of children and their parents. (Rho = .163, p < 0.001). To test the correlation between the educational status of children and their parents we used the so-called “dominant principle”, i.e. the par-
ent with the higher educational achievement, in this case the father. Young people who hold a tertiary degree more often have fathers who also hold tertiary degrees, and those with less education usually also have less educated fathers. The family’s cultural capital as represented by parents’ education clearly influences the achievements of their children.

No relationship was detected between respondents’ place of residence and their level of education, while unsurprisingly we find a correlation between age and level of education. The higher the age, the higher the average level of education (Rho = .525, p < 0.001). There is also some correlation between respondents’ gender and education. Women are somewhat more likely to hold higher tertiary degrees (Rho = .098, p < 0.05). The family’s economic situation, self-reported by the respondents, is also linked to their achievements (Rho = .111, p < 0.05). Bearing in mind that the majority of the respondents were still undergoing education, and that a very large percentage is involved in tertiary-level programmes, it is to be expected that the general level of education of this generation will be higher than that of their parents.

Only 2% of young people did not have any books in the household they grew up in. About 29.1% have more than 100 books in the family library. A little over one-half (51%) have between 10 and 50 books, and 17.9% have 50 to 100 books.

The place of residence seems to matter here: young people from rural areas have fewer books at home than those from urban areas ($\chi^2 = 42.44, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.168$). The size of the family library also depends on parents’ education ($\chi^2 = 112.82, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.191$). Those whose parents (father) have a tertiary degree have more books in the family library. More than 50% of young people whose fathers hold a university degree had more than 100 books in their house growing up, compared to only 9.1% of the young people whose fathers only have primary schooling. Young people with higher education are also more likely to have libraries with more than 100 books ($\chi^2 = 87.77, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.166$). More than one-third of young people with university degrees (39.3%) have more than 100 books in their household. The number of books in the household in which the respondent grew up is also largely related to the family’s economic situation ($\chi^2 = 56.83, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.171$).

Education today is unimaginable without the use of modern technologies such as PCs and the Internet. More than half of respondents had one PC or laptop, 29% had two, and 12.9% three. Only 6.1% said they do not own any PCs or laptops.

There are however significant differences depending on respondents’ economic situation ($\chi^2 = 79.23, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.214$). As many as one-third of young people who are members of the lowest strata in terms of economic wealth do not own a single laptop or PC, whereas 27.3% of those in the wealthiest households have three. Young people with better educated fathers are also more likely to own more than one laptop or PC ($\chi^2 = 55.75, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.174$). Owning more than one laptop or PC also correlates with respondents’ education, with more educated persons being more likely to own more than one ($\chi^2 = 29.92, p < 0.05, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.128$).

The economic situation of the family also determines respondent’s access to the Internet at home ($\chi^2 = 29.92, p < 0.05, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.128$). Just over a third of those in the worst economic situation (36.6%) have no access to the Internet at home, while about one-third of the well-off strata have two or more connections (29.4%).

**EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF YOUNG PEOPLE**

Out of the total sample of respondents, 11.2% are in permanent employment (9.9% full-time and 1.2% part-time). Another 23% of young people have a temporary or short-term contracts (20% full-time and 3% part-time). 7.9% of young people work occasionally, 4.4% are self-employed, and the same number are undergoing on-the-job training. 43.8% are unemployed, and 5.3% said they had some employment arrangement but did not provide details.

Of those aged 18 and older, 12.62% had a permanent employment contract (11.24% full-time and 1.38% part-time). A fifth had a short-term job (22.7% full-time and 3.46% part-time). Among those aged 18 and above, the unemployment rate is 38.75. The other 21.78% work occasionally, or are self-employed, undergoing on-the-job training, or have some other type of employment arrangement. More educated respondents were more likely to be employed than those with less education (Rho = –.301, p < 0.001). As expected, age is linked to employment, with the older persons being more likely to be employed (Rho = –.547, p < 0.001).
**MATERIAL STATUS OF YOUNG PEOPLE**

When asked to self-assess the economic situation of the household they live in, the majority of respondents judged their situation to be average (42.5%). According to respondents, this means that they are wealthy enough to afford some pricier things, but not big-ticket items like cars or apartments. Those youth who see no problems with their situation and believe they can afford a good standard of living make up 18.9% of the sample. Meanwhile, 3.3% are unable to cover their basic needs, whereas 13.9% can afford basic necessities, but not clothes or shoes. Those who can afford clothes, shoes, and food, but not some of the more expensive consumer items like televisions or refrigerators make up 21.4% of the sample.

Youth’s economic situation correlates with their education (\( \rho = .111, p < 0.05 \)). Those with more education are more likely to report higher standards of living in their households. Young people’s perception of their economic situation is also positively correlated with young people’s perceived material status (\( \rho = .225, p < 0.001 \)). Those with better-educated parents often see their economic position as better.

Just 6.1% of respondents reported that their families do not own a house or apartment. Just above two-thirds have one house or apartment (67.3%), and just over a quarter own two or three houses or apartments (26.7%). Ownership of house or apartment is correlated with the economic situation of the household (\( \rho = .332, p < 0.001 \)), father’s education (\( \rho = .184, p < 0.001 \)), and the respondent’s education (\( \rho = .112, p < 0.005 \)).

15.3% of respondents said that their household does not own a car, more than a half said they owned one car (51.4%), and a third said they had two or three cars (33.3%). Car ownership is correlated with parent’s education (\( \rho = .196, p < 0.001 \)), and the economic situation of the household (\( \rho = .372, p < 0.001 \)).

**THE HOUSING STATUS OF YOUNG PEOPLE**

As many as 71.8% of young people live with their parents, and a much smaller percentage (4.7%) live in housing inherited from parents or relatives or bought for them by parents. 6.2% of respondents live in a rented apartment/house that they pay for themselves, and 5.6% in a rented apartment/house paid for by someone else. Only 3.2% live in a house or apartment they bought themselves or together with a partner. Prevalence of independent living is related to the age of the respondent (\( \rho = .231, p < 0.001 \)), level of education (\( \rho = .154, p < 0.001 \)), and employment status (\( \rho = –.110, p < 0.05 \)) – those with a job are more likely to live independently.

With age young people become less dependent on parents for housing, but even in the oldest cohort of our respondents – young people aged 25 to 29 – more than two-thirds (62.19%) live with parents. Another 14.43% live in a house or apartment they bought themselves or with a partner. Independent living does not seem to be correlated with the type of environment (urban or rural) or with the economic situation of the family.

4.7% of respondents said their house had only one room, shared by all members of the household. Another quarter of respondents (25.9%) live in a house with two rooms, 29.1% have three rooms, and 20% have four rooms. Every fifth respondent lives in a house with four or more rooms (19.7%).

Young people in rural areas have more rooms in their houses than those in urban areas (\( \chi^2 = 60.75, p < 0.001 \), Cramer’s V = 0.185). Households’ economic situation is correlated with the number of rooms in the house (\( \chi^2 = 86.71, p < 0.001 \), Cramer’s V = 0.198). Parents’ education is also related to the likelihood of children having their own room (\( \chi^2 = 14.38, p < 0.05 \), Cramer’s V = 0.153). As many as 77.6% of respondents had their own room, while 22.4% did not. Those from wealthier families are more likely to have a room of their own (\( \chi^2 = 30.19, p < 0.001 \), Cramer’s V = 0.145).
Research on youth leisure time is an especially important step towards understanding young people, their position in society, and influences on the development of their personalities (Larson & Verma, 1999; Wight et al., 2009; Zick, 2010). Leisure is a complex contemporary phenomenon whose content and implications are increasingly becoming a decisive factor in the development of young people’s personalities (Pehlić, 2014). Studies of leisure time seek to assess the quality of life of young people, but also reveal whether and to what extent “young people use leisure time in a constructive manner that prepares them for adulthood and the competitive 21st century global world” (Larson, 2001).

A society that genuinely cares about its youth and seek to foster their development, including both personal development and that of society at large, will take leisure time seriously as one of the key elements of socialisation of young people. The way in which leisure time is organised is a measure of society’s care for its youth and for its own future, and all investment in broadening the possibilities for leisure time is investment into society’s own development. Young people are a resource which can only develop if their leisure time is sufficiently diverse, actively engaging them to develop their creative potential, and stimulating social engagement and responsibility.

Research on leisure views time as a resource that can be constructively deployed or unproductively squandered. From the point of view of development, time is understood as a resource in a very broad sense: in addition to building instrumental knowledge and skills, young people are also expected to invest time in activities that are important for acquiring social and emotional competencies, identity-formation, and a series of other dispositions linked to personal development and successful adjustment to adulthood (J. Pešić, M. Videnović, D. Plut, 2007).

Some authors view different ways to spend leisure time as a “long-term investment in overall maturity and mental health” (Larson & Verma, 1999). The choices young people make with regard to the type of activities chosen and the time dedicated to these influence their current and future welfare in multiple ways.

There are many definitions of leisure. One of them defines it as a collection of activities to which an individual willingly dedicates his or herself, to relax or be entertained, to become better informed or educated, more socially active, or to unleash his or her creativity once professional, family, and social obligations have been settled (Božović, 1970).

It is time for rest, entertainment, and socialising, but also a space for young people to express and develop their talents, interests, and abilities.

Leisure-time researchers point to the important functions of leisure over and beyond mere rest, distraction, or recreation. An important function of leisure is the development of a personality that is at the same time its most complex aspect and is accordingly a subject of research in a number of disciplines. Leisure is important for development of personality because it allows young people to engage their interests and needs and activate creative forces that could not be satisfied in other areas of life.

The authors generally agree that leisure time should allow various ways to satisfy needs through individual or teamwork.
Youth expect leisure time to provide entertainment, company, an opportunity to learn new skills, and a chance to be active in their local communities. Leisure and leisure-related activities are thus understood as an important way to empower young people, and an opportunity for each individual or group to pursue their interests (Jedud and Novak, 2006).

Research on leisure generally concludes that leisure time contributes to the proper personal and social development of a young person in proportion to the extent to which it engages them both mentally and physically. Thus a distinction is usually made between active and passive leisure, the active one being far more conducive to the mental and physical development of youth.

Various studies have also found that involvement of young people in challenging and engaging activities is essential to their proper development, i.e. to their current and future welfare (Gordon-Larsen et al., 2004; Hunter & Csikszentmihalyi, 2003; Iso-Ahola, 1997; Mahoney & Stattin, 2000).

Hobbies and creative leisure time are also a significant source of cognitive and socio-economic engagement of young people, and multiply beneficial to development (Coatsworth et al., 2005; Hunter & Csikszentmihalyi, 2003; Larson, & Verma, 1999; Mahoney & Stattin, 2000; Wight et al., 2009).

Furthermore, engagement in voluntary and social groups and activities also has a number of positive developmental effects, such as: strengthening self-confidence and self-respect, a sense of control over one’s own life, development of initiative and responsibility, development of pro-social values and social competences, better attitudes towards education, as well as higher educational achievement (J. Pešić, M. Videnović, D. Plut, 2007).

Diversity and quality of activities available to young people in their leisure time also double as measures of the quality of life of this social group. There is a consensus among research on the sociological and pedagogical implications of leisure that it ought to be replete with contents and activities that impart to young people intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and work-related principles.

Pedagogues of leisure stress that the educational purpose of leisure is to direct and channel development of the personality and develop young people into individuals capable of having satisfying, active, and responsible personal lives, and contributing to their communities. To succeed in this, leisure should be conceived as a time devoted to creative activities capable of developing and improving young people’s personal strengths.

During leisure time, young people ought to be able to develop their proclivities, creativity, the collective spirit, as well as express themselves personally through various activities. The way in which young people spend their leisure time can influence their development and personality in the direction of being a responsible citizen and individual.

If leisure is insufficiently structured, however, it could become a space for socially unacceptable activities, various forms of socially deviant behaviour and addictions, i.e. fail to contribute positively to an individual’s development. Leisure without enough content or structure could thus lead to various forms of problematic behaviour, excessive use of drugs, alcohol, smoking, etc., as well as sexual harassment, violence, and more serious forms of delinquency.

**YOUNG PEOPLE’S LEISURE ACTIVITIES**

Our findings show that young people in Montenegro spend their leisure time predominantly engaged in passive activities such as rest, relaxation, and time with family and friends. They spend the most time listening to music – nearly 70% of respondents said they spend the most time every day doing this activity. Time with family is the second most common activity (58.4%), followed by time with friends (47.4%). A significant percentage of young people spend their leisure time doing nothing (38.3%), or partying (31.1%) and watching movies (30.4%). Young people are least likely to spend their leisure time volunteering (64.2%), involvement in youth clubs (57.4%) or in creative activities such as writing, painting, or playing an instrument (38.9%). Young people are also less likely to spend their leisure time reading newspapers and books (11.5% and 14.4%), (Figure 5.1).

Relative to men, women appear more likely to read in their leisure time($\chi^2 = 43,02$) or to engage in creative activities ($\chi^2 = 31,95$). Young people who are currently in higher education are also more likely to read books ($\chi^2 = 42,90$), as are those who already have a tertiary degree ($\chi^2 = 46,39$). Those with more education also read more newspapers ($\chi^2 = 53,53$). Young people’s reading habits are also affected by their social capital, the availability of books at home ($\chi^2 = 95,35$) and parents’ education, as young people from better-educated families read more than others ($\chi^2 = 41,77$). Young people with less education are more likely to use their leisure time to engage in sports ($\chi^2 = 47,18$). High school students are more likely to spend their time in youth clubs than are university students (61.6% vs. 47%). Parents’ education is also related to propensity to engage in creative activities ($\chi^2 = 51,61$). No significant difference was found between rural and urban areas, though youth from rural areas spend more time with the family ($\chi^2 = 32,11$), whereas those from urban areas are more likely to do sports ($\chi^2 = 23,03$).

Those from wealthier background are more likely to travel for leisure ($\chi^2 = 72,53$), or engage in creative activities ($\chi^2 = 27,87$). Men are more likely to do sports than women ($\chi^2 = 49,83$), but they also play more video games ($\chi^2 = 108,154$). Women spend more time with the family ($\chi^2 = 14,76$), but are interestingly enough more likely to spend their leisure time in prayer ($\chi^2 = 12,54$) or reading about spiritual development ($\chi^2 = 18,26$). Women also more frequently spend their leisure time shopping ($\chi^2 = 57,25$) and listening to music ($\chi^2 = 18,38$).
The Internet has become an integral part of the lives of individuals today, especially for young people. Research has shown that the Internet’s influence has far outstripped that of traditional media. Any research on leisure time of today’s youth must include research into the access to and ways of using the Internet – the new “best friend” of most young people. Like any other content available to young people in their leisure time, the Internet can be used in various ways and to satisfy various needs: from finding information to education and communication, to mere entertainment and distraction. Our study shows that two-thirds (65.3%) of young people have access to the Internet nearly 24/7. Only 0.8% have access less than once a week, and only 0.1% no access at all (Figure 5.2). Youth from poorer families are most likely not to have access to the Internet or only have access once a week ($\chi^2 = 50.04, p <0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.145$).

Given the wide availability of the Internet, it is no wonder that young people spend on average six hours per day online. There is a significant relationship between the time spent online and the place of residence: youth from rural areas spend less time online than those in urban settings ($t=2.027, df=348, p < 0.05$). Their economic situation also influences the use of the Internet to some extent, with young people from poorer backgrounds spending fewer hours online than those with a wealthier background ($t=1.992, df=100, p < 0.05$). No other characteristics seemed to be significant in determining the number of hours “spent” online.

Young people use the Internet mainly to communicate with friends and family (85.4%), use social networks (82.6%), and share photos, videos, and music (61.7%). Similarly, many young people use the Internet to download or listen to music (60.4%). 61.1% of the respondents said they use the Internet for school or work,
FIGURE 5.3: Overview of the most common purposes for Internet use among young people in Montenegro (%)
and 59.1% to read news and get information. Respondents also frequently use the Internet to download and watch videos and film (46.9%). Young people are least likely to use the Internet for online banking, to rate products and services, or for e-mail communication (Figure 5.3).

Personal background also determines how young people use the Internet. Women use it more often for work and education (Rho = -.163, p < 0.001), and are more likely to share photos, videos, and music (Rho = -.129, p < 0.001). Men more frequently download films and other videos (Rho = .077, p < 0.05) and watch video games (Rho = .346, p < 0.001).

The younger they are, the more likely respondents were to spend their Internet time on social networks (Rho = -.104, p < 0.05). Older ones, by contrast, were more likely to use it to rate goods and services (Rho = .206, p < 0.001), for online banking (Rho = .251, p < 0.001), and shopping (Rho = .173, p < 0.001) and for email communication (Rho = -.330, p < 0.001). Older respondents are more likely to use the Internet for education and to read the news (Rho = .251, p < 0.001). Younger age groups are more frequent among those who use the Internet to play games (Rho = -.197, p < 0.001), and download and listen to music (Rho = -.117, p < 0.001).

Use of the Internet also depends on education. Those respondents with higher education more often use it to study and work (Rho = .130, p < 0.001), look up information and read news (Rho = .209, p < 0.001), exchange emails (Rho = .310, p < 0.001), shop online (Rho = .151, p < 0.001) or use online banking services (Rho = .231, p < 0.001) and rate and evaluate goods and services (Rho = .121, p < 0.05). Those with less education typically use the Internet to download and listen to music (Rho = -.147, p < 0.001) or watch films (Rho = -.156, p < 0.001).

Young people with better-educated fathers, or those from more educated families in general, are more likely to use online shopping (Rho = .100, p < 0.05) and banking services (Rho = .111, p < 0.05).

Social networks are among the most common ways of using the Internet among youth – as many as 82.6% of the young people interviewed frequently visit social networks. Only 4.3% of respondents said they never use social networks (Figure 5.4). Half of them have more than 500 “friends” online (Figure 5.4). And yet a significant number – about a quarter – cannot say how many of these they could count as close friends in reality. Those who do usually say the figure is lower than 20.

All the advantages offered by the wealth of information at our fingertips notwithstanding, the virtual world also carries with it numerous risks. Young people face threats, cyber bullying, manipulated information, hate speech, misuse of personal data, etc.

Only 11.6% of young people believe that the Internet, as far as the use of personal information on social networks is concerned, is perfectly safe. Almost a quarter (23.6%) trust online security to a great extent, and another third (33.5%) to some extent. On the other hand, 19.8% mostly do not trust in the security of their information, and 11.6% do not trust in this at all.

**LIFESTYLE AND RISK BEHAVIOUR AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE**

Risk behaviour is behaviour that can endanger the physical and psycho-social health and development of young people. This means above all consumption of dangerous substances, risky sexual behaviour, deviant behaviour, and delinquency. International literature on the subject usually mentions risky sexual behaviour, lack of responsibility in the use of protection in sexual encounters, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, aggression, and violence.

For this reason, the choice between healthy lifestyles and risk behaviour is an important indicator of young people’s quality of life. This is why our research included questions about attitudes toward smoking, alcohol and drug use, as well as sexual and reproductive health.

The World Health Organisation predicts that by 2030 smoking will be the cause of death for ten million people per year, more than any other single cause. Smoking, which causes the body to absorb various substances such as nicotine, tar, and carbon-monoxide, falls under risk behaviour because it damages the human body. It increases the risk of many other diseases, such as cancer, lung disease, heart and cardiovascular disease, etc. It also has all the characteristics of an addiction. Early use of tobacco increases the risk of alcoholism and drug abuse later, as it creates an addiction-prone personality.

Our study shows that every fifth young person in Montenegro smokes (22.7% of the respondents), while another 8% smoke sometimes. 64% do not use tobacco at all, and 5.4% say they have quit smoking. Altogether, this means that about 30.7% of Montenegro’s youth are regular or occasional smokers (Figure 5.5). The vast majority do not smoke, which suggests that this “habit” is not particularly popular among young people. Men are more likely to smoke than women (Rho = .139, p < 0.001), as are older responders (Rho = .246, p < 0.001). Those from less wealthy families are somewhat more likely to smoke (Rho = -.098, p < 0.05). Among young people aged 18 and below, as many as 94% do not use tobacco, while 2.4% smoke regularly and 3.61% occasionally.
Alcoholism is a medical condition because the toxic effects of alcohol and the metabolic changes it causes damage the body. Alcoholism is, however, also a social problem, as the social environment is to a large extent responsible for the development and spread of alcoholism, which in turn affects society through the behavioural disturbances exhibited by alcoholics in the communities in which they live and work. Only a small percentage of young people in Montenegro consume alcohol every day – just 0.9% – while 11.3% drink several times a week. Among 14.2%, partying on weekends is always accompanied by drinking. Alcohol consumption is rare for 40.5% of young people, and 33.1% never drink. Overall, one-quarter or every fifth young person drinks frequently, while a third never do (Figure 5.6). Young people who are less satisfied with their lives overall are somewhat more likely to drink (Rho = –.094, p < 0.05), as are older cohorts of respondents (Rho = .308, p < 0.001). Men drink more often than women (Rho = .215, p < 0.001).

Regarding attitudes toward alcohol, 22.1% of the young people do not consider it acceptable, about half (49.3%) think it is somewhat acceptable, and a bit over a quarter find it acceptable (28.6%).

Young people from urban environments show a greater acceptance of alcohol consumption (Rho = .098, p < 0.005), as do older respondents (Rho = .181, p < 0.001) and men (Rho = .146, p < 0.001). Level of education is also related to tolerance of alcohol consumption – respondents with higher levels of education are more likely to be accepting of alcohol consumption (Rho = .136, p < 0.001).

Our study found that young people are generally not inclined to consume drugs, including so-called “light” drugs such as marijuana. The overwhelming majority have never used marijuana (90.3%) and only 7.2% have used it rarely – 0.6% on weekends, 1.5% several times a week, and 0.3% every day. Respondents’ age is related to the frequency of marijuana use: older persons are more likely to use it regularly (Rho = .093, p < 0.05). Men are also more likely to consume marijuana than women (Rho = .150, p < 0.001).

Other risk behaviour relates to youth’s sexual lives, habits, and reproductive health. Many authors believe that one of the key characteristics of our societies has been an increase in sexual activity among youth. This is manifested, among other things, in the rising numbers of sexually active adolescents, growing numbers of those who have their first sexual experience during early adolescence and a decline in the average age at which young people have their first sexual encounter (Sedlecki K., 2001).

Risky sexual behaviour can lead to new health problems, and can result in unplanned pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases. The extent of damage to the reproductive health of young persons depends on their model of sexual behaviour as well as on many other physiological factors and health-related habits of individuals, and, finally, on sociocultural factors at work in the environment. Risky (negative) health behaviour includes little physical activity, excessive eating, smoking and alcohol, avoidance of medical checks, unprotected sex, and use of psychoactive substances.

One “new” phenomenon relating to sexual behaviour of young people is the “hook-up” culture – the race to “catch” as many sexual partners as possible, without mutual commitment or feelings.

In our sample, 47.4% of respondents said they were sexually active. Of these, 37.2% had had sex with more than one partner, and 10.2% with only one partner. 24.8% of the respondents had not had a sexual encounter yet. A large number of respondents (28%) did not answer this question, citing discomfort with the topic.

Women are less sexually active than men ($\chi^2 = 65.22$). They are also less likely to have had sex with more than one partner (20.8% of women compared to 53.7% men) and are more likely to decline to answer this question (32.6% women compared to 23.3% men).

Parents’ religiosity appears to be a factor that affects the sexual practices of young people and their willingness to talk about this issue ($\chi^2 = 36.19$). Young people whose parents are religious or moderately religious were less likely to report having experi-
enced sex, especially with several partners. They were also less likely to talk about their experience. Sexual encounters with multiple partners are more frequent among young people with higher levels of education ($\chi^2 = 187.33$), who were also more open to talking about their sex life.

The first sexual experience usually takes place at age 17 (M=17.21), with a standard deviation of 2.16.

Our findings show the sex life of young people in Montenegro to be fairly risk-prone, as demonstrated by the fact that only a quarter (26.4%) use contraception as a rule during sexual encounters. More than half of the respondents do not use contraception, or only use it “sometimes” (59.6%). 13.9% of young people said they did not know much about contraception (Figure 5.7).

Women are better informed and more likely to use contraception than men ($\chi^2 = 12.53$). The place of residence makes a significant difference, with youth from urban areas being more likely to use contraception than those from rural ones ($\chi^2 = 18.08$). Those with more education are also more likely to use contraception more frequently, while fewer members of this group reported not knowing about it (Rho = .164, p<0.05).

The results indicate that the level of awareness of the importance of contraception among young people is still low. Our findings also constitute a damning assessment of Healthy Lifestyles, an elective course in primary and secondary schools in Montenegro which is supposed to cover information on sexuality, reproductive health and rights.

In the context of the discussion of risk behaviour, it should also be noted that young people in Montenegro have a markedly negative attitude toward abortion. Asked whether abortion can be condoned, 42.9% respondents said it is never justified, and 3.6% that it is always justified. The average answer on the scale of 1 to 10 is 3.2 (the scale ranks from 1 – it is never justified to 10 – always justified) (Figure 5.8).

The majority of young people (37.9%) consider sexual abstinence before marriage to be an outdated concept, and 38.4% consider it an unnecessary burden on both men and women. Nevertheless, as many as 23.8% consider abstinence a virtue. More think it is a virtue for women (16.6%) than for both sexes (7.2%). It is interesting that as many as 38.4% of respondents failed to answer this question. Though the relationship is not statistically significant, women appear to be somewhat more liberal towards sex before marriage than men.

Regarding attitudes toward homosexuality, young people still unswervingly display marked homophobic attitudes, an opinion that has been consistently evident for years both in the general population and among young people in Montenegro. On the scale of 1 to 10 (1 never justified, 10 always justified) young people rank acceptability of homosexuality at 2.79. More detailed analysis shows women to be more tolerant towards homosexuality than men ($\chi^2 = 27.04$).
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

Our findings indicate that young people in Montenegro mostly use leisure for the purposes of relaxation and entertainment. A large proportion of leisure time is spent listening to music, watching movies, relaxing, or simply not doing anything. Going out with friends, family time, partying and online and social network-based entertainment are the most likely ways for young people to enjoy leisure. Activities that engage young people intellectually, creatively or socially are barely cited. It is especially worrying that young people spend too little time engaging in activities that develop creativity, interests, competences, and identity. Socially engaged activities are of the least interest to young people (volunteering or work in youth clubs). Research shows high levels of risk in terms of attitudes toward reproductive health. The community as well as local and national cultural policies for youth ought to be more sensitive to these gaps and omissions and motivate young people to spend their time in a more creative and active manner, as it is precisely such activities that prepare them best for adult life, and for programmes offered by youth clubs, options for voluntary commitments and other possibilities for socially engaged activities both at school and outside of it, i.e. through various activity clubs and other forms of creative engagement of young people. Development of a participatory culture in schools through civic education programmes plays a huge role in this, as does raising awareness of healthy lifestyles, which includes meaningful and engaged use of leisure time.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

— Further strengthen educational approaches that develop an awareness of the importance of healthy lifestyles
— Support creation and work of youth clubs to improve the content of activities available to young people in their leisure time.
— Strengthen extracurricular programmes on offer at schools to develop creative proclivities of young people
— Improve cultural policy directed at youth
— Strengthen and promote voluntary commitments among young people
— Strengthen media literacy in young people in order to help them use the Internet in a more diverse and secure manner
VALUES, TRUST AND BELIEFS OF YOUTH

VALUES OF YOUTH

On a list of 16 options offered, priority values for youth are distributed on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 not important; 5 very important) as follows:

Young people at the top of the charts cite traditional values of interpersonal loyalty to friends, one’s partner and the employer. It is important for them to have children, to marry, even though this is now becoming part of the context in which the professional sphere assumes primacy. Hence, successful career, education and healthy nutrition are highly valued and are, conditionally speaking, regarded as post-modern values. A certain confusion in the scale of values is worth noting – responsibility is high on the list, but participation in civic activities or politics is low. And it is clear that without social and political engagement in the broadest sense there will be a dearth of responsible citizens. It is encouraging that young people recognise responsibility as an important precondition for personal independence, career success and education, but it is problematic that there is a strong lack of interest in political and social activism. Interestingly, however, participation in civic activities differs somewhat from political activism, i.e. young people are more inclined toward engagement in the civic sphere than formal politics. Material values such as wealth and wearing designer clothes are not high on the list of young people’s priorities, but healthy nutrition and good looks are part of a new image of a beautiful and healthy appearance that is heavily promoted in modern society through the media (Figure 6.1).

TRUST

Research on social trust seeks to illuminate the structure of social capital in every society. Social capital denotes trust relationships among members of one community and the developed feeling that it is important to act together in order to achieve goals of general interest and common good. Society has a high level of social capital if its citizens are open to creating relationships and cooperating with people outside their primary communities, such as families, and to working in solidarity in order to achieve common interests. The concept of social capital is, in fact, the idea that the quality of social relations affects the success of individuals and entire societies in a number of areas, such as the functioning of democracy, economic development, educational achievement, health, etc. (Šalaj, 2007).

Robert Putnam, one of the founders of the theoretical concept of social capital, defines it as a socio-cultural feature of a group or individual that consists of civic participation, citizenship and general trust, whereby it can improve the achievements of society by facilitating spontaneous cooperation or harmonised action (Putnam, 2003, A. Gvozdenovic). Putnam distinguishes two types: bonding and bridging social capital (sometimes called exclusive and inclusive). The bonding type is characteristic of primary groups such as the family, as well as for groups of people sharing certain traits, ethnic or religious, while bridging capital connects people with distinctive characteristics. He believes that both contribute to society, but that the bridging type is more important to society for the benefits it can produce.
Bridging capital weaves networks that are dominated by ethnic, social and divisions based on other characteristics. Bonding social capital is about establishing mutual relationships in a narrow circle of particular solidarity and loyalty, thereby creating closed social circles which are often hostile and do not display solidarity with actors outside of their group.

Social trust is the most important element of social capital, although there are different perceptions of this concept. Claus Offe defines social trust as a ‘belief that others, through their action or inaction, will refrain from inflicting damage upon me and that they will, when possible, contribute to my well-being’ (Claus Offe, 1999). Kenneth Newton refers to a ‘belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will take care of our interests, when possible’ (Newton, K., 2004). As social capital, trust is both bonding and bridging.

The growth of bridging trust in society is a characteristic linked to accepting diversity and tolerance, while at the political level it is the basis upon which citizens engage in social and political groups (Stolle, 2002; Uslaner, 2002; Putnam, 2008).

Society is being democratised with the growth of bridging social capital, with simultaneous strengthening of the participation and credibility of civil and political actors and institutions. Societies with an expressed, high level of intragroup bonding and markedly low level of intergroup bridging capital are unstable, conflicting and divided. In short, developed social capital means that citizens of a society identify with the community and have confidence in the political institutions, with high levels of civic activism, providing a cohesive basis for good governance and development of successful communities. That is why the degree of trust and development of social capital is a kind of glue that holds society together and fosters efficiency of the system in all aspects.
Finally, the degree of social trust points to how much young people are open to cooperating with others who are not part of their primary groups, or to what extent they close themselves as a precaution and division in relations with members of other groups.

**TRUST OF YOUNG PEOPLE TOWARDS DIFFERENT SOCIAL GROUPS**

In the research, youth expressed their trust and confidence in different social groups on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 complete distrust; 5 complete trust (Figure 6.2)).

It would appear that most young people place the greatest trust in members of their closest family. The results indicate that 90.9% of young people have complete trust in their family members, followed by friends (74.9%). The relationship of trust towards members of the extended family, which is diminishing in relation to trust towards friends, is one of the indicators of the process of modernisation.

At the bottom of the trust list are political leaders, whom only 2.6% of young people fully trust. A huge majority (80% of young people) do not trust them at all or only trust them very little. Neighbours are also a group in which young people do not have great trust; only 23.2 percent trust them completely. Given that respondents are young people, it is somehow to be expected that their particular relationships, i.e. primary target groups, are those with the greatest trust as the framework that provides them with the greatest support and security in the period of transition to the adult world.

Below-average trust was registered towards persons who have different political beliefs, which may be of interest for further analysis because a social system's ability to spread trust is essential if cooperation it to take place between people who have different beliefs.

Judging by research findings, young people in Montenegro are mostly oriented toward primary social groups. Hence so-called bonding or ‘dense’ trust is strongest. On the other hand, bridging or ‘thin’ trust is relatively developed, and particularly weak when it comes to attitudes towards political leaders and people of different political beliefs.

Altruism, philanthropy and volunteer work are of undeniable significance with regard to intergroup bridging capital and the state of social cohesion in society.

Research findings suggest that volunteer engagement and participation in socially engaging youth activities are scarcely an element of leisure-time activities. Over 64.2% of young people never engage in voluntary work; 57.4% are not active at youth centres, which offer one form of civic activism and help create a network of bridging trust that contributes to a strengthening of social capital. In response to the direct question of whether they had volunteered in the previous year, only 19.7% of young people answered in the affirmative, while 80.3% said they had not participated in voluntary activities. Voluntary engagement is more likely among youth with higher levels of education ($\chi^2 =13.978$), but also with youth from villages compared to the city (51.4% versus 42.6% from the city). No statistically significant links with other characteristics of youth were observed. Research on ways of spending free time suggests that 58.4% of young people dedicate their free time to the family.

**ATTITUDES OF YOUTH TOWARDS SOCIALLY UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR**

In the context of social trust, analysis of condonement of certain behaviour by young people posing a threat to the society is instructive. Attitudes towards cheating on taxes, giving bribes, using connections to get employment or exercising certain public services as well as other corrupt actions can serve as an indicator of young people’s awareness of the importance of responsible behaviour in the general interest. By taking shortcuts through bribery and corruption, the foundations of society are compromised, cultivating a sense of distrust, insecurity, i.e. the belief that nobody wants to harm anyone with their actions is undermined.

Cheating on taxes is not condoned by most young people. For 40.4% of them it is never justified, for 14.8% it is always justified. The average response value on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 never justified, 10 always justified) is 3.91.

Bribery is never justified in the view of 49.7% of youth, while for 15.7% it is always justified. On average, responses tend towards it never being justified in the view of most of the respondents (3.46) on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 never justified, 10 always justified).

Using connections in order to find employment is never justified in the opinion of 22.4% of respondents, but for 30.1% it is always justified, indicating a split in opinions (5.59) on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 never justified, 10 always justified).

Using connections to ‘get things done’ in public services, hospitals, etc., is never justified for 21.5%, but for 31.2% it is always justified. The average score on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 never justified, 10 always justified) is 5.7.

**SOCIAL AND ETHNICAL DISTANCE AMONG YOUTH**

Another important aspect of social cohesion is relationships with other categories of people, i.e. willingness to accept and cooperate with them. Social distance exists towards certain groups, which, if it is on a significant scale, translates into distrust, difficulties communicating and cooperating or, if it is on an insignificant scale, greater chances of connecting.

This aspect allows one to explore the degree of tolerance and openness in a society when it comes to establishing cooperative relationships and full use of all potential to achieve general goals and values without bias. Groups towards whom there is a social distance are constrained in their ability to contribute to the
shaping of the society in which they live. Although social distance does not automatically mean discrimination, it certainly does not contribute to unity, and it often actually leads to it.

Social distance expresses the degree of closeness in social relationships that a person accepts with members of social groups and may vary from close and warm relationships to indifference all the way to hostility towards social groups, values or individuals (Petz, 1992; Supek, 1968). Social distance represents the degree to which a person agrees to enter into relationships with other individuals or social groups (Milosavljević, 2005). It measures the scope of bridging trust as a prerequisite for stable development.

Young people included in the survey were asked to answer the question of how willing they would be to accept members of nine stated groups moving into their neighbourhood. Their feelings regarding the acceptability of a particular group were expressed on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 very bad, 5 very good).

The data indicate that young people would feel rather bad if a drug addict or ex-prisoner moved into their neighbourhood (M = 1.41 and M = 1.54). Nor would they be particularly happy to have a homosexual person or homosexual couple (M=2.13), a refugee or a Roma family (M = 2.7 and M = 2.63) in their neighbourhood. The level of discomfort decreases if the persons moving into the neighbourhood are a family from Western Europe (M = 3.34), a group of students (M = 3.65), a retired couple (M = 3.71), or a local family with many children (M = 3.81) (Figure 6.3.).

Women are more tolerant towards homosexuals (M = 2.35, SD = 1.43) compared to men (M = 2.89, SD = 1.45), i.e. they exhibit less distance (t = 4.324, df = 626, p <0.001). Also in relation to social distance to the Roma population, women (M = 2.74, SD = 1.39) differ from men (M = 2.52, SD = 1.33) and are more tolerant (t = 2.044, df = 622, P <0.05). Demography influences attitudes towards certain social groups, as young people from urban areas have less distance towards homosexuals (M = 2.22, SD = 1.46) compared to young people from rural areas (M = 1.62, SD = 1.21) (t = −2.309, df = 155, p <0.05). In addition, more educated young people are less inclined to distance themselves from homosexuals, while respondents with a university education (M = 2.41, SD = 1.49) differ from those with elementary education (M = 1.79, SD = 1.18) (t = −3.094, df = 199, p < 0.05). Other variables do not have any significant links to (non-) acceptance of certain social groups.

This survey measures ethnic distance by means of the question as to how much respondents would oppose socialising or family relationships with members of different ethnic groups.

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The greatest ethnic distance among young people is exhibited toward Roma and Albanians. A third of young people stated that they would not socialise with a member of the Roma population, and almost the same number are not open to the idea of socialising with a member of the Albanian ethnic group (Figure 6.4). However, when asked whether they would have anything against marrying

![FIGURE 6.3: The level of social distance among young people in Montenegro](image1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Level of Social Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family from Western Europe</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former prisoners</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug addicts</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired couple</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma family</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of students</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexual person or a couple</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local family with many children</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![FIGURE 6.4: The openness of young people toward socialising with other ethnic groups.](image2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>90.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Would you have anything against socialising with members of other ethnic groups?

- Yes, I would  
- No, I wouldn’t
someone from the stated ethnic groups, the distance ‘explodes’ in relation to Roma. For two-thirds such a marriage is unacceptable, and the future is similar with regard to Albanians. One-third of youth are opposed to the idea of marrying Croats, Bosnians and Macedonians, and every twentieth with Serbs (Figure 6.5).

These findings confirm tendencies seen in some earlier measurements of social distance, in which Roma are consistently a social group towards which there is a distance when it comes to any kind of social contact or even socialising.

Ethnic and social distance reminds us that the degree of distrust and revulsion felt towards certain groups is transmitted and strengthened through time. This kind of attitude on the part of youth towards different social groups requires deliberate and effective action, as it poses a threat to the stability of society.

THE EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION

The degree of affiliation with, and trust in, a society is also measured by determining the perception of one’s own experience of discrimination. Young people in the research project were able to say whether they had experienced discrimination due to some their characteristics or involvement in society.

The greatest percentage of young people stated that they never felt discriminated against because of their gender (81.5 %), economic status (73.5 %) or age (72 %). With the other characteristics offered, young people did not feel that these involved discrimination (Figure 6.6). This information can be interpreted as encouraging because these statements by young people indicate that a small number of them are actually discriminated against due to their personality, affiliation or public engagement. This is the only link, albeit an important one, that emerges between perception of one’s own experience of discrimination and the material status of young people ($ \chi^2 = 38.35$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.183$). Young people who assess their material status as poor are more likely than others to feel discriminated against because of their status.

YOUTH AND RELIGION

When asked whether they are members of a religion, 95.15 % of young people stated that they were members of a particular religion. A majority say they are Orthodox (78.4 %), followed by Muslims (15.8 %) and Catholics (3.6 %). Only slightly more than 1 % state they are not members of any religion, and 0.4 % are members of another religion (Figure 6.7).
Among youth whose fathers have a higher level of education, a majority claim not to belong to any religion ($\chi^2 = 93.16, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s V} = 0.198$). Also, youth with higher levels of education themselves tend not to identify themselves as members of any religion ($\chi^2 = 38.61, p < 0.005, \text{Cramer’s V} = 0.121$) compared to young people with a lower education.

In enquiring about religiosity, young people were asked about how important God is in their life. Respondents were able to opt for one of the values on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 not important at all to 10 very important). The greatest percentage of young people state that God is very important in their lives (48.5%). 5.5% state that God is not important to them at all. The average value which they opted for was 7.90, which is fairly high.

With regard to differentiation of young people according to certain characteristics, a relationship between religiousness and resident status ($\text{Rho} = -.103, p < 0.05$) was established. Thus, young people from villages are somewhat more religious compared to young people from urban areas. Also, the cultural capital of family is connected to the degree of religiousness measured by importance of God in the life of a young person ($\text{Rho} = -.095, p < 0.05$). Young people whose parents are religious are more religious than others ($\text{Rho} = .333, p < 0.001$). More authoritarian young people also tend to be more religious ($\text{Rho} = .214, p < 0.001$). As a measure of authoritarianism, the degree of belief of young people in the claim that a strong leader with a firm hand is what society needs was used. There is also a correlation between young people who express a greater social distance towards homosexuals and their religiousness ($\text{Rho} = -.259, p < 0.001$).

However, when it comes to the practice of religion, the greatest percentage of young people (39.1%) visit religious services only on the occasion of important holidays for the religion that they are members of. Once a month, religion is practiced by attending church services or other rituals at places of worship by 15.5% of young people. Religion is practiced one or more times a week by 12.8% of young people. 18.4% of young people do so once a year or less, and almost 14.2% of respondents never do so (Figure 6.8).

With regard to the religion that they are members of, there are certain differences in practicing religion among youth. Thus, young people who are members of the Catholic faith are more numerous among those who worship more often ($\chi^2 = 71.37, p < 0.001, \text{Camer’s V} = 0.173$).

Finally, young people whose parents are very or mostly religious practice religion more often than young people whose parents are moderately or predominantly non-religious ($\chi^2 = 148.39, p < 0.001, \text{Camer’s V} = 0.255$).
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS:

The social trust of young people is predominantly specific, which means they mostly trust members of their family and friends, but trust in other groups is great as well, except when it comes to people of different political persuasions and neighbours, where this is slightly less, while least trusted are political leaders.

Young people almost never volunteer in the community; 80% of them have not even performed any voluntary work in the previous year. Volunteering and participation in social engagement activities are the least frequent free-time activity, even though volunteering and community support are one of the key indicators of social trust. The social and ethnic distances of young people are very marked towards certain social groups, such as drug addicts, former prisoners, homosexuals, Roma and refugees. Ethnic distance is particularly pronounced towards Roma and Albanians. A significant percentage of young people, one-third of them, would not socialise with Albanians or Roma, and the distance greatly increases when it comes to accepting entering into family relationship with these two groups by marriage. Over 60% of young people would not marry Roma, two-quarters or over 50% would not marry Albanians, while more than a third of young people would not marry a male or female Croat, Bosnian or Macedonian. The greatest percentage of young people state that they have never felt discriminated against due to any personal trait, affiliation or public engagement.

Social trust that is bridging, i.e. that connects people regardless of their different affiliations, is a type of trust that can foster the democratic and sustainable development of societies. However, it is apparent from the results of research that there is considerable social and ethnic distance in Montenegro towards certain social and ethnic groups that may for a lengthy period of time serve as an obstacle to full integration of all members of society, proper functioning of democratic institutions and stability of society. Relying on and including primary groups in the face of distance and distrust of those who think differently about the state politically and future directions of community development poses a real challenge to the further development of society and it is therefore essential to work directly with young people. Parallel to this, the overall functionality of the system has to be improved and a spirit of trust and cooperation needs to be cultivated because this is the context in which young people live and which shapes them.

Although religiousness is a complex phenomenon, findings suggest that religion constitutes an important area of young people’s lives in Montenegro. Over 90% of young people state that they are members of one of the confessions. The importance of God in the lives of young people is very salient, but when it comes to active worship, a majority of young people only attend religious services on important religious holidays.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

— Promotion and encouragement of volunteering and other forms of social engagement among young people, both at school and in the wider local community
— Support for the development of organisations and projects aimed at empowering youth activism in society
— Empowering formal and informal programmes that develop tolerance, understanding and which contribute to the acceptance of diversity
— Creating national policies that contribute to the integration of different social groups into the community through promotion of mutual communication and cooperation in order to reduce the existing social and ethnic distance
YOUTH AND POLITICS

A general interest in politics, participation in political life and decision-making processes by all citizens nurtures and maintains the vibrancy of democratic societies. In this context, participation by young people, who are the guarantors of sustainability for democratic political culture and its modernisation, is key.

Analysis of the aspects of political culture among young people is crucial to research into youth’s attitudes towards politics. Political culture encompasses attitudes towards the political system and its various elements as well as attitudes towards the role of individuals in that system (Almond and Verba, 1963). For societies which are in the phase of democratic transition and consolidation, such as Montenegro, young people of civic political profiles are needed if this process is to be implemented efficiently, which implies an informed, competent, responsible and active citizenry. The importance of well-developed political participation has been discussed by a host of authors, who underscore that without the active engagement of young people there can be no high-quality youth policy, nor at the same time are there any prospects for the democratic development of society.

Political participation is crucial if democratic political systems are to be effective. A high level of political participation at all levels can be viewed as a civic political culture necessary for the stability of democratic political systems. If there is no developed civic political culture in the political system, a conflict will develop between the political culture and political structure (Almond & Verba, 1963). In such an environment, some sort of subject and/or elitist rule will form and be reinforced instead of democracy, aside from the fact that the political structure nominally has a democratic nomenclature (Besic, 2014).

If in a democratic order citizens are not interested in politics, and they do not engage in political debates and in the work of socio-political organisations or interest groups, and their participation in politics is reduced only to voting, it represents a model of political culture which is not democratic in nature (one can call it “subject” using Almond & Verba’s terminology) (Besic, 2014).

Bearing in mind that young people are a part of the population which do not live only in the present, but also constitute the society of tomorrow, their lack of interest in politics as well as ignorance of it can be fatal to survival of democratic system (Kovacic; Vrbat, 2014). The political culture of young people and their level of participation is the sum total of their activity as social agents, from the family, through schools, to the broadest social framework and holders of political functions.

In societies without respectable democratic traditions, the political will and ability of political actors to purposely create adequate conditions are decisive. This implies respect for democratic values and patterns of behaviour in political and entire social life (Ilin, 2015).

In the development of a democratic political culture, the educational system also plays a role, and the educational system should stimulate a democratic political culture through learning content that informs and inculcates knowledge about the political system and possibilities of participation, as well as through the whole way of stimulating critical thinking, which serves as the basis for further activism on the part of young people.

YOUTH INTEREST IN POLITICS

The political culture of young people can best be traced through their interest in following political events from the national to international levels, and inferred from the way in which they gather information, the frequency of their communication about politics with family and friends, but also their ability to critically
observe and perceive all events as well as their formation of attitudes. Naturally, the question of whether young people accept principles and values of civic and democratic political culture, thereby making possible an open society, also needs to be monitored.

The results of the survey indicate that in general young people in Montenegro are interested in politics very little, and this goes for local, regional and international politics. At the general level, 62.7% of young people are not interested in politics. A more detailed look into the results shows that young people are somewhat more interested in local and regional politics, but as political developments move away from the national level, the already limited amount of interest wanes even further. Young people in Montenegro are exceedingly disinterested in political developments in the European Union, the USA and Russia, although interest in what is happening in the EU is somewhat higher, probably due to the ongoing process of Montenegro’s accession to the Union (Figure 7.1).

There are strong correlations between (non-)interest in relation to all levels of political activity.

In relation to interest in politics, no effects of factors such as gender, social capital of the family (education of parents), educational level of youth and age were detected at all. Men are somewhat more interested in politics than women (t=3.567, 654, p < 0.001). Interest in politics tends to grow with age (Rho = .190, p < 0.001). Politics in general is of greater interest to young people whose fathers are more educated (Rho = .164, p < 0.001). Also, those who have completed higher levels of education show more interest in politics (Rho = .224, p < 0.001).

Interest in politics is a basis for, or basic form of, political participation and is also at the roots of interest in stronger political engagement. The data show that socialisation factors, young people’s maturation and level of education affect the intensity of interest in politics.

Young people rarely talk about or discuss politics within the circle of their family or friends, which is a logical consequence of a low general lack of interest in politics. Most respondents do not talk to their parents and friends about politics (37.4% say they never do so). A very small percentage does so very often (3.6%). (Figure 7.2.). Summing up the options on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 never to 10 very often), it seems that young people never discuss politics with their closest friends and family (1+2+3 = 64.4%), 9.9% do sometimes (4+5+6+7) and a fourth of them (25.7% = 8+9+10) do so occasionally.
In the era of the Internet, young people in Montenegro still predominantly inform themselves about politics through television (63.1 %), while the ‘network of all networks’ is second as a channel of information (51.3 %). Social networks serve slightly less as a source of information (22 %), as do daily newspapers (20 %). In accordance with previous findings, the group of friends is a more frequent source and a field where information is exchanged about politics in relation to family (14.3 % versus 9.3 %), while radio is completely marginalised as a medium (7 %) (Figure 7.3.).

Internet is used more often by young people with a higher level of education level ($\chi^2 = 32.83, p < 0.001$), as well as young people of older age ($\chi^2 = 40.40, p < 0.001$). A statistically significant link between the age of young people and use of television as a key information channel about politics was registered ($\chi^2 = 31.88, p < 0.05$), while younger respondents are somewhat more inclined to inform themselves about politics via television.

Young people who have achieved higher levels of education are more likely to inform themselves about politics from daily newspapers ($\chi^2 = 16.25, p < 0.05$), as are those who are currently at higher levels of education ($\chi^2 = 19.47, p < 0.001$), and respondents of older age ($\chi^2 = 33.27, p < 0.05$).

Young people whose parents have a higher level of education ($\chi^2 = 15.19, p < 0.05$) are somewhat more likely to inform themselves about politics in conversations with their parents, while younger men are more likely to exchange information and talk about political events with friends ($\chi^2 = 6.50, p < 0.05$), those with higher levels of education ($\chi^2 = 21.97, p < 0.001$) and those who are currently at higher levels of education ($\chi^2 = 23.43, p < 0.001$), as well as youth from families with more highly educated parents ($\chi^2 = 23.37, p < 0.001$).

More than a quarter of young people think that their political beliefs are not at all similar to those of their parents (28.6 %). Almost a fifth thinks that their political attitudes are very similar to their parents (22.2 %), while 19.7 % of young people are somewhere in between. 15.8 % of young people did not even know, and 13.9 % did not provide any answer at all (Figure 7.4.).
Summing up the options on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 not at all, 10 very much), two-fifths of young people (40.8%) consider their political beliefs to be totally different from their parents, 31.4% assess their political attitudes as being very similar with their parents and 27.8% state that their political attitudes are similar to those of their parents to a certain extent.

Young people who are generally more interested in politics discuss political topics with their parents more often ($\chi^2 = 546.31$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.476$). The frequency of discussions about politics with parents is positively related to a growing interest in political events at all levels, from local to international. Young people who talk about politics more often with their parents tend to be interested in political events in the EU ($\chi^2 = 465.80$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.442$), at the national level ($\chi^2 = 477.13$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.447$) regional politics ($\chi^2 = 490.16$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.452$), American politics ($\chi^2 = 382.45$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.399$) and politics in Russia ($\chi^2 = 353.16$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.383$).

The level of interest of young people in politics in general and events at different levels grows when they concur with the political views of their parents, as does their willingness to perform a political function ($\chi^2 = 68.91$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.203$).

Also, young people who talk to parents about politics more often think that their political convictions are similar to those of their parents ($\chi^2 = 706.45$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.397$), and they have voted more often in previous elections, i.e. they have been less likely to stay away from the polls ($\chi^2 = 60.38$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.236$), they more often believe that they know a lot about politics ($\chi^2 = 229.50$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.351$), have participated more in some informal political activities (petitions – $\chi^2 = 67.78$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.263$, demonstrations – $\chi^2 = 57.36$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.28$), volunteer or civic activities ($\chi^2 = 53.85$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.229$), boycotted a product or service due to their political stance ($\chi^2 = 66.69$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.261$), and participated in a political activity through social networks ($\chi^2 = 82.96$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.286$).

### THE PERCEPTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE’S INTERESTS REPRESENTATION IN NATIONAL POLICIES

One-quarter of young people did not know how to answer the question about how well interests of young people are promoted in national policies (24.3%). Only 8.4% of respondents believe that national policies adequately address issues of interest to young people. Almost a third of young people are somewhere in the middle – half are satisfied (30.4%), while a quarter are dissatisfied and think that the needs and interests of young people are not adequately taken into account in public policy (25.9%). Public policy that addresses the situation of young people in society cannot be effective if young people are not involved in its creation, implementation and evaluation.

### POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF YOUTH

Three-quarters of young people think that there should be greater equality between the income of the rich and the poor (76.8%), and more than two-quarters, i.e. more than half of young people, are of the opinion that state ownership of business and industry should be increased. In the opinion of three-quarters of young people, the government should take more measures to ensure that everyone in society is equally secured (75.1%), and almost half (47.9%) are of the view that competition is positive, while a majority (55.3%) believe that personal initiative requires diligent work to attain a better future.

Young people who maintain that the household in which they live is poor in material terms are more often inclined to support the assertion that the difference between the incomes of rich and poor should be smaller ($\chi^2 = 44.15$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.144$). Also, they are especially more likely to assert that state ownership should be expanded ($\chi^2 = 32.99$, $p < 0.05$, Cramer’s $V = 0.129$). Finally, youth who are poorer in material terms believe that the state should do more to ensure that everyone’s existence is sufficiently secured ($\chi^2 = 33.59$, $p < 0.05$, Cramer’s $V = 0.127$).

These attitudes demonstrate a strong orientation on the part of young people towards socialist principles and values, especially young people from materially deprived strata.

### YOUTH AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Lack of interest in politics can also be expected to be reflected in political practices of young people. Participation in elections as a conventional form of political participation shows that those young people who have the right to vote tend to vote more often than they stay away from the polls. According to responses by interviewees, 54.9% of young people from the overall sample voted in the last parliamentary elections in 2016, 15% did not vote even though
they had the right to vote, and 30.1% did not vote because they did not have the right to vote at the time of the elections (Figure 7.5.).

In the group of young people between 18 and 29, 63.4% voted in the last elections, 17.2% opted not to vote, and 19.4% did not have the right to vote for some reason. This suggests that young people are relatively active when it comes to participation in political life, but the question for further analysis is what motivates them to participate in elections if they are generally not interested in politics, who they vote for and what information serves as a basis for their decisions.

The influence of young people’s age with regard to participation in elections was found to be statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 411.24, p < 0.001$), as young people of older age participate more often in elections. Education as well has to do with participation in elections ($\chi^2 = 194.19, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.416$), i.e. more educated young people participate more often in elections. Generally speaking, those persons who are more interested in politics have voted more often in previous elections ($t=4.030, df=385, p < 0.001$), discuss politics more often with friends and family ($t=4.950, df=225, p < 0.001$), and are of the opinion that they know a lot about politics ($t=3.025, df=236, p < 0.05$).

However, in response to the question of whether they would vote in parliamentary elections if they were held now, 81.5% said they would, and 18.5% would said they would not, vote (Figure 7.6.). 97.5% of those who did vote in previous elections would vote again in the following ones, and 73.8% of those who did not vote, or those who decided not to vote, would do the same again. When it comes to participating in elections, it is important to note that 56.7% of young people agree with the statement that it is every citizen’s duty to vote in a democratic system. This response is actually more frequent among those who voted in previous elections than those who did not ($t=5.862, df=338, p < 0.001$) as well as among those who would vote in new elections ($t=10.461, df=390, p < 0.001$).

So far, a small percentage of young people have participated in some unconventional forms of political activity, and when they have done so, it most often involved signing online petitions or political demands (17.9%), voluntary actions (16.1%) and protests (11.8%), (Figure 7.7.).

When they participate, they are more inclined to participate by signing petitions ($\rho = .186, p < 0.001$) as well as engaging in political activities online or in social networks ($\rho = .100, p < 0.005$). Those who are generally interested in politics participate more frequently in demonstrations ($\rho = .153, p < 0.001$), have boycotted the product of a particular company due to a political stance ($\rho = .243, p < 0.001$), engaged in social activism on social networks ($\rho = .299, p < 0.001$) or in social or volunteer activities ($\rho = .247, p < 0.001$), and have signed petitions ($\rho = .295, p < 0.001$).

There is also a link between participation in unconventional political activities and involvement in debates about politics. For example, those who talk more often about politics are more inclined to sign a petition ($\rho = .299, p < 0.001$), to boycott some service or goods due to their political stance ($\rho = .266, p < 0.001$), to be active online ($\rho = .321, p < 0.001$) or in demonstrations ($\rho = .236, p < 0.001$).
ATTITUDES OF YOUTH TOWARDS POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

One-third of young people did not know where to position themselves on the 10-point scale of political ideologies ranging from the extreme left to the far right (33.3 %), and almost a third did not give any response at all (29.3 %). The greatest percentage of young people are concentrated around the centre of the spectrum (21.8 %), the least at the end which marks the far right (4.9 %) and slightly more (10.7 %) on the end of spectrum that advocates leftist ideologies (Figure 7.8.). Measured in terms of the t-test, there are no statistically significant differences associated with different traits of young people.

READINESS TO PERFORM A POLITICAL FUNCTION

Most young people would not assume a political office (51.9 %), almost a fifth (19 %) would probably not perform such a function, only 13.2 % would do so gladly, and there is an extremely small percentage of young people can get behind this idea (2 %) (Figure 7.9.).

Although about half are satisfied with how well the interests of young people are promoted in national policies, the will to take over at the helm in the form of a certain political function is limited.

Those who are generally interested in politics would more frequently perform a political function (Rho = 402, p < 0.001), as would those who discuss politics more often with friends and parents (Rho = .341, p < 0.001) and those who assert that they know a lot about politics (Rho = .341, p < 0.001).

ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY AS A VALUE SYSTEM AND THE CURRENT STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN MONTENEGRO

Every fifth young man is somewhat satisfied with the state of democracy in Montenegro, i.e. 21.5 %. A quarter of young people are very unhappy or dissatisfied (23.1 %), and one in every five is satisfied or very satisfied (20.4 %). 16.5 % did not even know how to answer the question, and 18.3 % chose not to answer it (Figure 7.10.).
Those who are satisfied with the state of democracy in Montenegro are also more inclined to agree that democracy is a good form of government (Rho = .327, p < 0.001). Their satisfaction with democracy also entails disagreement with the assertion that in certain situations dictatorship is better than democracy (Rho = .139, p < 0.05), and that we need a strong leader with a firm hand (Rho = .291, p < 0.001). These are the same persons who also believe that it is every citizen’s duty to vote (Rho = .218, p < 0.001), but also that politicians do not care about the opinions of young people (Rho = –.125, p < 0.05).

Almost half of the young people (46.3 %) agree that democracy is a good form of government, while only one-fourth of this amount disagree with this claim (13 %) and 14.3 % agree somewhat. 13.9 % stated that they did not know, and 12.5 % gave no answer.

Opinions on dictatorship are divided, with 24.9 % of young people supporting the statement that dictatorship is a better form of government under certain circumstances, 36.6 % disagreeing with it, and 9.8 % agreeing with it to some extent. 15.8 % stated that they did not know, and 12.9 % did not provide an answer.

45.8 % of young people agree that it is necessary for us to have a leader who rules with a firm hand for the common good, while 16.3 % oppose this statement, and 10 % agree to some extent. 13.5 % stated that they did not know, and no response was given by 14.3 %. Those young people who are satisfied with the state of democracy in Montenegro are less inclined towards authoritarian views (Rho = .291, p < 0.001).

More than half of young people (50.7 %) also agree that we need a strong party to represent the people. 10.9 %, or one in every ten persons, does not agree with this claim and 9.8 % agree to a certain extent. 13.9 % stated that they did not know and 14.8 % did not respond at all.

A majority (50.2 %) of young people are of the opinion that it is every citizen’s duty to vote, while 15.2 % of their peers do not agree, and 7.3 % agree to a certain extent. Among those interviewed, 12.8 % said they did not know and 14.5 % did not respond to the question. Those who voted in previous elections are more likely to support this assertion (t=5.862, df=338, p < 0.001), as are those who voice their intention to vote in the next elections (t=10.461, df=390, p < 0.001).

56.4 % of young people believe that the interests of young people do not have enough weight in politics and that they should have more opportunities to express themselves. 7.7 % do not agree with this, while 10.3 agree to certain extent. 11.7 % said they did not know and 13.9 % did not answer. Over half of young people (53.4 %) agree with the statement that politicians are not interested in the opinion of young people, with 9.4 % of young people not agreeing with this, and 11 % responding in between, 12.2 % stating they do not know and 13.9 % not responding.

44 % of young people believe that an opposition is necessary for a healthy democracy, while 11.3 % do not agree with this statement and 13.1 % are in agreement somewhat, while 16.5 % do not know i.e. 15 % did not respond.

Violence as a strategy for conflict-resolution is rejected by 55.8 % of young people, while 10.5 % think that it is sometimes necessary to use violence to solve conflicts, with 6.9 % being somewhat in agreement. 12.9 % stated that they do not know and 13.8 % did not answer.

As many as 42.3 % of young people even stated that they do not know much about politics, 15.3 % partly agree with this, and 11.4 % do not agree. 13.1 % responded that they did not know, and 17.9 % did not respond (Figure 7.11).
In assessing key political priorities that the government should address in the upcoming period, young people most often state reduction of unemployment (89.1 %), improvement of economic growth and development (79.7 %) and the fight against corruption (79.2 %). Protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms are also given a high rating (78.1 %) as is improvement of social justice and security (77.6 %). Least important in the opinion of young people at present is addressing the issue of national identity (57 %). It is interesting that 74.6 % of respondents also attach priority to an improvement of the position of youth, and 66.2 % an improvement in the status of women (Figure 7.12.).

With regard to the perception of priorities, differences can be identified among young people according to individual traits. Young people in the older age cohort more often cite a reduction in the level of unemployment as a priority ($\chi^2 = 99.71$, $p < 0.05$, Cramer’s $V = 0.204$). As was to be expected, women are more often among those who believe that the focus should be on improving the position of women in society ($\chi^2 = 20.48$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.187$). Those young people who state that they have a low status in material terms are more inclined to feel that a government priority should be to improve social justice and security (Rho = –0.087, $p < 0.05$).

**Trust in Institutions**

Trust in institutions is a prerequisite for stability of the political system as a whole, and the degree of distrust in these can be an indicator of disruption in the functioning of the system. Stable democracy cannot be effective without effective institutions (Patterson, 1999; Thomas, 1998; Ulsaner, 1999). Institutions op-
erate in different segments of society and regulate their function so that the system is able to respond to the needs of citizens and social groups. Desired behaviour of individuals in society is shaped by policies of strong institutions (Sen, 1977; Wiseman, 1998). From a sociological point of view, shaping the behaviour and attitudes of citizens through the policies of institutions subsequently produces solidarity and altruism in society (Warren, 2001). To couch it in the language of social capital theory: trust in institutions falls under the rubric of general trust in contrast to particularised trust (Putnam, 1995; Newton, 1999; Ulsaner, 2002).

On the scale from 1 to 5 (1 not at all, 5 completely) young people place their greatest trust and confidence in the church as well as so-called repressive institutions such as the army and police. Attitudes towards these institutions (church, army and police) may represent a reservoir of authoritarianism and certain traditional attitudes. It is interesting that the list is headed by banks and voluntary organisations despite the lack of involvement in voluntary engagement expressed by young people. All political institutions have below-average trust, with the lowest levels being registered by political parties and trade unions (Figure 7.13.). Women have more trust in the church than men ($\chi^2 = 27,29, p < 0,001$), while the church enjoys somewhat greater trust and confidence among young people with lower levels of educational attainment ($\chi^2 = 41,74, p < 0,001$, Cramer’s $V = 0,141$) as well as among young people who are currently undergoing lower levels of education ($\chi^2 = 27,47, p < 0,001$, Cramer’s $V = 0,117$), and somewhat greater trust among persons who come from families with parents of lower educational attainment ($\chi^2 = 47,34, p < 0,05$, Cramer’s $V = 0,153$).

Trust in the church is also present with those who see themselves as having a proclivity to right-wing political ideologies ($\chi^2 = 69,14, p < 0,001$, Cramer’s $V = 0,262$), and who are more authoritarian in their attitudes, such as the view that “we need a strong leader who runs the state with a firm hand” ($\chi^2 = 68,37, p < 0,001$, Cramer’s $V = 0,193$).

The survey also included a measure of young people’s trust in international institutions (NATO, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the OSCE, and the United Nations). All institutions offered a low level of trust among young people except for the European Union, in which young people have somewhat more trust, with the arithmetic mean of the values selected being $M=2,52$ on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 total distrust, 5 total trust) (Figure 7.14.). If the degree of trust is expressed in percentages, then one in every twenty young persons, i.e. 11.4%, has complete trust in the
European Union, 6.2% trust it a lot, and 23.2% of youth trust it somewhat. Total distrust of the EU is voiced by 25.9% of young people, while 11.8% are quite distrustful. As many as 11% said they did not know, and 17% did not give any response.

Young people have the least trust in NATO, which sums up to 27.4% in the various forms, while distrust is expressed by 44.1%. A relatively high percentage of persons stated that they did not know (11.4%), while 17% of young people did not even answer this question.

Although trust in international organisations is generally speaking relatively low, one could say that the trust expressed in NATO and the EU generally coincides with a stance among the citizenry, who voice greater support for the EU compared to NATO, which Montenegro has been a member of since 2017.

One-fifth of young people were unable to predict how the economic situation of Montenegro citizens would develop in the next ten years (20.8%). 15.8% of young people expect the economic situation to worsen, and more than one-fifth (27.4%) think that it will improve significantly, with approximately the same number of young people being somewhere in the middle between these two extremes 23.5% (Figure 7.15.).

**SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS:**

The lack of interest in politics among young people is worryingly high, as is motivation to participate in political activities, especially unconventional ones. Political affairs are not among the topics that a majority of young people discuss in their family or among friends. Social and cultural capital plays an important role when it comes to overall interest in politics and its different aspects. There is a large percentage of young people who despite a generally low level of interest voted at the last parliamentary elections, as well as the motivation for voting in the next one. In general, young people do not know to assess to what extent the interests of young people are promoted in national policy-making, while one-fourth state that they do not know. At the other end, one-fourth of those who answered this question stated that they are dissatisfied. When asked to position themselves on the scale of political ideologies from far right to far left, the majority located themselves around the centre and one-third stated that they did not know. More than one-half of young people said that they would not be ready to perform a political function. It is interesting that one-fourth of the young people interviewed even consider dictatorship acceptable in certain situations (24.9%). Almost half of young people think that society needs a strong leader to rule with an iron hand (45.8%) and 10% agree with this statement to some extent, which means that the majority of young people are inclined to authoritarianism. A strong populist party is acceptable to half of young people (50.7%). Living in a country with a ruling party that has been in power for more than three decades with leaders that merely exchange the most important political functions among themselves certainly has a major impact shaping this kind of authoritarian attitude among young people. On the other hand, authoritarianism is strongly rooted in the social fabric, shaping the attitudes of people as demonstrated by numerous previous public opinion research surveys. Authoritarian attitudes are also visible in the way young people express their trust in social institutions. Among those enjoying the greatest trust among young people are authoritarian
institutions such as the church, army and police, while political institutions characteristic of democracy such as political parties, government, parliament and civil society are among those in which the least amount of trust is expressed by young people. Even highly authoritarian young people at the same time express the attitude that voting is the duty of every citizen, and that political opposition is important for a healthy democracy. Perceptions of youth to the effect that political decision-makers do not care about young people’s opinion (53.4% and 56.4%), as well as the 42% who stated their knowledge about politics is insufficient are some of the findings that could indicate the main shortcomings that need to be addressed in order to overcome the challenges identified in attitudes of young people towards politics. Without young people who are interested to actively participate in building democratic values, principles and institutions, there is no sustainable future of a democratic political system.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

— Strengthen access to civic and political education via formal and informal programmes so that young people can gain a better understanding of their own roles and responsibilities in the democratic political system and open society;
— Stimulate activism of youth via participation in school-life and decision-making processes;
— Advocate political parties having a more thorough approach to the issue of youth and challenges which youth are facing, and to assign greater importance to young people through their programmes and practices;
— Ensure conditions encouraging greater involvement of youth in the process of developing youth policies as well as monitoring and evaluating their implementation;
— Continuous investment in building up and enhancing democratic values and institutions as a barrier to the preservation and strengthening of authoritarian tendencies in the general population and especially among youth;
— Investment in creating a favourable environment for the development and free operation of civil society.
Unemployment among young people is one of today’s biggest problems, affecting not only individuals, but also the entire community. It carries with it negative economic, social and political implications that are then manifested in society as a whole.

The unemployment rate among young people is an indicator of their overall status because employment is a key mechanism for successful integration of young people into society and the basis for developing positive prospects in all other segments of life. Unemployment slows down involvement in social interaction and is often held to be the key predictor of marginalisation and poverty among young people.

**YOUTH (UN)EMPLOYMENT RATES**

In the overall sample of the survey, the percentage of young people who do not have a job is greatest (43.8 %) when we add up the number of those who do not have a job, but are actively seeking one and the number of those persons who are not employed, but are not actively looking for work, either (19.1 % versus 24.7 %). Only 11.1 % have a permanent job (9.9 % have a permanent full-time contract and 1.2 % a permanent part-time contract).

35.3 % are employed (23 % under fixed-term contracts, with 20 % being full-time and 3 % part-time), casual jobs account for 7.9 %, while 4.4 % state that they are self-employed. 4.4 % are undergoing vocational training, while 5.3 % say that they have some other type of work (Figure 8.1.).

As was to be expected, the greatest number of unemployed are to be found among those who are in primary and secondary schools (70.1 %) because they are actually still in the process of education. In this group, however, 1.4 % state that they have a permanent full-time contract, while 5.4 % have fixed-term or part-time contracts. 2.7 % have occasional or casual jobs and the same percentage state that they are self-employed. 4.7 % of young people are professionals, while 12.9 % say that they are in some other line of work.

Students in undergraduate, postgraduate and doctoral studies are mostly unemployed (45.65 %). Education and work is combined by a very small number with a full-time (5.6 %) or part-time
contract (1.74%). 15.65% work full time with a fixed term and 2.61% part-time. 11.30% are casually employed, 4.78% are self-employed, and 7.39% are undergoing vocational training.

Of those who are not in the educational system (35.3%), most have fixed-term contracts for full-time work (33.5%) and a lower number have contracts for fixed-term and part-time work (4.7%). 19.5% have permanent full-time employment contracts, 1.4% part-time, while 25.6% do not have any job (20.5% do not have one, but are actively seeking one, 5.1% do not have a job, and are not looking for one). 7.4% have occasional jobs.

Here we find that one-quarter of young people are classified as so-called NEETs (not in education, nor in employment).

In relation to the educational level already achieved, those with higher education are most often employed. With completed basic studies, 10.6% have permanent jobs, while 0.8% are permanently employed part-time. 32.1% of young people who have performed or are performing basic studies have temporary full-time work, and 4.5% part-time work. 27.4% among this category are unemployed. 28.1% of young people with higher levels of university education (specialist and master studies) have permanent employment, while 6.2% have a permanent part-time job. 34.4% work temporarily with a full-time contract. 9.4% in this category are unemployed. Unemployment is also lower when young people have attained higher-level education.

**RATES OF YOUTH (UN)EMPLOYMENT BY AGE**

The youngest cohort of young people aged 13–19 is expected to have the most unemployed because it is comprised of the largest number of young people who are still at the educational level of high school, i.e., a number of them are at the beginning of university education. In this group of young people, 1.06% are permanently employed, either working with a full or part-time contract, while 4.79% of young people work at temporary jobs full or part-time. 4.79% of young people work occasionally, while 1.06% say they are self-employed. 4.25% of respondents are involved in vocational training or performing a practical. 73.40% of this cohort are unemployed youth, i.e. 11.17% say that they are doing some other type of work.

In the group of young people aged 20–25, 9.07% are permanently employed, while 26.49% have temporary employment. 9.7% have casual jobs, and 5.59% are self-employed, while 6.34% are undergoing training or vocational training. 37.68% are unemployed, while 4.10% state that they are performing some other type of work.

21.78% of the oldest cohort of young people aged 26 to 29 are permanently and 35.15% temporarily employed. 8.91% perform casual work, and 5.94% are self-employed, while 1.98% are undergoing vocational training or training. 24.75% are unemployed and 1.48% say they are performing some other type of work.

Obviously, the number of permanently employed people increases with age, i.e. the number of unemployed declines, although the unemployment rate even among the oldest cohort of young people is still quite high. Employment in temporary full-time or part-time jobs is dominated by young people in all cohorts, but this also holds true for the structure of the most educated young people.

The total unemployment rate for young people between 18 and 29 is 38.75%.

With banks in Montenegro offering unfavourable housing loans subject to restrictive rules requiring that borrowers be permanently employed, and furthermore with only a small percentage of employed people having permanent employment contracts and predominantly occasional jobs, the transition of young people into the adult world is slowed down, i.e., independent housing and founding of a family, in particular planning of children, is delayed. The unfavourable living conditions in which many young people live today are not only a problem for their future as individuals, but for Montenegrin society as a whole.

When it comes to the average number of working hours during the week, one-third of young people who participated in the study responded to the question. Among these, 41.57% stated that they work more than 40 hours per week, and one-fifth of them (20%) more than 50 hours per week.

The largest percentage of young people who are employed do not work in the profession they were trained or educated for (44.6%), while 40.1% are working in their profession. 11.7% work in a profession close to that which they were educated for, and 3.6% said that they were not educated or trained for any profession.

Persons who are highly educated are the dominant group of young people who work in the profession they were educated for.
Highly educated young people most often work in the profession for which they were trained or educated (55.73%), 13.93% work in the profession close to what they were trained or educated for, while 29.51% do not work in their profession.

A majority of young people who have completed middle-level vocational school do not work in the profession they were trained or educated for (53.2%), with 34% and 11.3%, respectively, working in their own profession or a profession close to that which they were trained or educated for (45.3% in total).

Permanently employed work in their profession more often than do temporarily employed persons (44.28% vs. 42.28%). However, within the group of permanently employed as many as 40% do not work in their profession, while this is the case for 46.31% in the group of temporarily employed persons.

These data show that a large percentage of young people choose to work even if this is not in accordance with the profession they were educated for, leading to a de-professionalisation of work, which can be significant as a consequence of the lack of harmonisation of education and labour-market needs.

The problem of ‘mismatch of the structural supply and demand for labour in the Montenegrin labour market’ was also stated in the National Human Development Report for 2016. One cause underlying this mismatch that has been identified is insufficient cooperation and coordination between educational institutions and institutions that are of relevance to monitoring movement of market and lack of joint projections of requirements. This is also emphasised in strategic documents which estimate that existing cooperation is more formal, and not substantial (Katnic, 2017).

In a recent survey that examined the relationship between educational supply and labour-market requirements (Stesevic, 2016), the insufficient link between institutions of higher education in Montenegro and employers was highlighted: ‘Only 12.3% of employers surveyed responded that they cooperate on a regular basis with institutions of higher education. 46.2% of employers even responded that there was no cooperation at all, of which 43.3% answered that there was no need to cooperate with institutions of higher education.’

There is also a gap between the level of education of those who work and job requirements. Almost one-third of young people (30.7%) work at jobs that require a lower level of education than those they have, while 5.4% work at jobs that require higher levels of education. 64% work at jobs whose requirements are at the formal education level that they have achieved, however.

The largest percentage of young people (67.6%) work in the private sector, 19.7% in the public sector, 1.1% in non-governmental organisations and only 0.7% in international organisations, while 10.9% of young people say that they are engaged in work in another sector (Figure 8.3).

Women are employed more often in the public sector. In terms of the level of education achieved, differences are evident among young people. Those who have completed higher levels of education are more frequent among young people employed in the public sector.

Although most young people are employed in the private sector, their preferred employment target is the state or public sector (Figure 8.4.).

The results with regard to employment preferences in relation to other sectors found by this study are consistent with data from previous research. The question remains: why is the public sector more preferable to young people than the private one, and what factors influence the development of such preferences? The
assumption is that this phenomenon is conditioned by a number of factors, from the inherited and perceived position that state work is the safest option for employment that is being driven by the previous socialist system. On the other hand, the private sector in Montenegro is still perceived as unsafe. It often has an image of exploitative relations because of numerous cases in which full protection and respect for workers’ rights have not been upheld, uncertainty and irregularity of wage payments, and so on.

Private initiative has a significant impact in terms of generating social progress, but it must also be nurtured through the educational system, through the development of an entrepreneurial spirit, innovation and creativity – all areas in which the educational system in Montenegro is ailing.

TRANSITION OF YOUNG PEOPLE TO WORKING LIFE

The entry of young people into the labour market takes place under the influence of various circumstances. In societies where the employment process is based on meritocratic principles and the principle of pairing the best candidates with the needs of the workplace, key employment factors include knowledge, skills and education. How this process is perceived by young people in Montenegrin society can be seen by examining which factors are considered crucial for a successful job search.

As the most important factors leading to work, young people assess relationships with people in power (64.5%), followed by acquaintances and personal connections (62.8%), followed by party membership (57.2%). Expertise and knowledge only rank fourth as a factor, with 52.6% of young people citing this. In the opinion of young people, luck is more important than education (49.7% versus 48.7%). Education or work experience acquired abroad is less important according to the rating by young people (31.6%) and is at the very bottom of the scale in terms of the importance of influence in finding a job (Figure 8.5).

Young people assign priority to political and social capital in relation to education and expertise as human capital, which obviously, according to their perception, can only provide a favourable outcome in terms of finding a job in combination with the first two. This situation also indicates social anomalies, the disappearance of clear and objective rules and a greater prevalence of arbitrariness in the employment process, which are all harmful phenomena for stability and progress of society. Employment thanks to political connections without any objective basis for such, which continues to exist in highly diverse forms at all levels, along with nepotism and corruption, have probably affected the perception of young people about the dominance of political capital to achieve success in employment versus knowledge.

A statistically significant link between half of the respondents and perception of factors influencing the finding of a job has been observed. Thus, women are more inclined to believe that luck is crucial in finding a job ($\chi^2 = 12.06$, $p < 0.05$, Cramer’s $V = 0.135$). The fathers’ education has an impact on perception of importance of personal relationships and acquaintances ($\chi^2 = 41.62$, $p < 0.05$, Cramer’s $V = 0.131$).
FIGURE 8.5: Youth perception of factors important in finding a job in Montenegro (%)
FIGURE 8.6: Perception of youth regarding factors important in choosing a job (%)
YOUTH ASPIRATIONS IN THE FIELD OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORK

In the context of a society with a high unemployment rate, the question is how much space is available to choose a job. In this respect, data suggests increasing de-professionalisation of work and acceptance of jobs that are far from the professions for which young people were educated. Nevertheless, the most important or most attractive factors in choosing a job for young people are predominantly salary and job security.

For more than two-thirds of young people, income or salary is the most important factor in selecting a particular job (78.8%). Similarly, for 82% of young people the most important factor is the security of the workplace (Figure 8.6.). In the context of such findings, it is not surprising that the state sector is the preferred area of employment for young people. Reality is different, however, and a majority of young people, as is demonstrated by the data we have acquired, state that they are working at jobs that are temporary and most often in the private sector.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS:

The unemployment rate of young people in Montenegro is extremely high in all ages and educational cohorts of young people, making them an extremely vulnerable social group. Given that unemployment is a predictor of aggravated integration into society, including poverty, the group of young people is at a serious risk of marginalisation and social exclusion. In the age group of 18 to 29, the youth unemployment rate is 38.75%. The unemployment rate declines somewhat with age and level of education, although it remains high in all groups of young people.

Young people work predominantly on fixed-term contracts, while the percentage of those who have permanent jobs is smaller, indicating the precariousness of work at present. The phenomenon of precarious work is often mentioned in more recent studies dealing with youth employment, which indicates that it is characterised by temporality, fluidity, and flexibility of work (Standing, 2011; Giddens, 2009; Bauman, 2009).

There is also a trend toward de-professionalisation of labour. A high percentage of young people do not work in the profession they have been trained or educated for, or work in various places requiring a lower level of qualifications than those which they have acquired through formal education.

Although they highly value expertise and education, young people view the most important channels of job access to be relationships with people in power, personal acquaintances and connections, and party membership. This data is extremely worrying since it indicates that there is already a perception among young people that the system operates on a basis diametrically opposite to meritocracy. A system where social promotion and advancement is based on arbitrary criteria, nepotism and corruption is seriously endangered in terms of its sustainability and functionality, both in the sense of democratic values and economic sense of development and growth. The perception young people have about the most important factors needed for finding a job is the result of numerous shortages in the system, especially its ineffective manner of dealing with cases of political employment and affairs in the field that never have been appropriately eliminated. This dangerous trend towards illegitimate ways of getting work and achieving advancement actually becoming accepted as legitimate is threatening to destroy the entire system.

Although most young people work in the private sector, for most of them the preferred sector of employment is the state sector. Salary and job security are the key factors in selecting jobs for most people.

Solving the problem of high unemployment rates for young people requires long-term, well-planned strategies that involve a whole range of social institutions whose activities should be linked and coordinated.

RECOMMENDATIONS

— The problem of imbalance between educational supply and labour-market demand should be dealt with by means of enhanced communication and joint planning of educational institutions, businesses and other sectors of society in formulating strategic approaches to matching education with the needs and requirements of the modern labour market
— Empowerment of learning about entrepreneurship, and in general the development of critical awareness, creativity and innovation through formal and informal educational approaches in order to encourage and develop personal initiative and incentives of young people
— Effective combatting of corruption, nepotism and other phenomena that undermine the principle of meritocracy in employment and career advancement
— Creation of effective and sustainable measures to overcome the economic crisis and foster recovery of all sectors of society in order to generate new jobs. This process should involve the largest number of stakeholders possible in formulating, monitoring, implementation and evaluation of measures.
In all strategies and plans for development of contemporary society, education occupies a central place (A. Lovakovic, 2013). Research on the position of young people in education is of multiple importance. As a system that prepares young people to assume important roles in personal and social life, education must be given special attention. A quality education system serves as the basis as well as a fundamental resource for development in every society.

The educational status of young people largely defines their social status and prospects in the field of employment and successful involvement in a society that guarantees the realisation of their full personal potential as well as contribution to the society itself. The educational structure and status of any social group significantly influences the ability to perform various social roles, including work and economic activities, to political and social. These personal, group or layered features also affect the possibility of social promotion, as well as the styles of life, social interaction and connections, and inclusion in different forms of social life in the community. (M. Milosavljevic, A. L. Jugovic, 2009).

**EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF YOUTH AT THE TIME OF RESEARCH**

1.2 % of young people are without formal education or have not completed primary school, while 12.1 % of young people have finished primary school. The greatest number of young people have completed secondary school (42.6 %), and 19.1 % of the respondents have finished high school. Basic studies were completed by 20 %, and 4.7 % have performed specialist or master’s studies. 0.4 % are doctors of science or postdoctoral students. A little over one-third of young people left the education system (33.5 %) while they were in primary or secondary school (26.8 %), 28.8 % during basic studies, 8.2 % during master or doctoral studies, and 2.6 % some other type of education or training. The oldest respondents, a cohort of 26 to 29 years of age, are most often among those who are no longer involved in the process of education (65.19 %), as is to be expected, as this is usually the age when the formal cycle of education is completed.

Among those who are not involved in the process of education are the youngest respondents who have completed secondary vocational school (49.29 %) and basic studies (27.01 %). Among those involved in the educational system, there are equal numbers of men and women. Parental education makes a difference in the involvement of young people in higher levels of education. Those whose parents are highly educated tend themselves to be more involved in higher education ($\chi^2 = 50.12, p < 0.05, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.144$). Regarding current educational status, there is a difference in relation to the place of residence of the young ($\chi^2 = 36.13, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.141$). Young people from village areas or more rural areas more often perform basic studies than those from urban areas (36.88 % versus 26.35 %). At the other end, at higher university level, postgraduate or specialist studies are attended by 9.1 % of young people from urban areas, compared to 4.91 % of those from rural areas and small towns.

Higher educational level of parents is related to higher personal educational achievements among young people. Those young people whose fathers are highly educated have more often completed higher levels of education themselves (Rho = 0.163, p < 0.001). The same is the case when levels of youth education achieved are compared with the educational level of the mother (Rho = 0.141, p < 0.001). No statistically significant link was found between half of the respondents and the level of education achieved.
Educational aspirations of young people indicate that the highest percentage of them are trying to complete a master (23.7%), basic (21.1%), and specialised studies degree (19.2%). 15.8% of young people would like to complete a four-years high school, and 7.4% want to complete a three-year high school. Doctoral studies are the ambition of 11.7% of respondents, while 1.2% would only like to complete elementary school. Girls have somewhat greater aspirations when it comes to university education ($\chi^2 = 18.23$, $p<0.05$, Cramer’s $V = 0.177$). Among women, 80.87% want to graduate from university compared to 70.18% of men. Material status also has an impact on educational aspirations ($Rho = .122$, $p < 0.05$). Out of those who perceive themselves as young people with the lowest material status, half of them want to complete some level of university education compared to over 80% of those who have the highest level of material well-being. Over 40% of those respondents with the lowest material status tend to finish high school compared to 19.56% of those with the highest material status, which is to say twice as much. Poverty, or the poor material situation of the household in which they live, obviously has an impact on the educational aspirations of young people.

Young people are quite confident that they will reach the level of education they aspire to, as attested by 46% of respondents. Measured on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 signifies complete uncertainty and 10 total certainty, most young people gravitate toward the option of complete certainty (75.2%), 22.8% are moderately certain and only 2.2% of young people are completely unsure about achieving the desired level of education. Women are more convinced that they will achieve the level of education they aspire to ($t = 3.538$, 581, $p < 0.001$).

**PERCEPTION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM**

Half of young people are satisfied with the educational system in Montenegro. The average grade on a scale from 1 to 10 is 5.53 (1 completely dissatisfied, 10 completely satisfied). The majority of young people (55%) are moderately satisfied with the educational system (options 4+5+6+7), while there is an equal number of young people at the other two ends of the satisfaction spectrum – one-fifth are very satisfied (22.7% = 8+9+10) – almost the same amount as those who are very dissatisfied (22.5% = 1+2+3) (Figure 9.1.).

Men are somewhat more satisfied with the educational system than women ($\chi^2 = 25.87$, $p < 0.05$). Controlling for other characteristics, there are no significant differences among young people in terms of (dis)satisfaction with the educational system.

A majority of young people perceive pronounced corruption in the educational system. On a scale of 1 to 10, the largest percentage (62.91%) of these young people are fully convinced that there are cases of corruption in education (when we add up the answers assigned to options 8, 9 and 10 on the scale), while around 10.6% of responses are concentrated around the second branch, i.e. those who say they are completely sure that there is no corruption (sum total of the answers assigned to options 1, 2 and 3 on the scale).

Older respondents are somewhat more inclined to believe that there is corruption in the educational system, i.e. students ($Rho = .098$, $p < 0.05$), as well as students from smaller environments ($Rho = .186$, $p < 0.001$). Quite logically, those who perceive that there is corruption in education are less satisfied with the overall education system ($Rho = -.173$, $p < 0.001$).

The vast majority of young people think that the educational system is not sufficiently harmonised with the employment needs that exist in the modern labour market (74.6%). Almost three times fewer young people are of the opposite opinion (25.4%).

Half of respondents stated that they had an opportunity to participate in a practical position or internship in connection with their education (51.2%), while almost half of them have not (48.8%).

Most young people, although not an overwhelming number, believe that it will not be that hard to find a job after completing their education. 20.4% believe that it will be very easy, with this comparing with more respondents who think it will be very difficult (22.9%). The largest number is somewhere in between (47.8%), with a slightly greater prevalence of those who are mostly optimistic. Only 8.9% stated that they already have found a job.

Those who are satisfied with the educational system also believe that it will not be difficult to find a job after completing their education ($Rho = .120$, $p < 0.05$). Also, optimism about finding a job is more pronounced among those who performed practicals during their schooling ($Rho = -.198$, $p < 0.01$). While they believe that other factors – political and social capital – have considerable influence in addition to education and expertise in finding a job, young people with better educational achievements nevertheless believe that they will find work easier because of their success ($Rho = .188$, $p < 0.001$). Scepticism grows with declining level of material well-being of the household from which young people come ($\chi^2 = 54.51$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.206$). Young people coming...
from households with poor material status tend to be pessimistic about the ease of finding work after schooling.

The largest percentage of young people evaluate everyday life at school/university as difficult and stressful (76.9%), while 23.1% rate it as an easy and not particularly difficult (Figure 9.2.). Secondary school students and postgraduates more often than basic studies students assess everyday life at school/university as stressful (χ² = 62.54, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.234). For those who spend more hours a day learning, education is more stressful than for those who spend less time learning (χ² = 45.45, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.207). Material status also affects the perception of everyday life at school/university (χ² = 50.72, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V= 0.135), so young people who perceive their material situation to be less favourable are more frequent among those who assess daily life at school and university to be more difficult.

Young people study approximately 3 hours per day after school, and their average grade in the last academic year was between 3 and 4 for those attending/who have attended primary or secondary school, and between 8 and 9 for those attending/who have attended university level of education.

Students of primary and secondary schools report less average time spent in studying each day in comparison to students at different levels of university education. Even though primary and secondary school students spend less time learning on average, they are more prevalent in the group of those with the highest marks achieved in the last academic year (χ² = 61.22, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.255). Almost one out of every two students at primary and secondary levels of education scored the highest marks in the previous academic year.

There is a certain link between the average number of hours spent studying and average marks in the last academic year (Rho = .158, p <0.05).

When it comes to the average time spent studying after school, it appears that girls are somewhat more diligent than boys (χ² = 13.66, p<0.05, Cramer’s V = 0.188).

Those young people from families with a better financial standing are more among those who have achieved better average marks in the last academic year (Rho =.195, p<0.001).

**SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS:**

Almost 30% of young people are currently undergoing some level of university education. Two-thirds of them have a desire to complete some university degree in the future. The research points to a significant link between the cultural capital of the families from which the young people come as well as the material situation in relation to the achieved or aspired level of education, and the perception of education and expectations in terms of the ease of finding work after completing education. Perception of pronounced corruption is present among a convincing majority of young people. One-fifth of young people are very dissatisfied, and more than half are half satisfied with the overall quality of the educational system. Almost two-thirds of young people think that the educational system is not preparing them well for the needs of the modern labour market, and half of young people have had no practice during their educational training. Everyday life at schools and universities is for the overwhelming majority stressful and difficult, in comparison to one-quarter, for whom school, i.e. university, is easy and non-burdensome. One-third of young people (36.9%) believe that it will be difficult or very difficult to find a job after completing education, especially those who come from families with a lower material status.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

— Further improve equality of access to education through creation of various support systems that will eliminate obstacles to more effective involvement and educational achievement of young people regardless of their social and cultural profile
— Develop a system of effective prevention and prosecution of cases of corruption in education at all levels
— Develop strategies that will contribute to increasing harmonisation of the educational system with the needs of the modern labour market and requirements in terms of appropriate competencies
— Develop programmes that will improve the availability of practical positions and internships for young people during their studies in order to have the opportunity to improve their knowledge and skills through application of what they have learned
Migration among youth is on a scale that can directly affect social, economic, demographic developments as well as cultural and human resources in a specific space, which is why it is important to observe the situation in this field. The focus of this research was placed on out-migration, which is becoming a more pressing issue in the public debate in Montenegro, since research projects such as Youth – Social décor or social capital? from 2016 have shown that there is a pronounced potential among youth to emigrate from Montenegro, i.e. 50% of youth have a strong or moderately strong wish to move out of Montenegro (M. Knezevic, P. Djukanovic, 2016).

Montenegro does not have a developed system of youth migration management. There are no systematic or precise data on how many young people have left the country, or about the motives behind migration. At the national level in Montenegro, there are two registers for collecting data on migrations, but none deals specifically with collecting data on emigrants from Montenegro (M. Radulovic, M. Brnovic, 2016). Youth migration management should be an integral part of strategic and action documents of the country, but also an issue which is addressed in a much more concentrated matter, and for which many interested parties should seek a solution.

How great is the desire of youth to leave the country, what motives are driving them to contemplate such a course, what are they doing in order to put their idea into practice and what traits do potential emigrants exhibit? These are only some of the questions we wanted to shed light onto.

The highest percentage of youth had not lived abroad for more than half a year, whether it be for education, work, etc. Young people who lived abroad to study are also rare (only 7.2% compared to 92.8% of those who responded that they have never lived outside of the country in connection with any of these types of education.

In response to the question as to whether they have any desire to emigrate from the country, one-third of youth (36.8%) decidedly do not want to, with a somewhat more moderate opinion, although they do not want to leave, being held by 12.5% of respondents, while a moderate desire for leaving the country is expressed by 25% of youth, and an additional 25.7% have a strong or very strong desire to emigrate (11.2% and 14.5%). Therefore, we still have a stable 50% of youth who want to emigrate from Montenegro because they believe that it would be more propitious for them (Figure 10.1.).
Educational status appears to be significantly associated with a desire to emigrate abroad ($\chi^2 = 42.951, p < 0.001$). For example, one-third (34%) of master or doctoral students state that they have a strong or very strong desire to emigrate. Among those who are not in the process of education, almost one-fifth or 19.5% of young people have a strong or very strong desire to emigrate.

The level of satisfaction with life affects the readiness of young people to emigrate, as well as satisfaction with work $Rho = -0.138$, $p < 0.005$; friends $-0.133$, $p < 0.001$; education $Rho = -0.145$, $p < .001$; life in general $Rho = -0.80$, $p < 0.05$. Those who express a greater degree of satisfaction with these aspects of life want to emigrate in a smaller number.

The material status of the household is also related to the desire to emigrate abroad for more than half a year ($\chi^2 = 44.755, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.142$). Those who perceive themselves as being in the poorest strata are more inclined to think about emigrating than those who perceive themselves as having a good standard of living.

From a regional perspective, Montenegro is somewhere in the middle when it comes to the potential of young people to emigrate (Figure 10.2).

As for motives to emigrate, the reasons are mainly of an economic nature – 33.8% cite an improvement in living standards, 18.2% higher salaries, 14.6% better employment prospects, 10% want to escape from a bad situation, 7.5% are seeking a better education, 7.1% a desire to get to know another culture and so on (Figure 10.3.).

There seems to be no negligible desire for emigration and the speed of achievement of this intent, even at a declarative level ($\chi^2 = 33.59, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.218$). For those who have a very strong desire, even 42.9% intend to move away in the next half to two years. The same number of young people intend to realise their desire to move in the next five years, and only 2.4% in more than ten years. Among those who want to move away in the next half a year, Bachelor students are at the forefront (53.1%).

Somewhat more than a quarter (27.1%) of young people would stay abroad for less than a year, while nearly the same number of people would want to stay forever (26.8%). Also, 19.9% would stay from one to five years, 12% five to ten years, 8.6% from ten to twenty years and 5.5% for more than twenty years. The correlation between the desire to emigrate and the length of stay abroad was significant ($\chi^2 = 118.988, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.378$). Even over half of those who have a strong desire to emigrate would move forever (56.6%).

The most desirable destinations for young people from Montenegro are the United States of America (20%) followed by Germany (15%), and in third place Italy (7%).
Knowledge of young people regarding possibilities available to emigrants in the desired country of destination is low. For example, almost half (47.3%) are not familiar with possibilities in the field of education, one-fifth (20.1%) are somewhat familiar, and only a third (31.6%) claim to have fair or good knowledge.

Furthermore, half of the youth (50.9%) are not familiar with the procedure for obtaining a residence permit, nor do they know how the health system of the host country works and what opportunities it offers to immigrants. Over half (54.1%) know nothing about social benefits, or about the cultural norms and values of the host country (50.3%), all indications that these plans in the minds of young people are not sufficiently well thought-through.

However, there is a link between the desire to move away as quickly as possible and the level of information about certain aspects of emigration. Those who want to move in half a year are more informed about how to get a residence permit in relation to others ($\chi^2 = 35.29, p < 0.05, \text{Cramer's } V = 0.200$). There are no significant differences in other aspects of life in this respect.

Young people who said they would like to emigrate have done almost nothing to see what options are really at their disposal, nor have they undertaken any actions in order to prepare for leaving the country (over 90%). The situation is only somewhat different when it comes to relatives and friends of young people, with whom 22% talked or asked how they can help them to leave. In this case, 57% say they have not done anything, while 43% have. Those who intend to leave the country in the next half year are more active than others in questioning and preparing for departure: they have contacted employers more often ($\chi^2 = 21.09, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer's } V = 0.308$), enquired at the embassy ($\chi^2 = 19.41, p < 0.05, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.295$), and only in 14.3% of cases have they not done anything to prepare, which is a significant difference compared to all other respondents ($\chi^2 = 20.89, p < 0.012, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.306$).

With regard to knowledge of the foreign language of the desired destination for emigration, young people are also unprepared. Over half (63.3%) do not know the language or only have basic communication skills, while one-third (36.6%) have good or excellent knowledge of the language.

Young people who want to emigrate generally believe that they cannot contribute significantly to the host country in different areas of life. Most, or over one-third, appreciate that they will only receive jobs that are less desirable among the domestic population, and one-fifth think that they can contribute to the cultural and scientific development of the host country (Figure 10.4.).
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS:

Half of young people have both an idea and a desire to emigrate from the country. For one-quarter of them, it is strong, while the same proportion of young people have a moderate desire to leave the country for more than half a year. Among those who have a strong desire there is a significant number who have achieved higher education, that is, they are among the most educated strata of the young population (one-third of postgraduates and PhDs). Therefore, one cannot ignore the risk of a ‘brain drain’, which poses a very dangerous threat to a country of Montenegro’s size and resources. From a regional perspective, the ‘brain drain’ tendency places Montenegro at the top of the list of countries most affected by this phenomenon.

Emigration motives are predominantly of an economic nature, such as better living standards, employment prospects, and higher salaries, as well as opportunities for a better education in part. Young people who wish to emigrate are usually not familiar with the functioning of different aspects of life in the host country, and very rarely do something specific to realise their desire. Those who intend to emigrate as soon as possible are significantly better informed and prepared. When it comes to moving, more than half of those who have a strong desire to leave claim they would move forever.

Young people who have the desire to emigrate do not have any great ambitions in terms of contributions to the host country, with most of them estimating that they could find jobs that the domestic population do not want to perform.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

— Youth migration is a topic that is increasingly salient in the public debate in Montenegro, but there is no reliable data on the number of young people who have left, their educational structure and other characteristics, so a database needs to be created in order to precisely determine the dimensions of migration among young people, motives, emigrants’ characteristics and in order to create conditions for this phenomenon to be systematically monitored in the future

— Create conditions for keeping most educated young people, i.e. young people who with their expertise can help in the recovery of different segments of society by investing in science and education

— Fight efficiently against corruption and nepotism in education, employment and promotion, and work to prevent the emergence of political employment because all this discourages young people

— Create a programme and strategy for the economic recovery of the country and create conditions to improve the quality and standard of living of citizens, and especially young people, by reducing the rate of unemployment so that they could see and recognise decent prospects if they stay in the country.
What is the family life of young people like in the family of origin and the prospects of transition to a family of affiliation? These are challenges in the transition to adulthood through marriage and parenting, and are the issues focused on in this chapter. Do young people in Montenegro have a common biography? The nature of this process of transition to adult life contains significant indicators of the overall status of young people in society.

Judging by the results of the research, the transition has slowed down. This situation is illustrated by a large number of young people who remain living with parents in their parents’ home in late youth, have not started a family, have no children and a high percentage of whom are unemployed or do temporary jobs that cannot provide them a stable perspective and independence.

Research on the transition of young people to the adult world is also a subject in various social sciences. Transition, or transition to adulthood, represents the process of young persons taking responsibility for different areas of life: educational, professional, housing, economic and family. The basic transition process in adult life is independence, i.e. achieving independence in relation to the family of origin. It is common for this process to take place in several key events: completing schooling, moving from parents’ home, employment and starting their own family.

The approach to transition studies has been developed within the life cycle study and points to a process of switching actors from one key life phase to another, while transition to adulthood involves a complex change of status in almost all aspects of the life cycle in a relatively solid period (educational, professional, family, housing transition) (S. Ignjatović, 2008).

One life cycle theorist, sociologist Glen Elder, defines life cycle as ‘a series of socially defined events and roles an individual takes over time’ (Mitchell, 2006).

The influence of various processes in post-socialist societies, among them Montenegro, has changed the standard transition of youth and its flow. There are more and more indicators indicating that the phenomenon of prolonged youth is being driven by the economic crisis, particularly with the growth of youth unemployment rates, longer periods of schooling and other processes slowing the independence of young people.

The slowness of young people’s transition to the adult world has a strong influence on the functioning of society as a whole, as it causes disturbances and crises in the demographic, economic and wider social context.

RESIDENTIAL (NON-)INDEPENDENCE OF YOUTH

Young people live mostly with their mother in the same household, i.e. nearly three-quarters of youth (73.7%), compared to only 26.3% of those who do not live in a household with their mother.

It is logical that with the youngest age cohort, a large number (89.6%) of these persons aged 13 to 17 live with their mother. This percentage is also high in the second cohort of young people aged 18 to 21, where 81.97% live with their mother in the same household, with this percentage then decreasing with each subsequent age cohort (in the 22-25 cohort, 74.26% live with their mother in the same household, and 58.25% in the 26-29 cohort). It is obvious that over time the number of those who remain living with their mother in the same household is decreasing, but remains very high in the oldest group of young people, especially considering that as many as 71.12% of adolescents live in the same household with their mother.
Among the youngest group of young people, 13–17 years old, 84.37% live with their father in the same household. This percentage decreases with age, but 46.91% of the oldest cohort of young people aged 26 to 29 still live together with their father in the same household. As many as 60.03% of adolescents live with their father in the same household.

71.8% of young people usually live in a parents’ home, then in a rented house/apartment which they pay for themselves, and 6.2% or 5.6% in a house/apartment which somebody else pays for. A smaller percentage (4.7%) live in the house/apartment that they inherited from their parents or their parents bought for them. The lowest portion of those who live in the house/apartment (3.2%) bought it by themselves or with their partner (Figure 11.1).

Among those who are married, 16.4% live in their parents’ home.

There is a statistically significant relationship between the age of youth and housing independence, i.e. older persons tend to live outside their parents’ home in a house/apartment that they have bought or whose rent they pay on their own, $X^2 = 257,19, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.217$.

Nevertheless, a very high percentage (62.19%) of the oldest group of young people (26-29 years of age), who should be in a situation to be residentially independent live in their parent’s home, while only 5.97% live in an apartment they have bought themselves or with their partner. This indicates that housing independence as one of the adult markers still only constitutes a reality in the lives of an extremely small percentage of young people in Montenegro.

The data indicate that housing independence increases somewhat with employment status ($\chi^2 = 123,43$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.156$). Those persons who are permanently employed live outside their parents’ home more often than other young people, although a high percentage (56.5%) still live in a parents’ home. Permanently employed persons are among those who live most often in an apartment/home they bought themselves or with their partner (12.9%) as well as in a rented apartment/home they pay for themselves.

Residential independence is also related to the marital status of young people ($\chi^2 = 276,31$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.302$). Young people who are married live more often alone in an apartment they have bought themselves (23%) than those who are not married, or in a rented house/apartment they pay for themselves (19.7%). However, the majority (52.5%) live in houses/apartments that are their parents’ home, inherited or purchased from parents or rented and paid for by someone other than themselves.

Likewise, young people cohabitating are more often residentially independent in the sense that 14.3% live in a parents’ home and over half (52.4%) live in an apartment/house they have bought with their partner or that they rent and pay for themselves (23.8% and 28.6%).

There are no statistically significant differences with regard to gender. Yet a slightly higher percentage of men live in a parents’ home, and women are somewhat more often in the apartment/house they have bought together with their partner. Also, young people in more rural areas live somewhat more often in a parental home than young people in the city.

Those respondents who live with their parents see this as the simplest and most comfortable solution (55.5%). A third (32.1%) would move out if financial possibilities allowed them. Only 2.9% remain with their parents because they are against their independence.

The age of young people is significantly related to living with parents ($\chi^2 = 79,48$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.244$). The older cohort of young people (26–29) would be more independent if their financial situation allowed them (almost half of this group (46.61%) would live alone if they were able to), while younger people are more likely to live with their parents because it is the simplest solution.

**FAMILY AND MARITAL STATUS OF YOUTH**

Between the age and status of young respondents there is a statistically significant relationship in the sense that the number of those who are married increases with increasing age; $X^2 = 172,95$, $p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.236$. 

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**FIGURE 11.1: Residential (non-)independence of young people in Montenegro (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In parents’ home</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In inherited house/apartment</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House/apartment bought by my parents</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In house of a cousin/friend</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House/apartment I bought with my …</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I rent and pay by myself</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I rent and somebody else pays</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student housing</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Out of the total sample, half of young people (50.2%) are single or are not in any kind of relationship. 10.3% are married, and 3.5% cohabitate, while 34.5% of respondents are in a relationship but do not live with their partner.

Among the oldest group of young people aged 26-29, 40.61% are single, 23.35% are married, 4.57% cohabitate, and 28.43% are in a relationship, but do not live with their partner, while 3.04% are divorced.

Of young people aged 22 – 25, 43.98% are single, 9.42% are married, 3.66% cohabitate, 41.88% are in a relationship but do not live with their partner, while 1.05% are widowed.

Young people from 18 to 21 are most commonly single (54.37%), with 3.75% cohabitating, 41.25% being in a relationship, but not living with a partner, and 0.62% are widowed.

In the youngest cohort, 82.67% are single, 17.33% are in a relationship, but do not live with a partner.

Among adolescents over 18, 11.68% are married and 45.8% are single.

As concerns status in terms of marriage or common law marriage, being in a relationship with children is $X^2 = 435.91, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.508$. Out of those who are married, 80.33% have children, most often one child (52.5%), two children (23%) and three children (4.9%). Young people who live in a common-law marriage have children in 11.8% of cases.

Young people usually live in a household of 4 members (the arithmetic mean of the answer is $M = 4.18$, median 4).

**RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN YOUNG PEOPLE AND PARENTS**

When it comes to the relationship between young people and parents, the vast majority state that they have a very good relationship (36%) or that they sometimes have different opinions (59.2%), while tensions and disagreements with parents are rare (only 4.8% affirm that this is the case for them). There are no statistically significant effects in terms of gender, age, place of residence, or perceived material status in the family on these relationships (Figure 11.2.).

As an indicator of the relationship between parents and young people, the overwhelming majority of young people report they would raise their children in the same or nearly the same manner as their parents raised them (31.6% and 52.4%). 12.5% state that they would adopt a different approach than their parents, while only 3.4% of respondents would raise their children completely differently than their parents (Figure 11.3.).

The mother is a key figure who according to young people has the greatest influence on their decisions (50.3%), while the father has a smaller influence (37.2%). Nevertheless, 22% state that they make decisions independently. Those who are employed are more independent in making decisions. The father has a greater influence on decisions among men than women ($\chi^2 = 4.13, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s V = 0.081). On the other hand, the mother has more influence on women’s decisions ($\chi^2 = 13.96, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s V = 0.149). Men more often state that they are more independent in making decisions than women ($\chi^2 = 4.35, p < 0.05$, Cramer’s V = 0.083).

The material status of the family is related to the influence of one of the parents in making decisions. The father more often influences decisions compared to the mother in families having a lower level of material well-being ($\chi^2 = 11.24, p < 0.05$, Cramer’s V = 0.142).

When making important decisions, most young people decide together with their parents (55.5%), with 40.8% deciding on their own, while parents decide on behalf of children among only 3.8% of respondents.

At first glance it is striking that the age of young people influences the degree of autonomy in decision-making ($\chi^2 = 149.61, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s V = 0.342). 60.63% of the older cohort of young people aged 26 to 29 state that they make decisions independently compared to 10.31% for the youngest cohort of youth. Also, education has an impact: the higher the level of education, the greater the autonomy in decision-making. Somehow, those who
are employed are more independent in making decisions than unemployed young people, who decide more often with their parents ($\chi^2 = 67.71, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.239$). Housing autonomy is related to decision-making autonomy ($\chi^2 = 54.12, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.208$). Young people who live alone are more independent in making decisions.

Young people who are parents decide independently more often than those who do not have children ($\chi^2 = 23.64, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.144$). Likewise, marital status has a significant influence on independence. Those who are married or live in a common-law marriage are more independent in making decisions ($\chi^2 = 43.00, p < 0.001$, Cramer’s $V = 0.192$).

**ASPIRATIONS OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN TERMS OF MARITAL AND FAMILY LIFE**

In terms of family and marital status, young people most often see themselves as married with a family in the future (66.5%), while fewer see themselves in a common-law marriage with their partner and children (2.1%), and an extremely small percentage see themselves in a common-law marriage with a partner or unmarried without children (under 1%) or as a single parent (1.4%). 20% stated they did not know how to respond to the question as to how they see themselves in the future in terms of partnership and family relationships.

There is no difference between gender in terms of this future perception, and men and women predominantly see themselves as married and with family, with the situation being similar with regard to residential status. However, the level of respondents’ education influences their view on family perspective, with those having a higher level of education more often stating that they see themselves in common-law marriage compared to those having a lower level of education.

For the greatest percentage of young people, the recipe for a happy life is to have a partner/spouse, children, plenty of friends and live in a good country. For 64.8% of young people, an important factor in a happy life is to have a partner/spouse. Having children is the essence of a happy life for 74.9% of young people, and more than half (54.7%) believe it is friends, i.e. plenty of friends. To live in a good country is a condition for a happy life for 67.4% of young people (Figure 11.4.).

According to respondents, the optimum age for women to get married is around 26, and for men around 29, although a large percentage did not know how to answer this question (35.7%).

Women are more likely to think that it is better to get married later than men ($t = 2.100, df = 510, p < 0.05$). Men more often think that it is better to get married at a younger age than women ($t = 2.463, df = 514, p < 0.05$). Young people from more rural areas think that a younger age is more suitable for men to marry ($t = -2.645, df = 290, p < 0.05$) and believe the same with regard to women ($t = -2.246, df = 292, p < 0.05$).

Women are married more often than men (12.5% versus 7.8%). Most young people do not have children (89.7%). One in every ten has a child, and among these most often only one child. An extremely small percentage of young people have two or three children (2.9% and 0.5%, respectively).

The largest number of young people plan to have two or three children, with three children being the median, which is the most common response to the planned number of children. Few very (3.5%) do not plan to have any children, and many (34%) did not know how to answer this question. The best age for having the first child is most often considered to be 28, which is the most common answer to the question as to when respondents were planning to have their first child.

Asked on a scale from 1 to 5 to specify which factors are important when choosing a spouse, most young people rank the personality of the person (4.41) first, then the existence or sharing of common interests (4.27), appearance (3.74), and education (3.68). Traditional factors are still very important such as family approval (3.16) and religious beliefs (3.06). The least important, though cited, are national origin (2.81), economic status (2.94) and virginity (2.29).

The first three items named are personality, mutual interest, and level of education, which are not traditional values. Closest to the top is religious affiliation and approval of the family, while material status, national origin, and virginity appear to be the least important. These data point to a trend toward de-traditionalisation in perceptions of family and marriage (Figure 11.5).

There is a significant difference between genders with respect to the importance of physical appearance for choosing a spouse, it is more important to men (Rho = .159, p < 0.001).

Age has an impact on the importance of partner’s education (Rho = – 175, p < 0.001), with there being a similar situation
regarding family approval (Rho = −106, p <0.05), and virginity before marriage (Rho = .185, p < 0.001). With age, the importance of these factors decreases when choosing a spouse.

Also, the place of residence influences the importance of economic status (Rho = .118, p <0.05). For young people from rural areas, this is the most important factor when choosing a spouse.

The level of education of the respondents is related to perception of importance of the factors for choosing a partner for marriage. The higher educational level of a potential partner is more important for young people with higher education (Rho = −0.233, p <0.001). With a higher level of education, the importance of physical appearance for young people in choosing a spouse decreases (Rho = −0.158, p <0.001), as well as the importance of the virginity before the marriage (Rho = −0.201, p <0.001), and the same applies to the importance of the family approval (Rho = −0.094, p <0.001).

**SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS:**

Young people in Montenegro are residentially dependent. They usually live with their parents in their parents’ home. Even in the oldest group of young people, this percentage is extremely high (two-thirds of young people aged 26 to 29, or over 60%). Stable employment increases residential autonomy, but even then more than half of young people remain in the parent’s home.

For the majority of young people, living with their parents is the simplest solution in their current situation, while a third of the young people would move out under the right conditions, which is more pronounced the older the age of young people. Most young people and half of those who are in the oldest group of young people live with their mother or father in the same household.

A third of youth consider their relationship with their parents to be very good, and more than half as good, although sometimes they have conflicting opinions with their parents.

Due to their residential dependency and living in their parents’ home, young people usually make decisions together with their parents, although there is a high percentage of respondents who state that they are independent in decision-making (40%). Very few young people stated that parents decide everything, which could be an indication of a weakening of patriarchal forms of family life, especially given that young people often mention mothers as someone who has a greater impact on their decisions than their father.

In the future, young people see themselves as married and having a family. Common law marriage or other forms of cohabiting are not present on any significant scale as a framework for partnership and a family relationship that young people can see themselves in.

When choosing a spouse, personal traits and non-traditional values such as common interests with a potential partner, level of education and personality are cited the most, but factors such as religious belief and family approval still persist.

Women, like men, display a rather traditional attitude regarding their role in the future, seeing themselves predominantly as
mothers and wives. Nevertheless, they contend that marriage and childbirth are more suitable for older ages of youth.

The transition of young people into adult life, i.e. assuming responsibility for different domains of their own lives, is extremely slow in Montenegro. Two-thirds of the oldest young people aged 26 to 29 still live with their parents in the parental home (62.19%), while only 23.35% are married, 79.7% have no children, and only 21.78% have a permanent job. Thus, young people in Montenegro have not met any of the so-called sociological criteria for growing into adulthood – aside from completing their education.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

— Given that the rate of unemployment is high and considering the low level of residential independence of young people as well as other opportunities for independence, it is necessary to develop effective policies that encourage employment
— Support programmes nurturing entrepreneurship and youth start-up initiatives in order to overcome unemployment through self-employment
— Develop programmes and measures that offer more favourable forms of residential independence for young people – different forms of insurance and support for more affordable rental of houses/apartments.
Different authors define life satisfaction in different ways. Campbell, Converse and Rogers (1976; cited in Diener, 1984) hold that satisfaction represents “the perceived difference between aspiration and achievement, ranging from perceived fulfilment to perceived deprivation”. Pavot et al. (1991, as quoted in Penezić 2006) define life satisfaction as “a person’s general assessment of his or her life”. Penezić (2006) believes that life satisfaction equates with the cognitive assessment of one’s general existence, through which each individual evaluates his or her life. Veenhoven (1996), on the other hand, defines life satisfaction as the degree to which a person positively evaluates his or her life, and considers it an indicator of the quality of life.

Generally speaking, the literature believes a positive assessment of one’s life to be linked to happiness and achievement of the “good life”, whereas low subjective ratings of life satisfaction are linked to unhappiness and depression (Proctor, Linley and Maltby, 2009). Healthy psychological states such as happiness and life satisfaction are often considered a consequence of economic security and success, although empirical studies point to a two-way relationship between the two (Lyubomirsky et al, 2005; cited in Proctor, Linley and Maltby, 2009).

Life satisfaction can be assessed in general, or through specific components such as health, employment, leisure, social and family relations. Individuals assess their satisfaction in each area, and sometimes also indicate how important each of these components are to their overall life satisfaction (Diener, 2006).

A review of the literature reveals different definitions of life satisfaction, but also multiple terms that are often used synonymously, such as welfare, happiness, quality of life, etc.

In everyday life it is usually assumed that young people are more satisfied with their lives, although some studies have shown satisfaction with life increases in the later years of life.

**DEGREE OF LIFE SATISFACTION**

On average, young people are very satisfied with their lives in general (M=4.44). They are least satisfied with their work, but even here the average is fairly high (M=3.87). Satisfaction with family life (M=4.60), friends (M=4.55) and education (M=4.25) (Figure 12.1.) top the list.

When asked to rank their satisfaction on a 1 to 5 scale (1 very dissatisfied; 5 very satisfied), respondents most frequently chose “very satisfied” in relation to family life (72.6%), friends (67.7%), life in general (58.1%), education (54%), and least frequently in relation to work (44.6%).
Respondents who reported living in worse economic circumstances were also more likely to be dissatisfied with education ($Rho = .135, p < 0.001$) as well as with their friends ($Rho = .113, p < 0.005$), families ($Rho = .174, p < 0.001$), work ($Rho = .201, p < 0.001$) and life in general ($Rho = .266, p < 0.001$).

Younger respondents are generally more satisfied with their lives in general than older cohorts ($Rho = −.99, p < 0.005$).

Most young people expect their future to be better than the present (76.9%), and a very small percentage think it will be the same (4.9%) or worse (1.7%). However, 12.2% of respondents could not say what they think their future will be like, and 4.2% did not answer this question (Figure 12.2).

Women are more optimistic about the future ($Rho = −.155, p < 0.001$), while those facing more difficult economic circumstances are more pessimistic ($Rho = .136, p < 0.002$). The data also reveal a correlation between age and perception of the future, with younger respondents being more optimistic ($Rho = −.98, p < 0.05$).

Regarding societal prospects, 44.3% believe that things will get better, 17.3% that everything will remain the same, and 16.2% that things will get worse. As many as 16.6% did not know and 5.3% did not answer the question (Figure 12.2).

The relationship between the place of residence and perception of society is statistically significant ($Rho = .188, p < 0.001$). Young people from urban areas are on average more optimistic. The economic situation also plays a role ($Rho = .128, p < 0.05$): those living in worse economic circumstances are more pessimistic about society’s prospects.

**YOUTH’S FEARS**

It is notable that the young people fear most those factors that could endanger their personal well-being, such as unemployment and illness. Next on the list of fears are socio-economic problems — corruption, poverty, and inequality. It is evident that young people have a good understanding of key economic developments and are reasonably afraid of them (Figure 12.3).

The place of residence also correlates with fear of immigrants ($Rho = −.124, p < 0.002$), while those facing worse economic circumstances are more afraid of unemployment ($Rho =−.115, p < 0.01$), poverty ($Rho =−.163, p < 0.001$), inequality ($Rho =−.207, p < 0.001$) and corruption ($Rho =−.193, p < 0.001$).
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS:

Our research shows that young people in Montenegro are fairly satisfied with their lives, especially with their families and friends. They are also satisfied with their education and life in general. They are least satisfied with their work (if employed), although here as well average satisfaction is quite high. Life satisfaction is strongly related to the economic circumstances of the household they live in. Those who say that they live in worse-than-average economic circumstances are also less satisfied with their lives, education, friends, and families.
A high percentage of young people (23.2%) said they did not know whether Montenegro should join the European Union, and 18.1% did not answer this question at all. Nevertheless, 45.3% of the respondents thought that Montenegro should join the EU, and only 13.4% that it should not. If we only look at those persons who answered the question, the percentage of those who support Montenegro’s membership of the EU (55.33%) far outweighs those who oppose it (16.32%), while 28.35% don’t know or are undecided (Figure 13.1).

A large percentage of young people (29.3%) could not say what the effect of accession would be on the economy. 38.5% thought the effect would be positive, whereas 10.5% thought there would be no effect and 8.9% that the effect would be negative.

Similarly, 30.5% of respondents could not say whether the EU will have a positive impact on the political system in Montenegro. Almost a third (33.8%) thought the effect would be positive, 9.1% that it would negatively impact the functioning of the system, and 13.5% that there would be no effect.

A third of the respondents believe that the EU would enrich and strengthen the cultural identity of Montenegro (32.6%), while 16.6% think there would be no effect, and a minority (7.3%) fear that accession to the EU would negatively impact the cultural identity of Montenegro. Once again, more than a third (30.4%) did not know how to answer this question (Figure 13.2).

Those who think that Montenegro should join the EU also believe that integration will have a positive effect on the economy ($\chi^2 = 183.88, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.720$), the political system ($\chi^2 = 174.09, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.711$), and cultural identity ($\chi^2 = 127.15, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.607$). Those who are interested in politics in the EU also think that it is important for Montenegro to join the Union ($\chi^2 = 27.85, p < 0.001, \text{Cramer’s } V = 0.266$). These respondents are also more likely to believe that joining the EU will have a positive effect on the political system.
and values ($\chi^2 = 25.21, p < 0.05, \text{Cramer's V } = 0.181$) and cultural identity ($\chi^2 = 18.46, p < 0.05, \text{Cramer's V } = 0.155$). Women are somewhat more optimistic about the likelihood of the EU having a positive influence on Montenegro’s cultural identity ($\chi^2 = 6.89, p < 0.05, \text{Cramer’s V } = 0.131$).

Respondents believe that values such as human rights, democracy, security, employment, etc., have a higher status in the EU than in Montenegro. On the scale from 1 to 5 (1 very bad, 5 very good), they assessed all the given values as having a better status within the EU than in Montenegro, (Figure 13.3.).

### FIGURE 13.2: Youth perception of the consequences of Montenegro’s accession to the EU for various areas of life (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>No effect</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>don’t know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural identity</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political system</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
FIGURE 13.3: Respondents’ perception of social values in Montenegro and the EU

- Personal freedom: EU 3.47, Montenegro 2.76
- Security: EU 3.27, Montenegro 2.75
- Equality: EU 3.40, Montenegro 2.60
- Employment: EU 3.50, Montenegro 2.20
- Economic welfare: EU 3.39, Montenegro 2.50
- Human rights: EU 3.38, Montenegro 2.70
- Rule of law: EU 3.25, Montenegro 2.61
- Democracy: EU 3.18, Montenegro 2.60
LITERATURE


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YOUTH STUDY MONTENEGRO 2018/2019


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FOOTNOTES

[1] At the point in time when the field research was conducted, the composition of Parliament and the Government had not changed with respect to the period of publication of the study, but the president of the state had.

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IMPRINT

PUBLISHER: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e. V.
Referat Mittel- und Osteuropa
Hiroshimastr. 28 • 10785 Berlin
www.fes.de/referat-mittel-und-osteuropa/
www.fes.de/youth-studies/

RESPONSIBLE: Matthias Jobelius, Max Brändle
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DESIGN: Andrea Schmidt • Typografie/im/Kontext
PRINTED BY: bub Bonner Universitäts-Buchdruckerei

ISBN: 978-3-96250-291-1
DATE: 2019

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