70/40/25 – The European Peace and Security Order under Threat – Open Space for a Progressive Peace Policy

politik für europa
#2017 plus

FRIEDRICH
EBERT
STIFTUNG

politik für europa
#2017 plus

A FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG PROJECT
2015 BIS 2017

Europe needs social democracy!

Why do we really want Europe? Can we demonstrate to European citizens the opportunities offered by social politics and a strong social democracy in Europe? This is the aim of the new Friedrich Ebert Stiftung project »Politics for Europe«. It shows that European integration can be done in a democratic, economic and socially balanced way and with a reliable foreign policy.

The following issues will be particularly important:
– Democratic Europe
– Economic and social policy in Europe
– Foreign and security policy in Europe

The FES will devote itself to these issues in publications and events throughout 2015–2017: we start from citizens' concerns, identify new positions with decision-makers and lay out alternative policy approaches. We want a debate with you about »Politics for Europe«!

Further information on the project can be found here:
www.fes.de/de/politik-fuer-europa-2017plus/

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) is the oldest political foundation in Germany. It was named after Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of the German Reich. As a political foundation our work is oriented towards the fundamental values of social democracy: freedom, justice and solidarity. As a non-profit institution we act independently and wish to promote a pluralist social dialogue about the political challenges of today. We consider ourselves as a part of the social democratic community of values and the German and international trade union movement. With our work we encourage people to take active roles in society and advocate social democracy.

Responsible for this publication in the FES

Anastasia Kluter, Department for Central and Eastern Europe
Reinhard Krumm, Head of Department for Central and Eastern Europe

Conference Report

70/40/25 – The European Peace and Security Order under Threat – Open Space for a Progressive Peace Policy

4 and 5 May 2015, Berlin, Conference Participants

„Peace is not everything, but without peace everything is nothing."
 WILLY BRANDT

INTRODUCTION

In 2015 we celebrate a historic triad: 70 years since the end of the Second World War and the founding of the UN, 40 years since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act and 25 years since the adoption of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (the Paris Charter). Leading Europe from the end of a devastating war to an era of unprecedented cooperation, these three events have retained their influence in the architecture of European peace and security to the present day. Against this background, the most severe crisis since the end of the Cold War – as perceived by the majority of actors – was triggered by the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine. Europe, which was founded on the principles of territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of conflicts and non-interference, once again faces the danger of new dividing lines, while the existing principles of its security order are under pressure.

In memory of these major historic events and in reaction to the current crisis, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung held an Open Space Conference on 4 and 5 May 2015 on the future of the European Peace and Security Order under Threat. The conference brought together 34 young experts in the fields of peace, security and conflict research, from 30 European and Central Asian countries – from Spain to Kyrgyzstan – to exchange views and ideas on a progressive European policy in a time of crisis.

The participants introduced their different areas of expertise and established their own choice of topics with regard to the following initial questions:

– Have the CSCE Final Act, the Paris Charter and the established security order outlived their relevance? If so, what comes next? Where do we want to go?

– Is it conceivable that 2015 will mark a turning point in history – the year of the beginning of a security »disorder«? How can we stay on track towards peace? What choices do we have?

– What can Germany do during its OSCE chairmanship in 2016 in order to provide the groundwork for an active and progressive peace policy in Europe?

To address this complex subject in an innovative and productive way the organizers chose the Open Space Method, which allowed the experts to approach solutions in an open, participative and direct manner with a high degree of individual responsibility.

In the course of the two-day meeting the participants created an agenda built around 12 different issues. The topics identified focused on the fundamental questions of values, cooperation and current challenges for the European security order. The discussions laid a foundation for further dialogue and insight, with the aim of preparing policy recommendations.

An important impulse for the discussions were the presentations of two policy papers by Wolfgang Richter of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and Dr Hans-Joachim Spanger of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF).

Policy-makers and practitioners Dr Rolf Mützenich, member of the German Federal Parliament, and Thomas Kralinski, State Secretary of Brandenburg, gave additional and valuable input for the debate during the welcome reception at the representation of Brandenburg.

PRESENTATIONS

FOUNDATIONS AND CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN PEACE AND SECURITY ORDER
WOLFGANG RICHTER

In his keynote speech Wolfgang Richter outlined the foundations and development of the current crisis of the European peace and security order from its very beginnings.[1]

THE ORDER OF YALTA 1945

After the end of the Second World War, the victorious powers aimed at establishing a new world order, which was marked by the foundation of the United Nations, privileged roles for the »P 5« in the Security Council, the solemn declarations of the UN Charter and the General Declaration of Human Rights and the rewriting of the norms of international humanitarian law. However, for the actual distribution of power and the fate of Europe, the trilateral conference at Yalta in February 1945 was more significant. It resulted in a new bipolar world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union and lasted for almost half a century, while the European colonial empires declined. The division of Europe led to a permanent bloc-to-bloc confrontation – politically, ideologically and militarily – with a constant recurrence of serious crises.

THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT 1975

When the Iron Curtain – symbolised by the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 – became more and more impervious and the situation in Europe seemed more frozen than ever, the West German government, in close cooperation with the United States, made an attempt to overcome the deadlock by replacing the policy of strict non-recognition (of the GDR) with the concept of »change through rapprochement«. At the same time, the Soviet Union was interested in »peaceful coexistence« of states that belonged to politically and militarily

opposed blocs and possessed competing ideologies. Although Moscow's interest in securing its sphere of political influence and military glacis in Europe, in principle, was not compatible with the Western interest in change, the 35 participants of the Conference of Helsinki in 1975 were able to strike a compromise, signalling détente. While all sides respected the status quo and promised not to use force to alter the situation, peaceful changes were not generally excluded. Even more importantly, human contacts between divided populations became possible and trade and cultural exchange were encouraged. Thus, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act harboured the potential to stabilise the political situation. It did not change the order of Yalta in the short term, but it did alleviate its direct consequences for the people and pointed towards a way out of permanent confrontation.

THE EUROPEAN PEACE AND SECURITY ORDER OF PARIS 1990

Despite the Helsinki Accord it took another 15 years and new severe crises (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979, missile crisis 1979–1985, martial law in Poland 1981) until the Soviet leadership under President Gorbachev recognised that it was time for change and embarked on a fundamentally new policy (glasnost, perestroika). The West insisted that, beyond declarations of principles such as non-use of force and non-interference in internal affairs of states, both sides had to agree on concrete measures that would enable a withdrawal from geopolitical glacis and ensure strategic and military restraint. On this basis, a new accord was achieved: the Two-plus-Four-Treaty overcame the division of Germany and traded the withdrawal of Soviet (Russian) forces from Central Europe against the promise of an end to the stationing of non-German forces in Berlin and the former GDR; the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) brought the missile crisis to an end, prohibiting the possession and stationing of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces; and the CFE Treaty set strict limits for major conventional armaments of the two still existing blocs. The Paris Charter replaced political confrontation by cooperation and the promise to establish a common space

---

1　This is the short version of the paper submitted by Wolfgang Richter to the conference and published by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung online: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/12060.pdf

of cooperative security based on equality and reciprocity, adherence to the principles of international law, common values and a balance of security interests ensuring mutual geopolitical restraint. Today, this order is in danger – to some, even obsolete.

CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN PEACE AND SECURITY ORDER

By annexing Crimea and intervening in the conflict in east Ukraine on the side of anti-Maidan and pro-Russian forces, Russia has violated the principles of international law. It was the first annexation of territory of a neighbouring country since 1945, which has shaken the foundation of the European peace order. Nonetheless, the deeper roots of the conflict cannot be found in Russian action alone. Tensions between the United States, a number of Western states and Russia have been growing since 2001.

Already the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 challenged some of the foundations of the Order of Paris, in particular, agreements on strategic restraint, such as the bipolar CFE Treaty. Like the West also Russia, as the legal successor of the Soviet Union in the Security Council from 1992 onwards, was interested in maintaining the integrity of the NPT and relocating former Soviet nuclear weapons from the territories of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to Russia. In return, nuclear powers vowed to respect their sovereignty and territorial integrity and to ban the use of force in mutual relations (Budapest Memorandum 1994). Likewise, the West and Russia insisted that successor states of the Soviet Union in Europe remain committed to the CFE Treaty to maintain military stability. For Russia the CFE Treaty was still desirable because it provided for collective ceilings and geographical distance from NATO member states.

NATO's first enlargement changed the geopolitical landscape in Europe and the basic assumptions of the Paris accord with regard to strategic restraint. In consequence, it rendered the CFE limitation concept obsolete. Significant adaptation efforts were necessary to calm Russian concerns that such enlargement contradicted earlier agreements and the objective of creating a common space of equal security without new geopolitical zero-sum games. From 1997 to 1999 such adaptations were negotiated successfully. They contained elements of closer NATO–Russia ties with commitments to no permanent stationing of additional substantial combat forces (NATO–Russia Founding Act 1997), adaptation of the CFE Treaty (ACFE) and strengthening the OSCE as the political framework for attaining a common security space.

After 2001, the agreed adaptation was revoked by the US administration under President George W. Bush. It made ratification of the ACFE conditional on the prior withdrawal of Russian regular troops and peacekeepers from Abkhazia and the Trans-Dniester region. With such linkages to further political ends the United States sought to terminate Russian obligations and influences in disputed areas at the southern fringe of the former Soviet Union and to prepare for the NATO accession of Georgia and Ukraine. With the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001, the build-up of a strategic missile defence system in the following years and advanced posts in new NATO member countries close to Russian borders, the United States rescinded earlier agreements with Russia and triggered suspicions that it was seeking to undermine Russian second-strike capabilities.

At the same time, the United States blocked Russian proposals to reform and strengthen the OSCE by providing it with legal status and a legally binding Charter. In the same vein, they rejected a proposal forwarded by the Russian President to conclude a new European Security Treaty. Instead, the United States used the Permanent Council of the OSCE mainly to confront Russia with its intransigent role in disputed post-Soviet areas, as well as democracy and human rights deficiencies, while ignoring Russian interest in maintaining basic security arrangements and adapting its instruments to a changing security landscape in Europe. Angry Russian responses to Western »double standards« (12–15 per cent Russian-speaking »non-state citizens« without voting rights in two Baltic States, Western interventionism in contravention of international law, Guantanamo and so on) added to an increasingly poisoned atmosphere, indicating that the earlier understanding of strategic cooperation had mutated again towards confrontation.

With the recognition of Kosovo by Western states, the Georgian attack against militias and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia and the subsequent Russian recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, relations between Russia and the United States, NATO and the EU had reached their nadir since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the attention of the Russian General Staff was drawn to Crimea when the then Ukrainian President Yushchenko warned that he would curtail the harbour rights of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which was operating in Georgia's coastal waters. Obviously, Russia now prepared contingencies to secure its strategic interests on the peninsula, should Ukraine turn West.

With that development, Europe became more and more united under the umbrella of NATO and the EU, while the role of the OSCE was ignored, Russian interests disregarded and a largely isolated Russia sidelined. Things became worse as the agreed reassurances – closer NATO–Russia ties, a stronger role for the OSCE and adaptation of arms control – were de facto rejected and the US military presence advanced towards Russian borders. Such policies contradicted the objectives of the post-Cold War European peace and security order, to establish an undivided OSCE space of equal security without geopolitical rifts.

Russia perceived such blockades as breaches of agreements, disregard for its historical role in overcoming the Yalta order and even as humiliation, because Russia's interests were obviously being ignored and the narrative changed: while in the 1990s the United States and NATO regarded the Soviet Union/Russia as an equal power and put much emphasis on the perception of a win-win situation, face-saving solutions and reciprocal security commitments, a new narrative held that Russia had »lost the Cold War« and its role and status had diminished to that of a »regional power«.

Russia feels that the West had not heeded and certainly had not rewarded its undoubted historical achievements. Instead, according to Moscow the West had pushed forward its alliances to Russian borders, endangered crucial strategic

positions und undertaken to split the Russian nation or alienate Russia from »brother nations«. In consequence of this perception, the Russian government believed that it had to win back national pride and dignity and to act defensively to protect strategic interests, focusing on the Black Sea Fleet bases in Crimea. In fact, Russia's unacceptable action in defiance of international law is – subjectively – based on a strategic defence motive rather than on a master plan to restore Greater Russia in its historical borders.

If this analysis holds true, Russia's future role and political course within the European security order could still be influenced by measured accommodation of Russia's interests in exchange for its return to rule-based behaviour. Details of potential compromises are less important than the fact that Russian interests are taken seriously and Russia is respected as a great power on an equal footing with the United States and leading powers in Europe. Ideally, creating new win-win situations and face-saving solutions, as was skilfully demonstrated in 1990, could facilitate withdrawals from glacis and spheres of influence. For such solutions to be viable they must contain as their basic elements the principles of reciprocity, equality and mutual commitments to strategic restraint.

Wolfgang Richter summarised his recommendations as follows:
Whether a return to a cooperative and rule-based peace order in Europe is possible will depend on the political will of all major stakeholders to understand – not necessarily share – mutual threat perceptions, exercise military restraint and seek a new and broad dialogue on all open questions. Such new dialogue should focus on the pillars of the order of Paris: adherence to the principles of international law, common norms and standards, strategic reassurances through arms control and strengthening the role of the OSCE in security cooperation.

All states should recommit to the principles of the 1999 European Security Charter of the OSCE: states, groups of states and alliances should not strive for security gains at the cost of the security of partners and give up trying to establish new dividing lines of preferential zones of influence. Instead, they should respect mutual security interests, revive, adapt and implement agreed reassurances, such as arms control and non-stationing commitments on the basis of equality and reciprocity, and cooperate on creating a common and undivided security space.

It will be crucial to renew mutual security reassurances and find an appropriate balance between the roles of the OSCE, NATO and the EU within the European security architecture. For reviving a cooperative security order, enhancing the role of the OSCE, with its inclusive and comprehensive security approach and its vision of an undivided security space, will be crucial. Its consensus-based re-emergence in crisis management proves Russia's interest, as conditioned as it may be.

MANAGING THE DIVIDE: EAST–WEST SECURITY BEYOND THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS
HANS-JOACHIM SPANGER

COMPETING NARRATIVES

A glaring sign of the current Cold War-type relationship between Russia and the West is the fact that – in the official discourse – the blame is unequivocally put on the opposite side.[2]

The public and the academic debates, however, are more nuanced. Nevertheless, in the prevailing Western perception it was events in Ukraine that provoked the crisis, notably Russia's actions in Crimea and the Donbas.

Conversely, in the dominant Russian perception the Ukrainian crisis grew out of a relationship that had been deteriorating for quite some time. The West is said to bear prime responsibility in that matter, be it NATO (and EU) expansion, be it undue democratic lecturing, be it Western uneasiness with the global shift in favour of newly emerging powers that it is allegedly trying to contain.

Two explanatory narratives have emerged in the West as the most prominent strands of thinking about the crisis and about Putin's Russia in general. The first primarily points to Western misbehaviour (or at least missed opportunities) that essentially boil down to not accepting Russia as an equal in international affairs. Disregard for Russian vital interests and the military alliance approaching Russian borders are the most obvious examples repeatedly invoked by Moscow's political class and not least by the president himself. In this view, Russia in Ukraine merely acted in self-defence, even if possibly out of proportion. This view is currently shared by most academics of the realist school, notably John Mearsheimer.

The other refers to the authoritarian transformation of the Russian polity that started around 2005 and has gathered speed since 24 September 2011 when Putin decided to return to the helm of the state. The resulting frustration is not only shared by the Russian opposition to the regime and many people in the West, but has also given rise to the assumption that the very nature of the regime makes it aggressive – for the sake of generating public consent and securing the regime's hold on power. Russia's intervention in Ukraine, in this view, is meant either to prevent the Euromaidan virus spreading east or to make sure that the resurrection of Russia's dominant role on the territory of the former Soviet Union is not derailed by a Ukraine defecting to the West. In academia this view is held mainly by those who subscribe to liberal and constructivist approaches.

As the two narratives can equally point to some evidence and try to make sense of the same phenomena, it would be strange if both did not have some measure of plausibility. However, their political consequences are vastly different: the latter advocates containment and deterrence and insists that Russia reverse its interventionist course in Ukraine as a condition for any meaningful dialogue and rapprochement. The former by contrast calls for engagement and cooperative efforts and hence addresses both sides and the need to re-

---

2 This is the short version of the paper submitted by Dr Hans-Joachim Spanger to the conference and published by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung online: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/12059.pdf

vive what is allegedly defunct, the European security order. If the diagnosis can be conceived as harbouring complementary elements, it makes sense to devise a response to the current crisis that tries to combine these prima facie incompatible prescriptions.

CONGAGEMENT

A strategy that tries to reconcile these competing prescriptions of »containment« versus »engagement« might be labelled »congagement«.

As the strategy of the West it starts out from the premise that the pan-European post-Cold War order as enshrined in the Paris Charter of 1990 has lost its meaning and for the time being no longer provides a sense of direction for joint efforts at devising a common European space. Nevertheless, even in conditions of a divide between East and West drifting apart needs to be managed in a productive, that is, a crisis-resilient way.

Congagement addresses both concerns raised by the continuous deterioration of East–West relations and the aspiration to reverse this trend. With regard to concerns it requires containment and is expected to provide reassurance against revisionism, which also includes sanctioning transgressions; the aspiration, on the other hand, calls for engagement and incentives that reward compliance and, at a minimum, make sure that the potential for political change is not blocked in mutual antagonism.

The pronounced gap between Russian autocracy and European liberal universalism equally calls for a modus operandi that keeps the competition under control without renouncing claims. This implies to recognise the plural character of political regimes as a given, provided basic human and civil rights are being observed. Such an approach neither sacrifices values on the altar of interests nor calls its own values into question. It aims at giving them weight by setting a good example in the first place and through an all-encompassing dialogue.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING

In conditions of *shattered trust* – which in the Western perception is the result of Russia's undercover warfare in Ukraine, while to the Russians it results from the West's arrogant negligence – reversing the slide towards an ever more antagonistic relationship is the most urgent political task. This calls for starting a process of confidence building. The necessary condition for any such effort is communication, preferably in a more formalised setting than hitherto. The sufficient condition calls for taking risks, which is the most convincing means to signal benign intentions and the absence of aggressive goals.

In the security realm there are a couple of measures that would gradually pave the way. The least demanding, if most pressing, is a mechanism to avoid dangerous encounters due to military posturing. Improved transparency would be next on the agenda.

Congagement requires further reassurance and extended deterrence for those NATO allies in the East whose feeling of insecurity is particularly strong. However, in order not to de-

rail confidence in benign intentions this strengthening has to take place with a view to real threats and not to worst-case scenarios. The current military balance – or rather imbalance – between Russia and NATO is no reason for Western alarmism. Hence, NATO can confine itself to measures of reassurance that remain within the boundaries of the NATO–Russia Founding Act of 1997. In this document NATO declared that it would refrain from deploying nuclear weapons and from »additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces« in the new member states.

Military confidence building and arms control are an indispensable building block of any security architecture in Europe and even a type of relationship characterised by peaceful coexistence.

RE-MODELLING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Whereas the West has not indicated that it would like to see the institutional security landscape overhauled, for Russia this has been the prime demand for quite some time. For Moscow's political class the Ukrainian crisis proved once again the dysfunctional nature of the security architecture in Europe. Its instruments and mechanisms are not only legacies of the Cold War but have also made sure that security on the continent remains divided – essentially between those in and those outside NATO. This, however, is an exclusively Russian concern as most others outside NATO have a clear preference for joining as soon as possible, whereas Russia never seriously harboured such an intention.

It is true that institutions that have security, crisis prevention and crisis management as their brief did not prevent the crisis in Ukraine. Neither the NATO–Russia Council (suspended for the third time when the crisis boiled up), nor the EU and its consultative bodies, nor the United Nations were able to play a significant role in preventing or managing the crisis. The only organisation that, in the wake of the crisis, somehow re-emerged from oblivion was the OSCE, which has in fact become most visible.

Trust in institutions, however, seems a bit too much to expect. Many international developments simply bypass international organisations – be it the UN, NATO or the OSCE – because they are too slow to react in a timely manner.

As a first step, there must be a reconfiguration of existing institutions reflecting the demands of the new divide. This means that Russia might be relieved of membership of those organisations – such as the Council of Europe – the essence of which are liberal-democratic values. At the same time, those elements of the institutional setting should be strengthened that are destined to secure stability and interest-based cooperation in an environment characterised by severe conflicts.

NATO

The Ukrainian crisis very much cleared the air for NATO. It not only made the allies move closer together, but also provided a new unequivocal sense of direction and once again made collective defence the core of the alliance's mission. It has become clear that NATO definitely is not the prime instru-

ment of crisis. Obviously, NATO policy on enlargement needs to be fundamentally rethought – and Ukraine is the first case in point.

OSCE

The OSCE is clearly the institution best placed to reinforce attention to arms control and military confidence-building, which are building blocks of a European landscape in which managing the divide has become the order of the day. Putting OSCE principles into practice more effectively should move beyond the mere affirmation of past commitments.

MAINTAIN BROAD-RANGING DIALOGUE

Congagement means keeping transformative options open. It aims to keep channels of communication and exchange as wide open as possible (which, incidentally, also applies to Western stubbornness on visa issues). Economic exchange is also important and needs to be shielded against political disruption as much as possible. Exporting arms to Russia is certainly not advisable anymore, and economic sanctions are a political tool that, irrespective of the unresolved controversies about their merits and limitations, needs to be employed in particular situations. However, one should not lose sight of the well-established fact that economic exchange helps to stabilise modes of cooperative behaviour and to bring about societal change.

Conference Results, Graphic Recording, May 4, 2015, Berlin

CONFERENCE RESULTS

IS EUROPE FINISHED BUSINESS?

The working group discussed whether questions of war and peace had been settled once and for all and whether the EU was ready to act decisively on behalf of its security interests. There was broad consensus among the participants that the spirit and values of the Helsinki Final Act and the Peace and Security Order of Paris should be kept alive. Furthermore, to improve the commitment of the signatory states to their obligations and principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter and the Universal Human Rights

Declaration, the experts proposed that a an international conference be held. Its goal would be the establishment of the so-called »Helsinki Peace Movement« as a continuation of the OSCE's Helsinki +40 Process. It would revitalise the spirit of peace and cooperation and initiate a new discourse on the European idea, its meaning and values. In addition, it was suggested that existing forms of cooperation should overcome the paternalistic approach of the EU towards its non-European partners. Rather they should be included in the major discussions and structures of cooperation as equal partners.

IDENTITY AND CONFLICT – (DE)CONSTRUCTING THE »OTHER«

An environment of mutual respect for and peaceful coexistence of different identities in contrast to the current aggressive expansion of exclusive identities was identified by the participants as an ideal scenario for the future of Europe and its partners. To achieve it, an increasing understanding of others' positions is necessary in order to ensure that identity is not seen as a binary choice or a zero sum game. Therefore, an exchange on all levels of societies should be reinforced and facilitated, for example, through visa liberalisation. The OSCE as the institution that proved itself as most effective during the lasting crisis in Ukraine must be strengthened.

CONFLICT OF STRATEGIC CULTURES

The experts agreed on the existence of strategic misperceptions of the objectives of different parties to conflicts, as well as on the different conclusions that result from taking either a realist or a liberal perspective. The realist school suggests that the Ukrainian crisis is based on missed opportunities on the part of the West with regard to accepting Russia as an equal in international affairs and respecting its interests. The liberal approach sees the roots of the crisis in the Russian regime's efforts to cling on to power and prevent the Euromaidan movement from spreading east. Moreover, Russia does not want its resurrected dominant role on the territory of the former Soviet Union to be called into question by Ukraine defecting to the West. In order to improve the communicative situation and to provide factual clarity, the experts discussed such measures as translating all strategic documents and making access to them easier, trust-building strategic initiatives for young people, joint political projects and more direct consultations and contacts between all interested political actors, not limited to the official Western–Russian dialogue.

RECONCILIATION

Europe and its neighbours look back on a long history of regional conflicts. Not all of them managed to realise the process of reconciliation that is needed to establish the desired atmosphere for long-lasting peace and cooperation. To initiate reconciliation processes that will prevent potential future conflicts the participants establish a list of recommendations to be specified in upcoming discussions.

In order to achieve a state of reconciliation societies need to be prepared for a painful and long process that requires endurance and the willingness of all parties. A clear political vision, strong leadership and reliable politicians are crucial for implementing deep changes in society. They will also need the help of catalysers and experienced mediators to reach all parts of society and set up symbolic actions towards reconciliation. Institutional support is also needed.

Conference Results, Graphic Recording, May 5, 2015, Berlin

EU EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

In the past, the European Union has made some major mistakes in dealing with the participating countries of the Eastern Partnership. The EU should have considered their economic and security ties with Russia, Russian interests in promoting the Customs and Eurasian Union and its involvement in unresolved territorial conflicts. These countries were confronted with mutually exclusive choices, ignoring their potential for conflict with Russia. This has to be avoided in the future and a more flexible, inclusive approach needs to be developed that respects regional interests and integrates Russia through dialogue. Instead of viewing the Eurasian Economic Union primarily as a geo-economic tool of Russian influence, it should be welcomed as a new opportunity for economic cooperation. Whether this opportunity will be realised depends, however, as much on the EU as on Russia. The ability of any country to choose its own economic policy and membership in any union must remain free from political pressure.

ROLE OF THE UNITES STATES IN EUROPE – PARTNERS WITHIN THE EU CONCEPT OF SECURITY

The United States still plays a very special role for Europe and the transatlantic link is irreplaceable, although dissent over the current crisis in Ukraine is evident. Despite the United States' new focus on China and the Pacific region, a strategy has to be developed for a common security order concerning new global challenges and beyond military doctrines. Europe needs the United States as an important actor within the new European Peace and Security order. To this end it was suggested to develop a joint EU–US concept of security beyond NATO. Within such a framework, special attention should be given to Turkey's role in the region.

RED LINES

For a debate on a new European security strategy, it is essential to outline the red lines of the involved parties for a better understanding of their threat perceptions in order to develop a suitable approach to each of them. For Russia the participants identified further NATO enlargement and the increasing influence of Euro-Atlantic institutions in the CIS as problematic issues; for the EU the territorial integrity of all member states and partners and democratic development are beyond question; for the United States the main red line is a massive global military build-up; for members of the Eastern Partnership it is any veto on sovereign choices. These already existing different perceptions and political limits have been heightened by the recent increase in new security challenges.

HYBRID WAR – INFORMATION WAR

When a country is attacked by conventional land, sea or air forces, it is usually clear how to respond. What happens when it is attacked by a mixture of Special Forces, information campaigns and backdoor proxies? What is the best response? A new phenomenon, so-called »Hybrid Warfare«, challenges the international security order. A major part of it, information warfare, was the main discussion topic on this matter. The international community should develop appropriate actions when information is used as a weapon in an environment of limited pluralism such as Russia, with blurred distinctions between facts and interpretation. Such measures could include the formulation and conduct of international media ethics, more funds to debunk and stop fake news and a more robust financing of foreign reporting. As in the post-Soviet countries there are major fears about the influence of the Russian state media on the Russian-speaking population; diversification of media is essential to counter potential conflict development.

ISLAMIC STATE

Another new challenge and a major global security threat is the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIL or ISIS). ISIS uses elements of information warfare effectively, especially for recruitment purposes in Western countries. This serious threat has to be added to official European security documents for further strategic measures, such as Track II diplomacy or the solution-oriented peace endeavours with regard to the conflict in Syria to prevent ISIS from advancing, creating even more victims and refugees.

ESCALATION PREVENTION AND THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER

All participants agreed on the urgent need to develop and establish a new European Security Order that will be able to respond to the current crisis, prevent new conflict escalations and be ready to face already mentioned new security challenges, as well as future ones. The experts mapped a number of threats and risks for European peace: the Ukraine crisis and other armed conflicts in the EU neighbourhood, failed states, international terrorism, cyber security, prolonged economic recession, climate change, natural disasters, human made disasters and potential energy issues. To confront these problems they stressed the importance of a common European Union defence policy that would include EU defence ministers' meetings, negotiations on defence spending and soft security instruments to meet hybrid threats. Other influential international actors must be included in this new strategy targeting global security challenges.

UKRAINE CRISIS

A consensus prevailed that a protraction and freezing of the Ukrainian crisis must be avoided. The participants recognised that there are similarities in all post-Soviet conflicts and therefore lessons to be learned. However, regional characteristics can be approached only in a way specifically adapted to every conflict. As a first step, comprehensive reforms and economic stabilisation need to be achieved as soon as possible. The Crimea remains an open question. An OSCE monitoring mission to the peninsula might be a good start.

NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER

To prevent a further escalation in Ukraine, security has to be recognised as a multidimensional concept. Non-military measures for building mutual trust are as important as military strategies, if not more so. Therefore, non-military spending for trust building projects should be increased and visa liberalisation for more interpersonal exchange introduced. All existing communication channels have to remain open. Furthermore, Europe should keep its existing norms and rules and make them a part of the political process, but with all the sensitivity necessary to meet Russia's security concerns and avoid double standards. The political process of peace negotiations remains pivotal for any solution.

CONTRIBUTORS

Participants
Nazife Al, Turkey
Satenik Baghdasaryan, Armenia
Rihards Bambals, Latvia
Victoria Bucataru, Moldova
Daniel Amir Campos Reviriego, Spain
Anthony Coutret, France
Raphaela Engel, Austria
Alexander Graef, Germany
Lina Grip, Sweden
Anna Gussarova, Kazakhstan
David Ramin Jalilvand, Germany
Cameron Johnston, Great Britain
Giorgi Kanashvili, Georgia
Damir Kapidzic, Bosnia
Alexandr Konkov, Russia
Katarzyna Anna Kubiak, Poland
Lucia Najšlová, Czech Republic
Berkay Mandiraci, Turkey
Panagiota Manoli, Greece
Daniar Matikanov, Kyrgyzstan
Murad Nasibov, Azerbaijan
Yulia Nikitina, Russia
Aleksandar Pavleski, Macedonia
Anna Péczeli, Hungary
Ursula Pensa, Estonia
Matti Pesu, Finland
Ileana Madalina Racheru, Romania
Bartosz Rydliński, Poland
Hanna Shelest, Ukraine
Arseni Sivitski, Belarus
Isidora Stakic, Serbia
Peter Tkáč, Slovakia
Maryna Tsapok, Ukraine
Ivaylo Tzoneff, Bulgaria

Policy Papers
Wolfgang Richter, Hans-Joachim Spanger

Peer Review
Alexander Graef, Giorgi Kanashvilli, Yulia Nikitina,
Bartosz Rydlinski, Hanna Shelest

Facilitators
Michaela Fischer, Stefan Fischer, Kommunikationslotsen

Graphic Recordings
Christopher Illigens

Organizers
Stefanie Elies, Tobias Fella, Peter Hartmann,
Reinhard Krumm, Kristin Linke, Kristina Schatz

FRIEDRICH
EBERT
STIFTUNG

www.fes.de/de/politik-fuer-europa-2017plus/