

## *Inclusiveness and the Perceived Legitimacy of Peace Treaties*

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**Abstract:** Participation at the negotiation table for finding peace agreements can be conceptualized as a peacebuilding function of civil society. Studies which measure the impact of civil society's participation at the negotiation table, however, are very scarce. Do people perceive inclusive peace treaties to be more legitimate? Does CSOs' trustworthiness moderate the impact of inclusive peace treaties on people's perception of the legitimacy of peace treaties? This study focuses on these questions by gathering and analysing data from 400 Turkish Cypriots. The survey experiment suggests that inclusiveness does not influence the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. Moreover, the findings suggest a null effect with regard to CSOs' trustworthiness and its multiplicative effect on perceived legitimacy based on civil society's participation at the negotiation table.

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## Introduction

Decades ago, Johan Galtung differentiated between negative peace and positive peace: *“Negative peace which is the absence of violence, absence of war – and positive peace which is the integration of human society”* (Galtung, 1964, p. 2). Peace research has evolved extensively since Galtung made this distinction. Peacebuilding, a term that takes social and psychological aspects of the conflict into the core of its definition has become a buzzword in peace studies. Peacebuilding refers to any kind of intervention that leads to sustainable peace (Bush and Duggan, 2014; Fast and Neufeldt, 2005). Sustainable is a keyword that may differentiate peacebuilding from other concepts such as peacekeeping and peacemaking. Peacekeeping is used only to define activities that help a state to transform from an environment of war to negative peace. It is usually conducted by foreign soldiers, such as the UN troops. These troops try to deter the recurrence of violence and supply local people with their immediate needs such as food, water and shelter. Peacemaking goes a step further than peacekeeping. Peacemaking refers to diplomatic activities. These activities involve negotiations that are aimed at finding a peaceful settlement between enemies.

It should be stressed that peacebuilding covers interventions that can be classified under peacekeeping and peacemaking,

but it goes further. It also includes interventions aimed at transforming a society towards the goal of achieving positive peace. Peacebuilding interventions specifically focus on dealing with the root causes of conflicts. If a conflict is caused by environmental degradation, environmental protection can be classified as peacebuilding. If negative rhetoric in history books is one of the root causes of conflict, interventions aimed at changing the content of history books can be classified as peacebuilding. Therefore, peacebuilding interventions refer to a set of activities that try to transform a conflict-torn society into a peaceful society by addressing the root causes of conflict.

It should be noted that peacebuilding is used in post-conflict contexts more than in civil war settings. The reason for this is as follows; in civil war settings, peacekeeping and peacemaking precedes in urgency compared to peacebuilding. Focusing on the root causes of conflict becomes much more relevant once major violence stops. However, it should be noted that peacebuilding, by using the definition above, also covers activities that are classified under peacekeeping or peacemaking. Therefore, peacebuilding emerges as a wider concept which includes both peacekeeping and peacemaking activities but with the addition of other activities which focus on the root causes of conflict in post-conflict settings.

By post-conflict country, it may not always be clear what is exactly meant (Call, 2008). It may refer to a setting where major violence comes to an end. It may also refer to a setting where a peace agreement has been signed after the end of a civil war. Finally, it may refer to a setting with an apparent military defeat of one side to the conflict (Call, 2008). The first definition is more appropriate than the second or the third because ending of major political violence has certain consequences which can be seen in all of these settings (Call, 2008; Diehl and Druckman, 2010).

According to the SEUPB report (2007), the interest in evaluation of peacebuilding increased with the growth in the number of peace negotiations and recognition of the inadequacies of the existing approaches. The United States Institute of Peace counts 40 peace agreements between 1989 and 2005 all over the world. The problem in most of these cases is that these agreements did not result in positive peace but rather intermittent violence, crime, economic hardships, suspicion toward former enemies and public dissatisfaction with life and politics. This suggests that a comprehensive peacebuilding approach which focuses on the root causes of conflicts can better address problems in countries which experience violent conflict. Unlike peacekeeping and peacemaking interventions in which civil society actors have either limited or no contribution, civil society

emerges as one of the main actors in peacebuilding interventions.

There is a misconception in the literature that civil society refers to 'civil' actors; actors that are inherently and functionally 'good' (Kumar 1993, 377). However, this is far from the truth. Klu Klux Klan, Al Qaida etc. are also civil society actors. Almost no one would argue that killing people just because of their ethnicity or faith can count as peacebuilding. Therefore, it would be erroneous to understand civil society as inherently 'good'. This type of actors actually 'spoils' peace rather than build it (Stedman, 1997). What makes any organization or any actor a part of civil society is their distinctiveness from family, business and the state. As soon as an individual acts collectively with other people outside their family, business and the state, this person becomes a part of civil society (Spurk, 2010). This does not mean that civil society cannot be related to family, business and the state. A civil society organization may have connections with the state, but in order to be defined as a civil society organization, it should not be organized under the state apparatus (Spurk, 2010). Since political parties compete to become governmental actors, however, they cannot be defined as civil society organizations.

There are two different approaches to analysing civil society. Actor-oriented approaches focus on the activities of specific

civil society actors. These approaches, however, might be problematic. They usually focus on a specific type of civil society organization and analyse what it does. Other important civil society actors are excluded from analysis. Therefore, they give us a rather bleak or even false conclusion about what civil society is and does (Spurk, 2010). Therefore, a functional approach to analysing civil society is necessary. Rather than focusing on specific groups, a functional approach divides the activities of civil society into different functions and evaluates them. This allows a more thorough and realistic picture of how civil society actors, overall, influence a certain function (Spurk, 2010).

Recently, peace researchers moved beyond only describing what civil society has done in single-case studies and defined and differentiated between different peacebuilding functions of civil society (Marchetti and Tocci, 2009; Barnes, 2009; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010). Nevertheless, peacebuilding literature is clearly short of studies that measure the effectiveness of civil society's peacebuilding functions. Evaluation of the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions is absolutely necessary (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak et al. 2009).

One study which took important steps toward measuring civil society's peacebuilding functions is Paffenholz (2010). Based on eleven case studies conducted by country-

expert researchers, Paffenholz (2010) presented the results of the first extensive study on the effectiveness of civil society's peacebuilding functions and enabling and disabling factors for the effectiveness of these functions. This study is, arguably, the single comprehensive academic study that tried to measure effectiveness and find which factors influence effectiveness. However, this edited book had methodological shortcomings. The findings were based on the opinions of scholars working on peacebuilding and a subjective quantitative comparison of the effectiveness of these functions based on these subjective opinions. This study advanced the research field by moving away from the liberal peacebuilding vs. indigenous peacebuilding debate (see Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015) and focusing on the effectiveness of civil society's peacebuilding functions. However, the effectiveness of asking country-experts to rate the effectiveness of peacebuilding functions, without a comprehensive data gathering process and a suitable method, is debatable.

Paffenholz and Spurk (2010) define seven different peacebuilding functions. I argue that two additional peacebuilding functions should be included in the framework. What falls under a specific peacebuilding function is not always clear. However, this framework is often cited in the peacebuilding literature. The first one of these peacebuilding functions is *protection*. Protection function

covers all the activities that civil society implements that ensure the physical security of the people either from a despotic state or armed groups (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010). Such work may involve landmine removal, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants. Protection may be intertwined with other activities such as monitoring and service delivery. The second peacebuilding function of civil society is *monitoring*. Paffenholz and Spurk (2010) note the connection between the different functions they describe in this case by conceptualizing monitoring as a precondition for protection and advocacy. Monitoring enables peacebuilding organizations to give recommendations to formal authorities or develop effective ways to implement protection and public advocacy activities.

The third function is advocacy. Advocacy, whether it is public advocacy (outside lobbying) that involves demonstrations, press releases and petitions or nonpublic advocacy (inside lobbying), which is one-on-one communication with the policymakers, can be used to influence governmental authorities (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010). There is a well-developed literature on the political outcomes of social movements (outside lobbying), as well as inside lobbying. Even though the aim of both types of activities may be similar, tactics differ significantly. Therefore, it is more appropriate to study *inside lobbying* as the third peacebuilding

function and *outside lobbying* as the fourth peacebuilding function of civil society.

The fifth peacebuilding function is *in-group socialization*. In-group socialization aims to induce peace and democratic values and behavior in conflict-torn societies. The goal is to transform society, not only to get rid of violence, but to anchor positive peace in people's minds (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010). The most often used activity for such change is peace education. There is a well-developed literature on peace education. The sixth and a similar peacebuilding function is *social cohesion*. Social cohesion activities are those activities that concentrate on attitude change by bringing individuals from conflicting groups together (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010). This function is similar to in-group socialization in terms of what is targeted. The main difference is that in-group socialization takes place within communities, whereas social cohesion takes place between communities.

The seventh peacebuilding function is *intermediation and facilitation*. This function includes civil society initiatives that aim to bring armed groups together for mediation (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010). This happens quite rarely and the distinction between advocacy and intermediation is again quite blurred. The eighth peacebuilding function is *service delivery*. In conditions of violence and famine, civil society may provide resources to society (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010). Similar

to other peacebuilding functions, activities under this function may also be interpreted as part of another function. In this case, it may be a difficult task to interpret what counts as service delivery and what counts as protection.

Paffenholz and Spurk (2010) also include the civil society's efforts at the negotiation table during peace-treaty negotiations as part of advocacy. This report will assess the possible effects of this inclusion on the durability of peace. However, it should be noted that the role of civil society at the negotiation table cannot be classified as advocacy as the aim is not necessarily to influence the governmental authorities. The literature shows that the main effect of having civil society at the negotiation table is the increased legitimacy of peace treaties, which in turn, contributes to durable peace (Nilsson, 2012). Therefore, one can argue that *being at the negotiation table* can be added to Paffenholz and Spurk's (2010) framework as an additional, eighth, peacebuilding function.

This study can be located in the broader peacebuilding evaluation literature which measures the effectiveness of one of these peacebuilding functions, *being at the negotiation table*. The argument in the literature is that; when civil society is included at the negotiation table, people see peace agreements as more legitimate. Thus, these agreements are more likely to last (Nilsson,

2012). Kanol (2015), however, tested this causal mechanism behind the positive correlation between civil society being at the negotiation table and durability of peace with a survey experiment in the southern part of Cyprus. Unexpectedly, the author's data suggested that having civil society at the negotiation table does not have a meaningful effect on the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. In the next part, studies published on inclusion and its possible effect on legitimacy beliefs, are reviewed and hypotheses are formulated.

## Inclusive Decision-Making Processes and Perceived Legitimacy

Most scholars perceive civil society's participation at the negotiation table as a positive thing (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008; Nilsson, 2012; Zanker, 2013; Chigas, 2014; Paffenholz, 2014). Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008) look at the correlations between the level of civil society participation during the making of 25 peace treaties and durability of peace. The authors suggest that "we see that high or moderate civil society involvement in peace negotiations appears to be strongly correlated with sustained peace in the peacebuilding phase. These findings suggest that a strong relationship exists between direct and indirect civil society participation in peace negotiations and successful peacebuilding"

(Wanis-St.John and Kew, 2008, p.30). Nilsson (2012) conducts an empirically stronger analysis and comes to the same conclusion. The author looks at 83 peace agreements in 40 different conflicts. Using duration analysis with control variables, she finds that inclusive peace treaties are more likely to create sustainable peace.

Paffenholz (2014) suggests that scholars should now accept that inclusion is beneficial and rather focus on different ways civil society can be included at the negotiation table. The author specifies nine models of inclusion:

- “1. Direct representation of civil groups at the negotiation table, either as their own delegations to the negotiations or as members of official delegations;
2. Observer status, with no official roles but a direct presence during the negotiation;
3. Official consultative forums that run parallel to official negotiations, and that are endorsed by the mediators and negotiators;
4. Less formal consultations, that lack official endorsement from all the stakeholders;
5. Inclusive post-agreement mechanisms that involve civil society groups in the implementation of peace agreements;
6. High-level civil society initiatives, nonofficial Track Two facilitation

initiatives that take place in the pre-negotiation phase or parallel to official negotiations and that use a problem-solving approach;

7. Public participation, involving the broader population via public hearings, opinion polls, “town hall” meetings or signature campaigns;
8. Public decision making, via referenda and other electoral forms that put major political decisions to binding public vote (e.g., terms of peace agreements, constitutional reforms); and
9. Mass action, campaigns, demonstration, street action, protests, and petitions” (Paffenholz, 2014: 76-77).

Such informative classifications are very much necessary. Nevertheless, recent findings suggest that it might be hasty to move away from looking at the impact of inclusion. Kanol (2015), for example, conducts a survey experiment with 337 Greek Cypriot subjects and argues that when subjects read about inclusion of civil society at the negotiation table during the negotiation process of a hypothetical peace agreement in Cyprus, their perceived legitimacy of the peace agreement did not significantly vary. Looking at other research which explore the relationship between decision-making types and perceived legitimacy also suggests



caution against moving away from inclusion/exclusion discussion just yet.

Procedural fairness theory suggests that fair decision-making procedures determine how people are to react to authoritative decisions (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler *et al*, 1997). In spite of the confidence of political philosophers who argue that participation and deliberation are fairer procedures (Manin, 1987; Barber, 1984; Cohen, 1997) and create better epistemic results than representative procedures (Estlund, 2008; Bohman, 2009; Goodin, 2008; Habermas, 1996), empirical findings are mixed.

Morrell (1999) found that there was no significant difference in legitimacy beliefs between two groups differing in the level of participation. Similarly, Gangl (2000) found that after providing the subjects with different definitions of fair and unfair procedures, 'people have voice' procedure was not conceived to have more legitimacy but in fact, statistically insignificant less legitimacy. De Fine Licht (2011) found that direct decision-making compared to representative and expert decision-making does not have a significant positive effect on the perceived legitimacy of health care policies. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002a; 2002b) found that giving an opportunity to voice reasons did not make a positive difference in the subjects' legitimacy beliefs about the outcome and

satisfaction. On the contrary, the subjects were actually frustrated when they were allowed to have a voice but this voice was not taken into consideration, thus reducing satisfaction with the outcome. However, when the subjects had the opportunity to influence the outcome after given a chance to voice their opinions, their legitimacy beliefs increased (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002b). A similar conclusion is also reached by the non-experimental statistical analysis of Ulbig (2008). This author found that voice alone does not make any difference. Only when the citizens' voice can actually make a difference do legitimacy beliefs significantly increase (Ulbig, 2008). Esaiasson *et al* (2012) found that subjects did not bestow more legitimacy upon the decision-making arrangements they have chosen in comparison to arrangements that are chosen exogenously by the experimenters.

Other studies have produced more optimistic results. The results of Cavalcanti *et al's* (2010) field experiment suggested that participation has a positive effect on the implementation of common decisions. Sutter *et al* (2010) found that when people are given a choice to decide on the institutions endogenously, they are more likely to cooperate. Grönlund *et al* (2010) also found that subjects were more willing to engage in collective action after deliberating on energy policy. Using vignettes, De Fine Licht *et al* (2014) compared reactions to different forms

of decision-making and found that students attribute most legitimacy to deliberative types of procedures. Comparing legitimacy beliefs between direct voting, electing representatives and expert decision-making, Esaiasson *et al* (2012) found that direct decision-making created the highest legitimacy beliefs. By using vignettes for robustness check, the authors confirmed their results. Such a result is supported by other studies such as Bowler *et al* (2007), Gash and Murakami (2009) Esaiasson (2010) and Olken (2010). Towfigh *et al.* (2013) argue that voters' decision acceptance vary depending on the nature of the issue. People are ready to allow parties and experts to take decisions for themselves only when the issue is not salient. People's decision acceptance significantly and positively changes when they perceive the issue at stake to be important, regardless of the personal agreement with decision outcome.

Persson *et al* (2013) argued that both direct voting and deliberation have separate positive effects on legitimacy beliefs. However, when direct voting is present, deliberation had no meaningful impact on legitimacy beliefs implying that when peace treaties are put to a referendum; civil society participation at the negotiation table may not make a difference. Nevertheless, we know that peace treaties are rarely put to referenda in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict. Asking people if they want to have peace with

their arch enemies under adverse conditions without a considerable amount of time lag might end up worsening the situation. Referendums on power-sharing plans, however, can be useful in places like Northern Ireland or Cyprus where major violence has stopped and a considerable amount of time has passed since traumatic violent incidents were a regular occurrence. All in all, if civil society participation has an impact on legitimacy beliefs, referendum results would be more positive in the first place. Therefore, the positive impact of participatory types of decision-making found in some of these studies might suggest a significant positive effect in favour of the independent variable. Nevertheless, mixed results in the literature provide more evidence for the null hypothesis.

**H1.** *There is no relationship between inclusive peace treaties and their perceived legitimacy by the wider public.*

Zanker (2014) provides a more sophisticated theoretical framework for the relationship between inclusion and legitimacy beliefs. In order to speak about legitimate peace agreements, the author suggests that civil society which is present at the negotiation table should represent the real interests of the people, people should identify themselves with those representing them at the negotiation table, and there should be knowledge of what civil society is actually

doing while participating in the negotiation process (Zanker, 2014). This could then suggest that in order to have a positive effect on legitimacy beliefs of the people, civil society participating at the negotiation table should be perceived trustworthy by the people in the first place. There is, however, no study which tests the interaction effect between civil society organizations' trustworthiness and their participation at the negotiation table on people's legitimacy beliefs. This might explain why there are contradictory findings regarding inclusiveness and legitimacy beliefs.

**H2.** *The effect of civil society's participation at the negotiation table on the legitimacy beliefs of the wider public is conditional on civil society's perceived trustworthiness.*

## Data Analysis and Results

The experimental study was conducted face-to-face with a non-probabilistic sample in the northern part of Nicosia. Cyprus was divided into two parts after inter-communal strife broke out in the second half of the 1950s which continued until the partition of the island in 1974. Turkish Cypriots seceded and promulgated their own state in the northern part of Cyprus in 1983. To date, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is an unrecognized state, recognized only by Turkey.

The treatment group comprised of 200 Turkish Cypriots who completed a survey by reading a paragraph which invited them to think that a hypothetical agreement was found. The subjects were notified that this hypothetical agreement was found as a result of the negotiations between the presidents of the two sides and active participation of 50 representative civil society organizations. Another 200 Turkish Cypriots were assigned to a control group where the participants were given the same text without any information about the active involvement of civil society organizations. Perceived legitimacy was measured for all respondents after they read the texts about a hypothetical agreement. The short texts that were presented to the subjects are as follows:

### Treatment Group

*Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides and active participation of 50 representative civil society organizations from both sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders and most civil society organizations from both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.*

### Control Group

*Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders of both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.*

The respondents in the treatment group are coded as 1 and the respondents in the control group are coded as 0. Using the means of vignettes like this enabled the use of a simulation to measure the legitimacy beliefs of the wider society depending on the participation of civil society organizations in peace-treaty negotiations.

Kanol (2015) relies on previous questionnaires used by Stromer-Galley and Muhlberger (2009), De Fine Licht (2011), De Fine Licht *et al* (2014), Esaiasson *et al* (2012), Persson *et al* (2013) and Zhang (2015) in order to operationalize perceived legitimacy. Kanol (2015) uses three questions in order measure perceived legitimacy. The average of the same three measures are used in this study to construct a perceived legitimacy index. The first statement used for calculating the perceived legitimacy index is:

‘the decision was taken in a fair way’ – ‘strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 strongly agree’.

The second statement used to calculate the perceived legitimacy index is:

‘please indicate what you thought of the outcome’ – ‘not satisfied at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 completely satisfied’.

The third question used to calculate the perceived legitimacy index is:

‘how willing are you to accept the decision?’ – ‘not willing at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 completely willing’. Cronbach’s alpha (0.99) shows that the perceived legitimacy index is perfectly reliable.

Trust in CSOs is measured with the following question: ‘on a scale from 0 to 6, how much trust do you have for civil society organizations in your country?’ Respondents were asked to put a circle around a number between 0 and 6 where 0 represented no trust at all and 6 represented complete trust. The questionnaire also asked the participants to give information about their age, gender, level of education, region of residence, religiosity, ideology, trust in Turkish Cypriots and vote intention in a future referendum after reading the short texts provided. Age is an interval variable. Gender is a dichotomous variable. Females are coded as 0 and males are coded as 1. Education is measured by asking the participants about their last degree obtained. The 6-point scale starts from no schooling and ends with a postgraduate degree. Ideology is measured on a 7-point scale. Respondents were asked to put a circle around a number between 0 and 6 where 0 represented left and 6 represented right. Regions of residence are coded as 5 dummy variables – Nicosia, Famagusta, Kyrenia, Morphou and Trikomo/Iskele. Religiosity is measured on a 7-point scale. Respondents were asked to put a circle around a number from 0 to 6 where 0 is used to code the respondents who are not religious at all and 6 is used to code the respondents who are very religious. Trust towards Greek Cypriots is measured on a 7-point scale. Asked if Greek Cypriots can be trusted, the respondents were

asked to put a circle around a number on a 7-point scale which varies from 0 that implies that they cannot be trusted to 6 which implies that they can be trusted. Finally, voting intention in a future referendum is measured on a 7-point scale. The respondents who are intending to definitely vote 'no' are coded as 0 and the respondents who are intending to definitely vote 'yes' are coded as 6. The full questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. The sample size is large (N=400) and there are 7 categories for the dependent variable. Therefore, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis to capture the potential effect of the interaction term is acceptable.

Table I presents the number of observations, means, standard deviations and minimum and maximum values for the dependent, independent and control variables. The number of observations is completely the same for the treatment and control groups with a mean of 0.5 (200 people in the control group and 200 people in the treatment group). Most respondents have strong trust in CSOs (mean=4.7). Compared to

Kanol (2015), age variance is larger since the sample is comprised not only of students (min=18, max=80, standard deviation=13.4) and there is much more gender equality in the sample (mean=0.5). Like Kanol's (2015) data, the data in this study are also comprised of people who are slightly negative towards the other community and the peace process. The means for vote intention in a future referendum (2.51) and trust towards Greek Cypriots (2.44) suggest that the sample is comprised of slightly distrustful and negative Turkish Cypriots. The mean value for level of education is 3.36 and the median respondent has an undergraduate degree. A vast majority of the respondents reside in Nicosia (65.5%). 10.3% are from Famagusta, 15% are from Kyrenia, 4.8% are from Morphou and 4.5% are from Trikomo/Iskele. The sample is comprised of slightly left-wing people with a mean of 2.3 out of a 7-point scale. The respondents are predominantly secular with a mean of 1.02. Unlike Kanol's study (2015), the average perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical peace treaty is very high (mean=4.72 instead of 2.82).

Table I – Descriptive statistics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<b>Treatment/Control</b>	400	0.5	0.5	0	1
<b>Legitimacy</b>	400	4.72	2.15	0	6
<b>Trust CSOs</b>	400	4.7	2.17	0	6
<b>Age</b>	400	37.9	13.7	18	80
<b>Gender</b>	400	0.45	0.5	0	1
<b>Education</b>	400	3.36	1.12	0	5
<b>Region</b>	400	0.73	1.15	0	4
<b>Ideology</b>	400	2.3	2.36	0	6
<b>Religiosity</b>	399	1.02	1.98	0	6
<b>Trust GCs</b>	400	2.44	1.97	0	6
<b>Vote intention</b>	400	2.51	2	0	6

Table II presents the correlations between the independent variable and the control variables to capture the success of the random assignment procedure. Control variables are not significantly correlated with the independent variable at the 90% confidence level. Hence, the random assignment procedure is successful. The perceived legitimacy


means of the two groups presented in figure I shows that there is no significant difference between the treatment and control groups at 90% significance level. The perceived legitimacy mean for the treatment group is 4.70, whereas it is slightly higher for the control group, 4.75. Hence, the first hypothesis is not rejected.

Table II – Correlations between the independent variable and the control variables

	<b>Treatment/Control</b>
<b>Trust CSOs</b>	-0.02
<b>Age</b>	0.01
<b>Gender</b>	0.01
<b>Education</b>	-0.04
<b>Region</b>	0.07
<b>Ideology</b>	-0.05
<b>Religiosity</b>	-0.02
<b>Trust GCs</b>	-0.06
<b>Vote intention</b>	-0.07

Note: Correlations are not significant at 90% confidence level

Figure I – Graph bars of means of perceived legitimacy for the control and treatment groups



**Note:** The difference is not significant at 90% confidence level

In order to test the second hypothesis, a multiplicative term between manipulation and trust in CSOs is created and introduced into an OLS regression model. The results can be found in table III. There is no significant effect of the interaction term. Hence, the second hypothesis is rejected. However, this result should be interpreted with caution. The R-squared is 0.97 meaning that perceived legitimacy and trust in CSOs

are so closely related that they are statistically intertwined. This is very curious since one cannot theoretically suggest that trust in CSOs and perceived legitimacy of the aforementioned hypothetical peace treaty should be so closely related. This might raise some concern regarding how careful the respondents were when answering the question about trust in CSOs.

Table III – Multiplicative Effect

	<i>Coefficients</i>	P-values
<b>Manipulation</b>	-0.11	0.9
<b>Trust CSOs</b>	0.98	0.01***
<b>Manipulation x Trust CSOs</b>	0.01	0.81
<i>N</i>	400	
<i>R-squared</i>	0.97	

**Note:** All p-values are measured as two-tailed, \*\*\* significant at p<0.01 level.

## Conclusion

Evaluating civil society's peacebuilding functions has gained prominence recently not only among practitioners but academics too. Being at the negotiation table can be understood as a peacebuilding function of civil society since some suggest that its participation will make peace negotiations more representative and peace treaties more legitimate. Zanker (2014), however, suggests that the relationship between civil society's participation at the negotiation table and the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties is not so straightforward. Inclusive peace treaties can be perceived as more legitimate only when civil society's deeds and civil society itself are perceived to be representative and legitimate.

Similar to Kanol (2015), this study used a survey experiment in order to explore the relationship between civil society's participation at the negotiation table and the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. This study complements Kanol's (2015) study by gathering data in the northern part of Cyprus. It improves upon Kanol (2015) by surveying a more representative sample. Although the sample is non-probabilistic, it does include all kinds of people, not only students. The results, however, did not change. There seems to be no relationship between inclusiveness and the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. Unlike Kanol (2015), this study

also tests the impact of the interaction effect between CSOs' trustworthiness and their participation at the negotiation table on the public's legitimacy beliefs of peace treaties. The results again suggest a null relationship.

These findings have important implications for negotiation strategies in countries which suffered from civil war. In Cyprus, for instance, UN Secretary General's Special Adviser Espen Barth Eide mentioned the critical nature of civil society in finding a peace agreement and getting a 'yes' in the referendum (Cyprus Mail, 2015). Yet, it is not clear what exactly the role of civil society at the negotiation table is. With respect to *being at the negotiation table*, if civil society's participation does not affect the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties, does this mean that its participation would not affect positive peace? Not necessarily. This study does not explore the perceived legitimacy beliefs of civil society actors participating at the negotiation table. If their participation at the negotiation table positively affects their legitimacy beliefs, it is again an empirical matter to explore how this effect influences peacebuilding. Neither did this study examine the possible impact of inclusiveness on epistemic quality of peace treaties. Therefore, one can argue that more research is needed to examine multiple possible effects of inclusiveness on peacebuilding, taking into account the complexity of the causal processes.



## Appendix

This study is conducted by Assist. Prof. Dr. Direnç Kanol. It is an academic study about the peace process in Cyprus. Your information will be kept private.

### Control Group

Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders of both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.

### Treatment Group

Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides and active participation of 50 representative civil society organizations from both sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders and most civil society organizations from both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.

If there was such a situation, what would be your reaction to the following statements/questions?

- 1) The decision was taken in a fair way.

Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree

- 2) Please indicate what you thought of the outcome.

Not satisfied at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Completely satisfied

- 3) How willing are you to accept the decision?

Not willing at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Completely willing

Now I will ask you some general questions.

- 4) On a scale from 0 to 6, how much trust would you say you have in Civil Society Organizations in your country.

No trust at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Complete trust

- 5) Age:.....

6) Gender:

Female 0 Male 1

7) What is the highest educational level that you have attained?

0 No schooling

1 Primary school

2 Secondary school

3 High school

4 Undergraduate

5 Postgraduate

8) In which region are you residing?

0 Nicosia

1 Famagusta

2 Kyrenia

3 Morphou

4 Trikomo/Iskele

9) In political matters people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale.

Left 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Right

10) How religious do you consider yourself as?

Not religious at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Very religious

11) Overall, would you say that Greek Cypriots can be trusted?

No, they cannot be trusted 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Yes, they can be trusted

12) If there was a referendum tomorrow, how would you vote?

I would definitely vote no 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 I would definitely vote yes

**\*Thank You\***

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