

The post-Annan generation: Student attitudes towards the Cyprus problem

Mete Hatay
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maybe

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THE POST-ANNAN GENERATION: STUDENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

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INTRODUCTION/EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The opening of the Cyprus checkpoints in 2003 resulted in a new experience of the island: one in which movement between the two sides was possible and relatively easy, even if the ceasefire line remained, and remains, intact. This report examines the “post-Annan generation,” that is, the generation of youth who can barely recall the time of closed checkpoints but who also experienced the excitement and the disappointment of the 2004 referendum. At the time of the 2004 referendum, the youth voting patterns differed radically on the two sides of the island; surveys taken since that time have confirmed that difference still exists.

In general, both the referendum results and subsequent surveys have shown that Greek Cypriot youth look more coolly on reconciliation than do older generations of Greek Cypriots (Jakobsson Hatay 2004). In the island’s north, on the other hand, the pattern is reversed, with Turkish Cypriot youth coming out strongly in favor of a federal solution and reconciliation and their grandparents being more skeptical about the possibilities for sharing the island.

More than a decade has passed since that divisive referendum, a decade in which the Republic of Cyprus has become an EU member, but in which it has also experienced a crippling financial crisis and the loss of public faith in political parties. Also during this time there have been several attempts to bring Cypriot leaders together to resolve the two communities’ political differences.

These attempts have involved various configurations of leaders from both communities, and with representatives from both the right and the left. The present report investigates how the youth on the two sides understand and interpret the above events (checkpoint opening, referendum, negotiations), and to what extent the open checkpoints have changed youth attitudes. While reconciliation efforts have targeted the youth in terms of how the education systems have influenced their attitudes, there has been very little investigation into the youth as political, social, and economic actors. This report examines youth on both sides of the Green Line, their hopes for the future, their vision for their country.

The youth interviewed for this report have been able to interact casually with members of the other community because of the easing of movement restrictions, even if, as we summarize below, only a percentage of those interviewed have taken advantage of the situation. For Turkish Cypriot youth, the opening also offered the opportunity to take advantage of the Republic of Cyprus’ EU membership, which enabled them to more easily pursue tertiary education in Europe, which also led to an influx of new attitudes and ideas upon their return

to Cyprus. In the island's south, the financial crisis curtailed opportunities for many youth, in terms of education and as well as employment. At the same time, many of these youth have been responsible for creating alternative spaces, especially in Nicosia, where entrepreneurs on both sides of the divide have opened restaurants and cafes, formed music groups, and established publishing houses.

The findings presented in this report are one part of a larger project examining attitudes among the youth since the 2003 opening of checkpoints. The first stage of the research involved interviews— with 332 Greek Cypriots and 232 Turkish Cypriot students enrolled in public universities on both sides of the island —and aimed to measure their openness to the other community and to reconciliation. At the same time, the survey was used to gauge socio-demographic characteristics and the predominant political stances of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot students, with the purpose of comparing the two sides' involvement in politics and relating these more general traits of the Cypriot youth to their more specific attitudes on the Cyprus problem.

Our analysis is structured in three parts, which mirror the three sections of our survey questionnaire. The first part deals exclusively with participants' socio-demographic characteristics. This enabled us to form a picture of the students that reflected their social status, age, sex and families, all factors that are important to any analysis but especially for their policy implications in what concerns the Cyprus conflict. This section also briefly refers to the general dynamics of the Cyprus problem and other well-known realities of Cypriot society. The second part concentrates on political attitudes of students on both sides, with the aim of later connecting some of these to conflict-specific stances, while also sketching a broad political-ideological portrait of Cypriot youth. The third part reports on habits, attitudes and perceptions in relation to the Cyprus conflict and especially inter-communal contact, both descriptively and statistically.

The next phase of the project will use in-depth interviews to understand in more detail the reasons for attitudes revealed in this report. Overall, the project aims to understand how the island's changing circumstances have affected political attitudes of the youth, especially in regard to a future federal solution to the island's division. This is examined in accordance with the extant literature in social psychology, anthropology and political science.

COMPARATIVE FINDINGS

Socio-demographic characteristics of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students


In the surveys, we recorded an equal number of males and females in the north, while in the south the number of females was almost 100% higher than males. This can be explained by the requirement for males in the south to do their military service immediately after high school. Therefore, the number of Cypriot females studying at university at any one time tends to be higher than in the north. In addition, there is still a tendency in the south to send males abroad to study but reluctance among many families to send females.

The average age of participants in the north (22.3) tends to be slightly lower than for the south, for the reasons cited above. Males at university in the south have already completed their military service before starting university, and this brings their average age up by almost two years. In the north, males tend to wait until after university for military service.

While a greater number of participants in the south originally come from the Nicosia district, in the north participants are weighted towards the Famagusta district. This is because we chose to conduct the survey in state universities, which are located in Nicosia in the south and Famagusta in the north. From previous surveys we know that on both sides of the island Nicosia has a higher percentage of persons who express reconciliatory attitudes (Psyllides and Kades 2015). In the north, previous surveys show Famagusta as being somewhat more conservative than the capital (Kıbrıs Postası, 3 June 2010). One potential implication of this is that, had the survey been conducted in north Nicosia, more reconciliatory attitudes may have been expressed. Similarly, we may infer that if the survey had been conducted outside Nicosia in the south, the attitudes expressed may have been more conservative.

We conducted the survey with students from a variety of faculties, rather than only with students studying subjects related to politics. In the north, the greatest number of participants came from the health sciences, business and economics, and education departments. In the south, the greatest number of participants came from the faculties of social science and the humanities, followed by pure and applied sciences, business and administration, and engineering.

In both surveys, almost 50% more participants came from urban areas than from rural ones. This also reflects the current demography of the island, where approximately 70% of Cypriots now live in urban locations.

Figure 1 Income of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students

Turkish Cypriot students express to a greater degree than their Greek Cypriot counterparts a sense that they live comfortably on their present income, though on both sides of the island the majority of students say that they either cope or live comfortably on what they and their families earn (Figure 1). This may also explain why no students, regardless of community, express concern over the economy as a chapter of the negotiations (discussed later). Having searched for an association between income and attitudes towards conflict, we report no such significant link. In other words, neither did we expect, nor did we find, that income has an impact on students' attitudes towards the Cyprus problem and conflict more generally.




Figure 2 Sources of income among Turkish Cypriot students

Figure 3 Sources of income among Greek Cypriot students

Looking at the main source of students' income, we see that most rely on their parents for their finances and that there are no important differences between the two sides (Figures 2 and 3). Students are not yet part of the emerging precariat (those with an insecure labour status) on either side, which may also explain why they do not give much importance to economic issues. A crucial point, perhaps, is that financial reliance on parents may make students more inclined to accept their political opinions. In addition, the family connection can be restrictive in terms of students' activities, travel and socialisation processes.

Figure 4 Status of parents (displaced persons or not)

A third socio-demographic characteristic we aimed to capture is whether the parents of students are displaced persons (Figure 4). We know from other studies (Ege 2007; Hadjiyanni 2002) that Greek Cypriot youth, particularly, have inherited intergenerational memories of the conflict, and indeed intergenerational trauma, from their parents and grandparents. We also know from previous studies that Turkish Cypriots have experienced this to a lesser degree or not at all (Bryant 2012). As a result, one might expect that, particularly for Greek Cypriot youth, parents' refugee status and the narratives of displacement transmitted during childhood would influence attitudes towards the conflict and the ongoing negotiations.

In both surveys, around 50% of those interviewed said that their parents were displaced persons.¹ For the north, this figure is just under 50%. However, the survey in the north also includes approximately 17% who are settlers, or persons whose parents were originally from Turkey. If we remove those persons and calculate only on the basis of persons whose parents are originally from Cyprus, the figure of interviewees with displaced parents would rise to around 60%. This realistically reflects the demography of displacement on the island.

This data raises several questions that need further investigation. (1) To what extent would a focus on other regions of the island affect the percentages? We know that south Nicosia is home to many displaced Greek Cypriots from the north, while north Famagusta has a smaller percentage of displaced families than other parts of the island. (2) To what extent do the students' parents' experiences of displacement influence their own sense of identity? In other words, do youth also consider 'refugee' to be an important part of who they are? And (3) finally, does this inherited experience of displacement affect political decision-making in the present? Preliminarily, there is no evidence for such an association. A series of Pearson's correlations between parents' refugee status and variables related to attitudes towards the conflict (e.g. vote intention in a potential referendum or preference for type of solution) do not yield statistically significant results. However, answering these questions more exhaustively requires further research that would investigate any subtle differences between the opinions of children of refugees and those with parents who are not refugees, both within and across communities.


Political attitudinal characteristics of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students

Figure 5 shows political interest in the two communities, replicating an analogous question from the European Social Survey. The data in Figure 5 show us that (1) the majority of respondents on both sides (approximately 1 in 3) are only slightly interested in politics (with possibly only superficial knowledge of political developments); and (2) Greek Cypriot students seem to be more politicised than Turkish Cypriot students. Fewer Greek Cypriots express little or no

¹ The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reports that at the end of 2011, according to the Republic of Cyprus, 'around 208,000 people in the area under its control had displaced person status, including over 86,000 people born to people with the status' ('Cyprus: Internal displacement in brief', Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, www.internal-displacement.org).

interest in politics, while fewer Turkish Cypriots are very or quite interested in politics. This difference may perhaps be explained by the activities of the youth wings of political parties on either side of the divide, but further research is required to fully understand the issue

Figure 5 Political interest among Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students



We know from recent elections that voter turnout has fallen on both sides of the island (Kanol 2014), and reports indicate that youth are amongst the most reluctant voters. We know, for instance, that voter turnout in the north's parliamentary election of 2003 was 86%; by 2013 it had dropped to 69.4%. In the south, we see a similar drop, from 89% in the 2006 parliamentary election to 66.7% in 2016.

The graphs below (Figures 6 and 7) reflect youth ideological orientation as measured by self-placement on a left-right scale. The distribution shows that on both sides centrists are a majority, but that on the Turkish Cypriot side there are more students who consider themselves left wing. More specifically, around 40% of interviewees in the north view themselves as affiliated with the left and only around 15% affiliated with the right, while in the south the numbers who see themselves on the left and right are approximately equal.

Figure 6 Ideological self-placement (0-9 scale, far left-far right) among Turkish Cypriot students (average = 3.90)





Figure 7 Ideological self-placement (0-9 scale, far left-far right) among Greek Cypriot students (average = 4.81)



One further difference we see is that those self-reporting at the extremes of left and right are considerably higher in the Turkish Cypriot community. While 18.5% of Turkish Cypriot respondents view themselves as being at the farthest fringe of the left, only 2.4% of Greek Cypriots consider themselves in this category. Similarly, while 9.5% of Turkish Cypriot students view themselves as being at the extreme end of the right, a miniscule 0.7% of Greek Cypriots consider themselves in this position. This appears to show a greater polarization of political


opinion amongst Turkish Cypriot youth, as opposed to the greater centrism in the south. Although on both sides the majority view themselves as being politically centrist (around 40% for each), youth in the north show higher numbers who associate themselves with ‘extreme’ politics, whether left or right. In the south, both left and right tend to be closer to the centre.

If ideology does in fact influence attitudes towards a potential solution, and if people further to the left are more inclined to be pro-solution, then in the Turkish Cypriot student community there might be a higher tendency towards a pro-solution attitude.

Trust in institutions shows us perceptions of those organisations’ capacities to fulfill citizens’ demands and work for their interests. On both sides of the island, we see very low levels of trust across all types of institutions (Figure 8), with only universities rated better than 5 (out of ten). Some differences, however, are evident. Trust in religious institutions is the lowest among the various categories in the north, where we know that Turkish Cypriots value secularism. In the south, however, religious institutions are third, behind universities and the justice system. Trust in both the justice system and parliament is higher in the south, perhaps reflecting a greater satisfaction with the way the democratic institutions function compared to the north.

On both sides there is very little trust in political parties, but youth in the north also show little trust in parliament and government. On both sides, the most trusted institutions are universities. For Greek Cypriot youth, the second most trusted institution is the justice system, followed by the church. For Turkish Cypriot youth, in contrast, the second most trusted institution is the media, including social media, followed by the justice system.

Figure 8 Trust in institutions among Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot youth (0-10 scale, no trust-complete trust)



Student attitudes towards aspects of the conflict

If the post-Annan generation is defined, among other things, by growing up in a Cyprus with open check points, then what has this meant for actually transcending the de facto division and regularly visiting the other side? The two communities differ significantly (Figure 9), with frequency of crossing being much higher for the Turkish Cypriots: more than 55% of the Turkish Cypriot students in our sample visit the south at least a few times a month. Moreover, the 12.8% of the sample reporting that they have never crossed is likely composed of the Turkish nationals who took part in the survey and who are not allowed to cross. In turn, more than 48% of Greek Cypriot students in the sample have never crossed, while another 43% have rarely crossed.

Figure 9 Students and checkpoints: Frequency of crossing




Figure 10 depicts the list of reasons for not crossing among the students of both communities. Amongst those who report never crossing on the Turkish Cypriot side, most respondents mention 'other reasons,' suggesting that they may be the children of settlers. Only a very small percentage of Turkish Cypriot students report that they do not cross for emotional reasons or reasons of personal conviction. For the Greek Cypriots, the trend is different, with the highest percentage of those not crossing explaining their stance with reference to personal conviction (52.8%), emotional reasons (42.9%) and security reasons (23.4%). This signifies the potential relevance of victimhood narratives among the youth, as well. A substantial number (26.1%) also mention that it is not convenient. Among the Turkish Cypriot students, those who cross frequently or very frequently (Figure 11) list their reasons as shopping and entertainment (62%), personal conviction (6%), meeting friends (2%), and to visit homes or villages (1.2%). Approximately 22% gave no answer or said they do not know. Amongst the Greek Cypriot students who cross, the largest number says that they

cross to visit houses or villages, although the answers were almost equally divided across the various categories, indicating that a combination of psychological and practical factors are at play as regards crossing the Green Line.

Figure 10 Reasons for not crossing (either frequently or at all) (mentioned as first, second or third most important)





Figure 11 Reasons for crossing (either frequently or very frequently) (mentioned as first, second or third most important)



These differences are something well known in terms of the wider population, but now we can establish that students are not very different from the rest of society. Combining these results with students' reasons for crossing, we can conclude that Greek Cypriot students, like Greek Cypriots more generally, are hesitant or find it inconvenient to travel to the other side, while Turkish Cypriot students, like Turkish Cypriots more generally, cross more frequently, largely for shopping or leisure purposes. Additionally, as more Turkish Cypriot students cross

over to the south than Greek Cypriot students cross to the north, we can infer that contact between the two communities occurs primarily in the south. This, in turn, translates into fewer opportunities for Greek Cypriot young adults to see the other side and thus familiarise themselves with those people and areas with whom they seek to reunite. We suggest that the lack of crossing helps to create a more phobic identity characterized by either ignorance or hostility towards the other side (see also later).

Figure 12 Degree of contact among Turkish Cypriot students





Figure 13 Degree of contact among Greek Cypriot students



The findings related to crossing are also reflected in our figures regarding contact between the two communities (Figures 12 and 13). While almost no Greek Cypriot interviewees say that they have contact with Turkish Cypriots in their homes or neighborhoods, around 25% of Turkish Cypriots say that they have contact in their homes and 33% meet Greek Cypriots in their neighborhoods, ranging from frequently to infrequently. Around 20% of interviewees in the south report that they meet either rarely or occasionally with Turkish Cypriots at bi-communal meetings, with similar figures from the north, where around 23% reported meeting rarely or occasionally. However, around 15% of respondents in the north report that they meet with Greek Cypriots at bi-communal meetings frequently or very frequently, while that number drops to around 4% for the south.

Around 29% of respondents in the south say that they have contact with Turkish Cypriots in the south either rarely or occasionally, while the number drops to around 8% for those reporting either frequently or very frequently. For the same question, 27% of Turkish Cypriots reported having contact with Greek Cypriots rarely or occasionally, and 25% either frequently or very frequently. Amongst Greek Cypriots, those reporting no contact with Turkish Cypriots in the south was around 60%, while for Turkish Cypriots it was around 30%.

Around 20% of respondents in the south report that they have contact with Turkish Cypriots in the north either rarely or occasionally, and around 8% say that they meet with Turkish Cypriots in the north either frequently or very frequently. For the north, those figures are 27% and 12%, respectively. While more than 71% of Greek Cypriots report that they have no contact with Turkish Cypriots in the north, that figure is only 41% for Turkish Cypriots.

The above charts further support the conclusion that most contact occurs in the south, although those Greek Cypriot students reporting that they have contact very frequently appear to meet slightly more often in the north. Although, and because, there is such a very low percentage (only 1.5%) of Greek Cypriot students who reported crossing very frequently (two or three times a week), we may infer that they are also more committed to reconciliation and more willing to meet with Turkish Cypriots in the north.

While Turkish Cypriot students report more contact in the south, we may surmise from their reasons for crossing that much of this contact is related to shopping and entertainment, and so their contact is primarily with shop-owners, waiters, etc. This is followed by meeting Greek Cypriots in the north, and at bi-communal meetings. The relatively high figure for meeting at bi-communal meetings—18% reporting meeting frequently or very frequently, with 45% reporting some contact—in turn implies that ideological and normative beliefs are a driving factor for meeting amongst almost half of Turkish Cypriot youth.

Figures 14 and 15 which measure quality of contact among Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students, respectively, illustrate a number of similarities. For both sides quality of contact is overall rated positively or moderately and negative opinions about contact with the 'other side' (i.e. responses of 'not at all' and 'a little bit') are significantly lower than those detecting a positive element. At the same time, the dominant perception among most of the scales on which quality of contact is measured (pleasant, superficial, in cooperative spirit,

positive, based on mutual respect) is that the quality of contact is moderate. The only exception for both sides concerns the sub-dimension of 'mutual respect', where the majority of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot students report mutually respectful contact.

Figure 14 Quality of contact among Turkish Cypriot students






Figure 15 Quality of contact among Greek Cypriot students




The questionnaire also investigated support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation (Figure 16) as agreed by the leaders in a joint declaration on the (re)resolution of the Cyprus problem, specifying two component states under the umbrella of a common nationality and citizenship. Only 44.1% of Greek Cypriot students are generally supportive of this kind of solution, while a very solid majority of 74.7% of Turkish Cypriot students (strongly or somewhat)

support a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. If we combine these insights with what was seen previously about frequency of crossing, then Turkish Cypriot students, in terms of both actions and attitudes, are more open to reconciliation than Greek Cypriot students.

Figure 16 Support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation




It is, however, interesting to observe the more detailed results referring to students' preferred type of solution; that is, the distribution of ideal-type solutions (Figure 17). One in four Greek Cypriots rejects all possible solutions and another one in four prefers a single state as a solution. Among the different choices, support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation (with either a strong central state or a loose central state) is also around one in four. For the Turkish Cypriots, we see a different picture. Approximately one in three prefers a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with a strong central state, which contrasts with the Turkish Cypriot leadership's public references to loose structures, as well as with the dominant narrative in the Greek Cypriot community, both of which assert that the Turkish Cypriots do not want really want a strong central state. And yet our survey reveals that Turkish Cypriot students do want such a state— in fact, approximately by one in three. Still, we should also note that around 25% of Turkish Cypriot students want a two-state solution and another one in five wants a single state. Indeed, if we put together the two similar solutions that suggest a strong centre, that of a 'bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with a strong central state' and that of a single state, the overall percentage is above 50%. More generally, the Turkish Cypriot student community is more fragmented in terms of their preferred solutions, which are not only different but also sometimes ideologically contradictory.

Figure 17 Preferred type of solution


The question asking students how they would vote in a potential referendum that could conclude the ongoing negotiations was intended to measure political conviction on the Cyprus problem, as it is one of its concrete manifestations (Figure 18). The greatest number of Turkish Cypriots (more than one in three) said they would certainly vote yes, while 22.1% said that they would surely vote no. Those unable to decide were equally divided between closer to a yes and closer to a no. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, were primarily undecided (42.8%), while it is striking that only approximately 4% would surely vote yes. The results on this crucial question, which may indicate electoral behavior among students at a potential referendum, only partially confirm a previous survey of the population at large (Beyatli et al. 2011). Compared to that survey, for example, the choice with the highest score among Greek Cypriots is undecided, as in our survey. Yet, the number of Turkish Cypriot students who would vote surely yes at a potential referendum is twice as large in our survey (34.3% compared to 16% in Beyatli et al. 2011: 11). Another comparison with the total population, in the survey conducted by the Team Cyprus in late 2015 (Team Cyprus 2015), yields additionally interesting results: while that survey reports 30% of Greek Cypriots to be generally leaning towards a yes vote at a potential referendum and 26% to be leaning towards a negative vote, we report 20% and 35%, respectively, indicating that Greek Cypriot students are less likely than the general population to opt for a yes vote.

Figure 18 Vote intention in a potential referendum




These figures show that a greater number of Turkish Cypriots are politically committed to finding a solution, and also that they are more politically polarized. For the south, the data appears to confirm the argument that has repeatedly appeared in public debates and public discourse following the 2004 referendum: in the Greek Cypriot community there are not many who are politically committed to a solution no matter the plan or the cost. And yet the Greek Cypriot youth appear to be in the process of forming an opinion as the negotiations progress and therefore to be responsive to ongoing political developments. We may infer from our data, therefore, that amongst the youth there is a higher possibility amongst Turkish Cypriots for a majority yes vote in a potential referendum, while there is a slightly higher chance that the Greek Cypriot students will vote no. Yet, among the general population on the Greek Cypriot side, and also among the youth, most individuals remain undecided.

Students were asked to enumerate the three main reasons explaining their vote intention, and results show (Figure 19) that on both sides the primary reason concerns the effect of a potential solution on their everyday lives. For Turkish Cypriots, these concerns also included a solution’s potential financial consequences. Additionally, Turkish Cypriots chose political conviction as a main motivating factor behind their potential vote, whereas this was a considerably less important reason (as was financial situation) for Greek Cypriot students. This appears to correspond both to the large numbers of Turkish Cypriot students who had already decided which way they would vote, and to the higher number of Turkish Cypriot youth who expressed political conviction at the farthest ends of the left-right scale.

Figure 19 Self-declared reasons for vote intention on potential referendum

Given the high number of students who are undecided on how they would vote in a referendum, it becomes important to understand how significant they consider the various chapters in the negotiations, as it is the decision on specific chapters that may determine their eventual stance at a potential referendum. We asked students to rank their three most important concerns, though here we report only the percentage of the chapters of the negotiations that were mentioned, rather than the detailed ranking (Figure 20). It may appear at first that the numbers are not very different across the two sides. However, when we think about the answers within the context of how each side understands the issues, we see significant differences emerging. Indeed, the three chapters of least concern to students on both sides—economy, governance /distribution of power, and EU-related issues—are the only chapters on which we can reasonably say that both sides similarly interpreted the questions.


Figure 20 Importance ascribed to topics in the negotiations (first, second or third most important)



For the issues of property, territory, governance/security, and political rights, on the other hand, we can reasonably infer that expressions of the importance of these issues broadly refer to conflicting political positions. The 65% of Turkish Cypriot youth who expressed concern with the territory issue indicate the importance of bi-zonality, while the lack of importance given to this issue amongst Greek Cypriot students (33%) signals less concern about territorial adjustments than in the more general population where this issue is politically salient. Around 47% of students on both sides express concern regarding governance and security. However, the political positions of the two sides are exactly opposite on this issue, with the Turkish Cypriot side desiring a continuation of the current system of guarantee, at least for a certain period of time, and the Greek Cypriot side demanding the abolition of the guarantee system.

Figure 21 illustrates how students were informed about the ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus problem. The main sources of information are the same for both sides—mainstream media, social media, and parents. These results are also reflected in the importance that students give to various chapters in the negotiations, as the ones that they chose as most important are also the chapters most discussed in mainstream media. The main differences concern reliance for information on friends and parties and youth organisations, although on both sides the percentages are 30 or lower. Although the Greek Cypriot community has long been portrayed as partitocratic, things may be changing insofar as the youth is concerned: only a very small percentage (approximately half compared to the north) reports that they receive their information on the Cyprus problem from the political parties or their youth organisations. This reveals an increasing sense of political distrust among students and causing political parties and partisan youth organisations to have less influence.

Figure 21 Sources of information on Cyprus problem negotiations (mentioned as first, second or third choice)



Correlates of student's political stances on conflict

In order to examine what influences students' political stances on the Cyprus problem, we tested two arguments—one current in social psychology research and the other in political science research. The general reasoning of the first strain of research is that intergroup contact is one of the most effective interventions for reducing prejudice, and that both the quantity and quality of contact is important in order to produce reconciliatory attitudes towards the perceived 'other'. This argument was first proposed by Allport (1954) and more recently developed in the context of Social Identity Theory (see Psaltis 2012). Although the overall argument is not uncontested in the literature – e.g., Pickett et al. (2014) suggest that only the quality and not the quantity of contact mattered in their study of Israeli Jews and Arabs – a number of surveys in Cyprus have consistently supported intergroup contact theory. Furthermore, these studies have more specifically shown a relationship between intergroup contact and perceived out-group threat, as well as prejudice; more contact and of better quality leads to the reduction of threats and prejudice (Psaltis 2012).

For the purposes of this report, we turn our attention to the more political relationship between intergroup contact and support for conciliatory solutions, and examine stance on a referendum as an associated variable of (the quality and quantity of) contact as captured in the surveys. The major mediators of the effect of intergroup contact on perceived out-group threat and prejudice are believed to be basically affective: reduced anxiety and empathy (Pettigrew et al. 2011). In line with this argumentation, we constructed three scales: (1) quantity of contact, i.e., places of socialisation with the other side —north, south, bi-communal meetings, home, neighbourhood, university; (2) quality of contact —pleasant, superficial, in

spirit of cooperation, positive, mutual respect; (3) institutional contact —contact with checkpoint police, nurses at hospitals, cashiers at shops (see Appendix I for the questions measuring the components for all three scales). As different types of contact have been said to matter for the amelioration of ethnic division (Pettigrew 2008), we also address institutional contact, that is, contact embedded within institutional settings. These three scales are statistically rigorous – we obtained Cronbach’s alpha(s) between 0.7 and 0.9.

The second strain of research we use in our study suggests that general ideological-political orientation is (part of) the context within which attitudes towards conflict are formed and framed. A number of studies within cleavage research contend that political positions on various issues reflect deep and lasting attitudinal and structural fault lines, which are based on social conflict; a full cleavage embodies both social (attitudinal and socio-demographic) and political divides (see Bartolini and Mair, 1990: 215; Deegan-Krause, 2007). Cleavages and party ideologies are seen to conform to a great extent, and this agreement is seen as having persisted over time.


In Cyprus, there are two definitive social cleavages (left-right and ethnic/Cyprus problem) that historically developed in parallel and are interrelated to a degree. While the left-right social and political cleavages are common throughout most of the western world, Cyprus has clearly had an additional and exceptional cleavage— the national issue. In fact, this has been the main cleavage. Political strategies and discourse, voter behaviour and even the relationship between political parties and civil society have all been largely determined by the attitudinal divisions inherent in issues of national identity, ethnic cohabitation, policies to regulate aspects of bi-communalism and – after the events of 1963, the coup and the war of 1974 – political reunification.

Especially after 1974, the left became identified as the most democratic and progressive force, a group oriented towards a bi-communal patriotism, rapprochement and a constructive attitude towards negotiations for a solution, whereas the right became most strongly associated with nationalist elements, and more prone to racist attitudes and a rejectionist stance towards a potential solution (Peristianis 2006; Christophorou 2006). These cleavages are also political as they are reflected in the political sphere, or put differently, in political and party competition, during as well as in between elections (Attalides 1979; Christophorou 2006; see also Mavratsas 1997).

We would thus expect that stance on the Cyprus problem and left-right self-placement are highly associated. Nevertheless, a note of historical caution is due. In 2004, a new social division emerged: this was between the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ camps around the issue of the Annan Plan referendum and it transcended party lines; as such it has deeply affected social and political life on the island (Faustmann 2008). Because of AKEL’s and DISY’s stances on the Annan Plan, this new division cut across the main cleavage rather than reinforcing it, and led to a situation of realignment and dealignment. People who considered themselves democrats and pro-solution advocates found themselves on the no side of the new division, while those with family, social and ideological roots in the nationalist camp found themselves on the yes side.

Of course, we do not aim to prove any direct causal effect through our analysis; rather we aim to discover if there are statistically significant associations between vote intention in a potential referendum on the one hand, and the quality and quantity of contact and ideological orientation on the other hand. Figures 22-25 are error bars, which show whether or not there is a statistically significant association between two variables by illustrating pairwise comparisons.²

Figure 22 Attitude towards referendum and quantity of contact (scale 1)



For the Turkish Cypriots, the surely no is associated with less quantity of contact and the surely yes is associated with more quantity of contact. From this, we can preliminarily conclude that the quantity of contact and political stances on conflict, such as on a potential referendum, are associated at a statistically significant level. This echoes a long-standing argument in social psychology that inter-group contact reduces prejudice because it increases familiarity, material exchanges and common situations. An Analysis of Variance comparing the six groups of the “Attitudes towards a referendum” scale has shown statistically significant results (see Appendix III).

For the Greek Cypriots, quantity of contact matters even more, since it differentiates those who are surely yes from those who are either surely no, inclined towards a no, or completely undecided. Together with our earlier finding that many fewer Greek Cypriot students cross the checkpoints frequently, this signals that potential stances on the resolution of the conflict— especially in the south— may be associated with the quantity of contact, which is markedly lower than that of the Turkish Cypriot students (again, as we saw earlier).

² Error bars are graphical representations of the variability of data and are used on graphs to indicate the error or uncertainty in a reported measurement. The error bars here report association at 95% Confidence Interval.

Figure 23 Attitudes towards referendum and quality of contact (scale 2)





Figure 24 Attitudes towards referendum and institutional contact (scale 3)




Quality of contact is associated with vote intention at a potential referendum only for the Turkish Cypriot side. It should be recalled that for the question related to quality of contact, we asked respondents to rate, on a 1-5 scale where 1 means not meaningful at all and 5 means very meaningful, their experience when they meet with Greek Cypriots/Turkish Cypriots, in general. This implies that for Turkish Cypriot students attitudes towards a referendum may be related to the quality of contact they experience with Greek Cypriots. More specifically, the more positive their evaluation of contact with the other side is, the more likely that they will be inclined towards a yes to the referendum (for significance levels, see Appendix III).

For the Greek Cypriot students there is no association between the quality of their contact with the other side and their stance towards a potential referendum. This tells us that Greek Cypriot students may form a stance on the referendum based on how often they meet with Turkish Cypriots but independent of whether they perceive that contact as being of quality, while Turkish Cypriots are more likely to be influenced by the quality of the contact as well. Perhaps we can make sense of this, with reference to the quantity of contact. Since for Greek Cypriot students there is less contact, the quality of that contact is less significant.

This same argument can be used to explain the differences between the students of the two sides in respect to institutional contact: there are significant associations for the Turkish Cypriots but not for the Greek Cypriots. For the former, (the quality of) institutional contact facilitates a more progressive attitude towards the issue of division and thus a more positive stance on a potential referendum. For the latter, institutional contact is highly unlikely to be associated with someone’s political stance on the Cyprus problem.

Figure 25 Attitudes towards referendum and left-right self-placement



Lastly, looking at Figure 25 and inspecting Appendix II, the left-right cleavage appears to be related to attitudes towards the Cyprus problem, such as stance at a potential referendum. For both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot students, what they perceive as left or right is related to their stance on a potential referendum. Subsequently, for the younger generation in the south there remains the possibility that the Cyprus problem cleavage and left-right politics (or at least what students perceive as left-right politics) are not cognitively separate constructs. In both the north and the south, the Cyprus problem appears to be embedded within the confines of the left-right cleavage.

CONCLUSIONS

We can draw preliminary conclusions based on our findings from the survey. In this final section, we examine their significance at both the societal and political level, for two reasons: to promote further research, both within and outside the context of this project and to offer suggestions for policies that could ameliorate the de facto division of the island.

- 1) Although Turkish Cypriots cross the checkpoints in large numbers, their reasons are primarily related to entertainment, shopping and other 'materialistic' pursuits. Effectively, this crossing is driven by non-political factors, but does not necessarily have a very limited effect in terms of substantive interaction. Going to restaurants and shopping creates interdependency and it normalises relations. It also reverses demonization processes, in that the Greek Cypriot sees Turkish Cypriots as customers instead of enemies, and they try to appeal to them, for instance by hiring Turkish-speaking staff. For Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot shopowners become providers of goods and services rather than 'others'. In other words, they engage in the normal interactions of the average city dweller.

In the south there is a reluctance to cross and the self-reported reasons for this are primarily political and emotional. This fact gives the unfortunate —and not always correct— impression to many Turkish Cypriots that 'they don't want to reconcile with us.' To address this issue and to help dispel deep emotional blockages, we believe that it is key to extend reconciliation efforts to schools, especially in terms of teaching the history of the two communities and their conflicts in a truthful and unbiased way.

- 2) Looking at the survey results from the south, we see a strong tendency to give 'politically correct' answers to questions such as 'Would you have a Turkish Cypriot neighbor?' However, we also found that such responses are not reflected in the actions and beliefs of Greek Cypriot students, who were shown to be more nationalist, more rejectionist in terms of a potential solution and more suspicious of the other side, in comparison with Turkish Cypriot students.
- 3) With regard to attitudes towards a potential referendum, we find the Turkish Cypriots to be more definitive in their decisions to vote either yes or no, while almost half of Greek Cypriots are undecided. This point suggests that if efforts were made to cultivate trust and shape political attitudes there could well be an impact on the results of a potential referendum in the south. It is likely that many Greek Cypriot voters are waiting to see what their parties or key opinion leaders will say in the event of a referendum.

- 4) It is generally accepted a country's education system plays an important role in shaping the views of its youth. In our study, however, what stands out is the importance of the media. On both sides of the island, the main source of information related to ongoing negotiations is the mainstream media. Therefore, we suggest that on both sides, a code of media deontology concerning the conflict and the Cyprus problem negotiations would possibly ease tensions and enable more critical and unbiased thinking about the Cyprus problem, its history and its future.
- 5) Our study also looked into the societal reasons underlying, or shaping, political views and emotions and we identified a number of potential factors: trans-generational memory (transmitted by families, schools, refugee associations, etc.); social pressure (peer group, family, professional); structural/institutional pressure (official discouragement to cross; as well as bureaucratic impediments). We believe that if the two sides are to overcome the political blockage, both the media and the political leaders need to make a greater effort. In all, political encouragement to cross can be very useful for encouraging more attention to the other side and for motivating students (as well as others) to cross. Given that a significant number of the respondents are children of refugees, this encouragement would be more effective, if it also deconstructed the mono-communal refugee victimhoods and emphasized the bi-communal relevance of refugees across the whole of the island.
- 6) Given the finding that ideology influences attitudes towards a potential solution, and the finding that people further to the left are more inclined to be pro-solution, then in the Turkish Cypriot student community there might be a higher tendency towards a pro-solution attitude.
- 7) At the same time, being on the far right end of the political spectrum translates into a hostile attitude towards a potential solution. Arguably, there is a good case to be made for authorities to fight right-wing extremism, among students as well as more broadly, as part of the effort to resolve ethnic conflict and find a viable solution. Both sides should work to contain extremist elements in order to reinforce a culture of co-existence. Education policy, too, should aim to fight right-wing extremism, as this will help to promote reconciliation efforts. Our findings show that this is much more necessary for the Greek Cypriot side.
- 8) Both the quality and quantity of contact (but not including institutional contact in the case of the Greek Cypriots) influence students' political stances vis-a-vis the Cyprus problem. This finding concurs with recent studies in the field of social psychology, which argue that the quality and quantity of bi-communal contact is related to the feeling of trust towards the other community and perceptions of threat. In this vein, we believe that to promote reconciliation, the two governments must craft a strategy to encourage more contact between students of the two sides. This is especially important for Greek Cypriots, for whom the quantity of contact was found to matter greatly.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX I – METHODOLOGICAL PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY

Eligible to participate in the survey were Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots over 18 years old with voting rights and currently enrolled at the University of Cyprus or the Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU). The total study sample included 332 Greek Cypriots and 232 Turkish Cypriots. Quotas were applied to achieve a more representative distribution of student population by gender and area of study at university (Faculty). Sample distribution was representative of the student population in terms of both university Faculty and gender. The data collection period was 21- 23 December 2015. At the University of Cyprus, the structured questionnaire was completed through a telephone survey undertaken by the University Centre of Field Studies (UCFS), whereas at EMU a self-completion survey was distributed by the survey firm Prologue.

The questionnaire was designed by two PRIO Senior Research Consultants, Giorgos Charalambous and Mete Hatay, as well as by Mine Yucel of Prologue and Charis Psaltis and Andrea Nicolaou of UCFS. Following a pilot study with 14 interviews, the questionnaire was amended as indicated. The pilot study aimed to ascertain the following: the clarity of the questions asked (wording); the time needed to execute the interview; the questionnaire flow and inclusion of all possible answers to pre-coded questions; the degree of comprehensiveness of the questions. The margin of error is 5.2 % at the 95% confidence level for the Greek Cypriot sample and 7.0% at 95% confidence level for the Turkish Cypriot sample.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX II – QUESTIONNAIRE (IN ENGLISH)

Socio-demographic features

Dem 1. Gender

Male	1
Female	2

Dem 2. Age

How old are you?

Dem 3. Citizenship

Are you a citizen of RoC/TRNC and have voting rights?

Dem 4. Level of education

What is your current level of studies?

Undergraduate studies	1
Master studies	2

Dem 4. Area/discipline of studies

In which Faculty are you registered?

(adjusted for T/C side)

Arts and Humanities	1
Medical School	2
Applied Sciences	3
Social and Behavioral Studies	4
Economics and Business Administration	5
Technical University	6
Philosophy	7

Dem 5. In which district do you live? (adjusted for T/C side)

Dem. 5.1 District

Nicosia	1
Limassol	2
Larnaca	3
Famagusta	4
Paphos	5

Dem 5.2 Type of district

Urban	1
Rural	2

Dem 6. Income criteria – Economic condition

Which of the following descriptions represents most closely how you feel about your **family** household's income nowadays?

- a. Living comfortably on present income
- b. Coping on present income
- c. Finding it difficult on present income
- d. Finding it very difficult on present income
- e. Don't know/Don't answer (DK/DA)

Dem 7. Income criteria – Sources of income

Which of the following options best describes the main source of your personal income at present?

- a. Full-time employment
- b. Part-time employment
- c. Scholarship
- d. Parents
- e. Independent Property
- f. Other
- g. DK/DA

Dem 8. Parents' refugee status

Are either or both of your parents a refugee/displaced person(s)?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. DK/DA

Dem 9. Parents' place of origin

(this question only pertains to the T/C side)

Where are your parents from?

- a. Area in the north of Cyprus
- b. Area in the south of Cyprus
- c. Turkey
- d. Other

Main Questionnaire, Part I – General attitudes in relation to politics (1-3)

As mentioned above, our survey focuses on the recent developments related to the Cyprus issue (and the relations between the two communities). Now we will ask you certain questions related to your political point of view.

Q1. On a scale of 1-5 where 1 means very interested and 5 means not interested at all, how interested are you in politics (in general)?

- a. 1. Very interested
- b. 2. Quite interested
- c. 3. Slightly interested
- d. 4. Hardly interested
- e. 5. Not at all interested
- f. DK/DA

Q2. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means no trust and 10 means absolute trust, how much trust would you personally assign to each of the following institutions?

- | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|-------|
| a. The parliament | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | DK/DA |
| b. The political parties | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | DK/DA |
| c. The government | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | DK/DA |
| d. The judiciary system | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | DK/DA |
| e. The church/ religious institutions | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | DK/DA |
| f. (Mass) Media | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | DK/DA |
| g. Social Media | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | DK/DA |
| f. Universities | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | DK/DA |

Q3. In politics people refer to the terms right-wing and left-wing to describe their political beliefs. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means far left, 10 means far right and 5 means centre, which grade would you assign to your political views?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 DK/DA

Main Questionnaire, Part II: Attitudes in relation to the Cyprus problem (4-18)

Q4. Since the opening of the checkpoints, on April 23, 2003, how often do you cross to the other side?

- a. Never
- b. Rarely
- c. A few times a month
- d. Two to three times a week
- e. Almost every day
- f. DK/DA

Codification: Insertion of text, Choice A & B Question 5 follows

Codification: Insertion of text, Choice D & E Question 6 follows

Answer this question ONLY if you selected d or e on Question 4.

Q5. You have told us that you visit the north/south frequently or very frequently. Can you please specify your reasons for visiting the other side, selecting your answers from the following list. You may choose more than one of the options below:

- a. For reasons of personal and ideological conviction
- b. For emotional reasons
- c. For entertainment (e.g., shopping, nightlife, casinos)
- d. To meet friends
- e. For professional reasons
- f. To visit homes or villages
- g. For other reasons
- h. DK/DA

Answer the following question if you selected a or b in answer to Question 4.

Q6. You have told us that you don't visit the north/south frequently or at all. Can you please tell us your reasons for not visiting the other side, choosing from the following reasons. You may choose more than one response:

- a. For reasons of personal and ideological conviction
- b. For emotional reasons
- c. For security reasons
- d. It is not convenient
- e. Other reasons
- f. DK/DA

Q7. Now, concerning your contact with Turkish/Cypriots/Greek Cypriots, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means not at all and 5 means very often, where have you recently established contact with Greek-Cypriots/Turkish-Cypriots?

- a. At home (1-5)
- b. At bi-communal gatherings/meetings/events (1-5)
- c. In my neighborhood (1-5)
- d. In the south, the free area (1-5)
- e. In the north, the occupied territories (1-5)
- f. At the University (1-5)

Q8. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means not at all and 5 means very much, when you meet with Greek-Cypriots /Turkish-Cypriots ANYWHERE IN CYPRUS, in general, how do you find the contact?

	Not at all	A little bit	Moderately	Quite a bit	Very much	DK/DA
Pleasant	1	2	3	4	5	99
Superficial	1	2	3	4	5	99
In cooperative spirit	1	2	3	4	5	99
Positive	1	2	3	4	5	99
Based on mutual respect	1	2	3	4	5	99

Q9. For the following questions, we would like you to think about situations in the past when you came into contact with members of the Turkish/Greek Cypriot community.

ONE Answer per question

	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently	Very Frequently	DK/DA
To what extent have you been insulted by a member of the Turkish-Cypriot or Greek-Cypriot community in the past?	1	2	3	4	5	99
To what extent have you been abused by a member of the Greek-Cypriot (Turkish-Cypriot community) in the past?	1	2	3	4	5	99
Was your car ever damaged whilst visiting the other side?	1	2	3	4	5	99

Q10. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means very negative and 5 means very positive, how would you evaluate the behaviour of the following people that you meet when you cross to the other side? (The last two items for T/Cs only)

	Very Negative	Rather Negative	Neither Positive nor Negative	Rather Positive	Very Positive	DK/DA
TGC/TC Policemen at checkpoints	1	2	3	4	5	99
Personnel at the shops	1	2	3	4	5	99
Public servants in the Passport Office	1	2	3	4	5	99
The people residing in your property/house	1	2	3	4	5	
Personnel at hospitals	1	2	3	4	5	99
Employers in the south	1	2	3	4	5	99

Q11 and Q12. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means I completely disagree and 5 means I completely agree, to what extent do you agree with the following statements:

- a. I would not mind having Greek-Cypriot (Turkish-Cypriot) neighbours
- b. I would not mind having Greek-Cypriot (Turkish-Cypriot) colleagues. I would not mind cooperating with Greek /Turkish Cypriots

Q13. Could you possibly consider having a Greek/Turkish Cypriot partner/spouse?

- a. Yes, I think it is possible
- b. No, I do not think it is possible
- c. DK/DA

Q14. In February the leaders of the two communities issued a joint-declaration on the (re)solution of the Cyprus problem, based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, composed of two component states, under the banner of a common nationality and citizenship. Are you in favour of this kind of solution?

- a. I strongly support it
- b. I somewhat support it
- c. I somewhat oppose it
- d. I strongly oppose it
- e. DK/DA

Q15. Which of the following options do you prefer as solution to the Cyprus problem?

- a. The maintenance of the status quo
- b. Bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with a loose central state
- c. Bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with a strong central state
- d. Two-state solution
- e. One single state (that is, with a central government for the whole of the country)
- f. Unification with Turkey
- g. None of the above
- h. DK/DA

Q16. Which of the following chapters of the negotiations on the Cyprus problem is of greatest concern? (One a scale of 1-3, with 1 representing the greatest concern for you, pick three chapters and assign the numbers 1, 2, 3)

- a. Property issue (concerning housing and immovable properties)
- b. Territory (concerning territorial divisions between the two communities)
- c. Guarantees/ Security
- d. Civil rights (including the settlers issue)
- e. Economy
- f. Governance and distribution of power
- g. EU-related issues
- h. Another topic
- j. DK/DA

Q17. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means Definitely yes and 5 means Definitely No, to what extent do you believe that the ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus problem will lead to an agreement and a referendum?

Absolutely yes	Probably yes	Maybe yes, maybe no	Probably no	Definitely no	DK/DA
1	2	3	4	5	99

Q18. What is the main reason for your answer to Q16? (One a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the most important to you, choose three and assign the numbers 1, 2, 3)

- a. Potential consequences on my everyday life (job, residence)
- b. My political beliefs
- c. Potential consequences to my economic condition
- d. Potential consequences to my family
- e. Other
- f. Dk/DA

Q19. We would like to ask you to think about a hypothetical scenario where the ongoing negotiations between the two leaders result in a proposed solution plan. A referendum is organised on the basis of this plan. In such a case of a future referendum, how do you see yourself voting (how would you place yourself)? Choose one of the following answers.

I would surely or almost surely vote No	1
At this moment I would say No, but there is chance that I would vote, Yes at the time of the referendum	2
It is equally possible to vote Yes or No	3
At this moment I would say Yes, but there is a chance that at the time I would vote No	4
I would surely or almost surely vote Yes	5
DK/DA	99

Q20. Which of the following options represents your basic source of information related to the ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus problem? On a scale of 1 to 3, with 1 being the most important source for you, choose three answers

- a. Mainstream media (TV channels, newspapers, websites of the newspapers, other websites)
- b. Social media (facebook, Twitter, blogs)
- c. My parents
- d. My friends
- e. The educational activities of the political parties or political youth organizations
- f. My professors/lecturers at my University
- g. Other source
- h. DK/DA

Our survey is completed. We thank you for your participation!

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX III – MEAN COMPARISON AND VARIANCE ANALYSIS STATISTICS

Part I - Greek Cypriots

Descriptives

						95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Scale of Quantity of Contact	<i>Surely no</i>	43	1.20	.35	.05	1.09	1.31	1.00	2.33
	<i>Closer to a no but could be a yes</i>	68	1.18	.35	.04	1.09	1.26	1.00	3.00
	<i>equally possible I would vote no or yes</i>	133	1.40	.51	.04	1.31	1.48	1.00	3.17
	<i>closer to a yes but could be a no</i>	52	1.57	.73	.10	1.36	1.77	1.00	4.00
	<i>Surely yes</i>	13	1.94	.64	.18	1.55	2.32	1.00	3.33
	<i>Total</i>	309	1.37	.54	.03	1.31	1.43	1.00	4.00
Scale of Quality of contact	<i>Surely no</i>	12	3.13	.55	.16	2.78	3.48	2.40	4.20
	<i>Closer to a no but could be a yes</i>	25	2.91	.75	.15	2.60	3.22	1.00	4.20
	<i>equally possible I would vote no or yes</i>	72	3.23	.80	.09	3.04	3.42	1.00	4.80
	<i>closer to a yes but could be a no</i>	33	3.52	.66	.12	3.28	3.75	1.80	5.00
	<i>Surely yes</i>	11	3.58	.67	.20	3.13	4.03	2.40	4.60
	<i>Total</i>	153	3.26	.76	.06	3.13	3.38	1.00	5.00

						95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Scale of Institutional Contact	<i>Surely no</i>	4	2.67	.54	.27	1.80	3.53	2.00	3.33
	<i>Closer to a no but could be a yes</i>	13	2.87	.62	.17	2.50	3.24	2.00	4.00
	<i>equally possible I would vote no or yes</i>	28	3.01	.64	.12	2.76	3.26	2.00	4.33
	<i>closer to a yes but could be a no</i>	12	2.83	.56	.16	2.48	3.19	2.00	3.67
	<i>Surely yes</i>	8	3.17	.25	.09	2.96	3.38	3.00	3.67
	<i>Total</i>	65	2.95	.58	.07	2.81	3.09	2.00	4.33
Left-right self-placement	<i>Surely no</i>	38	5.24	1.68	.27	4.68	5.79	0	10
	<i>Closer to a no but could be a yes</i>	61	5.11	1.63	.21	4.70	5.53	0	10
	<i>equally possible I would vote no or yes</i>	113	4.78	1.58	.15	4.48	5.07	0	8
	<i>closer to a yes but could be a no</i>	49	4.49	1.88	.27	3.95	5.03	0	8
	<i>Surely yes</i>	13	3.46	1.85	.51	2.34	4.58	0	7
	<i>Total</i>	274	4.80	1.71	.10	4.60	5.01	0	10

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Scale Quantity	8.30	4	304	.000
Scale Quality	.74	4	148	.567
Scale Institutional	1.41	4	60	.241
Left-right self-placement	.91	4	269	.459

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Scale Quantity	Between Groups	10.04	4	2.51	9.53	.000
	Within Groups	80.00	304	.26		
	Total	90.03	308			
Scale Quality	Between Groups	6.58	4	1.65	2.99	.021
	Within Groups	81.30	148	.55		
	Total	87.88	152			
Scale Institutional	Between Groups	1.05	4	.26	.77	.548
	Within Groups	20.34	60	.34		
	Total	21.38	64			
Left-right self-placement	Between Groups	41.35	4	10.34	3.68	.006
	Within Groups	756.01	269	2.81		
	Total	797.36	273			

Part II – Turkish Cypriots

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Scale of Quantity of Contact	<i>Surely no</i>	45	1.61	.90	.13	1.34	1.88	1.00	4.00
	<i>Closer to a no but could be a yes</i>	29	2.05	1.05	.19	1.65	2.45	1.00	4.33
	<i>equally possible I would vote no or yes</i>	35	1.98	1.21	.20	1.57	2.40	1.00	5.00
	<i>closer to a yes but could be a no</i>	27	2.32	1.23	.24	1.83	2.80	1.00	5.00
	<i>Surely yes</i>	70	2.62	1.18	.14	2.33	2.90	1.00	5.00
	<i>Total</i>	206	2.17	1.17	.08	2.01	2.33	1.00	5.00
Scale of Quality of Contact	<i>Surely no</i>	45	2.39	1.03	.15	2.08	2.70	1.00	5.00
	<i>Closer to a no but could be a yes</i>	29	3.27	.81	.15	2.96	3.58	1.60	5.00
	<i>equally possible I would vote no or yes</i>	36	3.03	1.03	.17	2.69	3.38	1.00	5.00
	<i>closer to a yes but could be a no</i>	27	3.35	1.02	.20	2.94	3.75	1.00	5.00
	<i>Surely yes</i>	70	3.85	.93	.11	3.63	4.08	1.00	5.00
	<i>Total</i>	207	3.25	1.10	.08	3.09	3.40	1.00	5.00
Scale of Institutional Contact	<i>Surely no</i>	45	2.44	.90	.13	2.17	2.71	1.00	4.60
	<i>Closer to a no but could be a yes</i>	26	2.83	.63	.12	2.57	3.08	1.00	4.00
	<i>equally possible I would vote no or yes</i>	33	2.35	.83	.14	2.06	2.65	1.00	3.40
	<i>closer to a yes but could be a no</i>	27	3.34	.61	.12	3.09	3.58	2.50	5.00
	<i>Surely yes</i>	68	3.25	.85	.10	3.04	3.45	1.00	5.00
	<i>Total</i>	199	2.87	.89	.06	2.75	3.00	1.00	5.00
Left-right self-placement	<i>Surely no</i>	42	5.12	2.98	.46	4.19	6.05	.00	9.00
	<i>Closer to a no but could be a yes</i>	27	4.93	1.96	.38	4.15	5.70	.00	9.00
	<i>equally possible I would vote no or yes</i>	34	4.26	2.61	.45	3.35	5.18	.00	9.00
	<i>closer to a yes but could be a no</i>	26	3.88	2.57	.50	2.85	4.92	.00	9.00
	<i>Surely yes</i>	67	2.51	2.46	.30	1.91	3.11	.00	9.00
	<i>Total</i>	196	3.89	2.75	.20	3.50	4.28	.00	9.00

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Scale of Quantity of Contact	1.68	4	201	.157
Scale of Quality of Contact	.58	4	202	.681
Scale of Institutional Contact	2.67	4	194	.034
LRscale	1.47	4	191	.213

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Scale of Quantity of Contact	Between Groups	30.17	4	7.54	6.03	.000
	Within Groups	251.32	201	1.25		
	Total	281.49	205			
Scale of Quality of Contact	Between Groups	60.61	4	15.15	16.12	.000
	Within Groups	189.85	202	.94		
	Total	250.46	206			
Scale of Institutional Contact	Between Groups	32.80	4	8.20	12.68	.000
	Within Groups	125.48	194	.65		
	Total	158.28	198			
LRscale	Between Groups	225.26	4	56.31	8.58	.000
	Within Groups	1254.27	191	6.57		
	Total	1479.53	195			

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The opening of the Cyprus checkpoints in 2003 resulted in a new experience of the island: one in which movement between the two sides was possible and relatively easy, even if the ceasefire line remained, and remains, intact. This report examines the “post-Annan generation,” that is, the generation of youth who can barely recall the time of closed checkpoints but who also experienced the excitement and the disappointment of the 2004 referendum. The report analyses the main socio-demographic and political attitudinal characteristics of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot students, and proceeds to examine their opinions on various aspects of the Cyprus conflict.

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