Rethinking European Security

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Just a few years after the end of the Cold War and the commitment of the former Cold Warriors to the Paris Charter “For a New Europe”, security on the European continent once again became a bone of contention. The wars of succession in Yugoslavia and NATO enlargement, resolutely pursued after 1994, were only the two most visible conflicts that once again pitted the former antagonists Russia and NATO against each other, and with ever increasing severity. Grand designs such as the “Treaty on European Security” presented by then Russian President Medvedev in 2008 as well as everyday diplomatic efforts within the framework of the OSCE (e.g. the Corfu Process) have vanished. Obviously, there was as much a lack of willingness as of ability to follow up the declared intention of creating a common security space on the continent. There were several reasons for this, of both a cyclical and a structural nature.

On the Western side, a common understanding of how to deal with Russia was lacking from the outset, especially between the continental European and Anglo-Saxon parts. Russia's fervent claims to an equal say in European security and beyond were predominantly attributed to the transitory phantom pain of a vanished empire and hence neglected. The fact that as a result of the expansion of NATO and the EU the idiosyncrasies of some East Europeans were imported into the West intensified the dissolutions on the Western side. This was enhanced by Russia's increasingly clear departure from the liberal consensus and thus from a core element of the Paris Charter. This was associated on both sides with the frivolous attitude that the security and arms control instruments of the 1970s and 1980s had essentially done their duty, having successfully contained the bloc confrontation and ultimately contributing to an end of the Cold War. In other words, there was simply no sense of urgency to maintain and develop the relevant control regimes. Unilateralism was the order of the day. The disarmament of conventional weapon systems, for example, far below the limits of the CFE Treaty is clear evidence of this. In 2002, the “Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)”, also known as the Moscow Treaty, turned this fact into a caricature. Yet unilateralism remains the order of the day, this time, however, in the opposite direction of mutually assured rearmament.

Both ignorance of Russia and of the importance of arms control, have seriously backfired in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, and the reinvigorated confrontation between Russia and the West has exerted a lasting impact since. But the role and significance of Europe and European security have also changed. This is usually overlooked in the lively debate about whether the current confrontation is comparable to that of the former Cold War. Although Europe was no longer the center of the world during the Cold War, as the virtual battlefield of the two superpowers the continent nevertheless still formed its core: it was there that they measured their power, and there their heavily armed spheres of influence met directly, there the bipolar world order originated, and there it found its most visible expression. Their mutual recognition – in actual fact back in 1956 and 1968, later codified by the German Eastern Treaties and the 1975 CSCE Final Act – was the condition and key for the global management of the bipolar confrontation, which is essentially what the policy of détente was about.

That is no longer the case today, Europe has moved from the center of world politics to the periphery. On the one hand, this is due to the significant shift in the political-military balance on the continent, which hardly substantiates mutual threat scenarios any more, but only allows them to be staged in an alarmist fashion. The reciprocal accusations of “hybrid” and “non-linear” warfare strategies bear witness to this. They only underscore that a genuine war, conventionally waged and potentially escalating to a nuclear exchange, is beyond current imagination, unlike the war-fighting capabilities and trigger alert of previous times – a new variant of the drôle de guerre.

It is even more important, on the other hand, that the bipolar structure of the world has been replaced by a multipolar structure that is getting ever more tangible. This structure knows many players with their own, mostly regional, power ambitions. However, the most important global poles are the USA and China – and for China Europe has a completely different significance than for the Soviet Union.
back in time and for Russia today, both politically and above all economically. The same applies vice versa to Europe, which locates China far away and is inclined to seize opportunities rather than risks – unlike the USA whose trade conflict with China is increasingly turning into a genuine Cold War. This divergence points to another potential transatlantic friction and a tradeoff for the American connection to the European continent and its security. Russia is involved to the extent that Moscow draws its weight in world politics (beyond nuclear weapons) above all as a free-rider of Beijing. Alternatively, connecting Russia and the European Union, as some right-wing populists in Karl Haushofer’s geopolitical tradition have in mind and as American realists fear as a “wildcard” (Walt, 2018a), would solve the European security problem, but would not create a third pole in world politics, which alone can conceivably create the momentum for breaking such a taboo.

It follows from this that European security under current conditions is not a determinant but a derivative, which can only be adequately addressed against the backdrop of the changes in global politics during the last ten to twenty years. These reveal a tendency, but not a trajectory void of contradictions. Consequently, the answers are also contradictory.

This concerns the international order, which is universally perceived as being in crisis, without specifying what constitutes the order and which elements of the network of institutions, norms and procedures are at stake. It is also about the global power shift that cannot be ignored anymore with the “Rise of the Rest” (Alice Amsden) and especially the rise of China, and which generates claims as well as counter-movements. In addition, the model of Western democracy is perceived as having plunged into crisis, in view of the (partial) successes of autocratic modernization, but above all in view of the populist challenge of democracy in its Western strongholds. In the following, these three dimensions will be examined in greater detail in order to present a conceptual alternative, with which the dangers of global changes can be contained and the potential for cooperation secured and expanded.

World Order in Crisis: What Are We Talking About?

Talk about the crisis of the international order or its being even on the verge of collapse has become good political tone, in both East and West. Specifically this refers to the “liberal world order” or the “rule-based international order” (which is occasionally also termed the Western or US-“shaped” order, sometimes scaled back to a merely US-“led” or “Western-centered” order). Yet, it mostly remains in the dark what exactly is at stake in this crisis, but the origin of this perception is clearly discernible: it is located in Moscow and Beijing, and in Russia the crisis drum has been stirred with particular intensity for almost ten years, signifying the success of Russia’s (world order) “revisionism”, according to the language expanded into the West by Washington’s National Security Strategy in 2017.

However, diverse definitions correspond with no less diverse concepts. There is often talk of the international or world order, but the understanding varies just as often. Only those who deal with the issue in a particularly ostentatious way, seem to presuppose an unequivocal concept, in both a critical and affirmatory fashion. In fact, however, international order is considered such a “vague” and “blurred” concept that some want to completely abandon the term and limit themselves to the “essential characteristics of world politics” (Walt, 2018a). The same applies to the concept of the “rule-based” international order, which has recently become even more popular in the West. This notion is tautological except for the case that one conceives an order without rules which, however, would be no order, but at least imaginable as disorder. But this neglects that even under the – thus incriminated – conditions of the Great Power prerogatives there are, of course, rules that constitute order, but these are not appreciated by the critics of Great Power revisionism – even if they are an integral component of the UN system.

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A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH

In view of this terminological and conceptual confusion, a systematic attempt is called for which preferably begins in good academic fashion with an abstract definition. It is undisputed that the international order is about the principles, rules and institutions that regulate relations between states (cf. Glaser 2019: 55). This, however, does not say much about their content and interaction. Since order serves to structure reality, its material starting point is the heterogeneity found in the world in different manifestations (large and small states, poor and rich, monarchies and republics, democratic and autocratic). This heterogeneity cannot be eliminated, but is meant to be made politically manageable and orderly through rules and procedures. This is done by attributing political authority that transforms naked power into authoritative power. Order can therefore be understood as a “configuration of political authority”. It consists of the legitimate units of political authority (such as sovereign states or, alternatively, colonial empires as in the past) and the authorization of difference (referring to, e.g., nations, religion or political constitutions). The stability and functioning of the order rests on two pillars: the legitimacy of authorization as a principle of order shared by all, and the varying material capabilities of its members giving the order a specific form. Both these factors – formally and informally – establish status and imply that changes in one of the two pillars call into question the stability of the order as a whole. It is usually shifts in the balance of power that raise legitimacy problems, because power has a dual function: it facilitates order, but at the same time power is also a result of order through the assignment of status. Hence order is both a means and an end. However, the disputes over the right to national self-determination indicate that problems of legitimacy can also arise from the normative foundations of order.

The UN system in force since 1945 normatively combines the sovereign equality of states with their real inequality, which is reflected in the UN Security Council with the (barely limited) privileged status of the five permanent members. Although there has been criticism of this arrangement for some time, this has nothing to do with Russian and Chinese “revisionism”. Rather, it is based on the fact that other up-and-coming powers – namely those that once fell under the enemy clause, such as Germany and Japan, as well as emerging great powers such as India or Brazil – assert their claims, which is based exclusively on shifts in the international distribution of power. They thus call into question the legitimacy of an order that privileges a handful of established (once) great powers in the UN system. Henry Kissinger once coined the paradigmatic formula that an order is “legitimate” when every great power sees the “vision of itself” realized in it. This consensus among the Permanent Members of the Security Council remains undisputed even today, despite the talk of the crisis into which the world order has supposedly plunged. If something has impaired the functioning of this order, it has been the sometimes excessive use of their common privilege, the right to veto decisions in the Security Council, in which above all the two antagonists USA and Russia/USSR have excelled practicing a bipolarism that continues to have an effect to the present day.

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE “LIBERAL WORLD ORDER”

Nevertheless, current political rhetoric about the “liberal” world order also claims authorship of the UN system for the West and argues that the “rule-based” order realized in it, in contrast to “power-based” orders, was derived from the liberal values of the West and its singular ability to cooperate with each other.

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2 Reus-Smit, 2017: 853. In his case, this difference is defined in terms of civilization or culture. What he calls “diversity regimes” emerges from the combination of the two (e.g. in the Westphalian system of 1648 or the Versailles Treaties of 1919/20).

3 Accordingly, an order becomes unstable if such an idea is no longer feasible for one of the powers involved (quoted from Waever, 2018: 78). However, the powers ante-portas, which obviously lack this “vision of itself” in the UN system, do not have sufficient power resources to more than rhetorically challenge the institutionally supported inertia of the established powers.

4 Exercise of the veto right (http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto)
That, however, is pure ideology. The (far from liberal) European Concert of Powers of the 19th century could equally claim an ability to absorb politically different, even illiberal, regimes in a common order, which academic representatives of liberal internationalism, such as John Ikenberry, elevate to the hallmark of liberalism and derive from it its unabated vitality and resilience to the current challenges. These allegedly singular openings for aspiring powers inherent in liberalism could also be called "liberal pluralism". However, this only applies to the Westphalian element of the international order in the form of the UN system, which is indeed regime neutral. Status assignments in the talk of the "liberal" world order remain tied to the desired – liberal – regime type. Apart from the counterintuitive affinity to Hegemonic Stability Theory, Ikenberry's assertion appears to critics to be more of a "liberal antipluralism" (Clunan, 2018: 47), since it feeds on the homogenizing ideas of liberal universalism, which binds status and leadership to a catch-up adaptation to liberal standards. This has a certain tradition, as a "tool of vested interests [...] perverted into a bulwark of the status quo", to which Edward Carr drew attention eighty years ago, to justify realism as an alternative to the hitherto widespread utopia.

Analytically it is therefore warranted in the debate on world order and its current crisis to separate the Westphalian element of sovereignty from that of liberal universalism, as is predominantly the case in academic literature, albeit in quite different forms. Richard Haass, for example, diagnoses two parallel orders: the one that emerged during the Cold War and was characterized by military equilibrium and nuclear deterrence, and the liberal order that existed alongside and was based on free trade and the United Nations (Haass, 2019). For Michael Mazarr, on the other hand, the "liberal world order" itself consists of "two different and not necessarily compatible visions": a "narrow" guarantee of sovereign equality, territorial inviolability and (at least partial) free trade, represented by the United Nations and the International Financial Institutions, as well as the "more ambitious agenda" of human rights protection, the strengthening of democratic and market-economy systems, and good governance (Mazarr, 2017). For Andrew Hurrell, on the other hand, the "liberal world order" is a "historical anomaly", limited to the period between 1990 and the beginning of the 2000s, since there was no liberal world order during the Cold War, the USA had never been hegemonic on a global scale, and ideologically two "visions of Western modernity" were irreconcilably opposed (Hurrell, 2018: 93). In other words, the liberal order existed alongside the "overarching cold war order", with the result that the liberal principles were regularly sacrificed (Acharya, 2014: 38).

In summary, one may conclude that with respect to the two elements that constitute the world order in its most general form – legitimacy as the ideal basis of order and the distribution of power giving it form – there are certainly changes, but they only have a partial effect. In the political discourse, however, the two dimensions are one-sidedly exaggerated reflecting contrary objectives. The adherents of the liberal world order, in the spirit of their liberal universalist claim, exclusively focus...
on legitimacy – the authorization of forms of civilizational difference mentioned by Reus-Smit - and thus denounce the ongoing relevance of power resources and their shift as a second constitutive element, in line with Spinoza’s *omnis determinatio est negatio*. The critics of the liberal world order do exactly the opposite and insinuate that the shift in power per se results in a new authorization of civilizational difference, without, however, being able to indicate which that might be and how a consensus could be reached about it; they thus simply turn Spinoza upside down: *omnis negatio est determinatio*. While liberalism has a clear program of which only its universal validity is in question, the revisionist formulas remain nebulous and incommensurable. Since 2013 the Russian discourse has been referring to "traditional values" and has thus once again stylized itself as the “Third Rome” and against Christian and secular decay in the West. China, on the other hand, seeks to place its rather amorphous formulas, such as the “community of human destiny” or the “new type of international relations”, time and again in official documents in order to enhance its own codes of references. That, after all, is an attempt at connection, while the Russian formulas justify demarcation.

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE LIBERAL ELEMENT

Obviously, during the Cold War the liberal element was only a part of the world order, limited to the Western hemisphere, and after the Cold War it was a geographically expanded, but only temporarily dominant element. Hence it was and is not constitutive for the world order. This is all the less so if the liberal vision, in the spirit of Francis Fukuyama, has sought to replace real heterogeneity with homogeneity in one’s own image. Not only for realists was this claim to sole representation based primarily on Western hegemony in the post-Cold War era and hence reflects power politics and less so the benevolent persuasiveness of liberalism. This phase ended in a fiasco, which some realists, in line with the "revisionists", blame again on the West and its blindly practiced liberal hegemony. Their liberal advocates, on the other hand, see the cause of failure in the difficulties of establishing democracy and a market economy in unfavorable environments and diagnose only temporary setbacks that do not detract from the universal validity of the liberal model.

However, the change in the balance of power has now given weight to another (not only) classical realist axiom, according to which the increase in power of a state inevitably corresponds to efforts to increase its political influence (Gilpin, 1981: 106). This cannot simply be ignored or denounced as archaic, and manifests itself not least in the claim to “recognition”, namely recognition of the difference negated to date (Hurrell, 2018: 97). This in the case of China and Russia directly affects the liberal foil of legitimation, whose universalist claim is in actual fact being particularized. In addition it also affects the Westphalian institutional bracket: the liberal universal claim, on the one hand, and its challenge, on the other, now transform the institutions of world order in the form of the UN similar to the Cold War into a prominent stage of the struggle for discourse hegemony – and paralyze it. This is not a new but the old crisis of the world order that has erupted again.

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10 David Held does this explicitly in an answer to the question: “what kinds of principles and values should be used as standards of evaluation for international, transnational political and economic institutions?” He emphasizes a twofold no: “the refusal to accept a background picture in which states are sovereign in the traditional Westphalian sense of the term and, consequently, a refusal to see their international obligations as only justifiable through voluntariness or consent. To paraphrase Rawls (1999), we now live in a (normative) world where states are no longer considered the originators of all their powers.” (Held/Maffettone, 2017: 6).

11 Even if it is an idealized notion, yet widely cultivated in political discourse, the emergence of an order is always based on a carefully elaborated and agreed design (Toozie, 2019a). He sums it up soberly: “What will resolve the current tension is a power grab by a new stakeholder determined to have its way.”

12 Which in turn prompted the US to spoil those efforts, for instance as far as UN documents are concerned (Lynch 2019).

13 Posen (2018); Russell Mead (2014); Mounk/Foa (2018). John Mearsheimer emphasizes that in any case “[l]iberal international orders can arise only in unipolar systems where the leading state is a liberal democracy” (Mearsheimer, 2019: 7). In contrast, bipolar or multipolar orders are basically ‘realistic orders’, because the (great) powers of this constellation inevitably engage in a “security competition”. Ideological considerations are subordinate because this also applies if all major powers are liberal democracies.

14 Walt (2018). He emphasizes that relations with Russia and China have bottomed out with both also coalitioning against the US, that the Middle East is on fire, that North Korea, India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and Iran is on the brink of nuclear disarmament, that democracy is in global retreat while violent extremists are on the rise and that the EU is experiencing one weakness after another. However, this list is far too diverse for a monocausal explanation.

15 Hence it is too early for an obituary: “In the long course of history, liberal democracy has hit hard times before, only to rebound and gain ground. It has done so thanks to the appeal of its basic values and its unique capacities to effectively grapple with the problems of modernity and globalization. The order will endure, too.”
Thus two principles are once again opposed to each other: the Western, which wants to homogenize real heterogeneity along the lines of its liberal teleology, and the "revisionist", which for the time being insists on the recognition of difference (but will almost certainly not stop there). The status assignments that are inherent in the normative foundations of every order, as well as the hierarchy and the claim to leadership that follow from them institutionally, are thus also at issue.

The certainties that emerged from the Western victory in the Cold War have fallen under the wheels of global power shifts, so that there is a time lag between the established status assignments of the liberal world order and real heterogeneity. Reactions of the political classes in the West are split: On the one hand more of the same and a vigorous defense of the liberal world order are predominantly propagated, on the other hand and under the banner of populism, various alternatives are contemplated, but rarely implemented. Both lead to a dead end and call into question the functioning of international institutions. What is needed is a policy that combines a clear diagnosis of changes in the global balance of power with an appropriate institutional and normative design in the interests of global security and peace. This is all the more urgent as in the past such adjustments seldom took place without resorting to war.

The Trump administration is the prototype of a perverse reaction. Although it continues to claim, in the name of the West and therefore with scattered declaratory references to liberal democracy, that it wants to lead globally, it practices unilateralism and utter disregard of the international institutions ascribed to the USA – from the United Nations to the WTO and NATO. While these institutions were once regarded as an expression and instrument of American leadership, Trump’s Washington only perceives them as a burden and a relic of the past. After all, they offered the partners, allies and even the counterparts of the US a multilateral platform for discourse and ensured them a measure of influence. Thus, according to critics, the “liberal” hegemony practiced so far is replaced by the attempt to establish an “illiberal” hegemony as a new grand strategy (Posen, 2018), which, in Robert Kagan’s words, mutates the USA into a “rogue superpower”. It is obvious that, at least against the backdrop of temporary liberal hegemony, there are now limits to the once held US dominance, which, in conjunction with the precarious internal development between political schism and progressive deindustrialization, are condensing into a comprehensive crisis mood to which there are allegedly only national or even nationalistic answers.

There is no question that a power shift has taken place in the international system and that this has weakened rather than strengthened the West. On the other hand, it is controversial how far this shift is reaching, how it influences the international order, and whether a power transition is in the offing that would rearrange the hierarchy in the state system.

### Parameters of Global Power Shift

The shifts over the last two decades are indeed impressive. While American GDP, measured in purchasing power parities, accounted for half of global GDP immediately after the Second World War, its share fell to less than a quarter by the end of the Cold War and now stands at barely more than a seventh (Allison, 2018). With a share of 15%, the US is well behind China in 2018, whose share is 19.2%.

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16 The speech by Foreign Minister Pompeo on 4.12.2018 in Brussels, where he, “in a sea of contradictions” (Smith, 2018), justified this attitude, is prototypical. “Multilateralism has too often become viewed as an end unto itself. The more treaties we sign, the safer we supposedly are. The more bureaucrats we have, the better the job gets done. [. . .] Bad actors have exploited our lack of leadership for their own gain. This is the poisoned fruit of American retreat. President Trump is determined to reverse that. [. . .] He is returning the United States to its traditional, central leadership role in the world. He sees the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. He knows that nothing can replace the nation-state as the guarantor of democratic freedoms and national interests.”

17 Kagan (2018): “The United States as rogue superpower, neither isolationist nor internationalist, neither withdrawing nor in decline, but active, powerful and entirely out for itself.”

18 According to Mearsheimer, nationalism is “the most powerful political ideology on the planet”, which “inevitably trumps liberalism whenever the two clash” – a remarkable observation for a once structural realist (Mearsheimer, 2019: 9).

19 IMF (2018). Based on the nominal GDP, the ratios shift significantly: in 2017, the USA accounted for 24.4% and China 16.1%.
The situation is similar when OECD democracies are considered together: since 2011, they have accounted for less than half of global GDP, with a further downward trend (OECD, 2014).

This corresponds to the fact that autocracies have increased their economic weight considerably. If one takes the Freedom House ranking as an indicator, countries that are classified as "non-free" mastered just 12% of global GDP in 1990; today, after barely thirty years, they have reached 33% and could exceed the share of Western democracies in the next five years (Mounk/Foa, 2018). Asian countries and China in particular account for the largest share.

These shifts hardly offer empirical evidence for Western triumphalism, as it marked the end of the Cold War and found its expression in the talk of an "American century" or a "unipolar moment". Nevertheless, there are analysts from both the camp of liberal internationalists and of realists who consider pessimism to be out of place. Even if they admit that the USA in the past years had to leave the "peak of hegemony" occupied during the unipolar era, their power were still as unrivalled as their prosperity and technological innovation. Others adhere even to the notion of unipolarism since the USA is still considered "a class of its own", which nobody were able to challenge – for the foreseeable future (Brooks/Wohlforth, 2016: 27).

Specifically, it is pointed out that the USA and its allies account for 75% of global military expenditure, that the alliance system built around the USA comprises more than 60 countries, while Russia has just eight allies and China has only one, the very special ally North Korea (Ikenberry, 2014: 138). As evidence of the technological lead it is referred to the fact that the USA currently earns more than 100 billion US dollars a year in license fees, while China, as a technology importer, receives just 1 billion US dollars per year (Brooks/Wohlforth, 2016: 24). Allegedly, the USA still had far greater freedom of action in the international system than during the Cold War. And even an anti-hegemonic coalition that equals or at least neutralizes the capabilities of the USA is considered a theoretical option at best, even for China: China and all other competitors "must concentrate their resources on navigating a local security environment shaped by U.S. power" (Brooks/Wohlforth, 2016: 115). However, the fact that since the end of the Cold War, as evidenced by the various national security strategies, the primary goal of all US administrations has been to prevent the formation of such a balancing coalition shows that Washington trusts its unipolar triumphalism only to a limited extent.

But the West continues to claim a prerogative not only because of these persisting asymmetric power resources, but also due to firmly established convictions that ascribe its democratic system a significantly better performance and greater potential for modernization as an indispensable engine of globalization. This combination tears down traditional economic and thus also political and social boundaries and creates a global space for interaction and communication in which not only capital and goods move freely, but also people and hence the ideas that have made all this possible. Nobody can escape this dynamic, according to the once widely held conviction, and in fact locating oneself on the right side of history and at the same time pursuing morally superior goals is a combination that is hard to refute – yet fatally also with a considerable auto suggestive effect.

20 Ikenberry (2014: 137). Beckley (2018) arrives at the same conclusion, relying on a calculation that includes costs (such as expenditures for internal security) in addition to the generally considered gross figures (such as GDP or military expenditure). The same applies to Gill, Gill (2018/19) who refer to the USA’s lead in military technology (which were almost impossible to catch up with).

21 See in detail Spanger/Wolff (2007). This, too, has been a familiar pattern for about a hundred years: “[T]he view that nineteenth-century liberal democracy was based, not on a balance of forces peculiar to the economic development of the period and the countries concerned, but on certain a priori rational principles which had only to be applied in other contexts to produce similar results, was essentially utopian; and it was this view which, under Wilson’s inspiration, dominated the world in the years following the war” (Carr, 1940: 37).

22 Held/Maffettone (2017). The consequences are fundamental and are quoted here pars pro toto: “The idea of global politics challenges the traditional distinctions between the domestic and the international, territorial and non-territorial, inside and outside, as embedded in conventional conceptions of interstate politics and the political. The present era of global politics marks a shift towards a multilayered regional and global governance system, with features of both complexity and polycentricity.” And as a new yardstick it creates a “cosmopolitan plateau” that manifests itself as follows: “Human beings are better understood as citizens of the world rather than of territorially defined political communities. The most important political implication of the cosmopolitan plateau is, in our view, the commitment to basic human rights. Their protection should constitute the most urgent moral imperative for global political action. Such core entitlements include at least basic rights to political representation (though not necessarily to a fully democratic system), rights against basic forms of discrimination, rights connected to freedom of conscience, religion and expression, and rights to basic subsistence” (4f).
However, reality is less and less conforming to this theoretically derived certainty, which in the Global South came across as a caricature much earlier. Hence China obviously does not intend to disappear into the middle-income trap, as had been expected for some time, while the Western democracies show obvious signs of economic and, as a result, political fatigue.

WHAT FOLLOWS FROM THIS DIAGNOSIS?

As Robert Gilpin aptly points out, it is not the static distribution of power but its dynamic change that determines perceptions and politics (Gilpin, 1981: 93). Thus it was the collapse of real socialism and the end of the Soviet Union that made unipolarism possible as an expression and guarantor of the idealized world of democracy and capitalism. And today it is the rise and the unexpected success story of a nominally still communist, but in any case autocratic country that once again questions this self-concept. Although China’s power resources are not (yet) sufficient to neutralize the US ability to project power, dynamics and forecasts clearly point into this direction.

What follows from this is nevertheless controversial. The goal and expectation that China’s integration into the world market would turn it into a “responsible stakeholder” (Robert Zoellick) of the liberal world order, which was once officially announced in the liberal optimism quoted above, has now been officially buried. It has been replaced by a significantly increased readiness of both parts of the G-2 to engage in conflict, and this does not only apply to economic relations. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how far this willingness to engage in conflict reaches. Whereas the current trade controversies between Washington and Beijing initially followed the idiosyncrasies of the self-proclaimed salesman, they quickly escalated to a test run for Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap”. The two relevant strands of theory, (neo-)realism and power transition theory, define the scope of possibilities.

John Mearsheimer’s offensive neorealism has been the most striking warning for years: “If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war” (Mearsheimer, 2004; 2014). As a peer competitor emerges, the USA will do everything it can to prevent China’s rise and increase in power and to thwart the concurrent Chinese drive to achieve regional hegemony in (East) Asia, including the use of its still far superior military power. This corresponds to the American policy of containment against the Soviet Union during the Cold War and follows the almost physical logic of the (anarchic) international system. In Mearsheimer’s logic, such balancing includes all of China’s neighbors – including Russia – who are expected to gather behind the American flag. In this perspective, the current tensions between Washington and Beijing are more than just a tiresome trade conflict: they represent a “turning point” in mutual relations and end the “era of ever-expanding cooperation” (Jones, 2019; see also Tooze, 2019b). In this regard, at least, neorealists are in unison with liberal internationalists whose transformation expectations have been shattered.

The power transition theory opens up an alternative perspective. Although it has overlaps with realism, it clearly distinguishes itself from neo-realism and is based on fundamentally different premises. Therefore, it also suggests alternative political expectations and recommendations. The core idea of this theory is that with echoes of realism, the conditions for a power transition are fulfilled when emerging nations are dissatisfied with the status quo – in an international order characterized not by anarchy but by hierarchy. This is not about such elementary questions as the “survival” of a state, cultivated in neoliberalism, but about

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23 The fact that today even the founder of the World Economic Forum, the holy grail of the “globalized elites”, Klaus Schwab, distinguishes between “globalization” as a technologically driven phenomenon and “globalism” as an “ideology that puts the neoliberal world order above the national interest” shows how far the uncertainty reaches (Schwab, 2019).

24 Since Mearsheimer, too, has not escaped the fact that Russia finds itself at China’s side for the time being, he consoles himself with the expectation, “it is likely to switch sides over time and ally with the United States, simply because an increasingly powerful China is the greater threat to Russia, given their geographical proximity” (Mearsheimer 2019: 48).

25 However, their diagnosis of an “unavoidable conflict” – “rooted in a clash of social models” – puts China and Russia into the same boat because they shared the goal, “of targeting free and open societies to make the world a safer place for authoritarianism” (Wright, 2018). This variant of a new systemic conflict received the first major attention in the context of Putin’s famous Munich speech of 2007 (cf. Gat, 2007; Kagan, 2008). After that, the trail was temporarily lost.
comparatively sober cost-benefit calculations and whether the order that the state represents and guarantees at the top of the hierarchy continues to promise a benefit that corresponds to the increased ambitions of the aspiring nation. The benchmark for ascent is economic performance rather than military potential (Tammen/Kugler/Lemke, 2017; Rauch, 2018). As a result, there are two opposing options. For one, the established power can make efforts to slow the rise and defend the existing gap. This has obviously been the choice of the United States, with a trade conflict that began with Trump’s fairness complaints and quickly expanded into a comprehensive attack on China’s development potential. But it can also strive to co-opt the challenger, try to influence his preferences cooperatively, appease dissatisfaction, and thus secure the status quo. This appears to be the preference of the Europeans and is suggested by those voices that assume a vital interest on China’s side in the stability of the international order, either because the country is firmly integrated into the order (Ikenberry, 2014: 136) or because it owes its rise to it (Gowa/Ramsay, 2017: 468). These reflections on the interests of China obviously overlooked that its success story in the USA, unlike in Europe, mobilizes resentments and defensive reactions in a way that made the noble declarations of liberal order obsolete. Mearsheimer’s expectation of being able to integrate Russia into an anti-Chinese front has not materialized, any more than the amateurish attempts of the Trump administration to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing have borne fruit. Schematic deductions have never adequately captured the complexity of international politics. It is also noticeable that Russia articulates its frustration about the liberal world order much more clearly than China, rigorously positioning itself against the West. This corresponds to the power transition theory in that Russia, with its exports of raw materials and weapons, participates only marginally in the international division of labor. It therefore has no genuine cost-benefit interest in preserving an international order which it blames, with some plausibility when measured against the Soviet Union, for the considerable loss of status. This does not apply to China, which only pulls in the same direction as Russia to the extent that both have grown much more self-confident, Russia after having overcome the transformation crisis and in the shadow of rising commodity prices, China thanks to its meteoric rise as a global workhouse. The virtual alliance between the two countries naturally reinforces this effect – as does conversely the crisis of legitimacy in which the citadels of liberal democracy have found themselves in recent years. In light of the above-mentioned shifts in the economic weight of the democratic camp, one can hardly expect the countries of the northwestern hemisphere to regain their former supremacy. “The most likely scenario, then, is that democracies will come to look less and less attractive as they cease to be associated with wealth and power and fail to address their own challenges” (Mounk/Foa, 2018). The containment strategy suggested to the US by various parties will not change this either (Blackwill/Gordon, 2018; Mandelbaum, 2019).

From Liberal to Illiberal Democracy?

In contrast to the Cold War, international relations are no longer a seamless continuation of the conflicting socio-political visions of the two east-west antagonists, but there are still close, mutually reinforcing relations between the international and national levels. After the Cold War, liberal hegemony manifested itself not only in a widely shared program of liberal transformation, it also coincided with the culmination of the third wave of democratization: Between 1974 and 1990 the number of democracies doubled from 30 to about 60 (Huntington, 1991: 12). The same is true today: the crisis of liberal hegemony corresponds with a crisis of democratic rule. For example, Freedom House’s latest report shows a continuous negative trend for the last 13 years: between 2005 and 2018, the proportion of countries considered “unfree” increased by 26%, while the number of “free” countries decreased by 44% (Freedom House, 2019). The Bertelsmann Transformation Index shows a similar trend among the 129 transition countries (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).

It is noteworthy that the declines in democratic governance not only affect democracies with adjectives from the grey area between democracy and autocracy, but also numerous consolidated
democracies of the OECD world and, at the other end of the political spectrum, the established autocracies, where in many cases liberal tendencies have been reversed. For example, Freedom House places the USA with 86 out of 100 possible scores in 2019 only 33rd on its scale between free and non-free states, far behind Canada, Japan, Germany and even Italy. The background to the decline is what is known in the political debate as populism, predominantly in its right-wing, nationalist and xenophobic variants. In all democracies such populist parties have been able to significantly increase their share of the vote in the last five years and today rank between 13% (AFD, Germany) and 65% (Fidesz/Jobbik, Hungary). In some countries they already form the government, notably in Italy and the USA.

The reasons for the rise of populism may be manifold, but the consequences are unanimous: democracies and liberalism are globally on the defensive, their common sense is eroding both internally and externally, conflicts inspired by nationalism are increasing, and the reputation of democracy as a guarantor of participation, economic modernization and social progress is fading. It should not be overlooked, however, that the attractiveness of democratic market economies in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s was fed primarily by the backwardness of real socialism, which glorified practically every alternative. Hence in other parts of the world it was less the pull than the push of conditionality in development policy from the North, which freed itself from the geostrategic shackles of the Cold War and was now able to impose its liberal transformation program undiminished.

CAUSE AND EFFECT

Among the plethora of structural and accidental reasons for populism in the Northern Hemisphere one moment stands out in the relevant literature: the socio-economic consequences of deregulation, globalization and technological change. Their origin, however, dates further back than the end of the Cold War and the unipolarism of liberal hegemony might suggest. This often serves as an argument for the unleashing of capitalism, which allegedly had been relieved of its disciplining socio-political alternative in the shape of real socialism. In actual fact, however, its origins can be found in the 1970s and are summarized in the following keywords: the end of Bretton Woods, stagflation and the departure from Keynesianism, the rise of supply-side economics and monetarism, the Washington Consensus, deregulation and structural adjustment, and finally Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The neo-liberal change of tack began in parallel to the East-West detente policy, but was completed at a time when in the 1980s the Cold War was approaching a new climax with the Afghanistan and missile crises. The end of the Cold War finally amalgamated economic and political liberalization and, above all, drastically expanded its geographical scope (which in the West acted as an almost cost-free economic stimulus package).

This has enabled dramatic progress – not only in China, where political liberalization has largely failed to materialize. For example, between 1990 and 2015 the level of extreme poverty (less than USD 1.90 per day) fell from 36% to 10% of the world’s population, the lowest level in history; in Europe and Central Asia the figure is only 3% (World Bank, 2018). In its north-western citadels, on the other hand, the result was more ambivalent and anything but homogeneous. Here, in the shadow of no less considerable growth neoliberalism transformed the economies uniformly into a “winner-take-all casino capitalism” (Deudney/Ikenberry, 2018). And as much as this part of the globe profited economically, so much deepened

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26 Freedom House (2019). And on consolidated democracies in general, the Freedom House Report 2019 notes that of the 41 countries consistently classified as “free” between 1985 and 2005, 22 have experienced deteriorating scores over the past five years.

27 The German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger, alluding to Lenin, once coined the legendary sentence that “socialism is the highest level of under-development” (quoted from Mounk/Foa, 2018).

28 Under the banner of “liberal peace”, this sometimes included R2P military interventions as well as nation and state building, which hardly ever achieved the desired goal, as one critic observed “in practice, however, the processes have created very weak states, and institutions, and civil society is marred by joblessness, lack of development, forms of nationalism, and the often tortuous slowness of the shift from the pre-intervention situation to even the most limited and conservative form of the liberal peace” (Richmond, 2006: 304).

29 Cultural patterns such as authoritarian personalities or traditional social images are just as much a part of this as a progressive alienation from the political class or the tipping point of the migration crisis.

30 It moreover remains open whether the failure of the socialist model gave the liberal alternative a decisive boost or, conversely, paralyzed the mobilization for a socio-political alternative that had also lost its material support from the East.
the social division with unrestrained enrichment at one end and growing precariousness at the other. The associated “corrosive effects of unrestrained self-interest” finally revealed their destructive political potential with populism (Inglehart, 2018).

For significant sections of the population, structural change, inspired by neoliberalism and accelerated by global competition and (information) technological breakthroughs, had serious and primarily negative effects. They were most evident in the distribution of accrued wealth, as income inequality has increased in virtually all OECD countries since 1980. Ronald Inglehart presents a graphic example from the USA of the ongoing structural change and the associated decline in real incomes: “Fifty years ago, the largest employer in the United States was General Motors, where workers earned an average of around $30 an hour in 2016 dollars. Today, the country’s largest employer is Walmart, which in 2016 paid around $8 an hour” (Inglehart, 2018). The impoverishment of former industrial strongholds, a deepened division between metropolitan modernity and rural stagnation, the curtailment of transfer payments or job losses and income cuts not only in the lower wage groups due to automation and the spread of robotics are only four socio-economic manifestations that have found a political outlet in populism.

PERSPECTIVES

Obviously, a breaking point has been reached that calls the democratic order itself into question and once again underlines how much it depends on social stability and consensus. Extreme and, above all, growing inequality poses a particular challenge to consensus and thus to democratic systems. Social inequality and democratic equality are inevitably in tension. However, it is difficult to determine exactly when absolute gains turn into relative losses in public perception and when the stimulating effect of inequality reverses into its opposite and becomes a source of social conflict. This differential is influenced by many factors, such as collective action barriers. The populist answer, at any rate, is reminiscent of the machine wrecking of the 19th century in its retrospective leanings. It is confined to protectionist isolation, nationalist demarcation, xenophobia, sectarianism and open attacks on the building blocks of democracy – from the separation of powers to freedom of expression. All this takes place in the name of an imagined and supposedly authentic volksgemeinschaft, and in so doing strives to employ rhetorical figures that are all too familiar from the European fascism of the 1930s. It takes little imagination to predict the practical consequences should the political breakthrough succeed on a larger scale.

At the international level, populism finds a common denominator with those forces in Moscow and Beijing that rub against the liberal world order and cultivate the same enemy image – the globalized elites and their multilateral institutions, in Europe first and foremost the EU. However, this is only a temporary confluence that follows an atavistic logic and will dissolve in militant smoke when only one of the two sides has reached its goal. For the time being, however, both live off the fact that the liberal order shows unmistakable signs of exhaustion both nationally and internationally.

But this does not question democracy, on the contrary: “Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current problems call for reforms to better realize them” (Deudney/Ikenberry, 2018). But the crisis not only demands such a reform, it also creates conducive conditions for it: it seems that the neoliberal bracket that has teleologically held the market economy and democracy together for forty years is beginning to disintegrate.

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31 See the biographic account by Enbom (2016).
32 See the detailed analysis by Hendrickson/Muro/Galston (2018) and the literary account by Vance (2016).
33 Fetzer (2018) illustrates this connection with electoral preferences in Great Britain since 2010 and the Brexit referendum.
34 Cf. Acemoglu/Restrepo (2017), which in their surveys for the US between 1990 and 2007 came to the conclusion that every robot reduces the employment rate by between 0.18% and 0.37% per thousand workers and the salaries by 0.25% to 0.73%, depending on the method of calculation. Moreover, in view of the relatively limited presence, potentially far greater losses are to be expected in the near future. This is all the more true since the revolution, especially in information technology with the spread of artificial intelligence, is only just beginning and is likely to have far more disruptive effects.
35 Unimpressed by such fears, the intellectual grey eminence of the Kremlin, Vladislav Surkov, identifies ideological bridgeheads. He praises the “export potential” of “Putinism as the ideology of the future” and boasts: “Meanwhile the interest of foreigners in the Russian political algorithm is obvious, because there is no prophet in their homeland, and everything that happens to them today has long been predicted by Russia” (Surkov, 2019).
This would initiate a tidal or paradigm shift, such as that which took place in the 1970s. However, as with neoliberalism at that time, such a shift will not occur on its own. Rather, a change of course requires a programmatic foundation and a political leadership that is willing and able to fight for a reversal and overcome power positions that block it. Both are missing beyond the populist aberrations so far.

The Alternative

The Freedom House Report of 2019 ascertains how the political class in the West — optionally also the “globalized elites” or the “mainstream” and the “establishment” — should react to the crisis of the liberal part of the world order as well as to the dual challenge of the global power shift and of populism: “The gravity of the threat to global freedom requires the United States to shore up and expand its alliances with fellow democracies and deepen its own commitment to the values they share. Only a united front among the world’s democratic nations — and a defense of democracy as a universal right rather than the historical inheritance of a few Western societies — can roll back the world’s current authoritarian and anti-liberal trends” (Freedom House, 2019). Unwaveringly confident to stand on the right side of history, any questioning of the endurance of liberal hegemony is suppressed and no idea spent as to whether there can be a world beyond it that does not sink into the jungle of anarchy.

The political recipe follows the classical method of more of the same and thus remains caught in the logic of the Cold War — by pursuing a “free world strategy” aimed at “pushing back against neo-authoritarianism”. In foreign policy, compromises with these powers amount to a “devil’s bargain” (Wright, 2018); instead a new “containment” policy is called for (Mandelbaum, 2019; see also Blackwill/Gordon, 2018), employing all available means “short of general war” (Wright, 2018). This, however, has paradoxical consequences, since more of the same essentially means saying goodbye to the harmonizing faith and expectation of liberal hegemony and appropriating those instruments of power politics that are identified as the anachronistic characteristics of the challengers.

Delegitimizing the demands of the illiberal world and of other emerging powers for recognition, status and joint leadership not only serves the purpose of self-assurance, it also makes it possible to ignore the global power shift and one’s own crisis. However, such a policy does not promise success, even in the short term, and is bound to carry unacceptable opportunity costs. On the one hand, it is obvious that the resistance of the “embittered outcasts” will increase and hence conflicts as well as the danger of war (Mazarr, 2018: 200). On the other hand, fissions are plaguing the West itself: its policy of neglect can be found in at least two variants that see themselves decidedly as opposites — without at least nominally leaving the common platform. First, there is the unilateral sledgehammer of the Trump administration, pursuing what it considers the “national interest” in which the democratic-normative references degenerate into a rhetorical façade that draws its plausibility from little more than the naked American power. In the second approach, the “Alliance for Multilateralism” propagated by Germany and grouped around the EU, the opposite is true: regardless of its ostentatious commitments to what has hitherto constituted the institutional and normative core of the liberal world order, it lacks the determination and power to push this through or even to assert itself against American unilateralism.

36 Such is the insinuation of Robert Kagan as the only possible alternative in his latest book: “The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World” (2018), in unison with other neoconservatives and liberal internationalists.

37 Wright (2018). This strategy is explicitly said to be “consistent with America’s post–World War II leadership. But it will entail significant changes from the post–Cold War strategy of liberal order building”. See also critically Allison (2018): “... misconceptions about the liberal order’s causes and consequences lead its advocates to call for the United States to strengthen the order by clinging to pillars from the past and rolling back authoritarianism around the globe.”

38 Optimistically the same outcome as in the Cold War is expected: “Cold War Containment was an open-ended policy with a hoped-for eventual outcome. The same will be true for the new version: the policy should continue as long as the threats it is intended to counter continue, and ideally it will end similarly” (Mandelbaum, 2019).

39 These references are so devoid of meaning that only a code of the cut of the Friends of the Italian Opera remains.

40 This has been rightly observed by Haass (2019). And indeed, so far the "alliance" has not managed to meet its own standards. It even failed in the first solidarity test when in August 2018 Saudi Arabia quarantined Canada because Foreign Minister Freeland had done exactly what the commitment to democratic values demanded: to criticise the human rights abuses in the kingdom. It was no less Germany’s peculiar economic interests that determined Berlin’s attitude to the Nord Stream 2 project against all resistance, which, however, was no less inspired by such particular interests.
Despite their fundamental differences, both variants do not offer an adequate answer to the heterogeneity in the international system and the power shifts that have given rise to new status claims. It is therefore necessary to think about alternatives. These are certainly not to be found among the ‘revisionist’ autocracies. As authoritarian kleptocracy and rigid developmental dictatorship, they are neither suitable as a socio-political model nor do they formulate programmatic offers beyond the defensive retreat to Westphalian sovereignty. Interpreted benevolently, both remain stuck with status claims, which can also claim little more than naked power for their authorization.

**THE PRIME TASK: SECURING PEACE**

Unlike in the Cold War, there are no diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive visions, which should make the task of achieving a compromise or even a grand bargain easier. Moreover, even if the changes of recent years call into question the liberal interpretation of the world order and its claim of universal validity, they do not require a new international order. The task is therefore limited: What is needed is an international order that no longer binds status allocations and participation to liberal democratic standards, but to ensuring stability and peace. Hence priorities and sequences are to be changed. And this is about a new authorization of difference and thus a new legitimacy of the international order. This will not resolve the currently pressing tension between security and democracy that the former US Secretary of State Alexander Haig once clothed in the legendary formula that there are more important things than living in peace.\(^1\) Liberal internationalism has resolved the conflict with its paradigm of “democratic peace” in favor of democracy, (neo-)realism with its structural deduction in favor of security. Instead a new balance is required which can be achieved, for example, by limiting the struggle for democracy to the societal level and by ensuring stability for the legitimate units of political authority in the international order, the states. This division of labor will undoubtedly also produce periodic tensions at both levels, because human rights and civil liberties are individual rights and not tied to the political constitution of the states. Their violation will therefore regularly trigger protest, as conversely this protest will be reproached by the claim that any such accusations form the smoke curtain for completely different goals. However, only such a distinction creates the systematic prerequisites for rule-based conflict management. These rules, however, have yet to be established.

On the Western side, such a new approach requires a dual decoupling of previously untouchable and highly ideologized paradigms, whose socio-political projections have linked the international and national levels. On the one hand, this concerns the neoliberal unleashing of (un)productive forces, which was imagined over decades as an engine of globalization and prosperity and thus as a guarantor of democratic stability. Their growing costs are progressively producing the opposite effect, or at least destructive effects, which are increasingly difficult to control, as populism unmistakably demonstrates. On the other hand, the bond of liberal universalism, which has so far united liberal hegemony to the outside and democratic transformation to the inside, must be severed. This requires and enables a pragmatic handling of diversity in the international system and a renunciation of official government missions of democratic homogenization. Contrary to widespread allegations, this in no way calls democracy into question, but rather reactivates its very core: the self-determination of the peoples.\(^2\) Even more importantly, it empowers Western democracies and does not plunge them into excessive adventures in which an ideologically driven commitment and a unipolar overconfidence mutually reinforce each other.

This point of departure is anything but spectacular, but after thirty years of liberal hegemony it is still at odds with the dominant discourse. One could have known better, since more than fifty years ago, Hans Morgenthau drew attention to the systematic limits and errors of such a self-image. He noted that the effects of social norms and

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\(^1\) Another foreseeable decoupling is addressed by Waever (2018), “a long-term delinking of Europe, the West, and universalism”. He expects that Europe too “will increasingly have to define its values as particular (that is, claim a right to difference), and not as universally valid”.

\(^2\) This too is a recurring theme, depending less on unwavering ethical principles than on political expediency in given historical circumstances: “The right is more precious than peace” - proclaimed Woodrow Wilson 1917. “Peace comes before all; peace comes even before justice” – replied Aristotle 1927 (as quoted from Carr, 1940: 93).
legal rules in domestic and foreign policy were exactly opposite: internally they limited state power, externally they served state power and justified it: “it makes it appear as though the interests and policies of individual nations were the manifestations of universal moral principles” (Morgenthau, 1962, cited after Karkour, 2018: 63). The consequences are devastating and all too familiar, for such an attitude would provoke “that distortion of judgment that destroys nations and civilizations blinded by crusading zealousness – in the name of moral principles, ideals or God” (Morgenthau, 1963: 56). Liberalism and its representatives are particularly susceptible to this as “line drawing subjects par excellence”.43

A CONCEPT REVISITED: PRAGMATIC COEXISTENCE

Such a new approach is less to be found in the world of think-tank political consulting, but in the current academic debate. Here the predominant proposals differ in terminology, but not in substance, which is the demand for a new authorization of difference in the international order. Some examples from a broad spectrum of theoretical approaches: “re-frame that debate in terms of a new pluralism” (Hurrell, 2018), “encourage pragmatic globalism in place of ideologically-charged liberal internationalism” (Acharya, 2017: 282) and pleas for “a grand strategy of restraint” (Posen, 2018; similarly Glaser, 2019: 82-85), “a prolonged period of competitive coexistence with illiberal great powers” (Lind, Wohlforth, 2019) or “a more flexible, pluralistic approach to institutions, rules, and norms” and “one with a bigger role for emerging-market powers and more ways for countries other than the United States to lead than the current order provides”.44

These strategic approaches are consistently linked with conciliatory policy proposals towards Russia and China, which are to be addressed with a “mix of compromise, incentives, and pushback” (Haass, 2019). It is therefore called for adapting the international order and not the relevant countries. This, however, is subject to the condition that the “revisionism” ascribed to the two most relevant of these powers is limited to the established hierarchy of the world order and its Western-inspired status assign-


44 Mazarr (2017: 192, 198). Elsewhere he states: “in a more multi-speed, variable geometry world, the concept no longer has to be one in which China, for example, simply “joins” a U.S.-led order. But the fundamental U.S. strategy could be a by-product of emphasizing the coalition and its accompanying institutional order.” And: “hold out to China the prospect of co-leadership of the gravitational center of world politics” (Mazarr, 2017: 46).

45 To the latter, Ward (2017) refers to the Social Identity Theory and its application to status claims by Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko which, however, does not reveal a coherent picture. They assume that candidates adopt “geopolitical competition strategies” when their status claims encounter insurmountable obstacles. Ward countered this by saying that this also applies if the candidates perceive geopolitically significant resources as characteristics of status and at the same time assess the chances of a status change optimistically.

46 In this regard current alarmism has hardly any limitations, as Mikheil Saakashvili (2019) amply testifies. He predicts that Putin’s next victim will not be Ukraine or the Baltic States but Finland and Sweden: “He [i.e. Putin] has already redrawn the borders of Europe by force and gotten away with it. Now, to provoke the West’s ire, he will have to do something even more egregious. […] This is a simple cost-benefit analysis that Putin has conducted, openly, many times before. Each investment of Russian force has paid dividends. Finland and Sweden meet both requirements.”
behavior is justified by the benevolently interpreted intentions of a political order that is nominally committed to freedom and human rights worldwide – a striking reminder of Hans Morgenthau’s complaints.

The situation is similar with regard to the revisionist geo-strategies which the two powers apply to challenge the status assignments by the West and with which they engage in balancing. This is done through a “contesting multilateralism” in the shape of alternative institutional formats such as BRICS, SCO or AIIB and the RCEP project, which have one thing in common: a heterogeneous membership and efforts to keep the US, but not its allies, away. Pursuant to the same logic, Russia and China repeatedly find themselves alongside those countries that are portrayed as spoilers in Western discourse, from Venezuela to Sudan or Myanmar. This is more pronounced in the case of Russia, which seeks to gain attention and prestige above all through demonstration – and the use – of military power, whereas China, which is far more integrated into the international division of labor gives higher priority to economic rationales. Reducing conflict behavior and hence the incipient Cold-War dynamics to regime affinities is misleading if only because the West is anything but picky in its geo-strategically inspired coalition-building. Its advantage is merely that the West has a wider choice, its disadvantage that it is under greater domestic pressure than the autocracies with their controlled public sphere.

Consequently, there is no reason to a priori rule out a common understanding on the basis of the Westphalian core of the international order. In this regard the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council have not much disagreement. Controversies only apply to that part of the international order that unilaterally assigns status in the liberal tradition and thus fixes an international hierarchy. But even here the fronts are by no means fixed, as the current trade disputes initiated by the US administration show. Moscow with its strictly transactional understanding of exchanges finds itself more on Washington’s than on China’s side, which continues to link its future as developmental state with globalization (Tang, 2018). The 17 Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015, are another set of tasks that elude Great Power politics and have the potential to transform their zero-sum logic. It is therefore by no means absurd to imagine a much more variable setting in which formal institutions and informal consultations are combined implying a “more diverse order – one that operates in different ways for different countries and regions and on different issues” (Mazarr, 2017: 200).

What Does this Mean for Europe?

The talk of the return of great power competition insinuates that world politics is increasingly shifting into the triangle formed by the USA, China and Russia. It also signals that their policies solely follow the prerogative of national interest so that international institutions only provide the stage and no longer the frame for their debate. Hence, the driving forces of the “flattened world” and globalization 3.0 (Friedman, 2007) are said to be no longer relevant. This once called for technocratic global governance, but has allegedly been replaced by the struggle for a new international hierarchy between the dwindling hegemon and its aspiring challengers.

This shift in perception and attention has pushed Europe and specifically the western part of the continent into oblivion. At the same time, Western Europe is currently in a peculiar hermaphroditic role: it can no longer be the mere appendix of a great power whose current administration expresses either disinterest or contempt for its allies. At the same time, however, it exceeds its ability and willingness to collectively oppose the “revisionist” great powers, which are also scolded in Europe. This manifests limits but at the same time provides
opportunities in order to position oneself in the global configuration of forces that is taking shape and to influence the patterns of conflict within it.

The proclaimed "Alliance for Multilateralism" as well as the European Union’s aspired ‘strategic autonomy’ represent defensive reactions that, for the time being, lack both assertiveness and strategic clarity. Both reveal the Union's weaknesses – not its strengths – and try to overcome them by time-tested means: by balancing, yet in different directions. On the one hand, this concerns the lack of power resources to be reckoned with in the Great Power rivalry, even if the EU members unduly degrade themselves compared to the most important competitor on the continent – Russia.

This is a cognitive deficit and in striking contrast to Russia. On the other hand, it concerns the fact that the EU is particularly dependent on the international institutions associated with the liberal world order. In the slipstream of American world politics, Western Europe has entered into a path dependency, both in terms of security policy and trade policy, which shapes its DNA and requires considerable costs and political efforts to leave. Western Europe was and is a free rider of the American security guarantee, and it has managed to exploit the world economic order to its advantage like hardly anyone else as "logical paths to power" (Hurrell, 2018: 92).

THE EUROPEAN ROLE

The question therefore arises as to what genuine role Western Europe can play in the current diffusing power constellation. The answer to this question must be based on the specific characteristics of the EU and must first of all take note of its strengths. There is no question that in the absence of federal statehood the EU will not become a military power. It will continue to confine itself to harmonizing the military policies of its members, which, despite the virulent uncertainties to the West and East, is clearly lacking a sense of urgency. The EU will continue to play its roles as a "civilian power" and a "normative power". In the latter role, Brussels has functioned in the past as an amplifier of liberal hegemony. In this respect, at least in dealing with the status-sensitive major powers, there is a need for an updated version that does not perceive democracy and the rule of law as an export commodity, but first and foremost as a creative task within the EU – and here, as we know, enough is to be done. On the other hand, the EU and its member states command the instruments of civilian power, including a reformulated catalogue of norms, better than almost any other group of states. This concerns the primacy of diplomacy, economic cooperation as an instrument for maximizing common advantages, and the (self-) commitment to multilateral institutions (Harnisch/Maull 2001). The diversified economic basis, the worldwide interdependence at all levels of politics, the economy and society and even the plurality of actors – provided they retain a sens commun – provide unique prerequisites.

On this basis, it would be the genuine task of Western Europe to contribute to civilizing conflict resolution by using its specific potential and not try to establish itself as the fourth pole in the global power constellation. This includes initiating the proposed change of course and perspective both towards Russia and towards China, because such a change can only originate in Europe. From the USA nothing can currently be expected in this regard, even if the incumbent president should follow his rhetorical advances towards Russia with deeds that consist of more than his trademark fake diplomacy, and even if the economic war he initiated with China turned out to be an empty threat as in the case of North Korea. The former is unlikely, since Russia has become such a toxic issue in Washington’s domestic policy that a rational discourse is just as impossible as a pragmatic approach to Moscow (Spanger, 2019). And the trade conflict with China appears to be merely the prelude

49 In the underbelly of liberal hegemony, Russia has achieved some successes in the wake of its military power projection, which Moscow has obviously gone so to its head that it has decoupled the two dimensions of the international balance of power - the material and the cognitive - and tends to ignore the former. The consequences are predetermined in history.

50 According to this year’s report of the Munich Security Conference, the EU is therefore “particularly ill-prepared for a new era of great power competition” (Munich Security Conference, 2019: 14).

51 This postulate is by no means new or extravagant. It can already be found in Hedley Bull (1952), long before security and defence policy found its way into the EU Treaty in 1991. But even then he referred to the differences with the USA and the need to counter the USSR with Europe’s own military potential.

52 This is also favored by different think tanks for different reasons, cf. Oliker (2018); Kubiak (2019).
to a strategic confrontation that seeks to deny China the “rightful place in the world” it aspires to.

The “Alliance for Multilateralism”, as propagated by the German Foreign Minister since the summer of 2018 (Maas, 2018), is a plausible start, but does not move beyond limited balancing against Trump and the unilateral demands of his administration. This makes sense insofar as Washington implicitly or explicitly questions practically all multilateral formats that have constituted the West since 1949. However, the “Alliance” cannot limit itself to this. It must also take into account the changed international balance of power and it must do so cooperatively, by establishing contacts with multilateral institutions other than those impregnated by the West, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, by reactivating moribund pan-European formats such as the OSCE or the NATO-Russia Council, and preferably also by advancing new concert formats.

At first glance such an expanded task looks like an ambitious big design, but in fact it can be broken down into small steps. In security policy the “Structured Dialogue” launched in 2016 within the framework of the OSCE is such an example. Small steps are generally seen as the only way to make progress in a situation of lacking confidence. However, small steps suffer from the downside that their direction can only be discerned at an advanced stage. No less important, therefore, are those steps that signal a departure from confrontational patterns, for instance by upfront moves that convey credibility through the risks inherent in them. A complementary move would focus on common interests and challenges meant to overcome the currently dominant zero-sum pattern through cooperative routines in solving attendant problems. Terrorism and climate change are, due to the shared exposure, as much plausible candidates as is the interest in avoiding unintended military escalations (Browne, 2018; FLEET, 2018; Kubiak, 2019). Two topics were selected to exemplify the rationale: the EU’s dealings with the Eurasian Economic Union and the Ukraine crisis. The subsequent considerations are neither spectacular nor exclusively derived from the analytical frame above. The modest aim is rather to demonstrate how the change in course and perspective, as proposed here, translates into practical political steps.

PUTTING AN END TO COMPETITIVE INTEGRATION: RECOGNITION OF THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION

Taking up a “structured dialogue” with the Eurasian Economic Union is a plausible and long overdue step for the European Union (Krumm, 2018: 22). Refusing official contacts is a hypocrisy typical of Brussels, which has a very favorable view of multilateral formats in other regions of the world and even creates some of them (such as within the framework of the Lomé and Cotonou Conventions), while pursuing strict bilateralism in the CIS. This is done with reference to the power asymmetries in this region, which in Western discourse often lead to two worst-case scenarios: the restoration of the Soviet Union and the Russian potential for aggression against its consistently smaller neighbors. This criticism ignores the fact that the advantages of multilateral formats also apply here: to give smaller states a voice, to bind larger states to jointly agreed rules and thus to enable influence in both directions. The history of the Eurasian Economic Union to date provides plenty of illustrative evidence.

Yet there is another asymmetry in Eurasia that Russia is less comfortable with, but which is appreciated in the West: the economic imbalance with China, which can hardly be compensated militarily. This prompted Vladimir Putin in the summer of 2016 to propose a “Greater Eurasian Partnership”, which is aimed first and foremost to link the Eurasian Economic Union with the Chinese Silk Road Initiative. However, contours of this partnership are much more fluid, either including ASEAN or Western Europe (Karaganov/Suslov, 2018). In addition to the primary economic purpose, such a concept may also make sense geo-strategically for Russia, as a force multiplier against the West on the one hand.
and as a hedge against China on the other.\textsuperscript{55} As a construct to shape the world order along the lines of Halford Mackinder’s geopolitical “Heartland Theory”, however, it would rather disappear in the fog of over-ambitious superpower dreams. Chinese scholars have drawn attention to the fact that the “Partnership” unites two visions that are quite at odds with each other: While the Silk Road is said to be part of the (cooperative) creation of the Chinese inspired “community of shared destiny”, the Russian vision is portrayed as a (confrontational) global counter pole (Ka-Ho Wong, 2018). In a different way, Russia imagines itself in the “Greater Eurasian Partnership” as a transcontinental center and a rotational axis, while the Silk Road seeks to connect the two poles China and Europe. This implies transforming Russia into (one of several) bridges with European-Chinese consent. In any case, a European Ostpolitik would be well advised to properly take account of these different meanings in its strategic considerations.

EXPANDING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN UKRAINE

Entering into dialogue with the Eurasian Economic Union is a rather small step, which requires first and foremost flexibility on the part of the West. Resolving the Ukrainian crisis by contrast is anything but a small step, as the stalemate has been revealing for years. However, time and again and mostly with reference to the implementation of the Minsk Agreement of February 2015, it is made a prerequisite for rapprochement or a “new security arrangement in Europe” (Oliker, 2018: 49; see also van Ham, 2018; Kortunov, 2018, Zagorskij, 2017). This, however, blocks any change on the continent, because as long as the global schism continues, neither Ukraine nor Russia will fulfill their Minsk obligations for internal as well as external reasons. For Ukraine, the implementation of Minsk amounts to the ultimate ratification of its surrender, at the cost of international attention and its (virtual) veto position. Russia would give up a diplomatic bargaining chip and, beyond that, solidarity with those forces that have been incorporated into the patriotic consensus back home.

Except for fundamental changes in Ukraine and/or Russia, a transition to the universally proclaimed return of the Donbass to Ukraine is conceivable only in one manner: through an internationalization of conflict resolution in the form of a UN protectorate. The officially negotiated UN-mandated stationing of blue helmets along the demarcation line indicates the direction, albeit more limited than in the Boistroposals by American and Russian academics, which covered the entire area even at the height of the conflict in 2014.\textsuperscript{56} In the meantime, these negotiations have also been blocked, and progress will only be possible if the cost-benefit calculations of the two antagonists and especially on the Russian side change. The Ukraine crisis is as much the cause as the symptom of the fact that on the European continent and beyond not all (major) powers see the “vision of itself” anymore, which is indispensable for the stability and legitimacy of the international order. This, however, is the central prerequisite for conflict resolution and can conceivably only be achieved by establishing a \textit{modus vivendi} – a key concept of the détente period. This demands from the West a renunciation of NATO enlargement towards Russia and from Russia a renunciation of the torpedoing of EU associations (Trenin, 2018: 17). Such a mutual self-restraint represents a compromise that shifts liberal hegemony back into its own sphere of application and encloses Russian revisionism. Two political events in 2018/2019 demonstrate that such expectations need not be far-fetched. One is the color revolution in Armenia, member of the Eurasian Economic Union and linked to the EU by a “Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement” which points into the European direction. The other is the coalition-building in Moldova which has been engineered by all foreign powers pulling into the same direction of overcoming the deep political crisis in a country which once was considered a lighthouse of the EU’s Eastern Partnership.

Demarcation and recognition are prerequisites for civilizing competition and focusing it on the social and economic level, even though it will hardly be

\textsuperscript{55}Thus Karaganov and Suslov follow the classic multilateral logic and see this “partnership” as a way of integrating China’s growing power within a system of institutions, ties, dialogues, and balances” (2018: 77).

\textsuperscript{56}Kommersant (2014). The latest update on the part of the Russian participants discusses in detail the mandate, composition and co-operation with the OSCE, but at the same time limits the possibility of stationing UN blue helmets: only after implementation of the Minsk Agreement it should also cover the area along the Russian border, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, (2018).
possible to exclusively keep it there. In view of the far more serious challenges posed by fascism and communism in the past, it can be confidently assumed that the liberal democracies will also survive the current confrontation. It would be conducive rather than detrimental to their vitality if the liberal democracies confine themselves to their core competencies by withdrawing their universal claim and renouncing their imperial practice. However, this is not decided solely beyond their borders, even if the prescribed market-democratic transformation in the post-Cold-War era has beamed many countries into a dreary grey zone with little prospect of improvement. Rather the foundations of the democratic order are endangered by populist attacks on the seemingly entrenched Western consensus. This too is both cause and symptom; the essence of democratic orders is to combat the symptom – the rise of anti-democratic forces – not by oppression and prohibition, but by eliminating the causes – the multidimensional consequences of the neolibera
tly inspired unleashing of (un)productive forces. This also applies to the German "tenable democracy" (st
treitbare Demokratie) until the opposite is constitutionally proven.

The democratic order finds its mission neither in a forced global expansion nor in a neoliberal economic and social policy. But even then, as Graham Allison (2018) rightly states, taking leave of more than thirty years of Western policy in this spirit demands "a surge of strategic imagination as far beyond the current conventional wisdom as the Cold War strategy that emerged over the four years after Kennan’s Long Telegram was from the Washington consensus in 1946". As odd as such a comparison might appear, it is anything but guaranteed that the departure from neoliberalism as well as from liberal hegemony will take place peacefully, it will definitely not be free of conflict.


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Hans-Joachim Spanger


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FES ROCPE in Vienna

The goal of the FES Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe (FES ROCPE) of the FES in Vienna is to come to terms with the challenges of peace and security in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union a quarter of a century ago. These issues should be discussed primarily with the countries of Eastern Europe – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – and with Russia, as well as with the countries of the EU and with the US. The security order of Europe, based until recently on the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Paris Charter (1990), is under threat. This is, among others, a result of different perceptions of the development of international relations and threats over the last 25 years, resulting in divergent interests among the various states.

For these reasons, FES ROCPE supports the revival of a peace and security dialogue and the development of new concepts in the spirit of a solution-oriented policy. The aim is to bring scholars and politicians from Eastern Europe, Russia, the EU and the US together to develop a common approach to tackle these challenges, to reduce tensions and to aim towards conflict resolution. It is our belief that organizations such as the FES have the responsibility to come up with new ideas and to integrate them into the political process in Europe.

**We support the following activities:**

- Regional and international meetings for developing new concepts on cooperation and peace in Europe
- A regional network of young professionals in the field of cooperation and peace in Europe
- Cooperation with the OSCE in the three dimensions, the politico-military, the economic and the human