UKRAINE
IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARCHITECTONICS
OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Cold War, in the space including the former enemies – the East and the West, there began deep geopolitical transformations. There emerged a unique opportunity to build up a more wide and perfect security system, which would comprise all the countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. Regarding the security in this very context, NATO launched the process of eastward enlargement. However this process caused an opposition from Russia, which took Central and Eastern Europe, and especially the ex-Soviet republics as a sphere of its influence. Despite the impossibility of return to confrontation, the political homogeneity of the Euro-Atlantic space remains reachess. This circumstance stipulates the importance of the place and, potentially, the role of Ukraine in the construction of the new security system for the great Europe of the XXIst century.

Ukraine must be not only the customer of European security, but also an active creator thereof. Owing to its geographical situation and geopolitical importance in Europe, Ukraine will probably play a particular role in the formation of the Eastern part of all-European security structure.

Ukraine has good grounds to play the role of an outpost of military-political stability in the East-European and Black-Sea subregions. The importance of Ukraine in the strengthening of security consists not only in the fact that success or failure of the Russian policy of reintegration of the post-Soviet states and realization of any expansionist plans essentially depends on Ukraine's standpoint, but also in the fact that its geopolitical position and potential are able to have a significant effect on the correlation of forces between the West and Russia.

The geopolitical situation of Ukraine and its image of a neutral state allow it to have a stabilizing effect on conflictogenous zones of the European part of the post-Soviet space: Moldova, Belarus, the Caucasus and Black-Sea subregions. Interacting with the Baltic states and Poland, Ukraine is able to become a pillar of stability zone in Eastern Europe. Further, establishment of a strategic axis Kyiv–Tbilisi–Baku can be forecasted, which will probably play a significant stabilization role in the South-Eastern subregion of the post-Soviet space.

Economic and scientific-technical determinants constitute an important ground for Ukraine's active participation in international military-political cooperation. Ukraine has inherited from the USSR a rather developed economic infrastructure and essential economic potential, including hi-tech industrial branches. Ukraine has mastered 17 of the 21 "crucial" technologies developed by leading scientific centers of the world. This gives it rather high opportunities for development of international cooperation with leading countries of the world.

The search of an adequate model of integration into security structures constitutes the main problem of its geopolitical choice. Probably, such a model will realize the most wide approach, rather than a mere statement on accession to NATO or other European security structures. The further strengthening of stability and security in Eastern Europe, in the part thereof, which is going to access to NATO in the close future, shall be possible through creation of certain outposts to stabilize the situation in particular subregions.

Though NATO has intentions to extend its influence on all the countries of Eastern Europe, there are no mechanisms of such influence, except the PfP program. This
also concerns the extension of US influence. The lines of opposition of NATO and Russia may turn into an instability curve. Evidently, the security of Western and Central Europe cannot be strong and safe alongside with a non-stable Eastern Europe.

Thus, the role of Ukraine as an outpost of stability in Eastern Europe would consist: firstly, in its carrying out of a deterring and stabilizing influence on Russia and European policies of the latter; secondly, in the ability of the state to undertake certain commitments and liability as regards the strengthening of security and stability of the European post-Soviet countries. Actually, this means that Ukraine itself must be able to resolve its problems with Russia and to neutralize the most dangerous destabilizing manifestations of Russia’s expansionist policy.

To play such a role, Ukraine itself has to be a politically stable and strong state. Thus, the role of the West and, in particular, of the USA in the strengthening of Ukraine’s security shall consist rather in promotion of the political stability and strengthening of economic and defensive capacities of the country than in its involvement into Western collective security systems. This obviously corresponds to strategic interests of the West. The actual way of implementation of such promotion consists in Ukraine’s proceeding to the level of not declarative but actual strategic partnership with the USA, as well as in its inclusion into the European collective security system.

Another way of strengthening of Ukraine’s stabilizing role in the region could be its accession to the functioning of European and West-European security structures owing to creation of a strategic axis Brussels—Warsaw—Kyiv at the North direction and axis Brussels—Kyiv—Ankara at the South direction. Closing the strategic axis of European security Brussels—Warsaw—Kyiv—Ankara, Ukraine could become a center for creation of a stability belt in Eastern Europe, which would spread from the Baltic countries through Poland to Ukraine. Further, the strategic axis, which would make it possible to stabilize the whole South-Eastern region of the post-Soviet space, is to spread along the line Kyiv—Chisinau—Tbilisi—Baku.

A strategic triangle Poland—Ukraine—Lithuania may become another subregional determinant of stability in CEE. The summit, which took place on 5 August 1997 at the Vilnius international conference "Co-Existence of States and Good-Neighbour Relationship – Guarantee of Security and Stability in Europe" became the actual step of implementation of such cooperation. Cooperation of Ukraine and Poland became the main axis of this alliance in the security sphere.

Although Ukrainian diplomacy is rather good in this regard, it should not be the only instrument in providing national security of the country. In the conditions of tough policies of the great powers, when Ukraine found itself on the crossroads of geopolitical interests, the perspectives of the policy of compromises has become rather limited. In this situation foreign policy of the country should be grounded upon usage of influence of one of the great powers and its own power mechanisms.

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE AND UKRAINE’S POLICY

The deep social-political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe have stipulated qualitative changes in the continent’s geopolitical structure. The vanishing of bipolar security system based on a global military-political and ideological opposition led to the change of the paradigm of international security and promotion of entirely new problems to the foreground.

The first, most general group of such problems deals with the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery vehicles; extension of "traditional" and political terrorism threatening regional stability. Both groups of issues create particular external threats to European countries. Another group of problems is connected with the emergence of "security vacuum" in Central and Eastern Europe, which created grounds for tensions and conflict situations in this part of Europe, including the borders of Ukraine.

At the same time, the continent has inherited a complicated and insufficiently harmonious institutional structure of states’ interaction in security issues. In the formation of the framework of the new European security system, various approaches are shown by EU, NATO, WEU, CE. As a whole, they outline the priority of collective political, economic and international-law means of providing national interests in security sphere. Alongside with this, obvious are elements of disagreement in their standpoints, or rather in particular states’ vision of their role. In particular, it reflects in the modification of NATO’s strategic doctrine, in peculiarities of developing partnership relations between European states in military and political spheres, attempts of activation of OSCE’s activities as regards the prevention and settlement of military conflicts. Essential efforts are made to form up a coherent approach to security problems, principles of interaction of the existing security structures, and provision of sufficient security guarantees to everyone.

Though the new European security system does not envisage a strict hierarchy or subordination, it is most likely that NATO will become its core element. The North-Atlantic Alliance has proved to be the most effective and established collective security instrument. NATO proved its ability to guarantee security of its members, adjust to new conditions, transform from a purely defensive to a wide military-political security structure.

Today this organization is playing a significant role in the development of military and political cooperation in security sphere throughout Europe. NATO has essentially reduced and keeps on adapting its conventional and nuclear forces. Preserving the potential for the fulfillment of its duties regarding collective defense, NATO is extending its political functions, it has launched new missions in the sphere of the peace-making and crisis management within the framework of UN and OSCE mandates to respond to new challenges of security in teamwork with other European countries. The process of development of the concept of "European Element in the Security and Defense" within the Alliance is going on. It is developing wide and dynamic cooperation with the states-members to OSCE, in particular, through "Partnership for Peace" program, and interaction within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
The precondition of creation of an essentially new European security system consists in the involvement of Russia into this process. Russia keeps on the reduction of its armed forces, it has withdrawn its troops from the territories of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states, it takes part in peace-making operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the same time, the Central European countries' attempts to fill the "security vacuum" through accession to NATO gave rise to Russia's opposition. Especially strict is Russia's standpoint as regards the cooperation between the Alliance and ex-Soviet republics. Currently, the main geopolitical interests of Russia lie not in Europe (despite its importance), but in the "close abroad". They consist in the reintegration of the post-Soviet space or keeping it in the sphere of Russia's influence. Therefore the most important actual Russia's claim to NATO is to recognize Ukraine and the Baltic states as a zone of vital interests of the RF. Such recognition would mean an actual distribution of influence spheres in Europe, that may develop into the main obstacle to the creation of a coherent security space.

The political-diplomatic competition between NATO and Russia has led to partial results, which are nevertheless important from the point of view of the prospects of democratic transformations of the system of international relations. The Fundamental Act on Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and NATO has laid down that Russia and the Alliance do not regard each other as enemies. Their common goal consists in the overcoming of the remnants of confrontation and competition, strengthening of mutual confidence and cooperation. However the further practice has registered the preservation of essential discrepancies both in the estimation of NATO's role and in the general vision of value grounds of acceptable mechanisms of regional security provision. Actually, having ceded to the West in Central Europe, Russia focuses its efforts at the renovation of its complete control over the European part of the post-Soviet space.

Probable, the zone of NATO's direct responsibility after the enlargement will be still limited to Western and Central Europe. The further strengthening of stability and security in Eastern Europe, especially in the territory of NIS, in close future will be possible not through the accession to NATO, but on the basis of creation of other structures or forms of interaction of states and/or their alliances. The standpoint of Moscow creates artificial obstacles to the achievement of homogeneity of the security space.

The NATO's policy vis-a-vis the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is determined by the internal interests of the countries of the North-Atlantic Alliance, which consist in the necessity of preservation of NATO as the most effective organization providing their national security and playing an important political role, rather than by the direct threat from Russia. The NATO's eastward enlargement is also a response to the expansion of the coherent economic space and deepening of integration processes under a full-scale participation of the CEE countries. However this is possible under a stable and safe political situation in the Central and Eastern European countries. It is NATO's task to create such a favorable situation. In this meaning, the movement of NATO to the East constitutes an enlargement of "stability zone" NATO desires to extend the security system to strengthen democratic regimes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. to tie these states to the West and thus to stabilize the whole Central-Eastern subregion of Europe. Actually NATO does not wait for the European Union to express its readiness to expand and is, in fact, playing the role of the main locomotive of European integration.

The Alliance has played the key role in the prevention of aggravation of contradictions between Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. It certainly promoted the constructive approach of Bucharest to the settlement of territorial disputes between Romania and Ukraine.

The Russian opposition remains the only serious problem of consistent development of the NATO's influence, the positive role of which actually enjoys the all-European consensus. The understanding of madmissibility of a new confrontation determines certain compromises. These consist in the fact that the states-members to NATO confirm that they have no intentions, plans or reasons to deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of the new members to the Alliance and do not need to change any of the aspects of the construction of NATO's nuclear forces or the nuclear policy of NATO, and do not plan to do it in future. The Alliance has also declared that it had no intentions to create stocks of nuclear weapons in the territory of these countries, either through construction of new stocks, or through the adjusting of old ones.

Russia and the states-members to NATO, together with other states-parties to OSCE, shall strive for the strengthening of stability through further development of measures for prevention of any potentially threatening increase of conventional forces in the agreed zones of Europe, including Central and Eastern Europe. Russia and NATO have clarified their intentions as regards the location of their conventional armed forces under the new conditions of European security and expressed their readiness to consult on the issues of development of such locations within the framework of the Joint Permanent Council.

NATO stresses that under the current conditions and in the future the Alliance shall carry out its collective defense and other tasks through the provision of the necessary compatibility, integration and reinforcement potential, not resorting to additional permanent deployment of essential combat forces. Accordingly, it shall rely on adequate infrastructure of provision of the mentioned missions.

Owing to such compromises, there was achieved the main provision set forth in the Fundamental Act on Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and NATO signed on 27 May 1997 in Paris. The new grounds of relations between Russia and NATO consist in the fact that the parties "do not regard each other as enemies. The common goal of Russia and NATO consists in the overcoming of remnants of previous confrontation and opposition... and strengthening of mutual confidence and cooperation". The Fundamental Act affirms their being resolved to fill with concrete contents the common obligation of Russia and NATO regarding the creation of a stable, peaceful and indivisible Europe, coherent and free, for the benefit of all its nations. Russia and NATO intend to develop firm, stable and long-lasting partnership on the grounds of common interests, reciprocity and openness. Provided that these intentions acquire a concrete contents, it will be possible to build a new European security structure in accordance with the intentions of its authors.

The search of an adequate model of safeguarding national security has led Ukraine to the proclaiming in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the intentions to become in the future a permanently neutral state not taking part in military blocs. It is known that the non-aligned and neutrality principles were first of all addressed to
Russia, which was the source of potential threat to new independent states. One of the examples of Moscow’s reintegration strategy reflected in the attempts to involve Ukraine into participation in the Tashkent Pact or in the bilateral agreement on alliance in military sphere. The non-aligned principle allowed to avoid such a trap.

The non-aligned status does also fully correspond to the home-policy situation in Ukraine, which is determined by variable geopolitical orientation of its Western and Eastern regions, and thus allows to keep internal political stability in the country. At the same time, the non-aligned status has not yet received either appropriate international recognition or a concrete political substance.

The actual opportunity of achievement of recognition and formalization of the non-aligned and neutral status of Ukraine could have been implemented in the course of the Russian-NATO dialogue. At least, there was a chance for Ukraine to get clear legal security guarantees, provided the country accepted certain obligations alongside with this. The granting Ukraine security guarantees of a non-aligned country under international law could become a component of the NATO’s enlargement mechanism. In this context, it would be expedient to sign a trilateral agreement between Ukraine, Russia and NATO which would lay down common official and clear obligations of the two parties regarding Ukraine’s security. Under the current conditions, the necessity of ultimate settlement of stability and security issues within the triangle Brussels–Kyiv–Moscow remains topical.

The artificial obstacles on the way of the Alliance’s enlargement, as well as any limitations on the right of choice of partners must be removed. To develop the security guarantees granted to Ukraine, NATO and Russia could assume additional commitments regarding each other. For Russia, such commitments would remove the perceived probable NATO’s threat from the territory of Ukraine. NATO would not have to locate its armed forces and nuclear weapons in the territory of the new members of the Alliance under peace time. In response to this commitment of NATO, Russia would withdraw its troops from the territory of Ukraine and Moldova.

Appropriate commitments of Ukraine as a non-aligned state could look as follows: not to place its territory and air in anyone’s disposal location of foreign troops and aggression against third countries. Ukraine would keep the right to cooperate with any of the military-political alliances in the sphere of peace-making activities and strengthening European security.

However such guarantees would hardly be expected from Russia. The strengthening of Ukraine’s non-aligned status contradicts Russia’s interests. Despite the fact that the Constitution of Ukraine does not allow location of military bases in the territory of Ukraine, there are foreign military troops in the country, and Ukraine does not place the question before Russia of their withdrawal after the expire of the twenty-year lease of the military infrastructure by the Black Sea Fleet.

The absence of clear security guarantees, which could have proceeded from the non-aligned status, makes Ukraine strengthening its own national security and defence systems on one hand and integrating into the European collective security structures on the other hand. The integration of Ukraine into the European security structures constitutes a strategic direction of its foreign and military policies.

When determining the new European security architecture, one should be guided by at least three basic approaches: range, problem and structural (system) ones. According to the first approach, the European security consists of two levels: subregional and regional. The second approach envisages an examination of the

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**Figure 1. European Security Architecture**

![Diagram of European Security Architecture](image)

**Organizations**
- OSCE
- NATO
- EU
- WEO
- CEI
- BSEC
- CIS

**Regional Level**

**Subregional Level**

**Problems:**
- strengthening stability in Europe under preservation of geopolitical heterogeneity;
- prevention of conflicts, crisis management, peace-keeping, settlement of conflicts;
- arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- strengthening military confidence and development of military cooperation

Currently, the main international security problems in Europe are as follows:

1. the strengthening of stability in Europe under preservation of geopolitical heterogeneity,
2. PARAMETERS OF DIFFERENTIATION OF SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Central Europe should be understood as a group of countries situated in the center of Europe between Germany and the Russian Federation, and between the Baltic Sea and the Balkans. These are Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Moldova. Taking into account the common past and the current condition of the countries of the region, we have grounds for speaking about common peculiarities of geopolitical situation of the Central European Region (CER) and trends of its near future development. Separate is the problem of the self-isolation of Belarus, its exclusion from the region to which we shall pay attention below.

Historically, these countries had always been related with numerous cultural, economic and political ties. The fate of peoples of this region had been for a long time determined by relations between the Russian empire and the Central powers (Austro-Hungary and Germany), which divided this space. The processes of formation of national states in the region had an anti-imperial and generally democratic orientation. The latter was also stimulated by the fact that the external powers, which national-liberation movements could rely on – such Western democratic states as England, France, the USA – were interested in the weakening and destruction of European empires. However most countries of the region have undergone periods of totalitarian dictatorship of their own, national or external, imperial type; but finally the CER societies formed a dominating consensus as regards the necessity of a democratic development.

The Slavic element and Christianity in the form of Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism are overwhelming in the region. Though there are certain ethnic and confessional contradictions, they do not play a leading role in the current political processes in the region. This is a positive difference of the CER from the neighboring Balkans.

All countries of the region are parts of the post-Communist space, they were members of the Warsaw pact and the COMECON i.e. were included into the sphere of Moscow's influence. After the USSR collapse they entered the condition of economic and social-political transformations by Western samples. In geopolitical vision, it looks like "quitting of the Soviet past" and "return to Europe". Subject to a number of determinants, this trend acquires different rates for different states and has peculiar features in relation thereto, but it is common for all of these states.

Currently, the general geopolitical situation in Central Europe is determined by three main factors:

1. NATO's eastward enlargement, that began after the decision of admittance of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the Alliance and the process of the European Community's extension connected therewith;

2. the financial-economic crisis in the Russian Federation, which questioned the processes of social-economic transformation in this country and led to activation of left-wing radical and national-patriotic forces of anti-Western and
anti-NATO orientation enforcing their influence on the global foreign policy of Russia.

3. formation of preconditions for internal regional integration with further understanding of peculiarities and unity of national interests of countries of the region.

The geopolitics are dominated by the idea that "vacuum of forces" emerging after weakening or quitting the geopolitical game by any foreign-policy power is to be filled either by other external power or by the growth of "local force". Such vacuum emerged in Central-Eastern Europe as a result of collapse of the USSR and "Socialist Camp" system. Simultaneously, a dual process began. Firstly, re-orientation of countries of the region at the West expressed in the striving for accession to NATO and the EU. Secondly, internal consolidation through the formation of local subregional structures and the Baltic and Black Sea systems as a whole. These processes are taking place against the background of the remnant forms of opposition of post-Communist and post-Soviet forces grounded on orientation at influential political forces of the RF. Thus, a great "Central-European game" is observed, where pro-Russian, and local trends are interacting. The configuration and dynamics of struggle of the mentioned forces determines the current geopolitical situation in the region.

The stability of the whole European security to a great extent depends on the Central-European area. Actually, they determine and will determine in future the status and structure of this security. These very countries find themselves in the heart of discussions on NATO's enlargement, they are the subject of the current concealed acute struggle between the North-Atlantic Alliance countries, first of all - the USA, on one part and the Russian Federation on the other part.

Currently, the situation looks as follows. The decision on accession to NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic has been taken. The process of integration of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia into the EU has been launched. Strategic interests of the Baltic states, Romania and Slovakia (after the elections of October, 1998) are oriented at the West. On the other hand, the Russian Federation established a total political and military domination in Belarus. The fate of Ukraine and Moldova remains uncertain.

As a whole, an impression may occur that a new geopolitical configuration based on a renewed confrontation of Europe and the RF is being gradually formed: i.e. one should expect a new divide of the world order they perceive the reflection of "class struggle" and a condition of renewal of Moscow's global importance. Deepening of the economic non-stability in the RF and emergence of a serious and permanent political crisis are rather likely. The West's refusal to render a broad economic assistance to the RF increases the chances of coming to power of national-patriotic politicians with their imperial ambitions. Probably, some short-sighted "realists" among Western politicians will welcome such a development of events. The West is surviving a certain loss of orientation having found itself in a position of "a winner without victory", i.e. having obtained the geopolitical vacuum without application of essential efforts. It seems attractive to some persons to return to the common confrontation stereotypes of analysis and estimation of the situation. It would be a logical response from the West to increase military budgets (that is already taking place in the USA) and build-up of new arms systems.

For politicians of the Central European countries, in case of confrontation development, there is a task of a most rapid consolidation "at this side of the curtain" and an intensified integration into Europe, to have the division line possibly most far from their Eastern borders.

The situation looks most problematic for Ukraine. For this state, the prospect of turning into a "cordon sanitaire" of Europe grows actual with the confrontation paradigm becoming the dominating one and European space closed. Another alternative is even worse - loss of independence and inclusion into a "renewed Union".

At last, as a whole, if the confrontation paradigm prevails, Central-Eastern Europe will re-acquire the role of the main theater of military-political opposition as under two world wars and the "Cold War" era.

In the beginning of the 90's, an idea of the Baltic and Black Sea cooperation as a zone of security of the countries of the region emerged in the leading circles of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, and a number of other countries looking for an acceptable alternative to the relations with the West and the Russian Federation. It was initiated in 1992-1993 for the first place by the President of Poland in a form of proposal of creation of a "NATO-bis." Then, the hope of Poland for joining NATO was raised, and this idea emerged as an interim variant in view of the security vacuum in the region and the declared ambitions of Russia to the renewal of its domination in this space.

By the time, Ukraine found itself in a certain political and economic vacuum. Despite the general international recognition, Ukraine did not have sufficient security guarantees and strategic partners and allies. The interests of foreign countries towards Ukraine looked too selfish and short-lasting. The West was generally oriented at democratic processes in Russia, the opportunities of Ukraine looking less attractive. Ukraine remained an informational "terra incognita". The West, having won in Ukraine's nuclear disarmament in a bloc with Russia, lost its interest to Ukraine.

Ukraine occupies the key position in the Baltic and Black Sea area, but its geopolitical situation does not look secure from the point of view of international security. Geostategically, Ukraine is an important link of the European security system, but on the other hand it finds itself in the center of opposition between NATO and the RF. The actual threat to turn into a "cordon sanitaire" places the question of an intensified integration into Europe, but the current economic dependence on Russia deters the taking of a final decision in this respect. Political circles of Russia regard the cooperation between Ukraine and NATO with a certain suspicion, and its possible accession to NATO - as a disaster, taking into account the issues of its own security and military-political plans. The Russian Federation
finds itself beyond the limits of the Central-European trends of regional development.

For Ukraine, the essence of the Baltic and Black Sea idea was that the formation of a regional bloc should create a stable international environment, would be a deterrence factor regarding Russia's encroachment on its territory and confirm the independent existence of the state. Thus, a regional system withdrawn from the field of confrontational relations of global world powers and corresponding to the scheme of multipolar world order can be formed. It was not excluded that in the future this regional structure, together with other ones, could become elements of a comprehensive European security system. The bringing together of the CER countries would allow to oppose external factors of political and economic domination and create conditions for equal cooperation and really democratic united Europe.

As well as any novation, the idea of the Baltic and Black Sea alliance met numerous opponents grounding their opinion on the following arguments:

1. the main idea of consolidation looks as a "confrontation" one – it is based on being afraid of Russia's ambitions, not on positive impact to mutually beneficial cooperation and regional development.

2. a reliable economic ground of the alliance is absent, because its potential participants required approximately the same things: leading technologies from the West and energy materials from the East. In the obtaining of the above they are competitors, while as exporters they could suggest almost the same list of goods.

3. there are social-cultural divergences between the countries of the region, that causes ethnic and confessional contradictions and conflicts.

4. the probable members of the alliance have different chances to integration into Europe, to which various foreign-policy orientations of political elites and population are correspond.

Certainly, all these arguments have appropriate answer. The main sense of the Baltic and Black Sea idea was not of confrontation character. On the contrary, a build-up of multi-polar and multi-vector relations between the countries of the region and external forces was envisaged. It can be understood against the very background of opposition between the West and the RF, which than especially stressed its democratic and market choice.

The economic ground of the new system could consist in the implementation of a wide-scale joint cooperation project based generally on internal investments and supported by international financial institutions. The social-cultural divergences were not so dominating to suffice for undermining of the regional consolidation process.

However, the realization of opportunity for a number of countries to join European structures was actual indeed. The intensification of this process during the next years and the beginning of involvement of a number of countries of the region into NATO and the European Community resulted in an essential hindrance to the process of the Baltic and Black Sea idea's development.

Effective steps aimed at the destruction of the idea were undertaken by the Russian diplomacy. The official Kyiv, as well as the leadership of many other states did not dare speak against its thesis on the RF's affiliation to the region. Alongside with this, there were allusions to the presence of the Kaliningrad region (the Baltic) within the RF, and the RF's facing the Black Sea. An assumed accession of Russia to the region would deprive the idea of any sense.

Today, there is an opinion that the idea of the Baltic and Black Sea alliance in its initial form has gone to the past. However this does not mean that it is not possible at all as a system of a more close economic and political cooperation of the countries of the region on the basis of mutual interests. Taking into account the new realities of the European world, we can affirm that the new stage of the development of this idea is to take place in the context of all-European interests, under a situation when most countries of the region shall join the European community and NATO. Thus, the new system has to be built under the auspices of European structures as one of the key zones of European security and cooperation.

Currently, the Baltic and Black Sea idea is in a latent condition. The main trend of the build-up of the Central-European space consists in the strengthening and comprehensive development of bilateral relations and ties between particular states. First of all, it is necessary to find mutually beneficial forms of cooperation in the general field of democracy and market economy and appropriate forms of political and economic cooperation for effective inclusion into the European and world order. Stage by stage, a common center of interests of particular elements of the Central-European region, which will determine the general features of common regional policy of the countries of this space, should emerge.

A peculiar feature of the current situation consists in a crisis of all-regional integration processes. A certain lack of intensity of the Vyshnegrad group's activities is felt, the development of frontier cooperation not supported sufficiently. The countries of the region focus their efforts at the West integration direction. The states, joining NATO, pay much of their efforts to meet the standards and requirements accepted there democratization of society and market reforms, civil control over the armed forces, absence of interstate conflicts and territorial claims, etc. These very requirements are playing the role of a stabilizing factor in Europe. It is sufficient to mention the rapid advance of the Ukrainian-Romanian and Romanian-Hungarian negotiations under a situation where Romania faced an actual chance to join the first wave of NATO's enlargement. The prospects of the future membership in such organizations as NATO and EU make the governments of the countries adhere to the requirements of these organizations as for the reformation of all spheres of public life on the principles admitted in developed democratic countries.

It is clear, that under such situation it is difficult for CER countries to focus at regional issues. The West is trying to intensify regional cooperation through various measures involving CEE countries into joint projects, stressing the political importance of regional cooperation, etc. However it is not sufficient to make Central-Europeans create their own powerful political and economic initiatives.

In the near future, such a condition may lead to Ukraine's moral isolation, the priority of relations with which is rather declared than receiving a serious material and intellectual support. Besides, during the negotiations on the accession of the CER countries to the European Union, the latter requires from the aspirants a cardinal enforcement of control (customs, visa, etc.) at their Western borders. There is a danger of decline of goods turnover and cultural cooperation between the CER countries and Ukraine.
Lunder such conditions, the realization of the concept of Ukraine's European integration with usage of the "Central-European springboard" is going to grow considerably. We can only hope that the "lobbyist" efforts of, say, Poland as for promotion of realization of Ukraine's national interest will go on. An objective negative factor impeding the activation of Ukraine's relations with the CER countries consists in the further aggravation of the gap in the rates and effectiveness of reforms. Ukraine's lagging from the countries of the region is turning into a permanent process resulting in a general lessening of Ukraine's importance as a reliable and effective partner. The rapid adaptation of the CER countries to the principles and standards of the European community shall complicate Ukraine's closing with these states, first of all in economic sphere. The absence of sufficient resources is going to make impossible the introduction of big joint projects with the firms and states of CER, turning Ukraine into a second-rank partner in the realization of regional initiatives. The dynamic development of Central-European states under a further decrease of Ukrainian economy is going to lead to a situation when business circles of the neighbor states shall perceive in Ukraine exclusively a market of cheap labor resources and a consumer satisfied with cheap and low-quality goods made in Eastern Europe.

The economic lagging of the state shall have a negative effect on the prospects of its political leadership in the region. The economically and politically weak Ukraine shall be unable to carry out an active and, what is essential - effective foreign policy aimed at an actual (not declarative) deepening of regional integration and strengthening security. Not to mention the realization of such projects as, for instance, representation of CEE's interests in the UN Security Council.

An intensive development of cooperation with the CEE countries becomes crucial for the intensification of European integration process, whereas for a number of reasons Ukraine is not sufficiently ready to be a full-value partner of West-European countries. In turn, the CEE countries are concerned about the development of relations and moreover - in a comprehensive support of Ukraine. They perfectly understand that the preservation of a democratic Ukraine is vitally important for their own national security and sovereignty. This determinant grew especially important after the self-isolation of Belarus and in the context of the trends of the growth of political non-stability in Moscow.

Whatever were the slogans of the development of cooperation and security system within CER, the Ukrainian-Polish relations shall have crucial importance therein. These are two largest countries in this part of Europe, and their fruitful cooperation has not only regional, but also an all-European importance. The latest contacts at the summit level between Ukraine and Poland give a certain hope for a new breath in the development of the Baltic and Black Sea idea. Poland is actively striving for the role of a representative of Ukraine's interests in the new Europe, feeling that this role will essentially intensify its own accession to the European community and strengthen the influence and authority of both countries at the international arena. As it was correctly stressed by Lech Balcerowicz, Poland had nothing to do in Europe without Ukraine, but the presence of both Central-European countries in the world will essentially increase the influence of each of them.

The Ukrainian-Polish relations had been rapidly developing since 1990. under a support of most Polish leaders. The Republic of Poland was the first one to recognize Ukraine as an independent state in May, 1992. The Polish-Ukrainian Treaty on Good-Neighbourship, Friendly Relations and Cooperation was signed, which included rejection of territorial encroachments in the present and in the future, refusal from the use of force and allotment of own territory for aggression against the other party. In May 1993, President of Poland visited Ukraine to declare that "an independent Ukraine is a condition for the existence of an independent Poland". Further, the Ukrainian-Polish relations were developed intensively.

There in a unity of geopolitical interests of Poland and Ukraine. This gives grounds to set up partnership and ally relations in their strategic dimension. The role played by Poland for Ukraine can be defined by the formula "to Europe with a help from Poland". For Poland, Ukraine is playing the role of an outpost of stability and security at its Eastern borders. The main trends of cooperation between Poland and Ukraine in the military-political sphere should consist in joint consultation bodies, which would coordinate military and foreign policies in security sphere, creation of joint military units, deepening of military-industrial cooperation, extension of joint exercises and maneuvers program, educational programs, exchange of military construction experience and mutual assistance in this sphere.

An accession of another significant country of the region, Romania, to the Ukrainian-Polish axis is possible. After the settlement of relations between Ukraine and Romania by the signing of the wide-scale Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries on 2 June 1997, the Ukrainian-Polish-Romanian triangle idea obtained chances for realization.

The Baltic countries, reviewing their restricted standpoint as for other states of the post-Soviet space and giving an actual estimation of their opportunities and terms of accession to NATO and the EU, are nowadays more inclined to the idea of the Baltic and Black Sea cooperation, recognizing the important role of Warsaw and Kyiv in this regard. Stage by stage, Ukraine broadened her relations with the Baltic states, which as a general shared her security concepts. The Baltic republics and Ukraine were first of the ex-Soviet republics to join the program of partnership with NATO. The Lithuanian President V. Brazdys told the current residence of Ukraine regarding the necessity of formation of a Central-European security zone.

The growing cooperation in political, economic, communications and transport spheres objectively meets the national interests of all CER countries and may essentially simplify and intensify the processes of transformation of their economies and integration into European structures. The situation arising currently in the CEE region is generally favorable for cooperation. Political elites of the countries of the region are consistently deepening the democratization of social-political relations and adhering to market reforms orientation. As a general, the economic situation in the region remains stable, despite certain difficulties. The reformation of the armed forces is going on, systems of civil control over them are introduced. In foreign policy, the countries of the region adhere to the fundamental principles of the OSCE and other standards of good-neighbourness.

In the economic sphere, it is necessary to stress the promotion of realization of joint business and production projects together with the countries of the region intergovernmental projects aimed at the build-up of transport infrastructure, communication networks, etc., are possible. Within the framework of regional cooperation, it would be necessary to attach a new impact to the idea of creation of new "Euroregions" and extension of the scope of activities of the existing interstate formations (the Carpathian Euroregion, the "Bug river" Euroregion, etc.).
The economic determinants constitute a powerful impact for the development of Ukraine's interaction with other CER countries, which are seriously concerned about the development of economic cooperation with Ukraine as one of the most essential prospect markets, their goods supplies thereto being much more easy and accessible. Developing cooperation with the CER countries and supporting their striving for accession to NATO and the EU, Ukraine could hope a more soon obtaining of an equal membership in the Central European Initiative and the Central European Free Trade Organization.

Such cooperation and common borders with the new NATO and EU members will to a significant extent promote the security of Ukraine itself and stimulate the process of accession to these structures. An effective and close cooperation of CER countries is a necessary precondition and an important transition stage of Ukraine's joining the European civilization space.

A comparative analysis of the course of internal transformations in the post-Communist countries allows to expose several models of formulating and realization of national strategy in the security sphere. First of all, the model of "soonest accession to NATO": it has been chosen and is being realized by the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, including all Western neighbours of Ukraine. As a rule, these are countries which have completed the transition towards stable political democracy in the society and market relations in the economy. Their geopolitical orientations are clearly determined and consist in an unconditional and full-scale reintegration into the European (Euro-Atlantic) space. Among the post-Soviet countries such a strategy is persistently realized by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

The Baltic countries have clearly determined their geopolitical priorities. The main of them consists in the development of cooperation with the North-European countries and in the intention to achieve a complete access to all European security structures. Such a geopolitical choice is supported by the overwhelming majority of population despite a rather high percentage of ethnic Russians therein. In Latvia it makes 34%, in Lithuania – 4.9%, in Estonia – 30.6%. Under such indices and trends of development one should expect that in close future the Baltic states are to become members if not of NATO, than of EU and WEU.

Another model consists in "post-Soviet space reintegration". Relying on Russia as an alternative power center. Such a model envisages reputation of accession to European security structures with a simultaneous orientation at a deep military-political, military-technical and economic integration with Russia. Under such situation, cooperation with the countries of the West is only possible in the light of interests of Russia and with the help of Russia. In practice, such an orientation has been chosen by only one country – Belarus.

The election of populist A. Lukashenko to the post of President of Belarus in summer 1994 intensified the Belarus's quitting the CEE region and rapprochement with the RF.

The economic and monetary alliance of Belarus and the RF (January, 1994) braked the internal reforms and intensified economic integration. On 11 January, 1994, a comprehensive military agreement between the RF and Belarus was signed. In the case of conflict between the RF and Ukraine, the former could use its military bases in Belarus. In October, 1998 the ministers for defense of the RF and Belarus declared the approval of a joint plan of military measures for resistance to NATO's eastward enlargement.

However we do hope that it is not time to stop calculating on Belarus as a country strategically important for CEE security. Regarding Belarus, Ukraine could potentially play the same role Poland is playing for Ukraine. Ukraine could align in the same way that independence of Ukraine is impossible without an independent and democratic Belarus. It is not occasional that A. Lukashenko and his model are so attractive for political forces in Ukraine speaking against integration into Europe and her liquidation as an independent state, a positive determinant of European security. The repeated provoking statements of A. Lukashenko on the inevitability and necessity of Ukraine's involvement into the alliance of Belarus and Russia testify to this fact.

As far as reasons concerns which made Belarus choose this very model, we can determine the main one – lack of self-sufficiency of the Belarusian economy, its dependence on Russian oil and gas, as well as on Russian markets. To preserve a developed economic basis and social stability in the country, it was necessary either to carry out cardinal market reforms according to the example of Western and Northern neighbours or, that would necessarily lead to fundamental reorientation of economic ties at the West and weaken the dependence on Russia, or, not resorting to essential changes, to reanimate the old economic relations in the CIS, which existed within the framework of the coherent economic complex of the ex-USSR.

The dependence of Belarus on the CIS countries, and first of all on Russia, reaches at raw – 70%; at energy resources – 90%; at import – 80%; at export – 90%2. The integration orientations of A. Lukashenko at Russia, which enjoyed total support among the population of Belarus (more than 90%) coincided with the reintegration policies of Russia. Besides, the weakness of social strata able to render direct support to reforms policy, weakness of counterelite, the spread of anti-Western sentiments influence the situation negatively.

The concept of "Slavic unity", common historical fate of "three brotherly peoples" and particular relations within the triangle Belarus–Russia–Ukraine serves the ideological basis of the model of "expected accession to Russia". A. Lukashenko repeatedly declared that he assumed the role of the统战ic pole and creation of a coherent pan-Slavic Slavic union. Calling Ukraine to join the Belarusian-Russian union during his visit to Kyiv in May, 1997. A. Lukashenko stressed "... it was the will of God, we were destined to have big ideas about many things lately – we became spoken about as of a same republic able to embody the Slavic unity".

As regards Ukraine, despite a certain similarity of external geopolitical and military-political determinants, it essentially differs from the Baltic states and Belarus. These are internal determinants, that do not allow Ukraine to develop consistent relations with European security structures, but at the same time they stipulate isolation from Russia, if not in economy, than in policy, in particular – in security issues.

24.3% of the Ukrainian export falls on Russia, while Russia's share in the gross import of Ukraine makes 56.1%. Compare: the Germany's share in Ukraine's import makes 5.3% in export – 6.7%. Negative balance of external trade for 5 months of

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1 Vesnik statistiki: Niremm SSSR 1990 – N7, tables 5, 6. – P. 12
3 Interfax Ukraine. 1998.06.17.
bargaining with foreigners. National interest is the crucial point! Our market is not a world dump! Ukrainian rockets, aircraft, tools, vessels and a lot of other things can and must be sold abroad at profitable conditions. If we leave world markets, our place will be occupied by others. Foreign energy resources should not be a yoke for Ukraine! We should extract own ones. If it does not suffice — we shall buy them at profitable conditions. We should have more partners, good and various! The energy sector is a national security problem. We shall turn Ukraine into one of the world centers of trade and international communications. Our foreign policy shall be based exclusively on Ukraine’s national interests. We shall maintain its multi-vector character, granting priority to friendly relations with the neighbor states, first of all with the CIS countries, a gradual Ukraine’s integration into European and world community, international and regional organizations active participation in preventing armed conflicts, supporting of NATO’s transformation into a collective security system. We shall insist on granting Ukraine the guarantees of security and territorial integrity from the world community, first of all from nuclear powers.”

All-Ukrainian alignment “Hromada” (4.68%): “... Protection of interests of the domestic manufacturers and consumers should be guaranteed. Renovation of the lost market positions in the CIS countries and a gradual expansion to new international markets are the urgent task. We shall by all means stimulate the development of the export-oriented production branches. Ukraine’s transit potential shall be used to a full extent as an item of export activities. The mechanisms of external economic activities shall be improved and oriented at an intensified integration of Ukraine into the world economy. Adherence to integration into world and European structures, development of strategic partnership with the USA and friendly relations with the CIS countries, especially with Russia.”

Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (4.05%): “... Ukraine should be protected from colonization. Ukraine’s external debt is growing from USD 400 million in 1992 to USD 12 billion in 1997. These credits are secured with enterprises being sold off, sales of the land have been launched... our program is oriented at protection of the domestic markets and manufacturers. An urgent denunciation of the agreement with the International Monetary Fund and proscription of all advisors of international financial institutions from Ukraine is the obligatory condition of realization of our program... we should undertake protectionist measures in external economic activities, first of all regarding the protection of domestic agricultural market... Russia and Belarus should be recognized to be strategic allies of Ukraine. The policy of fraternal peoples’ opposition should be blamed. The Charter on Distinctive Cooperation with NATO should be denounced.”

Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (4.01%): “... Social-Democrats managed to build a society of social equity in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Austria and other countries of the Western Europe. With a help of our citizens we can do it in Ukraine... Granting high priority to the domestic manufacturers, protection of domestic markets, lowering of Ukraine’s dependence on foreign energy resources... strengthening sovereignty, integrity and inviolability of Ukraine’s territory, strengthening the authority of our state in the world... reformation of the army which would not make the country’s defensive capacity vulnerable... we speak against Ukraine’s economic dependence on other states.”

1998 made USD 1,065 million. Ukraine’s debt to Russia in the beginning of the year made USD 383 million. Ukraine is one of the main consumers of Russian energy resources. Ukraine purchases 30% (57.2 billion cubic meters) of 196.5 billion cubic meters of gas exported by Russia.

The great dependence on Russia, especially of the Eastern industrial regions of Ukraine, supports pro-Russian geopolitical orientations among a part of the population. At the same time, aggravation of economic situation in Ukraine has led to the strengthening of the left-wing forces’ positions in the parliament. Though they do not have firm majority at the Supreme Rada, there is probability of their direct influence on the country’s foreign policy. Activization of attempts of reintegration at the post-Soviet space becomes still more probable after the September (1998) changes in the Russian government.

The parties’ actual involvement into political process, which took place due to the new electoral law, gave the opportunity to obtain an incomplete but still more clear picture of popularity of these or those political orientations and the possibility of their realization. The election programs of the parties and blocs having passed to the Supreme Rada contain the following provisions as regard to foreign and security policies:

Communist Party of Ukraine (24.65% of votes at the multi-mandate constituency): “Ukraine should join a voluntary union of fraternal peoples... throw away the own and the strange ownership... Ukraine... is rapidly turning into a ‘banana republic’ having no future, into a puppet of NATO and financial structures of the West. The domestic manufacturer shall be protected from foreign interventionists”.

People’s Right of Ukraine (9.40%): “The foreign policy of Ukraine shall be based on the principles of economic, political and military integration into Europe. At the same time we shall insist on withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Ukraine obtaining Ukraine’s share in the ex-USSR assets. Equal and mutually beneficial relations with all states shall safeguard Ukraine from turning into a ‘raw appendix’ of developed countries and the market of low-quality imported output”.

Electoral bloc of Socialist Party of Ukraine and Peasants’ Party “For the Truth for People, for Ukraine!” (8.56%): “... Sovereignty, security and equal partnership!... the disgusting practice of dictates of international financial institutions regarding Ukraine should be stopped;... the unjustified import of food should be stopped;... a better export of agricultural produce to the countries of CIS and other countries should be provided;... the foreign policy should be in the interest of the state, we should not let Ukraine turn into a colony, a NATO’s appendix. We shall develop good-neighborly, fraternal economic and political relations, first of all with the Slavic world, Russia and Belarus, other states.”

The Green Party of Ukraine (5.44%): “We suggest to arrange a Green summer Olympiad in Ukraine. We propose to form a permanent Ukrainian detachment of the UN peace-making forces of the officers retired during the reduction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukraine should be a non-aligned neutral state.”

People’s Democratic Party (5.01%): “... International credits are not a gift. We should take them only under conditions beneficial for Ukraine. We should not have losses...”

Ibid
2 Zv’yazheny zovnishnokhozyaistveny balans Ukrainy za 1997 rr. Derzhavni komitett statistyky Ukrainy
3 Ekspresa-Dopovid’ 174, 16. 02. 98.
4 Russian
3. GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF UKRAINE

Ukraine has already gained a formal foothold at the international arena. Nevertheless, its formation as a capable actor and attractive partner, a strong element of the system of international relations has far not become the only possible perspective for its development. The current dynamic international relations, particularly the European ones, are extremely rigorous to those trying to become their actor on an equal footing. Never before country’s progress in its internal democratization, backing the rule of law, and establishment of efficient economy and social sphere was so important for defining the country’s international position. In this context it is evident that the Ukrainian state as an international actor has not acquire yet neither attractive nor even clear features. Its place and role in the new Europe is not completely ponderable while further damping of social transformations brings forth a dangerous perspective of fixing the state of isolation or deepening dependence upon external factors.

The complex dynamics of the modern geopolitical shifts is qualitatively changing the international space Ukraine belongs to. Dissolution of the Eastern bloc created preconditions for development of the new Europe, dissolution of the USSR originated new sources of geopolitical ambiguity and inconsistency. Establishment of European unity requires Eurasian disintegration and geopolitical reconstruction of the space of the former Eastern bloc, including its post-Soviet component. The latter brings elements of withstanding in the process. Ukraine finds itself in its very epicentre.

The Euro-Atlantic space is a unique and the most complicated of the present geopolitical formations. It emerged during the last years as a certain coherent phenomenon, having united the former antagonists – the “West” and the “East” and absorbed the difficult problems of post-confrontation geopolitical transformations. This space, which consists of two regions, one of them being enlarged at the expense of the other one, first of all outlines the format of the post-Communist world evolution under the new role of the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) and of Russia.

The mutually integrated Western states make the Euro-Atlantic community, which is the most capable and initiative actor of the present geopolitical transformations and is simultaneously solving three following problems:

1. deepening and improvement of mutual cooperation;
2. eastward enlargement;
3. establishing entirely new relations with Russia.

This has the greatest influence on changing the situation in the European continent.

The present condition and opportunities of cooperation between Ukraine and its natural partners – the countries of the CEE – cannot prevent the aggravation of qualitative differences between them emerging from different direction and outcome of social transformations. The threat of a new delimitation of Europe as a result of “falling out” of some countries, in particular of Ukraine, from the general paradigm of development still exists.
The probability of the orthodox left-wing forces' regaining power in Ukraine, as well as strengthening of the oligarchy and clan model of the state, constitutes an obstacle for its joining the system of European relations on equal conditions. Actually, it does not concern the growth of external threats, but it would exclude the opportunities of developing effective international ties and caused an attaching to Ukraine a status of outsider.

A dangerous lag of Ukraine from the processes of building up the new Europe draws the prospect of worsening of geopolitical and therefore international status of the state.

The transition period the post-Soviet space is surviving has to result in its ceasing as a separate coherent region. It is evident that its geopolitical prospects, including the long-term order, cannot be automatically connected with integration into Europe. By the present, the heterogeneity of the region has caused intensification of away-from-center trends of both Western and Southern directions. It stipulates the controversy of the international situation of Russia which is actually doomed to lose the zones of monopolist influence and to act as a single country-region. Moscow is trying to avoid such a prospect and actually straightforwardly impedes the mature transformations. Today it is reflected in the complicated political-diplomatic struggle concerning the geopolitical future of the Baltic states. Without any doubt, the actually postponed dispute as regards the place of Ukraine in the relations between Russia and the West will be even more dramatic.

The European continent has scored most advantages of the demounting of the Soviet bloc and the system of military-political and ideological dissent. Nevertheless, the real reestablishment of homogeneity of this space and stability depends upon the essence of internal transformations of the post-Communist states, particularly the NIS. Further development of the integration processes and efficiency of the new security system are directly preconditioned by the ability of the members of the European unity to recognize a system of similar social values and basic principles of national being. Only on this basis can the real mutual confidence and efficient cooperation in the fields of security and development be achieved.

The specificity of geopolitical coordinates of Ukraine consists in its simultaneous presence in two regions - Europe and Eurasia. In both regions, Ukraine occupies the peripheral place. Trying to refrain from integrating with Eurasia and being unable to realize the European alternative, the country deadlocks itself in a geopolitical vagueness. It is a not subject which forms the geopolitical space around itself, and remains a generally passive object of large-scale processes taking place in the new Europe.

The Russian factor, to which Ukraine still is very vulnerable, is objectively the main problem of providing stability and security in Europe. Such a role is caused by country's qualitative internal characteristics and national interests' inconsistency with the interests of the European community of nations. The problem has both objective and subjective components, the principle being Moscow's denial to play according to the rules of the Euro-Atlantic community, acceptable for the numerous bidders for NATO membership. Russia's policy shows its unwillingness, on the one hand, to put away its special rights and role and, on the other hand, to be isolated therefore. This policy has been completely accepted and is widely pursued by all the major political forces. At the same time the latter have an exhaustively cleansed vision of the strategy of development and even the essence of the national interests making prospective Russian actions at the international arena dangerously unpredictable.

Security with the CIS, as well as security based upon a separate strategic military-political partnership with Russia, will never be security of independent Ukrainian state. There is still no conditions for the real civilized parity relations at the post-Soviet space, furthermore, such relations have not assumed all features of international ones. The reason is incompleteness and, to some extent, lack of organic driving force of the formation of the NIS, as well as fundamental objective and subjective obstacles to overcoming their "republican complex". Internal and external factors of the Eurasian politics are naturally tangled: domestic ones being of a huge amplitude and instability. Russia actually does not recognize Ukraine's non-aligned status thus preventing its establishment. In the close future the Russian military presence in Ukraine and exploitation of its military infrastructure is likely to remain an important feature of the military-political position of Kyiv, thereby a feature more significant against背景下 participation in the PRC, the Ukraine-Poland-Russia triangle, and implementation of the Ukraine-NATO Charter on a Distinctive Partnership.

In this conditions, the non-aligned status of Ukraine means just abstaining from the fullfledged and synchronous participation in all-European processes. Such status actually means nothing else than a peculiar - Ukrainian - bipolarity. Kyiv's relatively active policy on the European direction looks like reflex actions aimed at the prevention of the deemed danger of isolation as well as compensation of the Russian factor. There is no advance towards European standards of organization of the society and state.

Practically important for Ukraine is clear vision of the appropriate "dosage" of the strategies' mix accepted in the international usage - first of all, in the security sphere - by its major partners. Simultaneous harmonization of relations both with Russia and the West is a tough imperative for Ukraine's current and prospective foreign policy. The need to choose between these two directions would mean a risky undermining of Ukraine's national interests. In the present-day situation Kyiv has to conduct the policy of complex maneuvering, which makes implementation of its own strategy and more or less effective safeguarding the national interests almost impossible.

Crossing of the Russian and European influences on such a unique object as Ukraine is intensifying and turning into direct competition. To harmonize and effectively use these factors according to the short-and long-range interests is the main objective for Ukraine's foreign policy. The strategic dependence upon much more powerful states, whose relations are rather complex and difficult to forecast, is the main essence of Ukraine's non-aligned status. Official Kyiv (probably, as well as other capitals of the Central and Eastern European states) is on the lookout for the NATO-Russia bargaining, which directly affects interests of third countries.

In the long run, in case the non-aligned status becomes a fundamental principle of Ukraine's foreign policy, it will always be just a form of international participation dealing with military-political security. It should not limit Ukraine's foreign policy in other spheres. Moreover, advancement of economic, ecological and other non-military components to the forefront of foreign policy minimizes importance of the traditional non-aligned status and requires an active participation in the integration process, making impossible neutrality in defining national values and geopolitical orientations.

Among the most acute problems, Ukraine should solve at the international arena, the military-political ones certainly do not belong to the most important issues. At the same time, the deepening decline of Ukraine's potential of economic cooperation
actually threatens national interests of the state. The deep social crisis and a high level of uncertainty in the prospects of reforming Ukraine's economy, shortcomings and instability of legislation, lack of real guarantees of private property, and widespread corruption feature international image of the state. As a result, Ukraine loses its chance to develop an effective international cooperation and country's economic presence in Europe remains proportionally very low. In the future, when the military-political issue of cooperation will lose its topicality, the European states may become unconcerned about Ukraine.

Not a formal status, but the real state of our country limits development of friendly relations with other countries and can fix its semi-isolation and dependence. Interstate relations both to the East and to the West of Ukraine become more close and intense. This requires that Ukraine reached a high level of self-sufficiency and efficiency. However, oversimplified attitude towards the practical issues of cooperation, overestimated prospects of the Western assistance, as well as lack of self-reliance in our society resulted in a number of specific syndromes, including xenophobia. Maneuvering between Russia and the West facilitates spread of paternalism, leading-strings mentality, jealousy, and susceptibility. All these phenomena are reflected, on the one hand, in the considerable vulnerability as regards Russian influences, and, on the other hand, in most-grown and deformed ideas of the Western structures of security. We still can’t disentangle from the Russian paternalism and are afraid of the deemed potential dependence of the unaccustomed 'other' partners.

Ukraine's foreign strategy should certainly have two vectors, but qualitative changes of its geopolitical position, providing security and establishment of advantageous conditions for economic and social-political development is decided conditioned by country's overcoming its Eurasian isolation and integration with Europe. Relations with Moscow should not limit these perspectives. Cooperation with Russia should envisage reduction of unilateral dependence and strategic orientation towards transforming relations with Russia into an element of stable system of regional and global security.

The non-aligned status has become one of the few significant qualitative characteristics of the foreign strategy of Ukraine. Nevertheless, curiously enough: the non-aligned status has not been implemented neither normatively nor institutionally since its declaration 6 years ago. The idea emerged situationally in order to protect sovereignty, is a natural state of ambiguity and transitional period of the Ukrainian society. There are still no preconditions for unambiguous choice of basic principles, strategies of development and geopolitical orientations. Considerable differences in estimations of the essence and sources of threats to the national security still exist.

Geopolitical indefiniteness of the country is not just a Ukrainian problem. It prevents dynamic development of Europe, strengthening of positive civilizational shifts of the contemporary historical period. That is why so much attention is paid to Ukraine, being an important, although passive, subject of international relations.

In the long run, in case the non-aligned status becomes a fundamental principle of Ukraine's foreign policy, it will always be just a form of international participation dealing with military-political security. It should not limit state's foreign policy in other fields. Moreover, advancement of economic, ecological and other non-military components to the forefront of foreign policy minimizes importance of the traditional non-aligned status and requires an active participation in the integration process, making impossible neutrality in defining national values and geopolitical orientations.

To overcome economic and geopolitical factors that estrange Ukraine from Europe, Kyiv should not just declare the intent of full-scale integration in the European space, but practically move the country towards consistent internal changes - prompt market, political, and legal reforms.

According to numerous adherents of joining NATO, we should use the moment to push Ukraine under the Alliance's "umbrella". That would promote internal market democratic reforms, making Ukraine an able and attractive partner of the West. Today one can see striking differences between values, internal and external policies of Kyiv. Ukraine has declared its unconditional adherence to high standards in international relations, being at the same time an outsider in internal life.

Ukraine will be mainly an object of external influence, will have to make political concession in order to get economic preferences. Limit its foreign policy to formal diplomatic activity until it start actual reforms. Such situation will not make Ukraine's international position stable.

Considering Ukrainian cultural-historical, economic, and political realities, we speak, first of all, of the Euro-Atlantic format of both eternal influences and priorities. Main problems of Ukraine's foreign policy, basic national interests, real nd prospective partners are concentrated on the very this direction.

The prospect of further consolidation of the Euro-Atlantic space eliminates the threat of disintegration of Ukraine, creates better conditions for complex resolving of national and general democratic problems of Ukraine's internal development.

The Euro-Atlantic community will obviously have to overcome the existing disagreement between the optimal formats of the resolution of the problems of development and problems of security. EU's priority is internal problems. The most useful function of NATO is safeguarding of stability, monitoring and preventing of threats of external origin. The Western and Central Europe will lead the integration process, which gives rise to the need of new forms of interaction with main external partners. In particular, this trend is being implemented in the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Association (TAFTA) as a means of institutionalization of economic cooperation at least with the NATO format.

Much more difficult are the processes of establishing of cooperation of the integrated Europe on the East European and Mediterranean directions, where a division line is likely to emerge between perspective members of the Euro-Atlantic structures and those remaining their external partners. In a long run, such line will determine certain regional differences in economic and mental spheres. Thus, it will be very important to prevent new split and notwithstanding.

A wide-scale system of European security should not be built in expense of a qualitative compromise and aberration from the standards of the Euro-Atlantic community. It should be build upon a widely shared principles and values, analogous national elements. In this context rather promising is the idea of "Big Europe", which is a variant of harmonization of regional and no less important inter-regional relations.

The new Europe and new system of the continental inter-state relations objectively needs independent Ukraine. The real advance towards European integration requires that Ukraine develops in a democratic, legal, able state featuring the
corresponding standards of internal and external stability. This perspective is also the only possible way for the actual normalization of the Ukraine-Russia relations and provision of Ukraine’s stable international position.

4. DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND NATO

The interest of Ukraine to NATO is far not less than that of NATO to Ukraine. The reason consists in the change of geopolitical situation in Europe and then – in the world, which began in mid 80’s and will obviously last, in various rates, for next 10-15 years.

By its emergence, Ukraine provoked alterations in the traditional structure of strategic continental relations: France—Britain—Germany—Russia and its later version involving the USA. There emerges a separate and rather essential unit which should be kept by the United States, partially France and moreover – the FRG and Britain in the role of the forward edge of defense against restoration of imperial Russia, especially in case of creation of an anti-Western alliance China—Russia—Iran.

In 1991, in the territory of Ukraine there was located an alignment of USSR troops numbering up to 1.2 million people armed with the best arms in the USSR: armor, technics, aviation, artillery, missile, including nuclear weapon. Today the Ukrainian army numbers 345 thousand, it does not have nuclear weapons, its arms meeting the restrictions imposed under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Actually, this army does not have ideology of the ex-Soviet Army and to this extent does not threaten the armed forces of the states-members to the Alliance.

Thus, Ukraine is an extremely attractive object from the point of view of both economic and security interests of NATO and Euro-Atlantic community. Moreover, during the latest years the leadership of Ukraine has undergone an essential evolution in its estimations of the Alliance in particular and the West as a whole.

The official standpoint of Ukraine evolutionized, not keeping the condition: it had in 1997, during the Madrid summit. The main differences of the Ukrainian standpoint of (a) 1994-95, and (b) 1997-98 are as follows:

1. a) NATO can admit new members from CEE only after or simultaneously with the transformation into the collective security system; b) NATO admits new members from CEE, and this is actually the beginning of alteration of ideology and practice of the Alliance.

2. a) NATO should not admit new members too fast, during years. enlargement should take decades, b) NATO should not stop admitting new members since it has started it, this process must be non-stop for those striving for it.

One of the main Ukrainian theses has always consisted in the appeal to the inevitability of conclusion of a certain agreement NATO-RF ("historical compromise") and an agreement on distinctive relations between Ukraine and NATO.

The current character of relations between Ukraine and NATO is determined by the new policy of the North-Atlantic Alliance as regards the development of dialogue, cooperation and partnership with the countries of Central-Eastern Europe.

The main grounds of the development of relations between NATO and its partners were laid down in the course of the London meeting of the Head of States and Governments of the NATO members on 6 July 1990, the Copenhagen meeting of the ministers for foreign affairs of these states on 6 June 1991, the Rome summit of NATO on 8 November 1991, the inauguration meeting of the ministers for foreign
affairs of the CEE countries and NATO in Brussels on 20 December 1991 as regards the creation of the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which comprised the post-Soviet countries, and by the resolutions of the Brussels meeting of Heads of State and Heads of Government of the NATO members on 10-11 January 1994 on the launch of “Partnership for Peace” program, which is open for all the states-members to OSCE.

All these measures constituted the implementation of the new military-political strategy of NATO which had an aim to preserve the Alliance as a defense one through the accession of new members and at the same time to transform into a security structure able to respond effectively to the instability challenges in Europe. Such a wide approach allowed to involve into the partnership almost all European countries. Though it is rather difficult to unite in one organization the functions of a defensive alliance, which envisage certain military measures, and at the same time to transform it into an all-European security structure. which envisages a different regime of relationship.

The countries of Central Europe and the Baltic states declared their desire to join NATO as a defensive alliance, provided that the military security guarantees under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty be spread on them. The equal membership in NATO provides them not only with military guarantees, but also with an opportunity to make easier their integration into Western European institutions. Such an unanimity as regards the joining NATO prompted the leadership of the North-Atlantic Alliance to take the decision on eastward enlargement NATO’s enlargement will be carried out in the form of “waves”: each of them essentially altering the geopolitical situation of Ukraine.

On 9 July 1997, at the Madrid summit, the decision on accession to NATO of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary was taken.

As well as Moldova and Belarus, Ukraine did not apply for NATO membership. Alongside with this, the situation of geostategic uncertainty faced by all the countries of CEE, including Ukraine, is characterized by general similarity of their estimations as regards the threats, challenges and the main priorities in this sphere.

The NATO’s eastward enlargement aimed at the provision of stability meets the main strategic interests of Ukraine, which could be outlined in the following three items:

1. Integration into European economic, political and security structures;
2. Obtaining of reliable international security guarantees through assistance of NATO;
3. Normalization of relations with Russia through the strengthening of Ukraine’s authority in European structures under support and promotion of NATO.

The neighbourhood with the new members of NATO at Western borders of Ukraine opens new opportunities of Ukraine’s integration into European security structures. Ukraine is going to have better conditions for the strengthening of its authority in Europe. The common border will lead to more close cooperation between Ukraine and NATO and other European structures. Besides, under the variant of enlargement NATO will be extremely interested in preservation of Ukraine’s independence, and thus will render it essential assistance, political support and promote its accession to political and economic structures.

Whereas political interests prevail under the “stability-providing” variant of NATO’s enlargement, the criteria of accession to the Alliance shall be as follows: peaceful settlement of conflicts, absence of territorial claims to the neighbors, civil control over armed forces, observing of human rights and rights of national minorities, as well as democratic development. The meeting of these requirements by the Central European countries – aspirants to the membership – will result in strengthening of stability and security at the Western borders of Ukraine.

The contacts between NATO and Ukraine started in 1991. As soon as in January 1992, a representative of Ukraine took part in a sitting of the NACC working group for the first place. On 22-23 February 1992, the first visit of M Vermer, Secretary General of NATO to Kyiv took place, where Ukraine was invited to participate in the NACC. Since then, there were launched active contacts and cooperation with NATO. President of Ukraine L Kravchuk visited the NATO Headquarters in Brussels on 8 June 1992, President L Kuchma attended it on 1 June 1995.

On 8-11 January 1997, a visit of V Horbulin, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to the NATO Headquarters in Brussels took place. In the course of his meetings with the leadership of the Alliance (9 January – meeting with CINC Joint Armed Forces of NATO, General G Jow Whane, attending of the Coordination Center of Partnership; 10 January – meeting with Secretary-General of NATO J Solana; 11 January – meeting with members of the North-Atlantic Council); Secretary of the NSDC declared the standpoint of Ukraine as for NATO’s enlargement and appealed to the granting of national security guarantees to Ukraine by the West in the course of this process.

On 20 March 1997 an official delegation of Ukraine headed by H Udovenko, the minister for foreign affairs of Ukraine, visited the NATO Headquarters in Brussels to carry out the first round of negotiations with the official delegation of NATO headed by Secretary-General J Solana. On 7 May 1997 Secretary-General of NATO J Solana visited Ukraine to lead the ceremony of opening the Center of Information and Documentation of NATO in Kyiv.

The difference of the situation and standpoint of Ukraine in this issue from those of other CIS countries first of all consists in the fact that Ukraine borders the future members to NATO on the West, while in the East lies Russia. Those regarding the Alliance’s enlargement differs from that of CEE countries, including Ukraine. Owing to this very fact a lot of international documents, including those approved within the framework of NATO, WEU and other European structures regard Ukraine as a country playing “the key role for European security”.

Thus, relations between Ukraine and the Alliance should take the shape of a “distinctive partnership”. Realization of such formula also envisages a transformation of NATO into a European security structure and deepening of integration processes between NATO and Ukraine within the framework of the construction of a stable and indivisible Europe.

Assuming that NATO’s enlargement shall mean the extension of stability both to Central and Eastern Europe, the accession to this process of Ukraine striving for occupying its place in the European collective security system is quite natural. The decision on the issue of Ukraine’s accession to NATO will become actual as the Alliance is being transformed into a European security structure and during a certain transition period. This will be the period for NATO to be joined by the Ukraine’s Western neighbours, the Alliance itself having been transformed and
made more open for cooperation in the process of formation of the all-European collective security system.

Besides, Ukraine requires a transition period due to internal circumstances and its geopolitical position. An immediate accession of Ukraine to NATO would give rise to growth of social-political tension in the country caused by various geopolitical reference-points of its Eastern and Western regions, as well as old stereotypes of ideas about NATO among a certain share of the population of Ukraine.

The distinctive partnership means the extension of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO at all levels and in all dimensions – political, military, economic, ecological, scientific-technical, information, etc. Ukraine deems it a guaranty of avoiding of new division lines in Europe and creation of a "grey zone" of security in CEE. All these conceptual provisions were laid down in the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization signed at the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997.

The Charter determines the goals, grounds, principles of distinctive partnership relations, spheres of cooperation and mechanism of implementation. Proceeding from the role played by Ukraine and NATO in the construction of Euro-Atlantic security system, the parties recognized the necessity to develop the "distinctive and effective" partnership relations aimed at the strengthening of security and cooperation in the construction of a stable, peaceful and indivisible Europe.

Fundamentals of relations between Ukraine and NATO. The Charter lays down that an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors of providing stability in Central-Eastern Europe. Ukraine shall assume the obligation to develop its cooperation with NATO with the aim of deepening the process of integration into all European and Euro-Atlantic structures and development of its democratic institutions.

It has been stressed that the NATO members shall keep on supporting the state sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, its territorial integrity, the principle of inviolability of borders, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status of a non-nuclear state as the key factors of stability and security in Central-Eastern Europe and the continent as a whole.

The parties emphasized the deep transformation of NATO having taken place in the aftermath of the Cold War and its lasting adaptation to the realities of Euro-Atlantic security, which are altered, including NATO's support in each particular case. new missions in the field of peace-making operations carried out on commission of the Security Council of UN or under responsibility of OSCE.

The parties confirmed the importance of firm and stable relations between Ukraine and NATO and pointed out the significant progress achieved in various spheres of activity aimed at the development of extended, deepened and more close relations between Ukraine and NATO on the grounds set forth in the Joint Declaration for the press of 14 September 1995. There was pointed out the positive role of NATO in the keeping of peace and stability in Europe and the promotion of stronger confidence and transparency in the Euro-Atlantic region, and its openness for cooperation with the new democracies of Central-Eastern Europe, to which Ukraine is an integral part.

The states-members to NATO confirmed the security guarantees obtained by Ukraine from the five parties to the NPT as a non-nuclear state-party thereto. The parties confirmed their commitment as regards the comprehensive development of EAPC and an extended PIP. This includes Ukraine's participation in operations, including peace-keeping operations, in each particular case on commission of the Security Council of UN or under responsibility of OSCE. In case of involvement of the Joint NATO tactical forces in such operations, the participation of Ukraine therein at the initial stage is envisaged.

Ukraine and NATO confirmed their commitments:
- to acknowledge that the security of all the states of OSCE region is indivisible, that neither country is allowed to construct its security at the expense of another one's security, that no country is to regard any part of the region as a sphere of its influence;
- to refrain from threat or use of force against any state in any way, which is incompatible with the principles of the UN Charter or those of the Final Helsinki Act, which the states-parties are guided by;
- to recognize the unalienable right of all states for a free choice and application of their own means of providing security and the right of a free choice or change of its means of providing security, including agreements on alliance, as they evolve;
- to respect sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all other states, inviolability of borders, and development of good-neighbourly relations; to recognize the rule of law, strengthen democracy, political pluralism and market economy;
- to acknowledge human and national minorities rights;
- to prevent conflicts and to settle disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the UN and OSCE principles.

Ukraine reaffirmed its decision to continue the military reform, to strengthen democratic and civil control over armed forces and to increase their operative and technical compatibility with those of NATO and states-partners. NATO confirmed its support of Ukraine's efforts regarding the above.

Ukraine supports NATO in cooperation with other international organizations, such as OSCE, the European Union, Council of Europe and the Western European Union, in the promotion of the strengthening of Euro-Atlantic security and the improvement of the general climate of confidence in Europe.

The main fields of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO are as follows:
- political and security issues, in particular, those of development of Euro-Atlantic security and stability, including the security of Ukraine;
- prevention of conflicts, crisis management, peace-keeping, settlement of disputes and humanitarian operations, taking into account the role of UN and OSCE in this sphere;
- control over arms and disarmament, including the issues related to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Open Sky Treaty and the measures as for the strengthening of confidence and security under the Vienna document of 1994.

The parties have determined the forms of realization of cooperation, spheres and mechanisms of consultations. The consultations shall be implemented through meetings of Ukraine and NATO at the level of the North-Atlantic Council (NAC) the periodicity determined under mutual agreement with appropriate NATO committees, mutual visits, military cooperation mechanisms, etc.
The military communications mission of Ukraine to NATO as a part of Ukraine’s mission to NATO has been established in Brussels. NATO keeps the right to establish a military communications mission in Kyiv.

It has been decided that Ukraine and NATO will create a crisis consultation mechanism for carrying out common consultations in any case when Ukraine feels a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

The parties agreed to continue the extension and intensification of their cooperation, in particular, within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, including the extended Partnership for Peace program.

The Ukraine-NATO Commission is being created. It shall meet at the level of the North-Atlantic Council not less than twice a year to supervise the implementation of the Charter and to promote the further development and intensification of cooperation. On 29 May 1998 in the Great Duchy of Luxembourg there took place the ministerial summit of the North-Atlantic Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meetings of the joint council NATO-Russia and the joint commission NATO-Ukraine.

At the meeting of the joint commission NATO-Ukraine, three main issues were discussed: first – the development and strengthening of security system in Europe and Ukraine’s contribution into the creation of the new security system in Europe. Second – the results of cooperation between NATO and Ukraine for the year having passed since the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO in Madrid. Third – the establishment of a military mission of NATO in Kyiv within the framework of the PIP.

For Ukraine, the crucial items within the context of the Charter are as follows:

- determination of the fact of NATO’s readiness to adjust to new realities in Europe, to take into account the standpoint of partner countries, in particular, of Ukraine, in the process of transformation and enlargement of the Alliance;
- lessening of the threat of distribution of Europe into spheres of influence and placing Ukraine into a “grey zone of security”;
- lessening of possible negative results of the enlargement of the Alliance connected with the specific standpoint of Russia and former plans of the Alliance as for the location of nuclear weapons in CEE countries;
- realization of NATO’s readiness to create conditions for the work of Ukraine-NATO commission. Ukraine is the first CEE country having obtained such a mechanism of consultations and cooperation with the Alliance;
- NATO’s support of Ukraine’s strategic orientation at integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

As well as the Ruse-S-NATO Act, the Ukraine-NATO Charter became an important stage of the construction of an actually new security system in Europe.

An important place in the multi-dimensional all-European integration process is to be occupied by the development of relations between new democracies in Europe; that becomes an objective necessity and even a political imperative. This multi-vector and multi-dimension process is to result in a gradual but inevitable coherence of the all-European integration. Therefore, against its background, NATO’s enlargement is important, though just one element of this process. Just NATO’s enlargement as such, without taking into account the whole political development in Europe, may lead to a certain disbalance in the structure of all-European integration.

The “Partnership for Peace” Program is an actual mechanism of implementation of the goals of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. Ukraine was the first CIS state to sign on 8 February 1994 the Framework of the PIP. The presentation document being handed to NATO Headquarters on 25 May. This document outlines the political goals of Ukraine’s participation in the PIP, the measures planned to be undertaken in this regard and forces and means allotted by Ukraine for the participation in the PIP. As soon as in the end of 1994 Ukrainian servicemen began to take part in exercises and measures envisaged by this program. Actually, the first Individual Partnership Program (IPP) between Ukraine and NATO was approved de-jure in June-July 1995, when NATO Secretary General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine exchanged appropriate letters. On 14 September, the same year, the Ukraine-NATO IPP was officially approved at the particular meeting of the North-Atlantic Council of NATO. Despite financial difficulties, the first IPP was successfully fulfilled, in particular, owing to external financial assistance.

The Individual Partnership Program between Ukraine and NATO for the next two years was approved on 19 July 1996. On 6 May 1996 the Agreement between Ukraine and NATO on the status of armed forces within the framework of the PIP was signed. Besides, since February 1995 Ukraine had been taking part in the first two-year-long cycle of the process of planning and estimation of forces allotted by the countries for the participation in the program. In 1995 Ukraine appointed its first officers in communications sphere to the NATO Headquarters in Brussels and the Coordination Center of Partnership (CCP). In spring, the same year, Ukraine and NATO concluded an administrative agreement and an agreement in security sphere, which became the ground for the opening of communications office at NATO Headquarters and CCP.

In support of the Partnership’s goals and pursuant to its Presentation document, Ukraine takes an active part in the PIP with an aim to obtain the opportunity to exploit the experience of the states-members to NATO for the reformation of national Armed Forces. This allows to train the national forces capable of better interaction with NATO armed forces, including peace-making and humanitarian operations under the auspices of UN or OSCE. Alongside with this, Ukraine proceeds from its financial capacities and the opportunities regarding the financial maintenance of its participation in the PIP program by particular NATO members.

Ukraine attaches a great importance to the mechanism of consultations envisaged by the Invitation to participation in the PIP program and item 8 of the PIP Framework, which stresses in particular that NATO shall consult any active participant of the PIP program; provided that such partner feels a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

The Individual Partnership Program (IPP) for 1995-1996 lays down the following types of activity: information exchange, development of concept of the planning and conducting of joint exercises, the work-out of guiding provisions stressing the requirements to troops, development of common material and technical base, joint planning of exercises, supervision of and participation in specific phases of NATO within the framework of the Partnership; language training.

In 1997 Ukraine took part in 219 measures of the PIP program. Alongside with that, not only the number of measures was increased, but also the level of their fulfillment.
had grown. For the future, NATO is planning an extension of the PIP tasks for involvement of a wide spectrum of functions and forces (including forced peace operations), participation of partners in the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), their presence at the International and International Military Secretariats of the Alliance.

The general responsibility for the implementation of the Individual Partnership Program is charged on the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. To improve the implementation of the measures under the Program, the Center for Coordination of Cooperation within the framework of the PIP program at the Ministry of Defense was established. The Center shall be responsible for the selection and training of specialists for participation in peace-making operations and measures within the framework of the PIP program, as well as coordination of actions of the Armed Forces, military districts, central apparatus departments in the process of implementation of PIP measures. It is planned to create permanent courses for training of military observers, officers of headquarters of multi-national peace-making forces.

The issue of information provision of the IPP implementation has become particularly important. This system is to provide an operative communication between ministries and departments of Ukraine involved into the preparation, approval and fulfillment of IPP. Another crucial aspect consists in the connecting of this system to the information network of NATO. The realization of this task will promote the complex of works in the mentioned sphere to an entirely new level. This, in turn, shall allow to prevent significant losses of time and improve the mechanism of interdepartmental coordination of work in Ukraine and the work with the NATO Headquarters and the Coordination Center of Partnership.

To this extent, the Plan of measures as for the deployment and introduction in the territory of Ukraine of a national information system for providing Ukraine's activity within the framework of the "Partnership for Peace" program and peace-making operations has been worked out.

The period from July to August 1997 was dedicated to the work at the set up of work stations of the national information system for provision of Ukraine’s activities within the framework of the PIP program introduced under technical and financial assistance of the USA. The work stations shall be at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the Center for Coordination of Cooperation of the General Staff, the Scientific and Research Center, the General Staff.

The main server of the system together with satellite communications equipment have been installed. In August 1997, a work station at the Center for Coordination of Cooperation at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was linked up to the network. Installation of the rest work stations is almost completed and waiting for the resolution of the question on providing communication channels in Kyiv that falls within the competence of the Ukrainian party.

The NATO Information and Documentation Center has been opened in Kyiv. Owing to the activities of the Center in Kyiv, the information and explanation work as regards the purposes and interests of NATO in Ukraine is being gradually developed.

The order of Head of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces "On the Measures Regarding the Improvement of Selection of Servicemen and Workers with the Ukrainian Armed Forces for Studying at Military-Educational institutions of Foreign States" was issued in 1997. This will essentially improve the selection of officers for studying abroad. The staff structure of the units involved into cooperation within the framework of the PIP program has been improved.

During 1997 representatives of Ukraine took part in the measures conducted by the NATO Committee for Coordination of Traffic in the European Air at the level of experts. The issues examined at seminars of the Committee working groups completely meet the goals of compatibility in the field of organization and management of air traffic set forth in the Air Code of Ukraine. Such issues include: compatibility of air navigation means; general requirements to airfield measures; compatibility of communications equipment; identification "friend-or-foe" (IFF). Other measures of the Program were fulfilled in the form of seminars, meetings and visits in the spheres of regional stability and security, crisis management, science and environmental protection. Joint military exercises became the most important measures of the Individual Program.
5. Security Issues of Relations between Ukraine and European Institutions

Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Ukraine takes an active part in the discussion of topical issues of all-European process development, speaks for the improvement of institutions and mechanisms of OSCE, strengthening of its role in the European security space, growth of OSCE's preventive and peace-making potential.

During the latest years, OSCE made significant steps as regard the strengthening of its bodies, creation of early warning structure, prevention of conflicts and crisis management, including missions for exposure of facts and preparation of reports. A successful direction in OSCE's activities consists in the branch of military confidence promoting the deepening of contacts and cooperation in military sphere. Fruitful can be considered the discussion of the "model of a general and comprehensive security in the XXI century Europe" within the framework of OSCE.

At the same time, Ukraine deems inadmissible the creation of the so called "Consultation Committee" within the framework of OSCE - a body arranged by the pattern of the UN Security Council, which consisted of a restricted number of members and took decisions binding for all states-members, because such a situation may undermine the very nature of OSCE, which is a unique forum where all states-members are equally responsible for the keeping of stability within the OSCE region.

To increase the effectiveness of OSCE missions, Ukraine deems it expedient to envisage the inclusion in their mandates of obligations to submit to the Permanent Council through the Acting Head particular suggestions and recommendations as for the resolution of conflict in their zone of activity. Such recommendations would have to be examined, an appropriate decision taken within a definite term.

The orientation of Ukraine's activities in OSCE requires an appropriate representation of Ukraine in the Organization's structures. Currently, Ukraine does not have any representative at OSCE institutions yet. The present representation at long-term missions of OSCE (one representative per mission) is insufficient for a state like Ukraine. Such a situation stipulates the necessity of a consistent promotion of Ukraine's representatives to posts in OSCE structures, such as the apparatus of Acting Head and Secretary-General of OSCE, OSCE Secretariat, Bureau for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, apparatus of the Supreme Commissioner for National Minorities (SCNM), the Center for Conflicts Prevention and the Secretariat of OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Ukraine's representation at OSCE long-term missions requires further extension.

Proceeding from the necessity of increasing the OSCE preventive potential, our state supports the extension of mandates of Acting Head, Secretary-General, the Three and SCNM, as well as interaction of the Bureau for Democratic institutions and Human Rights with SCNM and Council of Europe. Alongside with this, in the light of the improvement of the process of approval of decisions within the framework of OSCE, Ukraine speaks for preservation of the rule of consensus as the basic principle of taking decisions, with certain modifications of this principle, in particular - in cases when a urgent interference of the UN Security Council (SC-UNO) is necessary. For the case of necessity of resorting to force, procedures of
between Ukraine and EU on 14 June 1994 in Luxembourg. This Agreement was ratified by the Supreme Rada of Ukraine on 10 November 1994.

The Agreement on cooperation provided Ukraine with a prospect to acquire the status of an associated member of EU. It envisages cooperation between Ukraine and EU on a wide spectrum of political, economic and humanitarian issues, and constitutes a legal basis for Ukraine’s organic involvement into European processes. An important aspect of the Agreement consists in the permanent political dialogue between Ukraine and EU. Pursuant to the Agreement, the institutional framework of its implementation should be based on three joint bodies: the Council for Cooperation Issues, the Committee for Cooperation Issues and the Committee for Parliamentary Cooperation.

The consultations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Three of EU (Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands) in New York in September and of political directors in Kyiv in October, 1996 allowed to put on the agenda of bilateral relations the issue on the development by the European Union of the Action Plan regarding Ukraine.

The Action Plan regarding Ukraine was approved by the EU Council of Ministers on 6 December 1996. By this document the European Union expressed its readiness to develop and strengthen political and economic relations with Ukraine. Striving for the promotion of a stable development of Ukraine, EU determined several leading trends of interaction:

• support of democratic reforms and development of civil society;
• support of economic reforms, development of commercial and economic cooperation;
• strengthening of political dialogue and support of Ukraine’s involvement into the process of formation of the new European security architecture;
• support of regional cooperation;
• strengthening of contractual relations, in particular – owing to the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation;
• energy sector reformation.

The aim of improvement of EU’s relations with Ukraine is to contribute into the development of Ukraine as a stable, independent, democratic, market-oriented, non-nuclear, territorially integral state. The task of deepening the aid to Ukraine under TACIS program has been put to the foreground.

The positive changes in the attitude of the European Union to Ukraine were registered in the Special Resolution approved by the EU Council of Ministers on 31 October 1994 and in the decision on Common standpoint regarding Ukraine approved on 26 November 1994. These documents began the process of realization of the EU’s Strategy regarding our state initiated by the European Commission in April 1994, and of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. The European Union’s policy as for Ukraine in this context acquired a particular importance as an example of EU’s common policy. Ukraine was the first European state to enjoy so specifically expressed concern of the European Union.

A regular round of consultations with the Three of EU (Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) at the level of ministers for foreign affairs took place in the European Union on 5 February 1997. In the course of the consultations, the ways of implementation of the Action Plan regarding Ukraine, as well as opening of a documentation center of EU in Kyiv were discussed.
Western European Union. The 1992 Treaty on European Union reads that Western European Union is an integral part of the EU. The first WEU Declaration stated that "WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance".

The second WEU Declaration drew the consequences of the first one for WEU's membership, inviting the EU states to accede to WEU on conditions in accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers 'if they so wish'. Simultaneously, other European member states of NATO were invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility to participate fully in the activities of WEU

The Maastricht Declarations and the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 aimed at the defining WEU's operational role caused a particular attention of Ukraine to the reformation and development of WEU

This interest is determined by two factors:

1. Attaching to CEE countries a status of WEU's associated partners;
2. A desire to acquire a formal status at WEU to provide a certain form of institutionalization of military-political ties with the EU (through WEU) to prevent exclusion of Ukraine from the list of potential candidates to members of the EU

This desire testifies to the Ukrainian leadership's intention to do its best to keep pace with CEE countries in the process of involvement into integration cooperation with the European Union institutions. This desire is quite understandable because the process of enlargement of the EU will be obviously more complicated than the enlargement of NATO. The process of taking decisions on admittance of these or those countries will be less prompt than that of admittance to NATO. In other words, it will be more difficult to become a partner and than - a member of the EU than to access to NATO. On the other hand any formal participation in integration processes within the EU allows the Ukrainian leadership to hope that a strict line delimiting the "integrated" and "other" Europe will not be drawn on the border between Ukraine and Poland and Hungary. In this context any forms of institutionalized ties with WEU may be allowed to when negating Ukraine's separation from the Central-European space.

The attention of Ukrainian executive structures to WEU has been also caused by realization of the fact that Ukraine does not meet and will not meet in the close future the economic and political criteria, which allowed to include to the list of "associate members" (European partners) Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia. Thus, we speak about a development of a, to some extent, palliative policy which would be able to stimulate the interest of the EU leading structures to Ukraine in military-political sphere. The aim of this policy consists in prevention of exclusion of Ukraine from the sphere of the EU's integration policy at the period of internal adaptation, and in avoiding, to the extent possible, the aggravation of discrepancies in the attitude of the EU structures to Ukraine and the CEE countries.

On May 9, 1994 in Luxembourg the WEU Council of Ministers declared that nine CEE countries-members to the Consultative Forum will be granted the status of "associate partner" (contrary to the status of "associated members" granted to Island, Norway, and Turkey). As the status of associate partner was introduced, activity of the Consultative Forum has been suspended. Thus, a flexible system of three levels membership and observers was established:

- full members (all WEU states are members to NATO and the EU)
- associated members (all NATO members but not parties to the EU)
- associated partners (not NATO or EU members)
- observers (NATO and/or EU members)

Ukraine is interested in institutionalizing its relations with WEU. We consider associated partnership to be the optimal variant (similarly to the rest of the CEE). It envisages participation in operational development of the WEU, joint military exercises, peacemaking and other operations, information exchange, briefings and consultations on the issues of mutual concern. Nevertheless, the latest meetings show that WEU is not still ready to decide this question positively.

Since 1994 Ukraine is repeatedly rising the question of institutionalizing its relations with WEU. Ukraine criticizes the WEU's approach of accessing the CEE countries under the "+3" scheme. It is actually a discriminating approach, that establish new division lines in Europe. It separates Ukraine from the integrated part of Europe, ignores already existing bilateral military-political relations between Ukraine and all the WEU members and associate partners as well as other European and Euro-Atlantic structures, particularly NATO.

Although Ukraine does not have any formal status in the Union, it is actively developing relations with WEU. It maintains permanent contacts with the WEU Secretariat and the Parliamentary Assembly.

Despite a significant activism of WEU's activities, one should take into account that in the political respect these activities are not independent. In the context of taking political decisions, WEU shall be oriented first of all at the EU, and partially - at NATO. Thus, an improvement of conditions of the dialogue Ukraine-WEU can be achieved only in case of the EU's general consent to future conclusion of an agreement with Ukraine on cooperation corresponding to the level of cooperation with other CEE countries.

In June 1997, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine have drafted a Protocol on Cooperation between Ukraine and WEU in the sphere of distant air transportation. Further work on the conclusion of a corresponding agreement is conditioned upon the Protocol. The document provides formal base for Ukraine's participation in peacemaking and humanitarian operations under the auspices of WEU. Promising is cooperation in the space technologies.

Thus, although Ukraine is concerned about institutionalization of relations with WEU, Ukraine considers the increasing influence of WEU in the structure of European security and holds rather flexible and constructive position towards the Union. Ukraine develops practical cooperation, looks for temporary alternative forms of deepening the political dialog. Last events testify to the possibility to achieve a considerable progress on this direction in the close future.

The formal implementation of its obligations before the Council of Europe should be stressed by Ukraine within its relations with UE/WEU. It should demonstrate consistency in realization of these obligations and adherence to the principles and norms of the European law (in case some provisions are broken, we should anticipate negative reactions and give corresponding explanations). The should be no violation of democratic rules in the spheres of political life where they could be successfully avoided (closing of papers, appointment of "provisional mayors" of
cities, fulfillment of capital punishments and hush-up of information as regards the sentenced to death, non-recognition of Kiev’s standard rights of urban self-government. Ukraine’s relations with the Council of Europe should not be an instrument of withstanding of the Presidential Administration and the Supreme Rada. This harms Ukraine’s national interests immensely.

Ukraine should carry out a consistent policy of adaptation to Central-European transition standards of cooperation with the EU – to do its best to maintain an active dialogue with EU institutions at Brussels and the mission of the European Commission to Ukraine. The of this dialogue consists in creation of an atmosphere of Ukraine’s being actually interested in developing cooperation with the EU and revitalizing the “Common Standpoint” of the EU towards Ukraine which was first declared on 21 May 1996. In this respect it is extremely important to continue the formulation and declaring in the form of particular documents of the common standpoint of the EU as regards Ukraine, in particular, as a demonstration of an effective direction of CFSP implementation.

A right move consisted in the signing of an agreement with WEU on cooperation in the sphere of distant air transportation in 1997. The ministries for foreign affairs and of defence would monitor the work of the WEU, its initiatives and plans, prospective planning documents in order to prepare timely proposals for concrete forms of the Ukraine-WEU cooperation in the fields our country is interested in.

A set of technical documents that would duplicate the Ukraine-NATO cooperation materials should be drafted and presented to WEU. They can be focused on the development of interoperability, arms design, army reformation, and implementation of the civil control over the armed forces.

As Ukraine – due to the internal economic situation – faces problems trying to get the status of the WEU associate partner and does not correspond requirements of observer (neutral and non-aligned EU members), it should try to find some other approach to the problem (not just recalling its position as a CEE country). Probably, in the course of preparation to the negotiation it would be efficient to revise the treaties on military cooperation with all WEU members, as well as with the CEE states – WEU partners, and conclude documents with WEU associate partners.

6. THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND UKRAINE’S STANDPOINT

Ukraine’s participation in the resolution of the nuclear security problem is preconditioned mainly by its denuclearization and attempts to create a non-nuclear zone in Central-Eastern Europe.

The main issues of Ukraine’s participation in the process of nuclear disarmament, its rights and obligations are determined by the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On Reduction and Resumption of Strategic Offensive Arms (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START) signed on 31 July 1991. The detailing of conditions of the implementation of this treaty after the USSR collapse is outlined in the Protocol to the START signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992.

In connection with the signing of the Protocol, Ukraine declared that in the process of realization of START and the Protocol thereto it would proceed from the following:

- the reductions and restrictions envisaged by the Treaty are to be attained through a proportional destruction of warheads and carriers located in the territory of states-parte;
- Ukraine, which voluntarily agrees for the reduction and restriction of nuclear weapons, shall insist on guarantees of its national security, including that from possible threat or use of force against Ukraine by any nuclear state;
- Ukraine shall insist that the Russian Federation should immediately resort to practical actions as for the creation of a joint (with Ukraine) system of technical control over non-exercising of strategic nuclear offensive arms located in the territory of Ukraine.

After that, pursuant to the Protocol, together with Belarus and Kazakhstan, Ukraine assumed the obligation to access to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state.

The signing of Massandra Agreements on 3 September 1993 was a step aimed at reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons located in the territory of Ukraine. These agreements envisaged, in particular, ways and basic principles of utilization of nuclear weapons located in the territory of Ukraine, as well as the order of warranty and author’s supervision over the exploitation of strategic rocket complexes of the Strategic Forces located in the territory of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

On 25 October 1993, Ukraine and the USA signed the Agreement on rendering Ukraine assistance in the liquidation of strategic nuclear weapons and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This Agreement determines the general conditions and mechanism of rendering Ukraine assistance in the liquidation of strategic nuclear weapons. With an aim of its realization, appropriate implementation agreements were concluded to determine the trends of cooperation between Ukraine and the USA in the liquidation of nuclear weapons located in the territory of our state and rendering appropriate financial and technical assistance in relation thereto.

On 18 November 1993 the Supreme Rada of Ukraine adopted the Resolution on ratification of the START and the Lisbon Protocol. The Resolution stressed that according to the limits imposed under the Treaty for ex-USSR Ukraine was to reduce 36% of carriers and 42% of warheads of strategic offensive nuclear weapons located in its territory subject to further liquidation. Alongside with this, the Resolution emphasized
that "this does not exclude the possibility of liquidation of additional carriers and warheads according to procedures, which may be determined by Ukraine". All strategic offensive arms, including warheads thereto, have a restricted guarantee term of service after which their further exploitation and even stocking become dangerous.

The Supreme Rada recommended the President and the Government of Ukraine to carry out negotiations as for a number of issues being crucial for the implementation of the Treaty by Ukraine, and to approve the program of liquidation of strategic nuclear offensive arms. The main efforts of the President and Government of Ukraine in relation thereto were aimed at the obtaining from the USA, Russia and other nuclear powers of national security guarantees and appropriate financial and technical assistance with the aim of nuclear weapons liquidation, obtaining of compensation for the value of concentrated uranium contained in all (including tactical) nuclear warheads, as well as prevention of possible political and economic isolation of Ukraine in connection with non-admittance by the world community of the Resolution of the Supreme Rada dated 18 November 1993, in particular – of its reservations regarding the ratification of START and the Lisbon Protocol, and non-accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

To unblock this problem under conditions when bilateral contacts with the Russian Federation were exhausted, the formula of trilateral negotiations with the USA and Russia was invented. In the course of trilateral negotiations in Kyiv, Washington and Moscow, a compromise was achieved that was outlined in the Trilateral Declaration of Presidents of Ukraine, the USA and Russia signed on 14 January 1994. The main provisions of the Declaration are as follows:

- providing Ukraine with national security guarantees after the coming into effect of START-1 and its accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a state not in possession of nuclear weapons;
- commitments of the United States of America, the Russian Federation and Great Britain to respect independence and sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine to restrain from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, to refrain from economic coercion and not to exercise any weapons against Ukraine;
- the rendering of technical and financial assistance to Ukraine for a reliable and safe dismantling of nuclear weapons and stock of fissile materials, and promotion of rapid realization of existing agreements on such assistance;
- control of representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense over the dismantling and liquidation of strategic nuclear warheads in the territory of Russia that would exclude the possibility of a repeated use of elements of such warheads in accordance with their initial purpose.
- Russia's provision of technical servicing and safe exploitation of nuclear warheads.
- giving Ukraine a just and timely compensation for the value of concentrated uranium by the Russian Federation and the United States of America as the nuclear warheads are withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine to be dismantled in Russia (the withdrawal and compensation for Ukraine should be simultaneous). In particular, Russia is already providing Ukrainian atomic plants with nuclear fuel in account of compensation. In turn, the USA paid to Russia in advance a sum, which is to be excluded from the payments to be obtained by Russia for supplies of concentrated uranium.

On 3 February 1994 the Supreme Rada of Ukraine examined the Trilateral Declaration of Presidents of Ukraine, the USA and Russia of 14 January and Enclosure thereto from the point of view of compliance with the Resolution of the Supreme Rada of 18 November 1993, and the suggestion of the President as for revocation of reservations regarding Article V of the Lisbon Protocol. The Government was commissioned to fulfil the exchange of instruments of ratification of START and to intensify activities as for concluding agreements flowing from other reservations of the Supreme Rada.

The achievement of an essential and actual compromise allowed to avert the threat of international isolation of Ukraine, to make a serious breakthrough in relations with the United States, including the sphere of promotion of economic reforms in Ukraine, to unblock the progress at one of the most delicate trends of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

On 10 May 1994, with an aim of realization of the arrangements between the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the USA achieved in Moscow on 14 January 1994, and of the Massandra Agreements, the Governments of Ukraine and the Russian Federation concluded the Agreement on Realization of the Trilateral Arrangements of the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the USA of 14 January 1994. In particular, this Agreement envisaged that the Russian Federation, in connection with the withdrawal of strategic nuclear warheads from the territory of Ukraine for dismantling and utilization, would supply to Ukraine heating assemblies, with taking into account the specified data concerning utilization. The order of further supplies shall be determined annually under arrangement of the parties. The Agreement particularly stressed that by the complete withdrawal of nuclear warheads from the territory of Ukraine the parties would cooperate in the servicing and liquidation of nuclear warheads located in the territory of Ukraine to provide nuclear and environmental security.

On 16 November 1994 the Supreme Rada took decision on joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

On 5 December 1994, the exchange of instruments of ratification of START-1 took place. Since that moment the Treaty become effective, and its actual implementation by the parties was launched. The same day, the documents on Ukraine's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty were transmitted to the leaders of depositary states.

Simultaneously, the leaders of the USA, Great Britain and Russia signed the Memorandum on security guarantees for Ukraine – a unique international document registering commitments of nuclear powers as for the national security of Ukraine in accordance with generally admitted standards of international law. Besides, on the same day France and China granted Ukraine security guarantees in a unilateral order.

In May 1995, Ukraine spoke for an unlimited prolongation of the NPT thus confirming again its consistent orientation in the field of nuclear policy.

Besides, in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, Ukraine takes an active part in the implementation of the US/RUS-USA Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (signed on 8 December 1987, came into effect on 1 June 1988). Ukraine is taking part in this process on the basis of the Resolution on Participation of CIS Countries in the Treaty signed in the city of Bishkek on 9 October 1992, and pursuant to the Law of Ukraine "On Succession of Ukraine" of 12 August 1993.

The completion of the process of withdrawal of strategic nuclear arms from the territory of Ukraine to the Russian Federation with an aim of its further liquidation under Ukrainian observance' control on June 1, 1996 meant a timely and complete fulfillment by the Ukrainian party of its obligations under the Trilateral Declaration of the Presidents of Ukraine, the USA and Russia dated January 14, 1994 and the attached implementation documents.
Herewith we should note that at this time the problem of compensating Ukraine for the value of nuclear materials extracted from the tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn to Russia during 1991-1992 has not been solved yet.

Ukraine has provided conditions for effective implementation of the START in particular, in the respect of inspection activities concerning direct supervision of the Treaty.

Ukraine stopped the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles for mobile launchers at the Pavlograd Mechanic Plant (PMP). Because the parties failed to solve the disagreement over the terms of the US persistent supervision at the PMP within the framework of the Treaty, the problem was solved at the political level. According to the agreement set forth in exchanged letters of the Representatives of Ukraine and the USA at the Joint Commission for Implementation and Inspections (JCCI) dated May 23, 1995, the American party stopped the persistent supervision at the PMP after May 31, 1995.

Today the most urgent problem of the START implementation is conclusion of an agreement on quantitative restrictions of the deployed strategic arms means, in particular the ICBM and corresponding silos, and heavy bombers.

Article 2 of the Lisbon Protocol to the START requires that the states-successors of the ex-USSR should conclude separate agreements providing for the quotas and restrictions imposed by the Treaty on the strategic arms of the ex-USSR. Belarus and Kazakhstan have concluded such agreements with the Russian Federation. According to the agreements, all strategic arms located in the territories of these states had to be withdrawn or liquidated in 1996, i.e., in the course of the first phase of implementation of the Treaty.

In December, 1995, alluding to the fact that the uncertainty of the strategic arms reduction in Ukraine hampers the planning of reduction of the Russian arms by Russia, and has a negative influence upon the process of ratification of the START-2 by the State Duma of the RF, the Russian party proposed a draft agreement "On Imposing the Quotas and Restrictions on the Total Quantity of Deployed Strategic Offensive Arms under the START". The Agreement was to fix coordinated schedules of stage-by-stage reduction and elimination of strategic arms in Belarus, Kazakhstan, the RF and Ukraine. Taking into account the obligations concerning Ukraine's elimination of "all nuclear weapons, including strategic arms", which are set forth in the letter of the President of Ukraine dated May 7, 1992 regarded by the USA and Russia as having the same effect as the Treaty, the mentioned draft agreement envisaged that after a 7-year period since the Treaty coming into effect, strategic arms should remain only in Russia. Belarus and Kazakhstan support Russia in this respect.

Ukraine spoke against the immediate achievement agreements on quantitative restrictions alluding, in particular, to the absence of a schedule of strategic arms liquidation in Ukraine approved at the governmental level and to some procedural issues. Besides, it was emphasized that Ukraine was ready to discuss only the first two stages of reduction, i.e., the period lasting till December, 1999.

It was for settling the problematic issues concerning the Parties' fulfillment of their contractual obligations, for what the Joint Commission for Implementation and Inspections (JCCI) was created.

On January 4, 1996 an intergovernmental communication line between Kyiv and Washington in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine began to work. It was aimed at the exchange of information related to the START-1 and Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and at effective implementation of these Treaties. The first message to the US Secretary of Defense was transmitted by the ex-Minister of Defense of Ukraine V. Shmyrov in the presence of the Ambassador of the USA to Ukraine Mr. Miller.

The realization of the START-1 in Ukraine began from setting up a persistent supervision at the object specializing in production of ICBM for mobile launchers – the PMP from 12.01.95 till 31.05.95. During this period, 13 cargo planes of the US Air Force were to deliver more than 100 tones of cargo for providing a persistent supervision.

From March 1, 1995 the inspections of the strategic arms objects by the US inspection groups started. By today 23 inspections at all of the 11 objects pursuant to the START-1 have been conducted. All issues connected with accompanying the US inspection groups were solved by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the staff of the Ministry of Machinery (Mininashprom).

During the inspections and persistent supervision at the PMP by the inspectors and observers of the USA it was confirmed that Ukraine was fully fulfilling its obligations under the START-1.

The remarks which took place during the inspections were of a purely technical character and on the ground of divergences in interpretation of these or those provisions of the Treaty. Disputable issues were solved at the JCCI sessions, in which the representatives of the Ministry of Defense have been participating and defending the standpoint of Ukraine since 1992. More than 38 Agreements and joint declarations were prepared due to their participation, that favored a more effective implementation of the START-1 provisions.

Ukraine has the right to carry out inspections in the USA. On May 27-28, 1995 a Ukrainian inspection group which also included three representatives of the National Center for Diminishing Nuclear Danger of the Russian Federation carried out an inspection at Barksdale base of heavy bombers (Louisiana). The Ukrainian inspection group inspected 51 heavy bombers B-52H equipped with air-based long-range nuclear cruise missiles.

By the date of coming into effect of the START-1 Ukraine had 222 carriers, i.e., 176 deployed ICBM and 46 deployed heavy bombers.

In accordance with the Schedule of stage-by-stage reduction of strategic arms confirmed by the President of Ukraine, the following items were eliminated in the territory of Ukraine by December, 1997:

1. Silos for ICBM RS-18 – 104 (ICBM base "Pervomaysk" – 38, ICBM base "Khmelintsy" – 66);
2. ICBM RS-18 – 61;
3. ICBM RS-16 – 13;
4. HBr Tu-95 – 2.

By November 20, 1997, 47.7% of the silos were eliminated.

According to the Sochi Agreement 10 ICBM RS-18 were transmitted to the Russian Federation in 1996. Today the elimination of ICBM RS-18 and silos for ICBM RS-18, which is to be completed by 1996, is being carried out. The scale of assistance in dismantling and elimination of strategic arms within the framework of the Joint Threat Reduction
Program which is rendered to Ukraine by the USA, as a whole, provides the necessary rates of work.

During the functioning of the intergovernmental communication link, more than 4060 messages from the USA concerning the START-1 and the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles were received, processed and analyzed.

During the same period more than 700 messages were prepared and delivered to the USA by the Ukrainian party. These messages contain the information which is used for analysis, forecasting and control over fulfillment of provisions of the START-1 by the states-parties, and for informing the military-political leadership of Ukraine.

The minute fulfillment of provisions of the START-1 creates a proper international image of Ukraine among the specialists and favors the process of solving the economic problems of the Armed Forces with the assistance of the industrially developed democracies.

A non-nuclear zone in Central-Eastern Europe – the idea which has been developed in these latter years – is aimed at a de-jure confirmation of the absence of nuclear weapons in Central-Eastern Europe and the adjustment of non-nuclear zone in this region to the new geopolitical conditions. This problem is growing especially topical in the context of NATO’s enlargement and Russia’s opposition thereto.

On one hand, the creation of such a zone in Central-Eastern Europe would lessen the confrontation between Russia and the West and facilitate the process of NATO’s enlargement; it would allow to remove a number of problems connected with the non-admitiveness of this process. On the other hand, it would allow to make a significant progress in the process of creation on an all-European collective security system.

The creation of such a zone would give Ukraine guarantees of non-location of tactical nuclear weapons near its borders. Therefore our country was the first to support Belarus’ initiative as regards the creation of a non-nuclear zone in Central-Eastern Europe declared by S.Senko, the Belorussian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the conference on prolongation of the NPT on 18 April 1995.

The Belorussian initiative gained further development in speeches of President Leonid Kuchma at the session of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe in spring, 1996. In the course of his meeting with Head of the National Council of Austria Heinz Fischer in May 1996, L.Kuchma stressed that “Ukraine wants the territory of the countries of the Central European Initiative to be free from nuclear weapons”, and that this status should be set forth in an international document.

Thus, our country declared that it was ready to assume the initiative and particular measures as for the creation of a non-nuclear zone in Central-Eastern Europe. The first step in the creation of such a zone consists in the resolution of the issue of its territorial limits. Obviously, such limits shall first of all depend on the readiness and consent of countries of the subregion to extend the zone to their territory. Besides, the fulfillment of the very idea of a non-nuclear zone in Europe shall depend on their political will. Therefore it is evident that a particular plan of creation of such a zone should envisage several stages.

The first stage of the plan could consist in passing by Ukraine and Moldova of a joint declaration on proclaiming of the territories of the two countries free from nuclear weapons as parts of the non-nuclear zone in Central-Eastern Europe and openness of this zone for accession of other states of the region. Though such a step does not provide any auxiliary guarantees as for the strengthening of Ukraine’s national security, it is of a great political importance. It could become an impact for accession of other countries. Such a declaration may acquire an international shaping in the form of a resolution of the UN General Assembly. At the same time, both the Declaration and Resolution should provide for inadmissibility of foreign military presence in the territory of Ukraine and Moldova – the countries making the non-nuclear zone. In case of a successful first step, it is necessary to proceed to the second stage – the process of enlargement of the non-nuclear zone to Central-Eastern Europe.

The second stage of the plan should be connected with accession to the non-nuclear zone of Ukraine’s direct neighbors – Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Belarus. However, unfortunately, Poland overtly ignored Ukraine’s initiatives and expressed its readiness to locate NATO’s nuclear weapons in its territory in case of necessity on condition of its accession to the North-Atlantic Alliance. Hungary and Slovakia did not express their official response to the initiative as regards the creation of a non-nuclear zone in Central-Eastern Europe, but declared that in case of accession to NATO they would fulfill all the conditions and duties connected with the membership in the Alliance, including fulfillment of decisions in the field of nuclear planning. Thus, the necessity of our Western neighbors shall be solely determined by NATO. Taking into account this situation, the main efforts of Kyiv were aimed at mutual understanding with NATO in the issue of non-location of nuclear weapons in the territory of the new members of the Alliance.

Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO in this regard turned out to be fruitful. At the Lithuanian meeting during a regular summit of OSCE in December 1996, NATO’s leadership expressed understanding and readiness to meet the suggestions of Ukraine. Later, NATO’s Council approved a declaration regarding the non-location of nuclear weapons in the territory of new members of the Alliance. The final communiqué of NATO’s North-Atlantic Council stressed that NATO did not have either intentions or plans or reasons for location of nuclear weapons in the territory of the new members and “did not envisage any necessity to resort to it in the future". Indeed, from the military-strategic point of view there is no sense for NATO to place its nuclear weapons in the territory of new members. The combat potential of NATO in conventional arms is almost three times as great as the Russian one. The issue of location of nuclear weapons in Eastern-European region is not crucial for the military-political leadership of the USA, because the nuclear “umbrella” over NATO’s members can be provided by the sea-based cruise missiles able to carry tactical nuclear warheads. The 2nd and 6th fleets of the US Navy can include up to 300 cruise missiles “Tomahawk”.

The seriousness of NATO’s intentions as for non-location of nuclear weapons in Central Europe is also testified to by the arrangement between Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in

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17 Henadzie Ushkovski. “U strany dotolny byt ne postoiyannee druzya i vrag, a postoiyannee interesy // Vseukrainskie Vedomosty. - 4.02.97.

the course of their meeting in Helsinki in March, 1997 stressing that one of the provisions of the future treaty between NATO and Russia will contain obligations of the Alliance not to locate nuclear weapons in the territory of new members.

Such a decision would allow to solve two key problems connected with the creation of a non-nuclear zone in Central-Eastern Europe. NATO’s refusal to place nuclear weapons in Central Europe would give the new members of the Alliance the opportunity of changing their approach as to the creation of a non-nuclear zone in the Central-Eastern region of Europe and taking an appropriate decision. Besides the military-bloc guarantees of the Alliance they would obtain additional guarantees as members of a non-nuclear zone.

By this time, Russia supported the creation of such a zone. But in its support first of all stressed the non-location of nuclear weapons in the territory of new members of NATO, it supported Belarus’ initiative on this very condition. However, provided that the non-nuclear zone in Central-Eastern Europe does not include the new members of NATO, Russia will most likely oppose its creation. Stressing V. Orlov, a well-known Russian analyst in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, creation of a non-nuclear space comprising only Ukraine and Belarus would contravene to the interest of Russia, at least with assured calculations at “adequate force response” to NATO’s enlargement in the form of location of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.

A question arises: what was the extent of independence of Belarus’ initiative as for the creation of a non-nuclear zone in Central-Eastern Europe? The point is that the very Belorussian initiatives regarding the creation of a non-nuclear zone were expressed in the context of opposition to NATO’s enlargement. Today, after the passing by Ukraine of the decision on non-nuclear status, we may speak of a particular ground for implementation of this idea. In his program speech in Minsk on 3 July 1996, President Lukashenko strictly blamed the plans of NATO’s enlargement and repeated Belarus’ proposal as for the “creation of a non-nuclear space in Central-Eastern Europe including the Baltic states”. And “being the author of this proposal, Belarus is ready to assume the role of coordinator of such steps.”

It is evident that the initiatives of Minsk were coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. By this Russia expressed its readiness to leave the territory of Belarus non-nuclear in exchange for NATO’s non-location of nuclear weapons either in Central Europe or in the Baltic states. It is not secret for anyone that Russia regards nuclear weapons as a means of keeping the balance of forces in Europe. Previously NATO objected against creation of non-nuclear zones, while today it is more convenient for Russia, from the military-strategic point of view, when it essentiallycedes to NATO in the correlation of armed forces, to locate its tactical nuclear weapons at forward edges. Under the economic crisis and rather restricted capacities as for equipping of its armed forces with new arms, not only current, but also rather remote security on Russia can be only provided by nuclear weapons.

An assumed third stage of formation of a non-nuclear zone in Central-Eastern Europe could consist in accession to this zone of the Baltic and North European states. There are grounds for such accession. As long ago as in 1961, then Swedish prime-minister declared at UNO the plan of denuclearization of Scandinavia, which envisaged establishment of a “non-nuclear club” on the basis of agreement between countries of Central and Northern Europe not in possession of nuclear weapons.

Today the governments of Sweden and Finland do not express their support of the initiative of creation of a non-nuclear zone in Central-Eastern Europe. The Baltic states, in their foreign- and military-political trends, are mainly oriented at NATO and Scandanavian countries. However, provided that the second stage of formation of the non-nuclear zone is completed successfully and a certain support of this process from NATO is rendered, one should expect that the Baltic and Scandinavian (Finland, Sweden and Norway) countries will join the Agreement. Anyway, the European security requires simultaneous actions of the Russian Federation aimed at the spread of the non-nuclear zone regime to the Kaliningrad region and the Baltic Sea water territory.

The fourth, final stage of the formation of a non-nuclear zone in Europe would consist in realization of suggestions of V. Prawitz and the Pugwash movement on the extension of the zone free from nuclear weapons from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Such a zone would comprise the Scandanavian countries, the Baltic Sea territory, territories of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, the Black Sea territory, the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation and Eastern lands of Germany (the former Democratic Republic of Germany).

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14 Interfax Zapad - 3 July 1996
15 Chumak V. Chi bude Yevropa v snyu vid yadem na zbroi / Polityka / chas - 1996 - NS - P. 32.
7. Ukraine’s Role in the Formation of the Regional Security System in the South-Eastern Europe

The zone of Eastern and Southern boundaries of Europe features the most dangerous uncertainty and instability in the region. At the same time, important economic and general strategic interests of European powers, as well as the potential of enlargement of the European structures are focused here. This makes today’s and tomorrow’s role of Ukraine particularly important.

The strategic importance of the region consists first of all in its transit function. The region is situated on the crossroads of ways communicating developed European regions on one hand and the Middle East countries rich in raw and human resources – on the other hand, leading to spacious markets of the Indian ocean and East Asia. The region also unites (or separates) the North and Central Europe with the Mediterranean region, thus forming a common space of economic and political interests of Europe, Asia and North Africa. For ages the Black-Caspian Sea region has been a zone of cultural and civilizational interaction and interference, these processes having become extremely dynamic trends at the current stage of development. However, geopolitically they are quite destructive. The existing vectors of interests of the regional actors contradict each other and feature no clear consistency. These vectors tend to result in a rather unpredictable geopolitical configurations, which can hardly be explained by civilizational, confessional, or social-economic factors.

The realization of wide-scale projects of construction of new ground transport highways from Europe to the countries of the Asian-Pacific region (TRASECA project – “the Great Silk Way) makes higher the geostrategic importance of the region. The trends of development of word economy require establishment of more effective and reliable transport ways uniting the Western and the Eastern parts of the Euro-Asian continent. Thus, the axis of economic integration of the continent can be formed, that would become a factor stimulating the organization of an appropriate geopolitical structure.

Another factor determining the importance of the region is the energy-resource one. The opportunities of development of oil and gas deposits in the Caspian territory and their transporting to world markets arrest attention of Western countries concerned about the diversification of their energy policies. As soon as nowadays, there has developed intensive activity of powerful international oil and financial-industrial companies trying to seize control over the most prospective deposits. The ultimate goal consists in formation of a new structure of energy security of Europe.

This has also caused certain geopolitical shifts. The moving of the Southern flank of NATO from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea region becomes ever more noticeable. It becomes ever more difficult for the Russian Federation to keep its positions in a number of states of the region. The alteration of geopolitical balance of forces in the region is able to cause formation of new configurations of interstate relationship, the forms of which can be only divined today.

The presence of Ukraine in the Black Sea and Caspian space should be regarded as one of its possible identifications, alongside with, say, the Central- or Eastern-European ones.
Ukraine is interested in diversification of foreign economic contacts through advancing to the East. Ukraine should strengthen its positions at the very this space, which still lacks stable inter-state relations.

Interaction with the states of the Black Sea region within the BSEC is an important political precedent in the development of regional system of security and cooperation.

The region, and not in the last turn — Ukraine, is the center of major oil transport communications both at the “East-West” and the “South-North” axes. The exploitation of Ukraine’s territory allows to shorten by two times the way of transporting oil from the Middle East (through Turkey and the Black Sea) to Europe. The Ukrainian-Georgian transport corridor for oil supplies to Europe is also more short compared to alternative ways through Turkey and Russia. Ukraine has a chance to become an important element of European belt of economic security.

Unfortunately, in this regard Ukraine is ceding its positions. The loss of markets in the Balkans caused by the closure of the Danube transport network, difficulties with the construction of the Caucasus transport-energy corridor, the Odessa oil terminal — all this lessens the opportunities of its regional leadership. Therefore, it is first of all necessary to work at the creation of favorable conditions of transit of raw and energy resources through its territory, to strengthen its strategic positions in the Black Sea region, to form up more close relations with the Balkan states and the countries of the Caucasus region.

As a general, the determination of Ukraine’s strategic policy at the South-Eastern direction should, in our opinion, proceed from the following circumstances:

- as a result of the collapse of bipolar model of international relations, a new geopolitical reality is being created. In this regard, Ukraine is one of the links communicating the West and the East. Our country has an actual chance to become one of “gravity centers” of new systems of international relations;
- contribution of Ukrainian enterprises and specialists into the development of economic potential of Eastern countries may promote restoration of lost economic ties;
- as a subject of geopolitics, Ukraine has its own national interests in Eastern countries. Some of them may contravene to the interests of other states and global powers. A rather strong competition from their part should be expected in this regard. Therefore, the penetration of our state to South-East should be mild, tolerant, though consistent in the protection of our interests, taking into account the current systems of international relations;
- Eastern states’ interest in Ukraine is not limited to its role in energy supplies. It is possible that their attempts to diversify economic, scientific and other ties will find appropriate response in Kyiv.

Ukraine is concerned about strengthening of existing and creation of new security structures in the East, especially in the Black Sea, Caucasian and Central-Asian regions, about stability and development of Eastern countries. Relations with them must acquire a consistent and long-term character, lead to decrease of uncontrolled migration flows, struggle against international criminality must become more effective. Furthermore, consistent Eastern policy is able to create a necessary system of counterbalances and alternatives, optimize Ukraine’s position in the system of international relations.

As an objective factor that accomplishes the development of Ukraine’s relations with the countries of the region can be regarded their affiliation to different civilization systems. In some cases, there is a lack of historical communication experience, in other ones – vice versa, there is a negative historical experience. This means that it is necessary to work out a deliberate approach to the choice of political and economic priorities as a precondition of development of comprehensive and mutually beneficial relations.

The military cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey is being developed. On 27 July 1994 Ukraine and Turkey signed the intergovernmental Agreement “On Cooperation in the Sphere of Military Training, Technology and Science”. The Agreement envisages realization of a wide-scale complex of measures and programs as for joint training of cadres and military personnel, exchange of information and joint scientific researches in military sphere. The framework of the Agreement give opportunities for development of friendly relations between the armed forces of the two countries. Among them there are annual exchanges of delegations at all levels, meetings, military ships visits. On the basis of the Agreement, there was worked out a set of military-economic programs, which envisage wide cooperation in the sphere of defense industry, military-technical and material-technical maintenance of armed forces, including annual exchanges of delegations of all levels, meetings and visits of vessels.

In May, 1998, the President of Turkey Souleyman Demirel to Ukraine took place. Returning to Ankara, Demirel left in Kyiv a set of nine intergovernmental agreements in the sphere of health care, commerce, investments protection and military cooperation, including proposals in the field of defense orders as regards the tender for the purchase by Ankara of one thousand tanks T-84, $ 2.5 per each.

The two states also find mutual understanding in the military-political sphere. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize independence of Ukraine and establish diplomatic relations with it. The initiatives of the Turkish side regarding the formulation of measures for keeping and strengthening of security in the Black Sea region enjoy mutual support. On the basis of the mentioned Agreement, a mechanism of mutual consultations on the most crucial military-political issues was created. In the prospect, Turkey may become a consistent representative of Ukraine’s interests in NATO.

Since the establishment of the CIS, relations with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova have become the priority ones for Ukraine. Ukraine has strategic interests in these countries. Georgia and Azerbaijan mean an opportunity of access to sources of strategic raw, first of all energy materials alternative to the Russian ones for the Caspian shelf and Kazakhstani oil and gas fields are among the most prospective oil deposits. Ukraine can access them through the Black Sea. Georgia and Azerbaijan provided a pipeline is built here. Georgia and Azerbaijan are also strongly attracted by Ukraine, not only in the sphere of economic relations, but also in that of security. Azerbaijan expresses concern about the implementation of a program of military-technical and political cooperation with Ukraine, as well as activation of its intermediary role in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict.

Lately, the military-political relations between Ukraine and Moldova have grown more intensive. The importance of Moldova in the provision of Ukraine’s national security consists not only in the fact that Moldova is our neighbour, but first of all in the presence of the non-settled Transdniestr conflict. An important role is played
by Moldova in the Ukrainian-Romanian relations. Like Ukraine, Moldova has not got rid of coercion levers of Moscow.

The main directions of Ukraine's relations with Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan in military-political sphere should be as follows:

1. Intensification of Ukraine's peace-making activities and rendering assistance in the settlement of the Transdniestria, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts.
2. Rendering military-technical and humanitarian assistance, development of military and military-industrial cooperation.
3. Establishment of a system of political consultations and coordination of efforts in solving mutual security tasks.

The policy of Ukraine in the issues of settlement of conflicts in the territory of CIS is to some extent passive. It can be explained by the new foreign and military-policy doctrine of the Russian Federation where the peace-making activity is regarded as one of the means of CIS countries' reintegration, not as a means of settlement of conflicts.

The Agreement on Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States dated 8 December 1991 and the national legislation of Ukraine do not provide for attachment to the Commonwealth of a status of subject of international law. Therefore Ukraine’s attitude to peace-making activities within CIS is based on the concept stating that no state, organization or alignment in the OSCE region can carry on any priority responsibility for keeping peace and stability or regard any part of the OSCE region as a sphere of its influence.

Ukraine is a consistent adherent of a more active participation of OSCE in the settlement of conflicts. In this regard, and proceeding from the necessity of strengthening OSCE's peace-making potential, Ukraine speaks for the completion of the development of the OSCE peace-keeping operations (PKO) concept and creation of an appropriate mechanism within the framework of the current security model.

In provisions for PKO in the security model, Ukraine emphasizes the requirement of the multilateral and impartial character of PKO and strict observance of the requirements to their preparation and fulfillment set forth in appropriate documents of OSCE, in particular, in the Helsinki document - 1992, resolutions of the Rome meeting of the OSCE Council, 1993, the Budapest summit, 1994. Proceeding there from, Ukraine suggests that the model should include a provision stating that all PKO in the OSCE region should be fulfilled under the auspices or a mandate of OSCE. The preparation and fulfillment of PKO OSCE must be based on special knowledge, experience and appropriate resources, which are in possession of the leading members of the future security system - NATO, WEU. EU. Therefore it is necessary that OSCE came to proper arrangements with the mentioned organizations and concluded particular agreements on the mechanisms of interaction with them.

Taking such a standpoint into account, Ukraine does not participate in CIS's activities for the settlement of armed conflicts in the territory of the ex-USSR, regarding such activities as not meeting all the principles of carrying out peace-keeping operations. Besides, whereas Ukraine does not recognize CIS as a regional structure or organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, our country does not recognize CIS's right to carry out PKO.

Among the whole complex of documents regulating the peace-making activities in the territory of states-members to CIS, Ukraine has signed only the Agreement on Military Observers and Collective Forces for Keeping Peace within the Commonwealth of Independent States dated 20 May 1992 (with a reservation), and two Protocols to it. Thus, the national legislation of Ukraine does not limit its participation in this sphere of multilateral cooperation within CIS.

Besides the lack of constructivity of the parties engaged, the slow progress in the settlement of conflicts in the territories of states-members of the Commonwealth has been caused by the striving for a creation of a special procedure of preventing and settling conflicts within CIS. Such a procedure actually excludes cooperation with UN and OSCE in the peace-making sphere. In practice, this only leads to the narrowing of material, financial and other opportunities of effective settlement of conflicts within the states-members of CIS.

Whereas the carrying out of peace-keeping operations falls within the competence of international organizations, which status is not attached to the Commonwealth, according to Ukraine's standpoint, a particular mechanism of preventing and settling conflicts within CIS has no effect for Ukraine. Therefore, Ukrainian troops are not included to the Collective Forces for Keeping Peace within CIS.

At the same time, in each particular case Ukraine is ready to examine the issue of its observers' participation in the formation of the CIS peace-making forces, the activity of which will be enforced by a mandate of UN/OSCE. Such a decision will be taken by Ukraine in a unilateral order under the national legislation.

It is also necessary to note that Ukraine enjoys sufficient opportunities to assume the role of a peace-making country in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Firstly, its geopolitical situation allows Ukraine to take into account to a full extent political, social-economic and cultural-ethnic peculiarities of the region. Secondly, Ukraine has educational centers and structures, appropriate means and forces for preparation and fulfillment of peace-making operations. A Center for Peace-Making Operations has been established at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Besides, a decision on establishment of a special educational Center for Peace-Making Forces Preparation was taken. Thirdly, the interests of Ukraine as a non-aligned state to a greatest extent coincide with the interests of keeping peace and stability in the Eastern European and the Black Sea regions.

It seems necessary to strengthen and extend cooperation within the framework of the non-formal "Group of Four", or GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova), which was formed during the preparation and in the aftermath of the Lisbon OSCE summit. Directing efforts both at promotion of rapid settlement of appropriate conflicts and realization of the priorities of activity within OSCE agreed upon by the members of the group.

The weak defensive capacities of Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan make these countries rely mostly on Russia which, in its turn, exploits their weakness for the establishment of a comprehensive military-political control over them and realization of its geostrategic interests. Fulfilling such control, Russia is at the same time interested in the preservation of non-stable situation in the conflictogenous zones, which would justify the strengthening of its military presence. Therefore one of the major strategic tasks of strengthening stability and security both in particular zones
and the region as a whole consists in rendering technical and humanitarian aid, as well as deepening of diversified military and military-industrial cooperation.

The assistance within the framework of military cooperation should be aimed at:

- training of military cadres for national armies of Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan at higher military educational institutions of Ukraine;
- rendering technical assistance in creation and development of the national armed forces of these countries, their frontier service and navies;
- rendering production services in maintenance and modernization of military technics and arms of the national armies;
- development of military-industrial cooperation with Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan;
- rendering material and technical aid in case of direct military threat to these countries.

The main directions of Ukraine's military-technical cooperation with CIS countries are as follows: mutual supplies of arms and military technics, maintenance and modernization of arms and military technics, comprehensive servicing there, preparation of specialists in maintenance, rendering assistance in material and technical and rear support of armed forces. Ukraine has already started preparation of military cadres for Georgia, Turkmenistan and Moldova.

As regards particular forms of realization of Ukraine's peace-making activities, they are going to vary, taking into account peculiarities of each conflict. In the Nagorno Karabakh, Ukraine's peace-making activity will be obviously limited to intermediary services, technical consultations, activities of military observers. At international level, Azerbaijan may calculate on diplomatic support regarding the restoration of its territorial integrity.

In Georgia, the opportunities of Ukraine's peace-making activities are more wide. The Georgian party has repeatedly addressed Ukraine requesting that peace-making troops be brought into the zone of conflict. Proceeding from the experience of creation of a Ukrainian-Polish battalion for participation in PKO, a suggestion was approved on the formation of a similar battalion consisting of servicemen of Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia. An opportunity of cooperation in this regard with other friendly states is being minutely examined.

Understanding the importance of the UN peace-making activities in Georgia, Ukraine has repeatedly declared its readiness to activate its role in the Organization's efforts aimed at the attainment of a comprehensive political settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. In particular, provided there is a consent of all the parties to the conflict, Ukraine is ready to join the group of countries of observers of the UN Mission for observation in Georgia. On this occasion President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma met President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze in Yalta, June, 1998, where he expressed support of E. Shevardnadze's activities aimed at peaceful settlement of the Abkhazian problem. There was declared an intention of Ukraine to take part in the process of this settlement, in particular, to join the "Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General" for Georgia.

Especially intensive is the development of relations in the sphere of naval cooperation. Detachments of the Georgian army take part in international exercises within the framework of the PIP program in the territory of Ukraine. Georgia has an intention to fulfill the modernization and maintenance of its military technics at

Ukrainian military enterprises. Ukraine is rendering material and technical assistance to the Ministry of Defense of Georgia. Georgian servicemen are studying at the Academy of Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Georgia is a priority country for Ukraine in the realization of its geostrategic interests connected with the strengthening of security in the Black Sea region. At the same time, Georgia suffers the strongest coercion from Russia, the instruments of which consist in the non-settled conflict in Abkhazia, the Russian military presence and Russian frontier troops guarding the sea borders of Georgia. Under any conditions, a situation when sea borders of a state are guarded by troops of another state is not safe. Therefore Ukraine's policy is aimed at rendering Georgia assistance in creation of its own frontier service.

Georgia is the first CIS country with which Ukraine signed an agreement on cooperation in frontier issues not having a common state border. Pursuant to the achieved agreements, Ukraine is fulfilling training and re-training of cadres for the Georgian frontier troops. The issue of involving Ukrainian military advisers to the work at creation of the frontier troops of Georgia is being examined. There is an arrangement on concluding intergovernmental contracts on joint drafting and production of technics and arms. Ukraine assigned to Georgia a patrol vessel, which initiated the creation of the Georgian coast guard in spring, 1997. The Georgian port of Poti was attended by two frontier patrol ships of Ukraine. When being in Georgia, the Ukrainian delegation examined the issues of interaction within the framework of protection of state borders in the Black Sea. After this visit, the ferry of Poti-Ilichivsk was opened.

As regards Moldova, Ukraine has already taken the obligations of intermediary and security guarantor to the parties of the Transdniestria conflict. Together with Russia, it has signed a memorandum laying down a basis for stability in the relations between Tiraspol and Chisinau. The next step of Ukraine aimed at the strengthening of the mission will probably be sending a peace-making contingent to the Transdniestria. Igor Smirnov, leader of the unrecognized Transdiestrian Republic, has already made a corresponding request to President Kuchma. The Transdniestrian leadership is concerned with the perspective of withdrawal of the Russian troops that may result in a rising threat to regional security. Through President Kuchma repeatedly states that the question should be coordinated with the Russian side. Ukraine, despite Russia's dissatisfaction - is preparing its "blue helmets" for the peace-making mission in the Transdniestria under the auspices of OSCE.

March 1998 meeting of Viktor Chernomyrdin, Leonid Kuchma, Petro Luchinsky, and Igor Smirnov in Odessa resulted in an agreement to establish mobile peace-makers' posts instead of stationary ones. The Agreement On the Measures of Confidence, and Development of Contacts between Moldova and the Transdniestria envisaged the reduction of the peace-making forces to 500 servicemen of each party within months. Some posts on the border of Moldova and the Transdniestria will be reduced. Ukrainian military observers will be present in the zone. The Transdniestria insists that Ukrainian "blue helmets" join the trilateral peace-making forces. Ukraine promotes withdrawal of the 14th army from the Transdniestria territory having signed the Agreement on transit through the territory of Ukraine of the military units provisionally located in the territory of Moldova.
As known, currently the stocks of the 14th Russian army comprise 49,476 units of firearms, 805 artillery systems, 655 units of combat technics, 4000 motorcars. According to expert estimations, these arms would suffice for four divisions.

Under the Agreement with Russia, Moldova is to be assigned 35 per cent of the armament of the 14th army, especially taking into account the fact that the Agreement on principles and order of the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe Moldova is allowed to possess 210 tanks and combat armored vehicles, up to 250 units of artillery, 50 units of combat aircraft and 50 striking helicopters.

Thus, taking into consideration the above, 32,160 units of firearms, 523 artillery systems, 426 units of combat technics, 2600 motorcars must be withdrawn to Russia, that will require about 2300 conditional carriages.

The Agreement on transit through the territory of Ukraine is in the interest of both parties. On one hand, it provides for security measures during the transportation of Russian military formations and cargoes. On the other hand it affords our state to fulfill control over the echelons, ammunition and technics, that excludes the probability of exploitation of these formations in the territory of Ukraine.

The payment for such transportations and reimbursement of possible ecological damage by the Russian Federation is the obligatory clause of the Agreement. The payment for the transit shall be made by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to transport organizations of Ukraine in accordance with tariffs and regulations of the railway transport of Ukraine through forwarding firms.

As far as relations between the Transdnestria and Russia concerns, in March 1998 the prime-minister of the RF and the leader of the Transdnestria signed a protocol on military and property issues. Under the agreement all the arms of Russian peace-makers in the Transdnestria territory shall be distributed into three groups: the first one will comprise arms, ammunition and property of the Russian troops which will remain untouched, the second one will consist of combat machinery subject to unconditioned withdrawal to Russia, and the third one will comprise surplus arms, which may be destroyed at spots or sold. The income of their realization will be equally shared between the RF and the Transdnestria territory. Alongside with this, the Transdnestria party committed itself not to resist the withdrawal of Russian arms.

Interesting are activities of the Ukrainian state bodies armed at technical and political backing of the withdrawal of the 14th Russian army from the Transdnestria.

A joint and coordinated position towards the modernization of the treaties on CFE and flank restrictions would help providing security to all countries of the region.

8. MILITARY SECURITY OF UKRAINE AND THE QUESTION OF ADAPTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS ON CFE AND FLANK RESTRICTIONS

Ukraine still is not fully adapted to the inherited terms of the treaties on restrictions of conventional arms. The following arms and technics restrictions under the agreement (ATRA) were set for the "flank" zone comprising the Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as well as the Crimean Republic: 680 battle tanks (400 of them in warehousing); 350 combat armored vehicles (CAV); 890 artillery systems (500 of them in warehousing).

Analysis of the situation shows that not more than 17% battle tanks, 7% CAV, and 22% artillery systems of the defined maximum levels for Ukraine can be placed in the former Odessa military district, which makes 23% of the territory of the state (in the regular units: tanks - 9%, CAV - 8%, artillery systems - 12%).

Reorganizing the armed forces without breaking the Agreement would have needed placement of the major forces within the former Prykarpatsky military district, which had already comprised about 50% of all tanks and 54% CAV. Moreover, 271 battle tanks, 749 CAV, and 208 artillery systems of the marines of the Black Sea Fleet had been disposed in this region.

In 1993 a Ukrainian delegation to the Vienna negotiations claimed that the Armed Forces of Ukraine should total 1000-1100 battle tanks, 1100-1200 CAV, and 1100-1200 artillery systems in this region in order to secure national interests and preserve the existing infrastructure.

Table 1. "Flank" Restrictions under the Agreement on CFE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BT</th>
<th>CAV</th>
<th>Acty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximum levels</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The presence of arms and technics restricted by the Treaty of Ukraine</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The presence of arms and technics restricted by the Treaty of Russia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As neither of the proposals were accepted by the parties to the treaty, while the problem needed prompt decision, Ukraine, according to the article V of the Treaty on CFE, exercised its right to dispose additional arms in the "flank" region. The maximum levels of ATRA made:

- 786 battle tanks (+106 units);
- 591 CAV (+241);
- 962 artillery systems (+72).

Thus, the additional deployment of ATRA did not solve the "flank" problem completely (see table 1).
By May 1, 1997 in the territory of the "flank" area in the Ukrainian Armed Forces 663 battle tanks, 544 CAV, 891 artillery systems were placed.

This quantity of arms and vehicles corresponded to the restrictions imposed on Ukraine, taking into account their additional deployment. Alongside with this, after signing the Founding Act on Interrelations between Russia and NATO, and the Charter on Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO, the adaptation of the Agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) to the present conditions became one of the most acute problems for European security. The most important issue for Ukraine in this respect is the solution of the problem of "flank" restrictions.

14 CAV and 24 arty systems with calibers over 100 mm which belong to the 810 Separate battalion of the Russian marine corps (SBRMC) are placed in the territory of Ukraine (the Republic of Crimea) without a legally set status. Therefore, the total quantity of ATRA of Ukraine and Russia in the "flank" area already exceeded the maximum admissible levels that led to a breach of provisions of the Agreement on CFE concerning the "flank" restrictions.

On May 31, 1996, at the First Conference for discussion for implementation of the Agreement on CFE it was proposed to discuss the "Document Agreed Upon by the States-Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, dated 19 November 1990" which concerns the problem of "flank" restrictions under the Agreement on CFE and the ways of solving it. In particular, the Document envisaged:

1. withdrawal of the Odessa oblast from the "flank" area, accompanied with restriction of arms deployed there to 400 battle tanks, 400 CAV, 350 artillery systems with caliber over 100 mm;
2. preserving all the existing "flank" restrictions for Ukraine which should be effective in the territory of the Mykolaiv, Kherson and Zaporizhzhya oblasts, and in the Republic of Crimea.
3. the Russian Federation should be allowed to use the maximum extent the quota for additional deployment of ATRA (459 battle tanks, 723 CAV and 420 arty systems) in the territories of other states (including Ukraine) on consent of those states, provided that in the territory of any one state there should not be more than 153 battle tanks, 241 CAV and 140 arty systems.

The provisions of the Document which concerns the withdrawal of the Odessa oblast corresponds to the interest of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

First, the exercising of the new decisions favors the process of strengthening security of the state, because the maximum levels of ATRA in the southern region of Ukraine are essentially increased:

1. battle tanks – from 680 to 1080;
2. combat armored vehicles – from 350 to 750;
3. artillery with caliber 100 mm and more – from 890 to 1240.
4. Besides, almost 40% of these ATRA are placed in the frontier of Odessa oblast.

Second, the tension, which emerged because of the fact that the Ministry of Defense had to fulfill obligations consisting in restriction of ATRA in the south of the Odessa military district, lessens.

It was caused by the shift of arms and techics, disbandment and rebandment of military units etc.

In the territory of the new "flank" area (the Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhya oblasts and the Republic of Crimea) Ukraine shall be able to have:

1. 680 battle tanks (by May 1, 1997 Ukraine had only 281 units);
2. 350 CAV (compared with the previous 183 units);
3. 890 artillery systems (compared with the previous 604 units).

However, unacceptable for Ukraine is the fact that the Documents determines the "flank" area where Russia is able to place its arms and techics as it was interpreted by the ex-USSR at the moment of signing the Agreement on CFE, i.e. expounded to the territory of Ukraine, including the Republic of Crimea.

During the Conference, Ukraine declared that the corresponding provisions of this Document should not be applied to Ukraine. Later, on December 3, 1996 in Lisbon it confirmed its stipulations as for the mentioned Document and declared the necessity for the withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet ground units from the territory of Ukraine by May 15, 1997.

On April 8, 1997 at the Joint consultation group in Vienna Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova made a common declaration which stressed the unacceptability of giving the Russian Federation the opportunity of placing its ATRA within the "flank" area without proper bilateral agreements.

On May 8, 1997 16 states-members of NATO spoke at the Joint consultation group with a corresponding statement of the fact that the mentioned Document did not ensure the right of either party of placement or a provisional deployment of ATRA in the territory of states-parties to the Treaty without a voluntary consent of the receiving state-party.

During the working visit of the President of Ukraine on May, 16-17, 1997 the Ukrainian Minister for foreign affairs H.Udovenko and the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright signed a common Declaration according to which the USA supported the standpoint of Ukraine stressing that a provisional presence of foreign troops in the territory of Ukraine is possible only on the basis of an Agreement with Ukraine signed in accordance with its Constitution and international law.

The Decree of the President of Ukraine on May, 14 1997 N439/97 approved the "Document Agreed Upon by the States-Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, dated 19 November 1990" with the following stipulations effective all through the terms of the Document, including the period of its provisional exercising:

1. The obligations of the Russian Federation envisaged by Section II of the Document are effective to the extent to which the very presence of the ATRA of the Russian Federation is admitted by Ukraine within the part of its territory which forms the "flank" area as it was interpreted by the USSR at the moment of signing the Treaty. In any case, Ukraine's consent for such presence, however it was expressed, shall not be regarded as such which cannot be annulled. Neither part of this Document shall be interpreted as Ukraine's consent for the presence or placing the ATRA of the Russian Federation in the territory of Ukraine which forms the "flank" area.
2. The provisions of item 2 Section IV of the Document by no means restrict the right and opportunity of Ukraine to deploy battle tanks, combat armored vehicles and artillery within the "flank" area on a provisional basis in accordance with article V of the Treaty.

3. The term of effect of the Document is ceasing on the date of coming into effect of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

On May 15, 1997, after the approval of all the States-Parties, the "Document Agreed Upon by the States-Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, dated 19 November 1990" (the "flank" Document) came into effect.

Therefore:

1. The Odessa oblast has been excluded from the "flank" area, but the opportunity of deploying arms there is restricted to 400 battle tanks, 400 CAV and 350 arty systems with calibers over 100 mm.

2. All the existing "flank" restrictions imposed on Ukraine shall be effective in the territory of the Mykolaiv, Kherson and Zaporizhzhya oblasts, and in the Republic of Crimea.

3. Ukraine reserved the right to deploy, if necessary, battle tanks, combat armored vehicles and artillery within the new "flank" area on a provisional basis in accordance with article V of the Treaty.

4. The presence of arms of the Russian Federation in the territory of Ukraine constitutes a part of the "flank" area (the Crimea) without consent of Ukraine and a proper bilateral agreement should be regarded as a breach of international law.

5. Passing the Document gave the Russian Federation the right to increase the quantity of ATRA in its "flank" area territory:
   - from 1300 battle tanks to 1600,
   - from 1380 CAV to 3700,
   - from 1680 arty systems to 2400.

The Agreement on CFE is constantly developing. Today it constitutes not only a military control means, but also an important measure of extending and deepening mutual frankness and strengthening confidence in relations between the states and their armed forces.

9. UKRAINE AND ARMS TRADE

The quantity and quality parameters of arms export to a great extent determine the rating of a state. Proceeding from this standpoint, one could affirm that the determination of a particular scale of arms trade must be preceded by a sharp outline of a state's strategic goal as regards its niche in the regional and world-wide "Tables of Ranks". Herefrom, an important conclusion can be made: if Ukraine is striving for having an influence upon European affairs and being regarded as one of the regional leaders in the future, it has to "prove" this striving for the world community. In particular, through the increase the indices of export of arms and military technics to the level of European "reference-point" countries.

The list of leading regional states which nowadays determine the European policies, in particular, in the field of security, includes Germany, Great Britain and France. Annual amounts of arms export of these countries, according to the data of SIPRI range between 1 and 2 billion dollars. Germany, a country with the most powerful economy, is leading. England occupies the second position. The third place is kept by France. We can assume that for Ukraine, a country with a rather developed MTC but significant macro-economic problems, it is a very ambitious strategic task to achieve at least the lowest level of arms export of the current leaders.

The experience of France, which is similar to Ukraine according to quantity of population and striving for carrying out independent policy, testifies that keeping the national main arms items export at the annual level of USD 1 billion may be deemed close to optimum.

The main strategic tasks of Ukraine in the spheres of foreign policy and defense include stage-by-stage adaptation of the national defense system with future integration into the all-European system which is being created. The analysis of French strategy in setting up the arms business testifies to the fact that the tasks of Kyiv and Paris, which is known as an adherent of European community, first of all in the security sphere, are to a great extent similar.

Nowadays, the keeping of readiness of the Armed Forces under economic crisis is an acute problem for Ukraine. First of all, it concerns the material basis of the army - arms and military technics (AMT). The maximum term of use of most arms systems made in USSR by which the Armed Forces of Ukraine are equipped constitutes 5-10 years. Therefore, in the beginning of the next millennium a renovation of AMT of national Armed Forces must be launched. Proceeding from the priority of providing national security before mere commercial benefit, we can affirm that the optimization of the national MTC is not to be reduced to the formula of expediency of producing AMT for export to produce only the samples having a demand at the market, while the income from realization of the goods are to compensate its production and provide necessary modernization (income).

There is no need to convince anybody that unlike other branches of goods production and transfers, the arms business is too tied to the policy of intergovernmental relations and constitutes one of powerful instruments of its implementation. Thus, partnership in arms business (at least, official one) is only possible on condition of political partnership, where strategic goals and foreign-policy reference-points of parties complete each other. Therefore, any closing of
states in the military sphere, their geopolitical interests and tasks are very close things.
The vagueness of Ukraine's presence at the world arms market should be considered a natural consequence. However as soon as today the foreign-policy accents allow to determine the circle of strategic partners, and not in the last turn in the field of arms production. Let us remind that re-equipment of the Armed Forces with modern arms and military technics (AMT) and occupying its place at the market with competitive and high-technologic output constitute a coherent strategic task of Ukraine in the sphere of development of its arms production capacities. In this context we should point out two important aspects:

1. Ukraine's accession to all-European security system in the future envisages an obligatory adaptation of Ukrainian arms to all-European standards and procedures. This especially concerns complicated and high-technological types of AMT, such as integrated systems of intelligence, management and communications of all levels.

2. During the "cold war" era, the arms market was shared between consumers of AMT produced in the West and the USSR's clients. Whereas arms are goods of rather long-time use, such a distribution will take place for a while, especially among the "third world" countries. However, the leadership in the branch of high-technological output, modern technologies and complicated arms systems is already kept by the West. And this trend is rapidly being strengthened. Thus, even merely pragmatic criteria are enough to outline the ideology of transformation of the national MIC. The current partnership of Ukrainian military industry, according to the extent of ramification and strength of ties and production chains can be conditionally marked by a four-level system from interdependence in particular production cycles at the highest level (the Russian Federation) to the first attempts of cooperation with particular countries of the West and the East - at the lowest one. Ukraine's strategy of arms production is determined by the task of its "return to Europe" - the current too high affiliation to the Russian MIC and market is to cede its place to strong integration ties with European partners and a wide diversification of exports. A stage-by-stage leaving the orbit of the Russian defense complex, for understandable reasons, is too difficult, long-lasting and at the same time - most priority task. But is there any alternative?

The main, officially declared task of Russian arms business consists in regaining of positions occupied by the USSR at the arms market. However, while for Moscow of the past the main condition was determined as an importer's political loyalty to the USSR, the present-day Russia is inclined to reject any conditions in AMT trade for mere benefit.

Let us remind that close cooperation in arms business testifies to similarity of political standpoints and preferences of partners. In accordance with this, the response of world leaders and community as a whole is formed. Taking into account political and economic criteria, the too egocentric and commercialized Russian strategy of military-technical cooperation should be recognized unacceptable for Ukraine. To confirm this thesis, we will allude to several examples.

According to M. Tyumin, first deputy Director General of the state company 'Rosvoorozheniya' which is the main manager of Russian arms export, Moscow is planning a series of contacts with CIS countries, which are actively exporting arms, to work out a coordinated price policy. "We want ... to gather all the leading arms exporters of CIS and together (italicized by the author) determine the price policy", he emphasized. For the first sight - it is an advisable suggestion. However, unfortunately, the interpretation of coordination of activities in Russia is rather original. Further, the following was said: "If the policy of CIS countries in the sphere of arms export is not altered, the RF will have to resort to economic sanctions and stop spare parts supplies to disobedient states. In general, - the "Rosvoorozheniya" representative stressed, - the RF regards CIS countries as Western competitors, proceeding first of all from its national interest" (italicized by the author).

It is clear that no actual coordination between competitors takes place. Thus, the hopes of certain Ukrainian producers for close cooperation with the Russian MIC on the basis of mutual benefit are unlikely to be justified. As early as several years ago, Russian experts proved that Russia never allowed and would never allow its national security to be dependent on that of any other, even friendly state. This ruling principle of military-technical policy was recently confirmed by it.

We speak about the fact that a considerable part of Soviet missile-building complex became Ukrainian. The RF faced a problem of choice of strategy of supporting its strategic nuclear force. Missile production in Ukraine had been created for forty years and was provided by resources of the whole USSR. But Moscow rejected the opportunity of joint Ukrainian-Russian development and production of new missile technics for equipment of the Russian armed forces. Despite all economic difficulties, the RF did not exploit the USA's consent to supplies by Ukraine of output of Category I according to the lists of MCTR, but managed to establish its own closed production cycle and carried out testing of the new carrier "Topol-M" in summer, 1996. Ukrainian rocketeers can only calculate for provisional participation in service and maintenance works at rocket complexes the exploitation of which will be gradually stopped.

According to reports of the press, specialists of the Ukrainian-Russian air consortium "Intermediate Cargo Aircraft" (ICA) and a German company Daimler Benz Aerospace (DASA) started production of common technical proposals for participation in international tender for production of a new generation military cargo aircraft. We speak about testing the probability of adaptation of the Ukrainian-Russian AN-70 to the requirements set by the North-Atlantic Alliance to such aircraft.

The list of the main founders of ICA consortium created in 1994 and intended for the fulfillment and after-sale servicing of AN-70 program includes Antonov's design office, Ukrainian plant "Aviant" (Kyiv), joint-stock company "Motorsich" (Zaporizhzhya), design office "Progress" (Zaporizhzhya) and the Russian plant "Aviakor" (Samara). AN-70 was designed and created in Ukraine. As one can see from the list of members of ICA, the general "weight" of the Ukrainian party is much more great than that of the Russian one. This also concerns the contents of cooperation. Thus, from the point of view of technological conditions, the presence of the Russian party in this project cannot be deemed crucial. Judging by persistent attempts of ICA to involve Western partners into the project, the RF is not a very powerful investor. Therefore, the participation of Russian aircraft builders is, probably, a consequence of stereotypic cooperative traditions of Soviet times.

Apropos, we should note that unlike Ukraine, for the Russian Federation, the presence of a Russian founder in the consortium is much more than merely desirable. The matter is that according to estimations of Russian analysts, a trend of
decrease of demand for combat fighters and bombers, which constitute the main item of the current Russia's arms business, is nowadays peculiar to world market. Soon, the situation at the market will additionally aggravate when the license production of some popular models of Russian machines is launched beyond the frontiers of the RF, as for instance SU-27 in China. Vice versa, multi-function cargo and passenger aircraft, such as AN-70, will be in great and stable demand, as forecasted. Let us emphasize that in messages of this project appearing in the press over the world, it is most often referred to as "Russian-Ukrainian" one.

Cooperation with the RF in military and technical sphere becomes for Ukraine a zone of high political risk, because the rush pragmatism of this country in AMT trade and its permanent opposition to anything connected with NATO do, from time to time, admit to the circle of its preferential partners rogue and threshold countries. This threatens to Ukraine with a non-desirable aggravation of relations with the USA and their partners. The latest sad example of such a strategy of Russia consists in Russian-Indian cooperation in nuclear sphere.

The strongly negative attitude of world community to Indian nuclear tests conducted this year that constitute a threat of impeding the global non-proliferation process and starting a new period of arms race, is known. The United States, Japan, Canada and other states introduced economic sanctions against India. Intensive search of mechanisms for neutralization of harmful consequences of nuclear adventures in South Asia is going on. A sharp dissonance in this situation was made by representation of V. Mikhailov, first deputy minister of the RF for atomic power, stating that the preparation of the Russian-Indian contract for erection of an atomic power station in the Indian Kudankulam, which is to be signed by the parties within three-six months, in V. Mikhailov's opinion, a "significant step forward" has been made in the process of bilateral cooperation, and Russia "has did right have launched the work at creation of an atomic power plant in India for it is a profitable commercial deal". Thus, due to a number of entirely objective circumstances of military-political and economic character, Ukraine's cooperation with Russia in military sphere must be gradually reduced to the level of non-crucial mutual interest.

On 16 July in Kyiv a meeting of L. Kuchma and Secretary-General of the North-Atlantic Alliance J. Stoltenberg took place in Kyiv. President of Ukraine expressed his being content with the negotiations and being convinced that Ukraine and NATO "will cooperate not only within the framework of military issues and "Partnership for Peace" program, but much wider". Speaking on the task of extension of the contents of cooperation with NATO, Ukrainian politicians stressed that Ukraine intends not to limit it to military-political sphere. In particular, it strives for activation of relations in economic sphere, namely in the sphere of military industry. For instance, in the opinion of H. Udovenko, Chairman of the 52nd session of General Assembly of UN, ex-Minister for foreign affairs of Ukraine, our country is able to take part in re-equipping of armed forces of the states-parties to former Warsaw Treaty which access to NATO.

These intentions are not groundless: Ukraine has proved that there are suggestions worth attention of Western partners. Serious expectations of arms producers in military industry are today related to prospects of participation in the recently promulgated program of modernization of the Turkish armed forces which is evaluated at 150 billion USD. Ukraine, which occupies the 9th place among world arms exporters, is not an exclusion in this regard. Ukraine's expectations first of all concern armor; the domestic samples of which are completely competitive and are in demand at the market. V. Vashchelin, Head of the State Service of Export Control of Ukraine called it "the main export output of the state". A particular political attractiveness of the Turkish tender for Ukraine consists in the fact that it provides an actual opportunity of establishment of joint production of military technics in a state-member to the Alliance. Ankara's concern about the organization of industrial cooperation is stressed by military experts as a peculiarity of the tender.

Among the examples of successful cooperation between Ukraine and the West in the sphere of Hi-tech there is the Ukrainian carrier rocket "Cyclon-2" modernized in cooperation with the Italian company "FIAT-Auto", which was chosen by Brazil for the launch of communications satellites from space-vehicle launching site Akanlar. This state intends to conclude an agreement with Ukraine on exploitation of "Cyclons" by the end of the year, while from 2001 it is planned to start regular launches, from 6 to 12 per year. In general, the plans of creation of global telephone communications system "Indium" envisage launching 61 satellites.

The capacities of the national military industry can be confirmed with the fact that today in Ukraine there are 50 candidates to the right to carry out independent arms and special output trade at external market as UNIAN agency was informed in interview with V. Vashchelin, Head of the State Service of Export Control. According to him, today 12 special output exporters are working in Ukraine. Among them there are the State Company for Export and Import of Produce and Services of Military and Special Purpose "Ukropsexport" and its three daughter companies, "Motor. Sich": "AVIANT" Artem's plant "Progress", "FED", etc. Head of the State Service also stressed that the list of official special exporters does not include producers which do not require intermediaries or special consent of the State Service of Export control. These are enterprises supplying spare parts or manufacturing output within the framework of cooperation or on state order. Taking them into account, according to V. Vashchelin's data, in Ukraine there are about 140 entities engaged in special commercial activities. During the first five months of this year, Ukraine obtained more that USD 200 million for export of arms and special technics, that is by 30% more than for an analogous period of the last year. Stressed V. Vashchelin. Russia and Pakistan are the leading importers, but they have been joined by the USA and Germany. The major share of special output realized in 1998 constitutes new systems and arms made in Ukraine. Among them there are armor, air defense systems, certain types of missiles, air engines, units for radio location plants. Ukraine delivers a plenty of spare parts, while the amounts of sale of ammunition and firearms are less. The Ukrainian MIC still has a considerable potential and competitive position.
Monitoring Foreign & Security Policy of Ukraine

Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine (CPCFPU) was founded in 1992 as the Ukrainian Center for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies. In 1998 the name of the Center was changed in order to better reflect the main subject of its research, which is foreign and security policy of Ukraine.

The Center and the Cooperation Office Ukraine of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung started the project Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine in January 1997 in order to compensate the lack of analytical materials on Ukraine’s foreign policy and defense issues. Our experts regularly collect and profoundly analyze factual and sociological information on the main events and trends in foreign and security (defense) policy in Ukraine. The mechanism of policy formation and the influence of leading political actors in this process are also examined.

The Monitoring of Foreign & Security Policy of Ukraine includes:

- weekly newsbriefs with short comments on events, government decisions, international treaties, etc.
- weekly occasional reports (3-4 papers on the most topic issues each month) and public opinion polls studying the most important problems facing Ukrainian society and measuring the public’s confidence in decisionmaking bodies and politicians
- quarterly experts' polls of the main events and trends in foreign and security policies, based on the polling of foreign and security policy experts
- annual reports reflecting trends and both short and middle range forecasting with respect to foreign and security policy

Materials of the CPCFPU are prepared by researchers of the National Institute of Strategic Studies; Institutes of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, including the Institute of Sociology, Institute of World Economy and International Relations; and military research centers.

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