

Juliusz Gardawski

Poland's Industrial Workers on the Return to Democracy and Market Economy

*To Stefan,
and also
to Emilka, Michal, Olek and Tomek,
with the hope that they will have a chance
to live in a Poland that is democratic
and liberal but also friendly to its citizens.*

A 97 - 02050

**FRIEDRICH
EBERT
STIFTUNG**

Warsaw 1996



This book represents a summation of the results of research carried out by the author with funds provided by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in 1991-1994. The research discussed here consists chiefly of four surveys carried out on representative samples throughout Poland („Robotnicy'91", „Robotnicy'92", „Robotnicy'93" and „Robotnicy'94"). These surveys constituted the most extensive series of research on the subject of Polish workers in the first half of the 1990s.

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Cover photo: *Krzysztof Świdorski*

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Printed in Poland

ISBN 83-86088-47-8

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Foreword

This work deals with the transformations that have been taking place in the consciousness of workers in the transition from authoritarian socialism to a democratic market economy. In the years 1980-81 workers united to deal a heavy blow to the system of authoritarian rule. They did so not only in the name of their material interests but also in defence of a number of values, such as truth, equality, justice, democracy in politics and the economy, the dignity of labour, and so forth. About a decade later, the same workers accepted the introduction of a pluralistic social order in which their position was seriously eroded and in which the reconstruction of the great community-driven Solidarity movement turned out to be impossible. Therefore the key objective of this work will be to try to answer the question why they agreed to—and continue to accept—this change and the hardships that go with it. The information indispensable for embarking upon this task comes from research done in the industrial workers' milieu since the mid-1980s.

In the years 1991-94, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation financed four nationwide representative surveys of industrial workers and a study of labour union leaders at the shop floor level. All the research was carried out by the CBOS opinion research centre. Additional panel studies were financed with funds provided by the Ministry of Privatisation. In addition, I used the findings of various surveys from the 1980s (financed by the Institute for Studies of the Working Class — IBKR ANS and the Institute for Social Economy — IGS SGPiS).

At this point, I should like to express my sincere thanks to the former director of Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Dr. Klaus Grimm, who first launched the project consisting in representative surveys of the working class milieu, and the present director, Hans R. Blumenthal, who decided to carry on the research. Both directors have been very supportive.

I owe gratitude to many people. I would like to express my thanks to those whose views exerted an impact on the theses presented in this work. First of all, I thank my tutor, Professor Leszek Gilejko, who has never stopped to assist me with his knowledge. The professor also took part in the survey of factory-level union leaders in 1993. I wish to thank Dr. Wojciech Widera, together with whom I carried out many surveys of the working class milieu in the 1980s, and Dr. Tomasz Żukowski, who took part in the "Workers '92" and "Workers '93" projects and in the survey of shopfloor union leaders.

I wish to thank Professor Maria Jarosz, who invited me to work with the team studying the problems of employee ownership. This gave me an opportunity to take a look at the important question of distribution of ownership in the so-called employee-lease companies and the social climate prevailing in those partnerships.

I must also mention those who helped me carry out qualitative analysis and those connected with the Warsaw University Computer Centre. I thank Dr. Zofia Aranowska, Ewa and Kazimierz Grabowski, Dr. Jerzy Bartkowski, Ewa Kaczmarek-Rygier, Irmina Harasymowicz, Anna and Wiktor Łupienko. I must not omit the numerous workers, section heads and managing directors of the enterprises in which I conducted qualitative analysis. I am especially indebted to two of them: Piotr Mikołajewski and Janusz Strzelec. Then there was Ms. Halina Szostkiewicz, whose comments helped a great deal to make this book as clear as possible.

During the long years of studies of the worker milieu and the work on this book, I could always count on the support of my wife Beata, especially in the most difficult moments.

Juliusz Gardawski

CHAPTER 1.

Ways of defining the working class

1.1. Primary and secondary working class

Two opposing points of view connected with the concepts of Nicos Poulantzas and Erik Olin Wright (Cf. Domański 1994 p. 63 ff., Widerszpil 1989 p. 131 ff., Hryniewicz 1987) have emerged within the neo-Marxist orientation. Poulantzas employed three axes of class division: productive labour which creates surplus value and unproductive labour, manual labour and mental labour, supervisory and non-supervisory labour. He proceeded to adopt the consistent formula according to which only hired manual workers who are directly concerned with the manufacture of physical goods on behalf of capital and who do not discharge supervisory duties may be included in the working class. Unproductive manual workers, clerical workers, foremen, low-level technicians were all "new petty bourgeoisie" to him (Poulantzas 1975). This division was based on a consistently applied Marxist criterion, according to which it is the workers who generate surplus value and are subordinated to supervisors (foremen, section heads), who are defined as those who enforce the generation of that value on behalf of the capital. Wright (1976, 1989) identified two poles: the capitalist class, controlling all aspects of ownership (investment and resource allocation, the physical apparatus of production and labour force), and the proletariat, denied control over these aspects. However, between these two poles he saw the existence of many groups that had "contradictory class locations" (senior managers, middle managers, technical experts, foremen). The groups with contradictory class locations can either be near the boundary of the working class or near the capitalist class. The position of middle management is especially contradictory: it is situated smack in the middle of the road between the capitalist and the proletarian pole.

* * *

For the purpose of this work, I adopted the following terminological convention; the notion of "working class" can be a designate of two categories. The first may be described as the primary working class. These are the actual producers who work as subordinates and do not work for themselves. In this form, this class corresponds to the notion of "working class" proposed by Poulantzas or to Wright's "proletariat." The second category is the secondary

working class, which includes vocational groups whose position is intermediate between the working class and the middle class, in the case of which one might refer to "contradictory class location," to use Wright's term, or to "decomposition of class characteristics" mentioned by Wesołowski (1966, p. 185 ff.). The origins of the two groups may vary: they may stem from the primary working class transformed under the impact of new organisation and new technology, they may be new vocational groups that emerged as a result of these processes and be characterised as being closer to the working class than to the middle class, or they may be where they are as a result of social degradation. The modern origin of such social groups is first of all the division of roles previously held by the owners. We are witnessing the separation from ownership from actual economic power and the separation of the function of management of work from control over the strategy of the enterprise.

The question of consciousness is particularly important for determining the relationship between the primary and the secondary working class. It may be seen in two dimensions. The first relates to the "class variant of social consciousness" or "class imagery" (Johnson 1995). These are views widespread among the members of given classes, in the broad sense of the word. Marek Ziolkowski wrote that the consciousness of one class displays rather significant internal similarities "differing to a smaller or bigger extent from the consciousness of other classes" (Ziolkowski 1990, p. 6). In the study of this dimension of consciousness, a class's subculture is often an important topic. Another line of research focuses on analyses of "class consciousness." Here the researcher is interested in question of the workers' appraisal of the situation of their own group among other groups, their awareness of distance between groups, the awareness of social conflicts, the inclination to divide the society into groups that are "ours" and "theirs" ("enemy awareness"), the presence of visions of a system devoid of class discrimination, revolutionary leanings, etc. (ibid., p. 7, Hamilton and Hirszowicz, p. 162). Social consciousness therefore also encompasses convictions concerning the economy, society and politics that are related to class self-identification. Ziolkowski wrote that this type of consciousness sometimes assumes a latent form and relates to "long-term memory resources." Then the appearance of a suitable stimulus may activate this consciousness or even, in some types of social situations, generate it out of the knowledge accumulated earlier (Ziolkowski 1990, p. 9). That author suggests that empirical studies of consciousness, especially when carried out by way of questionnaire interviews, are not a good method of identifying class consciousness understood in this way.

The first of the aspects of consciousness mentioned above, namely the working-class variety of social consciousness, is particularly important from the point of view of this work. The analysis of this dimension of consciousness may be one of the criteria of determining the scope of the working class. It should, however, be borne in mind that while differences in the vision of a desired social system are significant for delimiting the boundaries between classes, they cannot be viewed as a sufficient criterion. It has been assumed that such a form of group

consciousness may be correlated to class differentiation, provided the groups concerned are tied by relations of superiority or inferiority due to some system of privileges or disadvantages (Ossowski 1957, p. 121).

Polish discussions about the definition of workers

Methodological problems connected with the research into the working class were discussed by Polish sociologists and their colleagues in the other countries of the Soviet bloc, especially in the latter half of the 1950s and in the 1960s. These discussions had their ideological overtones (less pronounced in Poland than in the remaining countries of the bloc). The main ideological imperative consisted in the formulation of axioms about the absence of antagonistic classes (the elimination of social domination and subordination, elimination of exploitation, etc.), about the hegemonic role of the working class or social ownership of the means of production.¹ It might be noted in this context that sociologists tended to navigate around that axiomatic reef. Its "neutralisation" consisted in verbal recognition of the basic ideological precepts, followed by their de facto removal from the area of study; for example, instead of mentioning class conflicts, they pointed to the intensification of inter-group interests related to the management of means of production. However, there were some areas that dealt directly with these axioms and that remained taboo not only in the period of totalitarian rule but also under authoritarian socialism (e.g., the role of the communist party and the "nomenklatura" in the system of social inequities, the political alienation of the working class, etc.). Incidentally, it should be noted that the necessity of evading some important problem areas produced a paradoxical result: analyses of social structure in Marxist (neo-Marxist) terms could be—and indeed were—carried out in the West, while in Poland they were mostly carried out in a functionalist language.²

After the events of October 1956, the first important statement by a Polish sociologist in the discussions about the definition of workers came from Jan Szczepański (around 1960). He assumed that a social class was an internally coherent collective, with some degree of organisation, and with the awareness of its own economic and political interests. This approach led to the conclusion that "not every manual worker employed in industry is a worker" in the class sense (1961, p. 7). Szczepański finally defined the worker as "hired manual labourer owning no tools of production for his own use, living off worker pay, and aware of his position and role in society" (Ibid., p. 7).

This definition reflects the situation of the Polish worker milieu at the time: a very high proportion of manual workers were recent migrants from the villages

¹ The briefest and clearest list of these ideological axioms was given by Jacek M. Bochenński (1963).

² This does not take into account queer deliberations on social consequences of the differentiation of the forms of ownership into "social" (meaning state) and "co-operative."

to towns. In the new industrial centres they tended to lose the cultural patterns passed from one generation to the next in rural communities but did not yet assimilate new patterns. As a result, those people were uprooted in the cultural sense and some more time had to pass before they adapted to work in industry.³ The emphasis Szczepański placed on consciousness was understandable if one takes into account the problems with the integration of the worker milieu, in which two large groups coexisted: the established industrial proletariat (some 30 per cent) and new arrivals from the countryside. All kinds of tensions emerged between them, especially between skilled urban workers and less qualified workers from the countryside or farmers with side jobs in industry.⁴

It was later charged that neither Jan Szczepański nor his associates made use of such a definition in their own studies and did not separately approach the two categories of manual workers: the workers who were aware of their distinctness and manual labourers who were not workers (yet).

Stanisław Widerszpil pointed out that if Szczepański's definition of workers were to be applied, then "the working class would encompass relatively few leading and most aware manual workers" (Widerszpil 1965, p. 182). Instead, he proposed a "nuclear model of the working class," within which he identified a "core" of this class, made up of "workers of large industrial plants directly engaged in the manufacture of physical goods" (Ibid., pp. 198 ff.). The groups included in the "core" are characterised by a "relatively high level of class consciousness, the awareness of their position and role in society." Outside the core there were categories of workers situated at a varying distance from it. In the 1960, Widerszpil included in those categories also "the bulk of engineering and technical staff in industry and other branches of the economy." With that approach, not only a foreman but also the manager of a manufacturing department could be classified as a worker.

The "nuclear model" of the 1960s was later interpreted by Widerszpil in terms of "contradictory class location" taken from Wright (Widerszpil 1989, pp. 147-151).

The broad definition of workers proposed by Widerszpil aroused controversy. Jolanta Kulpińska rejected the idea of including engineers and technicians among workers: "Let me emphasise the subordinated, order-taking nature of the

³ Maria Jarosińska (1964) described the process of adaptation of rural youth to work in industry and to urban life on the basis of studies carried out in the years 1960-61. The graduates of vocational schools coming from the countryside did not display major differences in comparison with youth at the same educational level coming from working class families but it took the several years spent in the vocational school for such differences to disappear.

⁴ At this point, it is worth mentioning the problems posed by workers who had started to work in industry before the war. The ideological presumption was that they should identify more strongly than any other group with the new socio-economic system (after all, they remembered pre-war exploitation and unemployment, etc.). However, empirical studies carried out at that time indicated that those workers were particularly critical of the new system (especially the flawed working practices and the shoddy workmanship which was inevitable because of the piecework method of pay). Jan Malanowski (1962, pp. 31-32) was one of a number of researchers who wrote about this.

workers' job, the limited scope of decision-making and control that is associated with their place of work and set of tasks" (1975, p. 96). Kulpińska was pointing to the need of examining workers' problems in relation to their enterprise or manufacturing division: "we regard the enterprise as the elementary, constituting institution (...). It is there that (...) the workers' basis social and productive contacts take place, the premises of contacts with other groups are shaped, personal and collective interests are formed. The extremely important internal differentiation of the working class is (...) [also] determined by the enterprise" (Ibid., p. 100).

In this work, I have utilised the achievements of the Polish discussions of the 1960s and 1970s. The concept of identifying a primary and secondary working class was inspired by the nuclear model of the working class.

1.2. Analyses of ambivalent worker mentality in British sociology in the 1960s and 1970s

The following theses concerning the working class in the West are pertinent because of the appearance in Poland of phenomena that are somewhat similar to what has been known abroad for years. The thesis that is most interesting from this point of view suggests the attrition of revolutionary attitudes among the working class in the West, its acceptance of the systems of values of the dominant classes and the emergence of specifically ambivalent attitudes. This problem resembles in some respects the question why Polish workers have ceased to identify strongly with the social democratic "first Solidarity ethos" with emphasis on community and equality, and have accepted market economy, with the strong social differentiation that goes with it and that relegates the workers themselves to a lower position.

Two alternative answers to the question about the lack of revolutionary spirit and the conservatism of the working class have appeared in the Western and especially British sociology. The first of them refers to the phenomenon of segmentation of the class, the appearance of many categories with conflicting interests and different perceptions of social phenomena. To use the terms proposed earlier, this could be viewed as differences between the successive incarnations of the primary and secondary working class. The second answer points to a process of incorporation of the working class into upper classes, the acceptance by workers (by the main sections of the working class milieu) of the values of the dominant classes and the emergence of ambivalent consciousness. The deliberations of British sociologists on ambivalent attitudes from the 1960s and 1970s are particularly important from the point of view of understanding the current state of consciousness of Polish workers.

The British studies of working class consciousness are particularly significant due to the analyses of worker ambivalence in that country. The surveys have shown that the most important groups of Polish workers are of a specifically

ambivalent nature and the analyses by British sociologists provide a valuable reference system for interpreting that very form of ambivalence.

The studies of social consciousness demonstrate the presence of ambivalent attitudes not only among workers but in all social classes: "the contradictions creep in incessantly into human minds. The deeper a person gets involved in the attitude toward somebody or something, the more conflicting his emotional attitude gets. The ambivalence in men's attitudes toward their work tends to be the most pronounced" (Zweig 1962). The incoherence in thinking may concern various issues with varying intensity. In the case of the workers, the kinds of consciousness that were particularly ambivalent were those which accepted to some extent the capitalist order and the social differences that go with it but at the same time opposed precisely those differences, both accepting and rejecting the values that make up the dominant system of values. The coexistence of heterogeneous contents was usually interpreted with the help of the Marxist or neo-Marxist pattern of division into classes and ideological prevalence. In keeping with this line of thought, the values of the dominant classes are the source of part of the opinions while the others are to be associated with the values and norms of the traditional working class milieu (as a subordinated class). Henryk Domański wrote: "next to support for the existing political and economic order, there are orientations [among worker attitudes] that could sow the seeds of mass-scale radicalisation of moods" (1991, p. 73). Looking at the matter in more general terms, Domański observed that the coexistence of conflicting attitudes does not usually lead to a conflict because a "normative compromise" appears and in specific circumstances either one or the other kind of content is articulated.

Many researchers tried to analyse the partial assimilation of the values of the upper classes by the lower classes. Sociologists often suggested that, short of giving up the general values prevailing in a society, members of the lower classes were developing some alternative configurations of values.

In this context, Frank Parkin's conclusions from the early 1970s are particularly valuable. For him, the analytical axis of systems of values was the moral interpretation of class inequality: "Although there is a factual and material basis to class inequality, there is more than one way in which it can be interpreted. Facts alone do not provide meanings, and the way a person makes sense of his social world will be influenced by the nature of the meanings-systems he draws upon" (Parkin 1971, p. 81).

Parkin regarded the social normative order as a number of competing meaning-systems. As he searched for the sources of social accord, he tried to answer a question about the degree of acceptance of the values of the dominant class in the social consciousness of the subordinate class. He thought that there were only very rare cases when an assessment of social inequality revealed an independent convergence of the attitudes of the dominant and the subordinate class. In his opinion, the existence of shared values in this respect should be interpreted in terms of the socialisation of the subordinate class by the dominant class.

He assumed the existence of three main meaning-systems, each of which has a different social origin and produces a different moral interpretation of class inequality. These are: the dominant value system, the subordinate value system and the radical value system. The concept of the subordinate value system is important from the point of view of this work.

Frank Parkin's subordinate value system

The social milieu that is conducive to the cultivation of this system is the local working-class community. It is typically associated with working-class or lower-class subculture. Parkin relates it to the social group which David Lockwood, in his classic 1966 work, described as proletarian traditionalists (Lockwood 1966). However, Parkin presented an interpretation of the views of that group that differed from Lockwood's.

While Lockwood saw in the traditional local working-class communities their radicalism and a tendency to reject the norms of the dominant class or, in the case of deferential traditionalists, full acceptance of the values of the dominant class, Parkin sees accommodative tendencies in traditional workers. These would consist in avoiding the extremes (meaning either the complete rejection or full endorsement of the norms of the dominant class). In this case, the workers' efforts are focused on the search for various methods of adapting to the dominant system of values. This is how the peculiar working-class type of consciousness, which can be termed as ambivalent, is formed.

While analysing the influence of the values of the dominant class on the consciousness of the subordinate class, Parkin pointed out that the dominant values were not assimilated by the workers in the original form but tended to assume the shape of a "negotiated version of the dominant value system" in their consciousness. The process of this peculiar negotiation consists in the fact that the members of the subordinate class do not reject the values of the dominant class and do not create their own rival normative system but they modify the dominant values from the angle of the conditions of their own existence instead. According to Parkin, the reason this is happening is that members of the subordinate class (or at least the non-revolutionary or non-radical ones) are helpless in the face of the strong influence of the dominant system of values (education, the media) and they cannot juxtapose some rival values to that system. At the same time, not all the values of the dominant classes are acceptable to the workers. Consequently, their thinking is condemned to show some form of compromise with the values imposed by the upper social classes.

Furthermore, Parkin assumes that this type of working-class consciousness contains two separate normative frames of reference; namely, the system of dominant values, created by the upper classes, and the system of subordinate values. These two separate systems are determined by the actual situation. Hypothetically, he assumes that when a worker assesses some phenomena that concern the general system, he refers to the dominant moral framework. However,

in a real-life situation, when he has to make definite choices and determine the lines of this personal action, it is the system of subordinate values that becomes the moral frame of reference. Parkin quotes data from a number of empirical studies to confirm his hypothesis. It is worth relating one characteristic example at this point.

Research done in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that industrial workers were as critical of trade unions as members of the middle class. In a 1967 survey of workers, only a third of skilled workers disagreed with the view that the unions had too much say in the society and the economy as a whole. On the other hand, however, there was no recorded instance in those years of British workers opposing labour union actions conducted in their enterprises in the interest of their own local community.

Parkin emphasised that the fact that British workers used this double standard should not be viewed as a sign of illogicality in their thinking. In his opinion, it was rather a case of the system of values of certain working-class groups reflecting the duality of their social situation. On the one hand, they were members of the society and were under the pressure of the dominant system of values, which they accepted, while on the other hand they were part of local community, often of "underclass" quality, which observed a different set of patterns than the dominant system of values: "Consequently, members of the subordinate class are constrained to accept the dominant morale framework as an abstract and perhaps somewhat idealised version of reality, although their life conditions tend to weaken its binding force in the actual conduct of affairs. It is from this tension between an abstract moral order and the situational constraints of low status that the subordinate value system emerges" (Parkin 1971, pp. 94-95).

In a system of subordinate values, the emphasis is on divisions and conflicts, the society is perceived from the angle of the distance between "us" and "them," and inequalities between groups are seen as contemptible from the moral point of view. At the same time, however, the system of these values does not contain a normative alternative to the dominant social order and it is not a manifestation of political radicalism of "class consciousness."

Parkin did not accept the very dichotomous picture of the society and the division into "us" and "them" as a sufficient indicator of a conflict-driven model of society (he plainly criticised Dahrendorf's concepts in this regard and indirectly also questioned Lockwood's conclusions). He believed that in the conditions prevailing in Britain in the 1970s the tendency to pass a negative moral judgement on the system of inequalities did not engender expectations for the advent of a world free of such divisions (the British local working-class communities remained rather distrustful of communist ideology). Instead, the workers were looking for "adaptive" answers as their goal was to improve their financial standing "here and now." Parkin believed that the group of traditionalist workers discussed would join trade unions in the name of "instrumental collectivism," i.e. narrowly understood material interests, rather than of radical political goals. To sum it up, according to Parkin, while the starting point for a subordinate system

of values was a moral dislike of the existing social inequalities, the ultimate goal turned out to be merely the striving to attain better material conditions within the framework of that very social order that was not fully approved. Referring to Merton's interpretation, one might say that the system of subordinate values identified by Parkin did not have the traits of a rebellion, despite some resemblances, but was rather of resentment (Merton 1968, p. 209).

1.3. The determinants of the composition and scope of the Polish working class

The various views concerning the definition, composition and extent of the working class indicate that while examining these issues, one should take into account the characteristic features of concrete historical situations. To use Włodzimierz Wesółowski's term, one should refer to the "historical-sociological context," although he also wrote about the "technological-economic" and "historical-cultural" contexts (Wesółowski 1975, p. 296). According to Jolanta Kulpińska, the "historical-sociological context" should be viewed as the entirety of social and especially economic structure, as "all the (...) determinants [of the working class] are subject to modification because of the nature of the economic structure" (1975, p. 296).

In keeping with what I have written above, I assume that the working class is composed of the primary and the secondary working class. I identify the former on the basis of a feature of a statistical nature. Namely, it is the most numerous group of manual workers, i.e., skilled workers with basic vocational education. In nationwide representative surveys of productive workers employed in large and medium enterprises (with a workforce of at least 500 persons), this group always turned out to be the largest and included 40-50 per cent of the respondents in each sample. Also the secondary working class may consider itself part of the working class. Looking from the bottom up, it would potentially include unskilled workers with primary and incomplete primary education and, at the opposite end, skilled workers with secondary technical education and foremen, heads of departments and their deputies, with technical college degrees (engineers). Among the workers directly engaged in production, the size of neither of these groups was more than 20 per cent.

According to the proposed classification, the working class is a group that meets the following conditions. First of all, the social and vocational groups that make up this class are characterised by similar objective position (especially the occupation of a similar place in the division of labour), second, these groups profess similar systems of values, aspirations, visions of an orderly system, etc., but at the same time they differ from the systems of values, aspirations, visions of a social system of groups regarded as being part of other classes, and third and most important, by definition the working class incorporates the primary working class (skilled workers with basic vocational skills). In extreme cases, the working

class can be limited to the primary working class or, at the other extreme, it may include all groups of hired workers which would thereby become segments of the secondary working class (engineers included). There is also the possibility of the emergence of an even broader social groups having class features, in which all working class groups taken together will turn out to be merely one of many elements. For example, according to Jacek Kurczewski (1991), the class of the "first Solidarity" from the years 1980-81 was an example of such a huge social group.⁵

It seems that irrespective of theoretical and methodological premises, the primary working class is not the object of disputes. However, individual criteria or sets of criteria of class or strata divisions may determine a varying scope of the secondary working class.

According to Marek Ziółkowski (1987), the working-class visions of the desirable economic and socio-political order are one of the most essential elements of workers' consciousness and may be included among the criteria determining the scope of the working class. However, in order to be treated as such a criterion, those visions must have certain specific features that are peculiar only to workers or some worker groups.

The research procedure must involve several stages. First of all, it is necessary to determine what visions of the desired social order and what inconsistencies and ambivalences are widespread among the primary working class. Second, it must be established in what other employee groups, which could potentially be included in the secondary working class, similar visions and ambivalences occur.

Obviously, the reply to be provided by the research will not definitively settle the question of the boundaries of the working class in the transformation period, but it may significantly contribute to such a settlement.

Finally, it ought to be noted that in Polish conditions, the industrial working class differs from the global working class in terms of its social and vocational composition. In one case and the other, the role of the "primary" working class is played by skilled workers with basic vocational education, but the views of other groups concur with those of the primary class and consequently they constitute the secondary class. As I am going to demonstrate later on, in industry the role of the secondary working class is played by manual workers with secondary education and lower management (foremen and technicians). Meanwhile in the global working class this role is played by unskilled workers with primary education. This makes it possible to speak about the existence of an "industrial working class" in Poland, distinct from the global working class. The former has a higher social status and technicians constitute its elite, while the latter has a lower status and its elite is made up of graduates of basic vocational schools.

⁵ With the proposed definition of the working class, it is also possible to have a situation in which this class will be absent, e.g., when the primary working class turns out to be not more than the socio-economic category devoid of internal ties and of a peculiar social consciousness that Jan Szczepański wrote about (1961), or a "class in itself," according to the Marxist classification.

CHAPTER 2.

The society in the period of authoritarian socialist rule

2.1. August 1980 and fifteen years later: two pictures of workers

Industrial workers have played an important role in the recent history of Poland. Their class developed in the period of accelerated industrialisation, beginning with the Six-Year Plan (1949-1955), and continued to grow until the 1980s. Despite being a product of authoritarian socialism, this class turned out to be its undoing. Almost all the important moments in which structural changes took place in People's Poland were connected with working-class revolts. It is debatable to what extent these revolts were the driving force of transformations and to what they reflected political crises within the ruling elites (Gilejko 1995b, pp. 64-71; Marciniak 1989, pp. 140-46). But even if the workers were only assigned a rather instrumental role during the tensions and crises of People's Poland, on at least two occasions they established their own institutions: worker councils after 1956 and Solidarity in 1980 (Gilejko 1995b, p. 11). This author was pointing to a peculiar "contestation privilege" of the worker milieu. The protests of the working class, which the political authorities of those times referred to as their power base, were awkward for those authorities to say the least: formally speaking, the articulation of the interests of workers was the communist party's title to exercising power.

Polish workers played a big role in the anti-Stalinist breakthrough of the mid-1950s, which was the most important development of the communist era. This became the dividing line between the times of Stalinist totalitarian rule and post-Stalinist authoritarian socialism and became a precedent in the whole Soviet bloc.⁶ The resistance of industrial workers and peasants was one of the barriers protecting Poland from the restoration of totalitarian rule after 1956. Hanna Świda-Ziemba voiced the view that it was mainly owed to the attitude of the working class that "the period of Stalinist ideological terror ended and gave way to the 'little stabilisation' of the Gomułka years" (Świda-Ziemba 1994, p. 11).

The other fundamental development in the history of People's Poland, the events of August 1980 and the birth of the Solidarity movement, also owes its

⁶ During one televised debate, a certain historian voiced the view that the Polish October 1956 occurred as a result of a coincidence: had Bolesław Bierut not died several months earlier and had Władysław Gomułka not taken over power as a result, the profound changes would not have taken place and Poland would share the fate of Czechoslovakia, East Germany or Hungary.

impetus to industrial workers. The recurring question in discussions about Solidarity is whether its ethos was created by the workers themselves or whether the ideals were brought to the working-class milieu from outside. Gilejko was right when he wrote that in that August "working class from big industrial plants, or at least a significant part of it, assumed the features of strategic groups [i.e., ones capable of devising their own strategy and setting its sights on taking over power], which select their own leaders and engender a new political class" (1995b, p. 70).

The years 1980–81 were one of those moments in Poland's post-war history when the intelligentsia felt respect and even an inferiority complex toward the working class. It is possible to recall many eulogies of the Polish working class that came from the country's top intellectuals and artists.

There is plenty of data indicating that in the August of 1980 the workers displayed a low degree of xenophobia and willingly turned toward higher values: they demanded not only free trade unions but also truth and the abolition of censorship, the freeing of political prisoners, etc. The authorities tried to sow discord between the workers and the groups of advisers or opposition intellectuals from the KOR (Workers Defence Committee) circle, reverting to methods from March 1968. At every step, one could come across leaflets resorting to anti-Semitic arguments and purporting to come from underground forces while in reality they were most probably fabricated by secret police, although there were also official publications appealing to this kind of resentment, bearing the stamp of the Grunwald organisation or of the Warsaw Committee of the Communist Party (PZPR). But the workers showed no interest in the hunt for Jewish culprits, or at least they did not take it up on any significant scale (Holzer 1984, pp. 128, 146).

Fifteen years have passed since the August of 1980 and, judging by press and television reports, many workers joining mass demonstration have made a habit of chanting "Gas them!" with disliked politicians in mind. During these assemblies, some local trade union leaders began to proclaim openly xenophobic slogans and television showed them to have quite a receptive audience. However, the most important change seems to be the change of the social climate surrounding the workers themselves and the changed attitude of most political elites to them (Pańków 1993, p. 94 ff.). A good case in point was the reaction to a workers' demonstration in the winter of 1994, on the anniversary of the Silesian Wujek coal mine tragedy in which an armed intervention against striking workers ended in the death of nine persons. A large group of people marched in the streets of Warsaw, most of them carrying shocking photographs of the people murdered in December 1981. The Silesian miners taking part in the demonstration were poorly dressed in comparison with the Warsaw inhabitants; they were even distinctly shorter than most of the locals. I heard a woman comment: "What an ugly crowd they are!" The Varsovians took no interest at all in the Silesian miners' demonstration.

In a controversial article in the weekly *Polityka*, Andrzej Szczypiorski aptly conveyed the current opinion of the intelligentsia about the lower strata of the

Polish society, including workers: "there are many educated and sensitive people in Poland who were fooled into thinking that the provincial and uneducated bigot, the backward and greedy peasant, the low-skilled and demoralised worker are the salt of the Polish earth" (1995b). This was an extremely categorical opinion but it did not differ greatly in tenor from many other articles published after the angry workers' demonstration outside the Cabinet Office in June 1995. More intellectuals began to engage at that time into a bitter settling of scores with the masses of Poland's hired labourers.⁷ Kazimierz Brandys (1995) attempted to write a sequel to Kazimierz Wyka's analyses (1984, pp. 138–175) by observing that "it was the German occupation that created a new type of man and a new social pattern. At that time a mass of millions of anonymous people, devoid of any firm world outlook, of membership in any organisation or party, came to the surface, engaging in illegal trading and cheating the authorities, which happened to be the occupier at the time. And we can see that mass to this day. After all, Wałęsa is one of them."

There are many indications that in 1980 the social vision of the workers was retouched so they would look better than in real life while now, fifteen years on, it is significantly distorted. At any rate, the "Gas them!" chants are certainly not representative of the present-day working class. Those commentators who paint a new picture of a worker as a person showing his fellow countryman the way to the gas chamber are unfair to say the least. There is evidence to show that one reason why the current economic reforms are possible is that industrial workers have been displaying moderation and in general approved the capitalist modernisation of the Polish economy rather than contested it. In fact, if the workers were really the kind of *homines sovietici* some critics accuse them of being, it is doubtful if the reform of the economic and institutional-social system in Poland could be going on; perhaps we would be building a collectivist or solidarist model far removed from the model associated with Balcerowicz. Further on, I will try to prove empirically the hypothesis that the reason why there was no massive working class revolt against the policies of Balcerowicz and his successors was the fact that the workers have accepted—albeit with numerous reservations—the switch to capitalism, rather than the lack of an incentive from opposition groups or the lack of an elite that would be ready to lead the workers to battle against capitalism. This is not to say that the workers' views should simply be seen as being functional for the capitalist economy. There are many rifts in those views, various myths, and they are relatively strongly populist, yet the majority of workers feel no nostalgia for authoritarian socialism and accept the market economy.

⁷ In his writings from the late 1980s, the liberal politician Janusz Korwin-Mikke wrote that the main obstacle to the rationalisation of Poland's economy were the attitudes of the workers. Stefan Kisielewski, a leading oppositionist of the communist era, called the Polish workers a "Soviet class": anti-communist as they were in their political declarations, they expected a welfare state and feared responsibility.

2.2. Totalitarianism or authoritarian socialism?

The thesis about the Polish situation being quite different from the rest of the Soviet bloc was widely proclaimed and accepted before 1989. At present, the differences between individual countries inside that bloc are being blurred. In reality, the argument that there were no significant differences between, say, Poland and Bulgaria, is only acceptable for the purpose of the most general comparisons of various systems, e.g. when the whole "capitalist" world (embracing, for example, Sweden, Bolivia and the United States) is compared to the whole "communist" camp. Unquestionably, the differences within such a broad "capitalist" camp were bigger than inside the "communist bloc" but if the Soviet bloc was analysed at a lower level of generalisation, it had to be admitted that in Poland communism did not work out right, that the difference between Poland and the rest of the bloc was striking.

As far as I am aware, there have been no comprehensive studies devised to identify the differences in mentality between individual societies and workers of the Soviet bloc. There have been international studies of organisational affiliation, participation in culture, and the like, but no surveys of the level of authoritarian rule, the level of fear, the attitude to the existing political system or to democracy. Therefore it is necessary to refer to one's personal conclusions from a peculiar participatory observation which made it possible to get to know several societies, especially in Russian (I had an opportunity to make such observations in the 1970s and 1980s).

The cultural climate prevailing in Poland was different than in the remaining countries of the bloc, and so was the attitude toward the system and the authorities. And this was not just an accidental difference, a minor variation in the intensity of some social opinions, but a truly fundamental difference. This Polish distinctness should be associated with the October of 1956 in the first place. This question is also very important—if only indirectly so—from the point of view of worker attitudes.

It is hard to accept the claims about the presence of a totalitarian system in Poland after 1956. This is because totalitarianism assumes not only full control over the economy by the authoritarian state but also complete ideological monopoly. Unless these conditions are met, one may speak about a dictatorship or authoritarian rule but not about totalitarianism.⁸ The incomparability of the Polish situation to the situation of the whole remaining part of the Soviet bloc

⁸ It has been suggested that there could be incomplete, or "flawed," totalitarianism. In extreme cases, it is assumed that the very existence of authorities that are technically capable of full totalisation of social relations is sufficient for defining the system as a totalitarian one. This does not seem to be correct, though: totalitarianism cannot be divided into lower or higher grades. It crowns various "less total," less complete forms of authoritarian rule. In keeping with the adopted approach, a system that has many features corresponding to the definition of authoritarianism but, for example, "glorifies privacy" and admits ideological plurality should be seen as a more stringent form of authoritarian rule rather than a "liberalised totalitarianism." It is, of course, possible to introduce a broad definition that would make it possible to classify some forms of authoritarianism as totalitarianism. Whether the authorities of People's Poland could be termed as totalitarian is another question.

consisted in the fact that ideology plays a special role in a totalitarian system: it is not limited to defining a political programme but also defines the fundamental meaning, the sense of history, creates a framework for interpreting social reality. The official ideology did not play that kind of a role in the "Polish road to socialism."

When the classic notions of "totalitarianism" as defined by Friedrich and Brzeziński are compared to the definitions of "developed socialist society" advanced by the Soviet "scientific communism," it could be seen that they are akin (Fedoseev 1974). This kinship was admitted by the authors of the definition of totalitarianism themselves (Friedrich, Brzeziński 1965, p. 3). In keeping with the definitions, both "totalitarianism" and "developed socialism" could only appear when there was one ideology that embraced everything and monopolistic control over the media or—which expresses the same idea—there is one party that is bringing up the whole society in the spirit of "scientific world outlook" while all forms of organised social activity are a "transmission" of the will of the party. It is impossible to describe the order prevailing in People's Poland after 1956 by using such notions as "totalitarianism" or "developed socialism" when a great majority of the adult population attended the Sunday Mass and the message from the pulpit was more important to them than the message coming from the state television or radio.⁹ By the same token, those notions could not apply to the order that began to emerge in Czechoslovakia during the "Prague Spring."

From the point of view of the working class, the air of relative intellectual freedom prevailing in Poland was not irrelevant. Admittedly, People's Poland still had an oppressive dictatorship, political trials, death sentences on trumped up charges, preventive censorship, suppressing of initiative, infiltration of the society by secret services, etc., but it must also be noted that genuinely independent periodicals were revived after 1956, benefiting from protection extended by the Church. They had a low circulation but were available all the same: *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Więź* or *Znak*. Czesław Miłosz wrote about the Catholic *Tygodnik Powszechny* that this was "the only periodical of this kind to be published anywhere from Vladivostok to the Elbe (...) along with the advancing disintegration of the communist ideology, it became the main vessel for independent opinion in Poland" (1993). According to Szczypiorski, "the

⁹ This peculiar feature of the Polish system was clearly perceived by the Russians. In the mid-1970s I was in Moscow and had the opportunity of listening to a series of lectures on "scientific communism." They consisted in the exegesis of several canonical texts (chiefly by Lenin and only rarely by Engels or Marx) and in a discussion of the commentaries to those texts. The purpose of the exegesis was to identify institutional features that were to correspond to "developed socialism" or "the first stage of communism." During those lectures, the students were presented a list of "socialist countries" arranged from the angle of their proximity to a "developed socialism" ideal. The list was topped by the USSR, followed neck-and-neck by East Germany and Bulgaria and then, some distance behind them, all the other countries of the bloc. Poland was at the bottom of the list (trailing Mongolia). When mentioning Poland, the specialists in "scientific communism" offered a commentary to the effect that while it belongs to the "socialist camp," in reality it remains in "a transition period from capitalism to socialism" because it has preserved the vestiges of the old system: a powerful Church and private farms (in the language of political science, this meant that Poland had not attained the level of totalitarian rule).

Polish opinion-forming milieux were almost thoroughly opposed to the regime during the last thirty years of communist rule" (1995a). Thanks to this relative intellectual freedom, it was possible to have in Poland numerous intellectual milieux engaging in institutionalised activities for the benefit of workers, starting with a group of advocates of worker self-management inside the communist party, who strongly criticised the omnipotence of the *nomenklatura* in factories, to openly oppositionist KOR (Workers Defence Committee).¹⁰

In the ongoing discussions over totalitarianism, representatives of the Warsaw school of history of ideas (e.g., Andrzej Walicki, Krzysztof Pomian) turn out to be right. Referring to Miłosz, Walicki used to point to the difference between "genuine totalitarianism" and "bureaucratic partyocracy" (Walicki 1993, p. 277 ff.). Pomian wrote: "although there was no revolution in October 1956, something very important took place, namely the political system of People's Poland changed. (...) Like the Soviet system, the system of 'people's democracies' was a totalitarian system. In October, however, it was replaced by an authoritarian system in Poland" (1994). Despite the fact that the public strivings of 1956 were for another system than the one which was ultimately established in Poland—instead of democratic socialism we ended up with authoritarian socialism—yet that October constituted "a significant accomplishment of the society" (Świda-Ziemia 1994, p. 12).

Szczypiorski aptly portrayed the difference between the situation in Poland and in totalitarian countries (using East Germany as an example): "these were different countries, different societies, with a different role being played by the political police and also by the party exercising dictatorial power (...). In a nutshell, these were different worlds and the people had a different spiritual experience. Any analogies either miss the point completely or are highly superficial" (1995a). These differences were even more intense with regard to the attitude to secret police. In contrast to countries that were closer to totalitarian rule, "in Polish society, while there was fear of the security service, there was always more contempt than respect in it" (ibid.).

The reason why the discussion about totalitarianism is so important from the point of view of labour is that this notion does not facilitate the interpretation of worker behaviour in post-1956 Poland; in fact, the opposite is true: "the notion of totalitarianism only helps to understand the modern history of Poland to some extent. The very fact that Solidarity could emerge would suggest caution in using the term. (...) How can one understand the extraordinary development that took place in this country [in 1980–81] without realising that, with the exception of a brief period in the closing years of Stalin's rule, from 1949 to 1953, a totalitarian society never existed here?" (Touraine 1989, p. 19). Witold Morawski character-

¹⁰ One symbol of the distinct Polish situation was the fact that in the years 1984–88, Leszek Gilewicz organised an anti-nomenclature self-management seminar at the Institute for Studies on the Working Class of the PZPR Academy of Social Sciences, where the main participants were worker council activists with ties to then underground Solidarity union (Paweł Ruskowski, Szymon Jakubowicz, Marek Dąbrowski, Andrzej Wiecezorek, Jan Boratyński, Jan Kalita and others). A symbiosis of such diverse milieux would be unthinkable of in other Soviet-bloc countries.

ised the evolution of the Polish system as follows: "after 1956, the Marxist doctrine was almost completely abandoned in favour of pragmatic arguments. The Stalinist system was replaced by an authoritarian system, which in the years 1980–89 contained some elements of concession democracy or socialist state corporatism" (Morawski 1991, p. 98).

2.3. Some features of social consciousness in Poland in the period of authoritarian socialist rule

Authoritarian socialism bred a specific kind of mentality, which was essentially dysfunctional in comparison to that bred by democratic market systems (Świda-Ziemia 1990, p. 357 ff.). It was a system that was "friendly" in a peculiar way to part of the lower strata of society. Those groups (including the working class) did not obtain any influence on government, despite promises to this effect, but they found themselves in a system that rewarded the average and nondescript. The system rewarded the stabilisation of aspirations at a low level, the absence of initiative, the abandoning of thoughts of success, career, high income, a reluctance to hold management posts. It was friendly to people who sought the confirmation of their worth in small groups, avoided conflicts at work, but it was not conducive to the cultivation of praxiological values (Świda-Ziemia, ibid.). Besides, this was the time when the conviction became firmly rooted that a "working man" deserved dignity and respect without making any personal contribution in return, by definition as it were (Tischner 1992). To many people occupying relatively low social positions, authoritarian socialism gave a comfortable feeling that the existence of higher social classes that dominated them was unwarranted ("envious egalitarianism," to use a term proposed by Mirosława Marody). But this comfort was strictly limited: it ended abruptly the moment higher social aspirations appeared, e.g., when working class elites wanted to gain tangible influence on management of enterprises (Dialogi Samorządowe 1987, 1988; Jakubowicz 1988, pp. 12–39; Nieciński 1991, pp. 13–18; Gilewicz 1993, pp. 36–70).

The picture would not be complete if it ended with the observation that authoritarian socialism was oriented to mediocrity and stifled the motivation to individual activity. Various groups developed methods of coping with this reality. Marody (1987) wrote that the depreciation of work in the state sector was accompanied by a strong growth of the value attached to working on one's own (especially in the form of moonlighting), that next to the expectations of social security, there was a tendency to take risks (a classic example of which were profit-oriented shopping trips abroad in the guise of "tourism"), and the focus on mediocrity coexisted with a striving for self-fulfilment and individual progress. In this way, we had both the "official country" (the institutionalised world) and the "real country," and people had a role to play in both of them. One consequence of this dual reality was the relativisation of moral standards: taking something that

was not yours did not have to be theft, saying something that was not true was not necessarily defined as a lie from the social point of view.

From the point of view of the role of workers, the far-reaching uniformity of social systems of values before 1989 was a significant matter. Stefan Nowak explained this uniformity by the fact that extensive intermixing of the old social groups occurred after the war while an "institutional articulation of interests and strivings" of the newly formed groups was lacking. Nowak drew two conclusions from this. The first was the very widely known observation that Polish society functions in a "sociological vacuum" and is a "federation of primary groups [family, circle of friends] united in a national community." The second conclusion was that there had occurred a more or less haphazard reshuffle of "old axiological structures characteristic of various social groups" (Nowak 1979).

The characteristic features of the uniform system of values were synthesised by Stefan Nowak in his writings from the 1980s. And so the dominant ("if not always universally observed") system combined values taken from two sources: the official ideology and the national tradition. The society accepted such values as equality, social justice, the principles of social security and the responsibility of the state for the level of satisfaction of the elementary needs of the people. Besides, there was widespread acceptance of the nationalisation of heavy industry and the principles of planned economy, with a simultaneous equally widespread approval of the presence of the private sector in farming, crafts and retailing. Next to principles rooted in the socialist ideology there were numerous elements of the national tradition, patriotism, attachment to democratic ideals (although that democracy was not clearly defined), the attachment to the Church and religion, and so forth (Nowak 1989).

The result was the emergence of a system of values that was referred to after 1956 as the "Polish road to socialism" (Nowak 1988). The preservation of many post-1956 changes in Poland made it possible to perpetuate this dual set of values for the whole remaining period of People's Poland.

But the uniformity of the system of social values was of a relative nature: "an extremely complex picture can be seen within this uniform (...) frame." While describing the complexity of systems of values, Nowak wrote about divisions between sectors of the economy, branches of industry, etc., and also about differences in terms of "membership (or otherwise) of the apparatus of power and management and (...) the scope of those powers or influence and its impact on the standard of living" (Ibid.).

2.4. Workers and intelligentsia: similarities and differences

One of the important aspects of the unification of the society in the period of authoritarian socialist rule was the emergence of certain specific class-forming phenomena, which led to the decomposition of the traditional class and strata patterns. The concepts formulated at the time pointed, for example, to internal divisions within the working class and to the blurring of the borders separating its

upper strata from the intelligentsia. The class-forming processes had to do mainly with consciousness, ethos, systems of values, etc. Stefan Nowak wrote about the contrast between an instrumental and autotelic approach to such values as education and profession, about the differentiating attitude to democracy and egalitarianism, about the class-forming significance of the perception of social reality from the "we—they" angle, etc. In this context he pointed to characteristic differences between highly skilled industrial workers and representatives of other working-class groups and farmers (the former were coming close to the mentality of the intelligentsia). Jadwiga Koralewicz-Zębik drew farther reaching conclusions from empirical studies when she suggested that there were two dimensions of the cultural stratification of the Polish society. The first, a vast and uniform one, was rooted in pre-war bourgeois/peasant tradition, the post-war structural and ideological transformations and modern industrialisation. The author defined that collective as follows: the core was made up of engineers, who were joined by technicians and some clerical workers and skilled workers ("especially those engaging in traditional crafts, but also ones working in the booming modern branches of industry"). Besides, the group would include owners of private firms, some farmers, some sections of the intelligentsia. A different system of values and a different ethos, one more deeply rooted in traditional values of the nobility and intelligentsia, was peculiar to the humanistic intelligentsia (Koralewicz-Zębik 1979).

The conclusions formulated by Stefan Nowak and Jadwiga Koralewicz warrant asking the question whether the workers preserved their distinctness in relation to other social groups in the times of authoritarian socialist rule.

Jacek Kurczewski's "new middle class"

August 1980 brought about a change in the stereotypical perception of workers, which was the result of the workers' unexpected invocation of "loftier," "sacred" values and the abandonment of narrow pragmatism they had been commonly suspected of until then. Suddenly the workers began to fit into the pattern of romanticism peculiar to the intelligentsia and nobility and by doing so they generated a cognitive dissonance. An important—if controversial—concept of a "new middle class" was born in the context of the new social definition of workers, first formulated by Jacek Kurczewski.¹¹ In some ways, it was a development on Nowak's and Koralewicz's deliberations on class-forming phenomena, but it went one step further. Namely, Kurczewski asserted that Soviet-type socialism "shaped right in front of our eyes a special variant of middle classes" (1991, p. 230). "There really exists such a thing as a social achievement of

¹¹ Jacek Kurczewski adopted the following definition of the class: "when speaking about social classes, I mean those huge social communities that engage in conflicts and co-operation within a given social pattern and whose membership in those patterns is not determined in advance. (...) I perceive these communities in a dynamic sense, in their formation, struggle, solidarity and disintegration, i.e., as processes" (1991, pp. 215–216).

People's Poland and it concerns the actual blurring of the borders between manual and white-collar workers, the fact that the division into manual and white-collar workers is not more than a statistical convention. It was the cultural and economic promotion of millions of working people that led to the emergence of a new middle class, whose further promotion was blocked, on the one hand, by the hermetic nature of the ruling class, and on the other, by the slowing down of social development caused by the incompetence of the authorities, which in itself followed from the fundamental features of the whole system" (Ibid., p. 212).

The crucial hypothesis about the blurring of the differences between workers and the intelligentsia stemmed from numerous data obtained in the course of studies of social consciousness, which, according to Kurczewski, confirmed the essential affinity of the views of "skilled workers or workers of large industrial plants and of representatives of the intelligentsia holding no managerial position." The empirical foundations of the concept were not unequivocal and the author himself conceded that he arrived at "the most interesting fact" in a "roundabout way," "digging through dozens of detailed and traditional divisions."

Kurczewski's main objective was to explain the phenomenon of the social situation of August 1980. Solidarity provided "the most natural sociological test" that made it possible to determine "the real patterns of conflict and co-operation in Polish society." That August showed that the division into farmers, workers, intelligentsia and office workers did not correspond to the pattern of mutual animosities and social conflicts whereas "the division the society tended to perceive was into those who participate in exercising power and those who are denied such participation."

Naturally, Kurczewski saw a difference between the intelligentsia and skilled workers. Referring to 1984 studies carried out by the CBOS opinion research centre, he wrote that white-collar workers with university degrees were less likely than the workers of large industrial plants to pass a positive judgement on the country's economic situation and they more often had the feeling they had no control over their lives, but in his opinion these differences became less important in "antiquarian socialism."

Kurczewski drew a sharp line across the working class milieu, leaving skilled industrial workers within the "new middle class" and unskilled workers outside its boundaries. The latter, according to him, were "in a dramatically lower place" than other social and professional groups in almost every respect (the "dispossessed and uprooted proletarians of People's Poland").

Differences in level of authoritarian attitudes and fear between workers and intelligentsia

The conclusions from empirical studies conducted before 1980 revealed some significant differences between the intelligentsia and working-class communities. These conclusions did not so much undermine the aforementioned

hypothesis about the increasing uniformity of the system of values as describe different psychosocial attitudes. The most interesting findings were obtained in the course of American-Polish comparative studies (the Polish round of the surveys was carried out in 1978). They made it possible to grasp the peculiar influence of authoritarian socialist rule on the Polish working class. It turned out that in the US, people occupying higher places in the social stratification system displayed a lower level of fear and greater self-confidence than people situated lower down the scale. In Poland, the opposite was true: people holding a higher social position (in terms of education and socio-economic status) had a higher level of fear and less self-confidence than those with a lower status. Jadwiga Koralewicz, a member of the research team, drew the conclusion that "the Polish intelligentsia was weaker" psychologically than the workers. The latter showed a lower level of fear and anxiety, greater self-confidence and higher self-esteem (Koralewicz 1987a, p. 99).

At the same time, Koralewicz's research indicated that the spread of authoritarianism in Poland resembled that of other countries, i.e., the lower the educational level, the higher the degree of authoritarianism (it was the highest among persons with elementary education and manual workers).

This shows that in the late 1970s, Polish workers displayed a peculiar combination of authoritarian inclinations and a low level of fear and big self-confidence. Kazimierz Słomczyński and Melvin Kohn, who headed the project, wrote that "of all the social classes in Poland, manual industrial workers are characterised by the greatest intensity of authoritarianism and highest self-confidence. This is a very specific combination of personality traits" (Słomczyński, Kohn 1988).

Jadwiga Koralewicz described in a similar vein the effects of the combination of authoritarianism and self-assuredness in workers. She placed emphasis on the workers' determination in struggle against the enemy, pointed to the "ability to demonstrate their dislike toward representatives of social groups with which they felt no bond" and to the fact that "the need to have authorities and leaders, combined with courage in displaying one's feelings (...) aptly characterised the workers of the late 1970s." (Koralewicz 1987a, p. 106).

The findings of qualitative studies conducted since the early 1980s by the author of this work indicated that the expectations of a strong leader assumed a specific nature among Polish workers, which may have been related precisely to their high self-esteem. Therefore it is hard to subscribe fully to the interpretation of worker authoritarianism which stressed their helplessness in defining their social situation and their waiting for a leader that would make their life worth living, show the way to take, etc. The workers were waiting for a leader, but they visualised him rather as an effective representative of the current interests of their social group rather than an architect of new programmes. What is more, the workers appeared to be skeptical of authorities from outside and put their (surely excessive) trust in their collective common sense.

In this context, it is worth referring to Słomczyński's and Kohn's observations to the effect that an authoritarian attitude does not indicate by itself what

rules are going to be supported, it merely means that the world is perceived in black-and-white terms and that the rules are perceived as rigid ones. Once some set of rules gets accepted, "the self-confidence may be conducive to the determination with which we struggle for them" (Ślomoński, Kohn 1988, p. 179).

According to most Polish sociologists and historians, the supporters of Solidarity, especially the workers, made out a bill in August 1980 for the socialist system to pay for the expectations it awoke but did not fulfil. From this point of view, the workers' demands of August 1980 were not really that novel. They were demanding the implementation of the values that were central to the socialist ideology (Koralewicz 1987b, p. 181). Among those expectations, the most important ones concerned justice and social equality, genuine political power for the people, social rather than state ownership of the means of production, self-government, unrestrained access to sources of information, the right to know the truth. It is debatable if the set of values that made up the ethos of the original Solidarity movement should be viewed as socialist but it is indisputable that Solidarity's fundamental feature was the sense of community, identity of views, collectivism (Szacki 1994, p. 141; Kowalski 1990). But were these expectations peculiar to workers alone?

The findings of sociological studies conducted at the time, especially the "Poles '80" ("Polacy '80" 1981) project, showed that the differences in the views of the basic social groups concerning the fundamentals of the economic and political system were not big (1981). It can be assumed, the way Jacek Kurczewski did, that authoritarian socialist rule led to the emergence of certain class characteristics that were shared by a number of social/vocational groups whose status differed considerably (some segments of the intelligentsia and the working class). Reading today data from the studies of social consciousness done at that time, it is easy to reach the conclusion that there were many more factors that united those groups than ones which set them apart. At the same time, however, the "contestation privilege" and the readiness for revolt were not evenly spread: they were characteristic of the workers but not of the intelligentsia. Therefore, with great oversimplification, it can be said that it was precisely the workers who may have been entrusted with the role of "leading force of the nation."

As for the problems with definitions raised in the preceding part of this work, it can cautiously be suggested that during August 1980 the primary working class, i.e., skilled workers (especially in industry), found themselves in the centre of a very wide circle. Inside that circle there was both the secondary working class (supervisors, engineers) and most of the segments of the intelligentsia of those times. Together they made up the "class of the 'first' Solidarity." That class only existed meteorically and began to disintegrate even before the December 13, 1981, imposition of martial law, which was already confirmed by the findings of the "Poles '81" survey ("Polacy '81" 1982).

It can be said that Polish authoritarian socialism led to the shaping of a relatively uniform set of values, accepted by the majority of the people, including the workers. One of the axes of this set were values rooted in the socialist system (equality and justice, welfare state, etc.). The other axis referred to national

values, independence, opposition to communist ideology. At the same time, peculiar psychosocial attitudes emerged in the working-class milieu, which combined the propensity to accept extremist views (of an authoritarian nature) with a low level of fear and much self-confidence. Industrial workers were in some regards close to intelligentsia groups (with whom they shared the system of values) and removed from them because of their militancy, courage or authoritarian leanings.

2.5. Ambivalent traits in economic consciousness of workers in the years 1982-89

The shock of martial law and the years that passed from its imposition to the demise of authoritarian socialist rule were related to profound changes in social consciousness. Martial law destroyed the great civic community of the Solidarity movement, led to the undermining of the ethos of this movement, started the process of disintegration of the social class of which Solidarity was the organisational form, and thereby paved the way for liberal economic policies (Modzelewski 1991).

The late 1980s were a period of growing "social awareness of the death agony of Soviet-type socialism," to use a term coined by Indraskiewicz. These were the years of growing anomie, a conviction of the senselessness of one's actions, a desire to escape from the system. Researchers were pointing to the social extent of apathy: analyses made by Jasiewicz indicated that 48 per cent of Poles had an inclination to get away from politics or to remain neutral (1986). Nowak described that group as "the apathetically withdrawn" (1988).

The state of social apathy was one of the factors that made it difficult to carry out economic reforms in the latter half of the 1980s: "the reform lost its social dimension as a result of the citizens' withdrawal from this process. Collective reactions to each successive move taken by the authorities assumed as a rule a defensive nature and were articulated in the form of strike demands" (Indraskiewicz 1994). As can be seen, profound changes took place in social consciousness; their characteristic feature was that the 1980s were characterised by withdrawal rather than revolt.

Another important element of the state of consciousness of that period was ambivalence, a duality in thinking about the economy.

Research done in the years 1982-89 typically recorded two phenomena.¹² The first of them consisted in a slow and non-linear but quite significant reduction of the level of support for egalitarian principles and statist solutions in the

¹² In the 1980s, there were a number of significant studies of social consciousness, which also tried to gauge the attitude to the principles of market economy and the ensuing hardships, to state (monocentric) economy, to workers' self-management, etc. These were surveys carried out by teams led by Władysław Adamski, Leszek Gilejko, Witold Morawski and Bogdan Cichowski, Maria Jarosz, Kazimierz Doktor, Jadwiga Koralewicz-Zębik, Marek Ziolkowski, Jerzy Hausner and Jerzy Indraskiewicz, Paweł Ruskowski and others.

economy and a growing approval of privatisation (Gilejko 1995a). The other phenomenon was the continuing or even growing discrepancy between the approval for market-oriented economic reforms and the desire to keep the welfare state intact. The researchers interpreted this duality as either a sign of incoherent thinking about the economy or as a rational expectation of the introduction of a social (welfare-state) market economy. The question of duality or ambivalence of thinking is especially important for further analyses because a certain form of it turned out to be a durable characteristic of the workers' thinking. In brief, the matter may be summed up as follows: as time goes by, ambivalent thinking becomes an increasingly typical feature of the working class milieu while its intensity among the intelligentsia decreases. This parting of the ways of thinking did not proceed in a symmetrical fashion, but over a longer period of time it was quite pronounced. It could be regarded as another symptom of the disintegration of the earlier ties between workers and the intelligentsia, especially engineers.

The changes in attitudes were best recorded in the course of the "Poles" ("Polacy") studies, conducted throughout the 1980s and headed by Władysław Adamski: "Poles '80" ("Polacy '80" 1981), "Poles '81" ("Polacy '81" 1982), "Poles '84" ("Polacy '84" 1986), "Poles '88" ("Polacy '88" 1989).¹³ The authors analysed, among other things, the visions of a well devised economic order. It turned out that from 1980 to 1988, support for the meritocratic principle of big differentiation of incomes depending on qualifications increased (from 54 per cent to 84 per cent), the support for curbs on the level of wages for the biggest earners fell (from 90 per cent to 56 per cent) while demands for guarantees of full employment became less frequent (from 78 per cent to 60 per cent). Meanwhile the approval for bigger possibilities of the operation of the private sector rose from 59 per cent in 1984 to 76 per cent in 1988 (Kolarska-Bobińska 1989).

Another topic of analyses was the coexistence of demands for the introduction of market economy and for continued implementation by the state of many welfare policy elements. The authors interpreted the presence of these two currents as a symptom of incoherence in thinking. Successive studies in the "Poles" series revealed approval for market institutions and for competition, combined with the conviction that the reforms should not entail social hardships, especially unemployment (Kolarska-Bobińska 1986).

However, subsequent surveys within the "Poles" ("Polacy") project demonstrated greater consistency in the respondents' views, a growth of the awareness of the lack of possibility of simultaneous implementation of market competition rules and the egalitarian welfare-state principles. The process of decrease in inconsistency of economic preferences during the 1980s was also noted by other researchers (Borkowski 1991).

The same expectations of changes and reconstruction of the economy combined with the desire to keep a high level of social security emerged from nationwide studies carried out in the summer of 1988 by Witold Morawski and

Bogdan Cichomski (Morawski 1991). A big proportion of respondents supported market economy methods, with 81 per cent supporting full competition and 73 per cent being in favour of freedom of operation of the private sector. The consent to a change in the rules of the economic game was so big that even with regard to unemployment those who accepted it outnumbered those who rejected it by a ratio of 47 to 35. There was also broad consent (86 per cent) to big pay differences tied to qualifications and productivity. At the same time, however, it turned out that the expectations regarding the preservation of the state's welfare concerns is equally widespread, with 90 per cent of the respondents saying that the state should provide jobs to everybody who wants to work while 68 per cent wanted to state to attend to the elimination of income differences between the rich and the poor. This means that the empirical findings strongly confirmed the dual-track thinking. Here the simultaneous support for competition and the market and for welfare state was interpreted differently than by Lena Kolarska and Andrzej Rychard. Morawski wrote that this dual thinking was not a sign of an incoherent mentality but a legitimate and logically consistent expectation of a social market economy corresponding to contemporary Western social democratic patterns.

The duality of expectations was also detected in the course of representative studies carried out in 1988 (Ziółkowski, Koralewicz 1990). The list of especially desirable characteristics of a good society included two market-economy principles: big pay differentials depending on qualifications and the amount of work done (90 per cent) and free competition in business (87 per cent). At the same time, only 60 per cent of the respondents were opposed to central management of the economy and the majority (64 per cent) demanded full employment. The authors observed that "the society wants a new model of the operation of the economy, expecting greater efficiency (...), but at the same time it wants to retain the privileges rooted in the old system" (Ibid., p. 44). A difference was also observed between the replies of skilled and unskilled workers. With regard to competition and centralised management, skilled workers displayed the same attitude as technicians and some specialists. All of them supported the idea of replacing the socialist economic system with a market economy. By contrast, relatively many unskilled workers were against changes (fewest of them supported competition). Due to these and other findings, Jadwiga Koralewicz and Marek Ziółkowski agreed—albeit with some reservations—with Jacek Kurczewski's aforementioned hypothesis about the formation of a "new middle class," including skilled workers and the intelligentsia, in the conditions of authoritarian socialist rule.

Two studies from the mid-1980s, dealing exclusively with workers, are particularly important from the point of view of diagnosing the state of social consciousness.¹⁴

¹⁴ The nation-wide representative survey from 1985, conducted by Leszek Gilejko, Grzegorz Nowicki and Marek Czarzasty (Czarzasty, Gilejko, Nowacki 1987), and a survey of workers from four large industrial enterprises from the years 1984-85, carried out by a team headed by Marek Ziółkowski (Robotnicy '84-'85).

¹³ Within that project, the problems of economic preferences were studied by Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (initially together with Andrzej Rychard and then on her own).

In its study, Leszek Gilejko's team used a number of indicators of economic consciousness, including attitudes to economic reforms and preferred variants of Poland's economic development. These indicators accurately revealed certain inconsistencies in workers' thinking about the economy. The findings showed that "an overwhelming majority of workers are in favour of reform as a certain symbol of change in the economic and social field" (Czarnasty, Gilejko, Nowacki 1987, p. 56). It should be remembered that the reforms from the closing years of authoritarian socialist rule were devised to eliminate "manual control" over the economy and replace it with market regulation, ushering in autonomy, self-financing and self-management of enterprises, although they were not supposed to alter the pattern of ownership in the economy. This reform program was supported by almost 90 per cent of the workers. The other indicator relating to the variants of economic development gauged the scope of workers' support for a variant of the economic reform that entailed considerable social problems: only 31 per cent of the respondents agreed that, with a view to "extricating the country from the crisis faster," Poland should get a genuine market economy, which meant fierce competition between people and enterprises, raising prices to a level guaranteeing market equilibrium, permitting enterprises to go bankrupt, introducing big income differentials, and reducing the welfare duties of the state.¹⁵ On the other hand, 50 per cent of the workers preferred to go on living in continual economic crisis (translating into permanent market shortages), provided the welfare state and guarantees of full employment were left in place. Therefore this indicator made it possible to determine the extent of consistently modernisational attitudes: while nine workers out of ten were in favour of reforms understood as introduction of elements of the market economy in 1985, only three out of ten consented to a full and efficient reform, which would bring tangible hardships, including the possibility of unemployment.

It was also established that modernisational tendencies were more often supported by those who at that time benefited from the existing economic system, namely by "the working class employed in heavily urbanised areas and in large enterprises." Reforms were not feared by better educated and younger workers. They reckoned that if someone has to pay the bill for the reforms, if someone has to lose a job, etc., it would certainly not be they. By contrast, the advocates of monocentrism and a welfare state were more likely to be workers of peasant origin, less skilled, living in small towns (Czarnasty, Gilejko, Nowacki 1987, pp. 124-145; Gilejko 1995b, pp. 89-90).

The 1984 study of workers of four enterprises yielded many important conclusions helping to systemise the knowledge of the subject (Ziółkowski 1987, "Robotnicy '84-'85" 1990). In his analysis of the views of the economy and politics, Marek Ziółkowski identified some syndromes of working-class mentality in each of these areas. He discovered patterns formed by the workers' visions of a

¹⁵ This indicator has already been analysed in this work. It was one of the few attempts to build an alternative, whose elements described multi-dimensional variants of the economic system (Gardawski 1992a, p. 19).

well ordered economy. One was the moderately efficiency-oriented model, combining big pay variations, albeit limited by a ceiling, the laying off of inefficient workers and the development of private farming. This model was characterised by a neutral approach to unemployment. The second pattern accepted the principles of efficiency, decent pay differences, the development of the private sector but it also imposed some restrictions. Namely, the state was supposed to guarantee a job and a minimum wage to everyone and prevent too aggressive competition. The third pattern accepted the development of the private sector of the economy, but only on the condition that no jobs will be lost as a result. These patterns reflect the duality of economic thinking of the respondents. Recognising that the workers' views are "fairly complex and hard to interpret in an unequivocal way," the author decided against viewing this duality as a sign of inconsistency, however: "[the working-class view] may be regarded as relatively consistent from the theoretical point of view, practicable and, what is more, applied in practice, at least partially, in many countries. Therefore it is easy to imagine the operation of a diversified efficiency-oriented society (...) that would also place much emphasis on welfare" (Ziółkowski 1987, p. 102).

Ziółkowski presented the correlation between the respondents' preferences and their characteristics. It turned out that in the middle of the 1980s, some slogans of a socialist nature ("social ownership of means of production") were more often supported by people enjoying a higher status than by those at the lower rungs of the social ladder (67 per cent of engineers vs. 41 per cent of unskilled workers). The opposite was true with regard to free competition, which was more often supported by engineers (53 per cent) than by unskilled workers (33 per cent).

2.6. At the threshold of the market economy

Rejection of a "Third Way"

The change of the socio-political system in 1989 was accompanied by the decision to implement a consistent market-oriented economic reform. Leszek Balcerowicz opposed the plans for the transfer of the management of enterprises to worker self-management bodies, rejected the idea of a "Third Way" and an alternative system, essentially questioning everything that was associated with the social ethos of the "first" Solidarity. This aroused protests from various Solidarity groups defending that ethos ("ethos groups," to use a term introduced by Tadeusz Szawiel to denote the democratic opposition of the last years of authoritarian socialist rule). In particular, the pro-ethos group of activists of worker self-management bodies were particularly hurt as they were those who kept up the spirit of the "first" Solidarity the longest (Balcerk 1986). To many of those people, who worked hard for years to "keep the embers hot" and save the spark of workers' Solidarity from dying out, Balcerowicz's concepts amounted to treason.

It does not seem, however, that Leszek Balcerowicz's actions can really be seen as a betrayal of the ideals in the name of which Solidarity won the 1989 election. Admittedly, a comparison of the discussions and decisions made during the "Round Table negotiations" with the subsequent policies of Tadeusz Mazowiecki's cabinet suggests that Karol Modzelewski was right when he asserted that the moment it assumed power, the Solidarity camp made an about-face in its socio-economic programme.¹⁶ But despite the fact that this liberal revolution associated with Balcerowicz was ordered from above, it should not be interpreted as an abuse of public trust. After all, this reform appealed to the ambivalent moods of the majority of Poles, especially the expectations of a market economy. Jerzy Indraszkiewicz observed that "support for the Balcerowicz plan, while engendering many phenomena that hurt the society, was not merely an outcome of 'trust in some people' but also the result of shifts in the economic consciousness of the Polish society" (Indraszkiewicz 1994, p. 39). It turned out that the consent to economic reforms was a lasting phenomenon, regardless of all the reservations and ambivalence surrounding them.

Transgressive interests and the working class

In the 1970s, the steamroller of authoritarian socialist rule formed a peculiar pattern of social classes and strata in which the workers lost many of their distinct characteristics. The studies of consciousness referred to above suggested that skilled workers resembled technicians and engineers but differed substantially from unskilled labour and from farmers. After 1989, the disintegration of the old social patterns gathered speed, the state was about to surrender its role of monopoly employer, and the time when the industrial working class held a special social position was also nearing its end. Authoritarian socialist rule, with its quasi-feudal social order, cultural uniformity, etc., became history; it was followed by a slow reconstruction of a social pattern in which the middle and upper classes are above the workers, with the significant economic, cultural and political consequences that go with that pattern.

As a result of this change, the working class may be analyzed using the concept of the subordinate class, developed by industrial sociologists in countries

¹⁶ With some oversimplification, it can be said that during the Round Table negotiations, the "civic" side was voicing demands that were close to the ideals of a self-governing republic and welfare state, thus carrying on some important elements of the programme of 1980 and 1981. At that time, the government side was definitely closer to economic liberalism. After 1989, a change occurred: the Mazowiecki-Balcerowicz government completely rejected the original Solidarity ideals and adopted a neo-liberal programme, carrying on in some respects the reforms launched by the last Communist government of Premier Rakowski and Industry Minister Wilczek. Meanwhile, the PZPR, after losing power and transforming itself into the Social Democratic Party (SdRP) at the beginning of the 1990s, took up the ideals dropped by the Solidarity elite's (demands for community approach, self-management, etc.). It should be added, however, that SdRP gave up proclaiming such a programme even before the September 1993 parliamentary elections.

with a stable democratic system. The classic concepts defined by Lockwood and Parkin, according to which the values of the upper (dominant) classes influence the mentality of the subordinate classes, become particularly important in this context. Poland's specific historical situation makes it necessary, however, to resort to other interpretational tools. The concept developed by Włodzimierz Wesolowski can be particularly useful for explaining working-class attitudes, even though it is impossible to agree with all his conclusions regarding that class. Wesolowski's views are highly relevant to the subject discussed in this work, especially due to his theoretical proposition concerning differences in material group interests in the period of transformation (Wesolowski 1993). He proposes to divide such interests into transgressive, existential and pragmatically calculated ones. The first two can be used for describing workers' attitudes and replace the notions of dominant and subordinate systems of values.

Transgressive interests are the overall interests of the Polish society as it discards archaic socio-economic institutional structures and attempts to build a modern and efficient economic order in a very short period of time. In order to do this, it is necessary to carry out privatisation and introduce many changes that can be painful for basic social groups. The understanding of transgressive interests assumes the necessity of "looking ahead to non-existent states, although they are known from the experience of other countries" (Ibid., p. 122). Existential interests are immediate concerns which do not require any thought: the maintenance of employment, preservation of the current level of real income, finding an apartment, etc.

According to Wesolowski, a large part of Poland's industrial workers now perceive their interests at the existential level. Such an existential attitude could be particularly dangerous for the transformation, especially if it becomes generalised; i.e., if people come to understand "existential interests as universal ones, i.e., as states of deprivation and privileges that occur 'always'" (Ibid., p. 128). The author's conclusions are rather pessimistic: referring to the findings of his studies he claims that "one of the most important factors slowing down the growth and formation of political consciousness among workers is this group's lack of 'rules of combining existential interests with transgressive ones'." The results of surveys of workers presented in this study indicate, however, that workers have a specific sense of transgressive values and make compromises between transgressive and existential values. While Parkin wrote about the "negotiated version of the dominant value system," we may combine his and Wesolowski's notions and speak about the existence of a "negotiated version of the system of transgressive values."

Although it is difficult to agree with some pessimistic generalisations made by Wesolowski, his observations concerning the working class contain many important points. He writes, for example, that "the processes of reforms cause the working class, formerly very numerous, to shrink in size gradually and to disintegrate from within. Various segments of this class begin to face a different fate" (1994). The class undergoes fragmentation as some of its members move to the class of small business owners and some are relegated to the category of the

unemployed. We can identify two main groups of workers whose interests differ from one another: one is made up of those working in prosperous enterprises and the other in companies threatened with closure.

The decomposition of the class was related to a specific differentiation of the social status of classes under conditions of socio-political transformation. With the social and economic conditions undergoing changes, it is possible to identify ascending classes, whose influence is growing and which adopt offensive strategies, and descending classes, which are losing the place in society they had secured in the past. Workers are a descending class and adopt a defensive position: "the working class does not engage in offensive battles or fundamental disputes over new solutions" (Ibid.) This class is struggling to preserve the standard of living of their families, to save their jobs, find apartments, etc. I might complement Wesolowski's observations by saying that most workers are, however, aware of the inevitability of economic reforms and the need for privatisation and the introduction of market principles and of competition. They are not ready to strike in the name of the restoration of the old order.

CHAPTER 3.

The working class's vision of a well ordered economy

Introduction

The central research question that was to be answered by empirical studies conducted in the years 1986–95 is the question about what is regarded by workers as the desirable economic system. We assumed that the vision of the desired economic order is an important component of "economic consciousness."

The notion of "economic consciousness" is understood in the broad sense. In keeping with the definition proposed by Jerzy J. Wiatr, it includes "the entirety of views and appraisals relating to economic relations between people and their technological determinants occurring in a given society" (1987).¹⁷ He reached the conclusion that "with regard to individual societies, one might try to determine the dominant pattern of economic consciousness, and it is also possible to try to establish a model of economic consciousness of individual classes" (Ibid.) I also accepted Marek Ziolkowski's suggestion that normative visions of a well ordered economy may be considered to be the central element of the pattern of economic consciousness (1987). In keeping with the assumptions formulated in the first part of this work, the visions of the economy defined in this way are regarded as one of the criteria determining the extent of the working class.¹⁸

The problems addressed here are a sequel to the current on sociology of the working class that was developed in the 1980s by teams headed by Leszek Gilejko, Witold Morawski, Maria Jarosz, Kazimierz Doktor, Marek Ziolkowski,

¹⁷ Jerzy J. Wiatr wrote that there were no theoretical obstacles to using the notion of economic consciousness, even though it is not in widespread use (Wiatr 1987, p. 33).

¹⁸ The biggest undertaking (preceded only by works headed earlier by Julian Hochfeld) were studies whose results were published in a series edited over a ten-year period by Jan Szczepański "Z badań klasy robotniczej i inteligencji," within which seventeen books were dedicated to workers (including several compilations). Most sociologists who studied the working class in later years were members of the original team set up by Szczepański at the time (Jolanta Kulpińska, Jan Malanowski, Maria Jarosz, Kazimierz Doktor, Halina Najduchowska, Maria Jarosińska and others). Problems of workers' were also studied by scientists connected with university of Łódź (a number of works edited by Jolanta Kulpińska), teams headed by Lidia Beskid (Maria Jarosińska, Zbigniew Sufin, Róża Milic-Czerniak and others), teams from the Institute of Research on the Working Class (projects headed by Leszek Gilejko and Przemysław Wójcik), the studies of Adam Sarapata, of teams led by Witold Morawski and Kazimierz Doktor, studies conducted in the Cracow centres (Jerzy Hausner and Jerzy Indraszkiewicz) and in Poznań (Marek Ziolkowski's team), analyses of workers' diaries (Janusz Golebiowski, Marek Latoszek), and others.

Włodzimierz Pańków, Jerzy Hausner and Jerzy Indraszkiewicz and others. This subject matter also refers to the rich earlier achievements of the Polish sociology of the working class.

This part of the work seeks first of all to explain the methods of study and analysis of data. Secondly, it discusses the results of studies of the changes in the level of support for individual principles making up the indicator of economic consciousness in the years 1986–95. Thirdly, it presents the typology of workers' thinking about the economy. The typology established in 1991 is compared with the findings of analyses from 1994. Besides, this chapter discusses the dependencies between the propensity to choose certain visions of the economy and the social and occupational situation of the respondents.

3.1. Method of research and analysis of data: search for the logic of workers' economic thinking

The objective of the survey of workers' views of the economy was such that the researchers could not be content with gauging the opinion about individual aspects of economic life and ascertaining what a given respondent likes and what he objects to. This objective was to find the links between the desirable and the rejected principles of the functioning of the economy, discover the consistent and the conflicting or ambivalent elements of the picture of a well ordered economy. The idea behind the first survey (1986) was a long-term observation of changes in economic views in step with economic transformations. At that time, however, it was hard to predict that history will provide such a vantage point for watching these changes.

Indicator of desirable economic order

Workers' economic preferences were studied in relation to many detailed matters, crucial from the point of view of the economy and its changes. In the first studies (from 1986 and 1990), the set of those preferences was modest but in subsequent surveys (starting with 1991) it was broadened to include 24 variables.¹⁹ The questions as a whole concerned the desirable economic order (monocentrism or market and autonomy of enterprises), the attitude to state ownership,

¹⁹ Both the initial, shorter version of this indicator, from the years 1986–90, and the later broadened version owe a lot to questions devised by other teams. The most important of them are the sets of questions prepared at the Institute of Research on the Working Class in 1985 by Leszek Gilejko and Grzegorz Nowicki and Marek Czarzasty, and the questionnaires prepared by the team lead by Witold Morawski and Bogdan Cichomski. The author also took advantage of questions from other studies, including the variables used by Lena Kolarska-Bobińska and Andrzej Rychard, the questionnaires of Maria Jarosz's team used for studies of employee ownership and the set of questions devised in the 1980s by Jerzy Hausner, Jerzy Indraszkiewicz and Paweł Ruskowski.

to private capital (both Polish and foreign), to privatisation, industrial democracy (participation in management), the role of trade unions in economic life, egalitarianism and other issues. Research questions were formulated as opinions which a respondent could accept, reject or refuse to take a stand on. The choice and formulation of the principles were subjected to verification in the course of unstandardised interviews with the workers. The set of principles was referred to as the indicator of economic consciousness, indicator of a vision of a well ordered economy or indicator of desirable economic order.²⁰ The final shape of that indicator was defined after pilot studies made at the end of 1990 and beginning of 1991 and was employed in the "Workers '91" project (Annex). It was later decided that this indicator should be included in an unchanged form in subsequent representative surveys of workers. As a result, it was possible to compile a wealth of comparative materials encompassing the years 1991–94.

The incentive to work with the complex indicator of economic consciousness was the desire to bypass certain limitations characteristic of other analyses of this area of social consciousness. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Polish social sciences saw the wide acceptance of a paradigm dichotomising and simplifying social consciousness, labelled as "transition to democracy." In his criticism of this paradigm, Andrzej Rychard wrote that its central assumption was the illusion that "communism was but an artificial coat of armour constraining the natural forces and inclinations of the society and after its removal, (...) the natural forces will come to the fore, meaning the forces seeking to introduce modern Western economic rules (Rychard 1993, p. 6). Rychard argued that "the real direction [of the society's adaptational reactions] is often quite distant from that normative pattern understood as 'transition to the market and democracy'" (Ibid., p. 7). Similarly, Mirosława Marody pointed out that sociologists' great involvement in the transformation processes distorted their studies to some extent because with such an attitude, "one tends to focus on the processes that take you closer or further away from the desired future state, ignoring many other aspects" (1994, p. 171).

In the studies of social consciousness, the "transition to democracy" paradigm could be seen in the tendency to construct bipolar theoretical models, in which one pole contained a set of modern, market-economy and democratic principles while the opposite pole was composed of traditional, obsolete principles, characteristic of a monocentric, statist order. Analysis consisted in measuring the extent to which the respondents' declarations in questionnaire studies were removed from the principles making up these theoretical polar models and in recording the degree of modernity (or conservatism) of the mentality of selected categories of respondents.

²⁰ It was pointed out in the course of discussions with economists that "economic consciousness," while containing normative visions of a well ordered economy, is in reality a much broader notion (a view voiced by Elżbieta Domańska). Sociologists, in turn, sometimes equated these notions, arguing that such normative visions of economic order constitute a central element of economic "consciousness" or "mentality."

As I wrote earlier (1992a, p. 39), it was legitimate to classify the content of social consciousness in terms of dichotomous models separating "progress" from "obsolescence," and the use of such divisions genuinely enriched our knowledge, but it also had one drawback. Namely, all the views for which the polar theoretical models were not ideal-type constructions (in the Weberian sense) could be classed by the researchers as "other" and therefore lost from sight; they were seen in advance as transitional views or ones devoid of reflection. At any rate, these "leftovers" rarely became the subject of separate inquiry. The few exceptions include analyses made by Morawski (1991), Kolarska-Bobińska (1986), or Ziolkowski i Koralewicz (1990). As A. Rychard observed critically, as a result of the adoption of the "transition to democracy" paradigm, views that did not match the dichotomous theoretical models were treated as "interim chaos" separating the socialist past from the democratic, market-economy future.

As I embarked on studies of workers' economic consciousness in 1991, already after several years of empirical studies of that milieu, I made the assumption that the use of the theoretical dichotomy may not take me closer to true differences in worker attitudes, in fact it could take my away from that goal. I decided that while searching for the ideal type that could be helpful for describing the working class's ideas about a well ordered economy, I must not limit my approach to the dichotomous models on which there was plenty of literature: the "pluralist," "market-oriented," "market-and-efficiency oriented" ones at one end and the "monocentric," "egalitarian" or "egalitarian/etatist" ones at the opposite end.

Therefore I approached the study of the extent to which workers accept individual economic principles as a prelude to the search for the logic of their thinking, the "inner organisation" governing the preferences. The key goal of the long analyses of normative visions of the economy was to reconstruct the syndromes into which the respondents arranged their visions. The range of replies obtained in the study clearly indicated that the widely used method of constructing theoretical dichotomous models is not the best method of identifying the structure of the workers' thinking about a well ordered economy.

3.2. Economic preferences and their changes in the years 1991-94

The years 1991-94 were characterised by a considerable pace and depth of transformations of the socio-economic system, the transition from the economy of shortages, crises and recession to shops full of merchandise, the suppressing of inflation, and the development of private enterprise, but also by pay that was disproportionately low when compared to the deregulated prices as well as unemployment and an uncertain future. How did these processes affect the workers' thinking about a well ordered economy?

In 1991, surveys revealed relatively high support for efficiency/market principles and a certain dislike of state interference in the economy (Gardawski 1992a). The questionnaire interviews conducted at the time and numerous infor-

mal exchanges made is possible to reconstruct the nature of workers' expectations. As in the case of Frank Parkin's analyses (1971), it turned out that most workers idealised and mythologised elementary macroeconomic institutions. Competition was perceived not as a tool guaranteeing a just reward for honest work but rather as the flip side of the sick system of distributing the rewards for work under authoritarian socialism. The support for efficiency, involving the closing down of loss-making plants, laying off redundant workers, etc., was not associated with unemployment but with a war on waste. Inevitably, the attitude toward unemployment was one of reluctance but at the same time the workers believed, paradoxically, that for the time being unemployment is not possible "because there is so much left to do in Poland." In 1991, workers often escaped stress by demonstrating to themselves and to others that the threat of unemployment was not real. On the whole, the respondents were then expecting a "friendly market economy," i.e., one that would be characterised by market relations and a capitalist system but at the same time guarantee decent living and working conditions.

An important research question appeared in this context: how are workers' preferences going to change in step with the development of market and financial market institutions and with the expected growth of unemployment along with other hardships? Will workers reject market economy and privatisation and will they want a return to the welfare-state economy known from authoritarian socialism? The studies from the years 1992-94 showed that this did not occur, although characteristic shifts took place on the map of preferences (Table 1).

Changes going in two directions took place during those three years; on the one hand, they attested to the growing support for some lines of transformations while on the other they pointed to a growing willingness to go back to some principles of the centrally managed economy and the welfare state.

It is worth noting the very high level of acceptance of Polish capital, especially the proposal regarding the construction of new factories by that capital. With regard to this principle, support increased by as much as 21 per cent, which resulted in a move from the fifth place on the list in 1991 to the second place in 1994. At the end of 1994, 87 per cent of workers agreed to the establishment of large enterprises by Polish capital. Besides, more and more workers wanted the existing state enterprises to be sold to Polish capital (a growth from 65 per cent in 1991 to 78 per cent in 1994, with a move from the seventh to the sixth place on the list).

There was a growth of support for various forms of industrial democracy, both for the idea of enterprises managed by a democratically elected worker self-management body and for employee-owned companies (i.e., privatisation of state enterprises by their sale to all or the majority of employees). As for the former, there was a move on the list of preferences from the fifteenth to the seventh place and an increase by 15 percentage points, while in the latter the number of indications rose by 11 points and the shift was from the sixth to fifth place. As a result, at the end of 1994, 76 per cent of workers wanted the creation of employee-owned companies while 61 per cent wanted enterprises run by worker

TABLE 1. The frequency of choice of principles making up the indicator of economic consciousness in successive years of the 1991-94 period (in order of decreasing frequency of choices in 1994) (%).

Content of a principle	1991	1992	1993	1994	'94-'91
1. Creation of possibility of setting up small crafts businesses by anyone.	85	92	94	91	+6
2. Facilitations for Polish capital in setting up large enterprises.	66	84	81	87	+21
3. Full autonomy of enterprises and fierce competition between them.	84	75	72	80	-4
4. Selling of state enterprises to Polish capital.	65	77	73	78	+13
5. Making it possible for employees to become owners of the enterprises they work for.	65	76	79	76	+11
6. Bankruptcies of loss-making enterprises.	72	63	57	66	-6
7. Permitting the operation of enterprises managed solely by employee self-management body.	46	58	51	61	+15
8. Exclusive state ownership of large industrial enterprises.	45	59	60	57	+12
9. Bigger influence of the Sejm and the Senate on the economy.	50	51	50	56	+6
10. Facilitations for foreign capital in setting up large enterprises.	55	44	42	52	-3
11. Laying off of non-essential employees by enterprises.	71	57	38	48	-23
12. Striving to equalise the incomes of all people.	50	44	39	48	-2
13. Introduction of an upper limit on pay, binding on all people in Poland.	47	51	40	48	+1
14. Increasing the influence of the president on the economy.	52	48	47	40	-12
15. Increasing the influence of Solidarity on the economy.	28	28	27	33	+5
16. Abandonment of state ownership of all or most enterprises.	35	27	22	30	-5
17. Government control over the operations of enterprises, e.g. by assigning production targets for them, defining the level of pay, supervision of the performance of the management.	19	24	26	29	+10
18. Increasing the influence of OPZZ-affiliated unions on the economy.	18	21	24	27	+9
19. Depriving trade unions of influence on the economy.	39	32	26	25	-14
20. Exclusive state ownership of enterprises, regardless of size.	22	22	20	24	+2
21. Permitting unemployment and paying minimum benefits to the unemployed (shortened to „permitting unemployment“ in 1993 and 1994).	26	36	10	22	-4
22. Growth of influence of political parties on the economy.	11	13	20	20	+9
23. Sale of state enterprises to foreign interests.	16	16	15	16	—
24. Growth of the influence of the Church on the economy.	5	4	6	6	+1

Source: "Workers '91" N = 2817, "Workers '92" N = 1006, "Workers '93" N = 988, "Workers '94" N = 997.

self-management bodies. Workers' support for employee partnerships stemmed from the conviction that they become co-operatives with a relatively equal distribution of shares.²¹

There was a growth of support for state intervention. The acceptance of "manual control" or direct management of enterprises by the state increased from 19 to 29 per cent. In addition, there occurred a growth of support for the idea of the monopoly of state ownership in large-scale industry, i.e., the segment of the economy in which the respondents happened to be working. In 1991, this principle was 14th on the list of the most frequent choices but by 1994 it rose to the eighth place, the respective percentages being 45 and 57 per cent.

It might be added at this point that the expectations of greater interference of state institutions in the economy did not assume extreme forms. The workers would like the state to own large industrial establishments but few of them liked the idea of its ownership of all enterprises, big or small. In none of the four surveys (encompassed by Table 1) did the acceptance of full monopoly of state ownership in the economy exceed 24 per cent.

There were bigger expectations that institutions representing employees (trade unions) and political institutions of the democratic state would intervene in economic affairs. In the case of Solidarity, the growth was by 5 percentage points (from 28 in 1991 to 33 in 1994) while for OPZZ the growth was by 9 percentage points (from 18 to 27). The proportion of those who wanted both Solidarity and OPZZ to interfere in the economy rose from 12 per cent in 1991 to 20 per cent in 1994. This means that in 1994 one worker out of every five expected that both labour unions will simultaneously provide him with a safety net protecting him from unfavourable economic phenomena, so one can speak of a certain growth of support for solutions of a corporatist nature. It should be remembered, however, that this backing is too small to speak of workers' expectations of a corporatist system. Workers might perhaps support paternalistic corporatism that would protect the weakest groups (Tatur 1994, p. 126), but they would not like corporatism of an authoritarian nature, the forms of which were described by Jerzy Hausner (1995). Workers' scepticism toward such formations is mainly due to the low level of confidence in trade unions.

In the years 1991-94, there was a substantial decrease in support for efficiency-oriented principles and for moves to rationalise management, especially for the idea of laying off redundant personnel. In 1991, this principle was widely supported (71 per cent backing and fourth place on the list of preferences) but three years later it was accepted by only a half of the workers (48 per cent and eleventh place on the list). Also the backing of the second efficiency principle, that of closing down loss-making enterprises, decreased (from 72 to 66 per cent, and a slide from third to sixth place).

There was also less acceptance of unemployment: from 26 per cent and the 18th place to 22 per cent and the 21th place.

²¹ Studies of the so-called leasing companies, conducted for three years by Maria Jarosz's team, prove that these companies are in reality controlled by the management rather than the work force as a whole (Jarosz 1994, Jarosz and Kozak 1995).

The third group of principles are those for which the level of support changed little during the three years. Between the spring of 1991 and the autumn of 1994, support for the principle of competition fell by 4 percentage points (from 84 to 80), with a drop from the second to the third place on the list of preferences. However, the findings of the four successive surveys suggest that workers' attitude to competition varied considerably (the lowest backing was 72 per cent and the highest 84 per cent).

As for the attitude to the selling of state enterprises to foreign capital, the replies were remarkably consistent, with some 15 per cent of workers accepting the idea in each column in Table 1. Similarly, there was a fairly stable level of consent to the proposal that foreign investors should be able to set up large enterprises in Poland without any complications. Over the three years, the backing for this principle fell by just 3 points (from 55 to 52).

The last group of important principles that enjoyed quite stable acceptance were ones that proclaimed social egalitarianism. On the one hand, it should be noted that a relatively high proportion of workers supported egalitarian solutions. Each of the two egalitarian demands (principles 12 and 13 in Table 1) was accepted by 48 per cent of workers but, on the other hand, that level did not rise over a longer period of time. In 1991, there were 35 per cent confirmed egalitarians, by which I mean those workers who favoured both the introduction of an upper limit on incomes and the plan for equal pay; by 1994, that changed to 32 per cent. This means that there was no radicalisation of the workers' anti-capitalist mood and no increase in the dislike of income differentials.

The information about changes in support for individual principles presented above indicates that on the macro scale, the workers did not turn out to be the enemies of the development of capitalist ownership or the introduction of foreign capital to Poland. They also supported the elementary rules of market economy: the autonomy of enterprises and competition between them. However, those general pro-capitalist declarations were accompanied by a growth of support for demands leading to the softening up of the economic regime. The workers wanted the consolidation of the role of the state in the economy, more say for trade unions and a greater level of social security. These expectations can be understood: after all, it is obvious that most workers, when asked about what they consider to be the desirable economic model, will choose a variant that guarantees greater security rather than one which, in their opinion, threatens to lead to higher unemployment.

3.3. Long-term analysis of workers' visions of a well ordered economy

The indicator of economic visions as a statistical tool. Syndromes and orientations

The quotient nature of the variables making up the indicator of economic consciousness was assumed while starting to make the search for the syndromes formed by the workers' preferences. This assumption made it possible to follow

the correlations occurring between replies to individual questions (variables) and, consequently, monitor the bundles of correlations between variables. An analysis of correlation matrices produces a preliminary picture of the correlations between the respondents' preferences. The negative side of correlation matrices, however, is the blurred borders of the configurations, so it was necessary to resort to one of the techniques of multivariate statistics, namely to factor analysis. It has been systematically used for studying the desirable visions of economic order since 1990.

Factor analysis is a statistical technique used to identify a relatively small number of factors that can be used to represent relationships among sets of many interrelated variables. A peculiar feature of this procedure consists in reaching beyond the differences occurring on the surface of events and in defining axes (factors) along which elements of the structure are grouped. The exploratory factor analysis employed here does not require preliminary hypotheses except the most general one, namely that there exists some order within a given scope, so, consequently, the variables combine to form some groups (Zakrzewska 1995). Besides, this analysis does not assume the isolation of dependent and independent variables.

Finally, a brief terminological remark: the clusters of variables obtained as a product of factor analysis of variables making up the indicator of economic consciousness will be referred to as *syndromes*. Those syndromes were subjected to second-degree factor analysis. The clusters of syndromes obtained as a result of this analysis determined, directly or after additional calculations of correlation coefficients, the types of economic consciousness, called orientations.

Early attempts to analyse the logic of working-class thinking: three-part model of workers' visions of a well ordered economy in 1990

Already in the years 1986–90, the purpose of the research was to identify the syndromes formed by workers' economic views. The studies conducted in those years suggested that three rather than two orientations were present among workers and the restriction of attention to "pro-reform" and "anti-reform" attitudes alone leads to ignoring a certain important current that is clearly present in worker mentality. At that time, however, these doubts could not lead to definitive conclusions because the studies were not representative. While the empirical material was quite abundant (the average sample was about 500 respondents), in each case it was collected in just several industrial enterprises.

When the replies to a question about a preferred economic order were analysed in 1990 with the use of exploratory factor analysis, it was discovered that next to the two extreme orientations, labelled as "the liberal model" and the "homo sovieticus model," there was also a third group, which was designated "petty bourgeois socialism."²²

²² At that time, we were using relatively condensed indicators of economic consciousness, containing not more than 12 variables (Gardawski 1992b).

The "liberal model" signified the acceptance of foreign capital and consent to unemployment and bankruptcies. The second pattern corresponded to the traditionalist vision, namely support for full authority of the state in the economic field, and was associated with dislike of all economic changes (the development of private ownership, bankruptcies of loss-making enterprises, handing over of control over enterprises to worker self-management bodies, etc.)

However, factor analysis applied to 1990 data revealed the existence of one more syndrome of principles whose inner cohesion was confirmed by the correlation matrix. This syndrome signified a specific selection of economic principles. It was characterised by a combination of a preference for the participation of employees in management and self-management with support for the development of small retail and crafts firms and also with objections both to monopoly state ownership in the economy and to the introduction of big foreign capital to Poland (Gardawski 1992b). This was the syndrome that was called "petty bourgeois socialism."

On the basis of data from that period it was not possible to determine whether this "petty bourgeois socialism" was widespread among Poland's industrial workers or whether it was going to last. In order to answer these questions, it was necessary to meet at least two conditions: devise a possibly comprehensive indicator of economic consciousness and conduct repetitive studies on a sample that would be representative of all industrial workers. It was possible to meet these conditions during the surveys taken in the spring of 1991 and in subsequent years.

The findings of the "Workers '91" survey made it possible to identify the general scope of differences of views and to demonstrate that there were indeed three types of working-class thinking about a well ordered economic system. This typology was subsequently verified in successive representative nationwide surveys of industrial workers ("Workers '92," "Workers '93," "Workers '94").

Workers' visions of a well ordered economy in the second year of transformation (1991)

The aforementioned studies from the early 1990 were conducted when the reforms were just getting off the ground. There was already much talk about the new rules on engaging in business activities but in practice they only materialised in trading: next to state-owned warehouses and state-owned shops there appeared private imports, private wholesale operations, private vendors, initially selling their wares off camping beds and later from folding steel sheet stalls that became a veritable symbol of the transition from socialism to market economics. The approaching capitalism was seen as a system whose central feature was the abundance of all sorts of goods. Meanwhile nothing was changing in the enterprises employing our respondents and the threat of restrictive policies against the state sector was not yet reflected in government actions.

When the 1991 survey was taken in the spring, the economic reform was in place and the government already took action directed against state enterprises.

However, massive unemployment did not appear yet although there was already much talk about the instances of foreign capital buying out enterprises (or parts thereof), layoffs and conversion of industrial facilities into warehouses for the distribution of imported goods. The 1991 survey therefore made it possible to grasp the views at the moment when real transformations directly affecting workers' lives were beginning to take effect. The study was planned as a useful point of reference for subsequent analyses of the dynamics of economic orientations.

Typology of visions of a well ordered economy at the start of the reforms

TABLE 2. Preferences and syndromes of workers' economic consciousness in 1991

Preferences and their syndromes (54.2% of overall variance was explained)	Factor loadings
I. Egalitarianism and etatism	
1. Equal pay	.701
2. Introduction of upper ceiling on incomes	.611
3. The state runs enterprises (monocentrism)	.368
4. The state owns all enterprises	.363
5. Establishment of enterprises managed by employees	.226
II. Privatisation and subjectivity	
1. Polish capital buys state enterprises	.598
2. Polish capital sets up large enterprises	.554
3. Enfranchisement of employees (employee stock ownership)	.454
4. Development of private crafts	.317
5. Elimination of state ownership in the economy	.267
III. Liberalism	
1. Foreign capital buys state enterprises	.582
2. Foreign capital sets up large enterprises	.454
3. The state as owner of big industrial establishments	-.275
4. Permitting unemployment	.207
IV. The authorities control the economy	
1. Increased parliamentary control over the economy	.932
2. Increased presidential control over the economy	.529
V. Associations' control the economy	
1. Growth of Solidarity's influence on the economy	.689
2. Growth of OPZZ unions' influence on the economy	.630
3. Growth of Church influence on the economy	.392
4. Growth of influence of political parties on the economy	.369
5. Depriving trade unions of influence on the economy	-.387
VI. Efficiency and competition	
1. Laying off of redundant employees	.495
2. Bankruptcies of loss-making enterprises	.372
3. Competition and autonomy of enterprises	.190

Source: "Workers '91" N = 2817.

In 1991, factor analysis made it possible to identify six sets of principles, which will be referred to as syndromes (Table 2). A characterization of each of them follows:

"Egalitarianism and etatism" is a traditional vision, with emphasis on the economic principles of state socialism. This syndrome included the demands for equal incomes in two variants: the moderate one (an imposition of an upper ceiling on wages) and a categorical one (striving for identical incomes). The state was expected to own all the enterprises and manage them directly, carrying out the demand for "manual control." During interviews with workers in 1991, those who supported such solutions said that only the state could be "the whip directors fear" and a potentially good defender of workers' interests.

In 1991, one new element of this syndrome in comparison to the 1980s was the demand to permit the operation of enterprises managed exclusively by democratically elected representatives of the employees (workers' self-management bodies). In the 1980s, the proposals for the organisation of enterprises run by workers' self-management bodies was associated with modernisational, anti-etatist tendencies. In our studies in 1986-88, support for the idea of transferring full control over enterprises to democratically elected self-management body showed a strong positive correlation with consent to the introduction of competition, opening the country to foreign capital and lifting restrictions on the development of small-scale industry and private crafts. On the other hand, workers who took an unfavorable view of the reforms were less likely to support the idea of self-managed enterprises. The change of the socio-political system was probably responsible for the fact that the pro-market workers reduced their support for workers' self-management somewhat. This is not to say that they withdrew that support but rather tended to take a more neutral view of self-management, focusing their aspirations on employee stock ownership instead. Meanwhile the conservatively-minded workers, who definitely feel a nostalgia for the welfare state and direct state management of enterprises, changed their attitude toward self-managed enterprises and began to back them strongly. This was connected to the hopes that such firms would not be laying off employees.

"Privatisation and subjectivity": this syndrome embraced a vision of a market economy but with peculiar limitations. Namely, the respondents falling in this category accepted the development of private capital only so long as it was of Polish origin and placed emphasis on small-scale ownership, on a scale that was within the reach of workers (employee stock ownership, small crafts and trading companies). The implementation of this syndrome of principles would give the workers a chance of becoming co-owners of their enterprises (state enterprises could be transformed into employee-owned companies) or a chance to start one's own business. It was therefore a concept of petty bourgeois "home-bred" capitalism. With some reservations, this pattern could be regarded as a modified version of the aforementioned "petty bourgeois socialism."

The appearance of Polish (but not foreign) capital in this syndrome is not necessarily a sign of xenophobia. Most of the workers that were interviewed believed that all the capital that comes to Poland is of a speculative, not "genuine" or "honest" nature. According to the respondents, speculative capital does not guarantee lasting jobs, the speculators will not be honest employers, will pursue a cut-and-run policy, export all profits, etc.

It is noteworthy that this syndrome is accompanied by anti-etatism. The correlations between appropriate variables showed that this syndrome was not only associated with a disapproval of state monopoly of ownership in the economy but also of exclusive state ownership of large industrial plants and other forms of pervasive presence of the state in the economy. The dislike of state institutions displayed in 1991 by the supporters of "petty bourgeois capitalism" is significant because in subsequent years they showed renewed support for state intervention. The situation recorded in 1991 indicates that the development of capitalist relations led to a peculiar reaction to authoritarian state socialism.

"Liberalism": in 1991, this syndrome included principles that were rarely accepted by workers (allowing unemployment to occur, sale of state enterprises to foreign investors). This position was embraced mainly by those respondents who worked abroad in the past and were aware of the costs of the transformation that had to be borne by Poland. As for permitting the occurrence of unemployment, they admitted it was a bad thing but in Poland's current situation it was inevitable.

As can be seen from Table 2, liberalism also signified the rejection of the idea of state ownership of large industrial plants, which was an element of the set of values that met with universal public approval in the times of authoritarian socialist rule.

The respondents approving the liberal pattern also supported other modernisation principles included in the "privatisation and subjectivity" and "efficiency and competition" syndromes. The liberal principles were a kind of a filter dividing the large group of supporters of the modernisation of the economy into consistent advocates of reforms (liberals) and less consistent, ambivalent supporters of changes (moderate reformers).

"The authorities control the economy" and **"Associations control the economy"**: these are two sets of syndromes containing the demands for a greater influence over the economy, exercised by all the organisations and associations which workers thought would be more inclined to listen to "labour" than to "capital." It can be said that they illustrate the aforementioned inclination of some worker milieux to support elements of a corporatist system.

"Efficiency and competition": this syndrome encompassed demands that were popular in the last decade of authoritarian socialist rule and in the early 1990s. Workers were very much exhausted by the "socialist mess," the waste, the dismal working practices. To some extent, they were exploiting the loopholes that emerged as a result of this disorderliness (mass moonlighting) but the physical

and psychological cost of the mess was not offset by the advantages. Therefore they expected that the new system will give them the comfort of doing well organised work. Besides, authoritarian socialism destroyed the link between work and pay: a lazy and negligent worker earned as much as a good worker. The system of wages was seen as being grossly unjust. The respondents hoped that market economy would restore just relations, they expected order that may be termed as "justice-oriented" capitalism and "justice-oriented competition." By that version of capitalism and competition they understood the kind of order in which an honest worker will always be appreciated and duly rewarded while the only losers will be the lazy loafer.

Remarkably, the respondents at that time did not notice the relationship between dismissing redundant employees and unemployment. The former was seen as nothing more than the elimination of wastefulness and poor working practices (it was believed that the laying off of redundant employees should not lead to the emergence of unemployment).

Second-degree factor analysis, i.e., one in which the units were the six syndromes presented above, demonstrated a clear structure composed of three economic consciousness orientations: the first of them was termed the moderately modernisational (or moderately reformist), the second the traditionalist one and the third the liberal one (Table 3).

TABLE 3. Three economic orientations among workers in 1991. Second-degree factor analysis.

Syndromes and orientations (60.8% of total variance was explained)	Factor loadings
I. Moderate modernisation	
1. Privatisation and subjectivity	.513
2. Efficiency and competition	.434
II. Traditionalism	
1. Associations control the economy	.624
2. Egalitarianism and etatism	.251
3. Authorities control the economy	.232
III. Liberalism	
1. Liberalism	.640
Source: "Workers '91" N = 2817.	

Moderately modernisational orientation encompassed two syndromes: "privatisation and subjectivity" and "efficiency and competition." It was the vision that was the most popular among the workers, the modal one for that milieu. It was also referred to as the vision of a "friendly market economy." It assumed the acceptance of market economy but to the exclusion of those principles that were seen by workers as (actual or potential) sources of unemployment. It was, in a nutshell, an economy that was friendly from the workers' point of view and free from the threat of unemployment; this view prevailed as the most

characteristic one for the working class milieu throughout the period encompassed by the study, i.e., until the autumn of 1994. However, during that period the workers changed their mind about the potential causes of unemployment: in 1991 the rationalisation of management at enterprise level (laying off of redundant employees, bankruptcies of loss-making firms) was not associated by workers with unemployment whereas the sale of state enterprises to foreign investors was seen as a prelude to the dismissal of most of the current staff and a source of unemployment.

Traditionalist orientation encompassed three syndromes: "associations control the economy," "egalitarianism and etatism" and "the authorities control the economy." This orientation was an articulation of fear of market economy and a longing for a paternalist state guaranteeing full security to the employees. Traditionalism rejected all new economic institutions connected with ownership transformations. The only exception was competition, whose tie to traditionalism was weak but nevertheless positive.

This happened to be one of the more pronounced contradictions in the workers' thinking: the traditionalists expected enterprises to remain state property and to be centrally managed by state bodies but at the same time they wanted competition between such enterprises (naturally, there could be no question of redundancies or bankruptcies in the traditionalists' vision). This attitude was a manifestation of the mythologisation of the notion of competition, which was already described in the mid-1980s. Within the "Poles" project, Kolarska-Bobińska (1986) reconstructed the social myth of competition free from any social costs.

Liberal orientation only encompassed the liberal syndrome presented above. In 1991, it turned out that this orientation was marginal in the pattern of working class mentality; besides, it was predominant among engineers and managers rather than manual workers.

The correlations between the orientations were basically consistent with the expectations: there was a positive correlation (0.18) between moderate modernisation and liberalism and a negative one (-0.15) between liberalism and traditionalism. The moderately modernisational and traditionalist orientations were neutral toward one another (0.02).

Estimated scope of supporters of individual syndromes and orientations in 1991

The method used in 1991 to estimate the number of supporters of individual syndromes was a simple one. In each syndrome, the researchers selected several principles (three, and in just one case two) which had the highest factor loadings and were most strongly associated with a given syndrome (these were designated as syndromic principles). Next they calculated the proportion of respondents who simultaneously accepted individual sets of syndromic principles (Table 4).

TABLE 4. Estimated relative numbers of consistent supporters of individual orientations (%).

Syndromes	Sets of syndromic principles	Overall proportion of respondents choosing a set of principles
Moderately modernisational orientation		
Efficiency and competition	1. Competition and autonomy of enterprises 2. Bankruptcies of loss-making enterprises 3. Dismissing of redundant employees	51
Privatisation and subjectivity	1. Polish capital buys state enterprises 2. Polish capital sets up large enterprises 3. Enfranchisement of employees (employee stock ownership)	41
Traditionalist orientation		
Egalitarianism and etatisme	1. Income equality 2. Introduction of upper ceiling on earnings 3. State manages enterprises (monocentrism)	12
Authorities control the economy	1. Greater influence of parliament on the economy 2. Greater influence of the president on the economy	39
Associations control the economy	1. Greater influence of Solidarity on the economy 2. Greater influence of OPZZ unions on the economy	12
Liberal orientation		
Liberalism	1. Foreign capital buys state enterprises 2. Foreign capital sets up large enterprises 3. Acceptance of unemployment	6

Source: "Workers '91" N = 2817.

There were also additional detailed calculations of the scope of the individual orientations (they are not taken into consideration in Table 4). These calculations indicated that moderately modernisational attitudes were professed by some 50–60 per cent of workers. As for attitudes of a traditionalist and liberal nature, their scope varied. Ultimately, we accepted that traditionalist attitudes were displayed by not more than 20–25 per cent of workers and liberal ones by 5 to 15 per cent of workers (Gardawski 1992a). Therefore the 1991 studies showed that the moderately modernisational attitude was the modal manner of thinking about a well ordered economy for the working-class milieu whereas the other two orientations remained of marginal significance, with the margin being somewhat wider in the case of traditionalist attitudes.

Workers' visions of well ordered economy after four years of transformations (1994)

The important finding of the subsequent studies from 1992, 1993 and 1994 was the confirmation of the lasting character of the three orientations identified in 1991. The visions of a well ordered economy did undergo some changes and the sets of principles associated with individual orientations differed but the changes were relatively small.

TABLE 5. Principles and syndromes of workers' economic consciousness in 1994. Factor analysis.

Principles and syndromes (50.3% of total variance was explained)	Factor loadings
I. The market, Polish privatisation, employee stock ownership	
1. Polish capital buys state enterprises	.488
2. Employee enfranchisement (employee stock ownership)	.478
3. Polish capital sets up large enterprises	.444
4. Competition and enterprise autonomy	.385
5. Bankruptcies of loss-making enterprises	.341
II. Labour organisations control the economy	
1. Greater influence of Solidarity on the economy	.711
2. Greater influence of OPZZ unions on the economy	.542
3. Denying trade unions an influence on the economy	-.302
4. Emergence of enterprises managed by employees	.201
III. Political institutions control the economy	
1. Greater influence of the Sejm and Senate on the economy	.750
2. Greater influence of the President on the economy	.543
3. Greater influence of political parties on the economy	.333
IV. Liberal employment policy	
1. Permitting unemployment	.651
2. Dismissing of redundant employees	.481
V. State ownership vs. foreign capital	
1. The state owns big industrial plants	.512
2. The state owns all enterprises	.426
3. Foreign capital buys state enterprises	-.346
4. Elimination of state property in the economy	-.328
5. Foreign capital sets up big enterprises	-.313
VI. Egalitarianism	
1. Introduction of upper ceiling on incomes	.654
2. Equal incomes	.491
VII. Centralisation of the economy (etatism) vs. the development of private crafts	
1. Greater influence of the Church on the economy	.498
2. Development of private crafts	-.351
3. The state manages enterprises (monocentrism)	.288

Source: "Workers '94" N = 997.

TABLE 6. Three economic orientations among workers in 1994. Second-degree factor analysis.

Syndromes and orientations (55.0% of total variance was explained)	Factor loadings
I. Moderate modernisation vs. traditionalism	
1. The market, Polish privatisation, employee stock ownership	.648
2. Centralised control over the economy (etatism) vs. the development of private crafts	-.490
II. Traditionalism vs. liberalism	
1. State ownership vs. foreign capital	.511
2. Liberal employment policy	-.371
3. Egalitarianism	.304
III. Traditionalism (corporatism)	
1. Employee organisations control the economy	.481
2. Political institutions control the economy	.297
Source: "Workers '94," N = 997.	

When the findings of factor analysis from 1991 (Table 2) are compared with those from 1994, it is obvious that the record of syndromes from 1994 is less clear-cut than the 1991 record. In 1991, the syndromes produced an unequivocal picture. In 1994, however, some findings of factor analysis appeared in the shape of bipolar scales, with one of the poles encompassing liberal or moderately modernisational principles and the other traditionalist values (e.g., the syndrome "state ownership vs. foreign capital" or "centralism vs. the development of private crafts"). Despite the bipolarity of some syndromes, the three orientations are easy to identify.

Traditionalist orientation. During the three intervening years, the content of the traditionalist orientation did not change: it still included the same preferences that were known from the 1991 study. In Table 5, traditionalism appears in no fewer than five syndromes and three of them are wholly made up of traditionalist values: "employee organisations control the economy," "political institutions control the economy" and "egalitarianism." In addition, traditionalist principles are an element of bipolar syndromes. In the "state ownership vs. foreign capital" syndrome, traditionalism clashes with liberalism, the first two preferences ("the state owns big industrial plants" and "the state owns all enterprises") being of a traditionalist nature. In the "centralised control over the economy vs. development of private crafts" syndrome, the two traditionalist principles are "greater influence of the Church over the economy" and "the state manages enterprises (monocentrism)."

Moderately modernisational orientation. The main syndrome in this orientation was the factor termed as "the market, Polish privatisation, employee stock ownership." Besides, the data given in Table 6 indicate that the principle of development of private crafts is associated with this orientation (it is an element of the "centralised control over the economy vs. the development of private crafts" syndrome). In this shape, the moderately modernisational orientation, the

modal one for industrial workers, was characterised in 1994 by support for the development of Polish private capital, market-economy principles and competition (including the bankruptcy of loss-making enterprises), employee (stock) ownership and the development of private crafts.

Let us now compare the preferences included in successive variants of the moderately modernisational orientation from the years 1991-94 and the earlier pattern of "petty bourgeois socialism" from 1990. Such a comparison shows that over a longer period of time, workers continued to support an economic order of a market nature, devoid of excessive state interference in direct management of enterprises or a monopoly of state ownership in the economy. It should be noted that after 1990 the moderately modernisational vision of a well ordered economy has invariably signified: a) support for all forms of petty ownership that were potentially within the grasp of workers (stocks in enterprises, private crafts, retail trade), b) support for market-economy principles and competition, and c) support for Polish capital, accompanied by a measure of distrust of foreign capital. At the same time, the moderate reformers consistently refused to consent to: a) allowing unemployment to occur and to principles seen as potential sources of unemployment, b) excessive interference of the state in the economy, and c) any extremist solutions (e.g., a complete elimination of state ownership from the economy or its full nationalisation). It should be noted, however, that as time went by, that distrust became less categorical. This orientation carried some ambivalent contents, e.g., it negated some forms of private capital but accepted others. The same could be said of efficiency-oriented principles. The ambivalence characteristic of this orientation is connected with the so-called privatisation dissonance, which will be discussed at length later on.

The moderately modernisational orientation underwent some change after 1991. That change was already recorded in 1993, when the proposal for the dismissal of redundant employees was removed from the list of moderately modernisational preferences. This principle moved, so to say, from the moderately modernisational to the liberal camp. The shift turned out to be permanent and in 1994 there appeared a separate syndrome called "liberal employment policy." (table 5). It included the consent to the appearance of unemployment and specifically the laying off of redundant employees. This means that by 1993 or 1994, the moderate reformers, while continuing to favour pro-market changes and also some forms of development of private capital and some efficiency-oriented principles, were removing the proposals for rationalisation of employment at enterprise level from their vision of a "friendly market economy." In 1991, workers rarely associated the laying off of redundant employees with unemployment. Between 1991 and 1993, the definition of dismissal was changed and redundancies began to be seen as a prelude to unemployment, not just a warranted pro-efficiency policy. The conviction that a good honest-working employee did not need to fear unemployment began to disappear. Workers knew by then that the mechanism generating unemployment was blind in this regard.

Also the proposals regarding the closure of loss-making enterprises lost some of the support they used to enjoy among moderate reformers. In one survey conducted in 1993 on a special panel sample, the moderate reformers turned out to be equally opposed to redundancies and to the bankruptcies of loss-making enterprises. It may therefore be assumed by extrapolating this process into the future that in the years ahead both efficiency-oriented principles will share the fate of the principle of "allowing the occurrence of unemployment" and move to the liberal orientation.

Liberal orientation. This orientation, enriched in 1994 through the addition of the principle of laying off redundant employees, appeared in two syndromes (Table 5). It filled in full the "liberal employment policy" syndrome (which incorporates two principles: the allowing of the occurrence of unemployment and dismissing of redundant employees). As for the capital-related principles that are central to liberalism, they were included in the "state ownership vs. foreign capital" syndrome, which was devised as a scale with two poles, the liberal and the traditionalist one (Table 5). The liberal principles were the ones according to which foreign capital should be allowed to buy state enterprises and set up large enterprises on its own and that state ownership in the economy should be phased out while the principles mentioning state ownership of industry belonged in the traditionalist category.

Estimated scope of support for orientations in 1994

In 1993, it was decided to revise the method of estimating the scope of individual orientations. In the first study in 1991, two or three principles with the highest factor loadings were selected for each syndrome and those respondents who simultaneously declared support for the two or three principles were considered to be representative of a given syndrome. This supplied approximate information about the scope of acceptance of individual syndromes (Table 4) but this information could not be applied to whole orientations (which, with one exception, included two or three syndromes).

The new approach, first applied to the 1994 survey, consisted in isolating three sets of respondents who consistently chose the principles characteristic not of individual syndromes but of whole orientations. It was assumed that the orientations will be represented by respondents who: a) consistently choose three syndromic principles that are most characteristic of a whole orientation (according to the level of factor loadings), b) do not choose principles characteristic of the opposite orientation (liberal vs. traditionalist and moderately modernisational vs. traditionalist). In addition, the respondents representing the liberal orientation were separated from the moderate reformers. This was necessary because these orientations do not contradict one another, only liberalism is "superimposed" on moderate modernisation (the liberals accepted most of the principles embraced by the moderately modernisational orientation).

The application of this technique made it possible to identify four categories of respondents. Three of them were made up of consistent advocates of individual

orientations and the fourth of respondents who did not choose any orientation in a consistent manner, were either "yes-sayers" or refused to answer questions. The identification of the four categories made it possible to devise a new variable ("orientations of economic consciousness"), which we subsequently used in our analyses as an independent variable. Table 7 contains the sets of syndromic principles and the proportion of consistent supporters of individual orientations.

TABLE 7. Estimated proportion of consistent supporters of individual orientations (%).

Orientations of economic consciousness	Syndromic principle for orientation of economic consciousness	Relative number of respondents choosing three principles
I. Traditionalism	1. The state owns large industrial plants 2. The state owns all enterprises 3. Introduction of a ceiling on incomes	14
II. Moderate reforms	1. Polish capital buys state enterprises 2. Enfranchisement of employees (employee stock ownership) 3. Polish capital sets up large enterprises	48
III. Liberalism	1. Permitting unemployment 2. Laying off of redundant employees 3. Foreign capital buys state enterprises	7
IV. Other	No set of syndromic principles chosen	31
Source: "Workers '94," N = 997.		

The figures presented in the table demonstrate once again that industrial workers directly concerned with the manufacture of physical goods are most inclined to support moderate modernisation, in this case measured by the support for Polish capital and employee-owned companies and rejection of unemployment, the sale of state enterprises to foreign investors and also of the monopoly of state ownership in the economy.

3.4. Economic orientations and socio-demographic characteristics of the workers surveyed (1991-94).

The problem of the scope of the working class

After presenting the workers' economic preferences and their patterns, it is necessary to answer the important question about the relationship between the respondents' views and their characteristics. Only then is it possible to take a look at the problem of the primary and secondary working class and the scope of that class.

Observations made under the system of authoritarian socialist rule were at the root of concepts which assumed that specific class-forming processes occurred before 1980, bringing down the barriers separating the upper strata of the working class (especially highly skilled workers of large industrial plants) from professionals, both foremen and technicians and engineers. Such concepts, advanced by Stefan Nowak and Jadwiga Koralewicz, found their extreme expression in Jacek Kurczewski's aforementioned thesis about the new middle class created by that system.

Studies carried out after the imposition of martial law demonstrated that in the last decade of authoritarian socialist rule, along with the waning of support for egalitarian and etatist values, came an atrophy of the bonds between the upper working class strata and technicians, supervisors and engineers (see Chapter 2 of this work). The progressing disintegration of the relationship was also borne out by findings published by CBOS opinion research centre, which revealed that the views of skilled and unskilled workers were becoming increasingly similar while the gap between the workers on the one hand and lower professional strata (technicians, foremen) was growing wider.

The problem of the widening gap between working-class strata is particularly important in the situation the Polish society and Polish economy are facing. Touraine must have been right when he suggested that the strength of the working class milieu depends on the degree of integration of the systems of values characteristic of its higher and lower segments: the carriers of the so-called high professional consciousness (highly skilled specialists) on the one hand and the workers with a proletarian mentality, representatives of traditional working class milieus on the other. It appears that only when such integration exists is it possible to talk about a chance for the emergence of a strong working-class interest group.

The data obtained in the course of the study make it possible to assess the scope of similarities—or dissimilarities—in the vision of a well ordered economy cherished by individual groups of industrial workers. It is also possible to trace back the evolution of these similarities and differences over a longer period of time and see if in a given milieu the traces of ties formed in the period of authoritarian socialist rule have survived or disappeared.

In view of the significance of the problem of differentiation of workers' visions of a well ordered economy, data from not only 1994 but also from the years 1991–94 will be presented.

Economic orientations and the scope of the working class in the years 1991–94

For the purpose of analysis of social support for individual orientations, we employed a variable combining a person's position and his/her education. The categories identified in this way were defined as elements of the primary and secondary industrial working class. In Chapter I, we adopted the assumption that the primary working class consists of employees directly engaged in the manufac-

ture of physical goods who had basic vocational education. It is their vision of a well ordered economy that is to serve as a criterion of the working-class nature of economic consciousness, a peculiar yardstick for including other groups of workers (unskilled workers, workers with secondary education, technicians, foremen, engineers working directly in manufacturing) in the working class or excluding them from it.

The new variable isolated five categories obtained by crossing the "education" variable with the "position" variable: a) engineers and managers with higher education (1 per cent of the sample in 1994), b) technicians and foremen with secondary vocational education (4 per cent), c) skilled workers with secondary vocational education (12 per cent), d) primary working class, i.e., skilled workers with basic vocational education (43 per cent), and e) unskilled workers with elementary education (6 per cent). In 1994, the respondents matching the description of these five categories accounted between themselves for 66 per cent of the total sample, the remainder being people whose position and education produced a different combination from any of the above. The largest category that was omitted from analysis were skilled workers with elementary education; then there were foremen with elementary or with university education, unskilled workers with basic vocational education and several more small categories.

Table 8 shows the level of support for the three economic orientations in five vocational/educational groups. The table also records changes in that support that took place between 1991 and 1994.

What are the conclusions that follow from this analysis for defining the scope of the working class, its inner differences and its composition? Let us begin by discussing the 1994 findings. When we look at the distribution of preferences regarding a well ordered economy, it turns out that the "primary" industrial working class is characterised by clear support for the moderately modernisation orientation while it rarely accepts traditionalism and even less often subscribes to the liberal orientation. This means that the hierarchy of preferences is clear: moderate modernisation, followed by traditionalism and liberalism. Let us accept that his hierarchy will be the yardstick of the distance the working class and other groups and the inclusion (or otherwise) of those groups into the working class. In this way, it will be necessary to include in the working class, next to the basic group, two groups of employees with secondary vocational education: rank-and-file workers and foremen and technicians. These two groups will be regarded as the secondary working class. They constitute the upper stratum of that class, its elite. Meanwhile, unskilled manual workers, often professing traditionalist views, on the one hand, and managers of production departments and their deputies, who have university degrees and often hold liberal views, on the other, will remain outside that class.

Let us now look at the dynamics of the scope of the working class from the angle of the three orientations. It turns out that the composition of the camp of supporters of the traditionalist orientation underwent rather profound changes in the years 1991–94. In particular, it is worth noting the big growth of support for this orientation among unskilled workers (by 14 percentage points). Among

skilled workers with secondary education and technicians, the growth was much smaller (by 0-5 points). The conclusions that follow from this for defining the scope of the working class are that the gap between the primary working class and unskilled workers grew wider during the three years while the groups making up the primary and the secondary working class got closer together.

TABLE 8. Indicator of economic orientations among respondents included in selected categories of positions and education. Comparison of the pattern from 1991 and 1994 (%).

Economic orientations*	Year of study	Average for sample	Position/education				
			Manager/ university	Foreman, technician/ secondary	Skilled worker/ secondary	Skilled worker/ vocational	Unskilled worker/ elementary
			Level of acceptance of orientation in a given category of respondents				
1. Traditionalism	1991	10	2	8	7	12	15
	1994	14	—	10	12	12	29
2. Moderate modernisation	1991	34	38	42	39	33	24
	1994	48	24	60	57	51	30
3. Liberalism	1991	5	21	4	7	4	2
	1994	7	36	13	4	5	3

* Moderate modernisation includes the combination of consent to the sale of state enterprises to Polish capital, facilities for the establishment of large firms by that capital and the development of employee ownership. Traditionalism is support for state ownership in the economy and egalitarianism. Liberalism is consent to unemployment, layoffs and the sale of state enterprises to foreign capital (see Table 7).
Source: "Workers '91" N = 2817 and "Workers '94" N = 997 surveys.

Moderate modernisation was a much more important yardstick of distances in the economic consciousness of the working class groups surveyed. In the case of this orientation, between 1991 and 1994 the group of engineers and managers with university degrees moved decidedly away from both the primary working class (skilled workers with basic vocational education) and from the secondary, elite stratum of that class. If the moderately modernisational orientation from 1991 were adopted as the basis for the operationalisation of the notion of the "working class," then engineers should also be included in this group. After three years, the situation changed in a fundamental way: the employees with university education clearly withdrew their earlier support for the key principles of moderate modernisation and their vision of a well ordered economy is now different from the vision that is typical of skilled workers with basic vocational and secondary education and also of foremen and technicians. Unskilled workers showed somewhat bigger support for moderate modernisation (by 6 percentage points) but during the same period the support for this option among both the primary and secondary working class increased by 18 points.

With regard to the liberal orientation, a similar situation prevailed. In 1994, managers with university education and engineers were much more likely to support this orientation than three years earlier, and there were also more foremen and technicians choosing this option.

This picture of changes in economic consciousness was relatively coherent, confirming the suggestions presented above: in the years 1991-1994, the distances between people with university education and unskilled workers on one hand, and the working-class groups, including skilled workers, foremen and technicians, on the other, grew wider. As time went by, members of the working class, both primary and secondary, increasingly often accepted moderate modernisation while the remaining groups of people employed in manufacturing were drifting either toward the liberal (managers) or traditionalist (unskilled workers) pole.

3.5. Attitude toward privatisation

Our earlier studies and analyses (Gardawski, Gilejko, Żukowski 1994) indicated that there were no integrated patterns of thinking about privatisation, but that the preferences undergo fragmentation and a peculiar autonomisation: a fair part of the respondents proclaim different views when we ask about the rules that should be in force in the economy as a whole than when they speak about their own enterprises and livelihood.

Capitalism and privatisation on a macro scale

The respondents' attitude to the basic institutions connected with the restitution of capitalism and with privatisation, such as the sale of enterprises to private investors, the establishment of new large enterprises by such investors, etc., does not exhaust the list of problems related to socio-political transformations. It is still necessary to explain the views on various aspects of private property, starting with questions of an ideological and political nature and ending with the attitude to privatisation in the respondents' social milieu.

The "Balcerowicz plan" remains a widely accepted symbol of the "Polish road to capitalism" and of privatisation. We asked about Balcerowicz's economic policy since 1991 and it turned out that with the passage of time, the reminiscences it evokes are increasingly positive. Initially about 40 per cent of respondents were opponents of the Balcerowicz plan while the last survey showed the figure dropping to some 30 per cent. In 1994, the plan got positive marks from 28 per cent of the respondents, negative ones from 30 per cent, 25 per cent had neither a positive or negative view (the rest formed no opinion). The differences of opinion matched the expectations: positive views about the plan were voiced by 54 per cent of managers and engineers, 42 per cent of foremen and technicians, 43 per cent of skilled workers and 16 per cent of unskilled ones.

One of the central problems, not only in the economic arena but also in the political, is the view about legitimate sources of income. Should income come only from work or can it also be obtained from capital? Should it be so that a person "who obtained capital has the right to draw benefits from investment, buying and selling of stock and leasing of property?" In 1994, the majority of the respondents (63 per cent) believed that capital gains were legitimate while 36 per cent disagreed. In each employee group (including unskilled workers with elementary education), at least 60 per cent of its members accepted income from capital while among managers and engineers that proportion rose above 90 per cent.

This high level of acceptance of income derived from capital was not unqualified, however. When they were asked if enterprising people should be offered favourable conditions for accumulating capital, investing it and getting rich, or whether they should not get any privileged treatment while a policy of evening up incomes and living conditions of the whole society should be pursued, three quarters of the respondents chose the egalitarian variant and only 20 per cent would accept facilitations for enterprising people (Table 9). As expected, support for entrepreneurship rose with the respondents' status: it was articulated by 73 per cent of managers and engineers and only 16 per cent of unskilled workers with elementary education. It should be noted that since 1991, the attitude toward this alternative did not vary greatly: the egalitarian option was chosen by 76 per cent of the respondents in 1991, 67 per cent in 1992 and 72 per cent in 1993.

TABLE 9. Dependence between choosing support for entrepreneurship and social egalitarianism and respondent's position and education (%).

Which of the views listed below is closer to yours?	Average for sample	Position/education				
		Manager/ university	Foreman/ secondary poly-technic	Skilled worker/ secondary	Skilled worker/ vocational	Unskilled worker/ elementary
1. It is the enterprising people who determine the prosperity of the society as a whole so they should be guaranteed convenient conditions for accumulating and investing capital and getting rich in the process	21	73	45	25	18	16
2. The prosperity of the society depends on the daily work of millions of employees. It is necessary to strive for the equalising of incomes and living conditions of the whole society	78	27	55	74	81	82
3. No answer	1	—	—	1	1	2

Source: "Workers '94" N = 997.

The economic changes that occurred after 1989 were not rejected by the workers and the institution of capital was endorsed in that milieu. At the same time, however, the respondents tended to expect egalitarian solutions and a welfare state rather than an economy in which the weaker are underprivileged. This means that they accepted entrepreneurship and capitalist expansion, but they expected guarantees of a moderately even standard of living for the remaining citizens who lack such enterprising skills. This set of views could be interpreted as another sign of the workers' dislike of extreme solutions and of expectations of a "friendly market economy."

TABLE 10. Expected mode of privatisation in the years 1992-94 (%).

Should the privatisation of large industrial enterprises be:	1992	1993	1994
1. Permitted without any restrictions	6	10	11
2. Permitted, but with restrictions	64	66	66
3. Forbidden	19	16	15
4. Hard to say	11	8	8

Sources: "Workers '92" N = 1006, "Workers '93" N = 988 and "Workers '94" N = 997.

This restraint could also be seen in the attitude to privatisation: the respondents supported it but wanted it to proceed under control, with limitations (Table 10). It is very important to notice that over a longer period of time (1992-94), the views of manual workers directly engaged in the manufacture of physical goods on the privatisation process did not change: it was opposed by 15 to 19 per cent of the respondents, supported with reservations by 64 to 66 per cent of them, while 6 to 11 per cent were in favour of unrestricted privatisation. This means that the suspicions that resistance to privatisation among employees of state enterprises or quasi-state ones (joint-stock companies wholly owned by the Treasury) would grow as the process advances proved to be unwarranted. Some resistance did appear but it assumed different forms than predicted (this will be discussed in a subsequent part of this chapter).

Remarkably, even among the most conservative unskilled workers with elementary education, 11 per cent of the respondents accepted unrestricted privatisation, 53 per cent wanted privatisation with restrictions and only 25 per cent were opposed to it.

Privatisation dissonance

One of the important peculiarities of the economic consciousness of industrial workers, especially those subscribing to the moderately modernisational orientation, was the deepening inconsistency of their convictions, the ambivalence of views about privatisation on the macro and micro scale. The discrepancy consisted in the fact that over three years (1991-94), the level of acceptance of privatisation plans on the national scale increased while the level of consent to the

privatisation of the state enterprise currently employing the respondents decreased. Simultaneously, the respondents' readiness to take employment with a private entrepreneur also decreased. The process is described in Tables 1, 11 and 12. The first of them contains the aforementioned information about the growing acceptance of the idea of selling state enterprises to Polish capital (from 65 per cent in 1991 to 78 per cent in 1994) and for facilitations in the establishment of large enterprises by Polish capital (from 66 to 87 per cent respectively). Asked about general economic solutions, the respondents showed growing acceptance of privatisation, especially if Polish capital was involved. But foreign capital in the form of an investor setting up new enterprises enjoyed stable support of more than a half of the workers during that period (55 per cent in 1991 and 52 per cent in 1994).

A different pattern of the respondents' views is obtained at the "micro" level, i.e., in relation to their own enterprises and their plans. In 1991, 73 per cent of the respondents were ready to accept some form of privatisation of their enterprises or were not sure how their ownership status should change (Tables 11). Three years later, however, only 50 per cent of the workers were prepared for a "de-nationalisation" of the enterprises they worked in. In 1991, 23 per cent of them accepted sale of their enterprises to private investors but by 1994 that proportion fell to as little as 11 per cent (and only 8 per cent would agree to the sale of the companies to Polish investors). This means that nine workers out of every ten agreed to the sale of state enterprises to Polish investors but only one out of ten would want this to happen to his enterprise.

There was a similar pattern of the workers' personal preferences: in 1991, 25 per cent of them were ready to move to a privately owned enterprises but three years later only 7 per cent said so.

TABLE 11. Preferred form of ownership of the enterprise in which respondents work now (%).

Do you think the enterprise you work for now should be:	1991	1992	1993	1994	1994-1991
1. A state enterprise	27	51	59	50	+23
2. The property of Polish or foreign private capital	23	14	10	11	-12
3. The property of all employees, with each of them owning an identical number of shares	23	25	21	25	+2
4. The property of those employees who buy its stock	7	5	8	10	+3
5. Something else	x	1	1	2	-
6. Hard to say	20	4	1	2	-18

Sources: "Workers '91" N = 2817, "Workers '92" N = 1006, "Workers '93" N = 988, "Workers '94" N = 997.

This shows that the preferences of individual groups of employees varied considerably. Unskilled workers were particularly attached to state ownership while engineers and technicians viewed it much less favourably. There was a huge gap between managers, foremen and technicians and the remaining employees:

the former were much less likely than the latter to think that the enterprises they worked for should remain state-owned (about 30 per cent vs. about 50 per cent).

Managers and engineers more often agreed to the sale of their enterprise to Polish capital and to the possible sale of part of its stock to employees for cash. All other groups of respondents displayed a distrust of a possible private investor and the expectation that if the company were to be transformed into an employee-owned company, the stock should be divided evenly, as in a co-operative. The differences between the groups all but disappear when the question concerns the readiness to take up employment with a private firm: the proposition is accepted by 3 per cent of foremen and technicians, 9 per cent of managers and engineers and 6 per cent of skilled workers.

TABLE 12. Preferred form of ownership of possible new place of work (%).

Please imagine you are free to choose a place of work. Would you choose:	1991	1992	1993	1994	1994-1991
1. Staying with the present enterprise	51	61	60	56	+4
2. Working for another state-owned enterprise	4	6	5	6	+2
3. Working for an enterprise owned by private owner	25	9	6	7	-18
4. Working in an enterprise owned by its employees	x	4	3	4	-
5. Working for myself, in my own firm	17	19	25	26	+9
6. Hard to say, I would be doing something else	3	1	1	1	-2

Sources: "Workers '91" N = 2817, "Workers '92" N = 1006, "Workers '93" N = 988 and "Workers '94" N = 997.

Origins and consequences of privatisation dissonance

The privatisation dissonance has been getting deeper: on the one hand, social legitimacy of important institutions of the capitalist economy is rising but at the same time the fears of the hardships that that economy may hold in store for the respondent himself are also growing. This, in turn, elicits dual reactions: the desire that the enterprise in which the respondent is employed remain in state hands and that it remains a "friendly social niche" (without layoffs, the risk of bankruptcy, and the like). This peculiar yes-no conflict, consisting in approving privatisation on a nationwide scale and opposing de-nationalisation of one's own firm, is a fact whose significance can hardly be overestimated. Let us now attempt to identify the sources of this dissonance.

The discord in the attitude toward Polish capital is highly unequivocal and impossible to interpret with the use of simple patterns. Questionnaire studies and "qualitative" analyses, however, produce a fairly clear pattern of the dissonance. What are the factors behind a positive attitude toward privatisation?

First of all, a new atmosphere began to surround the notion of "private capital." The change was connected with a phenomenon that might be described as the "wearing thin of socialist values." In a nutshell, among the symbols referring to a general economic order, there was a growth of support for some

capitalist institution while the social scope of acceptance of some—but not all—crucial socialist ideals and values declined. The monocentric idea of “manual control” over enterprises by the state was losing ground and the distrust of private capital was waning. The idea of “social (state) ownership” in industry lost its former supremacy over the idea of “private ownership.” Even so, this change of climate was not a categorical one, as most respondents were in favour of economic pluralism, rejecting both the complete elimination of state ownership and monopolistic state ownership. Most workers also remained moderately egalitarian, expecting guarantees of “justice” from social institutions, etc.²³

The aforementioned “wearing thin of socialist values” is connected with two very important effects of the change of socio-political system. Sociological analyses indicate that market economy freed the society from the nightmare of perennial shortages of goods and made people satisfied with the role of consumers (Rychard 1995). Gone are the night queues outside shops, meat rationing, the importance of having friends in the right shops, etc. At the same time, many working-class households were able to adapt to the new situation and maintain, albeit with difficulty, the ability to satisfy their elementary needs. It is important that the unemployed members of households have a chance of finding work in the “grey sector.” In a 1994 survey, 26 per cent of workers said their families were suffering or suffering badly, while the rest described their situation as good (59 per cent) or very good (14 per cent). During that study, only 22 per cent of the respondents expected that in a year’s time the situation of their family will be “slightly worse” while 8 per cent feared it would be “much worse than now.”

However, the conviction about the victory of capitalism, which reduces the possibility of return to an etatist, monocentric and extreme egalitarian traditionalism, clashes with the fear of changes and with some stereotypes and with the early, not very encouraging experience with new capitalism, both Polish and foreign (Gardawski, Gilejko, Żukowski 1994). It should also be noted that employees had and still have a certain inclination to idealise “real” capitalism: they expect from it the stability they got accustomed to under authoritarian socialist rule, they expect good human relations in enterprises, etc.

The privatisation dissonance is the outcome of a peculiar way of thinking, of associations connected with Polish and foreign capital. The strong growth of support for Polish capital stems from the attitude toward foreign capital. The view has often been voiced that if capitalism is to develop (which is taken for granted), then let it be chiefly our own, domestic capital because “at least it will not export profits,” because it will curb “the sellout of national assets,” etc. The support for “Polish capital” and the positive emotional attitude that accompanied this notion stemmed from automatically juxtaposing it to the unacceptable and dishonest “foreign capital.” Let me add that the dislike of foreign capital was

²³ It is also important to remember about the existence of numerous factors which additionally complicated the process of change in attitudes. One such factor was the growth of support for state intervention in the economy and for the proposal for keeping the biggest, strategic industrial enterprises in state hands.

not so much an outcome of xenophobia as of the conviction, still widespread in 1994, that the foreign capital coming to Poland is not “honest” or “genuine” foreign capital but mere speculators in search of a quick buck.²⁴ However, when the notion “Polish capitalist” appeared in the interviews with the workers, the pattern of associations changed instantly. The comparison was then made not to “foreign capitalist” but to Polish state employer. The home-bred capitalist was suspected of dishonesty (because how else would he make a fortune?), and a dishonest businessman cannot be a good employer, according to the workers, because “a crook will always be a crook.” By contrast, a state enterprise, for all the reservations about it, was perceived as a welfare institution. This produced an important consciousness effect in workers, one that was absent in the managers’ and engineers’ thinking and consisted in legitimising Polish capital but refusing to legitimise Polish capitalists.

It is worth mentioning one more important phenomenon contributing to the said dissonance. In 1994, workers were aware of excessive employment in state enterprises (also in manufacturing). Their dislike of privatisation and growing attachment to state enterprises were certainly a reflexion of justified fears of layoffs which the company would have to carry out if it were to be managed fully rationally.

The most important consequence of this dissonance was the dual picture of the economy. The workers thought about the economy as a whole from a different perspective than about their own enterprise. The simplest explanation of this approach was this: most respondents agreed to the privatisation of many branches of the economy and of many large enterprises, agreeing that this is the economic imperative now. However, they also wanted to preserve some enclaves of state ownership (they most often mentioned the raw materials industries, power generation and defence industries in this context), and they wanted their enterprise to be included in that enclave. As a result, something that was a great strength of the working class milieu in the times of the first Solidarity had disappeared; that is, the conviction that there is only one truth, one way of improving the situation, that the interest of all Poles is identical and that it is worthwhile to unite to fight in its defence (Kowalski 1990).

3.6. Moderately modernisational orientation and privatisation dissonance as manifestations of ambivalent mentality

The inconsistency in workers’ views on economic matters can be interpreted at least to some extent by referring to some generalisations and sociological concepts developed in the course of the observation of workers in developed

²⁴ During interviews with workers, we were often told that they would gladly move to a genuine, prestigious Western company but they did not believe that such a company would be interested in coming to Poland.

market economies. These include the theses about the ambivalence of workers' thinking (related in particular to Frank Parkin's concepts) and the Polish concept, developed by Włodzimierz Wesółowski, which differentiated between "transgressive" and "existential" interests.

For Parkin, the basic type of working-class mentality was characterised by an ineradicable inner incoherence, due to the fact that workers were simultaneously under the influence of two different axiological currents: the system of values of the dominant class, which was moulding the world precisely in the interest of that class, and the values, expectations and aspirations evolving from their own experience and reflecting the situation of workers. According to Parkin, whose concept of worker ambivalence can be particularly useful for interpreting the views of Polish workers, the inconsistencies stem from the fact that some representatives of the subordinate classes may perceive social reality from the angle of "meaning systems" provided by the dominant class. These systems and their component values assume one of two forms after they are internalised by the workers: the "official" or "idealised" form or the negotiated form. Therefore there may be cases of idealisation of some important institutions; in the Polish case these could be the market and competition, for example. At the same time, many existential questions are not perceived by workers from the angle of dominant values but of values shaped in local working-class milieux. What occurs here is a peculiar compromise between value systems and there can be a specific continuity, whose borders are determined, on the one hand, by the dominant values in the pure, idealised form, and on the other, by the subordinate class's own values. In between the two boundaries, there is room for many compromise configurations, with varying degrees of saturation by the dominant values. This is the area of ambivalence and inconsistency.

This interpretational pattern provides a good language for describing the moderately modernisational orientation and especially the phenomenon referred to as privatisation dissonance. Let me repeat once again the example taken from Parkin's work (1971) on the attitude of British workers to trade unions in the 1960s: the workers were opposed to strike actions launched by the unions in other industries and enterprises than their own and there was a very high level of workers' criticism of trade unions as a force that was threatening the prosperity of the country. At the same time, the workers were always ready to support strikes organised by the unions in their own enterprises in defence of their interests. This example describes a pattern of views that exactly matches the characteristics of privatisation dissonance.

Apart from the notions of the system of dominant and subordinate values and of the negotiated system of values, another important reference system is the pattern proposed by Włodzimierz Wesółowski, who distinguished between existential and transgressive interests. For the present situation in Poland, the patterns borrowed from English sociology of the working class have one shortcoming, and that is the fact that Poland lacks a clearly dominant class and a system of dominant values such a class should produce. The dominant values are not articulated and disseminated by a narrow modernisational elite indoctrinating

the subordinate class; instead, these values are taken from the world market economy and its social legitimacy rests on the collapse of authoritarian socialist rule and the fall of "the world communist system." The Polish working-class milieux accept the market and capitalist values mainly for pragmatic reasons and not because of a prolonged socialisation of the subordinate class by the dominant class. For these reasons, the notions proposed by Wesółowski appear more useful, especially with regard to the moderately modernisational vision.

Let us then assume that a specific ambivalence effect appears in the consciousness of Polish industrial workers, especially the moderately modernisational ones, consisting in the fact that they are aware of the transgressive interest of the national economy in privatisation and in attracting investors, especially foreign ones. These transgressive values assume an idealistic nature in their mentality and the proposals they formulate are sometimes of an extreme nature. Competition, for example, is sometimes seen as a tool of justice, Polish capital was to be an excellent antidote to the schemings of foreign capital, etc. As a result, the degree of support for some market-economy or capitalist institutions was higher among workers (especially the upper strata of workers) than among managers and chairmen of supervisory councils. Using a spatial metaphor, one could say that the sphere of negotiated values was placed below this idealised sphere of transgressive values in workers' consciousness. Both were of a compromise nature, which means that restrictions were imposed on some solutions that were consistent with transgressive interests. For example, workers agreed to foreign capital investing in Poland by setting up new enterprises but objected to the sale of existing state enterprises to such investors (but not to the sale to Polish capital). Furthermore, workers accepted competition and some inconveniences ensuing from it but they said no to the most drastic inconvenience, namely unemployment, and were beginning to withdraw their acceptance of dismissing redundant employees. They consented to the privatisation of other enterprises but defended the status of their own state enterprise and were not ready to take up employment with private firms.

As for the view of a desirable general economic order and the idea of a good employer, the workers' consciousness turned out to have many dimensions: It was not oriented to existential values alone but also contained some specific internalised transgressive values. Multi-dimensional thinking is characteristic of those employee groups that make up the primary and secondary working class, with a moderately modernisational orientation but not of the subclass of unskilled workers with a traditionalist or purely existentialist attitude, or to the group of engineers and managers with university degrees, who tended to subscribe to the liberal orientation.

It is almost certain that it is precisely the ambivalence of social consciousness of the industrial working class discussed above that makes the relatively fast reconstruction of the economic system of Poland possible. It appears that if the workers thought in the traditionalist or existentialist vein, they would rally round some populist and anti-capitalist ideology articulated by the unions from the Ursus tractor factory and could effectively slow down the process of reforms.

CHAPTER 4.

Workers' visions of a well ordered political system

What vision of a desirable social and political order goes together with the normative pictures of economic order identified in the preceding section? The explanation of this dependence is indispensable in order to get a better understanding of social reactions to the process of transition to a new socio-political system.

In all the surveys of industrial workers, the questionnaires also include questions concerning problems of the political system. On each occasion, however, the content of the questions was dictated by other assumptions, derived to some extent from current social and political developments in Poland (e.g., elections).²⁵ For this reason, it is not possible to carry out a broad comparative analysis of the changes in workers' political and social preferences. Workers' visions of a well ordered political system are reconstructed chiefly on the basis of the findings of the 1994 survey.

4.1. Political system principles chosen by industrial workers

In the study of political preferences, the respondents were given a list of principles relating to selected social, legal and socio-political problems. The procedure was supposed to reveal both open attitudes, marked by acceptance of parliamentary democracy procedures, and attitudes of a populist and authoritarian nature.

The level of support for individual principles given in Table 13 indicates the remarkably moderate character of the workers' vision of a well ordered political system. It can also be seen that the workers supported a stable democratic system although they preferred on the whole direct democracy and many of them would welcome a strong government. The support for direct democracy and some forms of one-man rule added a populist hue to the workers' vision. Therefore the analysis of workers' attitudes to democracy is followed in the next chapter by the findings of the qualitative study of the workers' understanding of the term "democracy."

²⁵ In 1992 and 1993, the questionnaires contained large sets of questions regarding election preferences. The team member responsible for analysing these problems was Tomasz Żukowski, who is now (1996) preparing a study of voting behaviour of industrial workers.

TABLE 13. Level of acceptance of political and social principles by position and education. Principles listed in descending order of support (%).

Content of the principles	Total	Position/education				
		Manager/ university	Foreman, technician/ secondary	Skilled worker/ secondary	Skilled worker/ basic vocational	Unskilled worker/ elementary
1. Freedom of speech regardless of views	91	82	95	97	92	90
2. Local authorities controlled exclusively by voters	70	55	74	73	70	67
3. Government organises referenda on important issues	69	27	71	72	71	60
4. Two, at the most three, political parties operate	68	72	82	62	68	68
5. Curbs on flow of Gastarbeiters and peddlers from the East	64	27	68	65	65	59
6. Make a prominent person the country's leader	49	36	55	43	49	56
7. Death penalty for serious fraud	39	36	55	39	42	35
8. Sejm (parliament) passes important acts without referendum	26	45	42	32	22	27
9. Local authorities controlled by the government	23	9	18	14	25	27
10. Many political parties co-exist	23	9	16	32	23	19
11. Restrictions of freedom of speech for opponents of Christian values	18	9	10	16	17	30
12. Restriction of freedom of speech for opponents of current authorities	18	—	8	15	18	30
13. Disbanding of political parties	9	9	3	5	9	8

Source: "Workers '94" N = 997.

Freedom of speech. The desirable system should guarantee freedom of speech for all, regardless of the views they proclaim. In every group of workers studied, the freedom of speech was a universally supported principle, although there was also a group of respondents whose attitude to it was inconsistent. The inconsistency concerned the fact that they demanded the freedom of speech but at the same time they suggested it should be curtailed for opponents of Christian values or enemies of the current authorities, or for both groups. If the replies of the inconsistent respondents are subtracted from the overall number of sup-

porters of the freedom of speech, we will see that this freedom was unequivocally supported by 67 per cent rather than 92 per cent of all respondents. In other words, two-thirds of all workers were consistent supporters of the freedom of speech while a little over a quarter of the sample were people who supported limited freedom. Consistent opponents of the freedom of speech and persons who had no opinion on the subject accounted for 7 per cent of the total.

Direct democracy. The next characteristic feature of the political preferences of workers was that support for direct democracy was bigger than for representative democracy. The majority of workers (69 per cent) preferred a system based on forms of direct democracy, in which the government would hold a referendum on every important matter. The group of advocates of classical parliamentary rule, without recourse to referenda, was markedly smaller (29 per cent).

As could be expected, support for referenda as a form of deciding about matters of great social significance was the highest among the respondents belonging to the primary and secondary working class (71–72 per cent of them expressed support). Unskilled workers with elementary education supported direct democracy with only slightly lower frequency (60 per cent), while only 27 per cent of managers and engineers subscribed to it. It could be added that direct democracy was supported by 51 per cent of the respondents falling into the liberal orientation and 81 per cent of those with a traditionalist view of the economy.

The pattern of workers' responses to a question about their consent to the dissolution of the Sejm and the Senate and the holding of new elections can serve as an illustration of their scepticism about the parliament. In our survey, this question served to measure the degree of "disillusionment with the Sejm." The workers did not accept the rubber-stamp parliament from the times of authoritarian socialist rule but they used to perceive the Sejm as a "dignified" institution, working in some isolation. In a 1993 survey, when Sejm disputes were quite animated and the workers thought that they concerned matters of secondary importance, many respondents made critical remarks about the parliament. A frequent comment was that the Sejm resembled a "circus" or that it did not occupy itself with "Poles' true problems," finding substitute topics, etc. In 1992, 49 per cent of the respondents answered in the affirmative to the question whether the parliament should be dissolved and new elections held (Gardawski, Zukowski 1992, p. 98); in 1993 that proportion rose as high as 63 per cent (Gardawski, Zukowski 1994, p. 177), while by 1994 it dropped to 36 per cent. This drop in the negative assessment of the Sejm during the current term was not so much due to workers' sympathy for the SLD-PSL ("postcommunist") coalition (other data suggested that this sympathy was not big although it was indeed higher than in 1993) as to their relief that the irritating parliamentary disputes were over.

The support for referenda and scepticism toward the Sejm and Senate should not be perceived as a sign of rejection of the parliament as such. According to the workers, the Sejm should exist, but only as a forum for debates involving two, at the most three, parties, and prior to taking important

decisions, it should ask the whole society about its opinion by way of a referendum.

The majority of workers (70 per cent) preferred democratic, grassroots control over local authorities exercised by their actual voters, while a minority (23 per cent) would like those authorities to be subordinated to central government. Centralised control over local government was opposed in particular by employees with a higher status: only 9 per cent of managers and engineers with university education supported such control. Workers with a lower status more often thought that the local authorities should be supervised from above: 29 per cent of unskilled workers with elementary education and 40 per cent of economic traditionalists said so. During interviews held during qualitative studies, workers fairly often voiced the view about the need of control "from the top" over local authorities, explaining that the local people on their own were too weak to effectively oppose the local cliques, which control important offices and positions. Only "the top" or "the government" can exert real pressure on local authorities and perhaps "look after the man in the street" and "be tough" on the local lords.

Two-party system. The need for political stabilisation can be seen in the suggestions regarding the number of political parties. Only one respondent in five would be happy with a large number of parties whereas the majority (68 per cent) expected that only two or at the most three parties would remain on the political scene. At the same time, only a small proportion of the respondents (9 per cent) were thoroughly opposed to the existence of political parties. This is a significant finding because it puts the lie to the assertion, often voiced by political writers, that Poles, especially the ones who are worse off, are consistently against all parties and are only ready to back independent candidates in elections, etc.

It is true that the dislike of political parties grows as the respondents' status gets lower and as we move from the liberal economic orientation to the traditionalist one, but in no group did this dislike exceed 18 per cent, the level recorded among economic traditionalists.

Interviews indicate that the workers' visions of a two-party system show a strong perception of a party representing working people, meaning "us." The party representation of the other side has mostly negative determinants, namely it should articulate the interests of the whole social area that does not embrace "us" (i.e., it should embrace the authorities, capitalists, "old and new *nomenklatura*;" in a word, "them"). It can be assumed that the growth of workers' support for Solidarity as a political party observed since 1994, is a sign of precisely such expectations for the appearance of "our" party.

Country's leader. The high level of support for the idea of transferring power to a strong individual emerged in the findings of the 1991 survey and has been observed ever since. Each time, the idea was supported by more or less a half of all respondents. The respondents often mentioned the need of finding a "master of the country" who will attend to their problems. Despite the differences in the level of support for the idea of a strong leader, that support never fell below 35 per cent in any group of respondents in the years 1991–94. The majority of

workers expected a system incorporating strong direct democracy institutions and a two-party system reflecting the fundamental division of the society into working people and those with ties to government and capital. Such a vision of the democratic system (containing a populist element) did not clash—in the view of half the respondents from the 1994 survey—with the idea of having an outstanding figure as the country's leader and of equipping such a person with vast powers.

What was the nature of the support for the idea of handing over power to a strong individual? In the case of some workers, this support was certainly a manifestation of a classical authoritarian and anti-democratic approach, a desire "to escape from freedom." The distribution of the replies to the question (devised by Tomasz Żukowski) combining the idea of a strong leader with the dislike of democracy indicates that a minority of the workers were guided by simple authoritarian ideals. The question concerned consent to "the elimination of democracy and introduction of strongman rule." With the question formulated that way, the level of support was much lower: the option was firmly backed by 8 per cent of the respondents and with reservations by 11 per cent, which means that all in all, only 19 per cent of the respondents supported the plan. Table 14 shows that only 26 per cent of the supporters of a national leader also consented to the "elimination of democracy and strongman rule" while 74 per cent would welcome an outstanding leader but did not consent to the dismantling of democracy.

TABLE 14. Support for the idea of handing over power to an outstanding personality vs. support for the idea of toppling democracy and introducing iron-hand rule (%).

Is it necessary to make an outstanding personality a national leader and equip him with vast powers?		Is it necessary to get rid of democracy and introduce iron-hand rule?	
		„Definitely so” and „Probably so”	„Definitely not” and „Probably not.”
„Yes”	(100)	26	74
„No” or „hard to say”	(100)	13	87
„Don't know” replies were omitted. Source: „Workers '94” N = 997			

When the workers proposed the appointment of an outstanding person to a leadership post, they meant a strong executive arm of government, which would properly pursue the interests of the society, which the respondents equated with the interests of "working people." The leader should be subject to public control and should be removed and replaced by another person if he proves to be ineffective. When asked in a "qualitative" probe how such a leader should be selected, the workers mentioned a ballot of the presidential election variety, some "free poll" carried out directly by the people. What most workers wanted was not

so much a "leader" as a "good manager," from whom they could demand honest service and whom they could "take to task." It would be the duty of such a leader to serve the public interest and do what the society wants him to do. Naturally, for the workers the term "society" is tantamount to working people or wage-earners. It appears that the main origin of support for an outstanding leader was the widespread conviction that "nobody is responsible for anything in this country." Such a leader would at last be somebody who is responsible and who can be accused of not doing enough.

Judging by the available data, the notion of authoritarianism, used to describe an authoritarian personality and assuming operationalisation with the use of traditional scales, should be employed with caution while interpreting the workers' expectations of iron-hand rule. The definitions of authoritarian rule assume a high degree of legitimisation of autocratic authorities and plenty of trust in them, the conviction about the necessity of obeying idealised authorities, etc. (Korzeniowski 1993). When he described monocentric order, a totalitarian and authoritarian one, Stanisław Ossowski used the term "blind subordination" (1957). In contrast, most of the workers examined were—and still are—characterised by immunity to "blind obedience," as a result of which they are distrustful of the authorities and want to keep them under scrutiny. Let us repeat then: the interviews with the workers indicated that many of them wanted to see the country's leader as someone at their service, someone who would effectively pursue their social interests and look after them. The leader would be subject to verification by way of general elections so he would not forget who he is supposed to serve. This kind of attitude was already present in 1980 and 1981, despite the fact that there were also some signs of a demand for a strongman in the "first Solidarity." Karol Modzelewski observed that the freedom of the top leadership was restricted by the unshakeable conviction of the masses of union members that "those are the top should do anything the masses at the bottom may demand from them." As a result, Lech Wałęsa "felt ill at ease (...) in the presence of an active crowd at a factory that actually had influence on the course taken by Solidarity." (Modzelewski 1993, p. 23).

Such an interpretation of the workers' vision of one-man leadership follows from interviews with workers. The conviction that this explanation is correct is borne out by the comparison of the views of Polish and Russian workers; the author had an opportunity to get to know the latter when he spent a period of time in Russia in the 1970s. At that time, it was quite easy to come across genuine authoritarian attitudes. Many Russians were saying that it is no use discussing the merits of the decisions taken by the supreme authorities, let alone criticise them, because the authorities simply "know more" (*'im vidneye'*) than the "simple Soviet man," the "simple working man."²⁶ In Poland, both in the past and at

²⁶ In the closing period of authoritarian socialist rule, Polish Television broadcast a series of conversations with the widely known Russian historian Natan Eidelman. He suggested that according to provisional estimates, Gorbachev's perestroika and the glasnost that went with it were supported by 2 per cent of the Russians at the most while the rest are opposed to it.

present, such views have been rare. With few exceptions, Polish workers showed no inclination to take a humble attitude toward the authorities.²⁷

The largest single group of workers were those who opposed any form of one-man rule (44 per cent). Next came those who would pass power to a competent individual, provided that democracy is preserved (37 per cent), while only 13 per cent of workers consistently supported one-man rule and opposed democracy (these figures do not embrace the few respondents who voiced contradictory views).

Socio-political system preferences and respondents' vocational characteristics

The survey revealed the existence of a relatively strong relationship between the workers' social and demographic characteristics and their economic views or political preferences. However, this relationship is not going to be analysed here because the most important problem from the point of view of the scope of the working class and class differences between workers is the distance between individual vocational groups identified on the basis of education and position. The data presented in Table 13 indicate that with regard to each principle, there was a significant gap between the views of managers and engineers with university degrees and the remaining groups. Apart from this distinct correlation, we identified a characteristic distribution of replies to questions concerning direct democracy (frequent referenda), direct "grassroots" control over local authorities by the voters and on controls on the flow of Gastarbeiters. The groups falling into the primary and secondary industrial working class (i.e., foremen, technicians, and workers with secondary or basic vocational education) declared significantly stronger support for these three principles than managers and engineers and than unskilled workers. From this it can be inferred that the ideas of direct democracy could be regarded as a special domain of industrial working class. Respondents falling into higher categories (engineers and technicians) were more likely than the remaining groups to opt for representative democracy while unskilled workers tended to choose undemocratic, authoritarian solutions. It could be added in this context that it was precisely unskilled workers who are most likely to support restrictions on the freedom of speech for the adversaries of Christian values and for the opponents of the authorities.

Among the various characteristics of the workers, the economic consciousness orientations were especially important. Those classified as traditionalists supported authoritarian arrangements and direct democracy, the liberals wanted a multi-party system and representative democracy while the moderate reformers placed between the two poles: they wanted direct democracy and rarely accepted either pluralism or authoritarian rule.

²⁷ This difference was most probably a reflection of different socio-political systems: Russia still had many totalitarian features, setting it apart from Poland's authoritarian socialist rule, in the 1970s.

4.2. Socio-political system orientations

As in the case of analyses of economic preferences, the questions in this part of the survey concerned not only the level of support for individual principles governing the socio-political system but also their interrelation and orientations they form. The internal structure of preferences relating to socio-political systems was reconstructed with the use of the same methods as those applied to economic orientations (correlation matrices between individual principles and second-degree factor analysis). As a result of first-degree factor analysis, thirteen principles were divided into four orientations, the most characteristic of which turned out to be the orientation of an authoritarian nature (Table 15). Two of the remaining three orientations expressed democratic attitudes of a populist nature (direct democracy combined with dislike of the visitors from the East) while the third indicated support of the multi-party system as opposed to the division of the political scene into two opposed camps.

TABLE 15. Preferences and syndromes of socio-political system consciousness in 1994. Factor analysis.

Preferences and syndromes (47.6% of total variance was explained)		Factor loadings
I. Multi-party vs. two-party system		
1. Many political parties should operate		.800
2. Two, at most three, parties should operate		-.794
II. Authoritarianism		
1. Restriction of freedom of speech for opponents of Christian values		.576
2. Restriction of freedom of speech for opponents of current authorities		.524
3. Local authorities controlled by government (Cabinet Office)		.416
4. Disband political parties		.342
5. Appoint outstanding figure as country's leader		.336
6. Death penalty for serious fraud		.210
III. Direct democracy		
1. Government to organise referenda on important issues		.703
2. Sejm (Parliament) passes important acts on its own, without a referendum		-.498
3. Freedom of speech regardless of political views		.273
IV. Direct local democracy		
1. Local authorities controlled by voters alone		.338
2. Curb flow of Gastarbeiters and peddlers from the East		.153

Sources: "Workers '94" N = 997.

Multi-party vs. two-party system. This was a heterogeneous syndrome involving two alternative principles, between which there was a strong negative correlation ($r = -0.64$). Both the principles themselves and the whole orientation were weakly linked to other socio-political system principles and orientations. In

order to interpret them, it is necessary to widen the point of reference and point to correlations with economic principles. The first principle, "the existence of a large number of political parties," showed a positive correlation to the principles of economic liberalism (especially with the principle of selling state enterprises to foreign investors). The second, "the existence of two, three at the most, political parties," was strongly tied to the principles making up the moderately modernisation orientation (the development of Polish capital, the development of employee stock ownership), but it also had ties—albeit weaker ones—to some principles of economic traditionalism (support for state ownership of large industrial plants).

Authoritarianism. This syndrome was mainly influenced by the group of strongly correlated principles which included restriction of liberties, centralised control over local authority, disbanding of political parties, and the death penalty for the worst instances of economic fraud. These principles were negatively correlated with the remaining principles of representative and direct democracy. In addition, this syndrome included the idea of appointing a national leader, which showed a positive correlation to the remaining authoritarian principles but at the same time was characterised by a different logic of inner ties. For example, in contrast to the remaining principles making up the authoritarian set, the idea of a leader was positively correlated to the principle of parliamentary democracy, according to which there is no need for the Sejm to resort to a referendum ($r = 0.11$). This confirms the earlier thesis, according to which support for one-man rule is not always a sign of an authoritarian attitude in Polish conditions.

Direct democracy and direct local democracy. Both syndromes and their component principles were not significantly correlated (the correlation coefficient between them being 0.16). On the whole, they contained an outline of a specific populist vision of direct democracy, whose features included the freedom of speech, direct democracy, "grassroots" control over local authorities and dislike of Gastarbeiters from the East. It appears that the dislike of migrants from the East was devoid of xenophobic features. When in earlier surveys the workers were only asked about their attitude toward "tourists" from the East peddling their wares at Polish bazaars, the respondents were not opposed to them (Gardawski, Żukowski 1994, p. 193). The high level of dislike at present must be due to the fact that the arrivals from the East drive down the price of labour and to fears of the Eastern mafias.

4.3. Socio-political orientations vs. economic orientations

As in the 1991 survey, in 1994 it turned out that there is a correlation between the visions of a well ordered economy and visions of a well ordered political system (Cf. Gardawski 1992a). An analysis of the ties

between economic and political preferences made it possible to arrive at a better interpretation of political consciousness. However, the most important result of these analyses turned out to be a confirmation of the existence of a pattern of workers' preferences involving three elements (Table 16).

TABLE 16. Economic vs. political orientations, second-degree factor analysis.

Syndromes and orientations (42.8% of total variance was explained)	Factor loadings
I. Traditionalism and authoritarianism	
1. Authoritarian rule (p)*	.588
2. Centralisation of the economy vs. the development of private crafts (e)**	.516
3. Employees' organisations control the economy (e)	.393
4. Egalitarianism (e)	.315
5. Political institutions control the economy (e)	.213
II. Moderate modernisation	
1. The market. Polish privatisation, employee stock ownership (e)	.558
2. Direct local democracy (p)	.489
III. State ownership and two-party system vs. foreign capital and pluralism	
1. State ownership vs. foreign capital (e)	.590
2. Multi-party system vs. two-party system (p)	-.260
IV. Direct democracy vs. consent to unemployment	
1. Liberal employment policy (e)	-.493
2. Direct democracy (p)	.451

* (p) denotes a political system syndrome, rotated in first-degree factor analysis, as recorded in Table 15.

** (e) denotes an economic syndrome, rotated in first-degree factor analysis, as recorded in Table 5.

Source: "Robotnicy '94" N = 997.

The four economic-political orientations presented in Table 24 were correlated with one another with varying intensity. The strongest link was between support for orientation III ("State ownership and two-party system vs. foreign capital and pluralism") and orientation IV ("Direct democracy vs. consent to unemployment") $r = 0.27$. Both of them had a positive—if weaker—correlation with orientation I ("Traditionalism and authoritarian rule"). All in all, these three economic-political orientations were of a more or less traditional nature. Orientation II, in turn, ("Moderate modernisation") turned out to be related to orientation IV ("Direct democracy vs. consent to unemployment"). On the other hand, liberal views did not form an economic-political orientation of their own but were incorporated in the traditionalist orientations III and IV as their "negative poles" (support for foreign capital, consent to unemployment, acceptance of multiple political parties). The analysis of the correlations points to the maintenance of a triple nature of working-class mentality also in the field of economic-political preferences.

Moderately modernisational economic-political orientation

This economic-political orientation, which is modal for the working-class milieu, incorporates two first-degree orientations: the moderately modernisational economic orientation, which involves the acceptance of the market, Polish privatisation and employee stock ownership, and the political orientation accepting direct local democracy. Besides, the correlation matrix of economic and political orientations indicates that the moderate modernisation category should also embrace the political orientation accepting direct democracy. Meanwhile a negative correlation exists between the whole package of moderately modernisational (economic as well as political) orientations and traditionalism and support for authoritarian rule. Below is a list of preferences that make up the moderately modernisational economic-political orientation.

In the economic field: a) competition and autonomy of enterprises; b) Polish capital buying out state enterprises; c) enfranchisement of employees (employee stock ownership); d) Polish capital sets up big enterprises; e) laying off of redundant workers (but without permitting unemployment); f) curbs on flow of Gastarbeiters and peddlers from the East; g) bigger influence of the parliament and president on the economy.

In the political field: a) government announces referendum on important issues (the Sejm should not pass important acts on its own, without a referendum); b) freedom of speech guaranteed for all, regardless of views; c) local authorities should be controlled by the voters alone, not by the government.

The vision of moderate modernisation of the economy, presented in detail in the preceding part of this work, is linked in terms of political system expectations with a certain syndrome of features with clear-cut boundaries. Both in the case of economic and political preferences, the moderately modernisational orientation is of an orderly nature, has a peculiar logic and, it appears, stands a chance of surviving and spreading in society. As in the economic field, moderate modernisation in the socio-political field does not fit into a simple dichotomy, in this case the democracy—anti-democracy dichotomy. It is strongly tied to the demands for freedom and democracy and at the same time is distrustful of representative democracy procedures and the politically fragmented parliament. Underneath this approach it is possible to detect a vision of a political order that makes it possible to limit the mediatory role of representative bodies. The important thing, however, is that the very notion of democracy, despite scepticism about representative democracy procedures, has not become discredited in the working-class milieu.

It can be said in conclusion that the moderately modernisational economic and political orientation incorporated a bundle of preferences combining a "friendly market economy" (which would first of all be free from the risk of unemployment) with a vision of direct democracy with a populist hue.

The figures in Table 17 show that the advocates of moderately modernisational political principles, like advocates of moderately modernisational economic views, are mostly representatives of the primary and secondary working class, i.e., skilled workers with basic vocational or secondary education, technicians and foremen. Unskilled workers subscribed to such views a little less often while managers and engineers were firmly opposed to those principles.

TABLE 17. Moderately modernisational political orientation by position and education (%).

Method of choosing principles by respondents	Total	Position/education				
		Manager/university	Foreman, technician/secondary	Skilled worker/secondary	Skilled worker/basic vocational	Unskilled worker/elementary
		Proportion of supporters of the principles in a given group				
Total number of indications of three moderately modernisational principles: subordination of local authorities to the voters, guarantees of freedom of speech for all, frequent resort to national referendum.	51	9	47	50	52	43
Choice of another configuration of principles	49	91	74	66	57	71

Source: "Workers '94" N = 997.

Traditionalist-authoritarian economic-political orientation

This orientation was characterised by the highest degree of inner coherence and strong internal logic. Judging by the economic and political preferences embraced by it, it could be assumed that if most Polish workers really displayed such an approach, they could justifiably be termed *homines sovietici* and the reforms included in the Balcerowicz plan could encounter effective social resistance. It has already been demonstrated, however, that the extent of traditionalism and support for authoritarian rule was not large.

The traditionalist-authoritarian orientation embraced twelve economic preferences (four of which reflected support for egalitarian principles and state ownership in the economy). In addition, this orientation embraced six socio-political system principles that were of an authoritarian nature.

In the economic field: a) the state manages enterprises (monocentrism); b) the state owns big industrial establishments; c) the state owns all enterprises; d) imposition of a ceiling on incomes; e) income equality; f) establish-

ment of enterprises managed by employees (self-management); g) greater influence of Solidarity over the economy; h) greater influence of OPZZ trade unions over the economy; i) greater influence of the Sejm and the Senate over the economy; j) greater influence of the president over the economy; k) greater influence of political parties over the economy; l) greater influence of the Church over the economy.

In the political field: a) restrictions of the freedom of speech for opponents of Christian values; b) restrictions of the freedom of speech for the opponents of the current authorities; c) local authority controlled by the government (Cabinet Office); d) disbanding of political parties; e) appointing an outstanding person the country's leader; f) death penalty for serious fraud.

The supporters of the principles making up this orientation were predominantly unskilled workers with the lowest (elementary) education.

Liberal economic-political orientation

This orientation is easy to identify in the economic field while in the political field two of the principles included in it also formed part of an orientation that was of the nature of a bipolar scale as their anti-theses (Table 16).

In the economic field: a) permitting unemployment; b) laying off redundant employees; c) foreign capital buys state enterprises; d) foreign capital sets up large enterprises; e) elimination of state ownership in the economy.

In the political field: a) existence of many political parties; b) the Sejm passes important acts on its own, without referenda.

The liberal approach was supported by the elites of enterprises, located above the secondary and especially above the primary working class. They were well educated people, relatively many of whom declared that they had worked for some time in the West.

4.4. Democratic models according to workers' definitions

In the course of the "Workers '94" survey, deepened, open interviews were held with a view to reconstructing the workers' perception of democracy. Qualitative studies were preceded by standardised interviews, which means that the findings could be used for devising code keys. This made it possible to define the extent of individual ways in which democracy is understood.

As in other contemporary analyses of social perception, there will be no discussion of the essence of democracy here, just of what it meant to workers (Cf. Kowalski 1990, p. 87). It is therefore possible to omit theoretical deliberations and proceed to presenting the workers' perception of democracy.

Freedom. The largest group of interviewees associated democracy with freedom.²⁸ By contrast to other models, the replies associating democracy with freedom were typically brief.

Most often the respondents defined democracy as the freedom of speech, religion and convictions. By implication, some of the answers concealed the dislike of the practice of subjugation characteristic of authoritarian socialist rule: "democracy is the freedom of speech and free life," "in democracy, man feels free, unintimidated, can freely speak what he thinks," "in democracy, I can say what I please," "[I associate democracy with] the freedom of speech, with speaking out my mind," "personal freedom, freedom of opinion, you can say what you want and not fear any consequences," "to me democracy is the freedom of speech and freedom of religion," "freedom of speech and convictions," democracy is freedom of speech and of political views, "democracy is the freedom of everything: speech, convictions," "I associate it with the freedom of speech and political views, so no one interferes if people think differently." In a few instances, people referred to censorship, especially better educated people: "democracy means freedom, lack of censorship, presence of religious tolerance."

The second group stressed democratic freedom for man, for people (the implication being that the respondent means simple, ordinary people): "in democracy, everybody is free," "democracy is the freedom of people," "democracy to me is the freedom of man," "I associate democracy with freedom for all," "it means that people live free."

Many replies associated democracy with a free country: "to me, democracy means that we live in a free country," "democracy is a free Polish country," "democracy is a free country," "it is independence from foreign influence."

Several respondents associated democracy with the freedom of travel: "to me, democracy is the freedom of speech, freedom of travel and lack of censorship," "the word democracy only brings two things to mind for me: the freedom of speech and the freedom to travel abroad."

Equality, rule of the people.²⁹ Equality came in two main forms: equality before the law and equality in the sense of the lack of differences between people. Most often the respondents pointed to the model of equality that referred to the law. Here is a sample of such replies: "democracy is equality and rule of law," "democracy is order, law, a constitution that guarantees freedom," "democracy is equal rights for all," "it is the equality of the people before the law," "democracy is freedom and equal rights," "democracy is freedom of speech and one set of laws for all," "democracy is freedom of speech, freedom of religion and equality of all before the law, regardless of gender," "democracy is equality before the law, freedom of speech and also freedom of religion and of travel to other countries,"

²⁸ In subsequent questionnaire surveys "Workers '94," 56 per cent of the respondents indicated such an association.

²⁹ In the questionnaire survey, this model appeared in the replies of 22 per cent of the respondents.

"democracy is the freedom of speech and of religion and the observance of the law by all citizens," "democracy is the observance of the law by the authorities and the citizens," "democracy is equality before the law; the law should apply equally to all, without any exceptions."

However, equality was also mentioned with qualifiers that imparted an egalitarian or populist character to it. They were less frequent than the definitions given above. In this sense, equality was often accompanied by freedom (more often than in the case of "equality before the law"): "democracy is the equality of all," "it is freedom and equality of all citizens," "true equality of people, justice and peace," "democracy is the freedom of religion and equality of all citizens."

A certain group of respondents associated democracy with justice and government by the people, where "people" denoted the working class in the first place: "a democracy is a country ruled by workers," "democracy to me means the rule of the people," "it's the masses that rule." Several people voiced the view that was more frequently encountered in the early 1990s, in which democracy was reduced to such values as "truth," "good," "honesty," even "unity," "solidarity" or "tolerance": "I associate democracy with respect for everything around us, e.g., people of different faiths," "democracy is a just system, free of lies." The author of the last statement went on to point out that there is no democracy in Poland at present because again "there is no truth" i.e., "justice for the ordinary man." Other definitions in this category were that "democracy is government by the people, social justice and a peaceful life," or "democracy is equality and social justice."

Well-being. For relatively few respondents, democracy was also (or chiefly) well-being.³⁰ Such an attitude often led to the conclusion that there is no democracy in Poland yet or that in Polish conditions it's no use waiting for democracy ("a worker will not live long enough to see democracy here.") In marginal cases, democracy was treated as an attribute of the situation of groups enjoying a high social status (in the sense that "the rich have democracy but we, the workers, will not be getting it"). In general, what the respondents subscribing to that model knew about democracy was mainly that "things should be better"; they associated democracy with "some better times."

This view was sometimes articulated without any qualifying statements: "democracy brings to mind the well-being of workers," "equality and work for all," "improvement of living conditions of the society," "a betterment of the quality of life and other material issues," "democracy is better living conditions and shops full of goods," "democracy should simply mean plenty of jobs."

In most statements related to this model, democracy meant not only well-being but also freedom or equality: "I associate democracy with the freedom of speech and better life for the people," "with the freedom of speech, good wages and jobs for all" "democracy is civil liberties and an improvement of living

³⁰ In the questionnaire survey, this model appeared in the replies of 10 per cent of the respondents.

conditions of society," "in a democracy, people should have a say, everybody should have a job and not worry how to make ends meet," "democracy is freedom, well-being, better life for ourselves and our children," "well-being, freedom of opinion and of speech," "democracy is simply the freedom of speech, justice and a chance to earn a decent wage," "freedom of speech and religion, the right to work," "a free country, shops full of goods, good wages," "new values in public life, well-being, freedom of speech and religion." In addition to freedom, security was mentioned, if infrequently, in this context: "I associate democracy with freedom, a better life and security," "democracy is that there should be well-being and order in the country, but they aren't there."

Parliamentary democracy, majority rule, political pluralism. Relatively infrequently did the respondents associate democracy with the democratic political process (majority rule, parliamentary system):³¹ "democracy is the influence through an elected parliament on the life of the state and its citizens," "democracy is joint government by the legislative and executive arms and the freedom of speech and of religion," "democracy is the existence of many parties and freedom of expression," "democracy to me is freedom of speech and a multi-party system," "democracy is free elections and the government by the whole society. The head of state, the president, is elected by the whole nation. Democracy is bigger possibilities of governing but also bigger responsibility."

Fairly often, the respondents pointed to the need of effective control of the voters over their elected representatives: "democracy is freedom and equal rights through elected representatives, with the possibility of controlling them." In this context, criticism of the current state of affairs would occasionally be voiced: "I associate democracy with equal rights and responsibility. In theory, everybody has some influence on what is going on in Poland because he can vote. But that's just in theory."

Some respondents pointed to direct democracy institutions as a feature of the democratic system: "democracy is when the whole nation can voice its views on all major social matters," "democracy consists in the fact that all decisions and resolutions should depend on the choice of the majority whom a given issue concerns."

Market economy. The few replies that associated democracy with the market, privatisation or private capital³² constituted a separate category. Such statements usually associated the market economy and capitalist institutions with some vision of political democracy while some replies simply equated democracy with a free market: "democracy is the free market," "anybody can get rich because he can start some business," "democracy brings privatisation to mind."

There were more statements combining political elements with economic ones: "democracy is a multi-party system and capitalism," "democracy is freedom

³¹ In the questionnaire survey, this model appeared in the replies of 6 per cent of the respondents.

³² In the questionnaire survey, this model appeared in the replies of 2 per cent of the respondents.

of speech and convictions, influence on government policies and a market economy," "I associate democracy with healthy competition, freedom of speech and religion," "democracy is a democratic government and privatisation of state enterprises," "democracy is freedom for the citizens, free market, freedom of speech and access to capital for the citizens," "democracy is freedom of speech, your passport in your home, capitalism and Poland in Western Europe, not in Asia."

The "market economy" model also included some statements of an ambivalent nature. As such, we regarded views whose general emotional tenor indicated support for the market economy but rejection of some of its aspects (e.g., unemployment). One typical reply of this kind was: "to me, democracy means democratic elections, freedom of speech and religion, privatisation and, regrettably, also high growth of unemployment."

Exploitation and underprivileged position. There was also a small but very characteristic group of replies that were very strongly pervaded with negative emotions.³³ Their authors identified democracy with hardships and with distortions of transformations: to them, democracy is "quasi-liberty," which, as one respondent put it, "in reality, [he] associate[s] with the poverty of most people." Others said that: "democracy is layoffs," "democracy brings to mind unemployment and lack of order," "democracy is exploitation," "I associate it with more theft that there was before they introduced it in Poland," "all that counts in democracy is clout—when you have a lot of it, you move forward and the weaklings just drop out from the race." There were also some very curt replies, such as "democracy is anarchy" or "idiocy."

The tendency to accuse democracy of causing social differentiation appeared on several occasions (a few benefit from democracy while the majority lose): "democracy is what we have here, and that means poverty. Some have too much while others have too little," "we are divided into the rich and the poor," "it is subordination to those who have more," "I associate democracy with the wealth of privileged groups and poverty of the masses," "in democracy some people prosper but most ordinary people, like us, suffer poverty."

A second variant of statements included in this model combined various positive aspects of democracy with aspects seen as negative, but emphasised the latter or pointed out that the social group with which the respondents identified was underprivileged: "now you are free and poor," "there is freedom in democracy, you may say what you please and nobody will tell on you, but what do I care when my job is not secure and neither is the fate of my family," "democracy is freedom of speech and riches for some but for others it's lack of jobs."

Other comments on democracy. Other views voiced by the respondents that deserve mention are those which defined democracy simply by pointing to the current situation in Poland: "it's what we have here now," "I associate it with the present time," or even "I associate democracy with politics."

³³ In the questionnaire survey, this model appeared in the replies of 5 per cent of the respondents.

In addition to that, several respondents pointed to a Utopian nature of democracy: "it's some utopia," "something unreal, unattainable in practice." Asked about a theoretical definition of democracy, one respondent named "the freedom of speech, personal liberties." Another two workers spoke in a similar vein: "Democracy? In reality it does not exist," "democracy is possible but unrealistic."

While analysing the quantitative scope of statements included in individual models, we noted that democracy is not universally perceived as a procedure, a tool for attaining important goals, a road leading to those goals, the "fishing rod for catching fish," but as a system that should satisfy concrete important social, spiritual and material needs. In other words, for most respondents democracy is not so much the abolition of authoritarian socialist subjugation and the introduction of equal opportunities as the implementation of the socialist ideals of freedom and relative equality, not the opening of the road to prosperity (by abolishing the barriers posed by the command-and-quota economic system) but prosperity itself.

The attitude of some respondents can engender de facto anti-democratic sentiments despite verbal declarations of support for democracy. The reasoning goes that if there is no equality, justice or well-being, then there is no democracy or a false democracy.

The multiple meanings of the term democracy have been exploited in political battles. It is worth recalling here the very characteristic statements by Lech Wałęsa. He drew a picture of democracy that faithfully represented most of the models reconstructed above: "We have democracy but democracy can be good or bad, efficient or inefficient. If people cannot have more bread due to such democracy, then it means it is a bad democracy. If it is preoccupied with itself and not with solving the problems of the people, then it means that it is inefficient. (...) The problems that are most important for the Polish people remain stalled. There are no new apartments, unemployment refuses to fall, pensions cannot keep pace with inflation" (Wałęsa 1994).

There were some characteristic correlations between the various models of democracy and the economic-political orientations, which was confirmed by the study of the respondents to the standardised questionnaire. It turned out that the traditionalists associated democracy with freedom less often than the remaining respondents (50 per cent vs. 62 per cent of moderate reformers and 62 per cent of liberals) while they associated it more often with excessive differences and exploitation (traditionalists 10 per cent vs. 3 per cent of moderate reformers and no liberals at all). On the other hand one liberal out of every six associated democracy with parliamentary procedure, compared to one moderate reformer out of every fifteen and hardly any traditionalists. Besides, the liberals were less likely than others to associate democracy with equality (13 per cent, vs. 24 per cent of moderate reformers and 23 per cent of traditionalists). It is also worth noting the correlation between position and education and the perception of democracy as parliamentary process: this is how democracy was understood by 36 per cent of managers with university education, 16 per cent of foremen and technicians with secondary education, 9 per cent of skilled workers with secondary education,

4 per cent of skilled workers with basic vocational education and 1 per cent of unskilled workers with elementary education.

On the basis of an analysis of the socio-political system preferences and the workers' vision of democracy, it is possible to reconstruct the attitudes characteristic of each of the three economic-political orientations. Let us begin with preferences that are modal for the part of industrial working class that belongs to the moderately modernisational current. The industrial working class has its own vision of good socio-political procedures. The legislative arm, the parliament, should be composed of two parties, one representing labour ("us") and the other representing capital, the authorities, etc. ("them"). On important matters, the parliament should organise a referendum and leave the final decision to society. The executive arm should be strong, equipped with very broad powers and relatively independent of parliament. That arm, ideally one-man rule, should be periodically verified in general elections and there must be a permanent mechanism that would make it possible to "keep an eye on it." Such authorities should be building democracy understood as a system whose supreme values should be freedom in the broad sense, universal well-being, and equality, with the latter rather of a socialist than of a liberal nature (which, as demonstrated in previous chapters, does not signify a rejection of the market economy or capitalist institutions). If this modal vision were to be summed up in one sentence, it could be said that it proposes a system that is not far removed from populist democracy. This democracy is to be socialist and caring for the weak and market-oriented and capitalist for the strong individuals.

The supporters of the traditionalist and of the authoritarian approach for their part propose a model of an egalitarian and etatist economy and a restrictive socio-political system. This model of a well-ordered state ignores democratic parliamentary procedure and the party system, proposing instead some kind of corporatist state, in which a strong influence on important economic decisions would be exerted by organisations and institutions representing the interests of rank-and-file employees (trade unions, political organisations, the Church, etc.). The model also involves the introduction of strong one-man rule but some ideas of direct democracy are also accepted. It can be assumed that most traditionalists would be ready to accept the aforementioned idea of direct election of the head of state. Statistical analyses indicate that the traditionalist/authoritarian orientation is more cohesive than the moderately modernisational orientation. If I may venture a comment at this place, Poland must consider itself lucky that the traditionalist and authoritarian attitudes have rather limited appeal to the primary and secondary industrial working class.

Economic and socio-political liberalism is the exact opposite of traditionalism and authoritarian leanings. It appeals to open-minded people, who easily adapt to the new system, accept market economy along with the hardships that go with it without reservations and support parliamentary democracy. However, among the workers directly involved in the physical manufacture of goods, liberals were few and far between; they would be more likely to be found in the groups situated above the industrial working class.

4.5. Left vs. right, communism vs. anti-communism

There has been much discussion concerning the link between economic and socio-political views, ideological self-classification on the left-right scale, attitudes toward the previous system and actual voting behaviour. Studies carried out over the last few years by Boski (1993) and Żukowski (Gardawski, Żukowski 1994) indicate that the left-right dividing line has at least two dimensions. One of them refers to the views of the economy and political system while the other deals with such values as national tradition, the Church, the assessment of communism, etc. In the former case, left wing signifies support for monocentrism, etatism, egalitarianism, welfare state while right wing means support for the market, competition, liberalism, etc. In the latter case, leftism is associated with the dislike of national values, openness to the "neo-pagan" Europe, calls for limiting the role of the Church to religious matters, etc., while the right wing is associated with some form of conservatism, espousing of national or Catholic values, respect for the Church hierarchy, and so on. The differences within these two dimensions are not symmetrical, which means that it is possible to proclaim a left-wing programme in the economic sense and a right-wing programme in the ideological sense. Western studies referred to in the first part of this work point to workers' propensity to hold left-wing economic views and right-wing political opinions. In the case of Poland, the problem is further compounded by the current state of social consciousness (reinforced by many commentators), according to which the left- and right-wing notions are only associated with the ideological dimension. As a result, those who cherish left-wing economic views while also supporting national tradition are likely to call themselves "right-wingers" and categorically reject the suspicion that their views could be leftist in any regard.

Data from the surveys of industrial workers confirm these observations. In the 1992, 1993 and 1994 studies, between 14 and 22 per cent admitted to holding left-wing views, 17 to 20 per cent said they were right-wingers, 26–28 per cent saw themselves in the centre while between 33 and 42 per cent of the respondents did not openly subscribe to any ideological orientation. How did these views compare to the respondents' position and their actual views?

In keeping with ideological self-classification, managers and engineers with university degrees turned out to be more leftist than any other group: 54 per cent of them saw themselves on the left, 18 per cent in the centre and 18 per cent on the right (the rest were undecided), while skilled workers with secondary education placed farthest to the right (16 per cent said they were left-wingers, 30 per cent in the centre and 31 per cent on the right). Foremen with secondary education leaned toward the left pole while skilled workers with basic vocational education and unskilled workers with elementary school only drifted to the right. Among the unskilled, 22 per cent pointed to the right wing, 24 per cent to the left and 24 per cent to centre. This means that if one wanted to find a person regarding himself as a left-winger among industrial employees, he should be looking among those with a higher professional status, whereas a right-winger would more easily be found among the working class.

Economic orientations corresponded to ideological self-classification only in the case of economic liberals: 44 per cent of them considered themselves to be on the right wing while only 25 per cent of moderate reformers and 19 per cent of traditionalists saw themselves in that camp. In addition, 25 per cent of liberals and as many moderates considered themselves to be left-wingers while only 16 per cent of traditionalists classified their views as left-wing ones.

On the other hand socio-political orientations displayed a weak dependence of the following nature: the right-wingers showed a slightly stronger authoritarian inclination than left-wingers. For example, among the right-wingers, 20–22 per cent would accept restrictions of the freedom of speech for the opponents of the authorities and of Christian values, while the corresponding figure for the left wing was 12–13 per cent. Among the right-wingers, 54 per cent advocated strong one-man rule, but support for the idea among left-wingers was not much lower (47 per cent). There was a stronger bond between ideological self-classification and opinions on socialism, the appraisal of public support for “the Reds” and sympathies for political parties. However, even then the level of differences was lower than might have been expected.

In the surveys taken in the years 1991–94, the workers were asked whether “socialism” was a good idea and whether a better system would have been built, had it not been for the “distortions,” or was the idea utopian in itself (Table 18). The question was formulated in very general terms, the point being to check how deeply the slogan “yes to socialism, no to distortions” became rooted in the respondents’ memory and see what emotions surrounded the notion as such. It turned out that such a vaguely formulated notion of socialism aroused a positive reaction of about a half of all respondents.

TABLE 18. The idea of socialism as seen by workers (%).

Survey	Do you think socialism is:	
	a good idea, but it was being distorted all the time — had it not been for the distortions, a better system would have been built	a fundamentally impractical idea, one that cannot possibly be implemented
1991	40	60
1992	46	54
1993	51	49
1994	44	56

Respondents who gave no reply (there were 2 to 8% of them) were ignored in this table.
Sources: “Workers ’91” N = 2817, “Workers ’92” N = 1006, “Workers ’93” N = 988, “Workers ’94” N = 997.

In the 1994 survey, the highest level of acceptance of socialist ideals appeared at the opposite ends of the social scale, among engineers and managers with university degrees and among unskilled workers with only elementary education: 54 per cent in each group. The lowest level (39 per cent) was

recorded among skilled workers with secondary education. The biggest difference in the level of acceptance of socialist ideals occurred between the supporters of various economic orientations and between people with varying ideological self-classification. Socialism was supported by 57 per cent of traditionalists but only 28 per cent of liberals. Among the left-wingers, 60 per cent considered socialism a good idea, compared to 49 per cent of centrists and 33 per cent of right-wingers. It is worth noting that one third of both the self-proclaimed right-wingers and of the liberals reacted positively to the word “socialism.” Ideological disputes and the squaring of past accounts are low on industrial workers’ priority lists.

Asked if their fellow workers would welcome a return to the previous (“communist”) system, 20 per cent of the respondents answered in affirmative, 40 per cent say their colleagues would be unhappy with it while 40 per cent said the other workers did not care.

Ideological self-classification and appraisal of the past are not easy to interpret. On the basis of qualitative studies carried out in the years 1991–94 at the same time as the questionnaire surveys, we could suggest that the problem of ideological attitudes cannot be satisfactorily examined by way of standardised interviews. During the interviews, it sometimes turned out that the attitude to the past and the propensity to assess one’s own ideological attitude is determined by the respondents’ own biographies or with the experience of their relatives, not necessarily close ones. In order to obtain suitable information, it would be necessary to hold a relaxed conversation, conducive to retrospection, to identify and revive some latent states. There have been no systematic studies of this kind so it is only possible to draw loose conclusions. The dislike of “the Reds” among people of a low status, who did not benefit from the transition to market economy, was mainly rooted in resentments toward authoritarian socialist rule. Several sources of such resentments were encountered. The first and most frequently recurring one was the desire for a peculiar “revenge” for the lost chance of developing a family business (e.g., a respondent’s father, a tailor, was forced through arbitrary taxes to close down his shop and take a low-paying job in a state-owned pseudo-co-operative). The second motive was connected with memory of reprisals against some relative in the Stalinist period (e.g., for fighting in the “wrong” underground organisation during the war). Another reason, and evidence of the hypocrisy of the old system, was connected with the Church and some restrictions on religious practices and to Russian dominance and the servilism of official propaganda from the times of authoritarian socialism. Or yet another example: a worker with some on-the-job training, a functional illiterate, says in 1994 (after the election victory of SLD and PSL) that he supports Olszewski, the right wing, and hates communism. During a long conversation it turned out that the dislike stemmed from a tale told by his father, a poor peasant from the Mazovian region, harmed after the war by a neighbour, who “joined the Commies” and “could do whatever he wanted.” Such motives of dislike of the communists appeared in irregular patterns, difficult to analyse with the help of statistical tools.

CHAPTER 5.

Workers' view of trade unions and of the Church

Workers' attitudes to trade unions and to the Church were found to be important socio-political research problems. The choice of these issues followed from long-term qualitative studies conducted in the working-class milieu, during which the respondents consistently indicated that these matters were extremely important.

5.1. Trade unions in working-class milieu

During the interviews, the workers often asked why at present, in the 1990s, trade unions are so weak although only a short time ago, in 1980 and 1981, they had a great deal of power. In 1994, during the last representative survey, the matter was not brought up as often as in 1990 or 1991, but the nostalgia for the influential role of unions in the past was still there. The reason the workers gave most often for the current weakness of the unions was the lack of unity. The workers remembered the times of the "first" Solidarity as a period when there were no divisions, when "everything was one." But since the obtainment of full independence in 1989, that unity has evaporated. The workers tended to suspect conspiracy: "somebody divided us," "they divided us," or they described their own leaders as people who sacrificed unity for the sake of private gains and excessive ambitions: "those Bujaks and Kuroń had a row and each went his own way." Despite the fact that the great national unity of the years 1980–81 could not be repeated in a market economy and a democratic system, the respondents were undeniably right when they identified lack of unity as the reason for the present weakness of labour unions. Obviously, the workers could hardly be expected to realise that one of the factors contributing to the disintegration of their milieu were changes in the social consciousness and the emergence of strong ambivalent trends within that milieu itself. In addition, the aforementioned privatisation dissonance contributed to the attrition of the former solidarity.

The last decade of authoritarian socialist rule: workers and intelligentsia in trade unions

During the years 1980–81, a huge social group known as the "Solidarity class" appeared on the Polish social scene. The Solidarity movement institutional-

ised the division of Poles into the social camp, or "us," and the authorities, or "them." In the authoritarian socialist environment, this propensity to divide the society into two opposed camps — well known to sociologists studying the mentality of traditionalist workers and described in detail by David Lockwood (1966) — became characteristic of the thinking not only of the workers but of most social groups. Kurczewski (1990) observed that on "our" side there were as many members of the intelligentsia as workers.

Although in the years 1980–81 there were three trade union federations in Poland (in addition to Solidarity there were the branch unions and the small "autonomous" unions), Solidarity alone represented the social camp in the broad sense. The branch unions, associated with Albin Siwak, the communist party's "anti-Wałęsa," were seen as a representation of the authorities.

The division of the unions into "ours" and "theirs" was evident both in their leaderships and—albeit with less intensity—among rank-and-file members. Numerous earlier studies have demonstrated that Solidarity membership was not related to any characteristic pattern of demographic, social or professional features deviating from the national average, the only exceptions being the below-average percentage of Solidarity members among communist party members and people holding senior managerial posts. A different situation prevailed in branch unions, whose members displayed special characteristics, with an overrepresentation of people in higher positions and a higher degree of loyalty toward the system than was displayed by the average Polish employee.

The situation changed after the imposition of martial law. When Solidarity went underground, its presence in the working-class milieu began to diminish, while union structures began to develop among the intelligentsia, especially experts working for the "first" Solidarity and people engaged in illegal publishing activities. On the basis of information collected through interviews with workers it is possible to reconstruct the process of Solidarity's erosion. Secret police and enterprise managers identified members of the banned union who were active at factory level and either had them interned or tried to isolate them from workers and prevent them from collecting union dues. Dues collections were discredited in various ways. In the enterprises in which this operation was carried out, the authorities on several occasions managed to get the workers to stop trusting the persons who "passed around the hat" to raise money for the underground union. For example, they spread rumours that a given activist had used the money to buy new furniture for his home. The discontinuation of collections meant the end of Solidarity as an institution. However, the memory of the fund-raising drives remained: in Warsaw factories, formerly active Solidarity members gave the pseudonyms of their enterprises under which they were listed in the underground publication *Tygodnik Mazowsze* as contributors.

The erosion of the Solidarity underground in the working-class milieu was accompanied by the authorities' efforts to install structures of the official OPZZ-affiliated unions. There were many reports of pressure being exerted on

management members (especially foremen) to join the OPZZ unions. There was also pressure on newly hired workers and the luring of new members with promises of loans and grants, etc. In the early 1980s, one's membership or non-membership in the officially sanctioned unions was reflected to some extent in workers' opinions, as was documented in studies carried out by Witold Morawski and Bogdan Cichomski in 1983 and 1984. It turned out that the attitude to economic problems was influenced not so much by an employee's position, measured by stratification variables, as by his political and cultural experience (especially membership of organisations). Another characteristic dependence was noted at that time: the persons who declared their loyalty to the system (confirmed, among other things, by their membership in an OPZZ-affiliated union), were less likely to support economic reforms and were more conservative, while the modernisation of the country was more often supported by people opposed to the socialist system (Cichomski 1986).

From the moment the OPZZ trade union federation was established, statistically significant differences could be detected between OPZZ members and persons who did not join those unions and were previously Solidarity members. It is worth noting that in the mid-1980s, persons who continued to identify with the "first" Solidarity displayed a lower level of approval of authoritarian rule than did persons who disliked the original union (Koralewicz-Zębik 1986, p. 430).

It is worth noting the difference between the working-class milieu and the intelligentsia. The surveys demonstrated that, in the years 1986-89, the consequences of belonging to the "first" Solidarity were different for the intelligentsia than for workers. First of all, for a member of the intelligentsia, past membership of the "first" Solidarity (or, to be exact, declaration to this effect in research questionnaires) was clearly correlated with subsequent trade union membership. Among the workers, this was not the case. For example, a 1986 survey of workers showed that Solidarity membership before martial law had no influence on subsequent membership in OPZZ-affiliated unions. The proportion of former Solidarity members among the members of OPZZ unions was the same as among workers who did not join the new unions ($V_{\text{Cramer}} = 0.02$) (Gardawski, Gilejko, Żukowski 1994, p. 59). Among the intelligentsia, the situation was fundamentally different. We can refer at this point to the findings of a study of economists who attended a congress of graduates of the Central School of Planning and Statistics (SGPiS) in 1986. If a graduate declared that he was a Solidarity member in 1980-81, it was a safe bet that he did not hold a managerial position in 1986, was not member of the Communist party (often as a result of turning in his party card after 1980) and was not an OPZZ member. On the other hand, SGPiS graduates who joined the OPZZ unions were usually directors and party members and in 1980-81 were members of the branch unions ($V_{\text{Cramer}} = 0.58$). In the case of SGPiS graduates, OPZZ affiliation significantly influenced other indices, while in the case of workers that influence was small.

While analysing statistical data obtained in surveys taken in the 1980s it should be borne in mind that owing to many diverse factors, some persons falsely claimed that they had been members of "first" Solidarity while others falsely denied such membership (Sulek 1990, pp. 62-69). The information collected in the surveys presented here were probably less likely to be falsified than data from individual interviews taken by pollsters because they were conducted with the use of auditorium techniques and the method of compiling the questionnaires guaranteed the respondents' anonymity.

TABLE 19. Respondents' 1986 declarations concerning their membership of labour unions in 1980-81 and of trade unions and the Communist party at the time of the survey (%).

Union membership in 1980-81:	
1. Solidarity	49
2. Branch unions	5
3. Autonomous unions	(0.2%)
4. Was not member of any union (or N/A)	46
Total	100
Union membership at the time of taking the survey (December 1986):	
A. Involvement in Solidarity or related organisations:	
1. Solidarity members from 1980-81 who did not join the OPZZ unions	34
2. Solidarity members from 1980-81 who joined OPZZ unions	14
3. Did not belong to Solidarity in 1980-81 (or N/A)	52
Total	100
B. Involvement in OPZZ or Communist party (PZPR):	
1. Members of both OPZZ and PZPR	9
2. OPZZ members who were not PZPR members	19
3. PZPR members who did not join OPZZ	5
4. Does not belong to OPZZ or PZPR (or N/A)	67
Total	100
Sources: „Workers '86," N = 533.	

The fact that workers with a record of Solidarity membership were joining OPZZ unions affected the composition of the latter. Distinct circles of "party unionists" (i.e., those carrying both the party and the OPZZ card) and "non-party unionists" emerged among OPZZ members. The largest group of workers, however, were those with no union affiliation and "non-party unionists." The latter enjoyed a rather low status and they were also more traditionalist (in the sense of distrust of economic reforms and attachment to welfare state institutions). Table 19 contains 1986 declarations regarding union membership collected in six large enterprises. The respondents were asked not only about membership at the time of the survey being taken but also about their membership of labour and political organisations in the years 1980-81.

Unionisation of Polish industrial working class in 1991-94

Support for OPZZ unions is steadily eroding in the industrial working-class milieu, and between 1991 and 1994 it slipped by 4 percentage points. Solidarity lost plenty of members in the initial period of economic transition, between 1991 and 1992, but has held ground since, actually recording slight gains.

TABLE 20. Respondents' declarations regarding trade union membership in 1991-94 (%).

Union membership	Year of survey			
	1991	1992	1993	1994
Solidarity	34	25	26	28
OPZZ	23	23	20	19
Solidarity '80	—	2	2	3
Other labour unions	—	3	8	1
No union membership or N/A	43	47	44	49
Total	100	100	100	100

Sources: "Robotnicy '91" N = 2817, "Robotnicy '92" N = 1006, "Robotnicy '93" N = 988, "Robotnicy '94" N = 997.

While in 1992 the difference between Solidarity and OPZZ was under 2 points, by 1994 the gap widened to 9 points in favour of Solidarity. Studies and observations made in subsequent years indicate that the growth of the number of Solidarity members and drop in the number of members of OPZZ unions among workers directly involved in the physical manufacture of goods is a constant phenomenon. This indicates that Solidarity is assuming the character of a workers' union. The above figures correspond to the findings of other studies of the unionisation of the Polish work force (Cf. Pańkow 1993, pp. 141-145).

"Second" Solidarity

The distinction between "first" and "second" Solidarity is frequently made in scientific studies and political writing nowadays. Studies demonstrate that the distinction is justified for a number of reasons. The new character of Solidarity is mainly due to the fact that the social and cultural foundations of the union, created by authoritarian socialist rule, have disintegrated, while rather deep cracks have appeared among industrial workers, separating the lower stratum of unskilled labourers from the working class proper and from professionals, mostly managers and engineers. Today, a Solidarity branch in an industrial enterprise organises blue-collar rather than white-collar workers, and the majority of the members are skilled workers with basic vocational education.

By the late 1980s, analysts were asking whether the re-legalisation of Solidarity would result in the return of those workers who belonged to the

"first" Solidarity but joined OPZZ unions later (especially the numerous unionists with no party affiliation). Some researchers assumed that the OPZZ would disintegrate and share the fate of branch unions in the years 1980-81; i.e., that only representatives of management and supervisors would stay, while rank-and-file members would move to Solidarity. However, these expectations proved wrong. OPZZ unions have survived. Non-party unionists did not desert them for Solidarity, and half of the workers who had belonged to the "first" Solidarity and did not join the OPZZ unions between 1982 and 1989 did not return to the reborn Solidarity.

The fate of Solidarity and OPZZ after 1989 was determined by many factors. One of the most important of them was the wait-and-see attitude of the workers themselves, who were not sure if Solidarity would indeed turn out to be the union they used to know. The next factor responsible for a change in Solidarity's status was the policy of the union's leadership and especially of Lech Wałęsa, who did not really seek to rebuild powerful trade unions in huge industrial enterprises. While accepting responsibility for the country in 1989, the Solidarity team was aware that there was a fundamental contradiction between a powerful mass labour movement organising the majority of workers of Poland's huge industrial plants on the one hand and the plans for the modernisation of the country and restructuring of the main branches of industry on the other. That "restructuring" is a euphemism which translates first and foremost into the painful operation of closing down loss-making enterprises and slashing redundant jobs. A strong labour movement with mass membership could prevent the authorities from embarking on the "thorny road back to capitalism." This is why the authorities actually tried to slow down the growth of Solidarity ranks. The third reason why the union did not grow as fast as some people expected was the tendency of some of the leaders to seek to "square past accounts." The original Solidarity was a mass movement in which nobody was asked where he was coming from, but the "second" Solidarity was being built with an air of suspiciousness around it: the local Solidarity leaderships, especially when made up of people who weathered the victimisation of martial law, were not well disposed toward people who "did not pass the test" and "betrayed" their union by joining OPZZ.

The matter that determined the fate of Solidarity and of the industrial working class was Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki's 1989 decision to entrust economic power to Leszek Balcerowicz, who in turn decided that there was going to be no "third way," i.e., no genuine participation of employees in ownership and management, no development of self-management institutions, no copying of American experiences of the ESOP variety, and so on. This was a rejection of many forms of social life developed earlier, including the elements that are sometimes referred to as the "ethos of the 'first' Solidarity."

Leszek Balcerowicz's policy was rational from the economic point of view but its psychological and material costs were high. On the other hand, surveys have shown that the majority of the people, workers included, considered the Balcerowicz reforms inevitable. This is indirectly confirmed by the continued

presence of the moderately modernisational orientation in the working-class milieu, the prevailing privatisation dissonance and various other forms of ambivalence, as well as the relatively high marks the workers give to the "Balcerowicz plan" a number of years later.

Nevertheless, the acknowledgement of the inevitability of changes need not be tantamount to their moral acceptance. For a time it was the Solidarity activists who were most fiercely criticised by workers: their colleagues from the factories blamed them for their accelerating impoverishment. Before long, such charges began to be countered with a stereotyped explanation: it was not the workers' Solidarity that was to blame, it was the new "they," the experts, specialists in putting people at loggerheads, the "revived nomenklatura," etc. It was "they" who cheated "the working people." Later, thanks to SLD's election victories, people began to reconstruct the old picture of the enemy, the nomenklatura from the times of authoritarian socialist rule.

As can be seen, there were many reasons why the "second" Solidarity began to become a workers' labour union in industrial enterprises. This "relegation" of Solidarity to lower-placed groups of employees could also be observed in other milieus, e.g., in higher education.

In the years 1989-93, Solidarity went through a deep identity crisis. Now it is beginning to shape its own programme, which is a new offer for Polish employees, for the lower class. Solidarity has announced its plans to create a new egalitarian petty bourgeois class in Poland. The idea is based on the assumption that, thanks to the mass privatisation programme, among other things, it will be possible to transform most employees into petty owners, turn them into a middle class, and extricate them from social deprivation (there is actually talk of transforming 60 to 70 per cent of the society into such a class). This plan also assumes the existence of a friendly market economy of a kind that might be described as moderately modernisational. This socio-economic programme is accompanied by an ideological platform which the union itself defines as a right-wing one (it incorporates Christian values, nationalism, independence, and anti-communist elements).

It remains an open question whether Solidarity's programme can integrate the whole milieu of present union members and attract employees who have not joined the union so far. Nevertheless, Solidarity is now really finding its own "third way" after all those years, even if the chances of its implementation are now incomparably smaller than they were in 1989. It should be noted, moreover, that in 1989 Solidarity was not yet a trade union in which workers played the first fiddle.

OPZZ after the transition

The All-Poland Trades Union Federation (OPZZ) embraces two groups of employees: the former "party unionists," i.e., the elite of their organisations, and the non-party unionists, most of whom stayed in the OPZZ unions and did not

move or return to Solidarity after 1989. Generally speaking, OPZZ membership included more workers in lower supervisory posts and more elderly people; it was less of a workers' union than the renascent Solidarity. As will be demonstrated below, although the social and demographic differences between OPZZ and Solidarity members became less pronounced, significant differences between the two remained all the same.

OPZZ was and remains a visibly weaker trade union federation than Solidarity if that strength is measured by the degree of identification of rank-and-file members with their organisation, the ability to devise programmes, or the activity of its leadership in defence of working people.

It looks as though OPZZ has been experiencing bigger problems than Solidarity since the SLD-PSL coalition took over power and more than fifty of its representatives were elected to the Sejm (on the SLD ticket) in 1993. In contrast to Solidarity, which has a programme of its own and tries to find its own "third way," OPZZ lacks a programme it could call its own. Paradoxically, those nominally "leftist" trade unions show greater approval of Poland's present-day liberal capitalism the nominally "centre-right" Solidarity. This must be due to OPZZ's heavy dependence on the Social Democratic Party (SdRP), which is its main political partner.

Lacking its own programme, OPZZ is forced to use the concepts developed by the SdRP (or at least to accept them passively). The SdRP for its part is a party whose programme does not currently pay too much attention to the interests of employees. Before coming to power, its leaders strongly emphasised the participation of employees in management, the development of worker self-management, and a social market economy with leftist overtones, but shortly before the September 1993 parliamentary elections and in subsequent years the tenor of its leaders' statements changed. There was an evident redefinition of SdRP's programme goals, with the expression "social market economy" being replaced by "democratic market economy."

The young SdRP leaders have never borne the stigma of Marxist-Leninist ideology nor have they ever called themselves "communists" and for that matter, hardly anybody referred to them that way before 1989. They expressly proclaim that they are building a party not only for today's employees, moulded in the "communist" period, but first of all for those who will only emerge with the development of normal capitalist relations, get their social education in a liberal economy and become "modern employees." With such an approach, inside the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) itself, the unions, representing the "anachronistic" milieu of employees shaped in People's Poland, had about as little to say as Solidarity had when its representatives held seats in the previous Sejm.

It should be remembered that senior OPZZ activists were shaped in the times of authoritarian socialist rule and were often members of the Establishment in the past. Most of them display what might be called an internalised pro-state point of view (they will not oppose the government); additionally, they represent union members whose attitude is more conformist than that of Solidarity members.

Differences in socio-demographic composition of Solidarity and OPZZ unionists (1991 and 1994)

The two largest trade union federations differed considerably in terms of the socio-demographic composition of their membership both in 1991 and at the end of 1994. Table 21 indicates that the average level of education of Solidarity members was somewhat lower than in OPZZ and they occupied a lower position in their enterprises. Both unions lost some members with university degrees between 1991 and 1994. It is worth noting that among those who declared that they were in Solidarity in 1980-81 there were relatively many foremen and technicians. However, only a fifth of them decided to return to the reborn Solidarity while the majority stayed outside trade unions. Additionally, the people with university degrees who had belonged to the "first" Solidarity did not join the "second" one.

In 1991, members of trade unions, both OPZZ and Solidarity, were characterised by a higher degree of education, position and incomes (especially in OPZZ) than workers on the average. Three years later, the averages for the two unions got closer to the national average, although the indices of status remained higher in OPZZ than in Solidarity. Therefore there are grounds for speaking about the intellectual impoverishment of trade unions, especially Solidarity.

TABLE 21. Solidarity and OPZZ members according to demographic and social and professional characteristics in 1991 and 1994 (%).

Characteristic		Solidarity		OPZZ	
		1991	1994	1991	1994
1. Gender	male	79	81	72	69
	female	21	19	28	31
2. Age	under 29	14	18	5	11
	30-39	39	41	32	36
	40-49	37	33	45	40
	50 and above	10	8	18	13
3. Educationel	ementary	15	21	14	22
	basic vocational	47	57	38	46
	secondary	36	21	42	28
	university	2	1	6	4
4. Position	manager	1	1	5	3
	foreman, technician	7	5	17	13
	skilled worker	79	81	63	72
	unskilled worker	13	13	15	12
N/A replies were omitted Source: "Workers '91" N = 2817 and "Workers '94" N = 997					

It might be added that among factory-level union leaders, the differences between the two unions were much more pronounced: OPZZ activists were older than Solidarity activists, better educated, often employed in middle management and earned more. Solidarity activists were also above the average level of their members but the gap was smaller than in OPZZ; in other words, Solidarity factory-level activists were closer to their members.

5.2. Economic and political views of Solidarity and OPZZ members

The narrowing of the social and professional gap between Solidarity and OPZZ members was reflected in the gradually increasing similarity of their views about a well-ordered economy. There remain, however, some disparities in the political and ideological field, although they too are becoming markedly smaller.

Visions of a well-ordered economy

In the latter half of the 1980s, surveys indicated the prevalence of modernisational attitudes among people declaring an attachment to the "first" Solidarity and of relatively conservative views and reluctance to accept changes among OPZZ members. However, this picture also contained some fine differences inside the OPZZ unions. Those of their members who belonged to PZPR ("party unionists") were admittedly opposed to privatisation and in favor of maintaining the state monopoly of the economy, but they also called for "restoring discipline" in the economy, eliminating inefficiency, etc. On the other hand, the OPZZ members with no party affiliation, especially those who had joined the "first" Solidarity, were among the staunchest enemies of any changes in the economy. By contrast, the workers who declared that they had joined the "first" Solidarity and in the late 1980s were neither OPZZ nor PZPR members supported radical economic reforms, privatisation, and so forth. At the same time, the figures indicated that the most modernisational-minded workers entertained few fears concerning the social costs of reforms, e.g., unemployment. This means that an optimistic vision of reforms dominated in this milieu.

The division into economic reformers from Solidarity and conservatives from OPZZ came out strongly in the 1986 and 1988 surveys but began to disappear fast after 1989. Already in 1990, the difference in support for the reforms among rank-and-file members of Solidarity and OPZZ unions was markedly smaller, and in 1991 and subsequent years the views of those unionists were increasingly similar. Only some ownership questions still divided the members of the two unions, whereas the attitudes toward competition, direct state involvement in running enterprises, unemployment and layoffs, private crafts, employee stock ownership and self-management, which had divided them before 1990, were now shared by both groups.

It could also be seen that starting with 1991, the differences concerned only support for some isolated economic principles whereas they no longer applied to economic consciousness orientations (i.e., combined support for whole bundles of syndromatic principles). The proportion of moderate reformers, traditionalists and liberals was the same among Solidarity and OPZZ members.

Visions of well ordered socio-political system

The vision of a well-ordered socio-political system cherished by Solidarity members did not differ from the expectations of OPZZ members. There were no differences with regard to such important issues as the number of parties, direct versus indirect (parliamentary) democracy, general support for the freedom of speech, the understanding of the notion of "democracy," etc.

As I mentioned before, there were some differences in the attitude to authoritarian rule between the two unions. Solidarity members turned out to be somewhat more authoritarian than OPZZ members when choosing some principles, although, on the other hand, fewer of them agreed with the view that the worst fraud should be punishable with death. At any rate, the differences were not big, and did not exceed 8–10 percentage points. According to statistical analyses carried out on the basis of the findings of the 1994 survey (multiple regression models, the details of which are omitted in this study), however, the somewhat more authoritarian attitudes of Solidarity members should be attributed to the slightly lower educational status of Solidarity members rather than to membership of that union as such.

It can certainly be said that, save for some nuances, Solidarity and OPZZ members had highly similar visions of a well-ordered economic and socio-political system. This means that the fairly deep divisions between the two unions in the last years of authoritarian socialist rule have disappeared. Comparative analysis made in the years 1991–94 show that the differences are less and less pronounced.

Ideological self-classification of union members vs. their economic and political views

Despite similar views on the economy and the socio-political system, there are ideological differences between the members of the two unions. Here the differences are also eroding, but at a much slower pace than in the case of economic views. It should also be added that while the authoritarian leanings of Solidarity members are not tied to membership in that union, the regression models prove that ideological declarations depend directly on union membership.

In each survey, Solidarity members declared a stronger dislike of the symbols of really existing socialism, including the word "socialism" itself, than OPZZ members. However, it is worth drawing attention to two phenomena. Until 1993, the level of support for "socialism" treated in general terms continued

to grow at a considerable pace, also among Solidarity members. This tendency was reversed after 1993 and support fell back slightly to the 1992 level. Besides, the difference in the level of support for socialism among the members of the two trade union federations, which amounted to 20 percentage points in 1991, fell to 7 points in 1993 before rising slightly again in 1994 (Table 22).

TABLE 22. Support for general socialist ideals in the years 1991–94 among Solidarity and OPZZ members (%).

Groups of respondents		Socialism is a good idea and, had it not been for the distortions, a better system would have been built
1991	All workers embraced by survey	40
	OPZZ members	52
	Solidarity members	32
1992	All workers embraced by survey	47
	OPZZ members	52
	Solidarity members	42
1993	All workers embraced by survey	51
	OPZZ members	58
	Solidarity members	50
1994	All workers embraced by survey	45
	OPZZ members	52
	Solidarity members	42
Sources: "Workers '91" N = 2817; "Workers '92" N = 1006; "Workers '93" N = 988; "Workers '94" N = 997.		

As for the respondents as a whole, the declarations of right-wing sympathies among Solidarity members and of left-wing sympathies among OPZZ members (Table 23) were not reflected in their economic views or visions of socio-political system. The extreme groups were isolated from all the respondents in the 1994 survey: the Solidarity members who described themselves as right-wingers (9 per cent of the total number of respondents) and OPZZ members who labelled themselves as left-wingers (7 per cent). It turned out that there were only slight differences between the two groups in terms of economic orientations: 63 per cent of the right-wingers and 59 per cent of the left-wingers were moderate reformers; 9 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively, were traditionalists, 9 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively, were liberals and 20 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively, gave inconsistent replies.

The differences in the visions of a well-ordered socio-political system of these two extreme groups were somewhat bigger but still they did not depart greatly from the averages for both trade unions groups. For example, strong one-man rule would be welcomed by 57 per cent of Solidarity members with right-wing views and 43 per cent of OPZZ members with leftist sympathies, a difference of 14 points, whereas the gap between members of the two unions as a whole was 10 points.

TABLE 23. Self-classification of political views by Solidarity and OPZZ members in the years 1991-1994 (%).

Groups of respondents		Self-classification of political views			
		Left	Centre	Right	None
1991	All workers surveyed	20	41	29	10
	Solidarity members	14	38	42	6
	OPZZ members	30	41	21	8
1992	All workers surveyed	14	26	20	40
	Solidarity members	10	21	31	38
	OPZZ members	26	25	16	33
1993	All workers surveyed	17	28	17	38
	Solidarity members	12	33	30	25
	OPZZ members	30	23	20	27
1994	All workers surveyed	22	26	16	36
	Solidarity members	16	27	33	24
	OPZZ members	37	24	11	28

Sources: "Workers '91" N = 2817; "Workers '92" N = 1006; "Workers '93" N = 988; "Workers '94" N = 997

TABLE 24. Appraisal of communist past by members of Solidarity and OPZZ unions (%).

Groups of respondents	To what degree are PZPR and communists to blame for economic problems and the hardships experienced by the people?		
	To a big degree	To a small degree	Hard to say
All workers	56	31	13
Solidarity members as a whole	68	21	11
Solidarity members who termed themselves as right-wingers	85	1	14
OPZZ members as a whole	45	39	16
OPZZ members who termed themselves as left-wingers	35	57	8
	What most of your colleagues at work think about a return of communism		
	They are against	They don't care and hard to say	They want such a return
All workers	40	39	21
Solidarity members as a whole	50	34	16
Solidarity members who termed themselves as right-wingers	62	33	5
OPZZ members as a whole	30	45	25
OPZZ members who termed themselves as left-wingers	23	47	30

Source: "Workers '94" N = 997.

It is therefore possible, with some reservations, to repeat a conclusion proposed earlier, namely that in 1994 not only Solidarity members as a whole and OPZZ members as a whole had a similar vision of a well-ordered economy and a well-ordered socio-political system, but also that there were no fundamental differences between the "extreme" groups of right-wingers in the Solidarity camp and OPZZ members with clearly leftist views.

It turned out, however, that the workers' right- or left-wing leanings are reflected in their attitude toward religion and toward the Church and the attitude toward socialist ideals and the term "communists" (Table 24). The members identifying themselves with the right-wing political orientation are resolute opponents of Soviet-type socialism and communist symbols and fairly frequently declare support for the Church. The left-wingers take a kinder view of the socialist past and would like to see the influence of the Church curtailed. It should be noted, however, that these differences do not in any way affect the declarations about faith in God. It turns out that 96 per cent of right-wing members of Solidarity and 96 per cent of left-wing OPZZ members consider themselves very religious or moderately religious people.

5.3. Views about trade unions as representatives of employees' interests

The special political and ideological role of Poland's main trade union federations and their mutual opposition poses the important problem of the role of those unions as representation of employees. Doesn't the political involvement overshadow the unions' role as defenders and representatives of the interests of labour? And, most important, what do the workers themselves think about it?

In Table 25, which shows the distribution of replies to the question "Who represents workers' interests in your enterprise best?," it is worth drawing attention to the following matters: only a minority of both OPZZ and Solidarity members believed that their own union is a good representative of workers' interests in the enterprise. Besides (with the exception of Solidarity members in the autumn of 1993), the proportion of unionists who declared on each occasion that "nobody represents employees' interests well" was always bigger than the proportion of those who pointed to their own union as such good representative. If these figures are compared to the findings of comparative analyses from the years 1986-1994 (Gardawski, Gilejko, Żukowski 1994, p. 77), it can be said that in the opinion of the average employee of a state enterprise in the closing years of authoritarian socialism, the officially-sanctioned unions (the OPZZ) did their job better than the unions active at present, especially in comparison to the present-day OPZZ unions.

Despite the fact that the leaders of none of the unions can be happy with the marks received from rank-and-file members, there is a huge difference

between the proportion of good opinions about the representation of worker interests in Solidarity and OPZZ. Almost twice as many Solidarity members as OPZZ members approved the performance of their union as defender of workers' interests (31 to 39 per cent positive appraisals of their own organisations by Solidarity members versus 15–20 per cent among OPZZ members).

A partial confirmation of this observation can be found in the fact that OPZZ members more often viewed Solidarity as a good representative of workers' interests than the other way round. Between 5 and 9 per cent of OPZZ members approved of Solidarity while only 1 to 3 per cent of Solidarity members approved of OPZZ unions. However, it is difficult to interpret this difference in an unequivocal way. It must be remembered that on the whole OPZZ is more tolerant of Solidarity than vice versa (this is borne out also by other findings of the surveys).

A growth of the role of Solidarity can be seen with respect to workers' views on the representation of their interests on the national scale (Table 26). They believed and continue to believe that this representation is inadequate, yet Solidarity is the only institution whose rating as representative of workers' interests has been improving with every passing year. In 1991, this view was voiced by 12 per

TABLE 25. Institutions regarded as representation of employees' interests in enterprises in the years 1991–94 (%).

Groups of respondents		Who represents workers' interests in your enterprise best*?				
		Solidarity	OPZZ	Management	Employee council**	Nobody does it well
1991	All workers surveyed	14	7	15	7	56
	Solidarity members	31	1	11	5	50
	OPZZ members	5	15	15	8	53
1992	All workers surveyed	18	7	18	—	48
	Solidarity members	36	1	15	—	42
	OPZZ members	7	18	20	—	49
1993	All workers surveyed	16	7	17	10	44
	Solidarity members	35	3	13	6	43
	OPZZ members	7	20	17	10	40
1994	All workers surveyed	18	6	15	13	39
	Solidarity members	36	1	12	11	33
	OPZZ members	9	18	17	12	35

* Several variants of replies, accounting between themselves for 4–5 per cent of the total number of respondents, were ignored in the table. They were: „Another union,” „Supervisory Council,” „Somebody else, who?,” „Hard to say” and „Don't know.” For this reason the percentages in rows do not add up to 100.0

** In 1992, employees' councils were not included in the questionnaire in order to see if workers would mention them in reply to the open-ended question „Somebody else, who?” But if any institution was mentioned, it was of a political nature (e.g., Confederation for an Independent Poland).

Source: „Workers '91” N = 2817; „Workers '92” N = 1006; „Workers '93” N = 988; „Workers '94” N = 997.

TABLE 26. Institutions regarded as representatives of employee interests in Poland in the years 1991–94 (%).

Groups of respondents		Who represents the interests of all the workers of the country best*?					
		Government	Sejm, Senate	President	Solidarity	OPZZ	No one
1991	All workers surveyed	3	3	4	12	5	68
	Solidarity members	4	2	6	—	2	61
	OPZZ members	3	3	2	5	13	72
1992	All workers surveyed	4	3	4	16	7	59
	Solidarity members	4	1	5	33	2	53
	OPZZ members	3	3	3	14	16	53
1993	All workers surveyed	3	2	4	17	6	65
	Solidarity members	4	2	5	29	2	57
	OPZZ members	5	1	4	12	16	60
1994	All workers surveyed	5	5	1	25	6	54
	Solidarity members	4	3	1	25	6	54
	OPZZ members	5	6	—	12	14	59

* Several variants of replies, accounting between themselves for 2–8 per cent of all respondents, were ignored in the above table. These included: „The Church,” „Another union,” „Somebody else. Who?,” „Hard to say” and „Don't know.” As a result, the percentages in individual rows do not add up to 100.

Sources: „Workers '91” N = 2817; „Workers '92” N = 1006; „Workers '93” N = 988; „Workers '94” N = 997 surveys.

cent of all respondents, while by 1994 that proportion increased to 25 per cent. It is worth noting that in the latter year, almost as many OPZZ members saw the best defender of workers' interests in Solidarity as saw it in their own union (12 per cent vs. 14 per cent).

To conclude the presentation of the problem of representation of workers' interests, it might be noted that there were very many respondents pointing to the lack of such representation (between 53 and 72 per cent). The analyses of figures from the previous years indicated the appearance of a peculiar „syndrome of a deserted society” in workers' moods (Gardawski, Żukowski 1994, p. 85).

5.4. Industrial workers' attitude toward strikes

The inclusion of the attitude of workers toward strikes among the subjects of the survey followed from two premises: a theoretical one, connected with the characteristics of the working class, and a practical, political one. Although strikes were frequent in the 1990s, Solidarity was unable — despite great efforts — to organise a single strike of a nationwide or regional nature.

This is an indication that the Polish industrial working class has undergone a transformation. To use notions peculiar to British sociology, there are grounds for hypothesizing a certain instrumentalisation of worker mentality and the appearance of a "pecuniary" method of modelling the picture of society. Workers sometimes stated in interviews (especially ones conducted in 1994) that the employees of prosperous enterprises would not join strikes. Another line of thinking that began to appear both among ordinary workers and factory-level union leaders, namely that there are certain areas in the Polish industrial landscape in which strikes can be organised and can be successful and other areas in which strikes are doomed to fail right from the start and can turn against the strikers (all of private industry and all small enterprises). The hypothesis about the instrumentalisation of working-class mentality does not appear to be the only key to analysing the strike actions of the 1990s. When strikes do erupt in inflammable spots of the economy, they result in some collective behaviour, some symptoms of solidarity. Additionally, strikes easily assume political overtones that are rightist in ideological terms and leftist in terms of institutional and economic expectations (Ursus, mining regions). So perhaps the instrumentalism of the working class is only skin-deep and underneath it there is a propensity to collectivist behaviour that is stronger than might be expected but cannot be uncovered in the course of surveys taken with the use of questionnaire methods?

General strike vs. local strikes: the strike climate

When we compare the findings of four successive representative surveys of workers from the years 1991–94, it turns out that the views about the inevitability of local strikes and a general strike form a sine curve. If we look just at the firm opinions about strikes being inevitable, we can see that from 1991 to 1992 the expectation of strikes was falling, while in 1993 it began to climb (although it plunged briefly immediately after the SLD-PSL election victory), only to fall again in 1994 (Table 27). The curve of views about local strikes being inevitable fluctuated between 28 and 47 per cent while the curve illustrating the views about an inevitable general strike moved between 12 and 20 per cent.

The respondents were also asked if they would join a strike in their own enterprise or a general strike. In 1991, 12 per cent of workers said they would definitely support both a factory-level and a general strike. In 1993, the proportion of "strike-ready" workers rose to 19 per cent, but a year later was down to 13 per cent. It should be added that the "strike-ready" workers constituted the hard core of a wider group of respondents who said they would "probably" join in either type of strike (that proportion ranged from 44 to 55 per cent in various years). These figures could be cautiously interpreted as evidence of a relatively level of declared readiness to strike (using the relative number of people decidedly prepared to strike as a point of reference).

TABLE 27. Strike climate in the years 1991–94 (%).

Year of survey	Are further local strikes against government economic policies:				
	Inevitable	Very likely	Unlikely	Impossible	Hard to say
1991	47	44	4	4	1
1992	28	57	11	1	3
1993	40	44	11	2	3
1994	30	45	20	3	2
Year of survey	Is a general strike against government economic policies:				
	Inevitable	Very likely	Unlikely	Impossible	Hard to say
1991	20	51	24	4	1
1992	12	47	33	4	4
1993	20	55	22	2	1
1994	13	41	39	6	1

Sources: "Workers '91" N = 2817; "Workers '92" N = 1006; "Workers '93" N = 988; "Workers '94" N = 997.

It was important to determine who feels ready to strike and to see if there are some classes of respondents that were particularly susceptible to strike sentiments. An analysis of the 1994 figures confirmed earlier conclusions. It turned out that some vocational characteristics accompany a reluctance to strike. For example, only 30 per cent of technicians and foremen would join both a local or a general strike and only 4 per cent would "definitely" do so. The corresponding indices for skilled workers were 67 and 15 per cent respectively; unskilled workers' responses were practically the same. Analyses carried out at this level demonstrated that the situation prevailing in a given enterprise was decisive in this regard. There were enterprises in which fewer than 20 per cent of the employees were ready to strike (and only several per cent were absolutely sure about it), but there were also some in which 85 per cent of the respondents said they would join a strike and 50 per cent said they would "definitely" do so. Such differences also occurred between various regions (voivodeships). There were some voivodeships in which "moderate" or "definite" readiness to strike was voiced by only 25 per cent of the respondents and others in which such readiness was voiced by 80 per cent of the workers surveyed.

Generally speaking, the studies from the years 1991–94 suggested that expectation of, and support for, strikes was declining. Workers increasingly preferred negotiations and compromise to strikes (Table 28). When asked in 1994 about the most effective form of defence of workers' interests on a national scale, most of the respondents chose negotiations between the unions and the government and only 18 per cent pointed to strikes. In addition, the majority of the respondents wanted the talks to involve not one but all trade union federations. If the workers supported strikes, they usually did so in a qualified way ("probably") rather than a categorical way ("definitely.") At the same time, there were shifts in

TABLE 28. Most effective way of defending workers' interests as seen by the respondents (%).

Groups of respondents		Negotiations between the government and:			Assistance from:		Strikes	Nothing can help
		Solidarity	OPZZ	all unions	Sejm and Senate	President		
1992	All workers surveyed	48	23	×	16	14	21	26
	Solidarity members	72	14	×	13	18	21	19
	OPZZ members	43	8	×	15	17	18	24
1993	All workers surveyed	34	14	×	9	13	31	38
	Solidarity members	53	9	×	10	21	32	29
	OPZZ members	25	30	×	6	13	31	34
1994	All workers surveyed	27	10	42	11	3	18	24
	Solidarity members	43	9	44	11	2	19	17
	OPZZ members	19	20	45	7	3	17	27

The respondents could indicate two options, although usually they named just one. For this reason, the percentages in the rows do not add up to 100. Several possible replies that were mentioned only rarely ("the Church and the Episcopate," "Solidarity '80," "new organisations," "other unions," and "hard to say") were omitted in the table.
Sources: "Workers '92" N = 1006, "Workers '93" N = 988, "Workers '94" N = 997.

the relation between OPZZ and Solidarity members: the former were more inclined to strike in 1991 while the latter voiced the readiness to strike somewhat more often in 1992 and 1993.

5.5. Religion, the Church, the clergy

Opinion surveys taken in recent years indicate a drop in the popularity of the Church. That drop could be observed in all communities, the working class and peasantry included. So how is the Church viewed by industrial workers?

Criticism of the Church's political and social activity appeared already in the initial period after the change of the socio-political system. In the years 1991–94, no major changes occurred in the distribution of replies to questions

connected with the Church. Asked if religion classes should be held in school or in parish facilities in 1991, 30 per cent of the respondents favored schools and 70 per cent Church premises. In 1994, the corresponding figures were 32 per cent and 67 per cent. Asked about abortion in 1991, 7 per cent of the respondents wanted an absolute ban, 22 per cent wanted it to be admissible in special cases and 70 per cent wanted the decision to be left to the woman, whereas in 1994, the corresponding figures were 5 per cent, 27 per cent, and 67 per cent.

In 1994, 66 per cent of the respondents said that the role of the Church in public life should be curtailed while 6 per cent wanted it to be bigger. At the same time, the Church placed next last on the list of the seven most trusted institutions with 37 per cent, behind the army (73 per cent), television (59 per cent), the police (53 per cent), the Sejm (46 per cent), the government (45 per cent) and only ahead of the president (27 per cent).

It should be remembered that those opinions came from people who regarded themselves as believers (12 per cent as very religious and 82 per cent as rather religious) and went to church at least once a month (67 per cent).

The picture of strong identification of the people with the Church in the times of authoritarian socialist rule and the end of this special relationship in the 1990s is open to a number of different interpretations. It seems that under Communism, an important characteristic of the Church was its relative tolerance of human weaknesses. This conformed to Roman Catholic tradition; as the historian Mieczysław Żywiec observed, the Church "had to acknowledge the fact that if it wanted to have many followers, it had to accept compromises from the point of view of ethics..." (1985, p. 213). As a result, "in peoples belonging to the Latin culture (...), the attitude toward religion was not always overly serious, it was rather warm, humanistic, sometimes actually lightly ironic" (Ibid., p. 221). In conditions of Polish authoritarian socialist rule, this general feature of the Roman Catholic religiosity assumed an additional significance. A number of factors — particularly the separation of the Church from the state and the lack of direct influence of the Church on political decisions — caused a sharp distinction to be drawn between the *sacrum* and the *profanum*. *Sacrum* was the Church and the ethical imperatives conveyed in the Sunday sermon. People went to church and listened to sermons with respect, especially when the priest chose to criticise the authorities. But real life went on in the *profanum* field, in which the Church did not interfere much. This division into *sacrum* and *profanum* remains firmly established in the workers' minds. People could consider themselves believers yet break the Ten Commandments daily. An elderly parish priest from an area inhabited mostly by peasants with side jobs in industry complained in 1991: "I have heard their confessions for over twenty years and I have pleaded with them to stop drinking and stealing. They promise to mend their ways and then go on drinking and stealing all the same." The Church repeatedly campaigned against abortion and alcohol abuse, but women continue to have pregnancies terminated, and the Church's proclamation that August was to be "a month without alcohol" were not reflected in alcohol sales statistics at all.

Władysław Piwowski, a sociologist from the Catholic University of Lublin, said in a press interview: "Already in the 1960s it could be seen that Polish Catholicism operated at two separate levels, the national and the everyday one. As for the national level, it was mass Catholicism, a strongly motivated one, but the motivations themselves were highly superficial. The real objective was to make a political statement through religion. (...) As for daily religious life, it turned out that the tendencies of change in it in Poland were similar to those observed in highly developed countries, (...) with the dogmas and ethical principles being questioned or rejected by the majority of Catholics. The only difference is that in Poland the proportion of people claiming to profess the faith remains so high all the time—actually almost all Poles say they believe in God" (1994, cf. also Piwowski 1993).

What has happened to the social situation of the Church during the several years that have passed since the collapse of authoritarian socialism? It seems that from the point of view of many Polish workers interviewed in the course of the surveys, priests are seen less and less as "one of our own." They find that priests are less helpful to believers at large and less forbearing. They are seen as a group aspiring to influence in the field of *profanum*, imposing legal regulations on the people and engaging not so much in criticism of politics as in politics itself. In other words, there is a growth of popular disapproval of the Church's venturing from the area of *sacrum* into the realm of *profanum*. The Church does not preach new values, nor does it advance new moral demands to the people, but would like to see its moral teaching translated into the laws of the land and the offenders prosecuted. Most Poles are simply not prepared for that and are defending themselves against it.

According to our respondents, the Church would like to have the fullest possible control over all Catholics, treating them somewhat as objects, as a "flock," and most respondents are not willing to consent to this. In 1991, among provincial workers we found the view that things look bad because the priests rule. This opinion, sometimes tainted with xenophobic elements ("things look bad because we are ruled by priests and Jews"), was voiced by practising believers who favour the Church and religion but are less and less favourably disposed toward priests.

In the course of interviews held with workers after successive parliamentary elections, we repeatedly—although not very often—heard remarks such as "the priest ordered us from the pulpit to vote for one party or another, and this got me so angry that I went and cast my vote for the man or party criticised by the priest."

As a result, the Church, which was the best friend of the people in the time of authoritarian socialist rule, is viewed by a considerable proportion of workers as one of the institutions which, in its own way, "deserted the society." From the point of view of the majority of workers, the Church is thus moving to the camp of the "new 'them'."

CONCLUSION

The working class between authoritarian socialist rule and the market and competition

The accomplishments of Western industrial sociology from the 1970s are an important point of reference for analyses of the Polish working class. However, concepts developed a quarter of a century ago must be supplemented. It turns out that the modern world is not only post-industrial (in the sense that the role of services is growing while the role of physical production is declining), but it is also a superindustrial world, in which the development of industry poses ever newer challenges. The division of the economy into the growth industries, declining and peripheral industries, the "affluent working class" and diverse subclasses, is getting more and more categorical. Contemporary international competition leads rather to deterioration than improvement of working conditions. The participation of workers in management, which was an important practical and theoretical problem in the 1960s and 1970s, is being pushed to the sidelines now. As it emerges from authoritarian socialism, the Polish economy is not joining the rational and orderly world of optimistic visions of the theoreticians of the post-industrial period, but the very hard world of superindustrial competition.

How can the situation of the Polish industrial working class be described against such background? In the times of authoritarian socialist rule, that class had an instrumental attitude toward work. Work was treated exclusively as a source of subsistence and whenever possible, people tried to take early retirement or qualify for a disability pension, etc. Trade unions and all official institutions that drew workers into their orbit (including the PZPR) were also treated in an instrumental way. This instrumentalism was, at least to some extent, imposed by the system in force at the time. The public never accepted the legitimacy of the party state or the official institutions set up by those authorities (the trade unions, parties or youth organisations). The ties with those organisations were weak and Poles lived in a kind of "sociological vacuum."

So, while the workers' instrumental approach was an unquestionable fact, it was of a different nature than the instrumentalism of the British workers, described, for example, by David Lockwood (1966). In the Polish case it was superficial, because hidden underneath were attitudes that resembled in many respects the traditional proletarian mentality conforming to British definitions. These attitudes consisted in a tendency to divide the society dichotomously into "us" and "them," to develop solidarity in a community, with one's colleagues, etc. Polish workers carried an extra burden imposed on them by the authoritarian socialist system. That burden was of a dual kind. One aspect of it was that the

workers were demoralised by disastrous working practices, the possibility of moonlighting and "privatising" (i.e., stealing) state property. The relationship between labour effort and wages was severed. Wages were poor but there was no threat of joblessness, which led to a loss of respect for work. Another negative phenomenon was the ease with which the whole blame for all negative social phenomena could be shifted onto "them." In the closing years of authoritarian socialist rule, the myth was born that if the Soviet domination were suddenly removed and "they" were removed from power, all the causes of evil would disappear and before long "the country would catch up with Japan." The other dimension of socialisation in those times consisted in the shaping of solidarity. The emphasis was not on competition between people, a climb up the career ladder and one-upmanship but mutual support, the cultivation of friendship and useful connections, the suppressing of the ambition to do better than one's neighbour.³⁴ Workers were supervised "by consent" rather than "by conflict" and the relations between supervisors and workers were usually good (Doktor 1987).

While this conclusion is a schematic one, it can be said that in the age of authoritarian socialist rule, Polish society and Polish workers were characterised in their majority by an instrumental approach to official institutions and by a traditional one, marked by solidarity, in primary groups, circles of friends or small local communities. When Solidarity was born in 1980, the millions of people who joined it did so in the traditional community spirit.

There is much to indicate that the change of the socio-political system resulted in a rapid erosion of the traditional attitudes of the working-class milieu. The emergence of the threat of unemployment resulted in a growth of the level of fear among the working class (in the 1970s, that level was lower among workers than among the intelligentsia). In just three years, the number of members of industrial working class employed in large and medium state enterprises shrank by a fourth as a fairly vast private or privatised sector emerged, now employing already almost a half of all Polish workers. Private enterprises assumed peripheral characteristics (lack of institutions representing the interests of the employees, poor social and technical working conditions, the need to work 10-hour days, etc.). A fairly large sub-class of people working in the grey zone of the economy appeared, including those working illegally as well as immigrants from the East, and this drives down the price of labour. All these phenomena contribute to an entirely new social climate, which has led a characteristic changes in worker attitudes. Within a short period of time, radical moods were eroded but, contrary

³⁴ A good example of socialisation by the authoritarian socialist system could be found in the irrational behaviour of students. As Gustaw Kerszman wrote in the Paris periodical *Kultura* concerning the discussion of the notion of *homo sovieticus*: "While taking part in university entrance examinations in Poland, I could see how often the candidates were giving each other prompts (...). It was shockingly irrational behaviour; after all, the worse one's competitors perform, the better is one's own chance of success. The young *homines sovietici*, although they were perfectly aware of that, could not suppress the habit of solidarity. They differed significantly in this respect from U.S. students, brought up in the spirit of competition. (...) I must admit that whenever I saw this irrational behaviour of the prospective students, I felt some warmth where my heart is." (Kerszman 1995).

to expectations, most workers accepted—albeit with reservations—the change of the socio-political system.

The surveys presented here indicate that the economic and political views of industrial workers make up three orientations, the axis of which are the visions of a well-ordered economy. Representatives of the three orientations are spread unevenly among individual groups of workers engaged in direct manufacture of physical goods, with one of the orientations enjoying bigger support than the remaining ones in each group. The distribution of these orientations makes it possible to find out which views dominate among the "primary" working class (skilled workers with basic vocational skills), which groups hold similar views and which ones think differently.

It turned out that among the primary working class, one orientation predominates which is also strongly supported by foremen, technicians and workers with secondary education. It was designated as the *moderately modernisational* (*moderately reformist*) orientation. We have concluded that this orientation can be used to define the industrial working class; at the same time, the fact that it occurred much less frequently among engineers and managers and among unskilled workers with only elementary education means that those groups may be excluded from the working class. Comparative analyses also warrant the preliminary hypothesis that the industrial working class differs from the global working class, in which the relations between the "primary" and "secondary" working class look different and the "secondary" class is rather made up of unskilled workers than of foremen, technicians and other employees with secondary education.

A characteristic feature of the moderately modernisational orientation was the expectation of a "friendly market economy," i.e., the kind of economic order whose main regulators are market-economy capitalist institutions, but which do not lead to the social degradation of industrial workers. The respondents expect market economy (competition) and privatisation (especially the takeover by Polish private capital), but they avoid any new solutions or institutions which, in their opinion, might make life harder for them (they accepted competition but not unemployment, they want the introduction of efficiency-boosting measures but not layoffs, etc.). This orientation involved myths about the economy as well as ambivalence, an important manifestation of which was the so-called privatisation dissonance. It consisted in general acceptance of privatisation combined with a reluctance to approve the privatisation of the enterprise in which the respondent worked and to agree to work for a private firm. The moderate reformers believe that some state enterprises can and should be privatised, especially by Polish investors, but they want their own enterprise to remain in the hands of the state or to become the property of all its employees. The respondents preferred to stay in the "friendly niche" of a state enterprise or a quasi-state one (i.e., joint-stock companies wholly owned by the Treasury). This was the outcome of an effect referred to in an earlier study as "legitimation of Polish capital without legitimising the Polish capitalist" (Gardawski 1992a, p. 77). The main sources of the ambivalent traits of the consciousness of the moderate reformers, which

consisted in the acceptance of capitalist economic institutions in general terms and their rejection on the existential plane, were of a diverse nature. Three reasons for the acceptance of the market-economy system and privatisation appear to be the most important. The first is the domination of a person's role as a consumer over his role as an employee that has been described in Polish sociological literature. The availability of goods which were rationed in one way or another throughout the socialist era, generates a natural sense of superiority of the market-economy capitalist order (Rychard 1995). The second reason is the fact that workers' households found ways of adapting to the new conditions (working abroad, earning money in the vast "grey zone"). Finally, the third reason for the absence of an unequivocal attitude toward the new system is the feeling that in the pragmatic, non-ideological sense, Soviet-type socialism turned out to be weaker than capitalism, with the whole society watching it disintegrate completely after getting entangled in economic and political crises. Even if authoritarian socialist rule appears to be more friendly to workers in some respects than the capitalist system, the moderate reformers are convinced that there can be no return to it. On the other hand, the dislike of capitalist institutions on the micro scale can be attributed to the loss of a sense of social security, fear of unemployment, and bad experience with private firms, in which working conditions are usually bad from the technical as well as social point of view.

An analysis of the ambivalent elements of the moderately modernisational orientation pointed to its affinity to some attitudes of British workers described in the 1960s and 1970s by Frank Parkin (see chapter one). Parkin pointed out that in some strata of the subordinate class a tendency to seek compromise between the two systems of values, the dominant morale framework (characteristic of the dominant class) and the subordinate system (upheld by the working class, among others), can occur. Parkin argued that representatives of the subordinate class do not assimilate the values of the dominant class in their entirety nor do they reject them wholesale. What in reality happens is that with regard to general phenomena, constituting the foundation of social order, those persons accept the dominant values and even tend to idealise them. However, with regard to matters affecting their very existence, their social environment and their own fate, workers try to work out a certain compromise between the dominant and the existential values. Even if the workers internalise some basic dominant values, they are unable to accept values and meanings that degrade their social position. The inconsistencies and ambivalence appear at the point where the two systems of values meet. Parkin was inclined to accept that such negotiated value systems are a proof of the socialising success of the dominant classes, which impose their vision of the world on the subordinate classes and, in a way, force the workers to seek compromise. The interpretation proposed by Parkin proved very helpful in understanding the mentality of part of the Polish working class milieu of the 1990s; however, it cannot be accepted uncritically. In the Polish situation, the explanation of the acceptance of capitalism cannot refer to the socialisation effected by the dominant class or even to some global indoctrination carried out

by the dominant classes of the Western world. The acceptance of capitalism by the majority of Polish workers is connected first and foremost with the social experience of the economic and political collapse of authoritarian socialist rule. The superiority of the capitalist order is accepted by moderate reformers in a pragmatic rather than ideological fashion. Therefore instead of Parkin's notions of "values of the dominant class" and "values of the subordinate class," it is better to use categories referring to Włodzimierz Wesolowski's proposal: transgressive values (corresponding to transgressive interests of an economy adapting to world economic standards) and existential values (corresponding to the existential interests of social groups, which see economic reforms as a threat to their current status). The use of such notions makes it possible to interpret the ambivalence characteristic of the moderately modernisational orientation in the following way: The workers accept in general terms the main transgressive values (market-economy or capitalist institutions and privatisation) but choose the existential values or specific negotiated ones when it comes to matters affecting their own living conditions. They prefer working for a state-owned enterprise and if that is not available, they would rather choose an employee-owned company than a private firm. The ambivalence of the moderate reformers also manifests itself in the fact that the workers apply a different yardstick to other enterprises, especially those belonging to other industries or regions, and the economy as a whole, than to their own enterprise. Therefore they accept the need of privatisation of other enterprises but believe that the enterprise they work for should be spared the experience.

The main consequences of this way of viewing the world are cracks in class solidarity in the traditional sense and the disappearance of the climate of support for joint actions on national scale. There are many indications that the process of instrumentalisation of the views of many workers on the economy, their employer and trade unions has begun and is advancing at a fast pace. It is possible to formulate a conclusion of a general nature: the real umbrella over economic reforms begun by Leszek Balcerowicz was not so much the behaviour of labour unions as the emergence of the moderately modernisational orientation and its acceptance by a considerable proportion of the Polish industrial working class. It can be hypothesised that if the moderately modernisational orientation had not prevailed over traditional, collectivist mentality typical of the ethos of the "first" Solidarity, the industrial working class would have effectively blocked the Balcerowicz reforms.

In the political field, moderate modernisation is correlated with a definite normative vision of the system. Moderate reformers are characterised by a certain dislike of parliamentary democracy procedures but they nevertheless accept the parliament and the party system. In their opinion, however, decisions on the most important issues should be made by the society at large in referenda. Not more than two parties should be present on the political scene, with one of them representing employees and ordinary people ("us"), and the other the employers, politicians, etc.; in short, "them." Workers would not have anything against the concentration of all executive power in the hands of one person, but they would

like to retain control over that person and monitor his performance. They believe that when crisis erupts, it is necessary to choose the path of negotiations rather than strikes, and the workers should be represented in those talks by all the labour unions acting in unison. This vision of negotiations between employees and employers does not signify support for lasting, "structural" corporatist arrangements, as the moderate reformers are sceptical about the existing unions and few of them would accept a growth of the influence of the unions in economics and politics. It should be added, however, that during the three years (1991-94), their support for a social order with corporatist features rose by several or even more than ten percentage points.

On the whole, the moderate reformers have a specific vision of a well-ordered political system. It is a populist-negotiational vision that does not very well match any consistent theoretical constructions. Those workers do not support either statist-authoritarian patterns (Hausner 1995) nor clearly corporatist ones (Morawski 1995a and 1995b, Tatur 1994), but rather populist models with weak acknowledgement of the parliamentary process. The ambivalence in their attitude to negotiations consists in their tendency to see the society in dichotomous terms and their expectation of a single party of their own or a single, integrated trade union, and their reluctance to surrender their freedom to anyone: they would like to decide themselves on important matters and have little trust in elected representatives. Furthermore, these respondents are not radical but rather moderate; there are few advocates of strikes among them and in particular they would treat a possible general strike with great reserve. When they talk about democracy, it turns out that few of them associate it with the parliamentary process; most equate it with freedom, equality and well-being. Generally speaking, the moderate reformers are characterised by an unequivocal and a rather simplistic vision of the socio-political system. But the important thing is that this normative vision of a political system does not involve autocratic patterns.

The second most frequently observed orientation was the *traditionalist* one. It was accepted first of all by unskilled labourers with only elementary education.

From the economic point of view, this orientation is of a consistently egalitarian and statist nature. A traditionalist accepts direct state management of enterprises, opposes all plans for privatisation, including the establishment of employee-owned companies in place of state enterprises. He favours the maintenance of state ownership of not only huge industrial enterprises but also wants state monopoly of medium and small industrial plants. A traditionalist has a special dislike of foreign capital, which is suspected of the intention of destroying the domestic industry. He rejects proposals for economic changes, including ones aimed at improving efficiency. He fears that any change in the status quo will be disadvantageous to him personally. He supports the idea of increasing the influence of political and religious organisations and trade unions over the economy, seeing in it a chance of widening the scope of welfare protection over employees. If a corporatist socio-political system were to appear in Poland, he would in all likelihood welcome it. The only element that does not fit in the otherwise very consistent traditionalism is the high level of acceptance of competition. However,

this is purely verbal acceptance, because traditionalists not only reject any social hardships associated with the market but also accept state micro-management of enterprises.

A traditionalist's expectations regarding the political system are also consistent: his attitude is authoritarian, he is opposed to any parliamentary procedures and would welcome the disbanding of political parties. He wants to entrust the rule over the country to a strong leader. He accepts the introduction of various restrictions of personal freedom, supports stiff penalties for offenders, including the death penalty for serious fraud. If he accepts democracy, it is only direct, populist democracy. His views resemble those characteristic of authoritarian corporatism (Hausner 1995).

The third, least strongly supported orientation, the *liberal* one, is practically exclusively one of engineers and managers, employees with university degrees. Both from the economic and political point of view, this orientation is of an open nature. The liberals support pluralism, their views are consistently democratic, and they support the parliamentary process. They welcome the development of not only Polish capitalism but also the extensive presence of foreign capital. They are firmly opposed to authoritarian rule in any form, which includes the vesting of authoritarian power in a strong leader. The liberal orientation is almost the exact opposite of traditionalism and corresponds to the pluralistic model, more or less of the kind described by Morawski (1995a and 1995b). In this relatively consistent, pro-capitalist and democratic vision of the social world, the only discrepancy is a certain idealising of market institutions, especially if the views of engineers and middle management are compared to the statements of top managers, who know from the practical angle the flaws of unlimited competition and are much more cautious in supporting the free market.

I could conclude by advancing a hypothesis about the boundaries of the industrial working class. The category of employees directly engaged in the physical manufacture of goods incorporates three groups with distinct class characteristics. Each group cherishes a different normative vision of the economy. Engineers and managers with university degrees, who fairly often support a liberal order in the economy, are part of the managerial middle class. The working class is made up of higher groups ("secondary"): technicians, foremen and skilled workers with secondary education, and of the "primary group," i.e., skilled workers with basic vocational education. The working class supports a moderately modernisational economic order. The lowest-placed group are unskilled workers with only elementary education, who are an underclass preferring a traditionalist egalitarian and statist order. These three class-like groups have a strongly differentiated market situation, which is connected with the different chances of adapting to market economy.

ANNEX

Characteristics of the groups examined in 1991-1994

This work examines the findings of surveys taken in the years 1991-94. These were four nationwide representative surveys of workers engaged in physical manufacture of goods, employed in large and medium industrial enterprises. The surveys were financed by Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The largest of the four surveys, representative both on the national scale and for individual macroregions and industries, was carried out in 1991. It embraced 383 enterprises and 2,817 respondents ("Robotnicy '91"). The three subsequent surveys were representative on the national level and for five regions that were designated especially for this survey. They embraced the workers of about fifty enterprises ("Robotnicy '92," "Robotnicy '93," and "Robotnicy '94"). The samples for the surveys were prepared by the CBOS opinion research agency. CBOS also carried out the field studies.

TABLE 29. Social and demographic features of the respondents in three representative nationwide surveys: „Workers '91," „Workers '92," „Workers '93" and „Workers '94" (%).

		1991 N = 2817	1992 N = 1006	1993 N = 988	1994 N = 997
1. Gender	Male	74	71	72	73
	Female	26	29	28	27
2. Age	up to 29 years	16	17	27	25
	30-39 years	36	33	32	35
	40-49 years	35	31	31	30
	50 years and above	13	19	10	10
3. Education	elementary	14	20	17	20
	basic vocational	50	48	48	52
	secondary	34	27	32	26
	incomplete university studies and university degree	2	5	3	2
4. Position*	manager, engineer	3	X	4	2
	foreman, technician	9	X	7	7
	skilled worker	69	X	67	72
	unskilled worker	13	X	12	12

N/A instances were omitted from the table.
 * Some variants of replies were ignored (officials). As a result, the percentages in columns do not add up to 100.

Table 29 gives data on the respondents (with the exception of "position" in "Workers '92," where some figures turned out to be missing).

Qualitative studies that accompanied all the surveys from the years 1991-94 involved specially selected groups of interviewees. In 1991, an additional survey was held in five industrial enterprises in order to identify workers belonging to the traditionalist, moderately modernisational and liberal orientations. About a hundred people (workers and management representatives) were interviewed then; individual in-depth interviews were held with 46 persons and group interviews with the rest. In 1992, the interviewees were selected in a similar manner (but the number of interviews was limited to 30). In 1993 and 1994, the interviews were held after the questionnaire surveys; specifically, CBOS pollsters asked the respondents to give their addresses and then came back to those they considered interesting from the cognitive point of view. On each occasion, they talked to some 25 workers.

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