The Euro-Atlantic Alliance under the Conditions of Building European Security Structure

The International Conference
The Euro-Atlantic Alliance under the Conditions of Building European Security Structure

A 01 - 00588

CENTER FOR DEFENCE STUDIES - THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG

RESEARCH CENTER OF THE SLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

Bratislava 1999
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Euro-Atlantic Alliance after the Washington Summit</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jozef Pivarič</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Future of the Transatlantic Alliance - view of the USA</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Mihalka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion to the presentation by Michael Mihalka</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Euro-Atlantic Alliance - view of Germany</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolaus W. Pfeiffer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion to the presentation by Nikolaus W. Pfeiffer</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Euro-Atlantic Alliance - view of France</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frédéric Drion, Laure Borgomano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion to the presentations by Frédéric Drion and Laure Borgomano</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Euro-Atlantic Alliance - view of Italy</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Rizzi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion to the presentation by Francesco Rizzi</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The Euro-Atlantic Alliance - view of new NATO memberstates – the Czech Republic</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Eichler</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The Euro-Atlantic Alliance - view of new NATO memberstates – Hungary</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferencz Gazdága</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The Euro-Atlantic Alliance – view of new NATO memberstates – Poland</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anton Z. Kamiński</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The Euro-Atlantic Alliance – European Security Structure – the austrian view</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Wosolosobe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint discussion to the presentations by Jan Eichler, F. Gazdága,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoni Z. Kamiński and Wolfgang Wosolosobe</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Slovak Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic Alliance</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Weiss</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion to the presentation by Peter Weiss</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. The New NATO Strategic Concept – view of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Barták</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion to the presentation by Peter Barták</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The Perception of Changes in the Development of European Security Structure by the Slovak Public</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oľga Gyárásťová</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion to the presentation by Oľga Gyárásťová</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Hungary and the NATO Membership</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>László Szabó</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of discussion participants</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFERECE OPENING

Jaroslav Kuča

State Secretary, Distinguished Guests,

good morning and welcome on behalf of the Director of the Defence Studies Centre and on my own behalf at this international conference organised as a joint effort of the Defence Studies Centre, Slovak Foreign Policy Association Research Centre and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

The Defence Studies Centre is a research facility of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic dealing with security and military strategy issues. The Centre was established in 1993 and since 1996 one of Centre’s activities has also been organising, traditionally in co-operation with NGOs, such international, inter-ministerial or ministerial conferences, seminars, workshops. These meetings are a great benefit for us. They bring together experts from various areas of social life, governmental and non-governmental organisations; they are a forum for exchange of opinions, views, discussions and education in the issue of common interest, which is security. These meetings have always been open for everyone, anyone can present his/her views regardless of their content, party or professional background.

Meetings held at an international level are of exceptional value for us because they make it possible to see us through the eyes of others. New contacts are established, confidence is built and prerequisites for new co-operation are created. This is already our sixth international event organised in Slovakia and many of you have already had an opportunity to participate in these activities.

The Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic is facing a challenging task – the reform of armed forces. It will also have an impact on the future of Defence Studies Centre. Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic has the ambition to have its own educational facility in the field of security, defence and crisis management that would serve not only the defence sector but also the whole state administration and supreme state bodies. Such an institution should be built on the foundation of the existing Defence Studies Centre. The newly established institution should develop in addition to the research function also an educational function. Already today it is possible to say that we would like to continue our good co-operation in events like this conference.

I wish you a pleasant stay and creative working spirit.

Magda Vášaryová

Good morning!

Welcome to this seminar, which is a continuation of a series of seminars organised by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association together with Defence Studies Centre for two years now.

The Slovak Foreign Policy Association was established in 1993 and today the Association is proud to have some 800 members, 3 offices and 15 clubs all over Slovakia. The Association has also an independent think tank, which covers various issues and exists 4 years.

The Slovak Foreign Policy Association has three fundamental objectives. The first objective is to disseminate information from as many sources as possible. We all know too well what a great problem it still is for Slovakia, Slovak experts, Slovak population, the public interested in foreign policy and international relations to acquire real information that is not a reference to some pieces of information with a reference to another piece of information. We think it is exceptionally important to organise seminars, meetings, discussions, and lectures to bring the most relevant and best information to our members and through them to the public at large. The second objective is to facilitate and create room for people to meet regardless of their profession, political views and generation. Here I have in mind what is called in English networking and for what we have not been able to find the appropriate Slovak expression. The task of our independent think tank is to produce critical analyses that will contribute to the best possible understanding of all the problems Slovakia encounters in the field of international relations and foreign policy. We are happy that despite all the difficulties existing in the co-operation between state authorities and the NGOs we have been able to maintain a very good co-operation with the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, the Defence Studies Centre for entire two years. It is our contribution to the development of relations between the civilians and the military. Civil control of armed forces, dissemination of genuine information and making available pieces of genuine information, views of certain experts, which often differ, to the people who are interested in these issues are only some of the key conditions for the understanding of the integration processes in Europe. Integration, in addition to transformation, transition of the society, economic transformation, good neighbourly relations and compatibility, is also one of the goals not only of the Slovak Republic but also of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association.

We believe that this is another contribution, our contribution, to the discussion among military experts, political scientists and the public at large. Slovakia's membership in NATO – as stated among the foreign policy priorities of the Slovak Government – should not be, and let's hope it is not, only a declaration
made by each government in Slovakia but let's hope that we will be able to maintain it as a true objective and that the SFPA will contribute to this significantly.

Our co-operation with the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic is another contribution to the building and understanding of civil society and we, as I have already said appreciate this co-operation highly and we want to continue it.

I would like to welcome you once again; I wish you a good working spirit and thank you for coming.

Michael Petráš

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to welcome you also on behalf of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Slovakia.

My pre-speakers have already said most of what I wanted to say and so I can be very brief. We operate in Slovakia since 1991 and we see this seminar as a part of our long-term plans or long-term projects aiming to support Slovakia’s economic, political and security integration and the enhancement of expert and public discussion of this issue.

We are very happy that we have been able to find such dedicated and nice partners like our colleagues from the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic and our friends from the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. We have done our best to prepare a good programme for this seminar that, as we hope, will facilitate good professional exchange. I wish you every success in your work here.
THE EURO-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AFTER THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT

Ladies and Gentlemen,

it is my pleasure and honour to convey the greetings of the Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic to the participants from abroad and from Slovakia, and to welcome you all on my and his behalf here, at the international conference called The Euro-Atlantic Alliance under the Conditions of Building European Security Structure.

The conference focuses on the new NATO strategic concept, the tasks of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and the relation of the Slovak Republic to this alliance. It is a continuation of the efforts of the Ministry of Defence of the SR and the General Staff to prepare the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic for accession to these structures and to contribute to further development of theoretical approaches in the field of national security. The participation of the Defence Studies Centre of the Defence Policy and Defence Planning Section, the Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Friedrich Ebert Foundation Representation in Slovakia, and foreign and domestic experts is a good prerequisite for a broad analysis.

One of the priorities defined by the new Slovak Government in its programme declaration is full-fledged membership in NATO in due time after 2002. We appreciate that the conference responds to the Washington summit of the Alliance held this April, when the Alliance celebrated its 50th anniversary and introduced the views on the Alliance in the 21st century. It will be an Alliance, which will keep the principle of collective defence with enhanced trans-Atlantic link as its foundation. Having new status, new members, higher quality of partnership, the Alliance will be larger, more effective and flexible - capable to perform new tasks including effective conflict prevention and active participation in crisis management. It is important for Slovakia to be able to co-operate with other countries and organisations in the promotion of security, prosperity and democracy in the whole Euro-Atlantic region. Enlargement of the Alliance eastwards has enlarged the zone of stability. The Slovak Republic, as a part of Europe, is interested in stability, which is the foundation for economic development, trusts and prosperity in this area. It is equally important that the Washington summit has declared a continuation in inviting new members with the objective to contribute to the development of peace and security. This process is understood as a part of the evolutionary process, which takes into account the political, and security developments in the whole of Europe.

We welcome the Washington summit noting the positive development in Slovakia after parliamentary elections. We are proud that Slovak diplomacy has an opportunity to make a concrete contribution to peace strengthening through Mr. Jan Kubíš, who has been elected Secretary General of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and Mr. Eduard Kukan, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for Kosovo. These are also reflections of the positive developments in our country. We believe, that the recent presidential elections in Slovakia have confirmed the continuation of the current trends to apply the same principles as the ones the alliance is built on.

We consider important the confirmation of Alliance openness and the opportunities created in the Membership Action Plan, which give the preparation of the Slovak Republic for NATO membership new impetus and content. Though, we understand, that the activities listed in that document are not a list of criteria for membership we want to respond in our Annual National Programme of Preparation for Membership to the fact that it is a manifestation of open doors. Slovakia not only wants to utilise these possibilities but it is also ready to share Alliance's responsibility for security in Europe.

The Slovak Republic identifies itself with the strategy of the Alliance expressed in the new strategic concept. This concept will be the source from which the drafting process of basic documents in the field of security a defence of the Slovak Republic will draw. This process is not solely the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. It is rather an issue concerning the whole society. We appreciate the efforts of the organisers of this conference to create a forum for a broader perspective of the issue. I am sure that its conclusion will help to translate Slovak Republic's Membership Action Plan into a medium-term plan for membership and the Annual National Programme.

In order to meet the tasks the defence sector is preparing these measures:

- publishing and studying of Washington summit documents
- drafting of the Programme of the Defence Sector Preparation
- establishment and co-ordination of working committees with NATO committees and agencies
- preparation of the medium term plan of preparation and the Annual National Programme in the defence sector.

One of the main prerequisites for our membership in NATO is active participation in the Partnership for Peace Programme. Here, we concentrate on:

- preparation and implementation of Slovak armed forces reform
- completing the building of troops allocated for deployment in UN peace missions under NATO command
- preparation for and action of a military unit in KFOR and AFOR peace mission
- gradual harmonisation of the national defence planning with NATO procedures
• building basic C3I subsystems in aviation and AAD at strategic and operational levels
• NATO standards implementation into air transport airspace control, operational and logistics doctrine
• completing the building of own educational and training facility for specialised and language training
• thorough selection of and participation of selected officers in specialised and language courses, education and training focusing on the application of NATO doctrines and staff procedures in the Slovak armed forces.
I am convinced that the Ministry of Defence can make use not only of the advantages offered by these three new tools of the Partnership for Peace but will also participate in them. They include:
• a consortium of defence academies and security studies institutes
• PTP training centres
• simulation network for exercises.
On our way to materialise these tasks we would like to make the best use of the experience of North Atlantic Alliance Member States as well as of the countries striving for membership. This conference is one of the possibilities of co-operation.

Concluding I would like to wish our participants from abroad a nice stay in Slovakia and you all a creative and inventive inspiration during the whole conference.

Michael Mihalika

THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE – VIEW OF USA

As always we have to make the standard disclaimer when making a presentation on this subject, that my views are my own and do not reflect those of the US government or the Marshall Center. This disclaimer is even more important than usual since I will be speculating on the consequences of the upcoming US presidential elections on the future of the alliance.

I will be looking at the alliance as an academic and an historian. I will put a theoretical gloss on recent developments in NATO, because I think such theories, particularly as they are taken up by policy makers within the United States, provide good guides to how the US will value the alliance in the future. Moreover I will show how these theories explain the two main recent projects conducted by the alliance - enlargement and the successive interventions in the Balkans.

The first thing we need to explain is NATO enlargement and the role that the US played in furthering it. Such an explanation is particularly important to the explaining any future enlargement is the fact that the political elite of many countries in Central Europe wanted to join. Without their desire to join enlargement wouldn’t have happened. But once they made the request, then the consensus had to develop within NATO to agree to accept them. Although NATO by and large operates by consensus, as we well know, the opinions of some countries matter more than others. In particular, without US support NATO enlargement would not have gone forward or taken the form it did. To explain this development it’s now useful to look at the difference between neo-realist and liberal-institutionalist views of international relations.

Neo-realism

We will only give you a short review here since I am sure many of you are familiar with these approaches. On chart one we have the dominant schools of neo-realist thought. This chart is drawn from the work of Michael Doyle in a book entitled „Ways of War and Peace”. I draw you attention to the middle column on Hobbesian structuralists. For a Hobbesian structuralist we have a state of war at the international level among states caused by their pursuit for power and security and the lack of an overarching authority to mediate between states, that is, the states exist in anarchy. For the purposes of this theory all states are alike; they only differ according to their relative power. The only way to achieve security and peace in such a system is though the balance of power.
Thus states join alliances in order to balance the power of their major adversary. International relations is essentially a zero-sum game - what one side gains, the other side loses.

Russian politicians have effectively taken a neo-realist approach to the enlargement of NATO. They have consistently viewed NATO as a military alliance. They see enlargement as lessening Russian security as NATO becomes more powerful with the addition of new members. Moreover, they see NATO enlargement as undercutting the security of Europe as a whole because as it enlarges and becomes more powerful, it becomes more likely to take military action. Russian see the intervention in Kosovo as confirmation of their suspicions that NATO will become more aggressive as it grows, especially as it followed so soon after the addition of the three new members.

While the administration of George Bush was in office, the US did not support NATO enlargement. Bush's administration was essentially neo-realist in its orientation. They thought that the addition of Central European states to NATO would lessen security because NATO would incur more obligations than it would increase its net military capability. Thus the US through 1993 largely ignored Central European appeals to join NATO. Generally speaking the Bush administration was interested in preserving the condominium style mechanisms for organizing European security and accepted change mostly when it was forced upon it. Bush's so-called Chicken Kiev speech provides an excellent illustration of this conservatism when he advocated that Ukraine essentially remain within the Soviet Union.

The Bush administration was also conservative in quite another way. It had a visceral reaction to any signs that the Europeans might develop their own capability. Many of you may be familiar with the so-called Bartholomew demarche (which is?) I might add that even though the force of external events forced the Bush administration to spend a lot of time on Europe, their main expertise lay elsewhere - in Asia, Latin American and global matters.

**Liberal internationalism**

The arrival of the Clinton administration marked a pronounced change in American foreign policy orientation, from the neo-realism of the Bush administration to what is known in the literature as liberal internationalism. The arrival of Tony Lake as national security advisor, Madeleine Albright as US representative to the UN and later secretary of state signaled a fundamental shift in US policy orientation.

What do we mean by liberal internationalism? Many of you are well acquainted with the strain of American foreign policy known as Wilsonian internationalism that advocated the spread of democracies and transparency as the way to achieve peace. Liberal internationalism, the third column on the chart, is the modern school of international relations that has the most in common with Wilsonian internationalism. From our point of view it is important to note that liberal internationalists believe that a state of peace is achieved through increase in the number of republican, that is, liberal democratic, states.

From the point of view of a liberal internationalist, then, NATO enlargement means enlarging the numbers of liberal democratic states and thus this enlarges the area of peace. Consolidated liberal democratic states do not go to war with each other. The tension between NATO, especially in terms of the arguments coming from the US, and Russia over the NATO enlargement can be likened to a dialogue of the deaf as Russia argued against NATO enlargement in neo-realist terms and the US argued in favor using the language of liberal internationalism.

**Kosovo - „War for values“**

In interests of time I will not discuss the sequence of events that led to NATO intervention in the Q&A. However, what happened in Bosnia in 1995 clearly affected the thinking behind the use of force in Kosovo. In particular, the Americans drew some false lessons from NATO intervention in 1995 just as they will draw some false lessons from the Kosovo experience. In particular, many Americans perceive that NATO air strikes brought Milosevic to the bargaining table at Dayton. What they fail to realize is that the Bosniak-Croatian offensive on the ground was having considerable success even before NATO took to the air. In fact the Bosniak-Croatian forces had to stand down and turn back territory to the Bosnian Serbs at the peace table. This offensive was much more persuasive than two weeks of NATO air strikes.

The intervention in Kosovo signaled a important departure in multilateral responses to how sovereign states could treat its own citizens. It harked back to an earlier era in European politics when the liberal great powers intervened in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire ostensibly to prevent the maltreatment of its citizens. This view can be seen from chart two as liberal crusading.

The most articulating expression of this approach has been made not by the US president but by Tony Blair in a speech that he made in Chicago right before the Washington summit. He argued for a new doctrine for the international community.

The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts. Non-interference has long been considered an important principle of international order. And it is not one we would want to jettison too readily. One state should not feel it has the right to change the political system of another or ferment subversion or seize pieces of territory to which it feels it should have some claim. But the principle of non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter. When oppression produces massive flows of refugees with unsettle neighboring countries then they can properly be described as „threats to international peace and security".
Since the resources of the international community are limited and it can not intervene everywhere, some criteria need to be met:
First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress; but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators. Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We should always give peace every chance, as we have in the case of Kosovo. Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? In the past we talked too much of exit strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over; better to stay with moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large numbers. And finally, do we have national interests involved? The mass expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded the notice of the rest of the world. But it does make a difference that this is taking place in such a combustible part of Europe.

Elsewhere Blair has called the war in Kosovo as a “war for values”.

Javier Solana, the NATO secretary-general, has also taken up this call. Responding to a question in an interview that appeared in the 3 May 99 issue of Der Spiegel, he said, “This is no war in the classical sense. We do not want to occupy a country, we do not want to protect any raw materials, or open new trade routes. This war is about values and the moral condition of the Europe in which we will live in the 21st century.”

Even Kofi Annan admits the possible legitimacy of taking action. To the French paper Le Monde, he said, “It is no longer acceptable to see governments flaunting the rights of their own citizens on the pretext of sovereignty”. Annan has strenuously objected to NATO deciding for itself that it could take such action. Another important development is the decision of the war crimes tribunal in the Hague to indict Milosevic. “For the first time in history, an international penal court empowered by the United Nations has indicted a current national leader (Milosevic) for crimes against humanity, and for crimes committed in his own country. It did so on the basis of information gathered outside the area where these crimes were committed and at the time they were being committed. When the new international penal court is up and running, indictments of this kind could be pronounced all over the world.”

Fighting in Kosovo obscured much of the underlying tension within the alliance that have been long festering between the US and its European allies.

The US presidential election in 2000

In you accept my preceding analysis, then you would agree that the main ideological orientation of the US administration plays a major role in what course of action it will take in foreign policy. We see a long term trend towards multilateral intervention in the affairs of other countries. But the near and midterm trends that over the next few years we will see rather less enthusiasm for intervention. To be sure there are rational reasons for that. The commitments to Bosnia and Kosovo certainly overburden the capacity of many countries for peacekeeping. And if we look elsewhere in Europe, we find only conflicts with much different dynamics than the ones we saw in southeastern Europe. In particular, we might mention Trans-Dniestria, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. So we have reached a natural stopping place for NATO intervention, unless we go outside Europe.

Another factor undercutting further intervention and enlargement is the change in US administration that will take place in 2001. Regardless of who is elected among the major candidates the administration will be less interventionist and less European in its orientation. The foreign policy advisors around George W. Bush consist largely of the younger generation that advised his father. So we would expect a more neorealist, non-European focus in his administration. The Gore team is somewhat harder to read at this phase but Gore himself is more globalist and less interested in Europe than Clinton. His issues have always been more transnational in nature such as the focus on the environment.

So we would expect the European orientation of this administration to come to an end, both from exhaustion and a shift in focus and ideological orientation of the leadership in America.

The strategic concept reconsidered

Against this backdrop I would like to address specifically some of the issues that remain within the strategic concept and the summit communiqué. The war in Kosovo tended to distract leading policy makers from resolving some major issues and points of contention between the United States and Europe and led to language open to a variety of interpretations that will be the source of tensions later.

No mandate required from UN

Different countries put different spins on the language in the Strategic Concept and summit communiqué on the need for NATO to secure a mandate from the UN. Jacques Chirac hailed the communiqué as “a triumph for French diplomacy”. He argues that the allies said, “we recognize the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security”. In a radio interview, Chirac had the following things to say on French radio on 24 April 99:

- We have approved two documents which complement each other: one is a communiqué, and the other a statement entitled: Strategic Concept. These documents lay down the framework for NATO’s activity in the coming years. At our request, they clearly affirm the role of the UN, on different counts.
- First of all, in the articles defining the alliance’s tasks: it is specified that the
allies are - and I quote - bound by the UN Charter. This first point is of capital importance as far as we are concerned.

• Next, the - and I quote - prime responsibility of the UN Security Council in matters of international peace-keeping and security, is affirmed in various respects.

• Finally, it is stated that NATO will carry out peace-keeping operations under - and I quote - the authority of the Security Council.

• Such is, thus, the framework within each NATO will operate in future. This is what we sought.

But of course a close reading of the communiqué and strategic concept leads to a rather different impression as even the French media are quick to point out.

Rather the US ensured that NATO continued to believe itself as having the right to take independent action. Earlier in the year, Madeleine Albright stated: „The Alliance cannot be held hostage by the veto of any single country opposed to a particular operation. If this were the case then NATO would simply be a UN subsidiary. NATO’s strength is its ability to make independent action (…). We are pleased that the Europeans are capable of sharing the weight of defense with us.”

Commentary in Russia, China and Iran were quick to point out the fact that NATO continued to reserve to itself the right to intervene without the authorization of the UN. They viewed this as quite a dangerous development.

In essence, NATO has adopted a liberal internationalist approach to intervention. It has decided that the permanent members of the UN Security Council are not all consolidated liberal democracies and can not thereby serve as a proper legitimating force for intervention, especially in the affairs of other countries. Only NATO can decide that for itself.

The non-global scope of NATO actions

The Americans wanted no limitations put on the scope of NATO action. However, over and over again in the summit communiqué and in the strategic concept the scope of action is limited to the Euro-Atlantic region.

The Americans have always been interested in involving formally the Europeans farther afield in security matters. Sometimes this has taken the form of quid pro quo of the US providing assets for European-led actions within NATO in exchange for Europeans acting farther afield. I'm sure that such issues were raised in the recent debates.

Defense capabilities initiative

It seems every ten years or so, something happens that highlights how much the Europeans depend on US technology for their defense. Twenty years ago this was the theater nuclear modernization issue. Ten years ago it was the Gulf

War. Today it is Kosovo. All of these episodes expose how far apart the Americans and the Europeans. As a result of these obvious European shortcomings, calls are made for the Europeans to catch up. They never do and I might add are unlikely ever to do so, because they are fragmented and lack the necessary political will to consolidate their defense industries. Internal issues also prevent the Europeans from acting. I’d like to quote from an article in a recent issue of French newspaper:

France, sad to say, did not learn the lesson and is letting itself be outflanked a little more from one war to the next, at the risk of cutting a laughable figure, as did it in Iraq in 1991, where the French Jaguars proved incapable of night-time bombing whereas the same planes, flying under British colors, could do so, or in (the Federal Republic of) Yugoslavia at the moment, where it has been found that some of the two-seater Mirage-2000-D’s are incapable of attacking and sighting from the same plane because they have not been fitted with the equipment (radar etc.) required for night-time precision bombing. How can such aberrations come about?

Once again, within the limits of its budget, the Air Force has given preference to its number of planes rather than to their effectiveness in battle,” and expert complained. The allegation constantly leveled at the French defense forces is just below the surface: that of going for a 14 July, parade army in which each service gets its toy in the hope it will never have to use it, even though it has to be stingy with equipment, like a collector of luxury automobiles turning down all the optional extras, in other words. Already burdened for years by investment in the nuclear strike capability, the French Army’s equipment budget (86 billion francs a year) has been eaten into by major prestige programs that have not always been effective! The army has had its Leclerc tank: 34.9 billion francs for a tank that bot nearly 20 million francs for an aircraft carrier whose landing strip has proved 4 meters too short in heavy weather. Last but not Least, the air force has had its Rafale (fighter), built by Dassault: a 188-billion franc program for which France will foot the entire bill as it has failed to find takers abroad. „At 300 million francs a throw without equipment, we will have a hard job exporting it,” they admit at the Defense Ministry, with the result that „the total bill could come to 300 billion francs”.

I see Europe thus following farther and farther behind the US. As the then head of the military committee, General Klaus Naumann has said recently, „the day may be close when the Europeans and Americans are no longer in a position to fight side by side in the same battlefield on account of growing inequality in their capabilities”. In fact, this day has already arrived as we have seen in Kosovo, in part because of the political limitations on the use of force in that conflict. No casualties meant flying at 15000 feet at night and in bad weather giving GSP guided missiles a decided advantage over laser-designated ones.

Thus we see the vision of co-operation outlined by US Defense Secretary William Cohen in November 1998 when he launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative as unlikely to take place:
Because we are modernizing and restructuring at different rates and with differing national visions, we are not as effective as we need to be as an Alliance. To move forward, we must build upon the emerging consensus evident at (the September 1998 NATO Defense Ministerial in) Vilaamoura (Portugal) by creating a 'common operational vision' and including that vision as part of the revised (NATO) Strategic Concept. We must craft our common operational vision to include four core capabilities: Mobility; Effective engagement; Survivability; and; Sustainability. We must be mobile enough to rapidly project forces and joint assistance. We must engage effectively by delivering the right assets when and where they are needed. We must enhance our survivability by improving our ability to protect our forces from terrorism and from chemical, biological, and electronic attacks. And we must increase our sustainability by ensuring our ability to deliver supplies that can meet any requirement. Achieving these core capabilities will, in turn, require three 'enablers': Responsive information collection, processing and dissemination; Interoperability, and; Joint Alliance exploitation of technological innovations.

Nuclear weapons

Disagreement also arose over the role of nuclear weapons within the alliance. In part motivated by a need to carry through at least one platform of his green party faction, the German foreign minister Joska Fischer advocated the NATO adopt a no-first use plank on nuclear.

However, nuclear weapons remained still play an important role in this version of the strategic concept, which reads, „Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.” Later in the document, the strategic concept reads: „The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.”

Future enlargement

I think the impetus for enlargement is at an end. In part this is because I believe that liberal democratic countries that are part of the NATO system have an implicit security guarantee which was made explicit in the recent Kosovo war. But in addition, the alliance will legitimately argue that it will take time to incorporate the new members - the Czech republic, Hungary and Poland. Moreover, I might note that many politicians in the US see very little domestic political advantage to be gained by adding new members.

Relationship with Russia

We should not forget that the ability of NATO to intervene in Kosovo, especially without the approval of the UN security council, reflected a very important geopolitical reality - the impotence of Russia. Yeltsin continued to harangue his generals that NATO was ignoring Russia. „Why, why” he would say. But no country that relies on the West to cover its federal budget can be a serious player and Russia has a GDP about the size of the Netherlands. Therefore, NATO has adopted a strategy of trying to engage Russia to appease its hurt pride and to deflect its potential for mischief in the region through a policy of co-option. I would say that this policy has largely succeeded. Moreover, NATO is unlikely to further irritate Russia by enlarging any time in the near future to include the Baltic state. The US will leave it to the Europeans to continue the integration of these countries.

Conclusions and observations

First and foremost, we see that NATO will remain the primary means of US engagement within Europe. In fact it is likely to become even more important in relative terms after the next election. However I see that the issues that remained vague in the language of the strategic concept and summit communiqué will be a source of tension between the US and Europe in the future.

I think that we have seen about as large a swing to liberal internationalism as we are likely to see from the foreseeable future. We are likely to see a period of consolidation. The United States is likely to become less accommodating of what it sees as failure of the Europeans to keep pace in the technological development of its military. Especially after the next US election we are likely to see a US administration which will have a focus elsewhere while demanding more from Europe.

Discussion to the presentation by M. Mihalka

K. ZAVACKÁ

She presented the view that there was a great difference in foreign policy and the views on security between Europe and the U.S.A. and the European Union and NATO. The EU did not have such a uniform foreign policy as the U.S.A. In the EU there was rather a combination of interests of various states and no „state interest” was defined. yet.
H. MIHALKA

He agreed with these views. Geostrategic location and history had an impact on this situation. The differing geostrategic orientation of the EU was a consequence of imperial traditions of some countries. In addition, it was difficult to develop a joint position in Europe because Europe did not have a natural leader. It was equally difficult to elaborate a coherent security policy and this would probably not change very quickly. However, specific European threats (weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation, migration, drugs) could be resolved. However, there was a tendency of moving to a coherent security policy. J. Solana, in his office in the EU, could play a positive role. The common foreign and security policy was taken seriously; however, NATO had the role of a dominant player. So far, the EU was not equal to NATO but there was a trend to a coherent policy.

R. TVAROŠKA

In the first question he deliberated whether the admission of three new members into NATO had not disturbed the balance and whether it would not result in instability. The second question was focused on the fact whether there was really a need to bomb the bridges over the Danube and thus damage the connection Rhine – Mainz – Danube.

H. MIHALKA

He emphasised that in his presentation he explained out the „neorealist“ approach to instability in the world. Currently, there were many institutions that get involved into conflict resolution.

The second question concerned infrastructure. Bridges were important targets. Basically, it was about the influence on Milosevic’s government and in reality the liquidation of infrastructure exerted pressure on Milosevic and speeded up his retreat. The question was what would happen if there were no such bombing and whether he would have opened another front. The historians would have to give answers to these questions.

J. EICHLER

The use of words „intervention in the interest of values“ and „liberal internationalism“ waked the view on the historic experience of 1968 when the intervention of the USSR in Czechoslovakia was justified with the need to protect values though it was about keeping the area and the terms used were „proletarian internationalism“. Was it today not only about a „justification“ and the return to classical „Realpolitik“?

H. MIHALKA

The intervention in Kosovo was fundamentally different from the one in 1968. It was different in the point that NATO had no interest to enforce its direct control over Kosovo. In addition, it was a temporary status. 1968 in Cze-

choslovakia was about imposing a concrete regime. NATO would try to withdraw from Kosovo as soon as possible. Kosovo was about the support of legitimate governments supported by their people while in 1968 it was just the opposite. It was about installing a government tributary to the USSR and the liquidation of the existing government. In addition, the objective in Kosovo was to support people who were oppressed and not to oppress who were free.

K. ZAVACKÁ

The balance of powers was also a problem of ideologies, and after 1991 there was also the issue of Russia’s ideology. It was reflected in the idea „who wins from whom“. As Kosovo was too small other interests might also be surmised. Bombing of Yugoslavia made an impact on the relation of the inhabitants of Bulgaria and Romania to NATO, though the governments of these countries motivated by their strive for NATO membership officially agreed. She expressed her doubts whether NATO was interested in the Balkans as such because the Balkans were not only Yugoslavia.

H. MIHALKA

The conclusions of Ms. Zavacká were the expression of a neo-realistic approach. Therefore he emphasised the difference between these two approaches in his presentation. In her lecture the balance of powers was characterised as the balance between two political values. The view in the theory of balance was that ideology was an „epiphenomenon“ – a status that existed but as if it were not existing. From the Soviet point of view ideology seemed to be something that served the interest of the state and it did not acquire its own life. If we were to understand the actions in Kosovo as NATO’s interest we would have to search for tangible interests serving the individual countries within NATO. However, this was not the appropriate approach to understand the actions. It was the interest to support stability and to help the people (intervention for the protection of human rights of the Kosovo Albanians).

In the medium term NATO supported a broader European stability. The Kosovo problem could influence a lengthy and deeper instability in Europe. By intervening in the given time and way NATO prevented the occurrence and development of a long lasting problem. There were also state interests, of course, but these were tackled in the negative and not the positive sense. E.g. Germany and also other EU Member States had no interest in another wave of refugees. Refugee communities were difficult, lacked integration in the European culture and Germany wanted to prevent this, so this was a negative interest.

Ms. Zavacká was right saying that after Kosovo enthusiasm for NATO diminished in Bulgaria and Romania. A similar development was observed in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic because people saw the consequences
- the expectations that they as NATO Member States had to do something. The question in Hungary was what would happen to the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina and also what the Serbian reaction would be if a ground operation were to come from Hungary.

One should look to the future - to how the people living in Southeast Europe would react. The Romanians said that there were no animosities between them and the Serbs.

Concluding he underlined that when people asked „what interests are involved in this game“ it was not a properly formulated question.

**A. GEĐOŠ**

Kosovo was a partial problem. The real issue was the war in the Balkans. The role of the UN was violated. One part of mankind took an important step without a discussion with the UN. The G-7 countries should first negotiate and only then solve.

**M. MIHALKA**

I am not the only G-7 representative. T.Blair identified 5 criteria justifying an action of this type.

1. Certainty that it was the right thing to do. Western Europe thought it was.
2. Exhaustion of diplomatic options. They were exhausted.
3. Analysis whether such a military action was possible and feasible. The answer was positive. Military action was appropriate.
4. Determining whether we were ready from the long-term perspective. The community thought that it was ready for Bosnia and Kosovo in the long-term perspective.
5. Assessment whether there was a state interest. The interest was stability in Europe, prevention of mass migration destabilising home policies of European countries.

It would be possible to deliberate why Albania and not Rwanda, why there was a lengthy conflict with worse atrocities raging in Sudan for decades. NATO could do something in the Euro-Atlantic area, it could act in Europe and for European stability. In the answer to the question why NATO took its decision without UN authorisation then NATO thought that in the area of its main responsibility it did not have to wait necessarily for the authorisation or Security Council resolution to take steps supporting European stability. NATO did not think that it had to listen to Russia to be able to take the appropriate measures but NATO wanted to implement these measures in compliance and co-operation with Russia.

**F. DRION**

If we wanted to respect the „philosophy of action” than the logic behind it must be adequate. When it was about regional level - the focus should be regional, when it was global - than the focus should be global. The issue of in-
Nikolaus W. Pfeiffer

THE EURO-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE – VIEW OF GERMANY

On the summit of the heads of states and governments in Washington from 23 April to 25 April 1999 on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of NATO it was pointed out that NATO is in fact one of the alliances in the world with the longest standing. Moreover, the summit could also look back with pride to an achievement that had turned NATO in the first half century of its existence into the most successful security organisation in history. Over the last years it underwent a complete renewal and both an external and internal adaptation. But also in the century to come it will remain the center and motor of the European peace structure. In a speech made in April this year Federal Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping put forward two reasons for this circumstance:

"On the one hand the Alliance has undergone a comprehensive process of adapting to the new geopolitical situation since the end of the East-West conflict. On the other hand the Alliance has introduced a process of dialog and co-operation with our neighbours to the East and South which will turn the Alliance into an anchor of stability for Europe as a whole."3

Therefore it is and has been a logical consequence that NATO's revised and now, since the Summit available New Strategic Concept had to be adapted to the completely changed political and strategic parameters in the "Euro-Atlantic Area" while, at the same time, it had to give evidence of both the Alliance's internal reform and its willingness to enlarge and to cooperate extensively with partners. To make sure that this concept could define the mission and the self-understanding of the Alliance in the next century there existed some important aspects from a German perspective that had to be pursued vigorously and will now be discussed in more detail.

1. The political and strategic future orientation of the Alliance both in political and strategic terms was based on an analysis of the global security policy situation. In this connection it was a question on the one hand of clearly defining the new risks and challenges posed to the member states of the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic and on the other hand of taking also into account the chances for a constructive co-operation between the Alliance and its partners, especially Russia and the Ukraine. This approach is pursued by Part II of "THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT": STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES. It describes both "THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT" and "SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RISKS".

2. This situation analysis must also serve to derive the new tasks NATO will have to fulfill with a view to the changed security policy challenges. Those new and very probable tasks such as: partnership, co-operation, crisis prevention, conflict prevention and crisis management had to be newly balanced according to their respective importance against their core function, i.e. "NATO as the warrant of collective defense and transatlantic link". NATO's responsibility as a new driving force for peace, stability and security in and for Europe and the resulting enhanced role of the Alliance was to be pointed out clearly. This was achieved by the Concept insofar as in Part III - "THE APPROACH TO SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY", this idea is commented in detail of which I would like to quote the following: "NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty". One paragraph is dedicated entirely to the significance of the "Transatlantic Link" for the Alliance. In the following passages NATO's new tasks are then described and assessed in great detail.

3. From a German perspective it was also considered to be important that a) the transatlantic link and b) the collective defense remain essential characteristics of the Alliance. Apart from that, however, the new concept was to stress NATO's character as a defensive alliance. A defensive alliance, however, which, beyond the territorial defense, is obliged to the overall Euro-Atlantic interests of maintaining peace, security and stability in and for Europe. In this context Part I - THE PURPOSE AND TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE states: "NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven

---

1 see also: Naumann, Klaus "NATO - A Look into the Future"; in: Eur optische Sicherheit 4/99, p. 11
3 see also: Scharping, Rudolf, "The Transatlantic Alliance on its way into the 21st century", Speech of the Federal Minister of Defense at the "Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft" in Bonn-Bad Godesberg on 18 April 1999
4 Ibid
since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defense of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region."

4. Within the framework of the Strategic Concept it was necessary to establish a balanced relationship between the Transatlantic Link and the development of the European Security and Defense Policy. On the basis of an equal partnership Europe will have to assume a greater responsibility. Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder expressed this in his declaration of the Federal Government in front of the German Bundestag in Bonn on 22 April 1999 as follows: "Europe has already assumed a role commensurate with its growing global responsibility especially in economic terms. Being ready to take responsibility for the enforcement of human rights, for legal certainty and legal peace Europe contributes within the scope of the Alliance to redefine our continent in political terms: as a Europe of human beings and of human rights." 

The Strategic Concept also meets this requirement since with number 30 the "European Security and Defense Identity" is given a paragraph of its own. The first two sentences state very truly: "The Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members and through which common security objectives will be pursued wherever possible remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. The European Allies have taken decisions to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defense field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and thus the security of all Allies."

5. From a German point of view it was also a basic requirement that structures and capabilities of the Alliance's armed forces should conform to the terms of reference to be defined in the new concept. These are included in PART IV - GUIDELINES FOR THE ALLIANCE'S FORCES. Here, the basic principles of the Alliance's strategy were clearly defined but also important statements were made regarding the Alliance's armed forces posture. The laid down "MISSIONS OF ALLIANCE MILITARY FORCES" (Paragraphs 47 to 50) and "GUIDELINES FOR THE ALLIANCE'S FORCE POSTURE" (Paragraphs 51 to 53) offer an important guideline for the work of the Commission on "Common security and Future of the Bundeswehr" commission established by the Federal Minister of Defense Schröder on 3 May 1999. This commission is tasked to analyze how the Bundeswehr could better fulfill its future tasks within the framework of an overall security policy. Its recommendations in connection with the long-term development of the Bundeswehr shall be submitted to the Federal Minister of Defense by

15 September 2000". Those recommendations for a future Bundeswehr structure shall include statements as regards the assignment of tasks, the size, type of armed forces, training and equipment in order to ensure that the new orientation of the Bundeswehr will meet with the permanent acceptance of society and will be realized over the next decade. In preparing the Strategic Concept it was also required to maintain a uniform defense and force planning process within the Alliance. This process shall comprise the entire spectrum of the tasks mentioned under paras 46 to 50 both in the sense of combining capabilities - according to Article 5 but also Non-Article 5 of the Washington Treaty - and a balanced combination of nuclear and conventional armed forces. Our respective ideas are particularly reflected in the "CHARACTERISTICS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES" (Paragraphs 54 to 61) and the "CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR FORCES" (Paragraphs 62 to 64).

Summary

NATO's new Strategic Concept has been adopted after long and intensive debates. The version in force until then (Rome 1991) was formally no longer applicable and had to be subjected to a comprehensive review according to a mandate issued on the occasion of the Madrid Summit 1997. One of the reasons was the fact that it still used the term "Soviet Union". Also in conceptual terms the old strategic concept was no longer valid since the Alliance's adaptation efforts made since 1991 - i.e. NATO's opening, partnership for peace, institutionalized partnerships with Russia and the Ukraine, development of the European Security and Defense Identity, the CJTF concept had taken on strategic dimensions.

The Strategic Concept stresses the Alliance's success in the fields of maintaining the freedom of its members and of preventing war during forty years of the Cold War. At the same time mention is made of the changed security policy situation and the central role NATO is playing within the scope of the emerging Euro-Atlantic security structure in coping with new risks and challenges such as in the Balkans.

The Strategic Concept will also in the future confirm the Alliance's fundamental aim, i.e. to guarantee the freedom and security of its member states and to ensure a just and lasting peace order in Europe on the basis of our common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

In this sense the Euro-Atlantic Alliance does not only guarantee the defense

---

6 Declaration of the Federal Government, loc. cit. p. 194


8 ibid
of its members but it also contributes to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The co-operation of sovereign states, the general validity of security, solidarity and unity still remain fundamental principles of the Alliance.

For decades now NATO has secured peace in Europe. In the first forty years of its existence this was done above all by keeping a strategic balance between the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact and our own Western world. After the security policy turnover in Europe the Alliance began to extend its task spectrum by placing greater emphasis on the projection of security and stability and thus it will also in the 21st century represent, together with the OSCE and the EU/WEU, an important frame of reference for meeting security policy challenges in Europe.

NATO is and remains a driving force for a new European security structure.

Due to its preparedness and capability to contribute actively to crisis management both with diplomatic but also military means the way has been paved for our security prevention in the Euro-Atlantic area.

NATO is no alternative to the United Nations. As it is a regional security organization one must not expect too much of it.⁹

The statement of a member of parliament made during the debate of the Bundestag on the occasion of NATO’s 50th anniversary had been to the point: ‘Had NATO not yet existed it would certainly have to be invented.’¹⁰

Discussion to the presentation by N. PFEIFFER

R. TVAROŠKA

He considered the statement that Europe had already assumed the role of peace-enforcer courageous. As seen from the lecture by M. Mihalka the role of the US was considerable. De Gaulle ‘expelled’ NATO from Paris. Did Europe really have such a dominant role? He thought that not.

N. PFEIFFER

In case of new NATO strategy a kind of ‘great utopia’ played a role. Without it there would be no hope for the future. He held the view that Europe should have more opportunities in safeguarding peace and human rights. The new strategic concepts followed this red thread. However, there was no intention to divide NATO into an European and an American part but rather give Europe room for problem solving. He thought that Europe would utilise this opportunity.

⁹ See also Fischer, Joschka, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs in: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Security Policy Catchwords No. 5, p. 43

¹⁰ Meckel, Markus, quoted in: Bundeswehr Aktuell, Bonn, 26 April 1999, Vol. 35, No. 16, p. 3

E. NEĆEJ

EU made progress in the 1st pillar. How did he view the role of Germany and France in the 2nd pillar – the common foreign and security policy, how could the changes in German policy influence a better formulation of own interests.

N. PFEIFFER

More consistent formulation (and enforcement) of German interests could also bring better results in the CFSP. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain Germany had been a new player in Europe and in the last 10 years Germany learned a lot from all neighbours. They had a good situation because the political line was clearly established. They wanted a large, strong Europe, Europe of human rights. They enforced this line during their 6-month EU presidency. They never were so close with France as today. The journalists looked for problems not them.

F. DRION

Germany was close player for France. The dream of two men – Adenauer and de Gaulle determined the road to the future. Democracy and human rights were this road. They would support common foreign and security policy and also economy and common currency for the future of Europe. The point was the capacity to defend stability and security in Europe. Bilateral negotiations with Britain, Italy and France were concluded at the EU summit in Cologne, which marked the beginning of the European defence process.
THE EURO-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE - VIEW OF FRANCE

1. 1949 is the birth date of NATO and France, as founding members of this new military organisation, would like to take a position as important as the ones of Great Britain and USA. But facts and events of this period drove France on the road of colonial conflicts and of the decolonization. That's why, NATO-France relationships couldn't be very intensive. Thus, in the fifties and sixties among the 13 main commands, 7 were American, 5 were British and one only was French.

2. In 1966, the French major choice about nuclear strategy (Deterrence vs. Flexible response) lead France out of the integrated military structure, which was mainly under the American strategic command and without a real political control of the nuclear decision. The most important, for France, was to preserve its national strategic autonomy. But France kept on having permanent links with the integrated military structure for air defense issues.

3. The Gulf war (1991) revealed to France the necessity of interoperability and modularity of forces more flexible and mobile. In the other hand, NATO nations considered that they could be, in the future, involved in „non-article 5“ operations, that is to say, to keep or to maintain security and stability in Europe. The NATO involvement in ex-Yugoslavia, is a good example.

4. In this new frame where the forces engagement depends on a political decision, France believed that it was possible to give, inside NATO, more responsibilities to the Europeans. Namely, to give the command of AFSOUTH (Naples) to an European Flag officer. In that purpose, France thought to join the integrated military structure (December 1995 - June 1997). But we judged NATO proposals unsatisfying. The US maintained their opposition to this issue. Thus, France defined a new position towards NATO, at the Madrid summit of July 1997:

   1. France decided to come back at the NATO Military Committee, as well as the other nations. French officers got seats at the International Military Staff, as in all the other NATO agencies and schools (NADEFCOL of Rome).

   2. France has no reason to join the integrated military structure as long as the responsibilities are not better shared between Europeans and Americans, inside that structure.

   3. But France still supports the Alliance through a constructive behavior, by participating to the Alliance renovation (reform of the commanding structure - long term study – revision of the „Strategic Concept”, external adap-

Which conclusions can we draw from the Washington Summit?

1. For us, there have been three major achievements and one fundamental reminder:

   - first, NATO commitments to human rights, democracy and the rules of law have been again emphasized,

   - Cf. W. Summit Communiqué, art. 1: „The North Atlantic Alliance founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, remains the basis of our collective defense."

   - secondly, NATO has to act under the principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter, more specifically, the role of the UNSC as primary responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security has been recalled (in the terms of the Washington Treaty, article 7).

   - Cf. article 6 reads about the fundamental security tasks of the Alliance: „In order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area: Crisis management: To stand ready, case by case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations” - article 38: „we recognize the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

   - third, NATO actions must complement those of other international organizations (OSCE, EU)

   - Cf. article 17 of the Communiqué, concerning the Kosovo crisis: „To achieve this end, NATO, WEU, the EU, the OSCE and the UN must work closely together” - articles 38, 39, and 40 of the Communiqué deal with the cooperation between Alliance, the United Nations and other regional organizations such as EU and OSCE.

Finally, the major commitment towards the collective defense as a key element of NATO cohesion has been recalled.

   - Cf. article 6, „deterrence and defence: to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided in article 5 and 6 of the W. treaty”.

2. NATO will now undertake two new missions
Partnership for peace

By developing Partnership for Peace and co-operation with other countries (NATO Russia founding act, Charter for NATO and Ukraine, Mediterranean dialogue) NATO may transform itself as a collective security organization.

But we must be careful not to create new lines of divisions: first, OSCE remains the most comprehensive security - organization; secondly, Russia must be kept within the negotiations and consultations as an essential partner for any security issue in the euro-atlantic area.

Crisis management

In crisis management, NATO must act with a specific UNSC mandate. That is particularly necessary if we consider that for such missions the consensus, between the Allies, may be more difficult to obtain than for collective defense issues. Therefore we need a clear and stable juridical framework.

Finally, crisis management implies the full implementation of NATO-Weu arrangements, as well of NATO-EU arrangements, when appropriated.

3. Two major challenges are still in front of us

- **NATO enlargement** will have to be closely considered. The so-called „open door policy“ has been reaffirmed but the procedures for its implementation are not fully clear? many dissension still exist among the Allies on how many, which countries, at which pace. Furthermore, the Kosovo events may change the agenda and the hierarchy between aspiring members. For NATO has extended its security warranty to countries near the Federal republic of Yugoslavia: Macedonia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria. Is it a form of hidden enlargement? In top of that, the recent European Stability Pact, launched in June, will also interact with NATO decisions. Under the terms of this Pact, the countries of the Balkan area are called upon to join the „euro-atlantic structures“. NATO and the EU must now discuss their enlargement plans together, in order to bring a coherent stabilization process. As a result, the only concrete achievement of the Washington Summit, the Membership Action Plan (MAP), may result obsolete.

- Above all, the Washington Summit confirmed that all Allies support our commitment towards European Defense.

- The Communiqué, in these articles 8, 9 and 10 is particularly emphasis on this point. (CF article 9: We welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and the reflections launched since then in the WEU and following the Saint-Malo declaration - (in the EU, including the Vienna European Council conclusions).

- But we must stress that for us the Alliance is a useful instrument but it is neither our unique horizon nor possibly the most appropriate instrument to allow the Europeans to act on the international stage. The integration of the WEU within EU will simplify the problem but it is a complex process.

- We must find appropriate solutions now, in order to:
  - maintain the WEU functions („acquis“, or heritage)
  - associate as much as possible to EU-led operations the European Allies non-members of the EU (Turkey, Norway, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic)
  - preserve article V of the Brussels Treaty, without negative affecting the neutral partners (Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Finland)
  - Find working procedures between EU and NATO.

Within the coming decades, we will see coexisting a North Atlantic Alliance, assuring security and territorial integrity for its members - within strick jurisdiction and geographical limits - and a strong European Defense, which is the logical consequence of the building of Europe. This cohabitation implies confidence and transparency: Europe, the transatlantic link and democracy will succeed.

Kosovo stands for the Alliance, as well as for France, the first as big and as intense operation in Europe since World War 2.

Strengthened by its experience of the Bosnian crisis, France could have a great weight inside the Alliance in every steps leading to a major involvement of our forces in Kosovo. I remind you that France was the 2nd contributor of forces during the crisis after the United States. As the Germany's ones or the United Kingdom's ones, our proposals, as full member of the coalition, have been taken into account and generally, implemented.

This crisis demonstrated that, even without the support of procedures adapted to a „non Article 5“ situation, the Allied succeeded in maintaining the cohesion and efficiency of the Alliance, as well as the legitimacy of its military choices, despite a background of heavy political and media pressure.

The great decisions of the Alliance lay on the principle of the consensus between the 19 nations. The consensus is the Alliance's strength, much more than any formal procedure.

The agreement of the 19 is necessary to approve each decision made in the name of the Alliance, whatever its topic may be: the political frame of the operations, the choice of the strategic options, the decision to start the military planning processes or the implementation of the operational plans.

Consensus is a process that requires patience and determination. That's the role of the Atlantic Council and of the Military Committee, which are the two main decision taking organisms, in which France seats, as well as all the other Allied.

During the crisis, the Military Committee met regularly in chief of Defense's format. The Atlantic council met also together many time at the level of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. This Council had taken most important decisions concerning the Alliance involvement. For example, during a ministers meeting in may 1998, the Alliance affirmed her determination to find a solution in this crisis and one month later, the 19 ministers of defense orde-
red the first military planification study. It's also during the informal session of ministers in September 1998 (Vilamoura) that Ministers of defense gave their agreement on the alert order (ACTWARN) with a view to air operations.

Moreover, in April 99, during the Washington Summit of the celebration of the Alliance 50th anniversary, the 19 Heads of State and government decided to maintain the pressure on M. Milosevic with the air operations which also contributed to reinforce the unity inside the Alliance.

I would like to insist on a not well known aspect of these operations: numerous works were done by NATO political and military organizations but also, and more important, by the capitals in order to prepare decisions of the Atlantic Council through the Military Committee activities. I remind you that NATO has nearly no forces of its own, NATO forces come from Nations's decisions to put them under OPCON of the Alliance Commanders.

In its normal running mode, each decision of the Alliance is proposed to the Nations for approval in the form of a document submitted to a „silence procedure“. This procedure consists to propose to the 19 nations, under time constraint, from a few hours up to 48 hours, each document written by the International Secretary or by the Policy Co-ordination Group (PCG). This procedure is also carried out for all the operational documents realized by the integrated military structure, as concepts or plans.

In this context, since may 1998, France answered more than 200 silence procedures, among which about 100 in the last 4 months, out of the momentum of instructions required by our representatives in Brussels.

Our capability to react to „silence procedures“, to agree to the paper or to „break silence“, on a close co-ordination basis between the MoD, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other ministries concerned, allowed us to firmly earmark our positions. So, for instance, we introduced within the air campaign, from July 1998, the principle of the necessary authorization of the Atlantic Council for allowing the transition from one operation phase to another. We persuaded also our allies to change their position on the issue by which a maritime embargo in the Adriatic sea could be imposed by force, without any international legal basis, which was, for France, the necessary legal way for this kind of operation.

It is inevitable, and to some extend normal, that some questions are subject to hard debate inside the Atlantic Council or at the military Committee. No Nation should send its soldiers in the theatre of operations without defending its own positions. France, like other Nations involved in this crisis, used the intern running of the Alliance, in order to get the leading place corresponding to its military weight on the field and its political will. On that subject, we can stress the importance of the French initiative, that led to the creation of the extraction force of the KVM (Kosovo Verification Mission), as well as the level of our participation to air operations, the second, I remind you, in the Alliance after the US.

With our allies, we will have to think about the lessons learned from the Kosovo crisis. We will have to define together procedures of decision taking adapted to the highly sensible policy of conducting non Article 5 operations which, by nature, do not engage the nation vital interests.

We will also have to uprise the issues of these lessons to the European Union level. Because the question of political control of operations will be also valuable for the future, for European Union-led peace support operations.

Discussion to the presentations by F. Drion and L. Borgoman

M. MIHALKA

Differences in the interpretation of the UN role indicated a certain source of tension in the Alliance, which would exist also in the future. The problem was the lack of unity in the language used. After NATO concept adoption in Washington the French could leave with the words that NATO submitted itself to the UN authority (that was the language Ms. Borgoman indicated). The Americans understood the same document to be „without any limitations“. He quoted „Le Monde“ which held that the new strategic concept was „explicitly“ assessing that NATO functioned under the auspices of UN SC. In the NSC there was nothing indicating that NATO should operate only under the UN SC auspices. The NSC mentioned the UN in the language defined by Ms. Borgoman. Under the pressure of time and the situation in Kosovo the press release often used language that made it possible for everyone to leave the summit with a feeling that their ideas came through. It was the language of compromise. The reality was that no idea really came through and that meant the presence of a source of tension. The question was where the source of tension would be and where the event to which NATO would be called take place. However, it was not probable that this situation should arise in this region because the intervention in Kosovo achieved a certain halt. Therefore any misunderstanding in the interpretation of NATO NSC would have no practical impact. As far as Kosovo was concerned Resolution 11/99 did not give any concrete authorisation for bombing Serbia. It only mentioned Article 7 from the UN Treaty but it did not mention the use of all available means. NATO decided on the basis of consensus. If France should insist, from case to case, that UN SC authorisation was necessary then it would be requested. In addition, veto to prevent any action could also be used. In the case of Kosovo, France did nothing of this type.

L. BORGOMANO

There was difference between media differing in their views on international law and the exact text. At the 1999 summit the problem was to determine the framework for NATO actions for a period of 20, 30, 50 years. Of course, everyone was happy that diplomatic success was achieved because a compromise was achieved. The way of NATO was the way of consensus which could be achieved through compromise and not through a blockade.
J. Tucek
In the context of the seminar held in the US, which he attended and where it was said that compared with the US, Europe did not do much for democracy, he asked why the US did not intervene in 1938, 1948 and 1968. The answer was that it was not an US interest. When assessing the current period the US interest directed to the south of Europe was pointed out. Therefore it was necessary to learn from the lessons of history.

Another problem he saw was the existing crisis of values. It seemed that we were turning away from the principles formulated at the beginning of the 1990s.

N. Pfeiffer
There was a crisis not for Europe - but it was in Europe. Kosovo was only one of the crisis we had and we should not see only one dimension. There are many latent crises. This was not only an issue for organisations like NATO, EU, WEO or OSCE but it was an issue for the whole of Europe and for the Trans-Atlantic link and for America. The reaction of Russia was also an issue.

F. Drion
When looking back improvement in the issue of values, e.g. in social matters, was visible. 100 years ago children were working 17 hours a day. It was a fact that some values were lessening and there were difficulties with which must learn to live. However, as far as the objectives in individual periods were concerned then NATO was doing its job well. The point was also to search for a new way of living and a better future for Europe.

M. MiHalka
People asked why new and new conflicts break out in the Balkans. It was true that the world security order collapsed tree times in this century. Two world wars broke out and the third one, at the threshold of the Cold War, did not. But we talked about the change of values. I would like to show the case of France and Germany. Their representatives sit with you at one table and they talk about the adherence to the same values. And, indeed, they fought each other in two wars. We really experienced changes of values.

K. Zavacka
NATO Member States ambassadors pointed out the consequences of the Kosov action performed in the way as it was. In the dilemma between a political and military concept the latter one won and we would have to wait to see its result. NATO European Member States would have to cope with long-lasting problems in this area which need not to exist.

As far as the NATO strategic concept was concerned it lacked protection against international terrorism. It was very moderately indicated in Article 53 of the NSC, letter e which reads „Alliance’s forces and infrastructure must be protected against terrorist attacks”.

L. Borgomano
There was a real threat of terrorism. However, NATO as a military organisation could respond to military threat. It could respond if the threat was against NATO troops or buildings. Terrorism was so diffuse and global that NATO (though being a global organisation) was capable to do all the work but this was not its mission. There must be also other bodies. It could not be done with military means only.

M. MiHalka
He did not see NATO primarily as a military organisation for it was rather a political security organisation. The first NATO Secretary General formulated the thesis of „keeping the US inside, the Russians out and the Germans down”. It was primarily a military purpose. The political goal of NATO was to continue its engagement in European security with the participation of the US. One could doubt whether the Germans should be down and the Russian out but NATO should rather have an integrating function.

As far as mafias and terrorism were concerned the things have changed fundamentally. We were not talking about the threat from Russia or another country. We could discuss whether NATO was the best means against terrorism. NATO adjusted to these changes. It adopted measures not for drugs but for weapons trafficking. However, in the European security architecture there were many institutions and each should do what it did the best. The EU would be a far better place for resolving these problems.

N. Pfeiffer
He also thought that NATO was not primarily a military institution. However, it was the only institution which used force to implement certain policy. However, as far as the new strategic concept was concerned (the opinion by Ms. Zavacka) this one was already the 4th concept. The first two lasted till 1967 and 1991 – Rome. The other two had a far shorter life and it was possible that in 5 – 6 years a new concept would be needed. In Washington 1999 there were some chapters which were modified even on the very last evening before signing and then translated very quickly. This had an impact on some nuances in understanding. Germany thought it must comment on 30 points, but there were also many other. If there were a need for change in 10 years so the concept would be changed.
On the other side, the new strategic concept has to be red together with the summit final communiqué, at least for those decisions that are mainly political. We could find out that:

- the second phase of the enlargement process will be reconsidered only in year 2002,
- decision on ESDI have been already implemented to a great extent,
- the defence capabilities initiative has been launched to improve Alliance military capabilities,
- the MDW initiative has been adopted to have better means to face the dangers of mass destruction weapon proliferation,
- NATO recognized the UN security council as the main responsible of peace keeping and international security.

One final consideration on Washington summit. We could not expect any statement on the legitimacy of NATO operations conducted for urgent humanitarian reasons, without a specific U.N. mandate, while bombs where falling on Belgrade.

The new NATO strategic concept is the result of the current political reality, in the context of the need to avoid, after the end of cold war, a re-nationalization of security policies and to maintain the transatlantic link.

The new strategy has been built on immediate experiences. Amongst which are:

- long and complex aggregation process, such as European integration,
- a more frequent mixture of political and military interventions.

The new strategic concept is a collective structure, to which each member offers his contribution in terms of national priorities.

Let me say, at this point, something about Italian priorities.

The Italian defence policy is based on the following two fundamentals: first is participation in the North Atlantic treaty, which has assured Italy during the last 50 years a valid security framework and is the best guarantee for future regional stability, second is Italy’s full support to the European concept, that remains a vital element in the national defence and security policy. These two pillars underline our significant contribution to the Partnership for Peace process and various United Nations initiatives, aimed at reaching international stability and peace.

From these fundamental points derives guidelines for our policy:

- the implementation of the new NATO strategic concept,
- the contribution to the development of the new European security and defence identity,
- the co-operation with central and eastern European countries,
- the Italian central role in the Mediterranean, creating an important European north-south link,
- the stability of those areas in the world in which Italy has strategic interests, such as the middle east, eastern and southern Africa.
The new geopolitical environment presents two crises arcs for US, one in the east (the Balkans) and one in the south (North Africa and the middle east). Both of them have significant consequences on our security, above all because of the flow of immigrants and illegal weapons and drug trade. Moreover, we have many important economic relations that are threatened by the precarious regional political stability.

With regards to the Balkans, our diplomacy is pushing towards a greater role in the Dayton agreement implementation and leading to the reduction of NATO forces in the region. Benefiting from the economic situation, Italy also takes part in all south-eastern European defence ministerial initiatives. In the military field, Italy provides a strong contribution to a multinational brigade composed also of Hungarian and Slovenian units. The brigade can be considered as a component of the multinational peace force for south-eastern Europe. Romania and Austria will probably take part in the near future. Many other activities underline Italy’s strong policy towards the Balkans:

- Operation ALBA (SUNRISE) in which Italy was the leading nation,
- the participation to IFOR/SFOR operations,
- the contribution to KFOR in Kosovo,
- and again the support to the Albanian economic, social and security activities,
- in addition, we are currently assisting in the education and training of Romanian and Bulgarian officers.

The Mediterranean theatre also presents serious risks for US. In this context, Italy is moving in accordance with NATO strategy and European policy, trying to establish useful relations with each north African country. In particular, the initiatives taken in the sphere of Partnership for Mediterranean have been very important, having involved 5 European countries and 5 Maghreb and Mashreq countries. This is not enough and Italy believes the next aim to be reached should be the institutionalization of an Euro-Mediterranean partnership. In the near future, many bilateral agreements are in progress or will be defined in the near future. Similar reasons pushed Italy to establish similar relations with middle east countries, such as Lebanon and Jordan. Strong links with Israel and Iran are currently being developed.

With regards to eastern and southern Africa, Italy is making efforts to ensure a solid stability by supporting African crises response initiatives and southern African development community activities. In particular, I have to underline Italy’s attempts to establish peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in which two different technical-military assistance missions will be launched as soon as there are the necessary political conditions. Moreover Italy played a primary role in the Mozambique crisis, one of the few U.N. interventions that reached full success. I have still to highlight the growing importance of relations with the Republic of south Africa, that is currently the leading nation for the economy and security of the sub-region.

So what I have been saying and the geographic position of Italy close to the Mediterranean and the Middle East arc of crises, advise us to oppose any restrictive vision of the Alliance, that could exclude interventions in areas of instability.

We think that the Alliance is a more preferable means than an improvised coalition or a unilateral adventure. But we also think that we should avoid the other extremity represented by a NATO acting as a „sacred Alliance”.

Furthermore we think that NATO should have a clear legitimacy, when and where individual and collective security is not concerned. Such legitimacy should come from universal organizations such as the United Nations, or from organizations characterized by strong democratic principles, such as the European Union.

The new strategic concept reflects our interests and those of our allies. This means:

- to maintain a conventional and a nuclear deterrence (with the nuclear one being drastically reduced),
- to re-balance the European component of the Alliance, and to build, within the Alliance itself, a security and defence identity of the Union,
- to involve Russia in a permanent dialogue and in participation towards continental stability,
- the open door policy towards new candidates to join NATO, strengthening in the meantime co-operation and partnership policies towards them,
- greater security in the Mediterranean area, to increase the trust in Alliance intentions from the countries of southern shores,
- a better NATO capability to react to MDW proliferation.

Let me comment now on two points that I believe of great importance: the open door policy and the European security system. As I have already said the decision to proceed to the 2nd phase of enlargement has been deferred to the year 2002. In fact there are some aspects to be considered before allowing other countries such as Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states enter the Atlantic institution.

Some NATO members believe that balancing the current eastern enlargement with a similar southern enlargement is a necessary step to be taken now. This should stabilize a theatre that might be the source of troubles for Europe and, more generally, for the west in the near future.

A larger group of NATO members believes that the Alliance has to wait for a period of 4 or 5 years before starting phase 2 of the enlargement process, because of the situation in the new potential members countries (of social and economic nature in some cases or of endemic political nature in other cases), but mainly because Russian opposition to NATO enlargement could be a significant obstacle for the west, that has to maintain as good relations as possible with such an important international actor. In any case the partnership established with the NATO-Russia act needs to be built up through a day by
day working environment of good faith, transparency and mutual understand-
ing. In this context that Russians are principally apprehensive about are ad-
ditional countries such as the Baltic states joining NATO. In the past Russian
authorities preferred to oppose NATO enlargement even at the price of con-
siderable tensions with the west, in order to immediately draw a clear line and
avoid a later confrontation over additional aspirants. Future Russian reactions
would probably be stronger if the Baltic states were to enter NATO without
a previous period of assessment. A pause of five or more years for the Allian-
ce to assimilate the first set of new members and carefully evaluate the bene-
fits and risks of any further enlargement would have much merit. On the other
end there is a political need to be considered: giving the impression that the
enlargement process is still in progress could be a positive signal to potential
candidate countries.

As far as European security system is concerned, I believe that the OSCE is
evolving as a global security architecture in Europe, a sort of European UN. It
does not possess, however, the means to accomplish its tasks. No matter how
important it may be from a political point of view, the OSCE will keep on being
a nominal institution as long as it does not change its decision making process.
It can either create a directory of major powers, similar to the UN security cou-
ncil, or it can deliberate on the basis of a qualified majority, and not on the ba-
sis on unanimity as it does now.

In any case the OSCE is destined to become the political organ of a Euro-
pean security community, with no direct responsibility for military matters. This
means that for a long time Europe will be characterized by a merely nominal
security system, while common defence institutions will be fragmented. At this
regard NATO is beginning to be viewed as the possible military component of
the OSCE.

On the other end WEU might change into an effective institution only in ca-
se of a weakening of NATO and of US disengagement, caused by the evolution
of European integration towards an actual federation. At present it is useful only
as a liaison between France and the European members of NATO. The Eu-
ropean area will therefore be characterized by a multi-institutional security sys-
tem. In order to be effective the system should evolve in such a manner to
include two well structured levels:

- a Pan-European level formed by the OSCE, whose security tasks would be
  mainly political. It could give regional legitimacy on military intervention,
- an operational level to be identified with NATO, competent to conduct mili-
  tary operations. NATO should keep in contact with WEU in order to co-or-
  dinate French contribution and should offer other OSCE members the pos-
  sibility to enter ad hoc coalitions.

Another step I think is important for a more effective European security po-
licity. Acceleration of the economic integration, however limited, between cen-
tral and eastern Europe, on one side and western Europe on the other. Since
it is impossible in the short term to integrate our eastern neighbors in the Eu-
ropean community, it is necessary to develop a system of secondary and se-
lective ties in order to bind their economies to the EC area. The current trend
which is moving towards the goal of pragmatic integration in selected fields must be reinforced
and clarified.

I would like to conclude going back to new NATO strategic concept to stress
the importance we give to two very sensitive points which are geographic limits
and legitimacy of interventions.

As far as geographic limits are concerned I would like to recall the formul-
a "in/and around for Europe" which means enough flexibility for the possi-
ble intervention of the Alliance without going too far. As far as legitimacy is
concerned there is the need to match two factors: first for NATO to conduct
non article five operations with a clear mandate from other organizations,
such as at a universal level the UN, second to preserve NATO flexibility and
operativity.

In other words it is necessary to act within the framework of the principles
of international law, but at the same time safeguarding the Alliance as a means of
stability and security.

Discussion to the presentation by F. Rizzi

K. MATOŠEK

His thoughts on the idea which was in the air in Slovakia, i.e. that the first
round of NATO enlargement was incomplete without Slovakia.

F. RIZZI

Italy was interested in the southern flank of NATO and therefore they sup-
ported Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. They, however, supported enlarge-
ment continuity and the open door policy.

M. LABUŽIK

The first problem was European security and defence identity, where Italy
and France had slightly differing views. The US had still a dominant position in
NATO. Italian and French views on this position diminishing. It would either be
bad experience or a new set of politicians who understand international relations
in a different form would come.

Another problem was terrorism and lack of unity in its definition. Some co-
tries classified UCK a terrorist organisation while in Kosovo they acted as pe-
ace makers.

F. RIZZI

European security and defence identity should not be separated from NATO
and the US were a member of it. Italy emphasised that it must be together and
it must clearly include the trans-Atlantic link.
As far as availability of means for Europe was concerned it would require long time and costs. Therefore EBOI was not separated from NATO as a political and military institution.

As far as terrorism was concerned they had their experience with red brigades and they did not view it as something not of concern for military organisations. It was necessary to engage military troops, however in co-operation with the police, they did not want to take over military functions. In general, however, terrorism should be separated from military organisations.

During the Cologne EU summit it was decided that till the end of 2000 the 2nd pillar should be built within the EU – it was the defence pillar. It was a sign that the European countries were interested to have the problems of European territory defence resolved.

Jan Eichler

THE EURO-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE – VIEW OF NEW NATO MEMBER STATES – THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Initial ideas

At the very beginning of the 1990s there was great hope and expectations, the last Czechoslovak President spoke even publicly about a parallel dissolution of both blocks and talked big in favour of a co-operative security system.

The change of 1993

Later, however, the interest to join NATO was mentioned more often. In the Czech Republic this occurred only after the split of the former Federal Republic. Those forces, which contributed the most to the split of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic – the whole ODA, most of the ODS, President of the Republic, Vondra, V. Žantovský, strove for NATO membership the strongest. Is it only a coincidence of historic moments or the one was the prerequisites for the other?

The grounds for NATO accession

Russian threat was the most used argument – this ceased when Czech politicians found out that this was the most inappropriate argument in the West, mainly in Western Europe.

The argument of propagating stability started to be mentioned more – however, this argument has also many paradoxes – see M. Mandelbaum.

The expression „community of values“ has become the magic formula – however, there is also a pitfall – why some countries could join and the others not?

The right wing fundamentalist – J. Ruml, M. Žantovský, J. Payne and other Jacobins – concentrated on the domestic policy dimension of NATO’s mission – for them NATO is a guarantee of internal political stability and a barrier protecting from the return of communism. And this is an anti-thesis of the mission of the former Warsaw Treaty. Slightly exaggerating one could talk about a shift from „the wall of peace and socialism“ to „the wall of peace and capitalism“.
What NATO have we joined?

At the beginning the politicians from NATO Member States reminded us that we are joining a new NATO which we should not expect to protect us against Russia but to give us tasks related to propagation of stability eastwards.

- However, we have joined it in a period featuring:
  - the return to the policy of force and power - see Samuel Huntington;
  - the dominant position and influence of the USA in NATO;
  - the shift of the USA to global universalism. P. Boniface warns that with respect to the so called values they behave in the same way as the USSR did with respect to the values of the so called world socialism in the past.

What can we mean for NATO?

As early as 1995 the RAND openly stated that the leading politicians in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are pro-American and that they will strengthen the American influence in NATO. Other NATO countries gradually joined this view.

This has been fully confirmed – the leaders of the three new NATO Member States supported American positions – this applied mainly to V. Havel. And, thus, another paradox has been confirmed – the more NATO enlarges in Europe the more pro-American it becomes.

The new countries have also become new markets for the American defence industry – the unique case of 159 aircraft.

What is the significance of the individual new NATO Member States?

Because of its territory, demographic potential and also due to its active diplomacy the greatest contribution is Poland.

Then, I would rank Hungary the second – mainly because of their contribution to the stability in the area (the relations with Rumania and Slovakia).

And on the third place I see the Czech Republic - the result of propagating stability eastwards is almost equal to nil. This view was also confirmed by President’s article in a special issue of Summer 1997 NATO Review. Compared with the articles by Polish President and Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs this article was modest in its length and ideas.

What will the results of Yugoslav tragedy be?

A two-week membership in NATO was enough to be in war with a country with which we all had some historic links:

- e.g. Hungary supported Croatian Ustaschas in their efforts aimed against the Belgrade dynasty from as early as the end of the 1920s, and at the beginning of WW2 the country has expanded its territory into regions of former Yugoslavia which then ceased to exist for the first time.
- on the other hand, Czechoslovakia had always good relations with Yugoslavia – the Little Entente, the 1945-1947 period, year 1966;
- in a way, we even had parallel history:
  - formation at the same time – mainly because of WW1 resistance,
  - comparable problems with dominant position of the most numerous nation (the Serbs in Yugoslavia, the Czechs in Czechoslovakia),
  - the first demise at the beginning of WW2,
  - the second demise after the end of the Cold War,
  - our relations with Yugoslavia deteriorated only when a dominant power in an organisation guaranteeing our security wished it – after 1947 it was the USSR and today it is the USA.

If to talk about the action conducted by the world community in the Balkans, then, we were again confronted with a fait accompli – we had no influence on the decisions taken with respect to the actions in Kosovo. We were forced to believe in the magic formula that NATO opted for the least evil and that all other solutions would be even worse.

Each of the three new countries, thus, participated in a way in a power solution, where it is not certain at all that it will mean a real long-lasting stability not only in the territory of former Yugoslavia but in the Balkans as such.

How to continue?

I have already appreciated Poland and Hungary for visible success in the improvement of their relations with countries that were a serious problem in the past.

As far as the Czech Republic is concerned it must cope with the consequences of its arrogant behaviour of 1993 – 1995 when it, lacking any substantiation, presented itself as the leader. One of the first contributions made by the country is the Greek-Czech initiative.

The consequences of the period when the relations of many politicians, and in particular of the President, were burdened by personal animosity and hatred against V. Mečiar, and demonising of the whole HZDS, are still not overcome. F. Mitterrand did not like H. Schmidt, either, and J. Chirac was really not in deep love with H. Kohl, however, these feelings had never had negative impacts in the relations between France and Germany.

If to talk about the Czech Republic, then, much can be learned from the visionary statements of its President:

- since 1993 he urged NATO enlargement, and in the end, it has become reality;
• in 1994 he required bombing of Serbian positions, and his wishes were materialised the following year during the war in Bosnia;
• in autumn of 1998 he said at a meeting of the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic that he can imagine a bloody conflict outside NATO territory in Europe, where the Alliance will be forced to intervene. His idea became true on 24 March 1999;
• during his last tour in the USA and Canada he outlined his vision of the eastern border of the Euro-Atlantic area – the Baltic states, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other words: there is no room of orthodox church civilisation in this area – with the exception of Greece which has become a NATO member in the Cold War period due to its strategic location.

If this vision were to become reality then it would not mean a continuation of co-operative security but rather a new dividing line in Europe. And its contribution is more than doubtful.

Ferencz Gazdág

THE EURO-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE – VIEW OF NEW NATO MEMBER STATES - HUNGARY

The membership of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland provides a historic and unique opportunity not only for these three countries, but for every country in the region, to change traditional geopolitical thinking to a new, collective perception of security, based on the commonality of values. This historic opportunity firstly consists of stopping the swinging of pendulum, alongside the region time-to-time changed their geopolitical position. Now, they believe to belong definitely to the family of Western-type democracies. The real significance of our membership could therefore be truly assessed of the three new member-states, a new chapter was opened (March 12, 1999).

At the beginning of the nineties, most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe opted for a firm place in the community of western democratic nations. Looking back to what has happened to date, we can confirm, that decision was the most important and long lasting decision for all those countries to be taken. We continue to consider this determination as of crucial importance and would therefore like to see this process continue as more and more countries fulfil the criteria of membership and become our allies. We are also ready and willing to help them with our experience and assist their efforts through close co-operation on both bilateral and regional and sub-regional level. It is important to realise that the enlargement of security zone provided by the Alliance does not mean an exemption from the fulfilment of conditions of membership.

The Washington Summit has confirmed this strong determination, and has reinforced our joint commitment to partnership and its further development. The new Strategic Concept, the Membership Action Plan and the Summit Declaration itself have set the stage for a new, enhanced form of co-operation and encourage the countries applying for membership in NATO to carry on their reform programs. The Euro-Atlantic orientation should remain a key element in the policies of these countries, which must feel it imperative to act together for the sake of common security in Europe.

One of the largest challenge to the European security has been the bloody Yugoslav war. Since its beginning (1991) the Hungarian foreign policy has a double difficulty? we had to take into account not only one geopolitical fact, namely that Hungary became and remained a neighbour to near all of the successor state (Slovenia, Croatian, Serbia), but also the existence of large Hungarian minority living in Vojvodina. The experience of the ongoing crisis has again clearly proven the importance of common democratic values in streng-
hening stability. The tragedy we are witnessing in Kosovo demonstrates how easily the lack of democracy and the disrespect for the human rights can destabilise a whole region and lead to a humanitarian catastrophe. On the brighter side, this crisis has also shown that the neighbouring countries of the best protection that can only be achieved through the adoption and respect of widely shared democratic values. We believe that this is the one and only long-term solution to ethnic hatred, intolerance and impatience. Yet, we all aware that this will take time but this should in no way discourage us from continuing with our efforts. Very much on the contrary.

The IFOR-SFOR experience provided a lot to Hungary as far as the NATO issues. Following the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Hungary reacted positively to the request of the Alliance to provide bases and logistic support on Hungarian soil to the US forces taking part in the IFOR operation and the Nordic Brigade. Plus we sent an engineering battalion to Bosnia. It was the first living NATO operation that Hungary took part in, and which pointed beyond the former frameworks and goals of PIP co-operation. As a new member, Hungary joined the NATO just the time when the Alliance undertook its first operation in Kosovo. On one side we provided all categories of host-nation support to these operations, on the other side we had to face a real risk, taking into account the existence of a large Hungarian minority, living in Vojvodina. Now, after the end of air strikes, we are actively taking part the follow-up activities, and Hungary is sending one unit into the KFOR.

In Bosnia, we have seen that indifference, in the end, proves to be more costly than engagement. In the case of Kosovo - even the international community tried to avoid making the same mistake and to act in time - something very similar happened, demonstrating that the mechanism of international organisations has not yet really adapted to the post-cold-war reality. Autumn of 1998 would have been better to act, and the following half year proved to be simply vast of time. During this period Beograd disposed enough time to prepare coarsely the next wave of ethnic cleansing. After that the air strikes couldn’t prevent the speed up of the events. Our common engagement has strengthened NATO and the transatlantic link, and demonstrated our strong resolve. Kosovo is different from Bosnia in many respects, but the challenge is ultimately the same: to look the other way or to get engaged.

Hungary - now as a full member of NATO and a country situated in the heart of Europe, and in the vicinity of a crisis-torn region - will do its utmost to project stability further to the entire region it lives in. It will do so by maintaining and developing good-neighbourly relations with all the countries of the region and by supporting the endeavours of countries striving for Euro-Atlantic integration to meet the requirements of full membership. It is also to that end that we wish to put greater emphasis on making use of all the bilateral, regional and sub-regional frameworks that have been established. We have a vital interest in seeing and also actively promoting the Euro-Atlantic commitment of our neighbours prevail and even increase. As the past years have clearly demonstrated, the mere perspective of accession served as major incentives and catalysts for countries to redouble their efforts aimed at promoting and consolidating their democracy and market economy and at fostering good-neighbourly relations.

We all must understand that the period of economic transition has put a growing pressure on societies to make sacrifices and challenged the democratic political system with tendencies and waves of instability. Therefore maintaining foreign and domestic stability proved to be invaluable as the benign environment to this process. Countries in the region have started their transition process at different times and from various levels of economic development. Moreover, they have maintained dissimilar pace in transforming their political social and economic structures. The logical conclusion from all this is that the dates of their accessions to the Euro-Atlantic institutions will also differ. Now we know that the process of enlargement is much more complex is the case of the European Union and to meet the criteria of the EU require permanent and strong determination from the side of applicants. This road will be longer than we have ever expected.

Hungary does understand well that Russia played and will play a determining role in Europe. There are precise sources of risks. However, that are linked to social, political and economic tendencies and that are characteristic of Russia. They do pose a danger first of all to Russia itself, secondly, to the countries beyond its borders. We are therefore interested in a stable and predictable Russia, one that is able and willing to co-operate with the outside world. The projection of stability brought about by NATO enlargement will strengthen security in the Western neighbourhood of Russia and ultimately, the security of Russia itself, and will enhance the chances for reformers and further reforms in Russia itself.

The Russian participation in the European security architecture is essential to maintaining and enhancing security in the Euro-Atlantic region. We cannot build a democratic and stable Europe without or against the will of Russia. That is why an European interest to keep Russia constructively involved in European affairs. Naturally, Russian determination to co-operate is equally important and required to achieve these goals.

As we can see, preserving and enhancing security in Europe is a major challenge and undertaking. It requires, on the one hand, firm commitment, dedication, determination and consistence on the part of all the European nations. However, as history has proved it several times in the history of the outgoing century, this goal may not be achieved without the continued engagement, commitment and presence of the United States on the European continent, for which NATO provides the most solid and durable framework. This is one reason why membership in NATO and the continued existence and engagement of the Alliance is so important to us.

Hungary takes the process of Euro-Atlantic integration in the largest meaning of this world and takes the European and Euro-Atlantic organisation – that
is, OSCE, the EU, NATO, the WEU, the Council of Europe and OECD - as parts of one and the same united system, as mutually complementing and reinforcing components of that structure.

As soon as possible we would like to be a full fledge member of the European Union too. Under the recent economic conditions the EU can provide the best institutional framework for our peaceful development. Of course with the WU membership we also believe to become the member of the Eastern European Union. Hungary is backing all CFSP activities as possible and we are expecting the development of the ESDI in the nearest future.

Antoni Z. Kamiński

THE EURO-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE – VIEW OF NEW NATO MEMBER STATES – POLAND

The twentieth century was an eventful, and often tragic period for the whole region of East-Central Europe (E-CE). The demise of communism at the turn of nineteen eighties opened new opportunities for the region. A new political and security order has been emerging on the continent which brings about deep changes in its geopolitical pattern.

NATO enlargement during the Washington Summit in April this year seems to be the most significant decision taken by the Western Alliance in building the new security order in Europe. Its consequences cannot be fully assessed yet, and the amount of debates that had surrounded this bold step shows how complicated and full of uncertainties it were. The enlargement was accompanied by the adoption of a new strategic concept. Finally, the newly enlarged NATO had an immediate opportunity to test its value in Kosovo.

The purpose of this presentation is to outline the motives behind the polish effort to join NATO and to look at some of the consequences of NATO membership for Poland, and for E-CE.

The main purpose of the Polish government after the demise of communism in 1989 was to work toward the consolidation of a stable European order by creating a network of treaties that recognised the existing borders and obliged the signatories to respect the rights of national minorities. Other international efforts of successive Polish government, like participation in the Visehrad cooperation, have also served the end.

Soon after the demise of the Warsaw pact in June 1991, and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the territory of Poland, the Polish government declared the attainment of membership in NATO and the US as its „strategic objective”. This has been considered as binding by all the succeeding government coalitions.

There were many motives behind these aspirations. Some were explicitly stated and used as arguments to promote the cause, others were never mentioned. Some were more general, like the persuit of the Western option which was said as natural for the country with deep connections with the West. Others were more specific, like the argument that the East-Central Europe (E-CE) belonged to the „grey security area” between the stable West and the unstable East. The desire to end with the „between” status, which characterised the strategic situation of Poland since the eighteenth century was particularly strong.
On the other hand, the language used by some Russian foreign policy and security circles gave an additional weight to the argument. Notions like the "near abroad", to describe the former Soviet republics, or aspirations to a "sphere of influence" suggested that Russia has not yet abandoned its traditional aspirations to dominate the region. Thus, the NATO enlargement could serve as a signal for Moscow that this mode of thinking was not accepted as legitimate.

The popular use of the term "grey security area" did not imply, however, that the possibility of an armed invasion was taken seriously. Had it been so, the share of military expenditures in the Polish budget would have certainly exceeded the two percent or so of the GNP. Yet, it is obvious that a sound defence policy must take into account not only the present security threats, but also the possible future ones.

Furthermore, taking into account what Polish politicians perceived as a traditional consistency of Russian foreign policy objectives and the quality of its diplomacy, and their fear of a certain lack of ability to grasp Russian intentions by the West, there is no wonder that the authorities in Warsaw could have felt uneasiness not fully justified by circumstances of the moment.

Let us consider what steps Poland would have taken in the absence of a realistic prospect for NATO membership. One can speculate that the Polish government would have been compelled to look for "alternative solutions", i.e., to look for allies against Russia in the region. There is no doubt, in my view, that these solutions would all have had a destabilising impact on the E-CE region.

To give one instance, Poland could have positively reacted in 1993 to an initiative to build with Ukraine, the Baltic states and Romania a security alliance to oppose the suspected murky Russian designs for the area. Such an undertaking, stemming naturally from a feeling of uncertainty, would have to be interpreted as anti-Russian and would have raised the level of political insecurity throughout the European continent. Thus, by eliminating risky policy alternatives, the decision to enlarge NATO helped to stabilize the political-military situation in the region.

There is a factor which has not been used in the debate on NATO enlargement, but whose importance should not be underrated: the Poland's accession to NATO removed military security concerns from the realm of bilateral relations between Poland and Russia, relegating them to the level of multilateral talks within the CSCE, or between NATO and Russia, within the NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council. This is a factor that can help to put the Polish-Russian relations on the right track, by focusing their content on the constructive aspects of economic and political co-operation in the region.

Thus, paradoxically, the NATO enlargement can contribute to regional stability and peaceful co-operation in E-CE by de-emphasising the importance of military concerns in the bilateral relations, and by helping Russia to change her internal and external political priorities, although the latter will be much more difficult than the former.

We should consider that, despite the strong position of the military in Russia's internal politics, the most important problems of the country, which also affect the status of the military, are related to the unfinished consolidation of democratic regime and the marked economy. I suspect that political objectives supported by the army in relation to its immediate external environment conflict with the aim of achieving economic development and political stability in Russia.

Consider, for instance, the case of the Union of Belarus and Russia (UBR). The political and economic regime of Belarus is the least reform-minded of all the postcommunist European states. It has been dominated by the most retrogressive elements of the old communist state. This exotic political mould could have survived only due to Russian economic assistance.

Last but not least, the accession to NATO posed before the new democracies in the postcommunist world the issue of civil control over the military. The solution to this problem is a crucial factor the consolidation of democratic regimes. Let me add that for many reasons the situation in Poland from this point of view is far from satisfactory. Yet, it is certain that the membership in NATO will bring about more effort to change the situation.

The civil control over the armed forces is not the only problem faced by the Polish government and the Polish military. The task of overcoming the heritage of the communist past has not been concluded yet: it can be seen in the organisation and equipment of armed forces, their territorial dislocation, elements of the cultural ethos of the army, etc. Yet, an important obstacle to the change of missions and a corresponding re-organisation of the armed force and a change in equipment are financial constraints.

An event of great consequence for the security of E-CE and for the consolidation of democratic regimes and market economies in the region has been the Kosovo operation. I am not going to discuss its political-military dimension. Yet, two elements of the Kosovo operation seem to be of particular importance. First of all, the focus of Western attention has shifted to the former Yugoslavia. This implies a certain decline of importance of E-CE on the priority list of Western powers; this may turn out to be particularly painful for countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine which have been co-operated with NATO at some political and, even more importantly, economic cost to themselves. Second, the key decision-making point has shifted from NATO and the EU to the G-8, i.e., to a forum which has no formal status in international law. Last but not least, these tendencies remove from the current Western priority list the topic that is unquestionably the most important for the transformation of the European security system: the Russian transition to democracy and Russia's incorporation into European and world political and economic co-operation. To address this most important issue, the West should agree upon a strategic doctrine and should follow it in a fairly coherent way. The strengthening of the second pillar of European Union, the common foreign and security policy, should help achieving this task.
To conclude, let me first repeat that the NATO enlargement had three important effects:

1. it enhanced the level of political-military stability in the region, and eliminated the policy alternatives that could threaten peace in Europe;
2. it created opportunities for concentration on political and economic co-operation, while removing the military security concerns from the realm of bilateral relations;
3. it helped democratic consolidation by providing conditions for a more effective civil control over the army.

Second, the Kosovo operation shifted the critical decision-making point from NATO and EU to the G-7, and forced upon the West a change of focus from the realm of strategy in establishing a new European order to that of tactics. These, to my mind, are negative developments. As mentioned earlier, the most important task for Europe is grounding the former republics of the USSR in a stable European political and economic order. The task is a relatively easy one when it concerns small countries like the Baltic republics. It becomes highly complex when it comes to Russia or Ukraine. Whatever aspirations Russia may have in world politics, she must first establish her presence in Europe. The Russia of the future will be much a product of her own efforts as of the European effort to accommodate her in a way that would satisfy both Russian national ambitions and European formal expectations as to Russia’s conduct in international affairs. One of the steps in this direction is to make co-operation within the NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council more active, as well as to re-invigorate the EU-Russian ties.

Last but not least, it is to give the regional integration, within the realm of institutions, like the Visegrad Group, CEFTA and the CEI, a higher priority than at present. The first wave of NATO enlargement and the possible EU enlargement should be counter-balanced by a strong network of institutionalised regional contacts that would eliminate the threat of a new division of Europe between the „ins“ and „outs“. Also the new NATO members should maintain a high level of co-operation within the PIP to create good prospects for the next wave of NATO enlargement.

Wolfgang Wosolsobe

THE EURO-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE – EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE

The austrian view

Allow me first to thank you for the opportunity to set out the Austrian view on the Euro-Atlantic Alliance in this high-ranking forum.

It is a privilege to discuss questions of security with neighbours and friends. It offers a highly welcome occasion to check the own position and to confront it with different views. To free a wider room for the debate, I want to stress that I am talking on my personal behalf, not officially. For those who mainly expect an official position, I can assure that my post as a deputy director for military policy in the Austrian MOD will not allow me to deviate too far from actual Austrian security policy. In order to remain as close as possible to the existing policy, allow me to focus rather on our view on Euro-Atlantic security than on aspects of the Alliance.

People dealing with security questions in Austria presently live a challenging period. It is not always easy to co-operate membership in EU, international solidarity, a strong commitment to the PIP-context, regional co-operation, neutrality and a series of elections. This is exactly the situation we have to manage at this very moment. I can imagine how difficult it may be for observers abroad to predict or simply to systematically observe a policy driven by seemingly contradictory factors.

A statement on the security policy of a small sized state always has to strike a balance between self-confidence and modesty. We have good reasons to be self-confident because of our still dynamic economy and of our multi-faceted contribution to European and global security, even as a neutral. We have to be modest, because even the most intense effort to contribute to European security will not enable a small country to play a determining part in the solution of a problem. But, and here I come back to self-confidence, the addition of limited contributions certainly makes up a sizeable part of the common effort. This is the basic idea of solidarity. Quickly I have to turn back to modesty, being aware of the problems a permanent neutrality status can create in a wider security framework.

So far, all necessary ingredients for my presentation are outlined. EU-membership, PIP-commitment, international solidarity and regional co-operation are the determining elements of the Euro-Atlantic security dimension from an Austrian point of view.

Let me take them one by one and start with the EU-membership. Austria has
to implement Article 17 of the Amsterdam treaty. That means a strong commitment to European security. On the first hand, these are Petersberg tasks to fulfil and the related operational requirements to meet, at a later stage Article 17 can lead to a full-fledged system of collective defence if the Member States so decide. As long as such a decision has not been taken, Austria can maintain her position between full solidarity and neutrality. Problems would arise if the Union decided and integration of the existing Article V into the legal framework of the EU. If Austria's status remained unchanged until then, her full participation in the EU security - framework would be out of reach. Thus, in the long range, a contradiction opposing neutrality and EU-membership is possible. The way outlined by the German EU-presidency and the timeframe of the strengthening of Europe's crisis management capacity can shorten the time still announced to provide a stronger and more independent crisis management capacity for the Union. As associated members wish to keep the WEU "acquis" and to integrate it into an eventual European crisis management structure, WEU-observers wish to be assured that their status as EU-member gives them full access to all activities of a European security mechanism still to be created.

European crisis management will remain the central topic of the Union's European security debate. We hope that the ambitious timeframe aimed at by the German presidency can be met. Austria supports the idea of a merger of WEU into the Union's second pillar under the condition that Article V of the Brussels Treaty remains outside the legal framework of the EU.

Austria shows a growing commitment to European security outside Article V. Our participation in PSO's over recent years underline the high priority we attach to the stability of the EU-periphery, particularly in the Balkans.

Just halfway between the European and the Euro-Atlantic dimension of security, allow me to briefly sketch out the current situation of neutrality. The security discussion during the recent weeks somewhat blurred the real possibilities to reactively neutrality. Austria is so strongly involved in the Union that it will be extremely difficult, in the long term, to accept a rift in our security-related solidarity as an EU-member. We already acceded to the Monetary Union, we are members of the Schengen Agreement and our economy is inextricably linked to that of our Union partners. Sooner or later, all relevant political forces in Austria will have to accept that full participation in a European security system is the only way to remain in the core part of security and prosperity.

If such an insight had occurred earlier on, it would probably have opened the path into collective defence shortly after our EU-accession. In fact, neutrality still represents much more than a constitutional status which could be abolished by the required majorities. The attachment of many Austrians to their particular status is much more of an emotional nature than the result of an objective analysis. During the seventies and early eighties, the originally exclusively legal character of the neutrality status smoothly changed towards a more political perception, the so-called "Neutralitätspolitik". Austria's role on the global stage was largely attributed to this central factor of the then valid concept of security. It will be necessary to reiterate the debate on security issues and I am confident that the until now positive development in the Kosovo crisis will give the right impulse to the forthcoming debate. This will not lead to the immediate conclusion to abolish neutrality, but we can get back to the level of a rational discussion about security. The central point of that debate will be to evaluate the remaining advantages of neutrality against its flaws.

Maybe there can be some role of a neutral State as a mediator, but will that outweigh the detriment brought to our credibility as EU-partners? Can the mere pretence of political independence outside an alliance dissipate our absence in local decisions on security, as made by NATO-countries in the Kosovo context. Our role as military is to provide the political level with answers, wherever such answers are possible.

Let me focus now on Austria's relation with NATO. The Atlantic Alliance certainly will remain the centrepiece of Euro-Atlantic security in the foreseeable future. There is of course the question which share of the Euro-Atlantic partnership can be taken over by Europe and, respectively, which part of responsibility will be assumed by the Union. In y personal view, Austria's capacity to influence the outcome of this debate is limited. What we have to care for, is the place Austria can take or shall take in the existing security framework. The difficulty of this analysis lies in the dynamic of the Euro-Atlantic security system. One important aspect is the perception of what ESDI really means. Neither the New Strategic Concept nor the Cologne Summit gave consistent answers on the scope of EU-led operations or the decision on who takes the lead in an operation, EU or NATO. What is really meant by European capacities? Under such auspices, there are probably a few years left for Austria's security decision.

This leads to the question of observer-participation I have raised earlier on in the EU-context. The NATO accession of three countries has changed the balance between associated members and observers in the WEU-framework. The Washington communiqué outlines ESDI in a rather Atlantic way. It will therefore be of high priority for Austria to improve the possibilities of WEU-observers to fully accede to all stages of PSO's, comparable to the associated members access in WEU and probably in a future EU crisis-management mechanism.

From the outset, our ambition was to fully participate in PIP and to reap from this effort the highest attainable level of interoperability. The objective of our presence in this partnership is to increase the Austrian Armed Forces capacity to share the burden of international or multinational Peace Support Operations. There will be no significant change in this vision, even after a redefinition of the governmental balance that will possibly result from the elections in early October.

The current period in time provides us with an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of our PIP-involvement. Austria has established in still ope-
rates a refugee camp in the AFOR-framework. The strength of the AAF presence initially reached 450 military personnel. Now we are preparing our contribution to KFOR, mainly an infantry battalion. (The Federal Parliament agreed to this contribution this morning). We intend to integrate contingents from partner countries, as Slovakia, Switzerland and possibly Slovenia. At the same time, this battalion-sized multinational force will be under operational control of the German brigade in the southern sector of Kosovo. The familiarity with procedures of international co-operation is, to a large extent, a benefit from our commitment to PIP and, in particular, to the PARP. These, so far very positive experiences will be an incentive to further increase our engagement in the partnership. In parallel, it will be important that all elements of the PARP remain open to partners, even those who for the moment remain outside Article 5.

May I turn to international solidarity. Our evaluation of the medium-term future leads us to the assumption that scenarios close to Petersberg-type missions will occur with a much higher probability than classical scenarios of collective defence. At the same time, we are aware of the strong political commitment expressed by membership in NATO and WEU. As I mentioned above, the forthcoming elections in Austria can give a good starting point for a renewed security debate, aimed at Austria’s full presence in Euro-Atlantic security. Though, I have to stress at this point, that my country always showed a clear and substantial engagement in international solidarity, either under UN-auscipes, or in a NATO-led or multinational framework under UN-mandate.

In the wake of the Kosovo crisis the impression seems to be growing that existent UN-operations cannot reach the same level of complexity and military value as other operations do. It is probably true that they are of a different kind and an effort of the dimension reached by “Allied Force” would hardly ever be within the range of UN-operations, even if there was an appropriate Security Council resolution. Austria still attaches a high priority to her participation in UN-peacekeeping. Different situations may occur, where NATO countries might not be able to find consensus on such an overwhelming effort as performed in the Kosovo crisis. In such a case, a new kind of military co-operation can be necessary in which the UN could gain a renewed effectiveness. Therefore we try to maintain our UN involvement, even at the risk to overstretch our forces. Shiribg certainly provides an appropriate framework in this context.

Austria now shares her participation in UN-operations on Cyprus and on the Golan heights with partner countries. The excellent co-operation with Slovakia in the UNDOF-framework can serve as an example and create an impetus to bring new multinational co-operations together. This remark leads me to dwell on our perception of regional stability. During the nearly ten years after the fall of the Berlin wall, Austria delivered a steadily increased contribution to pave the way for a gradual approach of former Warsaw pact countries into the direction of the western political framework.

This effort started immediately after 1989, which means years ahead of PIP. In many areas, stability could be consolidated, but some regions are still mired in violence. The analysis of our geopolitical environment has to continue and has to take into account all possible factors of instability. We are now in the fortunate situation that virtually all neighbouring countries are stable, involved in PIP or Nato and coming rapidly closer to the European Union. At present, some of our eastern neighbours and partners are confronting a situation similar to ours some years ago. Nowadays some of their eastern boundaries designate the rift between an area of liberalism and economic prosperity and areas of dire economic and social prospects.

As an EU-member, we have to perceive stability in our immediate geopolitical environment as part of a larger security context. An increasing share of responsibility in the CFSP framework should lead us to increase our presence in a wider regional context. This requires considerable effort which is more and more difficult to be delivered alone. Herein lies the importance of multinational co-operation, as seen by Austria. Such an effort should aim at bringing the gap I mentioned above.

The CENCOOP framework bears the idea for this type of co-operation. The Southeast Defence Ministers council is another excellent example of synergy in order to reach common security goals. The participating countries should consider the question if their existing co-operation should be enlarged to neighbours who still remain on the other side of the economic rift.

Bratislava and Vienna are at quite a similar distance from existing and potential crisis spots in eastern and south-eastern Europe. The areas of our countries stretch from the proximity of the Balkans to the plains of the Ukraine. This should give an impetus to deepen common analysis, shared with partners.

Regional co-operation and PIP complete one each other. That’s another aspect of the fact that European security cannot exist without an Atlantic dimension. The PIP framework proves extremely useful in all questions of training, interoperability and standardisation. We should use this to improve our capacities for regional and multinational co-operation. This could be an additional way to avoid the appearance of a gap between MAP-countries and those which are not.

Let me conclude by giving a series of perspectives for Austria’s future perception of the Euro-Atlantic security-dimension. I would like to formulate options.

A first option could be to maintain the Law on Neutrality. According to my analysis so far, such as choice will further increase existing contradictions with European solidarity and accelerate an already perceptible loss of credibility.

Another way can be taken by abolishing the neutrality status and, simultaneously adopting a status of non-alliance. This could free our hands for future decisions but still maintain a kind of compromise which can be supported by a majority as well in the Parliament as in a referendum.

Finally, abolishment of neutrality and accession to NATO as a first step, fol-
lowed or possibly accompanied by WEU-membership. In the coming years, this order of action can change, depending on the shape taken by European crisis management structures and mechanisms at a given moment. The adoption of this way would be the strongest signal of European solidarity and would ensure Austria's full participation in all security-related decision-making processes.

For the forthcoming discussion it has to be clear that a commitment to full European solidarity is not a way which would allow to maintain neutrality. Even if there was, very far away, something like a vision of European defence without NATO, the obligations of collective defence will last.

Joint discussion to the presentations by Jan Eichler, Ferencz Gazdága, Antoni Z. Kamiński and Wolfgang Wosolsobe

**R. TVAROŠKA**

Defence industry was a sensitive issue in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and in Slovakia. The insensitive pressure of NATO to supply weapons and technology without a possibility of our exports could have political, economic and social impacts. A question to J. Eichler concerning the visit of Czech President to Kosovo and to F. Gazdága about the interest of Hungary in Vojvodina and the possibility of its misuse in Slovakia to achieve a similar attitude to the southern territories of Slovakia.

**J. EICHLER: WESTERN**

Europe talked about the unification of the defence industrial base, co-operation and countering American competition which went through the process of association and rationalisation; western Europe was lagging behind. The Czech defence industry base was on the knees. He agreed that conditions for selling own production should be created in order not only to purchase from other manufacturers. In the Czech republic many things were purchased without a tender and Boeing exacted (after the contract was signed) a 1 billion US$ guarantee. They exploited the situation under the short period of Tosovery's government, who gave them this guarantee.

The visit of President Havel to Kosovo was one of the steps in the policy of personal gestures, which did not serve the Czech Republic. Neither B. Clinton nor T. Blair did such a step.

**F. GAZDÁG**

The Hungarian minority in Vojvodina counted more than 300 thousand people. Hungary was concerned about three issues. The first one was a mass migration of the Hungarians from Vojvodina to Hungary. The second one was change of the ethnic composition in Vojvodina, which could result in cleansing if the Serbs were to come. The third one were the scenarios of ethnic cle-ansing. They wanted the human rights of the Hungarians to be recognised by international organisations. It was an internal affair of Yugoslavia and not of Hungary. They would support all proposals formulated by legitimate leaders (organisations of the Hungarians in Vojvodina) coming from Yugoslavia.

**K. ZAVACKÁ**

To W. Wosolsobe, Austria had an exceptional status – it was an EU Member State but it was not a member of NATO. Therefore he might say an opinion on the situation of the EU and NATO with US dominance.

**W. WOSOLSObE**

He did not think that the EU was established to replace NATO and to suppress American influence in Europe. What the EU did was taking over a greater part of the responsibility for security which had so far be borne by NATO Member States. The first step was done when accomplishing tasks not falling under Article 5, which were the Pataberg tasks of the WEU.

Austria did not think that a situation falling under Article 5 would occur and this made its situation as a neutral country easier. They also realised that this must change. There were western values in Austria and there was no cleft between the US and the EU. However, the Europeans had to bear responsibility for the security in the European part and the periphery.

**V. KMEC**

The new Member States views Slovakia's situation today compared with yesterday.

**F. GAZDÁG**

Hungary as a country having a common border with Yugoslavia lobbied in Brussels to reduce bombing of those areas of Vojvodina, where the Hungarians lived. The Serbs exploited it and stored huge amounts of guns in churches, gardens and villages. But Hungary had the feeling that its status improved since NATO accession. He did not think it could have an impact on bilateral relations with Slovakia. Hungary would appreciate to have most of its neighbours in the same organisations, including Slovakia. NATO and the EU had their criteria and it was up to Slovakia to see how it would go to satisfy them. The best Hungary could do was sharing experience.

**J. EICHLER**

The motivation of Germany to support NATO enlargement could serve as an example. The Germans said that for the first time in history they were surrounded by allies and they ceased to be the east of the West.

It was in the interest of the Czech Republic not to be at the interface and to have a neighbour in the East who was in the same political and security group. It was may be a pity that NATO in the case of Slovakia did not materialise its
own idea that NATO enlargement was also enlargement of stability by giving a chance to the propagation of this stability already in the era of V. Mečiar (when there were doubts about Slovakia’s stability).

D. GEISSBACHEROVÁ

The question whether it would be possible to form an European defence and to what extent it was possible to increase the European capability to act in terms of the political would to act this way.

W. WOSOLSÖBE

It was really a question of political will. He thought that it was not feasible in the nearest future. He was rather of the view that Petersberg tasks could be resolved with European means. This was also linked with the issue of bombing Yugoslavia. If this method were to be used a second time (in another case) Europe did not have the appropriate air force available. Europe, though, had large means (may be not the appropriate ones) and it was necessary to take the lesson from crisis and decide how to use these means.

F. DRION

In issues of security there did not exist small or large countries. European defence was European will and Europe had already some usable structures – EUFOR, EUROAMFOR, EUROCORPS. France thought that if we would build institutional structures (till the end of 2000), i.e. military command and political structures, than it could be an organisation functioning in a similar way as NATO. After its completion we would talk about the equipment and capacities this European parallel to NATO should have, how should political decision-making function. There was an agreement between the WEU – NATO on the use of forces under WEU command. It meant that Europe had some things and some military capabilities should be developed.

M. MIHALKA

He was surprised to hear the argument that NATO enlargement was an instrument used for the penetration in the markets of new countries. He gave the example of Romania and its plan to manufacture a combat helicopter called „Dracula“. Military justified it with the need of gunpower and mobility (due to the limitation of numbers in the CFE treaty). The politicians made the calculation that the manufacturer was from Texas – USA and thus, they would be able to influence US support for Romania in its NATO membership aspirations. However, the USA reminded Romania that they would spend money for the wrong thing and that what was needed firstly was the recovery of national economy. So there was no attempt to gain the market and Romania was not invited to join NATO. Besides this, when looking on global economy one could not speak only about the American economic policy. Transnational companies dominated mainly the oil and automotive industries. Maybe this did not fully apply to the defence industry. The USA had, however, rationalised this industry and made it competitive. This could not be said about the European industry.

Therefore it was also necessary to make an analysis about the competitiveness of these industries in Slovakia and to take a decision which weapons were to be manufactured, and what should be modernised.

However, the aspects of interoperability started with the English language. Then it was only command and control, not heavy „hardware“. Of course, there were also pressures of the defence industry.

As far as J. Eichler’s question about stability enlargement was concerned. NATO’s approach was to proceed step by step and in geographic harmonisation. It was not possible to jump over 20 countries. Creation of secure environment was also guaranteed through the PIP.

J. EICHLER

Mr. Mihalka was right in many cases, though one could dispute how it was in case of Romania. There were also views (geopolitical) that the accession of three new countries would enhance American influence – in particular in case of Poland. The US had one partisan in the West – Great Britain, Poland should be the one in the east. Romania was rather pro-French oriented, it was more European. 9 countries were in favour of Romania’s accession to NATO in Madrid, only one country was against.

As to the markets. As early as 1995 the USA created a committee for NATO enlargement and it was headed by the director for strategic development of the Boeing company. This committee significantly contributed to the funding of B. Clinton’s second election campaign. If to talk about the purchase of „expensive toys“ then the Czech Republic was not envisaging purchase of any supersonics. It became an issue only after Boeing started to lobby. We knew the problems in Vodochody, and the promises of Czech avionic industry access to new markets had not become reality, either.

It was true that the American industry was more dynamic and rational and the European industry lagged behind and competed with itself. In Europe there was no European committee for NATO expansion.
SLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY AND EURO-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

I. Introduction

The collapse of the bi-polar system has brought not only the known positive changes but also new risks and challenges to the stability and security. In the past Slovakia did not give the appropriate response. The expansion of contributory values has not been accompanied, in general, with an extensive cooperation, which would result into an effective Euro-Atlantic partnership.

The theory of international relations teaches that guaranteeing the stability of existence and security of a state is one of main parameters of national interests and of their enforcement in international relations. Small countries have also their share of responsibility for what is happening in the world, and in the case of Slovakia valuing national interests over objective globalisation has so far brought negative consequences that cannot be measured in money or time.

Foreign policy in the understanding of the former government was characterised by non-conformity of practical steps with the programme of the government, official proclamations and commitments publicly given to foreign partners. Giving of examples would take too much of our time.

The former government and political elite supporting that type of governance had, if to put it moderately, a schizophrenic attitude to Slovakia’s foreign policy priorities, which are the integration into NATO and the EU, and/or the accession to OECD, i.e. to various forms of Euro-Atlantic alliances.

In addition, the former governmental coalition also failed in the understanding of strategic trends in international policy at the end of the 20th century and proved unable to advocate vital interests of Slovakia. To see the result did not take long. Slovakia (its governing political representation) lost the confidence of its partners and its credibility.

The loss of credibility was mainly the result of former elite ways of using power and violating democratic rules. No respect for standards, failure to honour international treaties, the efforts to undermine or mar the implementation of international treaties..., these are the parameters that could be perceived as threats to the mobilisation of solidarity and common responsibility for the future.

II. New internal political environment in Slovakia

In countries like the Czechoslovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland the interest in integration into the trans-Atlantic and European security structu-
The convergence of Alliance's eastern border closer to the borders of the former USSR and the non-inclusion of Slovakia into the first wave of enlargement will, inter alia, mean that Slovakia, simply because of its short-sighted policy, will no be able to search for and find an ally in the sphere of security who would want to influence Europe with her non-European cultural tradition and who has a tense relation with NATO. And this happens despite persuasion of (economic) benefits from such links.

We have to free ourselves of our fixed (traditional) geographic orientation and to think globally.

The Europeans and North Americans must build a common trans-Atlantic vision and co-ordinated trans-Atlantic reactions, which recognise that our collective security challenges have today strong political, economic, cultural, ethnic and environmental dimensions, in addition to the military dimension.

In Slovakia, the concept of strategic inclusion prevails over the concept of short-term economic profitability, though this transition has an untraditionally long life and in the Kosovo context it has a strong re-animation capability, which will be exploited by the former governing elite in their attempt of return.

Slovakia is not facing alone a dropping score of NATO support. The public support for NATO declined in all Member States. One of the tasks of the coming Kosovo peace mission is to improve NATO's repute. It can be anticipated that publishing new evidence of atrocities in Kosovo after opening mass graves will bring a change in the perception of use of force by NATO. Russian propaganda of NATO as an American organisation testing new weapons in Yugoslavia, etc., is also largely responsible for the public opinion.

In reality NATO is an Euro-Atlantic organisation. The Europeans themselves have an interest in American presence in Europe. Europe is more secure with the US than without the US. One should also take into account that without the experience gained from the Kosovo crisis the important decision of the Cologne EU summit on strengthening the common foreign and security policy would not be adopted. The fact is that today the US has supremacy in advanced technologies, weapon systems and funds spent on defence and research.

Intensive diplomatic efforts of Slovakia after the previous Madrid reality supported with real results of the work of the new coalition formation brought results, which were also reflected, in the Washington results for Slovakia.

NATO has promised that the accession of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to the Alliance will not be the last wave of its enlargement and that the door for NATO membership shall remain open for all other countries wishing to share Euro-Atlantic values and to satisfy membership criteria. Slovakia wants to be a member of the Alliance and to understand the Washington Declaration as a document reflecting the view on the future development of Europe in the security field and the confirmation of NATO's openness.

Prime Minister of the Slovak Government underlined in his speech before the North Atlantic Council in Brussels (27 November 1998) that it is important for Slovakia to be given clear prospects for membership. The Washington doc-

ument unequivocally states that the next NATO summit dealing with enlargement shall meet till the end of 2002 the latest. Such a conclusion is a clear prospective for Slovakia.

The evaluation process, which expects compliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) criteria, is the basis for invitation. The Programme of Organising Slovakia's Preparation for NATO Membership that incorporates Washington summit conclusions with an emphasis on the MAP mechanisms has been prepared at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. This programme will be the basis for the National Programme of Slovakia's Preparation for NATO Membership that will include annual and target tasks in order to provide for the preparation and readiness of Slovakia.

Participation in the activities of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), enhanced Partnership for Peace (PiP) and intense communication and co-operation with NATO Members states and V4 countries will continue to be among the main directions in the intensification of co-operation between Slovakia and NATO.

The co-operation mechanism in the EAPC will make the improvement of direct political consultations with NATO Member States individually or in smaller groups possible.

Active engagement in the second stage of the Planning and Review Process - PARP - that also aims at the improvement of Slovak armed forces interoperability with NATO - will be an important activity under PiP.

IV. The Vision of the 21st Century

What is the new world we are going to face in the 21st century? So far there is no consensus in the best characterisation of the international system. NATO endeavours to have an international system supporting enduring peace and stability, and democratic values and institutions, created.

One cannot omit the deepening asymmetry in the development between the North and the South and other risks of general, global nature.

Risks may also emerge from wrong strategic decisions (e.g. inappropriately defined premises, thoughtlessness, ...) in foreign policy, mistakes and errors in decision-making in economy, underestimation of the significance of military security tools (including transformation and modernisation of armed forces,...).

Among the risks coming from the East one should mention mainly instability (civil, value, political, military) in Russia.

Today, NATO is probably facing the challenge of absorbing the challenge, of responding to significantly changed security environment and readiness to absorb new members (of the political and military component) of the Alliance.

In Kosovo NATO Member States and non-NATO states alike proved that they are capable to co-operate for the sake of a common good during a crisis.

Through its foreign policy the Slovak Republic wants to be an active element
of security structures of the Euro-Atlantic dimension and to continue in its effort to achieve the criteria of integration and security.

In gaining support for the incorporation into the Euro-Atlantic system Slovakia will look for support from the US, trigger its bilateral relations with the individual NATO Member States and revive the V4 processes.

We hope that these efforts will contribute not only to the stabilisation of our security but also to the development of new strategies and innovation programmes that will facilitate a wise use of limited resources in the forming global security environment.

The current power must exert maximum efforts to nullify the until now divergent process and accelerate a convergent one in Slovakia that is one of the premises for further consolidation of the democratic order in Slovakia and accession to the North Atlantic Alliance.

**Discussion to the presentation by P. Weiss**

**V. KMEC**

He responded to that part of the presentation, which elaborated on a declining trend of defence expenditures. Would then it be possible to build new elements to face new risks and threats?

**P. WEISS**

From the long-term perspective it was more advantageous to be in a system of collective defence including the spending of resources. The defence of an isolated country was the most expensive. In order to achieve real military readiness it would be necessary to increase the expenditures in certain rates but it was worth it for the future.

**V. KMEC**

The issue of dropping defence expenditures did not correspond with the philosophy new states integrated into NATO, either. In Slovakia no change in the way of thinking occurred so far despite our efforts to integrate into NATO. A question to Mr. Weiss - which countries did he consider economically and politically most interesting for potential co-operation?

**P. WEISS**

The economic situation also deteriorated in Slovakia as a consequence of voluntaristic economic policy of the former government. This was reflected in the pressures on the budgetary chapter of the Ministry of Defence. It was an issue of economic recovery and political priorities when adopting the budget.

To economically interesting countries we paid only little attention to the meeting of the European Union with the countries of Latin America and the creation of a free trade zone. It was also an impulse for Slovakia. We did not have capacity for a global economic policy but we could not limit ourselves only to Europe. We should not ignore traditional partners in South-east Asia, contracts with South America were possible. It was about pragmatic economic co-operation.

**J. TUČEK**

He objected against the assessment of the former government and said that the armed forces met the criteria and were assessed positively by other countries.

As far as reduction of costs on armed forces was concerned, it was possible in the long-term horizon, but it would no be the case from the beginning. E.g. we had problems with paying the 6 military seconded to NATO commands. If it was going to be more people the budget had to reflect it.

**P. WEISS**

In his presentation he spoke about the mistakes in home and foreign policy which resulted in a different situation of the Slovak armed forces (though, at least as good as the Czech one). This was not a failure of the armed forces which enjoyed a good credit in Brussels.

The second question was the reality resulting from insufficient economic possibilities. It was necessary to identify priorities in the efforts to meet integration targets also in the armed forces even if the cost was lack of funds elsewhere. The officers were highly motivated to join the Alliance.

**K. ZAVACKÁ**

She confirmed the contribution of the former government to the absence of invitation to join NATO. One of the reasons for not inviting Slovakia was the fact that the fascist past was not clearly coped with. At the same time we had the stigma of the smasher of the state which meant certain instability. The thesis „if they do not take in the west we should turn to the east“ did not contributed to a positive view on our stability, either.

**P. WEISS**

The 55th Anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising should show the supporting tradition of Slovak statehood. The attempts to derive the Slovak Republic from the war Slovak state were a marginal tendency.

**N. PFEIFFER**

A question as to the complexity of the current coalition government.

**P. WEISS**

Because of its historic and political tradition and constitution which envisioned a system of classical parliamentary democracy it was doomed to have coalition governments. The current coalition in contrast to the former one did not
have fundamental disagreement in the understanding of the tasks of foreign policy. Despite differences in the views on the work of the government there was consensus in the field of foreign policy.

The other moment which strengthened the current coalition was that all parties of the coalition had natural partners in European political families. The former government had to rely on official negotiations between the countries. In addition, the chairman of two parties (despite the programme declaration of the government which had foreign policy priorities similar to ours) openly and sometimes in a rude way talked about NATO and the WEU. The HZDS was also internally divided on this issue.

Despite the disputes between governmental coalition – opposition it was our task to expand consensus, to co-operate with the realistic streams in the HZDS (with those who understand the necessity of Euro-Atlantic integration). The SNS had an isolationist programme, it rejected the incorporation of Slovakia into the Alliance, this meant there was no point to strive for consensus with them.

A. GEIDOS

What was the view on the role of the UN with respect to NATO and to the precedence which occurred by bombing Yugoslavia? He agreed with the need of co-operation between the governing coalition – opposition in defining state interests. In Denmark they achieved agreement towards re-organisation and re-fit of the armed forces. Were we also planning something in this kind?

P. WEISS

The Kosovo crisis put the issue of UN reform on the table in a dramatic way. The things in the Balkans got so far because the international institutions were not able to take preventive measures. During a discussion in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Mr. Weiss said that on the one hand we monitored Ukraine and its laws and on the hand we had hundreds of thousands of people murdered in 4 ethnic wars a few kilometres more to the Southeast.

Despite all the deficiencies the Security Council of the UN showed certain decision-making capacity. At the same time, however, it was became clear that there was a need to change the decision-making process. The position of Slovakia was such that the right of „veto” should be limited e.g. to Article 7 – operations for the sake of peace and stability. It was this right of „veto” making the UN SC incapable to force the implementation of its resolutions by Milosevic. However, NATO intervention should remain an exceptional solution and not a rule. The UN should have mechanisms to cope with such crisis on the basis of consensus. This means that the UN needed to be reformed.

As to the co-operation between the governmental coalition and opposition. The problem was often made a mental issue. Our specific features were that the parties in the government and the ones in opposition were built on different fundamental values and understanding of national interests. However, there were also positive moments. The Declaration of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the Integration of the Slovak Republic into the EU (in January 1999) was supported by 118 MPs, 1 MP for the Slovak National Party was against, 7 MPs abstained. The others, including the HZDS, were in favour. Such a consensus was harder to achieve in concrete strategic and tactical steps which follow. E.g. the relation between the governmental coalition and opposition polarised in the issue of Kosovo, which we did not cause. We needed more positive experience from something we prepared together. It was strategies that would remain valid regardless of who would be in the government. In December 1999 the parliament should assess the 1999 foreign policy and offer an approximately three-year vision.

L. SZABÓ

In Hungary they thought that defence would be cheaper after becoming NATO members. It was the logic of a theory that it was cheaper in a group. After becoming member the budget increased by 0.2 %, though no investments were made. He thought that in the long-run (which would be some 15 years) they would spend more on defence than initially thought. It was necessary to transform the defence thinking, to create new institutions and refit. Therefore the time needed to have expenses declining was so long. Problems also occurred because the small party of trade licence holders had a limited insight in the defence problems.

P. WEISS

The Slovak armed forces would have to invest into modernisation regardless of the fact whether they become NATO member or not. Of course, adaptation to new conditions would require gradually growing expenditures. He agreed that it may take 15 years. The economic reality was, however, similar, and that was the GDP.
The Washington summit this April has also given an answer to the discussion, which developed recently around the issue whether there is a need to reform the Alliance? A transformation needed in order to have this political defence organisation better prepared for and adjusted to the new challenges, risks and threats that will accompany the coming 21st century in the Euro-Atlantic area. The key document, which takes into account this transformation of the Alliance is the adopted New NATO Strategic Concept (NSC). Another document adopted at the summit – Membership Action Plan (MAP) is, however, for Slovakia equally important.

Before I will elaborate on some selected issues, I would like to make two remarks:

1. The above mentioned Washington summit documents study has reached various levels of detail of processing and therefore I will not always present the view of the MoD SR but often only the views of the Defence Policy and Planning Section or my own views.

2. The Washington documents, in particular the NSC, contain dozens, hundreds of various stimuli, targets, tasks, measures, which will need years for implementation. What should one select from this multitude of new ideas of strategic decisions of the Alliance for a 20 minute presentation? And why to choose this and not to choose that? I have selected only two small sets, groups of questions, which are, in a way, linked together: some concrete steps and ideas and the blather and illusions.

Recently (19 June 1999) the Government of the SR adopted a document submitted by ministers Eduard Kukan and Pavol Kanis, called the Programme of Organising Slovakia’s Preparation for NATO Membership. Approximately at the same time, (23. – 24 June 1999), the College of the Minister of Defence of the SR discussed a material called the Concept of the Slovak Defence Sector Reform to the Year 2002 (and with a view to 2010). These two most topical documents extensively reflect the documents adopted at the Washington summit.

The Programme of Organising Slovakia’s Preparation for NATO Membership takes into account mainly the Membership Action Plan (MAP). In addition to the Government, which controls the whole programme, a Committee of the Government for Slovakia’s Preparation for NATO Membership has been established. This Committee has formed 14 expert inter-ministerial groups, which will draft five chapters of the Membership Action Plan adjusted to the Slovak conditions. The result shall be an annual, and also a middle term national programme including our goals and tasks, schedule of our preparation for future possible membership in the Alliance. It is not so much the number of goals and tasks written down that is important but rather the achievement of those to which we have committed ourselves. It will be the confirmation of our capacity to plan realistically and to fulfill adopted plans. The MoD SR has established and provided guidance to four working groups.

The Slovak Defence Sector Reform to the Year 2002 (and with a view to 2010) reflects the New Strategic Concept of the Alliance even more. The works on it started as early as the end of 1998, i.e. before the Washington summit. This April the NSC has been adopted, and thus, it has become a benchmark for assessing the appropriateness of our direction, of our ideas on military reform, and also a source of inspiration in its finalisation. Our military reform concept takes into account the NATO NSC and applies it to our conditions in many respects.

To confirm the above I will give some illustrations and examples:

- our concept responses to new challenges and threats by defining in a new way and expanding the mission and tasks of the Slovak armed forces for the next decade;
- it determines minimum possible numbers of troops, in particular of the armed forces of the Slovak Republic in peace times, as well as number of troops in war times;
- these new or newly defined missions of our armed forces determine not only their numbers but also their structure, new organisation, deployment in the territory of Slovakia, a more modern command;
- the concept points out that the new challenges and risks often of non-military, civilian nature, are not reasons for relaxing in our efforts to join the Alliance, rather the opposite is true, only organised international effort and cooperation are capable to cope with some threats;
- thus, our armed forces must be ready not only for defence but also peace-keeping operations, active participation in various civil emergencies and crisis operations;
- the NSC includes some 15 – 20 tasks (Article 43) in the field of collective defence, i.e. for Alliance members. These tasks range from collective military planning to logistics operations. Our concept does respond to these tasks also;
- the NSC requires the creation of joint, multinational and multi-purpose commands. This is also reflected in our plan for general staff transformation into a part of the MoD and ground and air forces commands;
- we also accept the requirement to build-up a well balanced system comprising rapid reaction forces, i.e. highly ready armed forces, and main forces, which may have a lower level of readiness. The first group has to be ready for action within a few hours or days, the second one is completed to reach the required numbers, exercised and trained for action in few months.
And I could continue in the list: the concept of language training for 2,400 professional military, the plan for drafting key documents which contain the essence of the security and defence policy of the country, the difficulties in the implementation of the defence planning system, human resources management, etc.

We understand that the NSC of the Alliance is a fundamental, long-term document, which has to be reflected in our documents and practical materials in this or that way. If it were not so all this would be only trashy about a kind of our interest in NATO membership and the concrete and practical steps would clearly be against these general declarations. Or I can say it also in other words. All those who in this country declare and say that we should not restructure our armed forces, that we should keep the general staff where it is and in the form it is, that we must not sell a single „veteran“ tank or aircraft, because that would bring the numbers of our weapons below the CFE Treaty limits, all those who claim that professional military cannot be transferred from one garrison to another but should stay where they all have their gardens, all those may generally declare that they are in favour of our membership in the Alliance, however, their concrete steps and requirements are against it. And several of them did behave in this way during the term of the former government.

Such a contradictory and split approach - in which general declarations differ from concrete actions - has been and still will be possible in Slovakia for a long time unless the democratic control of armed forces makes a significant progress, unless all strategic, key decisions and steps become transparent, unless the information flow to our citizens about security and defence improves, thus also improving the education of our citizens. In other words: unless a consistent security and defence system of the Slovak Republic is built.

Some theses to illustrate the above said:

- many of our MPs, civil servants, not to mention most of our citizens, do not perceive, and therefore do not know, that NATO is developing, transforming, and therefore NATO today is different from the NATO at the end of the Cold War. All this was expressed in the previous strategic concept adopted in Rome in 1991. They do not know that the 1999 NSC of the Alliance outlines clearly what NATO wants to be in the next decade. Therefore it is necessary to know, that our potential NATO membership would mean that we have joined an organisation that is substantially different from the one our middle-age and older generations know from a period ten or more years ago; it is even necessary to know that in some aspects NATO today is different from the Alliance of the early 1990s when the first and civic interests and goals of our membership were formulated;

- in present NATO collective defence of its members still remains its fundamental goal and mission. However, it is not limited only to it. The Alliance is gradually moving from a dominant defence of the territory of its Members States to the defence of common interests and values, from the defence of the country and things to the defence of citizens, people, and ideas. We feel that the Alliance has ambition to expand its mission and activity from political and defence dimension to a multidimensional security organisation;

- the NSC of the Alliance does also give a kind of explanation for the crisis operation in Kosovo. Kosovo is the practical complement to and concrete form of the NSC. And so we see that after a long worrying period of a global nuclear disaster threat the idea of rehabilitating Clausewitz' thesis about a military continuation of politics is getting rooted not only academic debates but also in practice. In other words, in some situations and under some circumstances, in particular when and where all unarmed, political, economical or diplomatic means were exhausted, armed force can be used with success.

Who says no or never? Why then do we build and keep armed forces, why do we spend billions on them? Why do we build specially trained anti-terrorist units, why do we have to use force to isolate dangerous individuals or groups and why do armed guards watch them? Why are our best men and women tasked to communicate early and reliable information about preparations of disasters against us, about the preparation and also possible use of mass destruction weapons? How do you want to master ethnic riots and armed fights, mass exodus of people, battles between people of one religion with the people of a different belief, mass encounters of skinheads with a group having other signs, how to face organised crime, terrorism?

We are building modern armed forces and corps, which are better ready for their more versatile use then ever before. We have to do it because most of the cases of aggression and armed clashes after the WW2 were not a result of rational ideas and possibilities.

Discussion to the presentation by P. Barták

F. DRION
The field interoperability aspects were generally known and when Slovakia would satisfy them then the Slovak armed forces readiness for accession would be guaranteed.

He asked whether the co-operation of V-4 countries would envisage also joint exercises or outfit in the security field.

P. BARTÁK
Interoperability was included in the proposal of reform. He agreed that interoperability was not the issue of materiel identity but first of all it was about the capacity to communicate together.

In the V 4 co-operation it was rather the fact that these countries went through a similar development like the SR not only in coming closer to NATO but
also in their economies and social affairs. They were ahead of us in the field of security and defence and their processes were a source of experience for us. It was not our objective to separate in a special way V-4 in the Alliance.

J. EICHLER

It was clear that Slovakia strived for NATO membership. NATO included countries with a pro-American influence as well as countries putting a greater emphasis on ESDI. It was also related to the defence industrial base. Would Slovakia rather like to focus more on purchase of technology from the US or did it want to direct its industrial base to co-operation with European NATO Member States?

P. BARTÁK

It was not possible to answer with one sentence. So far reform concept concerned only the defence sector. It did not give an answer to a more concrete direction in modernisation and possible links of Slovak defence industry. Until now – like in the Czech Republic we were not capable to draft a credible long-term 10-15 year plan. The concept temporarily substituted such a document in the system of defence planning. It would be discussed in the Committee for Defence and Security, the Council of State Defence and the government. In addition it would also be submitted to the plenary of the National Council. Security strategy of the Slovak Republic, military strategy and innovated defence doctrine would be drafted. A security and defence system would be built. This work and these documents would also cover the outfit issue. E.g. the issue of what equipment should be used by the air force was discussed in the moment. The general view was that it should by a subsonic multipurpose aircraft, there were several options, no decision was taken so far.

J. TUČEK

The fifth reform in a row would also fail if no personnel measures similar to those taken in the other three countries were taken.

P. BARTÁK

The reform really depends from people. No measures in the human resources field were taken. Even the linguistic and professional training were insufficient. We could be further ahead if we were able to implement the concept expressed in the document on the development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in the period till the year 2000 adopted by the former government.

Olga Gyártášová

THE PERCEPTION OF CHANGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE BY THE SLOVAK PUBLIC

1. Views of the Slovak public on foreign policy

The Slovak public shows a long-lasting relatively low interest in foreign policy. In January 1999 only 36% of respondents stated interest in foreign policy (6% were highly interested and 32% were rather interested) (IVO, January 1999). Previous surveys also indicated that the level of knowledge about international events is very low in the Slovak public. Low interest of the Slovak public in foreign policy is also confirmed by the fact that the citizens do not perceive foreign policy as a long-lasting and pressing problem of Slovakia. Only 1% of respondents considers it a serious problem.

Interest in foreign policy is education related - out of university educated respondents almost 70% were interested in it, in respondents with basic education it was only one quarter (IVO, January 1999). Men and middle age persons (35 - 54 years) showed higher interest in foreign policy.

2. Expected foreign policy development

During Mečiar's 1994 - 1998 government the international position of Slovakia deteriorated. It was also the period in which Slovakia failed in its integration process into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Despite the declared integration objectives Slovakia was not included into the first group of countries invited to start accession negotiations with the European Union or in the first wave of NATO enlargement. The causes of these failures had a common denominator - democratic deficit in domestic policy.

In autumn 1998, however, a significant share of Slovak population saw an opportunity for improvement of Slovakia's international status in the change of government. Immediately after elections there was also a strong belief that chances of Slovakia to catch up with the neighbours from Visegrad 4 Group in the integration processes improved.


3. Support to Slovakia's accession to NATO and the EU

After 1998 elections a seemingly paradoxical development occurred in the views of citizens on integration into the EU and NATO. On the one hand, according to many people the integration chances of Slovakia improved, on the other hand the overall confidence of citizens into the European Union and NATO decreased (Table 2). At the same time the share of citizens supporting Slovakia's accession into both integration groupings (Table 3) dropped. While in October 1997 accession to the EU was supported by 74% and rejected by 14% of respondents, in January 1999 accession was supported by 62% and rejected by 22% of respondents. The views of citizens on Slovakia's integration into EU show a significant majority support despite a slight decline. However, in the views on NATO accession the number of supporters and opponents has started to equal. In January 1999, 42% of respondents supported NATO accession and 41% of respondents rejected it.

These shifts in views should first of all be ascribed to the fact that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and Slovak National Party (SNS) representatives have, after becoming opposition, started to infirm much more openly the need to integrate Slovakia into the Euro-Atlantic structures, and their supporters have responded by lowering their support for both integration aspirations of the Slovak Republic.

Table 2
The development of the ratio of confident, mistrusting, and vague attitudes to EU and NATO (%)

|----------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|


Table 3
„Do you support accession of Slovakia to the EU and NATO?“ (% of „yes“ : „no“ : I do not know” answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>October 1997</th>
<th>April 1998</th>
<th>January 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>52:35:13</td>
<td>58:31:11</td>
<td>42:41:17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Institut pre verejne otazky, October 1997, April 1996, January 1999

In January 1999 most of the people in Slovakia agreed that Slovakia's integration into the EU is necessary. This approach is observed in most women and men, persons of all age and education categories, inhabitants of larger cities and small villages, persons of Slovak as well as Hungarian ethnicity. Young and more educated people support Slovakia’s integration into the European Union more (IVO, January 1999).

When in 1998 there was also a consensus among the parties on the need of Slovakia’s integration into the EU and among the supporters of all parties the numbers of supporters of Slovakia’s integration into the EU were significantly higher than the numbers of its opponents. The attitudes of supporters of coalition and opposition parties differentiated more significantly in the post-election
period. Dramatic drop of support for Slovakia's integration into the EU occurred mainly among the supporters of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) who were not anymore „confused” with officially declared foreign policy objectives of the government. After the movement went into opposition many of them openly hold anti-integration positions.

Similarly to the accession of Slovakia to the EU, more educated people and younger age categories more frequently support joining NATO. In governing coalition supporters the support for Slovakia's accession NATO prevailed over a negative attitude. In supporters of opposition parties and also potential non-voters and the undecided the ratio was reverse. Compared with April 1998 the support of Slovakia's NATO accession dropped in supporters of all political parties but the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) The most significant drop of the support of Slovakia's NATO accession occurred in the HZDS electorate (see Table 4).

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>April 1998</th>
<th>January 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes and</td>
<td>No and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rather yes</td>
<td>another no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Democratic</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition - SDK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Hungarian</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition - SMK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Civic</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation – SOP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Democratic Left</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDL</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak National Party – SNS</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-voters</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for a</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Slovakia – HZDS</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The balance to 100% is the answer „I do not know”.
Source: Institut pre verejne otazky. April 1998, January 1999

When we combine the views on EU and NATO accession to express the combined support by the public for Euro-Atlantic integration in January 1999 then we find out that 41% of citizens supported both goals at the same time. 19% of respondents supported EU accession but rejected NATO accession, 21% rejected integration of Slovakia into both institutions. 15% could not hold a position to any of these two foreign policy objectives. Other answer combinations were insignificant. Compared with April 1998 the share of those who support both goals dropped from 56% to 41%.

4. Expectations linked with NATO accession

The consequences of Slovakia's membership in NATO are for many citizens unclear. The most clearly perceived link is the one between NATO accession and security of Slovakia. In January 1998, 36% of respondents thought that after this step security of Slovakia would strengthen. Only one fifth of the respondents anticipated positive impacts on economy. In the issue of expenses on armed forces the view that NATO accession would bring higher expenses on the armed forces was even represented stronger. A significant share of respondents could not comment on the consequences of Slovakia's NATO accession or they did not anticipate any effects from this act.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>...when Slovakia becomes NATO</th>
<th>...when Slovakia does not become NATO member</th>
<th>...when Slovakia cannot have any effect on it</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>security would increase</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economy would develop better</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy would be stronger</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armed forces expenses be stronger</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Institut pre verejne otazky. January 1999

Supporters of integration expected favourable effects from NATO accession. Most of them expected mainly increase of security, however, less than a half expected strengthening of democracy, development of economy and reduction of armed forces expenses.

These findings illustrate, that a significant part of citizens, including supporters of current governmental coalition, is poorly informed about the broader context of Slovakia’s accession to NATO and they also probably do not have
basic information about the North Atlantic Alliance, its objectives and values after the end of the Cold War. Comparison with older surveys shows that the situation has not improved recently. Rather the opposite is true: confused positions and negative expectations have increased among the supporters of all political parties.

5. Attitudes to Russia and neutrality

Let's now study to what extent the military and political alliance with Russia is attractive for the citizens. In January 1999 only 13% of citizens supported such orientation, and 68% rejected it. Table 6 shows that before the 1998 elections the critical distance from this orientation was even more significant.

At the beginning of 1999 majority of supporters of all political parties rejected military and political alliance with Russia. The supporters of the HZDS showed the lowest resistance to it (29% of them were in favour of an alliance with Russia).

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military and political alliance with Russia</th>
<th>October 1997</th>
<th>April 1998</th>
<th>January 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Institut pre verejne otazky, October 1997, April 1998, January 1999

The attitudes of citizens to neutrality, which is still a constantly attractive slogan for approximately one third of citizens, showed a more intricate picture. In January 1999 proclamation of neutrality would be supported by 34% of respondents, 42% would be against it, and 24% had no clear position.

Repeated surveys show that a significant number of citizens has confused ideas about neutrality. For instance, 18% of respondents thought that it were compatible with NATO membership. Compared with the October 1997 survey the attitudes have not clarified but rather the share of people with controversial ideas has increased.

Persons with higher education and supporters of the SMK, SDK and SOP had mainly critical distance from the neutrality concept. Neutrality seems attractive to people who were inclined to confrontational and authoritarian policy and weakened ethnic tolerance.

6. Slovakia’s partners and allies

Which countries do citizens perceive as reliable partners for Slovakia? Table 8 shows that these were mainly the Visegrad 4 countries. Significant majority of citizens considered them a suitable business partner (84%) and political partner (62%) and also military ally (74%). Recently, the V4 position has grown significantly stronger in the eyes of people in Slovakia. Citizens also highly appreciated 15 EU Member State, which was probably also the basis for their prevailing support of Slovakia's accession to the EU. The US ranked third among reliable partners of Slovakia. The share of those who considered them a reliable political partner increased from 46% in October 1997 to 57%.

Table 8

Evaluation of countries as a reliable partner for Slovakia (% of positive answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland</th>
<th>EU Member States</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business partners</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political partners</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military partners</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Institut pre verejne otazky, January 1999
Russia comes out the least attractive partner for Slovakia from this comparison. Half of the respondents perceived her as an appropriate business partner, however only one third considered her a reliable political partner and a quarter of respondents thought of her as a military partner. Compared with October 1997 the views on Russia as business and military partners had not changed, however, the number of persons who saw an appropriate political partner in her had increased. In contrast to SDK, SMK and SOP voters, the HZDS voters assessed Russia most favourably.

7. Views on the Kosovo crisis

After the failure of the Rambouillet peace negotiations about the settlement of the situation in the South Serbian province of Kosovo, the North Atlantic Alliance decided to start air strikes against Yugoslavia with the objective to stop driving out of Kosovo Albanians and to force President Slobodan Milosevic to accept a diplomatic solution. This decision met with controversial reactions in the world. In most NATO Member States the public supported the view that NATO attack was necessary. The majority of the public in the new Member States – Poland and Hungary – also held this view. The Czech public first agreed with the air strikes, however, as the time passed their support attenuated.

According to IVO telephone survey in April 1999 the views of Slovak citizens were full of discrepancies. On the one hand, most of them (68%) made President S. Milosevic responsible for driving out the Kosovo Albanians. This was the view of most voters of the parties forming the governmental coalition and not the one of the SNS and HZDS voters (Table 9).

Table 9
Is Yugoslav President S. Milosevic responsible for the tragedy of the Kosovo Albanians?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes and rather yes</th>
<th>No and rather no</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Democratic Left - SDC</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Democratic - Coalition SDK</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Hungarian - Coalition SMK</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Civic Reconciliation - SOP</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak National Party - SNS</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for a Democratic Slovakia - HZDS</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of Slovakia</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Íništítut pre verejné otázky, April 1999

On the other hand 65% of citizens criticized attacks by the Alliance and only 28% approved them. Young people, age 18 – 24, people with university education, respondents of Hungarian ethnic origin, inhabitants of the region of Bratislava approved most frequently NATO’s military action. And the opposite is true for criticism of this action - people from age categories 35 – 44, persons with basic and secondary education, inhabitants of the region of Trenčín and Banská Bystrica were against it.

Table 10 shows that views on NATO’s air strikes are politically differentiated. While the majority of supporters of one wing of the governmental coalition – SDK and SMK - approved these attacks the supporters of the other wing – SOP and SDL - were against such a solution. The supporters of parliamentary opposition parties – HZDS and SNS - were most often against NATO air strikes.

Table 10
„To what extent do you think the NATO allied forces air strikes against military targets in Yugoslavia were appropriate?” (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes and rather yes</th>
<th>No and rather no</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Hungarian Coalition - SMK</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Democratic Coalition - SDK</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Democratic Left - SDL</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Civic Reconciliation - SOP</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak National Party - SNS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for a Democratic Slovakia - HZDS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of Slovakia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Íništítut pre verejné otázky, April 1999

Deeper analysis has shown that a significant part of the Slovak society (40%) did make Milosevic responsible for the Kosova tragedy but at the same time they disapproved NATO air strikes. The largest share of people with such discordant views were among SOP and SDL supporters. On the other hand, 25% of the citizens condemned Milosevic and approved NATO attacks. They came mostly from SDK and SMK voters. And finally, approximately one fifth of the citizens disapproved with NATO attacks and did not make Milosevic responsible at all. HZDS and SNS voters held these views most frequently.

The views of citizens on NATO air strikes reflected into mostly critical response to the decision of the Government to permit NATO aircrafts to fly over
the Slovak air space. 32% respondents agreed with this decision and 64% did not. The remaining 4% could not comment on it. While most of SDK and SMK supporters approved this decision of the Government, SOP and SDL supporters were rather hesitant in their views. A significant majority of HZDS and SNS voters disapproved this decision of the Government.

Though a significant part of the public distanced themselves from the clear position of the Government on the Kosovo conflict, the support enjoyed by the governmental coalition parties did not drop; surprisingly, it even slightly grew. It may therefore be concluded that a part of the voters of the governmental coalition did not identify themselves with the decision of the cabinet but, at the same time, they did not lose their faith in the governmental coalition.

The issue of a long-term effect of the crisis in the Balkans on the public opinion concerning NATO remains open.

Discussion to the presentation by O. Gyárfásová

L. BORGOMANO
Question whether the decline in EU and NATO support had the same trend or whether there were differences.

O. GYÁRFÁSOVÁ
There were differences in the scope of support, it was a long term issue. After the 1998 elections a certain decline in the support for EU membership was observed. Similarly to NATO also here this should be ascribed to the voters for the former governmental coalition, today's opposition. It was also linked with the phenomenon that the anti-integration rhetoric of the HZDS and SNS was more open than when they were in government. Other surveys show that EU accession support increased to 70% (it could be a temporary drop) while negative views on NATO accession persisted.

P. WEISS
Many politicians, though with a good intent, made a fundamental mistake. The problems were usually formulated in such a way that we had to do something because it was our condition for becoming an EU or NATO Member State. Citizens (until now insufficiently informed) then perceive these organisations as an external power forcing us to do something. We were not saying that it was our interest. We invoked an external power the citizen did not know whether it was benign to him or not. Question to O. Gyárfásová - what were the target groups it was necessary to focus on.

O. GYÁRFÁSOVÁ
Surveys with this focus were not conducted so far. The group of young people might consider education, travelling, free movement of labour attractive, however, the whole population might have the feeling of security. Research should focus on these issues.

M. MIHALKA
A question concerning the groups supporting integration or who changes public opinion.

O. GYÁRFÁSOVÁ
There was a link that those who supported NATO also supported the EU but this did not apply vice versa. The shifts were studied through political preferences so far, demographic aspects in the change of views were not studies therefore it was not possible to define these groups accurately.

L. SZABÓ
They had a special group working with public opinion in Hungary during the preparation for NATO accession. This group existed at the Ministry of Defence. Members of armed forces participated in meetings, where various publications were distributed. In Slovakia the situation was more complex in terms of justification. There were 3 NATO Member States around Slovakia and it was more complex to say that Slovakia was in danger today. He asked whether there were such teams.

O. GYÁRFÁSOVÁ
The answer should be given by ministries. The Institute for Public Affairs could give analyses and carry out also specialised surveys. However, the Institute did not determine communication strategy. Something should be done about the EU, about NATO she did not know. The communication strategy of Slovakia could not be built on the fact that Slovakia was threatened by a direct external enemy - other arguments were also needed.

P. BARTÁK
After the start of the Kosovo operation the Ministry of Defence found out that the source of information was insufficient not only for the military but also for the public. An „ad hoc” group was created. In addition, one of the 14 groups established by the government was for this area.

K. ZAVACKÁ
Remark on P. Weiss. Democracy must really be wanted. If it were not than it was presented as something forced on us and disturbing our sovereignty. It was necessary to develop the atmosphere of something wanted.
HUNGARY AND THE NATO MEMBERSHIP

The change of system which took place in 1989-90 and the fundamental social, political and economic transformations put an end to the artificial and forced separation which for four and half decades had been keeping Hungary out of the mainstream of European development. The obstacle in the way of Hungary taking its place among the democratic states of Europe and the world had been removed.

A consensus emerged among the political parties in the Hungarian National Assembly constituted in 1990 - irrespective of whether then were in the Government or in opposition - according to which Hungary would come a modern European country in the shortest possible time and with the least sacrifice and develop an economy and culture, social and political structures based on solid foundations by becoming part of the European and Euro-Atlantic co-operative institutions. Therefore the government which took office after the first free elections held in 1990 set itself as a priority goal of Hungarian foreign policy accession to the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. This endeavour was reinforced by the program and practice of the government formed under the leadership of Prime Minister Gyula Horn and Viktør Orbán as a result of the elections held in 1994 and 1998.

Hungarian foreign policy has right from the start considered the European and Euro-Atlantic organisations that is, OSCE, the European Union, NATO, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe and OECD - as parts of one and the same united system as mutually complementing and reinforcing components of that structure, and has therefore set the goal of fulfilling the criteria of and thus achieving full membership in all these institutions.

This main focus of Hungarian foreign policy has been backed up by practical efforts which have in last years taken shape in concrete results: in October 1990, Hungary was admitted as a full member to the council of Europe, and in 1996 to the OECD. As of early 1994, Hungary has been linked to the European Union by an association agreement, the so-called European Agreement, while in the same year the government also submitted an application for membership. The Western European Union first offered Hungary - and a number of other new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe - the status of consultative partner and subsequently, in 1996, that of associated partner and in 1999, that of associated member. It was natural for Hungary to take advantage of such an opportunity. And in 1995, for the first time and in a rather difficult period, faced with a number of challenges, Hungary assumed the position of Chairman-Office of the OSCE.

The intention of joining the organisations of integration of the unifying Europe, and thus ever closer co-operation also characterised the relationship of the Republic of Hungary with The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) during the last four years.

Within this context, a number of questions were frequently posed both within the country and abroad: What has Hungary to do in NATO? Is there a need for NATO at all after the end of the Cold War period and East West confrontation, and the collapse of totalitarian one-party regimes?

A reply to these questions requires, first and foremost, a brief review of the past. NATO's four and half decades of existence may reasonably be qualified as a success story: the Alliance has succeeded in carrying out its mission enshrined in the Washington Treaty, namely, the safeguarding and promotion of democratic values shared by the member states and the collective defence of the member countries. The determined stance of the organisation in defence of these values has prevented the spread of totalitarian ideas. NATO provides the legal and practical framework for the active engagement of the most powerful force in the world, the United States of America, in the Euro-Atlantic area, including its military presence in Europe. In other words: it provides a solid basis for the trans-Atlantic relationship. The importance of the latter was unequivocally proved by the lessons of World War II: the Allied victory would have been inconceivable without the participation of The U. S. To give another example which leads us into the present: it was only through the active participation of NATO and its strongest political and military power, the United States of America, that the hope of bringing about a solution of the crisis in former Yugoslavia surfaced.

Security and Defence Policy

National defence is a matter of the highest public interest in Hungary. The Republic of Hungary requires, as a tool of its security policy, armed forces able to ensure reliable defence and to contribute to the common security of NATO. Our defence policy is based on the interdependence of the alliance, cooperation, deterrence, and defence. Hungary fully identifies itself with NATO's principles concerning collective security and defence - it shall maintain and develop its capability to repel an armed attack in accordance with the basis principles enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty.

The paramount mission of the Hungarian Defence Forces is to protect Hungary's sovereignty and territorial integrity and, acting on the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty, to contribute to NATO's collective defence. Their additional tasks include participation in other joint allied missions, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions under the auspices of international organisations, and efforts to reduce the harmful effects of major industrial and natural disasters. In keeping with its commitments and for the benefit of common defence Hungary is ready to make available an appropriate military force and, commensurate
with its capabilities, to contribute to other NATO missions. In accordance with the basis principles of defence policy the Hungarian Defence Forces shall do everything possible to promote regional security and stability by actively participating in bilateral and multilateral military co-operation.

The significance of the support of NATO-accession by the society was increased further by the fact that the program of the government that took office following the 1994 elections envisaged a referendum on the issue on the count NATO-membership. With this step, not required by the constitution, and, in particular, with the subsequent qualification of the referendum as a legally binding one, the overwhelming, active and tangible support of the public became an irreplaceable and indispensable element of the process and an unavoidable prerequisite of Hungary’s membership in NATO. Moreover, with the initiative put forward by the Workers’ Party in July 1995, the issue of the referendum unexpectedly appeared in a concrete form of the agenda much earlier than anticipated. In the middle of December, however, the National Assembly adopted a resolution with consensus, according to which a referendum - in spite of the 140,000 attested signatures of support that had in the meantime been collected - would be held on the issue only later, once the conditions of NATO-accession had become known and public.

The Public Opinion

In September 1995, NATO published its study on the enlargement of the Alliance. Issues such as the IFOR-operation in Bosnia and the Hungarian participation therein also emerged. Attention to the issue of our NATO-accession increased. One of the signs of the growing interest was the fact that opinion polls about NATO membership started to be conducted regularly. According to the survey carried out in October 1995, almost half (48 %) of those asked supported act Hungary’s membership in NATO, while the other half was equally divided between opponents and those undecided and indifferent.

By December, the support decreased to 46 %, and by February 1996 it reached the lowest level in the whole process at 44 %, while the share of the opponents first increased to 28 % and later to an all-time high of 35 %. This change was due mainly to the appearance of U.S. IFOR-troops at Taszár and the initial difficulties experienced there, as well as to the sending of a Hungarian engineering contingent to Okucani.

The percentage of supporters slowly increased in the spring, rising from 45 % in May 1996 to 50 % in December. Parallel to that, the weight of those pronouncing a negative view propped from 32 % to 28 %. The favourable changes that had taken place in the meantime at Taszár played a significant role in those developments, and resulted in an increase of support in that region much higher than national average.

The positive effects of the nation-wide dialogue begun in March 1997 first made themselves felt, and in a spectacular manner, in the results of the survey conducted in June 1997. The magnitude of support had by that time reached a figure of 61 % which was by far superior to any other figure before, while the share of opponents decreased to 27 % According to the poll taken in October 1997, more than two-thirds of the population saw a relationship between EU-and NATO-accessions. At the same time and in the light of the developments of the preceding year, 37 % as compared to 20 % in August 1996 were of the correct view, that membership in NATO would help our accession to the European Union. The proportion of those who saw this linkage the other way around decreased from 50 to 24 %.

The assessment of the inclination to participate in the voting which became increasingly relevant as the date of the referendum drew closer showed that the number of those determined to take part in the vote increased from 43 % to 56 % in the course of a single month after the convocation of the referendum was concretely put on the agenda. As a result of the dispute that had erupted on the issue of the referendum this support dropped to 51 % by the end of October. During this latter period, however, two conflicting tendencies took shape at the very same time: while the proportion of the opponents of accession determined to vote decreased from 55 % to 50 %, that of the supporters increased from 61 % to 64 %. The fact that three-quarters of those certain to participate were made up of the supporters of accession foreshadowed an overwhelming victory of the „yes votes” at the referendum.

The referendum took place on 16 November 1997, with a participation of 49.24 % of all Hungarian citizens entitled to vote. 85.33 % of the turnout voted in favour of Hungary’s accession to the North Atlantic alliance and 14.67 % against.

The successful referendum and its spectacularly positive result have left a very deep and favourable impact on the leading politicians of NATO member countries who had previously shown a rather contradictory attitude on the issue of the referendum, as well as on Western public opinion. With the referendum, Hungarian accession has passed the point of legal procedure considered most risky, while the determined stance of the Hungarian society on the issue of NATO-membership, which by far exceeded any previous expectation, significantly contributed also to the advancement of the enlargement process as a whole, more rapidly than anticipated.

Nevertheless the attention paid in Hungary to NATO-related subjects tends to cover, in addition to the formerly dominating issues directly linked to Hungary’s accession, more and more of the broader perspectives of the activities of the North-Atlantic alliance. For example, according to the last poll taken in August 1998, the Hungarian public has a positive view of NATO’s role in preventing and managing the conflicts of the region. With respect to the situation in Kosovo, which was considered to be the most pressing issue at the time of that poll, 55 % of those asked were of the position that an involvement of NATO would reduce the probability of a border conflict between Albania and Yugoslavia and could prevent the breakout of a civil war in Kosovo. The remaining 45 %
were equally divided among the disapproving and the undecided. At the same time, support for direct Hungarian participation in such actions is substantially smaller. Although at the time of the poll the overwhelming majority of those asked accepted in principle that the Hungarian airspace be made available, only 46% were supportive, while an identical percentage opposed the participation of a Hungarian engineering contingent in the SFOR-mission in Bosnia. Even less, only 28% agreed with a Hungarian military participation in a NATO operation in Kosovo, the percentage of those opposed being even higher (64%).

As far as possible future rounds of NATO enlargement are concerned, there is widespread agreement among the not too significant part of public opinion, which care about this issue on the generally positive impact of further admission of new members. Accordingly, the portion of the public opinion, which pronounced an opinion during the respective polls and was quite well informed is much higher than this rate. (In the case of Slovenia 56% are supportive and 20% against. The numbers are 53% and 23% in the case of Slovakia, 49% and 29% in the case of Romania and 46% and 27% in the case of the three Baltic states.) These figures may be interpreted as a confirmation of the approach for solving problems with some of our neighbours through their genuine commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and to implementation of Euro-Atlantic values. It is therefore a Hungarian interest to see these countries comply as soon as possible with the expectations, the accession criteria of the institutions of integration and thus to become members of NATO (and the European Union).

Towards an Atlantic Alliance in the 21st Century

The Washington summit in April was complete in important phase in the transformation of the Alliance, which started a decade ago. NATO's 50th anniversary means much more, of course, than just a solemn commemoration of the achievements of the past decades or a celebration of the accession of its new members. The task of the summit is to outline the Alliance's profile for the 21st century. It will have to strike a balance between what the Alliance has achieved so far and what its most important tasks will be in the next few years and decades to come.

The past decade has in fact proved that NATO is ready for and capable of permanent transformation. Perhaps it has changed more than any other international organisation. Now is the time for it to focus on the new security challenges of the forthcoming century. These risk factors have for the most part already become visible. However, some have become particularly terrifying because they are like an iceberg: you can only see the tip, while the greater part of it remains hidden. What they have in common is that they threaten the entire Euro-Atlantic region so that defence against them must also be common.

One can already sense that threats to European security increasingly extend beyond national boundaries. Instability at the peripheries as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime and terrorism, and the degradation of the natural environment constitute challenges to us all. And it will hardly be possible to squeeze the Genie back into its bottle once it has been let out. NATO will therefore have to adapt to the new challenges. The urgency of this has been realised by NATO in good time, however. Internal reform of the Alliance has been proceeding for years; the establishment of the new command structure, the creation of multinational Combined Joint Task Forces, and the development of the European Security and Defence Identity, as well as of the new Strategic Concept, all constitute important milestones in this process of adaptation.

NATO has proved to be the only organisation capable of guaranteeing the security and stability of the entire continent. The maintenance of this capability is in the fundamental interest of both the United States and Europe. The tragic events taking place in the former Yugoslavia have clearly shown that the European allies may cope with such crisis situations only with the active engagement of the United States.

Collective defence is certain to remain the core function of the Alliance in the next century, too. It could not be any different. The transatlantic relationship and the commitment of Canada and the United States to security in Europe will lose none of its relevance. It will also remain the case that only the unity and solidarity of the Alliance will make NATO genuinely effective. Collective defence as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and joint military planning, which is considered to be the "glue" of the Alliance, will remain the force that keeps the organisations together and, at the same time, a guarantee that member countries' defence policies never fall hostage to short-sighted national interests.

At the same time a strong transatlantic relationship does not contradict the intention of enhancing the European pillar of the Alliance. On the contrary, it will increasingly condition the latter. This is what the European Security and Defence Identity to be developed within the Alliance is all about. In our view, ES-DI must not lead to the loosening of transatlantic relations. Quite the contrary! The two pillars must together ensure the achievement of our common goal: the consolidation of security in the Euro-Atlantic region. We are convinced that this is a strategic interest of all European democratic states.

NATO cannot afford to pay less attention to the challenges threatening common security. We must explore potential risk factors as far in advance as possible. The Alliance will be able to pursue its mission successfully in the century to come only if it looks to the future instead of merely reacting to events that have already taken place or replying to challenges occurring in the course of the rapid changes taking place in our security environment.

Hungary is interested in participating as a member of the Alliance in the establishment of a flexible organisational structure, one which should not lose sight of the core function of collective defence. We consider crisis-management activities pointing beyond the core function as a mission whose aim is to
safeguard our common interests, to further enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic region, and as far as possible to avoid having to resort to arms in pursuit of collective defence.

What Are We Looking for in NATO?

In the context of the integration process as a whole Hungarian foreign policy is, naturally enough, guided by national interests. We have shown clearly why NATO enlargement serves the interest of Europe as a whole, but that are the characteristic Hungarian interests underpinning our NATO membership? This question has also been formulated in a much less sophisticated way in the course of the public debates that have evolved over the last few years: What are we looking for in NATO?

First and foremost, we are looking for a stable, peaceful, and secure environment, for favourable external conditions for the development of our country, enabling it to embark on a course of continuous growth.

Hungary was among the first to take NATO's hand when it was extended to the East. The ever-closer relationship with the Alliance, expanding co-operation, the Partnership for Peace programme, and the joint work carried out within the framework of IFOR and SFOR logically led to the desire for full-fledged membership. All these things led to the recognition that it was Euro-Atlantic integration in its entirety - including accession to NATO, the EU, and the WEU - that constituted the most significant international framework of the country's security, stability, and economic and social development. As a matter of fact, these institutions are pillars of a developed, democratic, and stable Europe, which although independent of one another from an institutional point of view, from the point of view of substance provide an overall framework for our endeavours.

We look at NATO enlargement as the eastward extension of the zone of security and stability. Our accession to the Alliance is not motivated by fears of an external threat or the menace of war, but rather by our desire to see Hungary enjoy the advantages stemming from stability and from belonging to a community of nations pursuing the same democratic system of values, and to take an appropriate part in establishing collective security.

The most tangible example of the great necessity for a collective security system serving co-operative goals in the Europe of the end of the millennium is the continuing crisis in the former Yugoslavia. As a neighbouring country Hungary has experienced the economic and other implications of this crisis directly, not to speak of the danger of an eventual territorial spillover of these hostilities.

Neutrality cannot be a viable alternative for a people living in the centre of Europe since risks exist irrespective of the international status of a country and by their nature fail to halt at national borders. Besides, it is easy to understand that Hungary's military security can be ensured at a higher level and in a more effective and less costly manner as a member of NATO than if we had to maintain a effective defence force on our own. The inevitable reform of the Hungarian armed forces and their modernisation will also be more efficient in the NATO context. NATO membership, although it will naturally entail expenditure, will reduce what we would have had to pay in any event by making available to us the resources provided by common defence.

We may also expect membership to have a beneficial impact on our economic relations. If Hungary is viewed as a stable part of Europe, it will become even more attractive as a durable partner for economic co-operation from the viewpoint of foreign capital investment.

On the other hand, NATO's adaptation process clearly shows that, with the disappearance of the former enemy, the Alliance has turned from a military security organisation into a security policy organisation which will preserve its military character in order to carry out its missions, but a reduced level and within a reformed framework. All this means that Hungary's desire for accession is primary political rather than military: through our active participation in the Alliance we may contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the region and on the continent as a whole, and to its peaceful development.

Hungary has unambiguously declared its readiness to assume all the responsibilities stemming from membership, but also its wish to make full use of all the advantages and opportunities available to members of the Alliance and to participate in decision-making on issues concerning both the continent and the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole. Hungary wishes to take part in shaping decisions that have to date been taken without us despite their Europe-wide impact. Besides, membership does not violate Hungary's sovereignty - which was regained after so long - since NATO is not a supranational organisation, but takes its decisions with the unanimous consent of its member states. Our accession therefore does not constitute a limitation of our national interests: very much to the contrary. It provides us with an opportunity to represent an asset our interests more effectively.

The Hungarian public does not have to be convinced of this: the referendum held in November 1997 proved more convincingly than anything else that the overwhelming majority envisages the future of the country within the framework of one of the most successful alliances in history. Opinion polls have also shown that the confidence of the Hungarian population in NATO as a crucially important international institution is stronger than in a number of founding members of the Alliance.

Contribution to Common Goals

In order to accede to the Alliance all aspirant countries must comply with certain requirements. This has applied also in the case of the three new members. The most important have been the establishment of a democratic political system, a functioning market economy, good-neighbourly relations with the
surrounding countries, democratic and civilian control over the armed forces, and the ability to co-operate with the armed forces of the other member states? In a word, interoperability. Hungary has fully met the political requirements. In the course of our preparations and with the date of accession drawing closer, however the spotlight was directed increasingly on the tasks still to be solved.

We will have to continue the modernisation of the armed forces and to make particularly great efforts, in a number of areas of crucial importance if we are to achieve an appropriate level of interoperability. At the same time, the Hungarian Government has unambiguously committed itself to being able to carry out the everyday tasks of co-operation as of the moment of our accession. This will of course also require us to keep defence-related expenditure at the necessary level. Economic prerequisites to that end do exist: the country is proceeding on the path of durable economic growth, enabling us to increase the share of defence expenditure continuously, to achieve a level of 1.81% of GDP by 2001. In real terms this will constitute an annual increase of 8-10% in our defence expenditure. The so-called „interoperability of minds” or the „human factor”, however, is even more important than technical and procurement-related development.

During the accession talks Hungary declared its full agreement with the goals laid out in NATO’s Strategic Concept and its readiness to assume all the obligations stemming from the Washington Treaty as they apply to all member states. We wish to participate in NATO’s Integrated Military Structure as well as in its defence planning process.

We are of course aware of the fact that from the viewpoint of military potential, Hungary’s accession will not substantially increase the Alliance’s common forces. We are convinced, however, that as a member of NATO we will be able to contribute even more actively to the maintenance of peace in our region and to the enhancement of its security. The extension of stability and security and the use of our experience in this region burdened with serious ethnic, political, and economic problems all justify our wish to belong to the Southern flank of NATO within the military structure.

The experience of co-operation with NATO, which has become closer every day in the course of the past year, proves that the Alliance regards its former partner and new ally with confidence. Following the signing of the accession protocols in December 1997 NATO has gradually involved Hungarian experts, the diplomats and military staff of our Mission in Brussels, in an ever-increasing number of committees and agencies. This has provided us with a significant opportunity to learn, to gradually integrate ourselves, and to become familiar with the democratic, consensus-seeking and -building decision-making mechanisms.

The Allies take Hungary seriously when we assert our wish to be not only a „consumer”, but also a provider of security. Hungarian views are being taken into account by the Alliance, which expects substantial contributions to the discussions on the agenda of the organisation. We are able to make a special

Hungarian contribution in the case of problems in respect of which we have accumulated substantial experience due to our history, set of relations, and geographical proximity. NATO also looks to Hungary as its member state situated closest to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia to make a substantial contribution to the realistic assessment of the situation and to the development of the most viable solutions for regional security. Hungary can also make a valuable contribution on the basis of the experience it has gathered in recent decades, with respect to Alliance policy vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine.

We Feel Responsible for the Security of our Region

In refutation of concerns that NATO enlargement may create new dividing lines in our region we can confidently assert that this process has had a stabilising impact on the countries of the region - currently in transition - and has contributed to the consolidation of regional security and bilateral relation. Hungary’s accession has without doubt influenced the development of our bilateral relations with our neighbours in a favourable way. This coincides fully with the intention of the Hungarian Government: we are striving for greater involvement than ever before within the framework of both bilateral and regional (and sub-regional) co-operation. We will pay special attention to the implementation of the obligations contained in the basic treaties, as well as to the solution of problems that have not been settled by these treaties as another contribution to the democratisation and stability of our region.

In the course of developing relations with our neighbouring countries we start from the premise that ethnic Hungarian communities living abroad are playing an important role in consolidating the stability and promoting the economic prosperity of Central Europe. Hungarian foreign policy wishes both to improve relations with the neighbouring countries and to safeguard the rights of ethnic Hungarian minorities living abroad, defending their identity. We are convinced that these two aspects are not contradictory, but can and must be implemented in a co-ordinated way.

Keeping the goal of enhancing regional stability clearly in view, Hungary is interested in the maintenance and further strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic commitment of its neighbours. Accordingly, it attaches great importance to the preservation of the credibility of NATO enlargement and wishes to provide active assistance in the preparations of those of its neighbours seeking membership. Among other things, this was behind the establishment of the joint Hungarian-Romanian peacekeeping battalion and the Hungarian-Italian-Slovenian brigade, and of the readiness of the Hungarian side to engage in regular consultations and exchanges of experience.

Hungary attaches great importance to the continuation of the „open door policy” in forthcoming years. There is consensus on this issue in NATO, although there are significant divergences of view with respect to the timetable. We deem it extremely important to use every means possible assist the prepara-
tions of the applicant countries. A serious role can be given in this process to the extension and qualitative enhancement of the Partnership for Peace programme, the increased efficiency of regional organisations, and the enrichment of the substance of co-operation pursued within the framework of the latter, as well as the establishment and institutionalisation of a special relationship between NATO and the candidate countries.

As far as the Hungarian position is concerned, we deem important and support the enhancement of relations and co-operation. We are convinced that enlargement is the most efficient and most cost-effective way of further increasing security in Europe. We are particularly interested in seeing those of our neighbours mentioned at the NATO summit in Madrid - that is, Romania and Slovenia - fulfil as soon as possible the conditions of membership and join the Alliance. We are similarly delighted to see the determined Euro-Atlantic orientation showed by the new Slovak government, on which basis it may become possible for Slovakia, which is returning to the part of democratic transformation, to once again take its place in both the Visegrad co-operation process and among the countries with the best chances of Euro-Atlantic integration. Besides, we wish to continue to play an active and initiating part in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. We take the view that the EAPC may provide further concrete opportunities in many fields related to regional security and co-operation. Hungary also wishes to make use of this framework in order to assist the Euro-Atlantic endeavours of countries not included in the first wave of enlargement, but still wishing to join NATO.

The better use of the existing frameworks of regional co-operation and the establishment of new ones, if necessary, are not only important factors of stability in our region but are closely embedded in our integration endeavours as a whole. By means of bilateral and multilateral co-operation among the countries of the region it will be possible to avoid isolation or unhealthy competition between countries advanced in the process of integration and states that are still in an early phase.

The various forms of co-operation, such as the Visegrad Initiative, the Central European Initiative (CEI), the South-Eastern European Co-operation Initiative (SECI), and the trilateral Hungarian-Italian-Slovenian and Hungarian-Austrian-Romanian co-operation process play an important role both separately and as a group in the process of confidence-building among the countries of the region, and in strengthening economic, infrastructural, and cultural relations, so exercising a favourable influence on stability. The ever fuller exploitation of opportunities deriving from regionalism may also help our accession to the European Union since it provides an appropriate framework within which we may become acquainted with the EU experience of countries that are members of both organisations.

Hungary is a founding member of all the co-operative organisations mentioned at the beginning of the preceding paragraph. As a member of NATO and,
List of discussion participants

Barták, Peter
Ministry of Defence, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Borgomano, Laure
Ministère de la Défense – Délegation aux Affaires Stratégiques, Paris, France

Drion, Frédéric
Ministère de la Défense - EMA, Paris, France

Eichler, Jan
Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic

Gejdoš, Anton
Ministry of Defence, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Geisbacherová, Daniela
Ministry of Defence, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Gazdag, Ferencz
Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, Budapest, Hungary

Gyárfásová, Olga
Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Kaminski, Antoni
Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw, Poland

Knec, Vladimír
National Council, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Kuča, Jaroslav
Centre for Defence Studies, MoD, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Labuzik, Milan
Ministry of Defence, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Matoušek, Kristián
Centre for Defence Studies, MoD, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Mihalka, Michael
Georg C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany

Nečej, Elemir
Centre for Defence Studies, MoD, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Pfeiffer, Nikolaus
Amt für Studien und Übungen der Bundeswehr, Waldbröl, Germany

Pivarčí, Jozef
State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Rizzi, Francesco
Italian MoD – Center for High Defence Studies, Rome, Italy

Szabó, László
Prime Minister Office, Budapest, Hungary

Tuček, Jozef
Ministry of Defence, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Tvrdoška, Rudolf
Ministry of Defence, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Weiss, Peter
Member of National Council of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Wosolsobe, Wolfgang
Ministry of Defence, Vienna, Austria

Zavacká, Katarína
Institute of State and Law, Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Acknowledgement

The co-operation between the Centre for Defence Studies at the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic with non-governmental organisations in security-related events has continued for several years.

Organising international conference on „Euro-Atlantic Alliance in the Context of Building European Security Structure“ and publishing of the book of proceedings would not be possible without their generous financial, intellectual and organisational support.

Our thanks go therefore to the Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association for organisational support and the Slovak Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation for financial assistance and organisational support.

Jaroslav KUČA
Elemir NEČEJ
Vladimir TARASOVIČ

Edited by: Jaroslav Kuča - Elemir Nečej - Vladimir Tarasovič
Run in by: ITEM co. ltd., Bratislava
The book has been published with the financial support of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Bratislava
© Center for Defence Studies - Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic - Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava 1999

ISBN 80-967745-7-3