IVO SAMSON–TOMÁŠ STRÁŽAY (eds.)

Risks and Threats in Central Europe for the 21ˢᵗ Century
Impact on the Defense Forces

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CONTENTS

Peter Šimlovič

OPENING OF THE SEMINAR

Mr. deputy minister, honored foreign guests, ladies and gentlemen!

Permit me to welcome you to the second international seminar this year, in the name of the director of the Center for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, the Slovak Foreign Policy Association and the branch of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in the Slovak Republic, in cooperation with which we have organized a series of seminars on national security.

While the first international seminar, held in June, concluded the problem of the geopolitical position of Central Europe after the Madrid Summit, this seminar is the culmination of discussion on the development of risks and threats in Central Europe and their possible influence on the armed forces. We discussed this theme at two internal seminars – on 8th September and 13th October. (You have the papers from these two seminars and from the first international seminar available in the hall).

To introduce today's discussions, I would like to speak of what led us to decide to organize this cycle of six seminars about national security.

The first stimulus was the rather unsuccessful public discussion about the effort of Slovakia to join to NATO in late 1996 and early 1997. At that time, we realized that the public, and often also the army, confined security policy to the area of the army.

We also felt the absence of any discussion forum, in which a wider spectrum of both military and civilian experts could concern themselves with security questions. Since we know, that there are not very many people in Slovakia concerned with this area, we wanted to include in the discussions as many interested people as possible from different departments and non-governmental organizations. We also aimed at young people, especially students and journalists. By means of these discussion meetings, we are attempting to assist with the education of a new generation of experts, unburdened by the past and able in future to work in the European and trans-Atlantic institutions.

Finally, it was also an attempt to make the current views of foreign experts, whether from partner institutions or international organizations, available to the Ministry of Defense and to others. So far, I think we were entirely successful, also thanks to our partners from the Slovak Foreign Policy Association and the Slovak branch of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Permit me to wish you all a good working atmosphere, and remind you of our principle from the previous seminars, that this is a forum enabling the presentation of theoretical views without limitation and fear.

Alexander Duleba

INTRODUCTION BY A REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

Permit me to welcome you in the name of the civilian organizers of this cycle of seminars on national security. I want to greet you and welcome you in the name of the chair person of the Board of Directors of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association Magda Vášáryová , for whose absence because of work commitments abroad, I want to apologize. I also wish to welcome you in the name of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, represented in Slovakia by Michal Petráš, who also could not come, but will certainly join us in the course of the day. I would like to explain one important thing: When we began this cycle of seminars about national security in cooperation with the Center for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, we, as representatives of a non-governmental organization, met with extraordinary cooperation and preparedness for dialogue. In the past, this was not a typical feature of relations between non-military and military institutions, and I am pleased that today, when this cycle culminates, the participants include a deputy minister from the Ministry of Defense. I consider it an important gesture, which was lacking in past years. I believe that cooperation in these intentions will become a precedent, and that dialogue between civilian and military experts will become usual, as has happened in other countries. The questions of national security and the questions of the army are among the highest public interests, and the public should follow them. I think that sooner or later, we will reach the conclusion that good research, above all means rationally saved state money.

Jozef Pivarči

SPEECH OF THE STATE SECRETARY

Ladies and Gentlemen

Permit me, in the name of the minister of defense of the Slovak Republic and in my own name to welcome you – foreign and domestic participants in the seminar, concerned with the problem of risks and threats in Europe in the 21st century and their influence on the role of the armed forces.

The representative participation of institutions from abroad as well as from Slovakia is a guarantee of the effective fulfillment of the program of your seminar. The cycle of seminars on national security, described in the introduction, is being completed in a period of important political changes, which we hope will bring positive development of the social situation in our country and contribute to breaking the circle of international isolation, in which Slovakia has been in recent years. This aim is set by the Program Declaration of the government of the Slovak Republic, presented by prime minister Mikuláš Dzurinda in parliament on 19th November 1998.

This program has the ambition to lead Slovakia across the threshold of the new millennium, so that we can achieve a responsible position in the family of modern states of Europe and the world. Apart from the basic aims of stopping economic decline, stabilizing and building up a competitive market economy, developing civil society, we have set the aim of achieving membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), achieving our inclusion in the first group of states for the enlargement of the European Union and gaining full membership of the North Atlantic Alliance. The government of the Slovak Republic regards achieving this membership as the optimal variant to achieve security, which must find a specific expression in internal and foreign policy. Since our aim is to prepare an integrated security and defense strategy and a conception of reform of the armed forces, we welcome forms of work, which are able to free creative potential and exchange views, with the participation of such important institutions as NATO, the OSCE, EU and WEU, as well as independent non- governmental organizations. We also regard today's discussions as such a form.

If we devote our attention to the problem of challenges, risks and threats, analyses of situations often show that many new threats derive from the internal development of states. Signals have also appeared that a potential for crisis exists in countries endeavoring to join the Euro- Atlantic structures. The development of the situation in the Slovak Republic, and the possible "dead end" we could get into, was also observed in the cycle of seminars, which you are ending to-

day. It is no accident that the Program Declaration of the government emphasizes the renewal and maintenance of the trustworthiness of Slovakia on the international scene. The government wants to create conditions for Slovakia to be a standard state and a stable element in the region. We start from the fact that the preservation of security and favorable conditions for economic development is possible only in the framework of the European and trans-Atlantic groupings.

One of the most important political and economic priorities is our membership in the European Union. To achieve it, we want to fulfill the political criteria and other criteria set by the Copenhagen Summit, as soon as possible. We also see an important security dimension in the further enlargement of the European Union. Achieving membership of the North Atlantic Alliance is a strategic priority in the area of foreign and security policy. The government will use the possibilities to approach the Alliance by means of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the program Partnership for Peace and other forms of cooperation. Pursuit of these aims at the Ministry of Defense will involve fulfillment of the further aims of strengthening Partnership for Peace and deepening multi-lateral and bilateral cooperation with armed forces. This effort will also include improvement of our approach to the partnership working program of the Slovak Republic and NATO, in the framework of which, this year's cycle of seminars was also prepared.

We are prepared to contribute to further development of theoretical approaches in the area of national security and international experiences to use at home. One of the routes is also the establishment of an institute for the education of qualified experts for the area of security, defense and crisis management, with the aim of stimulating the development and implementation of new trends in military thinking. In the government's Program Declaration, we describe the preparedness of the Slovak Republic to participate in the efforts of the international community to solve global problems such as organized crime, international terrorism and ecological risks. When the risks are analyzed, the fear is often heard, that the deepening of economic problems may lead to social unrest or the return of authoritarian regimes. Therefore we declare an interest in integration between the economically developed countries and the early fulfillment by the Slovak Republic of the conditions of membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The government is preparing a conception of foreign development aid, with the aim of contributing to the effort of developed countries to reduce the problems in the less developed countries.

We attach importance to participation in the project "Cooperation of the Central European Countries in Support of Peace" (CENCOOP), which was initiated by Austria. I welcome the fact that experts from two participating countries, Austria and Rumania, will present their views on the possible risks and threats. I think that the analytic materials from this year's cycle of seminars could be useful when organizing a workshop on crisis management, which the Rumanian delegation proposed in Vienna at the meeting of ministers of defense.

From the point of view of reactions to possible new challenges, we consider it necessary to prepare a reform of the armed forces, their modernization and the construction of units capable of autonomous action. Like the neighboring states, preparing for entry to the Alliance, we are considering securing an annual growth in state defense spending by 0.1% of gross domestic product. However, at the same time, we will endeavor to deepen the effectiveness of the use of resources, and to improve the quality and intensity of military training. The introduction of a system of defense planning and adaptation of the organizational structure and numerical state of the directing organs of the Ministry of Defense, to the new requirements, will also influence quality. During fulfillment of these tasks, we want to use the experiences of the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance, as well as of the states in the process of joining. Seminars of today's type are one of the possible forms of cooperation. We expect that the vision of further development of cooperation in the direction of joint research projects and common approaches to the problems of the Central European region after the year 2000, will be successfully implemented.

In conclusion, permit me to wish you a pleasant stay in Slovakia and a creative spirit in the course of the whole seminar.

Zdeněk Matějka

POSSIBLE RISKS AND THREATS IN THE EUROPEAN SPACE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE OSCE: POSSIBILITIES OF CONFLICT PREVENTION, OF THE POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION

Out of many security risks and threats in the European space the most important from the point of view of the OSCE are nationalism, chauvinism and xenophobia, illegal and uncontrolled migration economic, social or political instability, violation of human rights, including rights of persons belonging to national minorities, and a lack or insufficient functioning of democratic institutions.

1. Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction have been key areas of OSCE activities since 1992 as a lesson of the Yugoslav conflict. After a deep analysis the OSCE has come to a conclusion that the OSCE is totally helpless when a conflict degenerates into a war as former Yugoslavia proved.

The Helsinki summit 1992 confirmed the OSCE's orientation on preventive diplomacy and a self-imposed limitation in the form of total rejection of enforcement. Any kind of OSCE armed intervention is, therefore, out of question. But there is enough room for activity within prevention and "co-operative security". Everybody agrees that it is the best approach to conflict management. But most politicians and Governments do not act according to that wisdom. Although they admit that prevention is much cheaper than later action, the costs of a conflict itself and post-war rehabilitation, they find adequate resources to do the appropriate thing in time. One of the problems with prevention is the impossibility of proving that it has worked. Too many people cannot be convinced that what did not happen has been a result of a preventive action. Another insurmountable obstacle is to attract the media's attention to something with no "news value". That is one of the reasons why the OSCE activities are hardly know to the public, and why they are under-financed and under-staffed; member countries' politicians feel no pressure to support the OSCE's appeals.

2. The OSCE implements conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction in close co-operation with other international organizations, namely NATO, Council of Europe, EU and WEU. Among international security organizati-

ons now in Europe there is no one which would deserve to be neglected. Each of them has its role to play and so far all they seem to be irreplaceable. The OSCE cannot do things only NATO or UN can do, as e.g. enforcement, because only UN and NATO have a mandate to use armed forces. But not all international disputes or conflicts can be solved by using weapons. There are situations when it is preferable to use the OSCE, though it has "no military teeth". Take for instance Chechnya, the Albanian conflict or Kosovo. It is not by chance that the OSCE was asked to act as the coordinator for all other international organizations in Albania. The role could not be played by NATO, trough the Albanian Government would welcome it. But certainly Russians would not like it. In Kosovo NATO is regarded by Yugoslav leadership as an enemy, while the OSCE is acceptable, though it remains "suspended" from participating in OSCE activities.

In former Yugoslavia the co-operation between NATO and the OSCE is working rather well. But there are many people outside the respective organizations who are convinced that "the international community has been ill-prepared, ill-equipped, inflexible and frequently operating at odds with each other in war-torn societies", as authors of an international project assessing UN operations in Eritrea, Mozambique, Guatemala and Somalia. Of course, nowhere the OSCE has been involved but even in Europe the situation is not always much better. I hope that at least the OSCE Kosovo mission will learn the lessons formulated in five principles: profound understanding of local situations and qualified field personnel; flexibility and adaptability of external assistance; new criteria for measuring success; effectiveness and efficiency of external assistance and above all, participation of local population.

In present circumstances NATO plays in fact a leading role in safeguarding security in Europe. The future role of NATO and the OSCE depends on many unpredictable circumstances but it is almost sure that military aspects of international security will be less and less important, while political, economic, environmental, social and all kinds of non-military aspects will increase it weight. There will always be security risks and challenges in Europe, but I presume that most of them will not be military in strict sense of the word. In spite of that the experience the last several years, especially in former Yugoslavia, has taught us a tough lesson: a strong and effective military alliance will be needed on the continent as a kind of insurance against some unthinkable – today – probabilities. Even a threat of force is sometimes necessary to achieve a political solution as the case of Saddam Hussein and Milošević shows.

One of the problems which need to be addressed in near future is growing overlapping of activities of both organizations. NATO is now doing some things originally only CSCE or UN were supposed to do. Until about 1995 peace-keeping or any "out of area" actions were impossible for NATO, political consultations were limited to East-West problems, but now many NATO bodies consult on almost anything under the sun. Peacekeeping is an essential part of NATO

activities and it is done outside the NATO territory. The membership of some NATO bodies – especially Euroatlantic Partnership Council – has become closer to that of OSCE.

3. The OSCE now possesses an impressive list of techniques and a lot of experience for dealing with conflicts mainly in the Eastern part of the OSCE area. As an elementary measure of preventive diplomacy, the OSCE offers open **political dialogue**. Specific problems are raised and discussed at weekly sessions of two main bodies – the Permanent Council and the Forum for security co-operation in Vienna, both at the ambassadorial level. Delegations seek clarifications and explanations and when asked, they reply. The answers are not always considered satisfactory, but raising a sensitive issue certainly has a moderating effect on the behavior of the criticized country. Discussions at the OSCE bodies within the framework of political dialogue have an important early-warning value. Much of this political dialogue is going on behind the closed doors of conference rooms in Vienna, so the public knows little about it, if at all.

4. One of the most efficient tools of preventive diplomacy is the **OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities**. Since its beginning in 1993, the post has been held by former Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel. He regularly visits about 10 countries with sizable national or ethnic minorities, because in practically all of them there are some problems – minor or more substantial. He pays key attention to the situation of the Russian and Hungarian minorities and of the Romans (Gypsies). That is why he most often visits Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Moldova, but also Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and the Central Asian states. But he goes to other countries, too, as e.g. to Greece, discussing issues concerning the situation of religious minorities in Greece and of Greeks living in Turkey. Operating independently from all parties involved in tensions, the High Commissioner engages in discreet dialogue with representatives of the respective Governments, NGOs and leaders of minorities. He reports on the visits and results of his talks to the respective Governments and the OSCE councils.

5. The OSCE's long-term involvement in conflict prevention on the ground is embodied in its field missions. Successful operations of all the OSCE's missions until now facilitated a unanimous decision of all relevant international organizations to use this proven tool of preventive diplomacy in the most complicated and dangerous conflict in the European continent – in Kosovo.

As of November 1998 there are fourteen **long-term OSCE missions** (four of them under different names) stationed in Macedonia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine and

Tajikistan. The so-called Assistance Group in Chechnya is in fact also a mission. The conflict in Nagorno Karabach is dealt with by the so-called Minsk Group of 12 member states, by a special CiO personal representative and his five assistants in the region, with the headquarters in Tbilisi. Since January 1997 there is "the OSCE presence in Albania". Apart from that there are special OSCE representatives in the Estonian Government commission on Russian military pensioners, in the similar Joint commission in Latvia. Since 1995 "the Central Asia Liaison Office" in Tashkent takes special care of the five Central Asian member countries. In 1998 OSCE Centers in Almaty, Ashgabat and Bishkek were opened.

The importance of individual missions can be judged by financial resources allocated to them by the OSCE budget. Out of about 100 million US$ for the whole 1998 regular budget about 35% went to Bosnia, 28% to Croatia (the two missions 63%!), 11 other missions got only 11%. All missions were supposed to spend 75% of all financial resources. Mission in Kosovo will be far more expensive and will be financed by a special arrangement.

At the present time and Croatia missions are the most numerous. The mission in Bosnia has about 200 internationally seconded members, while at the height of its activity had 246 members. The mission in Croatia has about 250 people. The so-called verification mission in Kosovo will soon become the year 1998 there will be about 1000 mission members deployed there. The Czech Republic will send about 30 people to the mission, half military, half civil.

Other missions are much smaller: Skopje and Ukraine 4 people, Belarus 5, Estonia, Chechnya and Nagorno Karabach 6, Latvia 7, Moldova and Tajikistan 8, Albania 11, Georgia 17. Altogether there are in all the missions over 400 seconded diplomats and all kind of experts, some military.

Most of the missions try to prevent conflicts, some of them deal primarily with post-conflict reconstruction, as e.g. in Georgia, Bosnia, Albania, Croatia or now in Chechnya. The Chechnya missions is an example of changing the contents of activities. Missions in respective states and conflict areas reflect different stages of the process of peace-making: first one being pacification, then reconstruction and finally reconciliation.

6. The biggest operation in the OSCE history so far has been the implementation of the Dayton Accords by its mission in Bosnia. The mission was established three years ago in December 1995 by expanding the original small mission in Sarajevo that had been providing assistance to three local ombudsmen acting under the OSCE's sponsorship since 1994. The new mission was charged with three main tasks: the preparation of elections, human-rights monitoring and facilitation of arms-control and confidence-building measures. During the last three years there has been a significant progress in Bosnia. The war was stopped, several elections were held, democratic institutions built and some of them are working. Much of the civilian part of Dayton accords still remains, however, only a theory, not a prac-

tice. It is not a fault of the OSCE or international community. They are doing their best. But scars of the war are too deep. If 32 000 soldiers of NATO S-FOR left, killing may start again. Bosnia reminds of a protectorate, because it is run in many ways by foreigners. Local politicians – mostly nationalistic – were unable to agree on a flag, currency or diplomatic service and it was imposed on them by international community embodied by the High Representative, named by EU and UN. It seemed almost certain that the dreaded "Cyprus situation" with long-term international presence will be repeated. The most discouraging aspect is a total lack of progress in returning hundreds of thousands of refugees to their original homes.

7. Of all activities of the OSCE mission in Bosnia election monitoring is best publicized, so it is not necessary to speak about it. It would be better to spend our precious time on almost unknown activity on arms control. One of the annexes of the Dayton Agreements (Annex 1B) dealt with **regional stabilization in the Balkans**. Under the auspices of the OSCE two sets of negotiations were successfully finished: the first one on confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) within Bosnia and the second set the so-called sub-regional arms control measures not only in Bosnia but also in Croatia and Yugoslavia; it limits five categories of heavy weapons: tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.

The tree parties to the agreement on CSBMs – B+H, the Federation of B+H and the Republika Srpska – took on a lot of obligations based on the Vienna document on CSBMs of 1994. Among 15 specific measures, prominent ones are: exchange of military information, notification of equipment holdings, constraints on certain military activities, restrictions on military deployments and exercises, withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons to barracks, program of military contacts, verification and inspection regimes, communications and implementation assessment. At the end of 1997 particular attention is being given to inspections, "identification and monitoring of weapons manufacturing capabilities" and visits to armaments factories. Despite problems in the implementation of some aspects of CSBMs the Personal Representative for the agreement noted "a changed atmosphere, growing transparency and gradual realization of voluntary measures in new fields of confidence building, like Open Skies". The new ceilings on limitations of heavy weapons, set by the second agreement, were reached by November 1997.

The third type of negotiations under the OSCE auspices, foreseen by the Dayton Accords on regional arms control in the whole Balkan region, have not started yet. It may actually take a few more years before their potential participants clarify many complicated problems. One of them is the status of Yugoslavia. The sanctions against it have been lifted but the country remains suspended from the OSCE bodies. It is very difficult to find a formula for Yugoslavia's return to them. Some member states are in favor of this, e.g. Rus-

sia, East European states and Greece, but the majority (including Albania and post Yugoslav republics) are blocking it. Of course, it is absurd to expect any meaningful negotiations on Balkan arms control without a key country – Yugoslavia, so we will have to wait until the conditions for them are ripe.

8. At the beginning of 1998 the number of the deployed **Croatia mission** members has surpassed the number of the Bosnia mission and has become the biggest OSCE field operation ever. The mission has taken over tasks of the expired mandate of the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia. Now the mission has 4 co-ordinating centers and 18 field offices around the Eastern and in other parts of Croatia. Its mandate is to "assist with and to monitor implementation of Croatian legislation and commitments on two-way return of all refugees and displaced persons and on protection of minorities rights". The mission will " make specific recommendations to the Croatian authorities".

9. When we speak about the OSCE's experience in post-conflict reconstruction and civil-military co-operation, there is no better example than the **OSCE operations in Albania**. It was the most important OSCE activity in 1997. It was asked to coordinate activities of all international organization there. The mandate included "mediating between the political parties, particularly as regards the election law". One of the most difficult tasks was to prepare and monitor three rounds of elections in the summer of 1997. They were observed by 500 short-term international monitors and over 200 long-term supervisors, who had been in the country for several weeks. The OSCE proved its ability to react effectively to this crisis. It achieved its objective in very close co-operation with the so-called Multi-National Protection Force led by Italy.

What is very interesting is the composition of this force because it shows a possible future pattern. America nor Russia sent troops there. The force was lead by the most interested nation, Italy, mainly because its Government and also the Parliament were afraid of a new wave of refugees from the country in total chaos. France and Spain participated as Mediterranean states, trying to prove that they can shoulder security responsibilities in the region. Greece took part as a neighbor, Turkey could not miss the opportunity when Greece participated. Romanians sent their contingent because of their desire to prove their ability to get into NATO in the first wave. Austria had to provide some infrastructure for the head of the OSCE mission, Mr. Vranitzky. Denmark chaired the OSCE in 1997 and had to set an example. So we expect that for similar expeditions in fact only countries directly threatened by a particular conflict will form "a coalition of interested" and send their troops to pacify the situation; only they will be able to convince their Parliaments to give necessary financial, personnel and material resources for the operation.

10. Now the **Kosovo Verification Mission** is being formed and it will become the biggest OSCE operation. It is safe to predict that it will also be one of the most difficult. First, the mandate, based on rather vague Holbrook – Milošević understanding, is very broad and will cause many controversies about its interpretation. Second, the positions of the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs are almost unreconcilable. All the Albanian factions demand full independence and sovereignty, Serbs say they will never agree to it. Third, there is a big confusion as to just who is to represent Kosovo Albanians. Rugova accepts peaceful means, but he is considered a traitor by the Kosovo Liberation Army, whose only way of achieving its aims is an armed struggle. The Yugoslav authorities are ready to deal with Rugova, the KLA is "a band of terrorists", as Foreign Minister Jovanovič says. But Rugova's followers refuse to attend talks with Serb authorities without international presence. Forth, The mission is operating in a country whose participation in the OSCE's activities is suspended and on whom the mission was actually imposed by threats of bombing.

The Kosovo mission will act in close co-operation with other international organizations to reach a political settlement. There are several plans but none of them has been accepted by both sides. One with some chance to be accepted after certain modifications has been presented by an American negotiator Christopher Hill; it is supported by the EU. It demands strong autonomy for Kosovo but within the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Milošević presented his own plan. In general terms they are not so different, but "the devil is in details". One of the difficulties the Kosovo mission is to overcome is a total lack of leverage over the extremists of the Kosovo Liberation Army occupying positions from which Serb police had left. The only way seems to threaten them with NATO

Discussion on the paper by Zdeněk Matějka
(POSSIBLE RISKS AND THREATS IN THE EUROPEAN SPACE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE OSCE: POSSIBILITIES OF CONFLICT PREVENTION, OF THE POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION)

Matúš Štefanovič: I would like to ask about the position of Greece in the Kosovo conflict. It is no secret that Greece is not so critical towards Serbia as some other member countries of NATO, and looks at Kosovo as a possible source of tension in the whole Mediterranean region. Did Greece cooperate correctly with the OSCE, or did she choose a more "specific" approach?

Zdeněk Matějka: The reality is that Greece is really a specific country. At the OSCE, we have seen endless (and unfruitful) discussions about Cyprus, with Greece and Turkey holding different positions. However, it is necessary to admit that Greece is partly right, because it was Turkey which committed aggression against Cyprus in 1974. But in the case of former Yugoslavia, Greece was dogmatic and the Greeks reacted incomprehensibly, for example over the question of the name of Macedonia. The Greeks immediately reacted to any mention of "Macedonia" with the observation that a mistake had been made, and it is necessary to use the designation "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". In NATO, Greece very frequently opposed the view of the majority, and broke the consensus in discussions on Yugoslavia. In Kosovo, Greece confronts the problem of refugees, and the connection of the Kosovo conflict with Albania, where a Greek minority lives. As is well known, Macedonia contains a numerous Moslem or Albanian minority, and for various cultural and religious reasons, Greece takes the side of the Serbs. The position of Greece is really very specific, and to simplify, I will say it is pro-Serb. In any case, Greece is the only member of NATO, which has not joined the united front against Serbia. As a result, Greece naturally occupies a specific position in OSCE discussions. Certain rules exist in OSCE discussions. For example, the representatives of individual members of the EU are authorized to speak, only when the representative of the country holding the presidency of the EU has spoken. If the representative of, let us say, Germany or Greece, simply continues the speech of the representative of the country holding the presidency (in the second half of 1998 this was Austria), he formally identifies with it, and only partly expresses the specific view of his own government. Thus the EU has its common denominator – the country holding the presidency – but the possibility exists of breaking the consensus of the whole fifteen. It often happens that the Greek representatives express precisely the opposite of the view presented by the EU as a whole. This is a Greek specific. It is natural that she breaks the consensus of the countries of the EU and NATO, over policy towards the problems of former Yugoslavia.

Jaroslav Kuča: I would like to answer the possible question of why we did not give space for a presentation by the representative of a non-governmental organization. It was not our explicit aim to analyze security risks, in such a way that everybody could fully express their views. It simply was not possible for reasons of time. However, I think that it will be possible in future.

Alexander Duleba: As the representative of the non- governmental organization chairing this panel, I can confirm that the participation of non-governmental organizations is considered here. However, I agree with the view that the role of non-governmental organizations in solving the problems of national security is not fully appreciated and that it was possible to include this theme in the program.

Elemír Nečej: I would like to mention the economic aspects of the crisis in the Balkans. The speaker in the last seminar mentioned that the OSCE poin-

ted to the economic crisis in Albania even before its outbreak, but this warning was ignored. This may give the impression that we begin to deal with a crisis only when it is in full flow. I think that it was Mr. Royen, who observed, at our March 1998 seminar, that Germany developed as a functioning democracy in the context of economic growth, and he asked whether German democracy will also be functional in unfavorable economic conditions. This idea undoubtedly applies not only to the Federal Republic, but also to every other country. Therefore, my question to the speaker is whether, from the point of view of monitoring certain economic problems, the OSCE could create a structure for early analysis? And what are the possibilities for cooperation with the EU, which, as we stated in our June 1998 seminar, has not chosen the best approach to dealing with the economic background of security crises?

Zdeněk Matějka: On the question of the economic dimension of the OSCE, we can really feel – to put it rather strongly – sabotage from the EU. The EU refuses to strengthen the economic dimension, because the EU is itself the economic dimension. The Americans, Russians and Eastern Europeans (including the Central Europeans) support strengthening the economic dimension. They also support this on the basis of experiences from Albania and former Yugoslavia. A former employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USA holds the position of head of department for the OSCE. However, the EU still prevents the Americans, Russians and the non-EU members in general (only 15 of the 55 members of the OSCE belong to the EU) acquiring any political instrument to criticize the EU for its controversial protectionist tendencies. There are constant discussions between these two camps in the OSCE, and these will undoubtedly be repeated in 1999, in Prague at the annual economic forum, which is always held in May. However, so far, no progress can be observed. Only the missions of the OSCE devote appropriate attention to the economic dimension, because they know very well what an explosive potential is hidden in economic problems. However on the level of the OSCE as a whole, similar discussions are rather muted, and it is pointed out that these problems are the responsibility of the European Economic Commission, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other economically oriented organizations. In Albania, for example, Franz Vranitzky – as the personal representative of the chairman of the OSCE – chose tough economic arguments in talks with the Albanian side. Unlike NATO, Vranitzky could not threaten military force, but he persuaded with the threat of the departure of foreigners from Albania, and pointing to the economic results. His threats were effective: If you do not change the election law, if you allow people to say that is necessary to hang Berisha and his supporters (earlier he naturally had to oppose to Berisha's intention to hang all former communists), we will stop economic aid, the foreigners will leave Albania and you can peacefully kill everybody. This is an example of the OSCE using peaceful methods. It could not bomb, but it used other effective instruments, by which it forced the other side to accept its conditions.

Question (Ministry of Defense, Slovenia): I think that the Dayton agreement fulfilled its original aim, but is already insufficient and a "post-Dayton" agreement should be concluded. The new agreement should take into account the complex development since Dayton. In Bosnia, we are witnessing a non-functioning state, and nobody should have illusions that the refugees will be able to return to their original homes. The speaker himself admitted that if the foreign armed forces left Bosnia, the war would return. Is it possible to adapt the Dayton agreement to the new conditions, to the present situation?

Zdeněk Matějka: It is difficult to say what plans the USA or the EU have at present. But it is certainly true that the Dayton agreement was only partly successful. Today, Bosnia is practically a protectorate, and everybody knows that hardly anything can be done there without a decision from the international community. The local politicians have not been able to agree on the state flag, the name of the state, its diplomatic representation or any of the attributes of a common state. After hopelessly planned discussions, the international community finally lost patience and began to submit its decisions to the Bosnian offices more or less for signature. It is very difficult to imagine the Bosnian leaders agreeing to anything. Therefore nothing remains, except to transport the leaders of the factions and the representatives of rump Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Croatia to some air base and submit a new text for them to sign. They will naturally have the right to comment, supplement and adjust, but not to change the substance. If they want something more, it will be necessary to threaten to fly them home. Obviously, it is not so simple. It was possible to "kick" Milošević into accepting the Holbrook plan. But how to "kick" him into at least signing the generally accepted plan of the Kosovo extremists? Milošević withdrew his police and army, but the fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army immediately occupied the vacated positions. The soldiers are confronted with groups of teenagers, who are armed with kalashnikovs and shoot at everything. I am a civilian, and I do not want to talk of military honor, but I think that every commander has a duty to defend his men. In practice, defense means to attack and liquidate their attackers. I agree that the Serbian soldiers react inadequately, but a soldier can understand their reaction better than a civilian. How can NATO persuade the Kosovo fighters to observe an agreement? It is impossible to bomb them! Many of these people came to Kosovo in the summer from Germany, Switzerland and other Western countries. They are financed by money from drugs and prostitution, and they are waging war. That is the reality. The OSCE plenipotentiary for human rights Jiří Dienstbier speaks publicly and openly about this. The international community still has not found a recipe for Kosovo. Thus, the situation in Kosovo is different from the situation in Bosnia. In Bosnia, the action of the international community basically works, and all the local parties to the agreement at least formally recognize the agreements, although all sides break them. The greatest problem is with refugees. Many of those who returned to their original homes were killed, others were terrorized or their hou-

ses were burnt, and the refugees often left again. Therefore, I think that the Dayton agreement will have to be reformulated, or a new agreement concluded. But so far, Dayton is more or less working and the world is now mainly concerned with Kosovo.

Jaroslav Kuča: In the recent past, Europe experienced a systematic shifting of frontiers. After the end of the Cold War, this problem was again opened in connection with national minorities. Slovakia is a state, which the OSCE monitors in relation to the rights of national minorities. We meet with two groups of views: one claims that they have limited nationality rights, while others say that they have above average rights. What is actually the average or standard, and where does the OSCE evaluation start from?

Zdeněk Matějka: The OSCE starts from the Copenhagen document from 1990, in which these rights are analyzed in detail, and from the documents of the Council of Europe. So far, nobody has signed an international document on collective rights. However, this is precisely what some Hungarians both in Hungary and Slovakia demand, and the present Slovak government will undoubtedly occupy the same position as the previous cabinet. That is, that it recognizes no collective rights and the individual rights of the Hungarian minority are above average in Slovakia. They can be called above standard, on the basis of the standard declared by all 35 members of the CSCE at that time, and now recognized by all 55 present members, including the Baltic states, Russia, Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. Everything depends here on so-called common sense, and the head of one government should not say that he is prime minister of all 15 million Magyars. That can easily lead to somebody comparing him to Hitler, who regarded the Sudeten German minority as a group of people he represented, and in the end he succeeded. When Henry Kissinger spoke in Prague about the demands of the Kosovo Albanians for independence, the Czech argument comparing the Kosovo Albanians to the former demands of the Sudeten Germans appeared logical to him. In the thirties, the Sudeten Germans demanded collective rights, and according to this logic, they had a collective right to become part of Germany. The Kosovo Albanians follow the same line: after independence they want to unite with their mother country – Albania. I intentionally do not speak about the rights of national minorities. I know from experience that some delegations – including Slovak delegations – always complain about such formulations, since it is a matter of the "rights of persons, who belong to national minorities". So far, nobody in the OSCE has recognized collective rights.

Jozef Šimuny: Kosovo is one of the examples of failure to solve the problems of national minorities. According to data from the beginning of this century, the proportion of Albanians to Serbs in this region was one to nine. Now, however, the proportions are completely reversed. Does the OSCE monitor gradual demographic and economic changes in nationally mixed territories, so that it can predict the appearance of crisis situations?

Zdeněk Matějka: Such changes are especially monitored by the high commissioner of the OSCE Max van der Stoel. Studies also exist on the development of the Slovak minority in Hungary. But this is only the academic aspect of a solution, which does not mean very much in practice. In practice, it is always a matter of specific demands and complaints, whether of Hungarians in Slovakia or Slovaks in Hungary. In the case of Kosovo, however, you quote the statistics the Serbs give. But at meetings of the OSCE, the Serbian voice is lacking, and their arguments are given only by Russia. The Western delegations show an uncompromising tendency to solve problems in Yugoslavia in black and white terms: the bolshevik Milošević against the democrat Tudjman. Naturally, it was never and is not true that the Kosovo Albanians are fighters for democracy against the bolsheviks symbolized by Milošević. The fact that Milošević was successfully forced to agree to the OSCE mission is a great success. For comparison, imagine that the Slovak government agreed to the sending of an OSCE verification mission to the Slovak areas inhabited mainly by Hungarians, although Slovakia was not represented in the organization. NATO, which represents the main enemy for the majority of Serbs, thus has permission to check how the Serbs are fulfilling an agreement concluded with terrorists. In Serbia, the Kosovo Liberation Army is not described as anything other than a band of terrorists. Certainly, Holbrook and the EU succeeded in persuading the Serbs with very realistic arguments: If you do not agree, we will simply bomb all your military facilities. It is only possible to hope that they will also succeed in persuading the Albanians, who all – including the group around Rugovo – speak only of one thing, that is full independence. The result of compromise can only be autonomy, which may approach independence, but can only be implemented strictly in the framework of Yugoslavia.

Rudolf Hecht

SECURITY-POLITICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE (NATO)

I.

Today we are to witness the end of a decade which saw the improvement of the **overall European security situation** in an unprecedented way. The re-unified Germany, the introduction of democratic systems in the former communist zone of influence and the evolvement of a partnership between the major institutions of the Western community and Russia mark the end of the European division which, although in a different form, had existed already before World War II.

This success was primarily accomplished by the decades-long close political, military and economic co-operation within the frameworks of NATO and the European Communities. The consistent policy of Western nations based on the firm foundations of the Transatlantic solidarity ensured the security of all democracies on both sides of the Atlantic during the Cold War, and finally gave the peoples of Eastern Europe the chance to independently shape their lives.

In the last years the new democracies have made good use of this unique opportunity, although it meant having to overcome all associated obstacles. It was only because of their resolute struggle for freedom and democracy and their commitment to overall European security that today's Europe was able to evolve.

As a consequence we have moved close to the vision which NATO has been pursuing already since its Harmel Report of 1967, which **challenges** have to be met in order to realize this vision that has become the specific political objective of the *new NATO?*

- *First* of all we have to maintain the current advantageous situation of the whole of Europe. A deterioration of the current state could be brought about by questioning the collective defense function of NATO, since this concept forms the very heart of the North Atlantic Alliance and is thus the best guarantee for Europe not to return to the old patterns of nationalism and power policy.

All governments and parliaments of the Western democracies are to further stress the **importance of the defense function** of NATO in order to en-sure the political stability in and around Europe! It also has to be made clear beyond doubt that the successful political and military implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty has strongly contributed to the decrease of classic threats. These treats may rise again if NATO neglects to continue its collective defense.

- *Secondly*, we have to point out that as a consequence of the international developments of the last years a **shift of threats** has occurred. This holds true for the nuclear, biological and chemical area as well as the conventional and sub-conventional level. Especially we have to be aware of the fact that between the biological and chemical on the one and the sub-conventional are on the other hand, an increasing interdependence has developed.

To put it in plain words; A largely internally stable *West* and a *European central region,* whose internal stability has yet to be improved, are increasingly confronted with **risk zones** at the periphery of and outside Europe. In this context we have to mention, above all, *Southeastern Europe,* the *Mahgreb region* and the *Near* and *Middle East,* as well as the *Caucasus region.*

- However, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests have shown how fast security-political developments faraway from the Western democracies may affect us. A further deterioration of the regional security structure in the area of India, Pakistan and China, which is characterized by the non-existence of confidence-building measures in this region, would inevitably have negative consequences on the global security situation.

This is why a close security-political co-operation of all democratic industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere will be of such crucial importance in the 21st century. Problems that at the moment apparently affect only a few countries may tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, become a global threat unless we do not co-operate to counter-act these developments early enough! We must not forget that especially the industrialized nations are increasingly interdependent on each other whereas they represent an ever decreasing part of the world population.

Considering all this, we must not postpone the solution of the "internal problems" of the Euro-Atlantic region. On the contrary, we have to actively promote the process of co-operation and **integration** as well as the development of a balanced strategic stability since a lasting overall stabilization of Europe can be achieved only this way.

The new **European security architecture** that has been given life to by the summits of NATO and the EU as well as the signing of the NATO-Russia-Founding-Act in 1997, still needs to be strengthened in order to reach its full working capacity.

Therefore:
- the partnership between Russia and the West has to be politically implemented in the best way possible,
- and the opening process of NATO for new members has to be pursued as fast and far-reaching as it serves the overall European stability.

In addition:
- the EU has to be gradually enlarged,
- and the Euro-Atlantic relation has to be put on a new and more balanced fundament.

The two most important pre-requisites for implementing these intentions are:

1. the development of a **common stabilization strategy** between the EU and NATO, and, simultaneously,
2. the formation of the European capacity **to implement political decisions.**

The EU as well as NATO are indispensable stabilizing factors for the European security.

Since, on the one hand, their policies are approaching each other but, on the other, they keep on having different central competences and since they share the same values and have similar strategic interests, it is most important for the two organizations to continue their **"bridge-building process"** at a faster pace. This is the only possibility for the Western community to pursue a genuine comprehensive security policy at acceptable costs.

By now the EU has gained influence in all apolitical areas whereas the respective levels of its competence are quite different. Before 1989, the Union was *de-facto* a "community for internal socio-economic stability". Since then, it has become the most important outside-based contributor of socio-economic stability to the new democracies.

In a slightly different form the EC/EU has had a stabilizing effect on some 70 Asian, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. Furthermore, during the last years the Union has increasingly concentrated upon elaborating a security-politically adequate policy for the Mediterranean region. Besides these socio-economic and therefore also politically effective measures for stabilizing its own environments, the EU gradually evolves into the crystallization point of Europe's political ability to act.

Also NATO has changed. It developed from an alliance, whose primary function was to implement a common defense, towards a comprehensive security organization. During the Cold War the active, creative component of NATO's policy played a minor role, while since 1989/90 it has gained ever more importance and reached highest priority within the framework of NATO's comprehensive strategy. Of course also NATO recognizes the comprehensive

notion of security, focusing not only on its military dimension. NATO has always been more than a sole defensive alliance.

But unlike the EU, NATO able to replace basic structural political stabilization effects of the European integration process.

The Alliance, however, offers special political-military capabilities, which the EU lacks. Only NATO is able to guarantee the political co-operation between North America and Europe and thereby secure the strategic stability of the northern hemisphere. Only NATO is able to shape the process of getting the armed forces of the new democracies under political control. Only NATO is able to politically initiate (based on a mandate by the United Nations) and independently conduct large-scale military crisis management activities.

Furthermore, NATO provides an invaluable contribution to the comprehensive stabilization of the new democracies and supports the development of a dialogue and co-operation with and within the Mediterranean countries. (The opening process for new member-states has, for example, considerably improved the relations between various Central and Eastern European countries.)

The NATO summit in Madrid and the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty have already established several basic prerequisites for actual co-operation of both organizations in the field of European crisis management.

As far as crisis management is concerned, **actual co-operation** between the **European Union** and **NATO** cannot be overlooked:

- Based on the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU will be able to politically initiate the so-called Petersburg-Missions (*humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping*) and "*avail itself of the Western European Union*" to prepare and implement decisions and actions with defense implications. In doing so the EU will also be able to issue "*general guidelines*" to the WEU.
- The WEU, however, does not comprise of its own military organization. Since 1995/96 it has access to specific troops (Forces answerable to WEU) of its member states, such as the multinational Eurocorps. Large-scale missions for a European crisis management operation, however, will be possible only with the aid of NATO.
- NATO's decisions of Berlin of June 1996 grant the WEU the possibility to use means and capabilities of NATO for operations, initiated by the EU. The North Atlantic Council will decide whether and how NATO resources may be used.
- Considering the fact that nearly all members of the WEU are also members of the EU and NATO, we may assume that those member-states of EU who at the same time are members of the WEU and NATO will only agree to a decision of the EU to "*avail itself of the WEU*" if it is clear that the WEU will be able to cope with the task and, above all, the support of NATO will be provided.
- In the light of all said the decision-making process concerning European crisis management will include all three organization – the EU, WEU and NATO.

Up to now the connection of NATO and the EU is thus neither direct nor formal. It rather exists due to the close co-operation of both organizations with the **Western European Union.** Therefore the WEU will stay being a decisive political factor for European security policy at least as long as not all members of the EU are willing to equally contribute to the development of the CFSP, including its military component.

But already now it is important to find a basis for a better relationship of NATO and the EU, not only as far as crisis management is concerned. We should also harmonize the roles both organizations play in peacefully re-shaping the European security structure.

In practice such a connection has already been in existence as the admission of new member-states into NATO generally is easier and faster to accomplish than being accepted into the EU. The so-called NATO enlargement sets the necessary framework for political stability for leading the new democracies on their long and hard way towards the stability standards of the EU and thus forms a significant element in the success of the European integration process as a whole.

The creation of a **formal relationship** between NATO and the EU will be a main challenge for the 21st century since a fully independent European security policy is politically and financially neither desirable nor possible. Those who favor an independent European development should be well aware of the resulting consequences: high financial burdens for the European countries, the break-up of NATO and thus not only of the Transatlantic solidarity but also of the existing political co-operation between Europe and North America. Of course, this would not result in the USA being wiped from the European "security map". The USA would have to be included in European security analyses as non-allied players with enormous potential, not only in the nuclear field. The political consequences would be unimaginable.

It is therefore much wiser and it seems to be the only realistic way to establish the **European Security and Defense Identity** within the framework of NATO. Thereby Europe's weight within NATO will increase proportionally to the number of European states that are willing to define a joint position within the alliance and to contribute adequately to its implementation.

Overall, the Western democracies in Europe are challenged to co-operative with all the countries in their environment, whereby common interests and values and the European stability are to be the main parameters. A close co-operation of the **power triangle** – EU, WEU, NATO – will automatically result from this situation.

II.

The situation in FYROM, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the recent developments in the Kosovo demonstrate very clearly that the co-operation of the EU, WEU and NATO is not only beneficial to overall European stability but also essential for maintaining or re-establishing regional stability in a crisis region.

In the case the **Kosovo** the main aim is to clearly show the parties involved that the Western community will neither tolerate the continuation of the current development nor any attempt to reach ones own's goals at the expense of others under all circumstances.

Only when both parties involved realize that a "either all or nothing" policy will not only lead to a long and bloody confrontation with uncertain results but also to massive sanction imposed by the Western community, will it be possible to resolve this problem in a way that makes co-existence within the framework of the existing national structures acceptable.

Such a development cannot be reached merely by words and much less if the Western democratic players pursued different policies. In order to bring about a development beneficial for all involved, we need a **comprehensive strategy** of the EU, WEU and NATO which has to include political pressure and economic sanctions but also the possibility of military actions.

The Western democracies should not only focus on the conflict within Yugoslavia. Rather the surroundings have to be stabilized in a timely and preventive manner as to minimize the negative consequences on the entire. Balkan region, the Southern NATO flank and thereby on the overall European security. The example of UNPREDEP clearly shows what results can be reached already by symbolic political-military actions if applied in time.

As principle however, Western security policy should not restrict itself to re-acting on already existing or developing crises. In addition to a new "threat-re-action policy" after the Cold War we will have to actively promote in the future not only overall European stability but also **regional stability** in those areas surrounding the more stable and prosperous part of Europe. It has to be our aim to prevent a "future Yugoslavia" from happening as early as possible.

This does not only mean strengthening the internal regional stability in zones with insufficient stability but also enhancing the possibilities for further co-operation in peace-support efforts in the regional context.

An example for this is the so-called "Central European Nations' Co-operation in Peace Support" (CENCOOP) with the aim of *"being able to meet the challenges of future peace support operations in a more effective way and thereby commonly gain a stronger position by enhancing the capabilities of the central European nations".*

III.

By initiating a multi-national activity program for smaller-sized countries in central Europe, Austria underlines the significance of regional co-operation for a common European security and it shows its willingness to contribute to this. Similarly, Austria is ready to continue to participate in peacekeeping operations.

Additionally, with the recent ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty by the Austrian National Council the whole spectrum of **peace support operations** is

now covered. Austria is aware of its specific responsibility for security and stability in Europe.

It is however, a fact that the Austrian government could not reach an agreement on what additional measures will have to be taken with regard to the future Austrian security policy, so that our country will be able to participate *"fully in functioning European security structures in the spirit of European solidarity and for the purpose of guaranteeing peace in Europe and Austria's security, in accordance with the aims of the European Union"*, as stipulated by the Austrian National Council in February 1997.

Already in March 1996, the Austrian government decided to evaluate all *"security-political options, including full membership of Austria in WEU"*. Up to this date we have not seen any direct results. It took nearly 9 months for a group of experts, including representatives from the Federal Chancellery and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, to prepare a draft of the so-called "options report". Unfortunately, the Federal Chancellor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and could not reach agreement on this draft.

The first part of this draft analyses the current security-political framework, the bases for the European and International security structures, including the importance of the WEU and NATO for European security and the security-political situation of Austria. The experts of the Federal Chancellery, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and my ministry could reach an agreement on this part before the talks were terminated on April 1, 1998.

Although the talks on the options report eventually failed because the Minister of Foreign Affairs and had insisted on including the perspective of Austria's NATO membership which, by the way, would not have been a foregone conclusion, the work was nonetheless very valuable. This draft includes the first comprehensive analysis of the Austrian security policy and the security-political framework in the New Europe, provided by respective Austrian ministries.

The agreed upon part of the draft includes some quite remarkable formulations. For instance, it states that the defense efforts of NATO during the Cold War-period played a decisive role in the strategic balance of powers which *"at that time provided the main basis for a peaceful development of all of Western Europe"*.

On current military co-operation in Europe we can find the following: *"We have to observe the general trend that armed forces are considered to be not the last, but a significant preventive mean in the framework of comprehensive security-political concepts. On the one hand, they shall prevent crises by a broader military co-operation and integration or, on the other hand, as in the case of Macedonia where we already have a crisis prevent the bloody escalation and the eventually necessary deployment of combat troops.*

The main conditions are ... to preserve one's own defense potentials and the in the majority of European countries already existing readiness and possibility to co-operate with the armed formed forces of other countries.

The more European countries participate in this process of co-operation and integration, the more it will be possible to prevent future denationalization processes in European policies".

It is obvious that we shall see no agreement on the basic reorientation of the Austrian security policy before the elections to the Austrian National Council in 1999. Additionally, the discussion of such an important security-political decision in Austria needs some more time since our independence and unity after World War II are closely linked to the Austrian neutrality.

For Austria and its population the discussion of the value of neutrality and a possible NATO membership is therefore not only a security-political issue.

At time however the development of a new Austrian security concept which is based on **solidarity** can be observed.

Austria has already taken the following decisive steps:
- membership in the EU,
- observer status in the WEU,
- participation in the PfP program,
- ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty,
- general readiness for using the opportunities of the enhanced PfP program.

All this could be interpreted as sings of Austria's willingness to fully integrate itself into the European security architecture in the end.

Small and medium-sized countries like Austria can make the best use for their own security and their ability to participate in the shaping of a common European security policy by being NATO members. Because of its geostrategic position it is of **vital interest** to Austria to get firmly established within the European security architecture and gain the best possible opportunities of shaping it along with other European countries.

Discussion on the paper by Rudolf Hecht[1]
(SECURITY-POLITICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE EU AND THE NATO)

Jozef Šimuny: The paper gave NATO unexpectedly high praise. Has Austrian policy towards NATO only changed now? In relation to the fact that Vienna is the seat of important international institutions and many documents are named after it, I would also like to hear whether Austria is considering joining the signatory countries of the treaty on conventional armed forces, in the framework of its adaptation. This would clearly mean that Austria would be obliged to observe the "Vienna I" and "Vienna II" protocols.

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[1] The paper of Rudolf Hecht was presented by Dr. Matthias Hoy

Matthias Hoy: No doubt you know the situation in Austria, and you know very well NATO is very controversial in political discussions in that country. But I dare to say that the Austrian population is pro-NATO. However, until the elections planned for 1999, all the official political statements will show restraint. I can say that the army of my country unambiguously supports Austrian membership of NATO. Where the second question is concerned, I have some problem with answering. I only learnt yesterday evening that I have to go to a conference at Častá -Papiernička, and so I only had a few hours to prepare for my contribution as a substitute. Therefore, I openly admit that I am actually unable to answer this question directly.

Ján Černák: As far as I am well informed about the circumstances of the above mentioned option reports, the greatest problem for the Austrian Parliament was the *definition* of incorporation of the country into the Western European security structures. The speaker said that it is difficult to express a view before the elections. I want to ask whether Mr. Hoy (or Mr. Hecht?) has a view on how this problem will be solved after the elections, or how, in his view, the "problem" of Austrian neutrality will develop after the elections?

Matthias Hoy: Without regard for the views of the population on NATO, as I said a short time age, it is necessary to say one thing: About 80% of the Austrian population also regard neutrality as a good institution. But you ask for my personal view: I do not think that Austria is condemned to be neutral for ever. It is entirely possible that after the parliamentary elections in September or October 1999, we will already know the definitive answer to your question about the "problem" of neutrality. So, if you want to hear from me personally and explicitly, I think that Austria will not avoid NATO. My country will take its decisive step towards NATO in the next two years, if not already in 1999.

Peter Šimlovič: I will deviate a little to the European Union. Does Austria feel any "contradiction" in being a member of the EU but not of NATO? I am also led to this question by the reference of the speaker to 80% of the Austrian public being satisfied with the status of neutrality. I admit that this percentage surprised me. I have other data.

Jaroslav Kuča: I want to ask a supplementary question: How does a neutral state, which is a member of the EU see realization of the CSFP, that is the common security and foreign policy?

Matthias Hoy: Firstly, it must be clear to every security analyst, that there is a difference between "general" and "political" reactions of public opinion on these sensitive questions. This also concerns the evaluation of membership of the EU and NATO by the Austrian public. I am sure that the question of neutrality will become a central issue in the approaching parliamentary elections in

Austria. We can only expect one alternative to neutrality: the principle of neutrality will be replaced by membership of NATO. No other solution is possible. Chancellor Klima and minister of defense Fasslabend hold diametrically opposed positions on this questions, and we will have to wait for the results of the election in the autumn of 1999, to learn more about the security orientation of the country.

Sergej Ermakov: NATO recently took a decision to use force in the name of the UN Security Council. In my view, it is nothing other than unilateral usurpation. NATO approves the use of force in carrying out peace operations, which cannot improve a situation and can only make it worse. I will only observe that the approach of the Western and Central European governments will significantly influence the reaction of the Russian Federation. The action of NATO may lead to a partisan war in Sarajevo, or in the whole of Yugoslavia. What do you actually think about the decision of NATO to use force on the territory of former Yugoslavia, and claim the mandate of the UN for this?

Matthias Hoy: I already said that NATO can intervene only with the mandate of the UN. It is always necessary to emphasize the fact that the function of NATO is defensive, and is aimed at ensuring security and political stability in Europe. At present, from the point of view of Austria, I cannot, with the best will, see any more appropriate alternative to the program NATO is carrying out in the crisis areas.

Sorin Encutescu

SOURCES OF INSTABILITY, RISKS AND CONFLICTS ON BALKANS[1]

Many of the recent conflicts in the Balkans have been temporarily halted trough emergency crisis-resolution actions. These emergency actions, though, have not focused on the interrelated sources of these conflicts, and have not so far led to a real, lasting regional solution.

Though the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has proved to be necessary in monitoring minority activities and elections in the region, it has been insufficient to resolve the region's ills.

The European Union remain "blind" to many of the countries and problems in the region; yet, many of the problems in South Eastern Europe are logically addressed by these European-pillar institutions.

Regional expectations about what NATO (and the United States) can actually achieve far exceed NATO's collective will and political-military capacities and the realities of the United States' limits. Yet, almost all attention has been focused upon NATO intervention. Hence, regional expectations are likely to remain unfulfilled with adverse implications for NATO's prestige and U.S. influence.

The roots of Balkan insecurity

The roots of Balkan insecurity and instability can be attributed to at least the following four inter-related problems: (1) psychological factors; (2) state-building challenges; (3) economic development; and (4) security/defense issues. Efforts to successfully eradicate the sources of Balkan insecurity and conflict must attack all these problems simultaneously. Because NATO is only effective in ameliorating two of the four problems (psychological and security/defense), a more comprehensive coordinated strategy is necessary.

1. Psychological factors: Balkan v. South East European

Two fundamentally different and contradictory modes of thinking remain evident in the region.

One mode of thinking, which remains predominant, is that which emphasizes the pursuit of narrow nationalistic interests even at the expense of neighbors. This mode could be labeled "Balkan" (with its images of Balkan powder keg and ghosts); it employs history to justify the need to rectify past political or social injustice. *The second* very different mode of thinking, which remains latent in the region, is that which stresses cooperation. This mode could be labeled as "South East European"; it requires shedding historical blinders and transcending legacies, and stresses the need to develop cooperative activities and institutions, such as the South East European Cooperation Initiative (SEECI), the Sound East European Defense ministerial, or the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE). The historical model for such cooperation is successful reconciliation of former adversaries Germany and France in Western Europe. We now need to implement this model in the South-East corner of Europe. It needs to be recalled, though, that the German-French project required attention to cooperative institution-building, and substantial resources over a fifty year period. In sum, enormous time and effort will be required to erode and eradicate the predominant psychological Balkan attitude. Compares to Western Europe, which had a fifty-year head-start, the South East European region is only beginning now.

2. State-building challenges

The post-Communist legacy presents a region-wide need to develop political and social institutions to meet the needs of each state's citizens-the challenge of state-building at the most basic level. During the fifty years while Germany and France were being slowly embedded in the institutional web of NATO and the European Community/Union, Communist regimes uniformly suppressed historic national differences and the vestiges of the Treaties of Berlin (1878) and Trianon (1920) in Europe's Southeast corner. Complicating the challenge is the fact that the post-Communist regional legacy remains quite diverse. While Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria maintained statehood during Communist rule, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia must develop independent state institutions from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and Moldova from the former Soviet Union. The FRY must develop state institutions to accommodate the varying needs of its ethnically diverse citizen in Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia. In all cases, though, the major challenge will be how to develop state institutions that meet the needs of all its citizens. In other words, state-building must accommodate ethnic minority participation and tolerate their contacts with ethnic brethren abroad. To the degree that minorities "feel" they have a place with-in the state, the state might be judged as being democratically healthy and viable. To the degree citizens feel excluded from state institutions, they will represent a potential threat to the viability of that state, and aga-

in the state will remain "weak". Among the weak states which predominate in the region, we have already witnessed the phenomenon of two "failed-states" (Albania and Bulgaria in 1996), and should recognize that others (e.g., Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Bulgaria) pose the potential for "failing" in the future. The countries in South East Europe provide many risks to security that arise from the alienation of ethnic minorities from state institutions with the resulting danger of spilling across borders. For example, remaining from the legacy of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin and Communist rule in Albania and FRY is the unresolved Albanian "problem". Aggravated by Serbian policies, Kosovo has become its flashpoint, where 90 percent of the Republic's two million population are Albanian Kosovars who have been effectively excluded from participation in the state's institutions. The Albanian minority in Macedonia is also connected to this crisis. In marked contrast to the situation in Kosovo, the Albanian minority does participate in Macedonia's state institutions. But to the extent that differences in perceptions persist over the size of the minority (Macedonian state statistics claim Albanians comprise 22 percent; while Albanians claim they comprise 35-40 percent), the potential for alienation exists. As a result, many Slavic Macedonians perceive Macedonia's demographics (where Albanians are growing at 3.5 percent per year) as potential threat to the state's security. Such perceptions weaken the state. (Bulgarians also tend to portray their declining population-resulting from a high death rate, declining birthrate, and emigration-as a threat to security). One of the most effective institutions to deal with these security problems has been the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which has evaluated the treatment of ethnic minorities and monitored elections. While this institution has been necessary and useful in preventing some conflicts, it has clearly been insufficient. Nevertheless, it remains one of the most effective tools to deal with these aspects of the region's risks.

3. Economic development

One illness common to the region is its general economic deprivation, which tends to exacerbate ethnic tensions. Unfortunately, the Yugoslav crisis, which has necessitated economic sanctions on FRY, has contributed to further economic dislocation in the region. Many in the region still do not understand why they must bear the costs of sanctions without reimbursement, and view them not as a security cost, but as a burden imposed by Great Powers. Most citizens in the region define the risks to their security predominantly in domestic terms-from drug and people trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, and state corruption. State ministries of interior, which are responsible for domestic security, are the institutions with the responsibility to deal with these risks to security, but they tend to be ineffective. Also since the European Union (and WEU) are the multinational institutions that are only responsible, but also the most capable of dealing with these internal security issues and concerns, they should assume

a more active regional role. The EU has played a positive role in stabilizing Slovenia (which did not get a NATO membership bid in July 1997 at Madrid), by extending an opening for ultimate membership. To a lesser degree, the WEU's offer of associate partnership to Bulgaria and Romania has offered hope. However it might be argued that the EU and WEU have had an unwitting, but negative impact on the security of the other countries in the region by offering encouragement to some but not all. First, regrettably some states in the region have remained "invisible" to the EU and WEU, particularly Albania and Macedonia.

Second, the Schengen agreement, which controls and limits the flow of people across borders, contributes to a future sense of regional isolation from Europe. Third, despite NATO's adoption of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in January 1994, and creation of a European deputy SACEUR to become NATO's military liaison with the WEU in 1996, the WEU did not respond when the Albanian crisis erupted from the pyramid scheme and resulting economic collapse. Fortunately, Italy stitched together an international military force (Operation Albania) to restore domestic order in Albania.

Many in region correctly see that economic stability is critical to their security. Many, though, incorrectly continue to see EU membership as a "life raft" as a tool to solve the problems that the "weak" states in the region are unable to solve themselves. To the degree that this perception exists and the EU remains distant and disengaged, the feelings of isolation and abandonment will persist.

In sum, the EU and WEU need to focus more attention and resources to the region. Their lack of attention in Albania and Macedonia, the unwitting results of Schengen, and lack of commitment of economic resources and attention contribute to the lack region's sense of increasing "isolation" from Europe. If ever there was a need for an EU-style Marshall Plan for the Balkans- a plan that would be in the European pillar's direct strategic interest-the time is now!

Other than Bosnia, the efforts undertaken to date by the UN, NATO, and EU/WEU in various Balkan states have primarily involved the use of military forces to prevent collapse or deter cross-border problems and to improve military-to-military relations. There has been too little effort directed to building local capacity for democratic public security and enforcement-as opposed to the traditional authoritarian ethos from the Communist era. By building upon and broadening the PFP approach so that it includes rebuilding and re-educating local border guards, constabulary, and police, a combined effort could reduce internal tensions and minimize the need for continued external involvement. However, to be successful, this must include parallel attention and assistance to judicial institutions. This area of activity is one for which the EU is much better suited than the United States, given differences in European and American jurisprudence.

At a minimum, an active EU program that would support deepening cooperation among the region's internal security organs (to include judicial and legal

reform, and police training and cooperation-for example, with French gendarmerie and Italian Carabinieri) would be appropriate. Such a response would give credibility to the EU and WEU's exhortations about a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and a European Pillar.

4. Security/defense issues

In the region, misperceptions about NATO are only prevalent, they also vary greatly; they alternate from the extreme Serbian view that NATO (and the Unites States) are the major source of instability, to the more widespread and extreme misperception that NATO has an almost magical capacity to solve any security issue and to guarantee the security of any state lucky enough to slide under its umbrella. (e.g., Moldovans argue that NATO should get the Russians to remove their 14th Army from Moldova). In other words, NATO's limitations are neither widely understood nor appreciated. Hence, whatever NATO ultimately does decide to do in the region is likely to result in disappointment and disillusionment because of unfulfilled expectations based upon misperceptions about the Alliance's capacity. Though NATO's regional role is limited, it nonetheless is essential and significant. It has become a very effective tool to build co-operative security trough confidence building programs and activities. NATO remains (aside from the OSCE) the one institution that has an extensive network in the region. Since it launched Partnership for Peace (PFP) in January 1994, all countries in the region (except Croatia and FRY) are participating. (As noted above, the EU and WEU exclude Albania and Macedonia as well as Croatia and FRY). In addition, since 1994 the forms of PFP co-operation have also broadened. Initially, at the Partnership Co-ordination Center (PCG) at Mons, PFP focused on developing partner military co-operation in peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations. In the Fall of 1995, in preparation for partner participation in the Implementation Force (IFOR) – and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) follow – on – in Bosnia, PfP's terms of reference were expanded to include "peace enforcement" operations. Finally, in July 1997 when the Madrid summit announced enhanced PFP, partner co-operation expanded to include civil emergency planning. In sum, NATO's PFP programs and activities in the region have been wider and deeper than EU/WEU programs. NATO enlargement also plays a positive role in the region by the effort to not draw new lines. In contrast to the EU/WEU enlargement process which specifically excludes much of the region, NATO is an "open" Alliance. The NATO mentioned the progress made by Romania and Slovenia, and instructed its foreign ministers to report on their progress to the Washington Summit in April 1999. In addition, the Madrid Summit announced the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) with Russia and a Joint Commission with Ukraine. Finally, as replacement to the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) which was created in 1991, the Madrid Summit established

the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This entity contains the yet unrealized potential for becoming the Alliance's political body to co-ordinate and enhance co-operative security programs and policies in the region. To this end, the EAPC could establish a South East European action group to co-ordinate the security activities and programs of the OSCE, EU (WEU), and NATO. One example in support of further deepening of the region's embryonic co-operative security efforts has resulted from the misfortune in Bosnia. In addition to bringing a halt to the conflict in Bosnia, the Dayton Accords have had an added importance in providing conditions for states in the region to fulfill their responsibility in IFOR/SFOR. This has proved to be one of the most significant laboratories for imparting the lessons and habits of co-operative security. (See, for example, "The IFOR/SFOR Experience: Lessons Learned by PFP Partners, "Sirategic Forum, No.120, July 1997). A second example has been the attempt to establish combined military units to enhance transparency and build confidence. Some regional examples can be found in the Hungarian-Romanian combined battalion and in the Italian-Hungarian-Slovenian battalion. Another more ambitious example might be found in the result from the slowly developing co-operation among regional defense minister. Following the firs meeting of Defense Ministers in Tirana in 1996, a second meeting convened in Sofia in October 1997. From it resulted the recent 22 May 1998 South East European Deputy Defense Ministerial meeting in Tirana which signed a letter of intent to create a Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE). The initiative – signed by Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, Albania, Macedonia, and Italy (with the United States and Slovenia as observers) – intends to create a brigade sized unit. The issues of the unit's relationship to NATO, its missions, and headquarters location remain to be determined (perhaps in September 1998). Summary. Four fundamental and interrelated problems contribute to Balkan insecurity. No single security institution (OSCE, EU, WEU, NATO) or country (U.S.) is capable of resolving all these sources of Balkan insecurity. Since these sources of insecurity are all interrelated, a comprehensive "action program" needs to be constructed and implemented; and a co-ordinated effort needs to be institutionalized between NATO and the EU. The EAPC, which has greater regional coverage than the EU (WEU), seems the most likely institution to take the lead in developing a comprehensive plan for the region's security.

Discussion on the paper by Sorin Encutescu follows after the contribution of A. M. Lebedev

Alexander Lebedev

SOURCES OF INSTABILITY, SECURITY RISKS AND THREATS IN CENTRAL EUROPE ON THE EVE OF THE 21st CENTURY

Introduction

Every new meeting of Slovak and Russian Experts strengthens our co-operation, widens the field of confidence and makes our intentions more transparent.

An exchange of opinions about the most actual problems of foreign policy, mutual informing about the principle decisions in the field of military security are the main directions of co-operation between our countries and must be considered as a token of strengthening confidence and increased transparency.

With an interest I listened to the reports made by our dear colleagues from Austria and Romania and I would like to stress the fact that in the respect of estimation of dangers and threats we, in a number of positions, have similar points of views, but still, there are some differences. I hope that Russian estimation of the situation existing in the world, our views about potential dangers and threats in Central Europe will convince You that our position aimed at supporting universal peace and stability. In my report I like dwell on our vision of security risks, challenges and threats in Central on the eve of the 21st century.

Modern geo-strategic situation in the World and tendencies of its development

Forming of a multivector system of international relations means the beginning of a new geopolitical epoch and has become the most important of the development of strategic situation in the World for the near, middle and the long term perspective.

The end of the 21st century is characterized by high dynamics of political events, appearing of new hotbeds of tension in different regions, difficult prediction of the situation development. In the 21st century the character of relations between the states will widely very – from a confrontation and a reserved temporizing, to a partner and friendship.

The limited amount of raw materials, contraction of the safe economic space, industrialization, urbanization, increased demographic and ethnopolitical tension are becoming the most important causes of the sharpening of geopolitical rivalry, political, economic, ethnic contradictions and territorial claims.

The process of a new World division, accompanied by a disintegration of multinational and emergence of new states, disbandment and creation of new

alliances and unions of different kind, changes in political regimes and territorial frontiers have significantly influenced the arrangement of political forces in the World and regions.

Geopolitical contest has embraced new spheres. From the land and the sea it has spread to the air and the space. The most sharp confrontation of interest in these spheres is expected between the Space Powers.

The active development of space and space technologies, including military purposes, leads to changes in the character and ways of the using of military force in conflicts of the new millennium and, because of the co-ordinated employment of means and forces of different nature, makes the using of force more massive, complex and effective.

It the states preserve a high level of military potential and the perfect international law and order base does not exist, even a dosed using military force may sharply destabilize the situation in potentially conflict regions, may bring the conflict escalation to the local and even the regional scope.

Nowadays and especially in future the importance of informational factor will arise. The tendency of growing of the role of informational resource of states and its strategic significance within the general system of the defensive potential are clearly seen. Systems and means of the strategic warning, control of troops and armament, navigation, reconnaissance and radio-electronic warfare are becoming its most important elements.

Gaining an informational superiority (domination) may provide a capability to forestall and to outstrip the enemy in taking military and political decisions, which will be the base of success in military actions.

Scientific and technical progress has also promoted to the appearance of new dangers and threats. They are concentrated in the high-technology spheres. Technologic advantages of the United States, Japan and a number of European states, starting works aimed at the development of the new generation of armament and technique of military purpose may lead to the new stage of the arms race, increasing of the role of conventional, based on the principles of high accuracy weapons, armament.

Ecological disasters and after-effects of unconsidered industrial activities of some countries posses more and threatening scale. They started to present a serious danger not only for the life and activities of separate states but for the whole civilization on our planet. Potential after-effects of the ecological disasters may be compared only with war losses in materiel and human resources. Contamination of the world's living space may bring to a critical state of environment and will be the cause of contradictions between states, and then it may provoke conflict situations and even military conflicts.

The increase of economic, technological, informational and ecological mutual dependence of states at the global level, has brought about prerequisites for the new division of the World and in the long term perspective it may lead to forming of new centers of power, such as Germany, Turkey, China and Japan in addition to the already existing in the World.

The new arrangement of political forces has interfered with the former alignment of forces and interests, has changed the character, scale and contents of former dangers and threats. They have changed their global importance to the regional and local and also possessed more complex character. Terrorism, narcobusiness, subversive activities of the organized criminal structures, religious fanaticism, spread of nuclear materials and technologies, more and more frequent conflicts with national and ethnical background arise serious anxiety of Russia. Among 180 countries existing in the world only 20 may considered as homo-ethnical and the rest of them, more or less, have a significant conflict potential. In the World there are "approximately" 160 zones of ethnopolitical tension and in 80 of them there are active conflicts.

Summarizing the characteristic features of the modern strategic situation in the World I would like to stress the following facts:

1. military force is still playing a considerable role in achieving of political goals, and the number of pretexts for its using becomes larger. The direct use of force started to be connected with the peace keeping activities or collective efforts aimed at peace enforcement;
2. the danger of possibility of the nuclear war and even a large scale war with the use of conventional weapons has been significantly reduced. At the same time the number of risks of emergence of armed conflicts, including of a local character, has increased;
3. new centers of economic power are forming up and the geopolitical contest aimed at the repartition of the word between them and the United States becomes more intense;
4. preserving and widening of potential conflict space is going on. The Balkans, the Caucasus, Middle, the Central and the Southern Asia, the Middle and the Far East are regions where the level of ethnical, confessional and criminal conflicts is rising up;
5. there is a tendency towards the resuming of the arms race, the danger of further spread of high accuracy conventional, nuclear and other kinds of mass destruction weapons and their delivery means. This is the case with India, Pakistan, Iraq and the Northern Korea; after admittance of countries of the Central and the Eastern Europe (Poland, Check Republic and Hungary) to the NATO and preparation of the second wave of the candidates to this block the zone responsibility of the alliance will widen not only in Europe;
7. we consider the NATO's intention and practical steps to use the armed forces without a sanction of the UN Security Council and the more so out of the zone of responsibility of this defensive union to be extremely dangerous;
8. we see an intention of the NATO to substitute the SCE in matters concerning the problems of European security;
9. peace keeping operations has started to change its traditional forms and to gradually transform into operations with the use of military force;

10. ecological situation in the world is deteriorating and this may lead to enforcement of states which industrial activities damage the environment.

The character of the development of military and political situation in the years to come is hard to predict and possesses new and new features of instability. In this connection the former international and regional mechanism of providing security loose its significance and no longer able to react at the rapidly changing strategic situation. The problem of a new structure of the security system of the world community and elaboration of effective mechanism for it realization becomes more and more urgent.

Stressing the matters of military security, first of all, I would like to dwell on new risks, challenges and threats which, in my opinion, may bring to the growth of tension and the number of military conflicts.

Potential risks, challenges and security threats in Europe.

Touching upon the question of European security, I would like to bring to your consideration that the position of Russia concerning this question is based on decision of OSCE states meeting in Lisbon in December 1996 and decisions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OSCE countries devoted to the elaboration of the European Security Charter in Copenhagen in December 1997. The idea of Russian European security vision is quite clear and easy to understand the security must be equal and universal for both big and small European countries. In realization of our pattern of European security project all the countries of the region, with no exception, are to take part and this fact will enable us to provide the balance of forces and interests in the territory of Europe. The uniting and representing interests of all European countries OSCE, must be the base for the regional security system structure.

Along with this, there is another position. The main contents of it is to increase influence of the NATO, the West European and the European Unions and weaken positions of the OSCE. The tendency to substitute the roles of the UN Security Council and the OSCE by the North Atlantic Treaty is clearly seen and settlement of "the Kosovo crisis" is a demonstrations of it. Unfortunately , we can see the inspiration of NATO to become one of the basic elements of the European security system, to turn into a dominating European organization, limiting the role and influence of the Russian Federation and blocking military and political integration within the CIS.

We also have negative attitude about NATO's plans to expand the block. In spite of the aspiration about the development of partner relations with European states within the framework of Council of European and Atlantic Partnership and the "Partnership for Peace" (PFP) program, officially declared by its military and political leaders, **the alliance expansion process results in approaching of military infrastructures to the Russian state borders,** thus increasing the conflict potential and the military tensi-

on level in the European region **and forces the Russian Federation to take adequate measures.**

So, the question of the architecture of the European security system is still being discussed. At present, the existing regional organizations look like a complicated, rather amorphous combination of economic, military, political and social institutions, not quite corresponding the situation character of the day to come, and the more so they don't reflect the nature of the challenges, dangers and threats in the middle and the long term perspective.

After the deterioration of the geopolitical positions of the RF and the reduction of its military potential, military and political integration of European countries based on the principles and strategic conceptions objectively gravitating towards American views, has been activated.

The problems of the Balkan Peninsula are still the matter of a serious concern of the World community. The situation in former Yugoslavia, in this particular in Kosovo, still remains unstable. In the near future the tension in this region will remain and might possess a form of an inert and protracted fighting.

The increase of military and economic contest between the CIS countries and the USA and Turkey in important for our national security regions, such as the Crimea, the Caucasus and the Transcaucasses is being observed. This threatens the RF's interests in the region and may result in creation of system of limiting factors like Georgia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya and others, using which, one could effectively regulate political processes in Russia and close-to-border regions.

The high conflict potential has been accumulated in the Central and Southern Asia, in the Near and the Middle East. **The Islamic fundamentalism,** which is the base for the most reactionary regimes of the Near, Middle East and Central Asia and in some African countries **will be of special danger. The Fundamentalists will follow the course for ideologization of all aspects of the society life including relations between the states.** Their actions will be based on deliberate ignoring of the universal international law, on their conviction that this law, in many points and paragraphs, does not correspond the basic principles of Islam.

Radical changes in the international situation, which had taken place, directly influenced the nature of external threats for military security of the RF and possible scenario of their development. **Outer threats are still coming from those states and military and political blocks which long-term political, economic and military aspirations counter national interests of the RF and which not only possess a sufficient military potential but ready to use it to reach the goals of their foreign policy.**

Peculiarities of the modern system of international relations did not lead to minimization of outer threats, but as a result of decreasing of probability of a large-scale war with the participation of the RF Armed Forces in it, sufficiently changed their priorities.

In spite of the clear tendency to shift the main stresses of inter-state contra-

dictions between the state from the field of politics and ideology to the economic sphere, principles of balance of forces and force integration are still playing an important role. **Military component of the state power is still considered to be a dominating element of the national interests ensuring system of any state.** The presence of mighty military potential and big military alignments in possession of leading foreign states, which in accordance with their not significantly changed doctrinal aims may be used for achieving goals of foreign policy is still the reality.

Threats for the vital interests of the RF

Proceeding from the points mentioned, I can attribute the existing and potential threats for the vital interests of the Russian Federations. They are:

(a) Actions of foreign states, aimed at breaking of territorial integrity of the RF, also with the use of interethnic, confessional and other internal contradictions, aimed at realization of territorial claims with the references, in some cases, to the absence of clearly determined official registration of the inter-state borders;

(a) Actions of other countries, which at present started to be more and more co-ordinated, aimed at undermining and hampering of the integration process within the CIS, at slackening of relations between the RF and countries of the Central, Western Europe and the Baltic and also with other states in the regions of traditional co-operation;

(b) Violation of rights and freedoms of Russian – speaking population and the RF citizens living in neighboring countries, which lead to the growth of tension even in some regions of Russia and to uncoordinated migration processes;

(c) The "double standard" policy, pursued by some forces abroad, which used to declare about the necessity of promoting stability for the RF, but in fact, do their outmost to prevent from this and thus to diminish the role of the RF in settlement of the key problems of the World community and in activities of international organizations;

(d) Aspirations of the Western leading countries to weaken economic independence of the RF and fix it as a supplier of fuel and raw materials and a source of qualified but cheap labor;

(e) Attempts to restrict the presence of the RF in international markets (and also in the market of armament), actions to force Russia out of it;

(f) Actions of the so called partners, aimed at preserving of restriction for the RF concerning the access to the new technologies, at creation of obstacles for the RF in participation in international financial and commercial organizations on an equal basis.

Rather new outer threats such as organized international crime, drug, armament and military purpose materiel smuggling, dangers of ecologi-

cal nature, which also require adequate reactions have recently emerged for our country.

Special danger of all what have been mentioned above is in the fact that under some circumstances these threats may turn into military ones. The following factor promote this:

- the presence of existing and potential sources of military conflicts, first of all close to the Russia's borders;
- the danger of spread of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons, its delivery means and advanced military technologies;
- possession by a number of countries of powerful alignments of military forces and big arsenals of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction;
- continuous growth of offensive capabilities of the armed forces of the leading countries as a result of introducing of new types of armament and military equipment;
- activation of religious radicalism, ethnical extremism and international terrorism.

Those were the main opinions about the existing state events in the world, about the dangers and threats for Russia and the world community.

In conclusion I would like to stress once again, if we join our efforts based on the universal for all sides understating of the meaning of the dangers and threats, we will be able to settle the existing problems and prevent new ones, which, most probably, our countries have to face in the millennium to come.

Joint discussion on the papers by Sorin Encutescu
(SOURCES OF INSTABILITY, SECURITY RISKS AND THREATS IN CENTRAL EUROPE ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY)
and Alexander M. Lebedev
(SOURCES OF INSTABILITY, RISKS AND CONFLICTS ON BALKANS1)

Ján Černák: I have questions connected with both papers. One of the aims of the international military exercises, which are occurring, have ended or are only being prepared by the WEU, is to prove an ability of the Western European Union to solve crisis situations without the help of NATO. What is your view on the proportionality of these two phenomena to further development, and on the role of these groupings in Europe at the beginning of the new millennium?

Sorin Encutescu: The Western European Union is undoubtedly a very important part of European security. The WEU, as we know, was founded even before NATO. In my view, a very interesting factor appears in the history of Europe. It is the United States, without which the stability of Europe is unimaginable. Therefore, perhaps it was always difficult for Europe to solve its security problems without the participation of the USA. Especially after 1990, we find many cases, where the EU or WEU was not able to solve some crisis situation. I participated in some sessions of the WEU as advisor at the Rumanian Ministry of Defense. I got the impression that this organization is endeavoring to find a new approach to European security. This search was especially clear after the St. Petersburg meeting. After it, the WEU began to establish new missions, widen peace keeping operations, initiate research etc. However, during all these meetings, I could not escape the feeling that the WEU represents a rather theoretical approach to European security. It is true that the Treaty of Maastricht, and after it the Treaty of Amsterdam attempted to define the place of the WEU in European security. But it is well known that Great Britain is not very favorably inclined towards the WEU, and that in spite of the partial success of the WEU in building up ground and later also naval forces, this organization was not able to establish real common European armed forces. Above all, the duplicity of NATO and the WEU struck me, when the WEU countries want a functioning Western European defense, and cannot imagine it without use of the infrastructure of NATO. To conclude this personal view: I do not think that the WEU can be effectively used as a common European defense institution to solve security crises. The success of the WEU in monitoring the embargo against Yugoslavia does not remove my pessimism. As far as I know, it was the only successful action undertaken by the WEU so far, and so the WEU naturally constantly refers to it. Therefore, NATO appears to me to be the only international organization, which is able to ensure European security.

A. M. Lebedev: I have a better view of the WEU, but I think that it is more appropriate to use non-military means, especially the OSCE, to solve crises in the centers of European tension. NATO and other military organizations should not be involved in the solution of crises. A whole series of resolutions exist, calling for the non-military solution of security problems.

Anton Sládeček: I thank Mr. Lebedev·for his contribution to evaluation of the causes of instability and risks in recent times. In general, we clearly all agree with what our Russian colleague said. But he should change the Russian approach a little, and also turn the criticism to his own side. Russia also appears to be a security risk. We spoke, for example, about organized crime. Slovakia is a good example, since organized crime is penetrating from outside, as an export from other countries. We have evidence that, for example, Moscow and Chechen mafias have settled their accounts on the territory of Slovakia. I can also mention the problem of proliferation of nuclear materials to third world countries. It is Russia, which is in the background and provides the materials. Another source of risk for our region, is the inability of Russia to complete her transformation from the former Soviet empire to a standard democratic society. Russia is entangled in internal disputes, which could at any time grow into civil war, and she is not able to solve these disputes by democratic dialogue, whether it concerns the Caucasus, the Crimea or anywhere else. Would it not be more correct for you to mention – apart from criticizing others – also the serious problems in your own country, and specifically, not only generally.

A. M. Lebedev: I will attempt to explain. Above all, organized crime has no homeland. The connections of the structures of organized crime are highly functional, certainly more functional than the state structures in my country. Russia is struggling against an enemy which threatens us all. You will find the origin of Russian crime in the USA and Europe, but equally you will discover crime coming from China, Japan or other countries. For example, drug dealers from Africa came to Russia and organized a mafia there. They have connections to Brazil, Afghanistan and south-east Europe, and they use Russia as a transit country for smuggling drugs to Europe and even to the USA. Consumption of narcotic substances has grown in Russia itself. We have created a special unit for struggle with these problems, and, for example, also with smuggling of weapons. But we have problems with the export of weapons from the Baltic countries, from Western Europe and from the USA. In the case of further reservations, I accept the criticism. Yes, we have certain problems caused by the breakup of the former USSR. Before the elimination of the Soviet Union, all the nations in it lived in peace. But when the division began, each started to demand its own share, in spite of the fact that the wealth of the USSR was created by all its nations collectively. It is our internal problem, which I believe we will solve in the near future.

Sorin Encutescu: Today, we are all trying to define security in a new way. At this event, we are attempting to analyze the specific security risks and threats of an individual country. Naturally, I do not think there is an ideal methodology for analyzing security risks, which would enable us to produce objective results. Every country has its own unrepeatable experience with security risks and threats. However, it would be worthwhile for the research institutions represented at our seminar to attempt to formulate a common methodology, with the help of which all our risks and threats could be analyzed, in spite of local specifics. Local specifics occur everywhere, and I can also document them using the example of Romanian security risks, which are different from the situation in some Balkan states. In Romania, we tried to analyze our security risks in a publication, which I will give to the organizers of this seminar (if others are interested, they can obviously write their names, and we will be pleased to send it from Romania). We researched security in a comprehensive way, that is we addressed four expert parts of the Romanian public: a) politicians, b) students of Bucharest University and students of the Romanian "National Defense College", c) the Ministry of Defense, and d) the Romanian intelligence service. We all addressed the question of how we evaluate the security risks for Romania. We learnt that Romanians perceive the risks as international terrorism, the drugs trade, the situation in Kosovo, tension between Greece and Turkey, the presence of the so-called Russian 14th Army in Transdniestria, the political and military situation in Russia, the enlargement of NATO, Ukraine, Albania, Hungary and others, a total of 24 risks and threats. Each of the four groups addressed perceived the risks with different intensity and had different priorities. A further question was directed towards independent evaluation of the security risks in the Balkans. The most frequent perceptions were the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the tension between Serbia and Croatia, the situation in Kosovo, the rights of national minorities, civil war, the political situation in Croatia. We also found differences in the perception of risks between individual groups, but we got a clear picture. I propose the same method of research to you present here. If each of the research institutions represented here, asks these questions in its surroundings, we could get a clearer idea of what are the common security risks and threats.

Laszló Nagy: I will ask direct questions, but also attempt a commentary. I remember various conferences and seminars, in which I participated in various Central European countries in the first half of the nineties. Then we often discussed the problematic situation in the Russian Federation, but without the participation of Russian experts. I am really pleased that we now have Russian colleagues here, and in a certain sense, I would like to amplify the arguments mentioned by a Slovak colleague, Colonel Sládeček. Colonel Lebedev spoke of the threats to Russia's vital interests. However, we in Hungary regard the Russian Federation itself as a specific kind of threat. Perhaps not because of a direct military threat, but because of instability in that country. Colonel Lebe-

dev's paper rather surprised me hardly mentioning internal instability in Russia. I think that all the countries of Central Europe hold the view that a new European security architecture cannot be built without Russia, or against Russia. You completed your paper with the claim that Russia certainly does not want to be a security threat to any country. At present it is a question of confidence. You also believe that our (Central European) countries have no intention to be a threat to Russia. Now I will ask the questions I promised. Firstly, what do you think of the Founding Act between NATO and the Russian Federation? How important is this treaty for Russia? And secondly, what do you think about the security conception of the Russian Federation, which the president of Russia signed in December 1997? I am especially concerned about the paragraph speaking of the stationing of Russian military forces abroad.

A. M. Lebedev: I reject the view that the presence of Russian armed forces abroad is a relevant problem, because, over the last ten years, Russia has withdrawn practically all her units from all countries, where they were stationed. Specifically from the territory of the former DDR and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. But in spite of this some states still have their armed forces in countries, which do not fall into the area of their defensive responsibilities, and they justify their military presence outside their own territory, by speaking of a "zone of vital interests". The former Soviet Union did not introduce such terminology, it only discovered it in the dictionary of a certain Western politician – I think, I do not need to mention his name. If one country maintains its armed forces on the territory of another state, this is not in harmony with the principles of general security. I can assure everybody that Russia does not represent any security threat for any country in Europe, and is doing everything possible to fulfill her international obligations. You all know how complicated it is, because the economy is the basis of everything and the Russian economy is not in a good state.

Matúš Štefanovič: I have a question about both papers. Both Romania and Russia are pursuing certain interests in the Black Sea region. I would like to ask about the positions of Russia and Romania on this problem, and on the possibility of cooperation. I am concerned with cooperation in the military area, but also with cooperation on the level of the struggle against the international drugs trade in the region of the Black Sea, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. I especially want to ask the Romanian speaker about the possibilities for trilateral cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine, in relation to the fact that all three countries are regarded as possible future members of NATO.

Sorin Encutescu: In Romania, we have really begun to work on a new security strategy. It is obviously also concerned with the problem of drug dealing in the environment of the armed forces. After 1990, the view prevailed among us that Romania was not exposed to any military threat, and in that case our armed for-

ces were losing their justification. In my view, this was a mistake, because the Romanian armed forces will still be necessary. It is not necessary for an immediate direct threat to exist, the main thing is that the armed forces should always be prepared to defend the country. It is important that the armed forces should not be allowed to take part in solving other problems, because then they may lose their ability to fulfill their original purpose. However, in Romania we also have a special category of armed forces, also authorized to fulfill roles other than those connected with immediate defense of the country. These are the special units of the Ministry of the Interior, which are structured like the French *Gendarmerie* or the Italian *Carabinieri*. These units can successfully intervene against the international drugs trade. They also have special equipment to fulfill such special tasks. In this way, they differ from the soldiers and officers of the Romanian army, the priority of which is defense, not struggle against individual types of security criminality. We also find similar armed units in the USA, some of them actually specific parts of the air forces, and are also used, for example, in the struggle against the drugs trade. And now, about the possibilities for trilateral cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine in the Black Sea region. In this case, it would not be the usual type of cooperation. Romania and Bulgaria participate in the Partnership for Peace program, but in contrast to Ukraine, they do not have a special agreement with NATO. Romania regards this as a disadvantage, and our president is at present attempting to find a solution to this, at the NATO HQ in Brussels, and to achieve a similar status between Romania and NATO to that between Ukraine and NATO. Without such an agreement, Romania – now after the Madrid summit – will remain only an ordinary partner of NATO on the level of other participants in PfP. Thus, although, at the Washington Summit in 1999, NATO will not invite us to join NATO, a special treaty between Romania and NATO, similar to the treaty between Ukraine and NATO would move Romania forward. I will mention only that all three countries are participants in Black Sea Economic Regional Cooperation. However, this does not enable opening trilateral security cooperation, because the chances of Romania and Bulgaria joining NATO in the medium-term are definitely higher than the chance of Ukraine.

A. M. Lebedev: The Russian armed forces are not concerned with drug criminality, because it simply does not fall within their responsibilities. But the Russian Federation has created a special security service, and within it also a special section for the questions of struggle against this type of criminality. In the end, the struggle against drugs is not a priority of Russian security. This problem was imported to us only when we opened our frontier with the West. It was helped especially by the invasion of Western culture, including Western films. In spite of this, the Russian security forces have succeeded in seizing and destroying a large quantity of narcotics. We must also consider the fact that countries such as Tajikistan or Afghanistan contain people pushed into the drugs trade as a means of making a living. We regard the drugs trade as a war declared on our country by a conglomerate of international gangs.

Daniel Domanovský: I assume that the Russian Center for Military and Strategic Studies not only monitors the sources of threat to the Russian Federation, but also arranges them according to their importance. I would be interested to hear whether you think Russia is threatened more by the enlargement of NATO to include the Central European countries, or by the disintegrative tendencies within Russia. I have in mind, for example, the ambitions of the Kalmyk Republic.

A. M. Lebedev: We cannot evaluate these threats in isolation. We must come to terms with both the enlargement of NATO and with the disintegrative threats coming from within. We must unavoidably achieve a better economic level, and we regard the enlargement of NATO as an accompanying threat, which only increases the internal threat to Russia. I cannot say whether one or the other is the priority threat. They are simply two great threats to the security interests of the Russian Federation.

Sergej Ermakov: I want to support my compatriot. Public opinion polls in Western states show that the public especially perceives security threats of a non-military character – the economic situation, growth of migration, distribution of drugs and organized crime. Military threats appear only in second place. It is similar in Russia: ordinary citizens there, are not concerned with the North Atlantic Alliance, but above all with economic problems. But the expansion of NATO may worsen the situation in Russia, and the Russian public cannot passively watch, while the NATO democracies approach the frontiers of Russia with their tanks. Where the distribution of drugs and organized crime are concerned, these are obviously great problems for Russia. But the impression sometimes appears that only Russian organized crime exists. This is not true, international organized crime exists, and Russia closely cooperates with the international organs, created for the struggle with international organized crime, for example with Interpol. For example, employees of the Russian Ministry of the Interior recently had a significant success in the struggle against drug criminality, in cooperation with German and Dutch colleagues.

Anton Sládeček: I have one observation and one question for Lieutenant Colonel Encutescu. On the basis of my own experience, I want to express a compliment towards the security policy of Romania, thanks to which she has progressed a long way, and is now ahead of Slovakia in the integration effort. The trilateral Romanian approach to security especially interested me. It is obvious that each of our states has some problems with its neighbors, or the neighbors may have problems with us as neighbors. I know that Romania has problems with its Hungarian minority, or the Hungarian minority perceives its position as a problem. Romania is also concerned with frontier disputes in the Danube Delta. I very much appreciate that when Romania solved her relations with Hungary, they invited Ukraine to talks, and when they discussed good ne-

ighborly relations with Ukraine, they invited Poland as a third partner in the discussions. The same happened in the case of discussions with Bulgaria, where they also invited a third country (I am not sure which, but I think it was Macedonia), and I could continue. I conclude from this, that Romania has some ambition to become a sub-regional Balkan power, which mediates the relations of the countries of this region to the states of Central and Eastern Europe, and this is a clear success of Romanian foreign and security policy. Therefore, my question is: How did Romania reach this approach of concluding trilateral agreements? Is it only a consistently implemented pragmatic experience, or is it the materialized results of specific social research?

Sorin Encutescu: I would say that this derives from geopolitical reality In geopolitical terms, we can regard Romania as a frontier country – a country divided between different types of culture, different types of religion and different ethnic communities. Romania was always forced to take all these facts into account. I think that the "managerial" experiences of my country, in dealing with these problems, also helped it to define its relationships to neighboring states. Naturally, it was first of all a matter of pragmatic initiative, and finally it also corresponds to the traditions of Romanian policy. This type of trilateral cooperation with neighboring countries was created by Nicolae Titulescu, one of the architects of Romanian foreign policy and a former minister of foreign affairs in the inter-war period. After the end of the Cold War, when the former communist countries became aware of their insecurity, and their security position guaranteed by nobody, Romania simply returned to the tested tradition of foreign policy orientation. Trilateral cooperation is actually also creating good links for a country, which is considered for the second wave of NATO enlargement. The well known *Study on NATO Enlargement* (September 1995) mentions good relations with neighbors as one of the criteria for entry to the Alliance. By using this trilateral approach, Romania can show that she is a sort of key country in the region. This means that although Romania is a Balkan country, she also has the standard usual in Central Europe. I think that Romania has an importance for the region comparable to that of Poland. If Romania becomes a member of NATO, she will offer the North Atlantic Alliance a certain credibility, as Poland offers today. The present enlargement of NATO is being carried out practically only in the northern part of Central and Eastern Europe. But as we also see on the basis of the talks at this seminar, the security risks and threats are found almost exclusively in the south of former communist Europe. Therefore, we were always a little surprised over why NATO wanted to enlarge in the north, but not in the south. In any case the process of the trilateral approach to relations in the region is going well and we are already able to evaluate the first results.

A. M. Lebedev: For our side, I can say that we are trying to analyze security from all points of view, including the political and economic. Our analyses also pay attention to religious, ethnic and other traditional factors. Therefore, we

are seeking a differentiated approach. I already said that the fundamentalists in our country deliberately ignore the norms created by Christian civilization. If I am not mistaken, the fundamentalists also said to the president of France, that there would be peace in his country if it accepted Islam. Culturally and ethnically conditioned conflicts have occurred in countries such as Kosovo, Chechnya, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Abkhazia. I do not want to offend the feelings of Moslems, but this fundamentalist tradition comes from the Koran, which practically regards non-Moslem nations, such as the Romanians, Bulgarians and Russians, as non-believers. But there are also good and bad "non-believers". Therefore, in countries with ethnically and religiously defined disputes with other countries – Chechnya, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan – we cannot find a common language for seeking starting points. Perhaps we should also invite religious leaders to these seminars, since only they could convince their people at home of the harmfulness of religious hatred. Anti-Moslem prejudices are needlessly provoked among non-Moslems in the Balkans. It is a matter of problems which can be solved at the highest level.

Slavomir Bienek: When I look at the whole problem, preparation for the 21st century appears to me to be the main priority. It is clearly a continuing process. We naturally look at things especially from our Central European point of view. In spite of this, when dealing with the security risks of the 21st century, we cannot avoid the global point of view. I have in mind especially some very topical aspects of the global situation from recent years – the terrorist bomb attacks against diplomatic facilities in Kenya and Tanzania, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, the threat of North Korean and Iranian ballistic missiles, the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan, the proliferation of certain types of weapon etc. These are also topical threats for our national security. I do not need to emphasize that the security environment we find ourselves in, is different from that of past years, and it will develop further. Obviously, we also ask how we will react to all these crisis phenomena, and we strike a serious problem: the crisis in our military budget. But the risks and threats are unforeseeable and many sided. I will divide these threats into three groups: 1) The first group includes all the military types of threat, but not only military threats, since under "military" aspects, we think especially of war, typical war, so I would also assign to the first group, the problems of regional conflicts or regional stability connected with ethnic factors and the threats caused by proliferation. 2) The second group of risks and threats concern the limits of our civilization, its possible development in the next century, the risks and possible "catastrophe" scenarios, whether of a technological, chemical, bacteriological or ecological character. 3) I would assign all the problems we have already mentioned here: organized crime, the trade in drugs or radioactive materials, money laundering etc., to the third group. Our honored colleague Mr. Encutescu expressed the view that the army should be oriented only towards solving military problems and no others. I am inclined to disagree. In future, the army will clearly also fulfill other roles,

for example, in the struggle against terrorism or against the threat of the misuse of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, I think that today, we already need to build mechanisms so that we will be able to protect our populations. On the national level, these tasks cannot be performed better by any other component, such as civil defense. In future, we must prepare the armed forces for all possible kinds of activity, and, as one example, I will mention protection of the population against biological weapons.

Sorin Encutescu: I was directly addressed by my Polish colleague, so I want to react. The idea of a changed purpose for armed forces in future is entirely acceptable. My latest experiences from the USA, Great Britain and France convinced me that armed forces everywhere confront one problem, and I know this problem very well from the environment of the Romanian armed forces. It is a problem which results from the inability of politicians to entrust the armed forces with a specific and clear mission. Politicians in countries like the USA, Great Britain and France are used to saying that no direct security threat exists at present, and this means that they have no clear idea about the future of the armed forces. Therefore, the politicians must, if necessary, find a new purpose for the army, with emphasis on the mission of other security forces such as the police as well. If this happens, it will be possible to take armed forces away from their basic task of defending the country. Only then, will it be possible to mediate to our armed forces such inestimable experiences as those gained by the American soldiers in Somalia: although they were highly trained professionals and functioned in the role of policemen with the most modern equipment, they had huge problems with a certain group in the population. The politicians have the great task of offering the armed forces a new vision, in connection with the process of globalization in the next millennium. After 1990, the armed forces endeavored to find a new mission, they were subject to a process of restructuring and spent much money, only to learn after almost ten years, that the politicians have nothing prepared for them, and they are not able to clearly formulate ideas about their new purpose. I think that the armed forces, also in Romania, understand very well, that the future society will need a more professional army, that society will rely more on information and a new culture, and that it is necessary to prepare officers for this change. This is why it is already necessary to retrain the armed forces. This requires considerable resources, but in conditions of an ever more restricted military budget, the armed forces simply will not be able to keep up with development. At present, it is fashionable to speak of the need to reduce the numbers of soldiers and officers, but few say that this step also requires financial resources. If you want to avoid reducing the quality of the army, you need more money. To put it simply, if you want fewer soldiers, you need more money. I will give the example of a tank: if you want to operate a tank today, you need five people. If you want to have only three soldiers to a tank, you logically need more money for its modernization. The best preparation of the army for the next millennium is professionalization. It is

very complicated to be an officer today – it is not enough for him to be prepared only for the defense of his country. The officer necessarily gets involved in a wider circle of problems, and he is also confronted with the expectations of the population, whose idea of armed forces is traditional: will the army be able to defend our country? By the way, the last public opinion poll in Romania, put the army in second place after the Church in the list of trustworthy institutions.

Slavomir Bienek: Just a brief clarification. Perhaps you understood me badly, but my question was not about the mission of the army in the 21st century. It was about what tasks the army will fulfill in confrontation with new security risks and threats. Therefore, I also attempted a more detailed identification of all the new security risks.

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[1] The contribution of Sorin Encutescu has been based on the study by Jeffrey Simon from the Institute for National and Strategic Studies (USA). The Study by Jeffrey Simon *Sources of Insecurity in the Balkans – Risks and Conflicts* was published in Bucharest 1998, pp. 242–247.

Christoph Royen

THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN EUROPE'S SECURITY AFTER THE YEAR 2000

Three introductory remarks

1. I am not representing NATO, EU, or WEU, nor the German government. I am not a professional military, nor a professional diplomat, but merely an independent think tank researcher free to express unorthodox opinions. Therefore, I intend to give you not so much data, facts, or figures on EU's various activities in the field of security, but rather a conceptual framework for a discussion of the fundamental political aspects of our subject.

2. IThe call for stronger and more autonomous role of Europe in the field of security is familiar since many years. Since 1991, when the Treaty of Maastricht was adopted, such a role is part of the official plan for the construction of the EU. Just recently the subject reappeared again in the headlines, when the British prime-minister, Tony *Blair*, reversed earlier British skepticism and demanded such a stronger role for the EU as an actor in security.

3. IHowever, before I try to give you my own answer, whether such a perspective is desirable and realistic, it is necessary to clarify (a) what we mean when we talk about "security", and (b) which are the other international organizations involved in the maintenance of peace and security in Europe, thus competing with the EU.

The meaning of security

After the disappearance of the former dominating East-West conflict between two antagonistic systems brief hopes for an era of general peace, as expressed in November 1990 in the CSCE's "Charter of Paris", quickly subsided. Instead our governments and our societies have to meet a number of new risks, dangers and challenges. Thus the question is justified: What is "security" today?

Let me give you first a very general definition: **Security is the absence of external or internal sources of violent conflict**.

In a second step let us distinguish between (a) external sources of conflict which require *military* means, and (b) external and internal sources of conflict which require *non-military* means.

Conflicts of type A, obviously, include traditional scenarios, where an ex-

ternal aggressor state is attempting to deprive other states of their independence and their territorial integrity by using armed force. In our contemporary world and in tomorrow's world, globally connected not only by the modern means of communication, but also by the proliferation of new weapons of mass destruction, this external aggressor may emerge from very distant areas on our globe. In addition, the external aggressor no longer must be state. Increasingly we will be facing international terrorism by groups or even individuals. At the same time, we are also returning to a category of conflicts which until recently were regarded as belonging to more primitive stages of mankind's development: the fight for vital living resources. Such a return may soon be with us again, when the competition will be over water!

Turning to the *conflicts of type B*, requiring non-military means, those means can still contain the element of force, but in the form of national or international police action. Yet, numerous other conflicts can only be solved or prevented by employing civilian means. Police action will be required in dealing with organized crime, whereas minority conflicts, social conflicts, and also ecological disasters must be addressed mainly by civilian means.

Competing and overlapping responsibilities

Obviously, this broad spectrum of potential threats to peace, security, and stability is reflected in the actions of various international security organizations.

1. IThe picture remains simple, as long as we talk about enforcing peace by military means. Here, NATO clearly appears to be by far the most efficient and suitable actor for such assignments. A similar, comparable role for the EU or for the Western European Union (WEU) is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Why I think so, I'll explain below in the third part of my presentation. The United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) can assume such a function only, if the required consensus is not blocked by a veto. We all know how the consensus role has prevented both organizations from early intervention to stop the violence in former Yugoslavia since 1991.

2. A rather complex picture, with a system of overlapping competencies, emerges if we turn to conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict reconstruction. Here we find not only the OSCE, the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE), and a number of non-governmental organizations (NGO's), engaged in similar activities. Increasingly also NATO and WEU plan to engage in so-called "non-article V" operations.

3. The EU can claim a leading role, partly supported by the CoE, the OSCE, and some NGO's, only where conflicts arise primarily from internal problems, such as:
- minority problems;
- socio-economic problems;
- ecological problems
- organized crime;
- illegal migration

Why only a limited role of the EU?

The first answer follows from the fact that the EU is a community of, at present, 15 sovereign actors which are not ready to subordinate their foreign and security policy to a supranational decision-making body. At the same time, there is no clear and undisputed leader, as the US in NATO.

Sometimes you can hear the opinion that the US prevent the EU from assuming a stronger role in security policy. In fact, however, the US would welcome a strong European partner in a kind of division of labor, where the Europeans would assume the main responsibility for peace in some regions, relieving the US for tasks in other parts of the world. In this context, I would like to remind you that the WEU was founded in 1948, i.e. one year before NATO, because the US wanted to have a proof of the Europeans' willingness to shoulder responsibilities.

However, till today the European members of NATO have done very little to create the capacities for a common defense and for common action of their own, as to be witnessed between 1991 and 1994, when the West Europeans – despite Washington's prodding to take care of this European problem themselves – proved unable to stop the atrocities and bloodshed, first in Eastern Croatia, and then in Bosnia. I see basically two reasons for this failure:
1. During the post-World-War-II decades Western Europe's governments and societies have become used to the American security "umbrella", and they still prefer to rely on it in dangerous constellations.
2. Occasional actions, carried out by Western Europe's governments themselves, independently of the US, were limited to goals and purposes of their national interests. France and Great Britain, also Belgium, intervened with armed force several times in their former colonies to restore political stability and to rescue European civilians threatened by turbulent violence in the streets.

Conclusion

Let me conclude with a critical reflection on Western Europe's policy towards the transforming countries of Central Europe in the belt stretching from Tallinn in the north to Tirana in the south:

The Western European governments were not prepared for the task opened by the unexpected implosion of the communist system. And until now they have done very little to guide and educate their societies in the spirit of European solidarity. As a consequence we see the rising unpopularity of extending the EU to the East, after negotiations with the first candidates have started and the

sharing of the common house with new inhabitants, therefore, is becoming a concrete perspective.

Western Europe's governments also failed to understand the real motive of the Central Europeans' desire to join NATO: i.e., the desire to belong to the European and Transatlantic community of democratic states, just as, say, Belgium or Portugal. Instead they suggested that since the Central Europeans are not threatened by an external aggressor there is no need to hurry with the opening of the alliance. Only due to Washington's resolve NATO finally decided to go ahead with a first, though limited, opening of the alliance to the East. If the decision had depended exclusively on the West Europeans, they would still find reasons to postpone it.

I am sorry that being the only participant from Western Europe I had not brought with me a more optimistic message for our Slovak hosts, who now, after the recent elections, as Pavol Kanis told us last night, hope to catch up.

Discussion on the paper by Christoph Royen
(THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN EUROPE'S SECURITY AFTER THE YEAR 2000)

Tomáš Zálešák: According to what Mr. Royen said, it could be thought that the more certain countries pursue their national interests, the worse it will be. However, I do not think this is entirely true. The problem is not that individual countries pursue their national interests. In the end we all know very well that NATO began to develop as a structure, which could combine the individual national interests of all its members. Therefore, the problem is not national interests in themselves, but rather the shift of interest from foreign policy to domestic policy. It has become proverbial that the murder of an ambassador does not cause as much excitement at home as a change in the price of meat. In the case of the USA, we can also see that this super power is ever more turning in on itself. The same applies to European nation states, and even supra-national structures, as in the case of the EU, which is concentrating on itself and drowning in its own internal disputes.

Christoph Royen: Basically, I agree with what you say. The priority given to domestic interests is really causing problems in Europe. But I will return to the problem of national interest itself. In spite of the fact that many of my compatriots would not agree with me, I think that the specific situation of Germany after the Second World War contributed – I will use the expression formerly frequent in the socialist part of the world – to a "differentiated approach" to the question of national interests. German politicians, who attended the most varied international conferences and international organizations, endeavored to persuade the West that German interests and German views on problems were compatible with the interests of its partners. In other words, there was an internationalist definition of national interests, a conviction that German national interests were compatible with the interests of partners. This German approach undoubtedly contributed to the success of European economic unification, since Germany as a relatively large country was able to abandon the traditional approach to foreign policy. It is very unfortunate that now, that is roughly from the beginning of the nineties, our politicians, journalists and researchers competed in emphasizing that Germany again exists as a sovereign country, which should also have a "normal" foreign policy, as if everything which happened before was harmful to our national interests. But it was not. The internationalist method of interpreting national interests was good, both for us and for our partners. If we abandon it, or turn away from it, we will only lose. Thus, although I think that the question of national interests is an important subject of study, I am a little skeptical about whether we will succeed in finding a satisfactory solution. Therefore, you are right to say that I associate the pursuit of national interests with an egoistic approach to foreign policy.

A. M. Lebedev: It is well known that the single European currency may come into conflict with the financial interests of the USA. The introduction of the Euro is already planned for next year, and, theoretically, should strengthen the capacity of united Europe. The European countries will want to rid themselves of huge amounts of dollars, which exceed the reserves of the American banking system. The USA will have to adopt a position on this. Can you imagine any specific movements in the event that the principle of NATO comes in conflict with the European monetary union?

Christoph Royen: The simplest answer is my view that the USA has no reason to undertake any measures against the single European currency. For a long time, the USA has made it known that European unity is in the interest of American foreign policy for the coming century. Up to now, we discussed European unity in security terms, but it also concerns economics. There may be some truth in the idea that some American business men or representatives of the administration may express certain fears of the development you mentioned . But the USA pursues a much deeper and more important interest, and wants to see a firm, strong and united Europe, which will be able to deal with the tasks of the new century. If the USA endeavored to undermine European monetary union, it would be a very short sighted policy. Although such voices appeared in part of the press, no government, either Democrat or Republican would adopt such a policy. Certainly, we are seeing constant trade wars, for example about chicken, but basic agreement always prevails on both sides of the Atlantic, over questions of common interest.

Elemír Nečej: The question of the Central European countries joining the EU from the economic point of view interests me. Well known criteria exist, and

we are endeavoring to approach them. Some time ago, on a platform where views were exchanged between experts from the Czech Republic and the USA (see: *Plzeňské rozhovory (The Pilsen Talks)*, ÚMV Prague 1997), I heard one American view that it might be more advantageous for the American economy to open its markets or the markets of NAFTA to the Central European association CEFTA. As is well known, the EU constantly tells the Central European post-communist countries to prove their preparedness for entry to the EU, with their ability to cooperate without problems in the framework of CEFTA. I consider this American idea very interesting, and I am not sure whether the USA does not see a little further than Europe, when they want to help the Central European countries not with grants, but by opening markets.

Christoph Royen: I admit that I know nothing about such an American initiative, endeavoring to achieve closer cooperation with the countries of CEFTA. However, I will use the question to say something about CEFTA and the Visegrád Three, or after the division of Czechoslovakia, the Visegrád Four. I think that the attempt at political union under the heading of Visegrád, as well as its economic mutation – CEFTA – was a very important integration project. But it had one basic disadvantage: the attitude of the Western European partners. The Western European governments openly said to the Visegrád countries, that, in their view, they had no experience of integration, because what was called integration in the socialist system – whether in COMECON or the Warsaw Pact – had nothing in common with what was regarded as integration in the West. If you want to become part of Western European integration, you must naturally gain basic experience in integration practice in the framework of your sub-regional organizations. Unfortunately, the Western governments which made this attempt, created the impression in Prague, Warsaw, Bratislava and Budapest that the EU saw Visegrád as a complete integration alternative, in which the Central European countries would remain for a longer time. Therefore, it is not surprising that it was first of all Václav Klaus, who vigorously opposed the Visegrád idea, and came to the view that his country would avoid it. The recent initiatives to J. Buzek, M. Zeman, V. Orbán and your Mikuláš Dzurinda to renew the dynamic of Visegrád is a very positive phenomenon. I only hope that this time the Western European governments will adopt a different approach to Visegrád than at the beginning of the nineties. Visegrád and CEFTA should be regarded as a preparation for deeper integration steps leading to the EU.

Zoltán Papp: (Government Office, Hungary): My institution is especially concerned with questions of defense and security, preparation of resolutions for the Hungarian government, and crisis management. At present, we are preparing a basic document for the Hungarian parliament, entitled "Principles of Hungary's security and defense policy". We tried to modernize the former document, approved by the Hungarian parliament in 1993, which had come to be several years out of date. In this document, we also deal with the new reality of Hungary's approaching entry to NATO. We are concerned with the question of security in its wider context, and we placed greater emphasis on the non-military aspects of security. Among the non-military aspects, we raised especially that concerning the different rates of development in neighboring countries, which could cause tension in the relations between these countries. The different level of development may also become a source of security risks. We start from the view that it is important to Hungary, for the neighboring countries to be on the same level of social and economic development. This is also why Hungary has the greatest interest in cooperation on the most varied levels with all the neighboring countries. Mutual understanding and mutual cooperation are also the best method to achieve a common definition of national interest. I also fully agree with the view that the internal situation in neighboring countries is also extraordinarily important for the security of a state, because internal problems in a neighboring country can easily grow into a sub-regional conflict. Therefore, we have an interest in neighboring countries such as Romania and Slovakia also consolidating their economic position. These are the main lines on which, Hungary wants to develop cooperation with neighboring countries.

Christoph Royen: Our Hungarian colleague has outlined the main interests of Hungarian foreign policy towards the neighboring countries, and mentioned one neighboring country, with which cooperation appeared to be very difficult at the beginning of the nineties: Romania. This is precisely where we can see a great step forward in both Hungarian and Romanian foreign policy. But on the first part of your statement: You are obviously entirely right to say that different levels of political or economic development in neighboring countries can be dangerous. There is certainly a difference, when one country progresses with transformation successfully, and the other only starts, or experiences regression during transformation. If I look at the neighbors of Hungary, then I see states with very different levels of transformation. Your idea that all the neighboring states should be on the same level of development, is, however, only a pious wish, which will never be fulfilled. It is necessary to start from the real conditions. It is not possible to say today to less developed countries that they will be more developed tomorrow. It is not wise to invest large amounts of money in them, with the idea that this will help them in their transformation development. What we should do, and what we actually already did is something different. We must clearly show them conditions and time possibilities, under which they can enter the community and become like the countries already in it for longer. I always defended the scheme of a three or four stage enlargement of the EU and of NATO. Precisely those who are lower on the list should be addressed with specific plans. It is not a matter of forcing them to reach the same level as the more advanced. It is a matter of the West expressing itself on the progress they made. And if they make progress, they should not be left in doubt, that they will have no problems going through those "golden" doors when they want to. Unfortunately, such a program for the less developed

countries of central and Eastern Europe does not exist at present. Here, I see the main task for the Western states, but also for countries like Hungary, which will soon be included in the same group of developed European states.

Zoltán Papp: Naturally, I did not want to say that all countries will reach the same level of development from one day to the next. In this context, I was not really talking about the integration process. If we look at any integration system as an integration system, that is from the purely technical point of view, we can see that an integration system represents investments and dividends. Investments are factors, which can enable a system to expand without losing its stability. Every country needs time and space for transformation, and sooner or later, the results, which I call dividends will appear.

Christoph Royen: This is a good opportunity to verify some of my views. A very striking phenomenon exists, which is often overlooked and forgotten, precisely in the eastern part of Europe. The countries, which are most successful in transformation, that is those which are the first to enter NATO and are at the top of the waiting list to join the EU, and were always there, that is Poland, Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic), Hungary and perhaps again in Slovakia, were the only countries in the former Soviet Bloc, which seriously attempted to reform the communist system. They did not succeed, but they discussed it, and endeavored and struggled to do it. I think this is not an accident. After 1990, these countries were simply internally better prepared for the first round of transformation, in comparison with the countries, which never experienced such a reform movement. I am not speaking of former Yugoslavia, that is an entirely different story, I am speaking only of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. The fact is that these four countries in the group, where attempts at reform appeared, launched themselves into transformation more easily than the countries which never experienced reform of the socialist system.

Zoltán Papp: I feel partly answered, and although it is more a question for historians, and I do not want to get into an analysis, I also regard the better transformation ability of some countries as a natural product of historical development.

Jaroslav Kuča: Perhaps nobody will doubt that NATO and the EU are creating an environment for stability and economic prosperity. The example of Central Europe also shows this. But this has another side. Some countries of Central and Eastern Europe may regard the process of enlargement as a source of security risks. Mechanisms exist, which help to eliminate the impression of a new dividing line. We have Partnership for Peace, we have the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council – a complete interconnected security system. But enlargement of the EU will also mean movement of the Schengen frontiers,

which is a firm dividing line in Europe. How is it possible to limit the creation of dividing lines connected with the enlargement of the EU?

Christoph Royen: That is a very relevant problem, and concerns the practical aspect of enlargement of the EU. Some opponents of enlargement of the EU used the argument that enlargement of NATO by one group of countries will mean the creation of dividing lines towards other countries or groups of countries. But this ignores the opportunities for a new type of partnership. You need not immediately become members of an organization to have good and friendly relations with its members. When we speak of enlargement of NATO, I do not think the argument of creating new dividing lines is serious. But the condition is, and I already emphasized this, that the first eastward enlargement of NATO will not be the last, and enlargement will not be limited to a small group of countries. This also applies to the Schengen system. We can already observe practical problems here. This was evident, for example, in Poland. Polish representatives – whether from the government or opposition – emphasized on various occasions in Brussels, that they have non-hard currency contact with some neighboring countries, specifically, for example, with Ukraine. They argue that if the USA and EU regard Poland as a bridge to Ukraine, it would be counter-productive to force the Poles to take strict measures against their eastern neighbors. On the other hand, it is understandable that, for example, the German minister of the interior insisted on consistent application of the Schengen system. At present, this is a real problem. I can only hope that both sides will reach a consensus, so that the situation will not arise, that you will have either a rigorous frontier according to Schengen norms, or a completely open frontier with all the negative consequences. In the eyes of public opinion in the Western European states, that would very quickly lead to rejection of EU enlargement. Public opinion is extremely important, and if, for example, the Germans come to the conclusion that the candidate countries are not able to control their frontiers, and opening of the German frontiers to the east will create space for an influx of crime, prostitution and the drugs trade, they will generally oppose enlargement of the EU. Thus, I agree that this is really a very serious problem.

Ján Buzalka

PREVENTION AND ELIMINATION

Since his emergence from the animal kingdom, man has constantly (unknowingly or knowingly) faced influences which directly or indirectly threaten his development and existence. A person experiences many threats to his security, dangers or risks everyday, and he is forced to overcome or eliminate them. Insecurity is always a definite possibility, a latency, which may become immediate. We regard the **minimization of insecurity** (with a tendency towards its elimination) as security, the real state, the value of which is determined by the character of the insecurity and the means available for its elimination.

The type of risk, its quantity and intensity has gradually changed and developed in the course of the historical development of man and civilization. **Early in the development of civilization**, threats and risks which had their source mainly in natural factors (e.g. floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, fires, epidemics, pandemics, famines, droughts etc.) prevailed and most threatened the individual or group. Today, apart from the continuing natural threats, others, mainly resulting from civilization and especially technology have been added. They effect all the valuable products of civilization, the whole material, cultural and informational wealth, which man has created during his existence. Therefore, it is necessary to see the whole wide spectrum of different phenomena and events, which can threaten the security of man. They include all the uncontrollable natural phenomena, the overlooked and neglected risks of technological processes, ecological accidents and catastrophes and violent human activities - terrorism, crime, armed conflicts both internal and international.

When considering the basic categories of risk and security, it is also necessary to be aware of the difference between "objective" and "subjective" security. While the first means the **real, objective state of development of risk and the degree of its elimination,** "subjective" is more the whole complex of subjective perceptions, feelings, inner experience, assessments and evaluations of risk from the mass media, politicians and general public. At the same time, the relationship between objective security and its subjective reflection need not always be in simple harmony, in some cases they may separate. Many empirical researches, in Slovakia and abroad, have repeatedly proved the existence of widespread feelings of being threatened, individuals fearing for the security of themselves, their families, their wider communities, countries or the whole of civilization.

In our conditions, in relation to the characteristics of the Slovak Republic, its geographical, economic, political and cultural conditions, it is necessary to

consider sources of threat or **risk, which have a combined or mixed character,** and which, from the point of view of seriousness need not create conditions for the origin and development or primary extraordinary events, but more frequently for the origin of secondary or tertiary extraordinary events. Cases where extraordinary events, resulting from civilization factors, for example technological accidents, sociogenic or psycho- genic collisions, cause serious risk of the origin of local, regional or even global natural extraordinary events, are ever more frequent. **Complex, multi-factoral combination of sources of threat to security** also appear, for example, in the fact that crises in the economic sphere, often have an impact on the public sector, especially the social area and can cause significant social and social-psychological tension. In the global, but also the regional context, the dependence of modern technologies, commerce and the whole tertiary sphere on special raw materials, adequate software programs and modern communications could become the target of anti-social and illegal activities of various groups and elements.

The differences between risks caused by nature and by people are overlapping in ever more complex ways, and this brings rather **disturbing prospects,** especially in the areas of continuing efforts to operate high risk technologies, the ever growing network of exchange of information and goods, the combined effect of the racial, ethnic and religious tension in the international and internal contexts, and the mutual interconnections of political, social and economic problems.

To fulfill **the demands of securing an adequate level of security and defense** of citizens, institutions and all the entities of social life in the complex situations of possible threat on all levels (from the macro-level – the state and society, through the regional level to the village and the individual citizen), it is essential to achieve wide coordination of the activity of the various entities, such as national and supra-national institutions, the armed forces, voluntary organizations, groups of citizens and individuals. In this context, it is common to present an analogy of the state and society with a biosystem, with a rich and complex internal structure in a relatively closed organism. Like such a system, a human society has also created an "immune or defense" system to ensure its own security and development. (The individual level of such a "defensive reaction" of society, can be illustrated as a hierarchy of defensive and "health-regulating" actions, beginning with self-help and help to neighbors, through the help of the local police, fire brigade, rescue organizations to the intervention of the state authorities, police, army and others. The effectiveness of such a system for ensuring security and the elimination of threats depends on the coordination of all subsystems, and the cooperation of all participating entities, including individual citizens. This objective requires the creation of an effective integrated defense system (e.g. the Federal Emergency Manager Agency (FEMA) in the USA, the Civil Emergency Planning system (CEP) in NATO), which is not provided on the national level in the Slovak Republic, although it functions on the regional level in many areas.

The complicated **many-factored, complex of criminal phenomena in society** is an important **parameter of the degree of threat to citizens**, their lives, health and property.

A natural reaction to the real situation in this area, and especially to disturbing trends in its development, is to appeal for a more intensive and effective struggle with crime leading to its limitation. Unrealistic expectations and erroneous ideas about the armed forces and especially about the police, as the only guarantor and actor in the struggle against these negative phenomena, are often created in the consciousness of citizens in this context. The position of these entities, needs to be seen against the background of a wide overall social system of regulation of the behavior of people, extending from the system of internal, moral limitation and regulation of the behavior of a person, through the external norms of morality in society (for example the ethos of a civil society), the level of the legal consciousness of society, up to the direct and deliberate activity of the institutions of the state.

In this context, it is appropriate to ask **what is the real level of quality of the coordination** of the mutual activity of these factors, their present effectiveness, and especially their possible effectiveness, in the horizon of the beginning of the next millennium. In our conditions, the individual structures of civil society, above all the family, but also the neighborhood community, voluntary civil associations, various societies and organizations, do not have a sufficiently long and uninterrupted tradition of normal functioning, for them to operate as effective regulators of crime. The continuing remnants of the traditional "paternalistic" mentality of our population, especially the tendency to expect effective and strong state interventions and a low level of personal civic responsibility, also have a negative effect in this area. Weakening of the regulative function of morality in the area of human behavior is also associated with the process of transformation in our society. The transformation of society brought a significant destabilization of traditional value orientations and established customs in behavior. Such destabilization of value systems is a typical accompanying feature of transforming post-totalitarian societies. Changes also occur in the moral background of the relationship between **the aims of human efforts and the means of achieving them**. Assessment of the success of a person on the basis of the size of his bank account or other property, an atmosphere of preferring material values, all creates conditions for attitudes and behavior in the spirit of "the end justifies the means" and "after us the deluge".

The gradual estrangement of people from each other, themselves and their moral ideals and values is accompanied by a significant anonymity and atomization of social bonds (especially in big city environments). This increasingly paralyses **the civic guarantee of security and reduction of risks**. Therefore it is ever more necessary to apply a balanced and proportional model of the coordination of all informal influences with **the deliberate activity of particular institutionalized entities in society**, especially the armed forces.

The scientific and educational staff of the Academy of the Police Force in Bratislava, on the basis of analysis of the present state and extrapolation of the developmental tendencies, worked out a prognosis for the development of criminality in the coming years. In very concentrated form, **the following characteristics** can be emphasized, in the context of this prognosis:

Criminality, as a mass social phenomenon will be a permanent part of all spheres of the life of society, including those where we have not encountered it up to now. The development of "traditional" types of criminality, such as **property, violent and economic crime** will tend to increase. Above all, a change in the extent and structure of economic criminality is expected, with an increase in acts such as tax fraud, unauthorized business, smuggling, bribery and frauds in supplier – consumer relations. In this context, the growth of so-called "computer" economic criminality and disturbance of ecological security is expected.

The development of these "traditional" types of criminality will be correlated with **a high level of "drug" and "organized" criminality**. It is possible to expect a **dynamic synchronism**, since so-called "drug" criminality will be almost entirely organized, and will also be its decisive **source of finance**. The symbiosis of these types will be mutually successful and sustainable in the long term. For example, it is necessary to expect a significant growth of organized crime in connection with Slovakia ceasing to be mainly a transit country in the drugs trade and becoming ever more a country consuming drugs.

The greatest risk for internal security with significant growth in the future will be the growth of **organized crime with international elements**. According to analyses of cases of this highly latent criminality, the most serious external forms are illegal migration, drugs, financial machinations, the sex trade including child prostitution, the trade in weapons, explosives or dangerous substances (including radioactive materials) and racial extremism.

Black-mail and "racketeering" is an ever growing form of organized crime (today, it takes about 7% of receipts). Criminal terrorism is also deepening, with ever more frequent and more powerful use of explosive systems, arson and other expressions.

The prognosis regards the development of organized crime as a gradual process, which will gradually acquire such attributes as:

- highly professional illegal activity
- increased conspiracy, strict internal discipline of groups
- strengthening of its own security and impunity (separation of directing and active elements)
- a large financial background, top quality technical equipment, a special subculture and connection to information sources in the highest power structures
- brutal conflicts between individual groups (gang wars) over territory
- shift of the centers of organized crime from the present legal centers to the centers of new administrative units

- growth of pressure to corrupt and blackmail representatives of the state mechanism, including the judiciary and police. In the event of failure, removal of incorruptible and "inconvenient" personnel
- domination of the criminal scene by the "domestic underworld", with use of foreign specialists for "special operations".

It is assumed that the **gradual establishment of organized criminality** in individual spheres of the life of society will **be masked or hidden with acceptable legends**, with the aim of preventing the action of counter-measures as far as possible.

On the basis of the brief outline of the trends of development of threats to the internal security of citizens and the whole of society, it is necessary to intensively rethink the **system of adequate measures for the elimination of this threat**. It is possible to formulate them in the form of certain recommendations with varying degrees of generality.

On the general social level, it is necessary to implement the following recommendations:

- systematically and scientifically analyze all areas and factors threatening security,
- effectively include in solving these problems all social entities (state organs, institutions, societies and civil associations, individual citizens), obliged (especially by legislative, administrative, professional or moral requirements) to participate in this task,
- effectively cooperate with supra-national and global (pan- European) organizations, on the multilateral and bilateral levels, in obtaining and exchanging information and experience in the area of elimination of the origin and spread of risk factors and sources of threat,
- consistently develop and respect the civil, democratic and humane character of our society in the social, political and economic areas,
- strengthen and support the activities of citizens, associations and institutions in the area of moral, spiritual and cultural prevention, against the activity of risk factors and regulation of their negative influence,
- create social and economic conditions to overcome the negative effects of the transformation processes on the life of the citizen, the functioning of the family, the activity of societies and institutions,
- to create standard conditions for the optimal coexistence of the majority of groups in the population of the Slovak Republic,
- faster completion of all economic, organizational and legislative requirements for the creation and effective functioning of an integrated defense system for the whole of society, with inclusion in the international system of defense systems,

- systematically create conditions to strengthen the positive value system of the citizens, shaping of their moral and legal consciousness, a positive relationship to and preparedness of citizens to respect the moral and legal norms of society, with an emphasis on condemnation of violence, intolerance and dishonesty in all areas of the life of society,
- to support humanitarian, charitable and religious organizations in activities aimed at the elimination of negative anti-social phenomena.

On the specific level, concerning the activity of the police force, generally and especially in individual areas of criminality, it is possible to recommend especially **the following**:

- security of constitutionalism, legality and democracy in the state. The security of the citizen in a state where the rule of law is respected, is inseparably connected with respect for his basic rights and freedoms,
- creation and deepening of mutual trust and respect between the police force and the public, especially on the basis of the personal experience of the citizens,
- improvement of selection for police service, raising of the level of general and special professional qualifications for Ministry of the Interior personnel, especially members of the police force,
- strengthen the achievement of balance between the preventive and repressive functions of the police in the state, with an understanding of their function as a "service to the citizens",
- significantly raise the responsibility of the public administration (including that of villages) for arising situations, creating a source of threat and their preparedness to eliminate these threats, with use of systematic measures in the organizational, personal and material-technical areas,
- strengthen the preparedness of citizens for the elimination of negative influences from the environment (the street, means of transport, various "suspicious" buildings and premises) and social relations in the micro-environment (the family, among neighbors, at work etc.),
- to strengthen civil solidarity and mutual aid in cases of violent threats to security, life and health,
- consistently regulate the spreading of cultural and media influences, presenting brutality, violence, cruel behavior by people, and in cooperation with other social entities, to create a positive relationship to "humanization" of the social micro-environment,
- to perfect the physical and technical protection of the property of citizens, institutions and the state, to create economic (e.g. through insurance) and legislative conditions for such perfecting among the widest possible part of the population,
- to analyze the real and latent sources, the conditions and environment in which entities of organized crime function, and use effective repressive means against the guilty, including the highest levels of their hierarchy,

- use specific means to penetrate into the structures of organized crime, uncover and clarify not only the "tip of the iceberg", but also the deeper layers and their connections,
- intensify the special professional preparation of the police force for the struggle against organized crime,
- intensify the international cooperation between countries interested in the struggle against organized crime.

Discussion on the paper by Ján Buzalka
(PREVENTION AND ELIMINATION)

Anton Sládeček: The paper gave us a really thorough orientation in the problem of internal security. I agree with most of the speaker's conclusions. But where he specified individual risks, I am not sure that he correctly assigned the secondary, that is social risks. This concerns the classification of the risks, which flow from the natural, primary risks. Personally, I think that such natural catastrophes as floods, volcanic eruptions or earthquakes represent primary sources of risk for criminality and other socially negative phenomena. This leads to my question: Do you think it would be appropriate that this information – that is your recommendations – should also be submitted to our legal experts and members of parliament? First of all, we could transform the legal order in Slovakia. I will mention only the principle of self defense. It is necessary to change the legal order here. I, as a citizen must also have the right to defend myself. I think that for foreigners, including our guests, it is unnatural that, when I as a citizen begin to defend myself against attack, I can easily come into conflict with the law. From the point of view of the understanding of Western philosophy and especially from the point of view of the American approach, this is nonsense. What do you think about this?

Ján Buzalka: We should leave discussion of primary and secondary sources of internal security risks, to our own bilateral level. But I want to say that human influences may also lead to landslides and floods, and from this point of view, I regard the human influence as the primary source, since the land slide is only secondary. Criminality, which begins to develop after such natural catastrophes, is therefore only tertiary. On the question, whether it would be appropriate to submit similar information to legal fora, I can say that it certainly would be appropriate. At the beginning of my paper, I talked about the relationship between theory and practice, which is not entirely appreciated in all stages of the development of our society. Practice – and in the past also police practice – often behaved very *carefully in relation to theory. I believe that in future, it will improve. Obviously, our whole prognosis, the whole extensive document, which has a secret character, is available to the appropriate authori-

ties: the Police Force, the whole branch and the higher authorities. In any case, I regard, the idea of developing our recommendations, as extraordinarily positive. I already spoke about the necessary legislative measures, which the responsible institutions should implement. I will again mention the principle of self-defense. Our colleagues from the Department of Criminal Law and other experts are already participating in the preparation of the necessary changes in the area of criminal law. Apart from the principle of self-defense, other principles should be changed.

Christoph Royen: Our general theme is the transformation of Slovakia and its chance to enter the EU and NATO. I would like to ask the speaker several questions. It is well known that in the former socialist system, the police performed certain repressive functions. To what extent did so-called lustration affect the police in your country? Second question: Does Slovakia have the problem, which seriously affects some other former socialist countries – corruption within the police force? Third question: How will the new measures you mentioned, fit in with the old style of work? The fourth question is a sort of summary of the preceding three questions: Can you say that the Slovak police now has the full confidence of the population, and that distrust of the police from the time of socialism has disappeared? The fifth question relates to your "catalogue" of recommendations: If you also want to implement all these recommendations, how much do you think it will cost? The sixth question concerns the more external relations of the Slovak police: Have you succeeded in establishing cooperation with neighboring countries such as the Czech Republic and Austria? or with Germany? or are you still working on effective cooperation with these countries? I apologize for the large number of questions, but they all concern matters of special interest to me.

Ján Buzalka: I am a member of the research and educational staff of the Police Academy, and I do not work in the supreme hierarchy of the management of the police. But I will attempt to answer as far as I can. On the first question: Lustrations affected the police force on a level comparable to other professional groups in society, and in harmony with the way the law on lustration was enforced in our country. On the second question: We are endeavoring to conceive research activity on the problem of corruption. But academic research in this area is unusually difficult, and in the present social situation, we have not succeeded in doing it satisfactorily. But after mastering various special techniques, we may have some success in this area. For example, the latest statements of the president of the Police Force in the press (on 27.11.1998) indirectly pointed to corruption in the ranks of the police, although I did not explicitly mention this in the part of my paper, which I devoted to measures. But I consider it natural that the Police Force should be financially and materially secured in such a way that the possibilities of corruption or the possibilities to buy policemen will be limited. On the third question, that is on new methods in re-

lation to the old style of work: In connection with my position, that is a delicate question. I can only say that, we have succeeded in deepening and improving cooperation with the executive units of the Police Force on the level of individual directorates, the Presidium of the Police Force and other authorities in the branch. I think that new methods will also gradually appear in the activity of the Police Force, in connection with raising the level of qualification of individual levels of management, and of the ordinary members of the Police Force. Concerning the fourth question, that is the confidence of citizens in the Police Force, we do not make many illusions on the basis of the partial research we have done in this area. For this reason, we consider it essential to implement one of the above mentioned measures, that is to work on raising and deepening confidence in the police. But here, we also meet with one of the system measures, of which I spoke in the preceding paper, and which concerns the preparedness of individual levels. On the fifth question: I already partly expressed my view on this. The cost of improving the preparedness of the Police Force is considerable and will above all require a financially quantifiable effort. We are aware of the fact that it is not possible to materially quantify this catalogue of recommendations and implement it immediately. It is a catalogue of measures for the future, and many of these measures have the character of long-term aims. This especially concerns those involving the moral and legal consciousness of the population, the principles of civil society and the strengthening of interrupted traditions. On the sixth question: As far as I know, the external relations of individual levels of the leadership of the Police Force, and of the whole branch are being deepened. There are also good conditions for further improvement in many areas, especially in the area of criminal and frontier policing.

Matúš Štefanovič: The speaker gave us a long catalogue of measures, which would help to raise security within the state. I think that the internal security of the state is at least as important as its defense, that is the military aspect of security. The speaker talked about various groups of offenders, such as drug mafias and defrauders. Racist groups, various gangs and other groups obviously also belong here. Is the Police Force considering the establishment of special units, which would penetrate these groups of offenders, monitor their activities and so prevent criminal activity?

· *Ján Buzalka*: That is not only being considered, steps are already being taken. For understandable reasons, I am not allowed to tell you the specific way this is being done. I will only speak in general, for example, of legalization of the principle of the agent provocateur, which is considered promising.

Ján Černák

THE OVERALL SYSTEM SECURING THE DEFENSE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIK. THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

In the time assigned to me, I will try to present my views on the problem of creating an overall system for the solution of crisis situations – which I think states my aim more precisely.

In the introduction, permit me to express the idea, with which I hope you will all agree, that we are not so rich that we can create a special system for every crisis situation, to react to the origin of the crisis, monitor and solve it. Therefore, it is necessary to create a sufficiently flexible system, and a sufficiently universal system to solve any crisis situation.

I will use projected sheets, to illustrate my starting points and the ideas I want to present, according to the educational principle of J. .A. Comenius: *It is better to see once than to hear a hundred times.*

The creation of an overall system for solving crisis situations in the newly arisen conditions, is a necessity, because the present situation in the area of solution of crisis situations is not adequate. The present conditions are diametrically different from the conditions, when the Council for the Defense of the State was the supreme organ for the solution of defense questions (Constitutional act no.10/1969 Col. on the Council for Defense of the State §3, "1. The Council for Defense of the State shall determine the main directions for the preparation and organization of defense."), and the solution of other crisis situations was not immediately connected to its activity. At present, the conditions are different, and require a change of system (the whole system), which will solve crisis situations as such. Before we talk about basic questions of the origin of an overall system for the solution of crisis situations, it is necessary to say something about the basic content of the terms used.

"Crisis situation" is a very frequent term. For the solution of questions connected with the "overall system" for solving "crisis situations", I start from the assumption that if I speak of a crisis situation from the point of view of the content of the term, I have in mind the following two basic areas:

a) military preparedness of the state or armed conflict;
b) other "extraordinary situations" of great extent, which are solved by legislation, and which are defined in Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic ·No. 42/1994 Col. about civil defense against non-military threats. Therefore, if we use the term "crisis situation" below, we will have in mind

extraordinary situations in general, but also military preparedness of the state, as the most extensive crisis situation for our state. This need to reevaluate and analyze the present state of provision for defense of the state and other extraordinary situations resulted from the changes after 1989 and 1992 (legislative unification is necessary).

If we speak of defense of the state, we especially speak of the most extensive crisis situation, which can affect the state. If we start from the idea of the creation of an overall system for the solution of crisis situations, it is necessary to know what crisis situations this overall system is aimed at. The idea of creating an overall system for solving crisis situations is very topical at present, but it is necessary to know the causes of the crisis situations, so that the system can react adequately. If we want to create such a system, we must start from the basic assumption of the possibility of a crisis situation arising. It is possible to schematically illustrate the possibility of crisis situations arising according to scheme no.1, the basic philosophy of the origin of crises and scheme no.2, the basic division of crisis situations arising from particular causes. This shows that, at present, our effort is to create such an overall system, which will be able to react to any crisis situation, as we defined the meaning of crisis situation, including armed preparedness of the state.

If we start from the basic idea and basic assumptions of the universality of the system, as well as from the inadequate solution of the legislative questions in this area, the problem acquires a new dimension, which needs to be called "national security". If we assess the question of the system ensuring the comprehensiveness, but also the flexibility of the system, the answer can be depicted according to scheme no.3. This scheme shows that the "national security" system is composed of various subsystems, representing internal security and external security, defense of the state's territory and the inviolability of the frontiers.

According to which impulse is dominant, reaction by a particular subsystem of "national security" should be sufficient. A "national security" system, which has to solve any arising crisis situation, must have an appropriate monitoring system, to perform initial evaluations of arising crisis situations, and a directing organ, which takes decisions to solve a specific situation, on the basis of the information and analyses it receives. It is necessary to emphasize that, at present, no department has a system to solve every arising situation so flexibly and comprehensively. The individual departments usually have a particular system created for monitoring or liquidating crisis situations concerning their immediate activity. (See, for example, the so-called Responsibilities Act no.347/1990 Col. about coordination of defense questions.)

An overall system, if we call it this, must be a sort of inter-departmental coordination system, in which the departmental systems will form sub-systems or elements in the overall system, so that they can adequately react to a crisis situation. From the point of this assumption, the basic principle of constructing such a system can be compared schematically to a triangle. As we see on figure 4, the system should secure the basic priorities, from the point of view of definition of crisis situations, that is to solve the worst crisis situations, requiring military preparedness of the state, which no other crisis situation reaches. The second assumption, from the point of view of solution and direction of a crisis situation is to have an organ, which is capable of solving a crisis situation, that is the Council for National Security. The Council for National Security is mentioned because, the Council for Defense of the State is not appropriate to the newly arisen conditions, not only because of its name, but also because of its function (constitutional act no.10/1969 Col. about the Council for Defense of the State §3 – activities connected with defense). At present, the Council for National Security should be the supreme organ able to solve any crisis situation. If we start from this assumption, this system (including the directing authority, according to the appropriate level of the state administration) will be able to solve any lesser crisis situation, as indicated (e.g. an industrial accident), because this situation will never reach the extent of military preparedness of the state.

However, if we speak of a flexible universal system, we must compare it to the "big" system from the synergic point of view. The "big system" is composed of elements or subsystems, which participate in the solution of a crisis situation and adequately react to stimuli. I have tried to illustrate the basic principle on figure 5, where the base of the triangle represents the subsystems or elements of the system, usually departmental systems, which usually solve certain situations in their departments. From the point of view of a system understood like this, points of contact arise between the elements of the system, and they are also adequate to solve other crisis situations, usually less than the military preparedness of the state, as is also shown on figure 6. (Note of the editors: the figures No. 1 – 6 have not been included in the edition). It is also necessary to mention the principle of "territorial responsibility", which means that extraordinary situations are solved by state organs on individual levels, depending on the extent of the extraordinary situation, and the possibilities of the appropriate organs of the state administration to solve it. (This applies to the levels of the district and region).

Such a Council for National Security would have the following activities:

a) To work out a conception of national security, which would be approved by the National Council of the Slovak Republic, after discussion by the government.

b) To propose measures to secure national security to the National Council, president and government of the Slovak Republic.

c) On the basis of the approved conception of national security and the measures approved according to letter b, to assign tasks to state authorities. It can request information about the state of implementation of the conception of national security and the approved measures.

d) To approve the measures of state organs providing national security and direct, coordinate and check their activity.
e) To direct, coordinate and check the activity of regional councils for national security and district councils for national security.

In conclusion, permit me to recall the idea of Professor Dror from Jerusalem University, who visited Slovakia in 1993. He said that mastering or directing crisis situations is the art of improvisation. I think that this improvisation can be done only by those who have sufficient information and professional experience.

The discussion on the paper by Ján Černák follows after the contribution of Jozef Marguš

Gabriel Kopecký

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

In the period of the Cold War, many security matters were almost clear, but with the end of the bi-polar division of the world, new phenomena are appearing in the area of security and defense. The evaluation of risks and the creation of threat scenarios has become more hypothetical and the reality of all the variants is very difficult to assess.

In the present strategic environment, it is very difficult to suppose the threat of large scale aggression, which would concern all nations, but rather tensions and antagonisms generated either by ethnic conflicts, extreme nationalism, religious intolerance, internal political weakness and other factors, which we may not be able to foresee. To these, we can add other potential sources of crisis, such as natural and technological catastrophes or accidents, which will require the use of military forces and equipment. The most important characteristic of the risk to security in the world is uncertainty. Nobody can be sure who will attack who, with which ally or allies, in what coalition or alliance, when it will happen and what means will be used. This uncertainty also appears in the planning of operations with the use of armed forces.

Crisis situations may affect part of one country to varying extents, or several countries together. Depending on the type of crisis, its magnitude and its territorial extent, it may be solvable by the assigned forces of one country, or by the above mentioned international grouping. It is usual, that, apart from the main authorized group, which has a mandate to solve the crisis, several non-governmental or interest organizations (e.g. the Red Cross, Medecins sans frontiers etc.) get involved in the process of solving a crisis. Their activity has a rather heterogeneous character and extent, and evaluation of their share in solving a crisis will not be the subject of this study. A seventh great power – the media, has great influence on the course of operations, and not always positive.

The Crisis

A crisis situation is a state of disturbance in the life of society, with an extent and effect, which seriously disturbs or changes the economic or social running of the state or territorial unit. A state of emergency, military mobilization of the state, a state of distress, extraordinary event, natural disaster, technological disaster or catastrophe is regarded as a crisis.

The Oxford dictionary defines a crisis as a "moment of danger or uncertainty in political, economic or other activity".

In other materials, a crisis is described as a "national or international situa-

tion, in which the values, interests or aims of the participating groups are threatened."

A crisis can also be defined as a "a complex of rapidly unfolding events, which increase the impact of destabilizing forces in the general system, above the normal level and increase the violence in the system."

The trigger mechanism of a crisis situation may be a human, natural or technological factor. The solution of a crisis depends on various factors. As was said in the introduction, we are not able to perfectly assess the tendencies causing crises. The single implacable enemy already does not figure as the main threat to security, but has been replaced by a great number of difficult to foresee risks with various forms, acting to and from different directions. They are difficult to analyze and usually unstable. These reasons lead to the need to create a mechanism, enabling us to minimize the effects of the crisis and lead to implementation of way of solving the crisis. These aims produce a need to form and improve crisis management, so that its organization, resources and general characteristics are best suited to the given crisis.

Crisis management was defined in various ways. The definition given in publication of the military committee of NATO is as follows:

"Coordinated actions realized for the purpose of solving crises, preventing their escalation into armed conflict, and restraining the resulting hostility. The machinery of crisis management gives the decision makers the necessary information and arranges for the use of the appropriate means (political, diplomatic, economic and military) in a timely and coordinated way."

The aim of crisis management is to:
- contribute to reducing tension, even before the possibility of occurrence of a crisis, and so to limit the resulting threat,
- effectively control the crisis, in the event that it cannot be prevented,
- secure civil and military preparedness for a timely and appropriate reaction in the event of a crisis,
- imit the escalation of the crisis with available means.

For crisis management to fulfill these criteria, it is necessary to understand the process of development of crises, to create a mechanism for response to particular types of crisis, to prepare people able to solve crisis situations, but also to equip them with means corresponding to the needs of crisis solution.

The most important element in crisis management is get the crisis under control and enable the managers of the crisis to direct the further development of the crisis towards the required final state, or an acceptable solution.

The method of solving crises depends on various factors. The main parameters determining the seriousness of a crisis are the extent and urgency of the threats.

A crisis is not very serious, if its extent is small and the threat is not immediate. A crisis is very serious, if its extent is large and the threat immediate in time.

The intensity of a crisis is shown by the amplitude of the feeling of threat in dependence on time. Intensity may grow together with the growth in seriousness, but a decline in intensity with a growth in seriousness and the opposite are possible (for example, a rise in intensity characterized by increased precipitation need not mean more serious floods, if measures were taken to prevent breaching of embankments, people and animals are located in safe areas and property is safe).

A crisis is characterized by its course, starting from a peaceful state, as the base at a given time. A certain level of unrest may already exist in this period, but it need not mean transition to a crisis. We can call unrest in a period without conflict friction, when the interests of the opponents are within sustainable limits, but each is striving to gain advantages at the expense of the other. In this phase, prevention is the key word of crisis management. Mainly political, diplomatic and economic resources are applied, but the use of military resources is not excluded.

Depending on the trigger mechanism of the crisis, it is possible to assess escalation of a peaceful state into a crisis, especially if the human factor is involved. Monitoring the situation, to which greater attention will be given later, plays the decisive role in this stage. Late identification of the escalation of a peaceful state into a crisis can have far reaching consequences.

The course of a crisis can be depicted in graph form as follows:

The shape of the curve depends on many factors, which effect the intensity and time span of the crisis. The period designated as **peace** does not mean there is no threat, but its level does not have to cause conflict. In this stage, crisis management is aimed at monitoring and evaluating the situation. Its decision making and directing elements can concentrate on high quality preparation, and analysis of preceding events as the starting point for the removal of inadequacies in similar cases in future or training by solving hypothetical situations.

Intensity

Depiction of friction
in graphic form
in a phase of peace:

In a period of escalation, **disagreement** occurs between the interested entity (states, population of a certain area etc.) and disturbing element (enemy, nature, technology ..). The transition from peace to confrontation may be gradual or abrupt. The most abrupt changes occur in the cases of technological disasters, natural catastrophes (e.g. earthquakes), but also in the case of military coups:

Confrontation:

Linear   Non-linear

Sufficient exact data from monitoring, their expert analysis and adoption of timely measures in the event of indications of disagreement, are the pre-condition for correct reaction to an arisen situation. This phase must be supported by delegation of the necessary level of decision taking authority, access to all relevant information and creation of a mechanism for communicating decisions in an agreed way to all participants. The mechanism must be sufficiently resistant to disturbance from outside, and have the necessary back up for the possibility of failure of the main channel. A correct understanding of its place by every element in the system of crisis management, and the entities subordinate to it, helps to overcome the initial difficulties associated with a crisis situation. Prevention of panic will certainly be one of the priority tasks of the crisis staff. Panic is not only a significant accompanying feature of all crisis situations, but above all, it plays a strongly negative role.

Confrontation as an open expression of a crisis situation is characterized by the already mentioned seriousness and intensity. Both factors determine the number of persons involved in the solution of a crisis situation and the duration

of the confrontation and solution. Confronting a strong opponent requires equally strong resources in response. This does not always mean only using a significant predominance of forces and resources, but ability to use all the available resources, experience and skill gained in the past. The beginning of confrontation need not mean the escalation of the crisis to its complete development in those cases where corrective means are available, and we use them to get the crisis under control. In the event of the approach of military conflict, it is possible to turn away from confrontation and escalation of the crisis, above all by diplomatic and political, but also by economic means, or by an exhibition of force. But if complete escalation of the crisis occurs, crisis management must begin to use all available resources to solve the crisis. This phase of crisis management is characterized by high intensity of monitoring and evaluation of the situation. If the structure of the crisis management staff is chosen appropriately, this staff will obtain information from the widest possible range of sources in a coordinated way. It will have a mechanism to compare the accuracy of the information obtained, and so contribute to a correct evaluation of the information. This is the basis for provision of information about an arisen situation to all relevant entities in the forms which are necessary and appropriate for them. The crisis management staff is equipped with a mechanism enabling delivery of undistorted and up to date information about situations to all relevant addresses.

In the phase of confrontation, the crisis management staff has one very weighty task. This is identification of the main people, who will directly control the process of crisis management in the phase of solution of the crisis. It is necessary to entrust specific tasks to individual persons. It is an advantage, if the crisis can be assigned to a known category, for which we have a certain pattern prepared and we can use this pattern with only minor adjustment. But if prepared "players" are not available, substitutes must take their places. Then it is important to determine appropriate tasks and be convinced that the appointed people will perform their tasks without a negative impact on solution of the crisis situation or on their colleagues. The preparation process of the complete team for solving the crisis may include submission of the solution strategy by the permanent crisis management staff. This is worked out on the basis of the experience and knowledge of the permanent staff in several variants and will help the complete staff to decide better and faster.

The prepared document on decision making should include especially:
• definition of who and what is threatened by the crisis,
• definition of who will be directly concerned with solving the crisis,
• who needs to be included in discussions, which allies can help us,
• what policy to implement, whose support must be gained,
• which interested parties need to be informed and to what extent,
• determination of the rules of the "game"
• what are the alternative solutions,

- evaluation of the risks of all the variant approaches to solving the crisis,
- definition of the final state, which should result from solving the crisis,
- definition of the obstacles, which will hinder planning of solution of the crisis, the method of their removal.

Solution of the crisis is really the most important part of the activity of crisis management. While sufficient time and certain known initial conditions are characteristic of peace time planning, planning in crisis management must react to a specific situation, often without warning and time limitation is really significant. Without perfect preparation for planning in a crisis situation, it is impossible to master the demands of all the steps necessary to master the whole process.

The correct solution of a crisis, above all requires the choice of the appropriate resources and approaches. The choice of resources is conditioned by the character of the crisis, its extent and intensity, but mainly by the availability of the resources. Depending on the character of the crisis, we can speak of diplomatic, political, economic, military and technical resources. Only one type of resource, for example, diplomatic, may be used to solve a crisis. The progressive application of individual resources may occur according to their expected effect, after the effect of the previous resource has been found inadequate. In this case, it is necessary to be able to make quick evaluations of when it is necessary to introduce a new resource. Often, a new resource is introduced only after the failure of that used before, and it is as if the solution of the crisis situation begins again. If it is necessary and appropriate, two or more resources may be applied immediately, as often happens in real life. In this case, if we want to use various resources immediately, we must carefully consider the possibility of further escalation of the crisis. By applying all available resources immediately, we may exhaust all usable forces, and nothing will remain for us to solve the crisis, if its intensity increases. In this phase of a crisis situation, it may become necessary to form an alliance with a partner, who has the required resources, and is also willing to provide help.

As in the phase of confrontation, in the stage of solution of a crisis, much depends on the type of crisis. While a military attack from a party will require immediate use of military force and starting of diplomatic and political negotiations, a natural catastrophe will require the priority use of technical resources with service personnel. In a military conflict, it is usually rather complicated to conclude agreements about mutual assistance, and to create an adequate coalition with somebody. Creating an alliance in a time of conflict is most probably impossible. In the event of natural catastrophe or technological disaster, cooperation with neighboring countries is much simpler, and they often directly offer help. The willingness of surrounding countries to participate in solving a crisis gives the planners substantially more possibilities for available resources.

Possible schemes for solving crisis situations:

Consistent approach   Inconsistent approach

The curves of the stage of solution of the crisis again depend on a large number of basic and accompanying factors. The ideal straight line is not possible for various reasons. An apparent balance of forces, changes over time depending on people, technical equipment, resources, relations, the progress and length of the crisis and many other factors. Most conflicts will be depicted in detail by a saw-shaped line, depicting the stage of solution, like that depicting the period of peace. This will be important for understanding the choice of the right way to solve a crisis, and determination of approach as, at individual moments, we reevaluate the already applied method of solving the crisis. One of the very important points is the culminating point. This is the turning point in military effort, and from this moment victory is on one side, although this is not always clear at the given moment. In his work "On war", Carl von Clausewitz wrote:

"No battle is decided in one moment, although in every struggle, there are moments of crisis on which the result depends. Loss in battle is therefore, a gradual decline in extent. But in every battle, there is a moment, which can be considered decisive, and in such a way that a renewal of the struggle would be a new battle and not a continuation of the old one. It is very important to recognize this moment, so that we can decide whether a struggle can be advantageously renewed with the help of rapid reinforcement."

We can also use knowledge of the culminating point in the context of solving crisis situations. If we can estimate the achievement of the culminating point in time, we can use the available resources in favor of accelerating the decline in the intensity of the crisis. Its incorrect identification can evoke an inappropriate euphoria and a severe blow to morale, which is reflected in the need to make a greater effort to achieve the final state than was really necessary. A completely inaccurate identification of the culminating point may also lead to a loss of previously held predominance over an unfavorable situation and complete

defeat. This situation should not happen in a well prepared group of crisis management staff, which is correctly prepared for its mission, with interconnections enabling a transparent overview of the whole situation and progress of the solution. Every individual, who actively participates in solving an arisen situation has the right and duty to point out any disproportion, which has arisen in the process. A correct understanding of such observations gives the possibility that no important factor, which could influence the solution of the event, will be neglected. The ability of leading personnel to limit their personal approach and accept all relevant information without distortion, plays an important part in this area. The ability to orient oneself among a large quantity of information and select only the essential in relation to solution of the crisis, is not only an important ability of persons participating in the process of crisis management, but one of the areas formable by good quality training.

The solution of individual crisis situations depends not only on the possibilities to use the necessary resources, and the preparations of individual persons for the fulfillment of tasks in the crisis staff, but also on understanding of the situation by other interested persons, or other not directly interested persons. A crisis situation is solved much better by a staff, which has already successfully mastered one or more other crisis situations, especially if they were similar crisis situations. Well learnt lessons from the solution of other crisis situations may be the basis for successful solution of a new crisis situation.

With the greatest probability, it is not possible to determine precise guidelines for the solution of a crisis situation, even if its initial phase is identical to that of a previous crisis. The individual factors of every crisis may be significantly different, and not only in extent, phasing, persons and other circumstances. Every crisis situation is unique and its solution requires an original approach using the above mentioned positive experiences and knowledge.

As was said at the beginning of this study, the choice of resources and approaches is the primary step towards mastering a crisis. The actual process of solving a crisis is complex and often consists of a multitude of more or less connected fragments. The ability to correctly evaluate the importance of the individual fragments, determine the correct position of each fragment and to evaluate the connections between the individual fragments of a crisis is the real art of the crisis staff. The flexibility of individual members of the crisis staff in their ability to orient themselves in all elements of the crisis situation is equally important.

The following overview of the basic demands on the members of a crisis staff can serve as a summary of the above mentioned requirements for solving a crisis situation:

- all its members need a high level of expert and psychological preparation,
- regular training in fictional situations, which are based on real foundations will prepare individual members to solve real crisis situations,
- consciousness of a high level of responsibility must be cultivated in every member of the staff,

- no member of the staff has only a subordinate role, no member is irreplaceable and no member can do everything by himself,
- assistance to others in the staff means faster and more effective activity and is often self-help in an indirect form,
- hiding and undervaluing facts and phenomena means a worsening of the whole process of solution,
- on the other hand, transparence will only help the process of solution.

The discussion on the paper by Gabriel Kopecký follows after the contribution of Jozef Marguš

Jozef Marguš

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC IN PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZARIONS

Since its origin in 1993, the Slovak Republic has supported peace initiatives of the United Nations and other international organizations. The participation of the Slovak Republic and members of our army in international activities, which aim to prevent conflicts, contribute to moderating their escalation or to solving them, is an important part of the foreign and security policy of the Slovak Republic.

At present 54 members of the Army of the Slovak Republic are working in six peace or observation missions of international organizations.

A) In missions
UNDOF – United Nations Disengagement Observer Forces

On the basis of resolution of the government of the Slovak Republic No. 606 from 19th August 1997, and resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic no.862 from 10th December 1997, 35 members of the Army of the Slovak Republic were assigned to the United Nations UNDOF peace keeping mission on the Golan Heights. The assignment of soldiers to the UNDOF mission was done in the framework of the project "Cooperation of the Central European countries in peace keeping operations" (CENCOOP), in which Slovakia actively cooperates with Austria, Slovenia, Hungary and Romania. The UNDOF mission on the **Golan Heights** is based on the resolution of the Security Council of the UN Security Council no.350 from 31st May 1974, after the conclusion of a force disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel. In harmony with the "Agreement between Syria and Israel on disengagement of forces", the peace keeping mission supervises the implementation and fulfillment of the agreement by observation, supervision and control regime in the zone of separation (the zone consists of territory extending from the junction of the frontiers of Syria, Israel and Lebanon in the north to the junction of the frontiers of Israel, Syria and Jordan in the south, its length is 70 km and its width 8 km), which was created by separating the armed forces of the two sides. **Thirty five members of the Army of the Slovak Republic** began to fulfill roles in the third company of the **Austrian Contingent on 26th May 1998.**

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Near East

Resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic no.1030 of 1st July 1998, authorized the sending of 2 military observers to the UNTSO peace mission in the **Near East.** The sending of observers from the Army of the Slovak Republic was done on the basis of the project "Cooperation of the Central European Countries in peace keeping operations (CENCOOP). At present, 80 military observers from 19 countries of the world work in the mission. The military observers are placed in 11 observation posts, located in the zone of separation between the two front lines. They monitor observance of the cease fire, inspection of the number of soldiers, equipment, weapons and other important aspects in the area of the Suez Canal and Golan Heights. To fulfill its roles in the area of the Egyptian – Israeli sector on the Sinai Peninsula, in Beirut and in **Damascus**, UNTSO cooperates with the UNDOF mission, which is concerned with the Israeli – Syrian sector on the Golan Heights, and with UNIFIL in the Israeli – Lebanese sector. **Two members of the Army of the Slovak Republic** have fulfilled roles in the mission since **22nd August 1998.**

MONUA – United Nations Observer Mission in Angola

The observer mission MONUA in Angola continued after the completion of the mandate of the UNAVEM III mission in July 1997, with a new mandate from the UN Security Council, and activity expected to continue until February 1998. The Mission MONUA took over all the units and activities in Angola from the concluding mission UNAVEM III. Its main role remains monitoring the fulfillment of the military aspects of the peace process, **including demobilization, in accordance with Lusaka Protocol from 1994. From 1st March 1998, the number of representatives of the Slovak Republic in the mission was reduced from 5 to 3 military observers from the Army of the Slovak Republic.**

An Observer Mission for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The center for conflict prevention of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) asked the Slovak Republic to send a military observer to the international staff of the OSCE observer mission in the **Moldavian Republic**. The National Council authorized the sending of a military observer from the Army of the Slovak Republic, by resolution no.1030 on 1st July 1998. The mission was established by a decision of the Council of High Plenipotentiaries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on 4th February 1993. The aim of the mission is to settle the armed conflict, which

arose as a result of the declaration of Transdniestria on part of the territory of the Moldavian Republic. The main tasks of the observers of the mission **include monitoring the process of reduction and withdrawal of the armed forces of the Russian Federation from Moldavia. The military observer from the Army of the Slovak Republic began to fulfill his task in the mission on 13th March 1998.**

The European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM)

The European Community Monitoring Mission in former Yugoslavia began its activity in July 1991 with the participation of 15 countries, including a delegation from former Czechoslovakia. The government of the Slovak Republic, by resolution no.45 from 19th January 1993 and the National Council of the Slovak Republic by resolution no.74 from 18th March 1993, expressed agreement with the participation of the Slovak Republic in the ECMM mission **on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Since 1st January 1993**, a delegation from Slovakia has consisted of a civilian part, formed by employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic and a military part composed of **5 members of the Army of the Slovak Republic.** The basic aim of the ECMM mission is **to support the peaceful solution of the conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia, monitoring the observance of human rights and international legal norms.**

Stabilization Forces – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

In harmony with the Peace Agreement on **Bosnia-Herzegovina**, signed at Dayton on 21st November 1995, and on the basis of a UN mandate, the resulting monitoring and implementation tasks were entrusted to the NATO-IFOR peace keeping force. On 20th December 1996, operation "Joint Guard", performed by the NATO SFOR stabilization, began on the basis of resolution of the UN Security Council no.1088 from 12.12.1996. Its aim was to stabilize the results achieved in implementation of the peace agreement in the military area, and to gradually implement tasks in the civilian area, with the help of other international organizations. Apart from the 16 member countries of NATO, the 20 countries associated in the program Partnership for Peace, participated in the SFOR operation. In June 1998, the third stage of the SFOR NATO operation ("Joint Forge") was started, with the aim of fully developing the civilian dimension of the peace process, to create conditions for the civil administration to take responsibility for stabilizing the situation, to restructure and reduce the number of soldiers in SFOR. On the basis of resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic no.863 from 10th December 1997, and with the agreement of the NATO command, from 26th August **eight officers of the Army of the Slovak Republic began to perform tasks in command organs of the**

mission in Tuzla, Gradačac and Sarajevo, in the sections of civilian – military relations, engineering services, health care provision and logistic support for the SFOR operations.

B) Prepared activities

In connection with the prepared more extensive transfer of part of SFOR and the planned end of the UNTAES mission at the end of 1997, the military organs of NATO announced the possibility of the participation of the Slovak Republic by sending engineering units of the Army of the Slovak republic and specialists for civilian-military relations to the SFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the basis of this offer, 8 officers, who were mentioned above, were assigned to the command structures of SFOR. The engineering unit, with a strength of up to 150 persons, is intended to perform engineering and mine clearance work. It can perform tasks in the construction of housing, and the construction, maintenance and repair of roads and air ports. The proposal to send engineering units to the NATO stabilization forces was already processed by the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, and in next few days will be available for discussion by the government, National Council of the Slovak Republic and command structures of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Another prepared activity of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic is a proposal to increase our participation in the UNDOF peace mission on the Golan Heights. In the framework of discussions between representatives of Austria and Slovakia, an increase in the participation of the Army of the Slovak Republic in the UNDOF peace mission from a platoon to a company was proposed. The planned date for beginning the fulfillment of the tasks of the Slovak unit with the new number of 93 persons is May 1999.

In October 1998, as a result of the worsening of the conflict in Kosovo, the secretariat of the OSCE asked the member states to send verifiers to the Kosovo verification mission. After the approval of legislative documents, five members of the Slovak Army should begin to fulfill tasks in the mission on 21st December 1998.

On the initiative of Austria, Slovakia joined Austria, Slovenia, Hungary and Romania in the project Central European Nations Cooperation (CENCOOP), aimed at closer cooperation between these states in the area of the preparation and participation of members and units of armed forces in peace keeping operations.

The conception of Central European cooperation assumes regional cooperation, following the example of the initiative of the Nordic states, in creating a flexible cooperation mechanism, and on the basis of it creating a **joint brigade of peace keeping forces** on the principle of so-called modules to support the activities of the UN and other international organizations.

The aim of the Central European Nations Cooperation is an effort to impro-

ve the abilities of these countries, so that they can more effectively react to the demands of operations in support of peace and achieve better results with the help of regional cooperation. This will involve not only the creation of a brigade, but also of a cooperation mechanism, involving meetings of ministers of defense, a directing committee and working groups for multi-national operations and civilian – military cooperation, training, logistics, communication and information systems, humanitarian questions and air security.

Safe and rapid mastering of conflict situations is usually conditioned especially by military, political, economic and time factors. In the form of the CENCOOP brigade, international organizations, such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, will receive an effective instrument, means or unit, which will be professionally prepared to react flexibly to requirements, within short deadlines, after the appropriate legislative requirement (UN mandate) has been issued.

The cooperation of the Slovak republic in building the CENCOOP project is in its initial phase. When constructed, this system will certainly contribute to the creation of such relations and mechanisms, which will lead to adequate and required measures for the prevention, or reduction of the possible political, economic or other results of a crisis or conflict, as a result of the ability to react in a short time.

To achieve this, the Slovak Republic has also joined the CENCOOP project.

Review of Assignment of members of the Army of the Slovak Republic to peace missions of the UN and other international organizations

UNDOF
United Nations Disengagement
Observer Forces
From: 26th May 1998
Number of persons: 35

UNTSO
United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization
From: 22nd August 1998
Number of persons: 2

MONUA
United Nations Observer Mission in
Angola
From: 1st January 1993
Number of persons: 2

OSCE
OSCE Mission to Moldova
From: 26th May 1998

Number of persons: 1

ECMM
European Community Monitoring
Mission
From: 1st January 1993
Number of persons: 5

SFOR – NATO
Stabilization Forces
From: 26th August 1998
Number of persons: 8

(THE OVERALL SYSTEM SECURING THE DEFENSE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIK. THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY)

on the paper by Gabriel Kopecký

(CRISIS MANAGEMENT)

and on the paper by Jozef Marguš

(THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC IN PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZARIONS)

Ján Buzalka: I have a question about Mr. Kopecký's and a comment on Mr. Černák's paper. The question for Mr. Kopecký concerns his understanding of the terms "crisis" and "crisis situation". Is it possible to consider them synonymous, or is it necessary to understand a difference between these terms? To me personally "crisis situation" appears to mean a more stabilized state, while "crisis" means a certain development. Mr. Černák's paper included a diagram of the development of a crisis: source, expression, situation etc. It is a matter of causal dependence, that is event and situation. Is it possible to regard these phenomena as crisis situations and place them equally after each other? You used terms such as "extraordinary event", "accident" and "crisis situation". For me, a certain causality flows from them. The comment on Mr. Černák's paper concerns an integrated protection system. I understand this as a supra- departmental system, that is not only something applied in the Ministry of the Interior, but also discussed on the highest legislative level.

Gabriel Kopecký: I consider a crisis to be closely defined in time, and the first moment of the whole process. Try to imagine not the progression from the moment we called a crisis, but precisely the moment of conflict, in which the problem was unleashed. That is a crisis. I call the progression from this moment, the growth of the conflict, a crisis situation. Various definitions of crisis are available. The Oxford Dictionary defines it roughly as the moment when a conflict appears between the situation in which we normally live and which we do not want. Therefore, a crisis is anything, which goes beyond ordinary life, which we are not able to accept. An unacceptable situation suddenly explodes, a crisis occurs, and the result of the explosion is the crisis situation.

Ján Černák: When I spoke about an integrated protection system, as it is understood in the prepared act, I also had in mind a supra-departmental or inter-departmental system. An integrated protection system also contains many other elements, not only those which come under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. However, the Ministry of the Interior is the coordinator and basis for the functioning of an integrated security system. But in the event of large-scale accidents, an integrated protection system must also use the army. According to the letter or understanding of the law, normal situations in time of peace, when it is necessary to save human lives as a result of natural disasters, and not only of great catastrophes, threatening, let us say, half of Slovakia.

Zoltán Papp: I will attempt to present as briefly as possible, a review of Hungarian crisis management. A month ago, we had the possibility to test our model on the greatest flood catastrophe of the last hundred years in the basin of the River Tisza. As you know, the disaster happened as a result as a result of climatic fluctuations in north- western Romania and the Sub-Carpathian region. Government provided crisis management forces controlled this situation, basically, with appropriate use of material and human resources. Everyday cooperation with the appropriate crisis management forces in Slovakia and Ukraine was very effective. This was enabled by government agreements about cooperation and mutual aid during catastrophes, signed by the governments of Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine. Hungary has concluded similar agreements with Slovenia, Croatia and Austria. These agreements enable protection forces to cross state frontiers without observing the usual visa, customs, residence and other formalities. From 3rd November 1998, Ukraine is obliged by treaty to inform the Hungarian defense and administrative units, frontier forces, civil defense units, river protection units, local government, charitable organizations and Churches about crisis situations. The Ukrainians fulfilled the treaty in an exemplary way and informed the Hungarian side every four hours. We experienced the same correctness from the side of our Slovak partners. Throughout the crisis, we were in constant contact with the offices of local administration and with the government authorities. We were constantly consulting, for example, about the problem of housing Ukrainian refugees from the natural catastrophe, the questions of the preparation of experts on the state of the rivers, the transfer of engineering equipment, maximal easing of the crossing of frontiers for the afflicted, meetings between representatives of local government on the frontier, commanders of frontier forces, and the question of supplies to the population. For example, the Hungarian government provided immediate financial resources of over 100 million forints (about half a million American dollars). All this was only possible thanks to the principle of inter-state agreement, which, in a crisis situation, completely eliminated the extraordinarily restricting factors of slow diplomacy. Thus, aid to Ukrainian areas affected by floods reached the places for which it was intended within 16-18 hours. When I sum-

marize this example of management of a crisis situation, I can only emphasize that extraordinary success was achieved mainly thanks to harmonization of interests. It was a typical example of the fact that crisis situations of this type can be solved, first of all, by direct cooperation, with temporary removal of all bureaucratic obstacles. We also have other examples of well functioning cooperation with neighbors during catastrophes, in the case of cooperation with Slovenia and Croatia, where there was a gas explosion in southwest Hungary. In that case, coordination of various levels of the state and local authorities, in the provision of information, was especially demonstrated.

Ján Černák: I will only supplement the words of our Hungarian colleague. I do not have specific data about the level of aid to Ukraine, but I want to state that on 10th November 1998, the contact place on the level of civil defense in the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic received a fax from Brussels, and immediately on the next day, our minister of foreign affairs verbally informed the government about the situation. At the same time, I called representatives of six departments, and we jointly solved the possibility of providing help to the afflicted areas. But on the next day, we received information by fax, giving specific data on the aid from Hungary. If I remember correctly, imposing figures appeared there: for example 10 tons of food, 25,000 pairs of shoes etc. But there was data that the Slovak Republic provided 300 kilograms of food and 25 pairs of shoes. This very much surprised us, and we found out the origin of this distorted information. It turned out that the authorities in Kiev had stated the Slovak aid erroneously. It only reflected the first aid from one humanitarian society in Banská Bystrica, which sent a lorry to the Vyšné Nemecké frontier crossing immediately after a natural catastrophe was announced. This was recorded as the complete aid from Slovakia. Thus it appeared that the Slovak Republic was completely indifferent to the disaster in Ukraine.

Matúš Štefanovič: I want to ask Mr. Marguš: Does the statute of the observer missions, for example, in Angola, former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere mean that it is really only possible to observe the given situation, for example, of military conflict, or to settle it? Or can missions also go beyond this boundary? Does this mean it is also possible to direct, to intervene, to cooperate authoritatively with local organs of power, for example with the police or legal authorities?

Jozef Marguš: In every case, the participation of members of the UN in peace keeping operations or observation missions happens on the basis of a UN mandate, which establishes the rules of activity. This is the deciding legal basis, which represents the legislative authorization and description of the work of the observers - military in UN missions, or civilian in OSCE missions. Ob-

servers are usually unarmed, and their main activity is to monitor, observe and submit information. However, this always requires cooperation with local military authorities and the police. But their activity should intervene in the tasks of the appropriate state authority, so they should avoid any of the activities you mentioned.

LIST OF DISCUSSION PARTICIPANTS

Bienek, Slavomír (Section of International Security, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, Poland)

Buzalka, Ján (Police Academy, Bratislava, Slovak Republic)

Černák, Ján (Department of Crisis Management, Section of Defense and Security, Office of the Government, Bratislava, Slovak Republic)

Domanovský, Daniel (the daily Národná obroda, Slovak Republic)

Duleba, Alexander (Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava, Slovak Republic)

Encutescu, Sorin (Institute of Political Studies for Defense and Military History, Bucharest, Romania)

Ermakov, Sergej (Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow, Russian Federation)

Hoy, Matthias (Institute for Strategic Research, Vienna, Austria)

Kopecký, Gabriel (Department of Strategic Planning, Section of Defense Policy and Development, Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic)

Kuča, Jaroslav (Center for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava)

Lebedev, Alexander (Center for Military and Strategic Research of the General Staff of the Russian Army, Moscow, Russian Federation)

Marguš Jozef (Department of International Security , Section of International Relations, Ministry of Defense, Bratislava, Slovak Republic)

Matějka, Zdeněk (Foreign Office, advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prague, Czech Republic)

Nagy, Laszló (Department of Security Studies, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, Budapest, Hungary)

Nečej, Elemír (Center for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defense, Bratislava, Slovak Republic)

Papp, Zoltán (Section of Defense, Office of the Government, Budapest, Hungary)

Pivarči, Jozef (State secretary, Ministry of Defense, Slovak Republic)

Royen, Christoph (SWP – Research Institute for International Policy and Security, Ebenhausen, Germany)

Sládeček, Anton (Minstry of Defense, Bratislava, Slovak Republic)

Strážay, Tomáš (Slovak Foreign Policy Association)

Šimlovič, Peter (Center for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defense, Bratislava, Slovak Republic)

Šimuny, Jozef (General Staff of the Army of the Slovak Republic, Trenčín, Slovak Republic)

Štefanovič, Matúš (student of the Institute of the Political Science, Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovak Republic)

Tarasovič, Vladimír (Center for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defense, Bratislava, Slovak Republic)

Zálešák, Tomáš (Institute for Public Affairs – IVO, Bratislava, Slovakia)

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