

The Declaration below has been endorsed by Madeleine K. Albright, Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank C. Carlucci, Warren Christopher, William S. Cohen, Robert Dole, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Stuart E. Eizenstat, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Lee H. Hamilton, John J. Hamre, Carla A. Hills, Sam Nunn, Paul H. O'Neill, Charles S. Robb, William V. Roth, Jr., and James R. Schlesinger.

JOINT DECLARATION

Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership

ONCE AGAIN WE HAVE ENTERED A DEFINING MOMENT in the history of America's relations with Europe. Once again we are engaged in a major debate that is said to be separating us from each other, Americans and Europeans. Once again we are debating the relevance of our alliance and the significance of our ties. There have been many other such debates in the past. But with the Cold War a full decade behind, and with many dangerous years of an unpredictable war against terrorism looming ahead, the transatlantic connection has rarely seemed to be at the same time so uncertain and so important.

Postwar visions emerge slowly and are never followed gracefully. After 1945, neither Americans nor Europeans easily agreed, among themselves or with each other, on the agenda that confronted them. The bold ideas that shaped America's leadership for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of post-conflict Europe were dismissed as naïve, and even dangerous: Rebuild and rearm Germany? Stay in and unite Europe? More than five decades later, even as other bold ideas are being debated for the management of a wide range of new security threats, the vision that shaped the development of transatlantic and intra-European relations must still be completed.

Our concerns are stated with some urgency. For now, there seems to be a view among many in the United States and in a number of countries in Europe that "maybe" we no longer need the partnership after all. The conditions that have allowed this sentiment to emerge and grow must be addressed and overcome. In short, whatever ground there may be for exasperation on both sides of the Atlantic, no disagreement should be allowed to disrupt our relations with our European allies. Even as the fighting in Iraq winds down in the absence of the allies' full consensus, serious efforts should be made by all parties to renew, rehabilitate, and rebuild our alliance with the countries of Europe and their union. Such efforts will be facilitated by using a more moderate tone when addressing some of our like-minded, even if difficult, allies and friends.

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THE INFAMOUS EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, have created many new realities and alerted us to many pressing dangers. But they have not changed our central aspiration in Europe. A whole and free Europe—more united, larger, and stronger—was a central U.S. objective after the Cold War, and so it remains after September 11. Now as before, the United States and the countries of Europe are bound together in an expanding community of compatible interests and consistent values. Now more than before, our *common challenge* is to form a community of action whenever these interests and values are deemed to be at risk.

The U.S. interest in a united Europe has been a corollary of U.S. interests in Europe. A whole Europe can gain enough weight to form a strategic partnership whereby each side of the Atlantic can be the counterpart of the other in addressing interests—whether security, economic, or political in nature—that are shared even when they are not identical. Especially when pursuing the crucial nonmilitary dimensions of the global war against terrorism, or when attempting to defuse its sources and end its practice, there is little that cannot be done more effectively and more expeditiously when both the United States and its European allies are in agreement and act in harmony.

A central dimension of the transatlantic partnership is a stable Europe in a cohesive and dynamic European Union (EU). Nothing the United States does or says should be misunderstood or misinterpreted as a reappraisal of the continued U.S. commitment to a uniting and stronger Europe. The Europe that had been the center of two world wars during the first half of the century changed after 1945 when U.S. policymakers made the creation of a whole Europe central to U.S. policy for the balance of the century.

There is also an urgent need for Europeans to do more to reassure Americans that the union they are completing will continue to make the United States feel welcome in Europe. Too much of what is achieved in the EU context is presented by some Europeans as Europe's new ability to challenge the United States. Rather, more should be done to reinforce the perception that the "finality" of Europe is being developed in cooperation with the United States. At

the ongoing European Convention and at the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference, for appropriate issues and at appropriate levels, U.S. representatives should have the opportunity to observe proceedings and debates—not to participate and to influence, but to hear and to be influenced by their peers' debates. In turn, the United States should continue to elevate its political relations with the EU to a level comparable to that achieved in its bilateral relations with individual EU countries. To that end, for example, both houses of the U.S. Congress should increase their contacts with the European Parliament at all levels, including members and their relevant staffs.

The issue is not one of U.S. membership in the European Union or any of its distinctive institutional bodies, but one of association, dialogue, and cooperation before decisions are reached. At some point over the next five years, a mechanism should be adopted that allows more direct consultation between the United States and the institutional bodies of the EU. The current format of U.S.-EU summit meetings does not satisfy that need. Europe should leave no doubt about its intention to build with its partner across the Atlantic the same intimacy that the United States built with the states of Europe within NATO.

THE CENTRAL PILLAR OF OUR PARTNERSHIP with Europe—its countries and their union—remains an Atlantic Alliance that is firmly centered on a strong and cohesive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Now as before, NATO members remain America's allies of choice, even when the organization itself cannot or need not be the primary institution for attending to the initial phases of the security missions that have grown out of the events of September 11. In the Balkans and now in Afghanistan, NATO has already proven its value in operations beyond the traditional "NATO area." Reconfiguring its structure and capabilities so that it can better serve in that role when its members see the need is a major task. In this context, we applaud the far-ranging transformations that were adopted at the recent NATO Prague summit as part of a U.S.-driven agenda readily endorsed by all other NATO members and applicants.

These transformations will give an enlarged organization the new capabilities and flexible structures needed to gain the global reach it needs, past the Cold War and into a new post-9/11 world. The broad timetable developed for their implementation should be respected.

The issue of capabilities is especially significant. Growing gaps between U.S. and European military capabilities are making transatlantic defense cooperation and interoperability more difficult. Admittedly, how much the European allies spend on defense, and how, is not an issue that can be decided by the United States, however concerned the U.S. government may be with current levels of EU defense spending. Yet, it should be recognized that continuation of the prevailing trends will have adverse political consequences within the alliance. To that end, cooperation within the EU, and between all EU members, can help achieve better value for the funding. So can, too, additional transatlantic cooperation aimed at strengthening the ability to share technologies, including reform of export control systems on all sides. But added cooperation alone will not suffice without added money. European members of NATO and the member states of the EU should agree on minimum levels of real annual growth in defense spending they themselves deem necessary and realistic.

While consideration of a “realignment” of U.S. forces stationed in Europe is in order, as part of a global reconfiguration of forward-deployed units and related military installations, such a decision must not be misunderstood either as a punitive measure or as a loss of commitment. Indeed, it should follow only after thorough consultation with all NATO countries and in the context of a postwar U.S. commitment to a larger, more cohesive, and more relevant NATO with a strategic vision that is shared by all its members.

Divisions resulting from the war in Iraq should not be allowed to stand in the way of this agenda. In coming years, NATO’s role during and beyond the war against terrorism needs to increase further. In a sense, that was a mission envisioned for the Alliance and its organization at the time of their creation—aimed not only at overcoming an

emerging Soviet military and political threat, but also at preventing the resurgence of the many conflicts that had previously conditioned the rise of instabilities throughout the continent.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATO and advances within the EU, as well as the processes that are shaping both of these institutions for the twenty-first century, are naturally complementary. Suspicions that one might stand in the way of the other as an adversarial counterweight, and complaints that one lags behind the other as an economic or military free rider, should be put to rest. Neither NATO nor the EU is a full-service institution; neither is sufficient because both are necessary—to win a war, end a war, and deal with the aftermath. For the latter, the EU can provide stability tools that complement well the NATO security toolbox. In short, while it may not be possible for us to take on everything together, it is imperative to make sure that taken together we do everything.

In the context of soft security issues, whose resolution would help avoid the rise of further hard security dilemmas, we urge that the Doha Round of trade negotiations, which was launched in October 2001, be pursued with the utmost sense of urgency so that it can be successfully completed at the earliest possible time. Failure of these negotiations would seriously threaten the global trade system at a delicate time for many of the national and regional economies that comprise it. It would also significantly hamper our ability to wage successfully the ongoing wars against terrorism and its core roots. Admittedly, it may prove difficult to conclude these negotiations by January 1, 2005, however desirable such a timetable might be. But, at the very least, on the way to completing the Doha round, other existing divisive trade issues between the United States and the EU should be resolved by that time.

THE PROCESS OF TRANSATLANTIC POLICY cooperation we are envisioning should become more feasible after the European Convention on the Future of Europe determines how best to allocate

authority between a high authority responsible to the European Council and a commissioner or series of commissioners responsible to the European Commission. Meanwhile in this and other relevant areas, members of the U.S. executive branch could be associated on appropriate issues with the work of separate European Councils. The goal of such coordination would be to produce a first draft of allied policies for impending crises, including allocation of responsibilities before a crisis has actually exploded. Plans for a postwar reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq should be pursued in consultation and cooperation with Europe.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is a major security issue that we share on both sides of the Atlantic. With the end of major combat operations in Iraq, the quartet made up of the United States and the EU, as well as Russia and the UN, should relaunch the peace process outlined by President Bush in June 2002. Key to the success of the president's vision, reasserted on February 27, 2003, are those measures that will not only assure Israel's security but also define the kind of state Palestinians can look toward at the close of the timetable already defined by the president.

The case for complementarity begins with a better sense of what each ally can accomplish, and a better appreciation of the reasons that prompt its actions. There will be instances when a good American (or European) idea, especially about security, will not seem equally good for those in Europe (or in the United States) who will be asked to live with its consequences irrespective of their preferences. Nevertheless, across the Atlantic no less than within Europe, the logic of unity transcends the logic of cleavage.

In this context, the rise of anti-American sentiments in Europe is legitimate cause for concern. Unfortunately, the use of such sentiments as a political tactic, at home or within the EU, has been reciprocated in the United States with an occasional use of comparable anti-European and anti-EU rhetoric. Those temptations should be resisted by political leaders on both sides, even in the face of popular sentiments, inflamed by media that are often more negative toward the transatlantic partner than are the policymakers.

In short, Europe's anti-Americanism hurts because those who share it undermine, or at the very least complicate, the U.S. ability to spread and defend the very values and interests that are now shared, however unevenly, by most Americans and Europeans alike. In turn, anti-Europeanism in the United States raises additional obstacles to European leaders who are struggling to pursue a demanding EU agenda in the transatlantic context within which Europe's unification should take place.

As has often been the case before, for both sides of the Atlantic there is a need for a less personal and more cooperative rhetoric. But following the war in Iraq, more than ever before, such moderation will be imperative during a get-reacquainted period when Americans should hear Europe's lingering criticism of pre-war debates and decisions with some indulgence, while Europeans should appraise U.S. military and diplomatic actions with some tolerance—more, at any rate, than has been shown on either side of the Atlantic of late.

WE HAVE ESTABLISHED THIS GROUP because of our concerns that current trends on both sides of the Atlantic may jeopardize the achievements to which all of us, and many more, committed much of our public lives. Divisions between the United States and the states of Europe, as well as among them, are serious because the issues that are being addressed are serious, indeed existential. These divisions are placing our solidarity in jeopardy at a time when unity is essential. Most of the main issues in the twenty-first century will be global in nature, and U.S. leadership in addressing them will not suffice if there is not adequate understanding and support from our European allies. In short, because neither the United States nor Europe is omnipotent, both will need help in ensuring their own physical and economic security, let alone threats beyond their respective borders. That help is most logically sought from the nations with which we have most in common. Accordingly, whatever the merits of our respective positions, it is incumbent upon us all to make of the renewal of the transatlantic partnership an urgent priority.