Editors: Nadiia Bureiko, PhD, Mariia Koval, Hennadiy Maksak, Hanna Shelest, PhD


This analytical study represents a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the Ukrainian foreign policy in 2018. Forty nine directions were analysed – from cooperation with key partners and international organizations to public diplomacy. Five evaluation criteria – indicators, based on the new model of research methodology, were applied. The experts have studied and assessed activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Parliament) and other institutions, involved into the development and implementation of the foreign policy of Ukraine. This book is the fourth annual study. Previous years’ analysis can be found at http://prismua.org

The reference to the author and the analytical study are obligatory in the cases of complete or partial use of its materials.

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## Content

**Introduction** .................................................................................................................................... 5

**Methodology of Research** ............................................................................................................... 6

**Foreign Policy of Ukraine in 2018** .............................................................................................. 14

1. **G -7 Countries** ............................................................................................................................ 29
   - United Kingdom ........................................................................................................................... 30
   - Italy ............................................................................................................................................. 35
   - Canada ......................................................................................................................................... 39
   - Germany ...................................................................................................................................... 43
   - USA ............................................................................................................................................ 46
   - France ......................................................................................................................................... 51
   - Japan .......................................................................................................................................... 56

2. **European Integration** .................................................................................................................. 60
   - European Union .......................................................................................................................... 61
     - Political dialogue ....................................................................................................................... 62
     - Economic cooperation ............................................................................................................. 64
   - Eastern Partnership .................................................................................................................... 67
   - European Energy Community .................................................................................................. 70

3. **Euro-Atlantic integration** ............................................................................................................. 74

4. **Bilateral relations** .......................................................................................................................... 79
   - Belarus ....................................................................................................................................... 80
   - Georgia ....................................................................................................................................... 84
   - Israel .......................................................................................................................................... 88
   - Iran ............................................................................................................................................ 92
   - China ......................................................................................................................................... 95
   - Lithuania ................................................................................................................................... 98
   - Moldova ..................................................................................................................................... 101
   - Poland ....................................................................................................................................... 104
   - Romania ..................................................................................................................................... 108
   - Slovakia ...................................................................................................................................... 112
   - Turkey ....................................................................................................................................... 116
   - Hungary ...................................................................................................................................... 120
   - Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 124
     - Political relations .................................................................................................................... 125
     - Economic relations ................................................................................................................ 127
     - Energy relations ..................................................................................................................... 130
Dear friends,

We would like to present Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2018, our annual report with experts’ views on development and implementation of Ukraine’s foreign policy in 49 directions.

For four consecutive years, we have been preparing the report based on clear measurable indicators. Firstly, this allows us to trace dynamics of the foreign policy activities of the Ukrainian authorities by vectors. Secondly, this enables a comparison between different directions of foreign policy to see improvement or barriers to progress.

The unique feature of this analysis is its comprehensive approach to analysing activities of all actors, not just the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its research of all regions in the world, which no other publication offers. This annual report looks at the political interests of the key Ukrainian players in individual areas of foreign policy, available mechanisms of coordination and strategic vision, as well as at the practical work and achieved results. This analysis can become a basis for the White Book on foreign policy as a background for conceptual documents.

This year, the methodology we developed in 2015 and improved annually, no longer required corrections. This signalled that, as we aspired to an improved and all-encompassing approach, we have found one that best serves the analytical design.

Ukraine’s overall grade of success and implementation of its foreign policy did not change in 2018 compared to 2017. It is fair to say that this grade is quite high and Ukraine’s authorities have succeeded in keeping up the pace of diplomatic work to match the established cooperation priorities. The Activities indicator ranked the best compared to others.

Further intensification of activities on the foreign policy arena with no strategic vision or proper interinstitutional synergy can lead to stagnation or decline in results and efficiency of the work. This annual report thus provides good food for thought. More importantly, it offers answers to the current dilemmas in shaping and implementing Ukraine’s foreign policy, in addition to outlining the problems.

On behalf of the team, we would like to thank our partners in this project – Regional Office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine. Its support allows us regularly preparing such analytical products, which hopefully have a real impact on decision making in Ukraine’s foreign policy.

I hope that each of you will find the Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2018 report, put together by our big team of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and the best experts from our partner institutions, as useful. Our special gratitude is for our diplomatic consultants.

Hennadiy Maksak,
Head of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”
METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH
In the course of its own methodology development, the working group of the “Ukrainian Prism” carefully studied the experience of evaluation of the foreign policy of separate countries and international institutions done by other foreign analytical centres. A special attention was paid to the projects of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and the Czech Association for International Affairs (Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky, AMO), which reflect either peculiarities of particular member states in the EU foreign policy (ECFR) or internal aspects of the Czech Republic governing (AMO). None of these methodologies is multi-purposed, and their principles directly depend on the peculiarities of the object under research. That is why after the methodological consultations with the ECFR experts, the working group of the “Ukrainian Prism” decided to develop their own methodology, taking into account Ukrainian conditions and some elements of the existing methodologies of the Western colleagues.

This research methodology of Ukraine’s foreign policy takes into account current foreign policy situation, disadvantages and advantages of the constitutional division of powers in terms of foreign policy implementation, established political and institutional practices in the field of international relations, documents of strategic and operational nature in the sphere of foreign policy and security of Ukraine, official analytical materials that form the basis for a foreign policy position of high-ranking officials, official reports, as well as priorities reflected in relevant mass media materials.

The present research covers the year 2018 in the sections on political interest, institutional cooperation, activities, and results of each direction. Evaluation of the strategic vision is based on a whole range of respected documents that were relevant on the day of evaluation. Moreover, there is a comparison of each direction with the results of 2017.

**Foreign policy directions of Ukraine**

For the evaluation of the foreign policy of Ukraine in 2018, 49 directions were selected and divided into the following thematic blocks:

- Relations with the G-7 states (United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Germany, USA, France, Japan);
- European integration (cooperation with the EU in economic and political spheres, the Eastern Partnership, the European Energy Community);
- Euroatlantic integration;
- Bilateral relations (Belarus, Georgia, Israel, Iran, China, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, the Russian Federation [policy, economy, energy], Romania, Slovakia, Turkey, Hungary);
- Regional cooperation (Asia-Pacific Region, Middle East, Western Balkans, Baltic States, Visegrad Four, Northern Europe, South Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Black Sea Region);
• International organizations (OSCE, the UN, Council of Europe);
• Multilateral initiatives (international security, nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, climate change);
• Build-up of the international support on countering Russian aggression;
• Economic diplomacy;
• Public diplomacy;
• Ukrainians abroad.

Evaluation indicators of Ukraine’s foreign policy in particular directions:

Given the above, five assessment indicators for foreign policy implementation in each of these directions were developed:

1. Political interest or engagement of political actors in particular directions of the foreign policy.
2. Effectiveness of cooperation and coordination among Ukrainian institutions in the sphere of foreign policy.
3. Strategic vision of a particular direction implementation.
4. Specific activities regarding a particular direction during the evaluated year.
5. Results and achievements regarding a particular direction during the evaluated year.

Each of the five key indicators shall be assessed using a five-point system, where 1 point is the minimum score and 5 points is the highest possible score. Each point in the assessment of a relevant direction by a specific indicator is linked to the presence or absence of a certain condition, which can be fixed. The regulatory and evidence base, required to calculate a score, was set for each indicator.

1. Political Interest / Engagement

The basis for analysis: Programs of the political parties represented in the Verkhovna Rada, parliamentary parties’ election programs if elections happen in the evaluated year, parliamentary fractions’ statements, statements of political parties’ leaders, the Coalition Agreement, the Analytical Report to the President’s Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, statements of the head of the government, interviews of the heads of parliamentary parties, chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada,
the President of Ukraine, election programs of presidential candidates if elections happen in the evaluated year, the Agenda of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as existing parliamentary hearings according to the topic, hearings in the respective parliamentary committees.

Points:

1 point – lack of references to a foreign policy direction in official or unofficial statements, policy documents, and manifestos of the main political actors;

2 points – existence of an informal declarative reference to a foreign policy direction that has not acquired the form of a political position, interviews, blogs, or articles in the media on the respective topics;

3 points – there are official statements regarding events or certain aspects of activity regarding the direction under research among some political parties, mentioning in the Presidential Annual Address;

4 points – there are official positions of various political entities represented in the higher authorities, but they are not mutually agreed upon, inclusion to the Agenda of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs or other respective committees according to the topic, organization of the parliamentary hearings and round tables;

5 points – existence of a political consensus on Ukraine’s activity in a chosen foreign policy direction, joint official policy statements (e.g. statements of the majority, inter-fraction statements, statements of the parliamentary delegations to the parliamentary assemblies of international organizations, decisions and letters of the Verkhovna Rada), organization of parliamentary hearings.

2. Institutional Cooperation

The basis for the analysis: Statements and resolutions of the chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, heads of parliamentary committees, parliamentary fractions’ leaders, decisions of the President of Ukraine, the NSDC of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, and other ministries in case of involvement in the realization of a certain direction, press releases on the results of development or realization of joint initiatives.

Points:

1 point – there are documented facts on confrontation of some institutions with others in policy development or conflicts between Ukrainian institutions or different branches of power in the implementation of a particular direction of foreign policy, failure of coordinating bodies’ activities;
2 points – a lack of cooperation and coordination among certain bodies involved in the implementation of a particular direction of the foreign policy, but without any competition or conflicts;

3 points – individual facts of non-systemic cooperation, which are not based on agreed positions, coordinating documents, and are not covered by coordinating structures;

4 points – there are declared agreed positions of the foreign policy actors regarding activities in a particular direction, establishing of the special coordinating bodies, adoption of respective documents aimed at coordination of activities;

5 points – full coordination of relevant institutions’ activities, establishing of special coordinating bodies to implement foreign policy in a particular direction.

3. Strategic Vision


Points:

1 point – a complete absence of references to a relevant foreign policy direction in strategic documents, effective at the time of the research, as well as bilateral programs of cooperation;

2 points – there are references available, but they do not serve the foreign policy course of the state, or do not consider new conditions of the international environment;

3 points – references correspond to current interests and objectives, with which the Ukrainian foreign policy actors are tasked, but are formulated in general terms and listed with other priorities, in such a way that a relevant direction is not identified as a priority;

4 points – there are detailed bilateral (multilateral) medium-term documents, which are up-to-date or were updated during the research period;

5 points – there are references in general strategic documents, along with the presence of up-to-date bilateral (multilateral) medium-term documents, which are agreed upon and meet the current interests.
4. Activities

**The basis for the analysis:** Reports of the MFA of Ukraine or other ministries involved in the realization of the direction’s tasks, statements and press releases of the Administration of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, bilateral committees and working groups, information on activities of Ukraine’s diplomatic missions.

Points:

1 point – de facto absence of activities connected with the implementation of the relevant direction of the foreign policy, other forms of cooperation or official contacts;

2 points – individual non-systematic activities, which are not based on current strategic or operational documents for implementing a relevant direction of the foreign policy, maintaining dialogue exclusively through available diplomatic missions of Ukraine, absence of a Ukrainian ambassador in the respective country for more than half a year;

3 points – along with diplomatic, trade, and economic relations, there are multilateral meetings or meetings “on the sidelines”; a relevant direction of foreign policy is implemented in a reactive manner;

4 points – visits of the MFA leadership, the parliament chairperson, prime minister of Ukraine or foreign representatives to Ukraine; interdepartmental and other committees’ and working groups’ work according to bilateral (or multilateral) mid-term action plans and road maps, joint military exercises, cooperation at the interdepartmental level;

5 points – joint international initiatives, visits at the level of presidents and heads of the international organizations, signing of international agreements, chairmanship in international organizations or initiatives, organization of joint bilateral or multilateral fora.
5. Results

The basis for the analysis: International agreements and memoranda signed for a relevant direction of the foreign policy, information on activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Administration of the President of Ukraine, MFA of Ukraine, and other relevant ministries and institutions, statistics of trade and economic relations, information and analytical materials on meetings’ results, sittings, etc.

Points:

1 point – termination of diplomatic relations, withdrawal from an international organization, termination of cooperation in an initiative’s framework, open military aggression or official support of the aggressor; trade, energy wars against Ukraine;

2 points – reducing the level of a diplomatic mission or existing discriminatory policy in the field of trade, lack of significant joint projects on economic and energy, lack of dynamics in political dialogue;

3 points – slight positive dynamics at the level of political dialogue, economic contacts, cooperation at interdepartmental, non-governmental, and trans-border level; signing action plans for cooperation at interdepartmental level;

4 points – active political dialogue, partial support of Ukraine’s position, signing of bilateral and multilateral agreements, and implementation of decisions agreed upon during the previous visits at the top level;

5 points – full support of Ukraine’s position, increasing trade turnover, results’ correlation with available strategic, operational and program documents regarding the implementation of a relevant direction of the foreign policy; state and official visits of the President of Ukraine; existence of large-scale projects in economic, energy, or military sphere.
General scoring of a relevant direction of the foreign policy (direction’s rating)

After giving points for all the indicators, a direction’s general score will be identified by calculating an arithmetic mean value. The general score (rating) will be then reflected in the form of Latin letters (A, B, C, D, E) with arithmetic signs (+/-) depending on the obtained value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating score</th>
<th>Indicator value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A -</td>
<td>4,6-4,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B +</td>
<td>4,1-4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B -</td>
<td>3,6-3,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C +</td>
<td>3,1-3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C -</td>
<td>2,6-2,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D +</td>
<td>2,1-2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D -</td>
<td>1,6-1,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E +</td>
<td>1,1-1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall scoring of Ukraine’s foreign policy implementation during the year (overall rating of Ukraine’s foreign policy implementation for the relevant year)

Overall scoring of successful implementation will be calculated by obtaining an arithmetic mean value of the general scores in all the directions of foreign policy under the research. The overall rating will be calculated similarly to the assessment of relevant directions of foreign policy.
# FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE IN 2018

**B-**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political interest/engagement</td>
<td>4-</td>
<td>4-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional cooperation</td>
<td>4-</td>
<td>4-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic vision</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>4+</td>
<td>4+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>4-</td>
<td>4-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General score</td>
<td>B-</td>
<td>B-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political Interest / Engagement

The year 2018 was a rather intense year considering level of interest to the foreign policy issues expressed by Ukraine’s main political actors. Traditionally political interest was focused on countering the Russian aggression, relations with main partners and issues of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. It is possible to speak about a consistently high interest to foreign policy on behalf of the President of Ukraine, Government Office for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, and the Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, however, there is evidently lower involvement in foreign policy issues coming from Ukrainian MPs.

Taking into account the lack of a single strategy or concept of Ukraine’s foreign policy, the main guides to consider may be the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On the Internal and External Situation in Ukraine”, as well as statements made at the Ambassadorial meetings or meetings with the heads of the diplomatic missions and international organizations accredited in Ukraine. In 2018, all three events took place and thus provided a possibility to determine certain strategic priorities of the President Petro Poroshenko.

At the 13th Ukrainian Ambassadorial meeting that took place in August 2018, the President of Ukraine singled out the following priorities: keeping and enhancing the Transatlantic coalition to support Ukraine, countering Russian aggression, European and Euro-Atlantic integration as ways of guaranteeing Ukraine’s security and a value-based, economic diplomacy and actions to hold Russia legally accountable for its actions according to the international law. Moreover, the attention is traditionally drawn to the strategic nature of relations with the USA and special relations with Germany and France. Petro Poroshenko also emphasized the necessity of more active work with neighbouring countries (Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria), especially with those countries that Ukraine has some difficulties in bilateral relations (Hungary, Poland, and Moldova). These above-mentioned topics were pointed out at by the President of Ukraine during numerous international meetings and addresses.

A more detailed position regarding separate geographic or functional directions of the country’s foreign policy is traditionally presented in the analytical report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Parliament 2018, however, it is difficult to state how exactly the National Institute for Strategic Studies’ expert propositions correlate with the political position of P. Poroshenko.

Compared to the President, a position of the Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Groysman is not as expressive, however, in political statements and meetings the same priorities of Ukrainian interests on the foreign policy arena can be observed. In particular, a special focus was made on international solidarity to counter Russian aggression, European integration, development of international trade and new markets, using macro-financial assistance and humanitarian aid to restore the suffered territories and to implement reforms. As for the governmental level, the First Vice Prime Minister
of Ukraine S. Kubiv as well as Vice Prime Ministers I. Klympush-Tsintsadze and H. Zubko were the most active in articulating political interests.

The VRU also took an active part in forming the country’s foreign policy agenda. According to the analysis of relevant statements, addresses, and parliamentary public activities, the MPs paid more attention to the following issues: countering Russian aggression, human rights protection, energy security, preventing Russia’s involvement in Ukrainian elections as well as normalization of relations between Ukraine and Poland. Adopting in the first reading and with 331 votes a draft law on amendments to the Constitution regarding Ukraine’s strategic course on becoming a full-fledged EU and NATO member can be regarded as a sign of a common political interest.

The most active parliamentary advocates for the country’s foreign policy interests were the following: the Chairperson of the VRU A. Parubiy, First Deputy Chairperson of the VRU I. Gerashchenko, Deputy Chairperson of the VRU O. Syroyid, the head of the Parliamentary committee on foreign affairs H. Hopko as well as committee members V. Ariev, S. Zalishchuk, and B. Tarasyuk.

In 2018, some politicians already started their unofficial presidential and parliamentary campaigns. For instance, Y. Tymoshenko presented her programme “The New Course of Ukraine”, in which she reveals her vision of the country’s foreign policy line. In particular, it is suggested to change the negotiation format of “Normandy Four” to “Budapest Plus” including the USA, the United Kingdom and Russia as well as France, China, Germany and the EU. The following directions remain among the strategic priorities: NATO and EU membership as well as harsher sanctions against Russia. Even though other potential presidential candidates also voiced their ambitions, not many of them offered a program vision of their foreign policy agenda.

In general among the directions of the relevant research the highest political interest was demonstrated towards the Baltic countries, Canada, Germany, Poland, the USA, Turkey, EU, NATO and the Council of Europe. On the contrary, the least attention coming from the political actors was paid to Iran, energy relations with Russia, Latin America and Central Asia, climate change and international security issues (apart from the issues of the Russian aggression in Ukraine).

**The overall score for the political interest/engagement – «4 -»**

**Institutional Cooperation**

The coordination of efforts between Ukrainian institutions involved in forming and implementing the country’s foreign policy has its own features and established forms. Occasionally such interinstitutional initiatives do not get enough media coverage, which may create an impression of the lack of systematic work. Moreover, frequently there is ad hoc interinstitutional cooperation following certain events and not systematic work aiming to develop predictable and balanced foreign policy in a certain direction.
In 2018, the most systematic and resourceful event was the 13th Ukrainian Ambassadorial meeting (August 2018). For several days heads of the Ukrainian foreign missions abroad had an opportunity to discuss best practices and new instruments of diplomacy with representatives of other state and non-governmental institutions, to hear about new priorities and operational objectives in medium-term and long-term perspectives. In 2018, aside from traditional meetings at different levels and training, accompanied by the President Poroshenko Ukrainian diplomats spent the first day of the meeting in the East of Ukraine, in Avdiivka, where they had a chance to meet the leadership of the Joint Operational Command of the AFU, which provided a better understanding of the situation in order to further explain it abroad and thus to form the international support for Ukraine.

The direction of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration is traditionally complemented by a high level of coordination. The Government Office for the Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration as well as relevant structural departments in ministries and agencies provide for the necessary institutional background. As for the implementation of the Association Agreement, in order to optimize the interinstitutional coordination, the Roadmap for the implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU 2018-2019 containing a list of 57 draft laws that need to be adopted by the VRU with relevance to the AA chapters was approved. Even though the level of implementation improved in 2018 compared to 2017, including on the parliamentary level, it is still rather low.

Aiming to implement provisions of the Communication Strategy in European Integration for 2018-2021, a relevant Coordinating Council was created under the Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration with relevant NGOs participation.

In October, the Decree of the President of Ukraine No 298/2018 “On Annual National Programs under the auspices of Ukraine-NATO Commission” proposed a new proceedings for development and evaluation of the Annual National Programs aimed at better planning coming by different state bodies involved in the process of program’s implementation.

Measures taken to popularize abroad reforms held in Ukraine draw considerable attention of the government structures and the parliament. On June 27, 2018, the second international Ukraine Reform Conference was organized by the Ukrainian side together with European partners in Copenhagen (Denmark). It is worth mentioning that a numerous government delegation head by the Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Groysman prepared the conference and participated in it.

Another good example of interinstitutional cooperation was organization of the Forum of Regions of Ukraine and Belarus in October 2018 in the city of Gomel (Belarus) that was marked by active institutional cooperation between the MFA and other central and regional authorities. The official Ukrainian delegation at the forum was made up
of over 700 participants and included respective representatives of ministries and agencies, leadership of 17 regions and management of some Ukrainian companies.

The traditional format of coordinating meetings included meetings of the Ukrainian sides (delegations) in joint bilateral working groups or consultation committees preceding meetings in the international format. Normally such meetings take place prior to the meetings of intergovernmental bilateral mixed committees on the issues of trade and economic cooperation that assume a rather broad intersectoral agenda.

Within the context of economic diplomacy and based on the advisory and consultative body “Export Promotion Office” under the Ministry of Economy, a state body “Ukraine’s Export Promotion Office” was created, which in December 2018 started its independent work on supporting Ukrainian business and promoting Ukrainian export. However, the Export Credit Agency has not begun its work by the end of the year (while the decision to launch it was adopted on February 7, 2018) due to the VRU refusing to provide costs for its first shares issuing. Potentially this could interfere with promoting interests of Ukrainian business in some regions of the world.

Several meetings of the Interagency Commission on Popularizing Ukraine under the MIP took place. An important achievement can be considered as follows: adopting the decision regarding a single brand for Ukraine “UKRAINE NOW” (adopted at the meeting of the CMU on May 10, 2018). At the same time, there is not enough coordination in the field of public diplomacy and there is a discrepancy present due to prevailing of hosting separate events and having parallel tracks of providing information to Western partners instead of presenting joint projects.

In 2018, Ukraine’s MFA actively operated a program on sending Ukrainian independent experts abroad in order for them to take part in relevant public events. The MFA together with the Public Council at the MFA of Ukraine hosted three visits of foreign journalists to Ukraine as well as initiated a series of bilateral expert forums.

On December 19, a new law “On diplomatic service of Ukraine” entered into force and its provisions make an impact on some aspects of building interinstitutional cooperation and coordination of positions. In particular, according to the provisions of this law, an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine is Ukraine’s top official representative abroad who is also in charge of managing and control over all state representatives that visit the country with official purposes. It is an attempt to resolve a chronic problem when delegations visited countries without coordinated positions and clear terms of reference that sometimes significantly complicated communications with international partners. The law’s new edition also expanded an economic component of Ukraine’s diplomatic activities adding to the main functions of diplomatic service coordination of trade and economic issues that are carried out by Ukraine’s diplomatic missions abroad. The law also regulates diplomatic service of the representatives of other state bodies.
Despite the norms of the new law being quite progressive, the process of its development and adoption demonstrated a confrontation of different branches of power regarding some of its provisions. On April 5, the Parliament adopted the law, however, the President vetoed it and returned for reconsideration. The main stumbling point was article 14 that provided mandatory consultations in the relevant committee of the Verkhovna Rada in order the MFA of Ukraine to submit for the President’s consideration a proposition of appointing Ukrainian ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary, permanent representatives for international organizations, Ukrainian representatives and head of the missions to international organizations. On June 7, the VRU adopted the new edition of the law taking into account the President’s remarks, who viewed there are some infringement as for his own constitutional powers in the previous version. The compromise was achieved by the President signing Decree No 168/2018 that provides for replacing consultations with to-be-appointed candidate being presented to the Parliamentary Committee responsible for the issues of diplomatic service.

In general, according to experts, the highest coordination in Ukraine’s foreign policy is implemented in the following directions: Belarus, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, economic cooperation with the EU, Euro-Atlantic Integration and public diplomacy. The lack of domestic cooperation was present in the country’s foreign policy regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, Iran and energy relations with Russia.

The overall score for institutional cooperation – «4 -»

Strategic Vision

In 2018, the scope of Ukraine’s strategic documents determining the country’s foreign policy and creating relevant instruments to counter Russian aggression was replenish. On the one hand, elaboration of concepts and strategies in separate directions of foreign policy is a positive development. On the other hand, there have been no practical steps on official level with regard to developing a single unified document of strategic level in the sphere of foreign policy.

As of the beginning of 2018, the system of strategic documents determining priorities and objectives in foreign policy included the following: the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, the Strategy for Sustainable Development “Ukraine-2020”, EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, IMF-Ukraine Memorandum, Charter on Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO, Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine, Energy Strategy of Ukraine for 2035, Export Strategy of Ukraine – Strategic Trade Development Road Map 2017-2021, the National Human Rights Strategy, the Ukrainian National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security till 2020, Concept of Ukraine’s Popularization in the World and Promoting Ukraine in the global information space, Strategy of the Peace-keeping Activities of Ukraine, Ukraine-NATO
Annual National Program etc. A set of objectives and measures in energy diplomacy, European and Euro-Atlantic integration is also included in the Medium-Term Priority Government Action Plan to 2020.

One of 2018’s important steps was an initiative of the President of Ukraine to secure in the Constitution of Ukraine its strategic course on becoming a full member of the EU and NATO. In November, following a positive review of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the VRU supported with 331 votes in its first reading the bill No 9037 on “Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (concerning Ukraine’s strategic course on a full membership in the European Union and NATO”).

The Association Agreement remains a key strategic document in the medium term for the Ukraine-EU relations. Moreover, in December 2018, the EU-Ukraine Association Council for the first time made a decision on possible review of the Association Agreement in separate sectors, which in general opens new horizons to Ukraine on its way to the European integration.

The President’s decree on “Annual National Programs under the Auspices of Ukraine-NATO Commission” signed in October 2018 launches new approaches to setting goals and objectives, their implementation and reporting, which, in its turn, can demonstrate attempts to strategically reconsider the ways of promoting Euro-Atlantic integration.

In February, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe approved Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine 2018-2021. It is symbolic that for the first time it is mentioned that fulfilling objectives under this action plan also helps achieving the objectives set by the EU Association Agreement. The Council of Europe key partners from the Ukrainian side are central and local authorities and non-governmental organizations.

In February, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine launched the second stage of developing Export Strategy of Ukraine – Strategic Trade Development Road Map 2017-2021, within which frames sector and cross-sector export strategies should be were developed. They would include current assessment of each prospective sector, a list of challenges and solutions to overcome them. In June, the Strategy of the Military and Industrial Complex of Ukraine development till 2028 was approved, and it assumes Ukraine’s bigger presence at world markets, active promotion of new modern arms and military equipment made in Ukraine at the foreign market. The issues of Ukrainian diplomats’ facilitation for promoting Ukraine’s military and industrial complex were brought up by the President of Ukraine during his meeting with heads of the Ukrainian missions abroad in August.

In May, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved a State program of cooperation with Ukrainians worldwide up to 2020. The priority for the nearest years is to counter the anti-Ukrainian propaganda and to establish a positive image of Ukraine in the world. The determined tasks are planned to be implemented by providing financial support to diaspora communities (using the funds of Ukraine’s state and local budgets).
The situation is unclear with regard to the action plan to implement the Concept of Ukraine’s Popularization in the world and promoting Ukrainian interests in the global information space that was approved back in 2017. There is no information regarding its implementation neither in public domain or relevant MIP reports in 2018. Moreover, work has not been finished concerning Public Diplomacy Strategy that was announced by the Office of Public Diplomacy under the MFA of Ukraine in 2017.

Unfortunately, the majority of geographical and functional foreign policy directions remained without medium-term plans or mentioning in strategic documents, which in its turn makes a negative impact on developing and implementing efficient and fruitful policy.

The following directions are most strategically secure: Canada, the USA, political dialogue with the EU, Euro-Atlantic integration, forming international support to counter the Russian aggression, establishing framework of political relations with Russia, and the Council of Europe. According to the experts, there is almost a lack of strategic frames when it comes to relations with France, Hungary, Iran, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America, Central Asia as well as international security issues and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

**The overall score for strategic vision – «3+»**

**Activities**

Yet another year in a row, active involvement of all state authorities in the sphere of foreign policy can be observed. According to the results of expert reviews of the country’s foreign policy in 49 directions, Ukraine takes a pro-active stand, constantly increases and diversifies official contacts and improves its foreign policy instruments.

As for its foreign policy, Ukraine got the highest results with five G7 states (the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, the USA, France), which can demonstrate its focus on achieving specific targets among separate foreign policy priorities. It is worth mentioning a very active dialogue at the highest level (during bilateral visits and on the sidelines), close intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary contacts as well as meetings of joint bilateral institutions.

Good opportunities to meet the heads of states and governments were presented by summits and international forums, such as: Munich Security Conference (February), NATO Summit in Brussels (July) and Paris Peace Forum (November), where P. Poroshenko met D. Trump, E. Macron, A. Merkel and T. May. The UK’s Prime Minister received an invitation but did not visit Ukraine due to domestic reasons, however, for the first time since 2014, the Chancellor of Germany A. Merkel came to Kyiv (November).
As for the institutional level, there are considerably more active efforts and differentiation of bilateral platforms with G7 countries. For instance, the following events were held in a new format: the US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission meeting, the second US-Ukraine Cybersecurity Dialogue as well as the eighth meeting of the US-Ukraine Trade and Investment Council. The 10th meeting of the Ukraine-Germany high-level group took place in Berlin, and the third German-Ukrainian Business Forum. Moreover, more active efforts are being made in the direction of Canada, but attention to Japan decreased.

Parliamentary diplomacy played a greater role in implementation of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Aside from important political statements and addresses by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, special attention was paid to the issue of enhancing bilateral parliamentary cooperation. For example, in April, a delegation headed by the heads of friendship groups “France-Ukraine” in the Senate and the National Assembly visited Ukraine, while in June, the chairperson of the VRU A. Parubiy visited Paris having been invited by the Head of the French Senate. For the first time since 2009, the Head of the VRU visited the United Kingdom (June). Also 2018 saw the first-ever visit of the parliamentary delegation of friendship group between Ukraine and Canada to Canada, headed by the First Deputy Chairperson of the VRU I. Gerashchenko and a co-head of the interparliamentary group I. Krulko (June).

Many events took place in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic integration, political dialogue with the EU and participation in the Eastern Partnership.

In 2018, the number of meetings, joint events and telephone conversations at the political level held by the Ukrainian authorities with their EU and its member-states partners increased against previous years. The dynamic of meetings of joint institutions within the AA framework is positive. Throughout the year, the fourth meeting of the EU-Ukraine Association Committee was held as well as the second meeting of the Ukraine-EU Sub-Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development and the fifth meeting of EU-Ukraine Association Council.

The establishment of new cooperation formats was made possible with the help of the inaugural meeting of the Council on Trade and Sustainable Development and the first meeting of the Ukrainian side of the Advisory Group on Trade and Sustainable Development.

The President of Ukraine had a series of meetings with the NATO Secretary General, in particular, in Munich (February) and in Brussels (July, December). Despite Hungary still blocking the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the highest level, regular meetings were held at the level of ambassadors and representatives as well as meetings in trilateral format including Georgia (North Atlantic Council meetings with Georgia and Ukraine). A significant role had a constant and active involvement of the Government Office for the Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. There are more contacts now between security and defence bodies.
Security agenda and the necessity to counter the Russian aggression made Ukraine push for active efforts in keeping its stand and backing its interests in the OSCE, the UN and the Council of Europe.

Since the beginning of 2018, Ukraine is no longer a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, the activities of the Ukrainian delegation within the UN framework concentrated more on the Ukrainian issues and became more active within the UN General Assembly, with Ukrainian top officials participating in international events.

It is quite traditional that within the OSCE Ukraine has been rather active both on the account of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine in Vienna and in the format of the Trilateral Contact Group, it facilitated OSCE SMM monitoring and cooperation with other institutions. The head of the Italian MFA A. Alfano at the beginning of Italy’s OSCE Chairmanship as well as OSCE PA President G. Tsereteli visited Ukraine.

As for cooperation with separate countries, special attention should be paid to bilateral relations with Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova and Poland where efficient bilateral dialogue took place at the highest level as well as in the intergovernmental format.

As for the regions, Ukraine's efforts were more intensive when it came to the Baltic countries and Northern Europe, as well as in the Middle East. It is worth noting that in March P. Poroshenko made a first in 15 years presidential visit to Kuwait and visited Qatar as well. Visits to Saudi Arabia and the UAE became important steps to give a boost to Ukraine’s presence in the region.

In 2018, the VRU additionally launched three groups on interparliamentary relations having increased the general number of such groups to 94. Within the framework of the interparliamentary cooperation, the Parliament’s leadership and the respective committee welcomed delegations of the foreign parliaments committees that deal with foreign affairs (Australia, Albania, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Estonia, Lebanon, Germany, the UAE, the USA, Turkey, Finland and others). Another crucial step was a creation of the interparliamentary Assembly “Georgia-Moldova-Ukraine”.

As for economic diplomacy, 2018 saw enhanced practice of trade missions visiting other countries. At the beginning of April, the first Ukrainian trade mission to Ghana and Nigeria took place headed by a trade representative N. Mykolska and consisting of representatives of 14 Ukrainian companies. Trade missions to Austria, Israel, Germany and Turkey also happened. A series of bilateral economic forums and meetings of intergovernmental committees aimed at improving trade, economic and investment cooperation between Ukraine and other countries took place as well.

As for functional directions, public diplomacy deserves a separate mention. Ukraine’s MFA together with the Ukraine’s missions abroad held a significant number of communication campaigns that covered an audience of approximately 14 mln foreign citizens, namely: a campaign supporting Crimea’s de-occupation
(#CrimeaisUkraine, #CrimeaisBleeding), a campaign supporting Ukrainian prisoners of war (#FreeUkrainianPOWs), a campaign on correct transliteration of Ukrainian toponyms (#CorrectUA, #KyivnotKiev) etc. The MFA was also doing a lot of work on launching the Ukrainian Institute and developing a concept of its activities and resource capabilities.

Yet an extremely low level of activity can be observed in the regions of Central Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, Iran and China, as well as in such areas as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, climate change and international security. Ukraine’s relations with Hungary were quite problematic in 2018. Ukraine’s activities in the Black Sea region were inconclusive as they concentrated only on problems of Crimea and the Sea of Azov.

Not sufficiently active were Ukrainian authorities in relation to the European Energy Cooperation, the Visegrad Group (as an international initiative) and cooperation with Ukrainian diaspora. The low level of Ukrainian activity may occasionally be explained by unfavourable dynamic of bilateral relations and the lack of interest coming from the opposite party. For instance, a good example here would be Hungary and the Visegrad Group, intensity of contacts with which was determined by the hard line of the Hungarian authorities.

The overall score for activities – «4+»

Results

In 2018 just as in the year before, the main focus of attention was drawn to priorities that could be reached in relations with different geographical directions. First of all, it concerns forming international support in order to counteract Russian aggression, enhancing economic diplomacy by expansion to new markets and strengthening positions at traditional ones, as well as protecting rights of the Ukrainian citizens. European and Euro-Atlantic integration were key in order to build both bilateral relations and to implement initiatives of multilateral nature.

Ukrainian authorities were quite successful in forming an international coalition of partners to support its own territorial integrity and sovereignty and continued to actively use the present international instruments to draw and keep attention of international partners for keeping a solidary stand against Russia.

Despite certain risks, both personal and sectoral anti-Russian sanctions were extended, enhanced and prolonged during the year. At the end of December, resulting from an active discussion at the level of the EU top-authorities, preliminary understanding regarding the necessity of applying stronger sanctions against Russia was achieved, taking into account an open act of the Russian armed aggression against Ukrainian ships in the Kerch Strait on November 25, 2018.
Active cooperation with political groups in the European Parliament allowed to get the following EP resolutions: with demand to the Russian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release O. Sentsov and other illegally detained in Russia and on the Crimean peninsula Ukrainian citizens (June 14); with calling on Russia to guarantee the freedom of navigation in the Kerch Strait and in the Sea of Azov and calling on the EU and its member states to deny Russian vessels coming from the Sea of Azov access to the EU ports unless the Russia Federation guarantees the freedom of navigation in the Kerch Strait and in the Sea of Azov (December 12).

International organizations and initiatives that Ukraine is a member of have remained an active ground to counter Russian policy. Vigorous diplomatic work was done at the level of the Council of Europe. On September 4, Ukraine made a voluntary contribution of USD 400,000 to the Council of Europe aiming to weaken Russian financial blackmail. In addition to a series of the CoE pro-Ukrainian resolutions adopted in 2018, in October, thanks to joint coordinated position of the Ukrainian delegation in PACE, Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe and civil activists it was possible to persuade PACE members to decline the draft resolution on rules’ changes that would allow Russia to renew its membership in the assembly.

Much was achieved in the UN framework even though Ukraine is already not a non-permanent member of the SC. Against the context of countering Russian aggression within the frames of the UN General Assembly, a resolution “The problem of militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine), as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov” (December 17) was adopted as well as the resolution on “Situation with human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine” (December 22). Ukraine’s initiative to include in the agenda of the 73rd UN General Assembly session a new item “The situation on the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine” that simplifies organization of further meetings on the issue of Crimea and Donbas looks rather promising for further organization of work.

During Italy’s 2018 OSCE Chairmanship, significant shifts towards de-escalation of situation in the occupied territories of Donbas did not occur. The conditions of the OSCE SMM mandate implementation did not improve due to the constant opposition of the Russian Federation and militants supported by Russia. Ukraine’s proposition on constant monitoring of the entire borderline between Ukraine and Russia, a draft of which is presented the third year in the row, is still blocked by Russia. Against this backdrop, adopting the Berlin Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (June) is a positive development, an important part of which is the Ukrainian delegation’s resolution on “Ongoing violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)”.

In 2018, Ukraine’s aspirations regarding its NATO membership again were acknowledged. Despite Hungary blocking, there were some significant achievements. Another crucial step was voting for changes to the Constitution and new procedures
for preparing Annual National Program. A series of agreements were signed allowing the launch of the practical phase of implementing NATO Trust Fund for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, while some measures were taken to improve interoperability of the forces and to introduce them to NATO standards with considerable financial support aimed at transforming the armed forces. Yet in general, lower results against last year can be observed.

Among G7 countries, the biggest results were achieved in 2018 in the country’s relations with the United Kingdom and Canada that received the maximum scoring. From the standpoint of solidarity, it is worth mentioning G7 foreign ministers’ statement on the events in the Kerch Strait (November 28). Unfortunately, it was not possible to secure the support of all partners in countering “Nord Stream 2” project, which is one of the issues the USA and Germany view differently.

Another important factor of support is military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. It is crucial to mention the US assistance – security assistance of USD 250 mln was approved as part of the US 2019 defence budget. Ukraine’s purchase of Javelin anti-tank missiles was approved while the country also received two Island-class patrol boats. The UK and Canada also extensively supported reforms in Ukraine and held joint military exercises.

In general, international political and legal support for Ukraine in fighting Russian aggression is getting bigger, yet some influential regional and global leaders (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, China, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa) are far from being in focus of Ukrainian diplomacy attention. The results of work in the regions of South Asia, Africa, Latin America and Central Asia are traditionally low, which points at the necessity of a more active and thorough policy coming from the Ukrainian diplomatic team. Against this backdrop, it is interesting that Ukraine provided humanitarian aid to Yemen, the Republic of Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to help overcome hunger (Presidential Decree No380 signed on November 22).

Concentrating on the issues of countering the Russian aggression, Ukrainian authorities considerably lowered its participation in resolving other conflicts, peacekeeping activities and cooperation in fighting terrorism and illegal migration. For example, Ukraine did not increase its participation in NATO mission in Afghanistan “Resolute Support” despite the official statements. The decision regarding making changes to the Agreement between the Government of Lithuania, the Government of Poland and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on launching a joint military unit looks quite promising, with special provisions added on being ready to take part in international operations (in December the VRU ratified the relevant Agreement on making changes).

As for achievements in the sphere of economic diplomacy, first of all it is important to mention the government’s work on reviewing and optimizing instruments of joint intergovernmental committees (the Cabinet of Ministers’ resolutions No 505 from May 23 and No 675 from August 29). In 2018, 21 meetings of joint intergovernmental committees were held, two meetings of working groups within the framework of joint
committees as well as three meetings of co-heads. There is a positive dynamic when it comes to economic and trade contacts, for instance, an agreement was signed with Qatar on launching a Joint committee on economic, trade and technical cooperation.

Aiming to diversify markets for Ukrainian goods, six meetings of Exporters and Investors Council under the MFA of Ukraine took place. Within the framework of implementing Ukraine’s export strategy a state agency “Ukraine’s Export Promotion Office” was launched, while a significant amount of work was done to establish “Export Credit Agency” PJSC. Ukraine’s export brand and exhibition brand-book were developed and distributed.

On February 1, Ukraine joined the Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (PEM Convention). In order to implement provisions of the Convention, changes need to be introduced to the free trade agreements signed by Ukraine and other Members of the Convention (EU and Georgia).

On November 21, Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers approved Free Trade agreement with Israel, while Free Trade agreement between Ukraine and Turkey has not been finalized yet despite both countries authorities promise to do it until the end of 2018.

The EU remains Ukraine’s main aggregated trade partner. The EU share in Ukraine’s foreign trade is over 40%, while the foreign trade turnover demonstrates a consistent growth trend. The CMU reports that in 2018 approximately 15 000 companies exported to the EU, while over 200 enterprises received a status of an authorized exporter. The most comprehensive account of Ukraine’s success in European integration was provided in the Joint Statement following the 20th EU-Ukraine Summit that took place in Brussels on July 9, 2018. As a result of implementing Memorandum of Understanding and Loan agreement between Ukraine and the EU regarding the fourth program of macro-financial assistance, funds of 1 billion euros were made available to Ukraine. According to the results of the fifth meeting of the Association Council between Ukraine and the EU on December 17, a series of agreements in infrastructure, energy efficiency and technical cooperation were signed.

In 2018, public diplomacy got a more systematic approach yet there is still a gap in fulfilling unified state coordination of educational and scientific programs of cultural exchanges and making Ukraine more popular in the world etc. The Ukrainian Institute did not end up working in its full power as most work was done in relations to preparing the sufficient legal framework in order to open the Institution offices abroad. However, the Institute team has been created, with the strategic session held and active communication within Ukraine launched.

As for bilateral cooperation, the highest appraisal in 2018 was given to Ukraine’s foreign policy results regarding only three states – the UK, Canada and Lithuania. The majority of cooperation results with separate countries got “4”, and only Italy, China, Turkey and Hungary – “3” while Iran got “2”.

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As for bilateral cooperation, the highest appraisal in 2018 was given to Ukraine’s foreign policy results regarding only three states – the UK, Canada and Lithuania. The majority of cooperation results with separate countries got “4”, and only Italy, China, Turkey and Hungary – “3” while Iran got “2”.
According to the experts, the highest results were achieved following Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts in the UN and the Council of Europe. Its political dialogue with the European Union has also been highly evaluated. The lowest scores were given to the results of the Ukrainian foreign policy towards Iran and in the region of Central Asia. The average score that demonstrates considerable untapped potential of Ukraine’s foreign policy was received by the following: economic diplomacy, cooperation with the European Energy Community, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, Visegrad Four and the Black Sea region, as well as all issues of multilateral diplomacy (protection of human rights, climate change, international security, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons etc.). At the same time, a low estimate of the results of its political dialogue with the Russian Federation is pre-conditioned by the reality and the current situation and not by Ukraine’s low involvement.

The overall score for the results – «4 -»
## G-7 COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Grade</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>C+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>A-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>B+</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>A-</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>B-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>C+</td>
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</table>
In 2018, relations with the United Kingdom were mostly focused on the area of security and defence, marked by solidarity, continuation and expansion of the existed cooperation formats. However, political dialogue was less intensive while efforts to define trade and visa relations after Brexit are still at the preparatory stage.

### General Score

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional cooperation</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Strategic vision</td>
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<tr>
<td>Results</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>General score</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>B+</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Political Interest / Engagement

Political interest in the UK continues to be determined by an interest in its support for the Russian aggression counteraction and is most active at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and inter-parliamentary cooperation. Civil society is also actively involved. The Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada does not mention the United Kingdom but the Analytical Report to the Address describes it as one of the most reliable partners of Ukraine.

Institutional Cooperation

In 2018, there were active contacts at various levels and between various branches of power, including Ministries of Defence and other security agencies. No inter-institutional conflicts in the implementation of foreign policy with regard to British direction were observed.

Strategic Vision

Ukraine continues its policy with regard to the UK in line with the 1994 document (Treaty on the Principles of Relations and Cooperation), focusing on active involvement of the United Kingdom in the fight against the Russian aggression and preparations for relations modification after Brexit. The short-term objectives identified last year (to bring trade to UAH 3.5 bln, to become one of top-20 exporter to the UK, to sign a free trade agreement, and to liberalise visa regime) were rolled over to 2019. Defence cooperation shows a more structured approach (the November 21 joint statement by the MoDs outlined priorities in cyber defence, counteraction to hybrid threats, military intelligence, increase of presence under the Operation ORBITAL, military education, military-technical cooperation, and development of the defence infrastructure).

Activities

Unlike in 2017, in 2018 there were no official visits either by the top officials or by ministers of foreign affairs. Despite an invitation, Prime Minister T. May did not visit Ukraine for domestic political reasons. The President of Ukraine met her on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference in February and had several conversations with her over the phone (May 24, May 11).

Prime Minister V. Groysman met Foreign Secretary B. Johnson in Copenhagen (June 27). Among those who paid visits to London were Prosecutor-General Y. Lutsenko (May 2), Vice Prime Minister I. Klympush-Tsintsadze (October 9), and the delegation of the Supreme Council of Justice (October 11). Ukrainian Week in London (October 8-11) at the initiative of the British-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce gave a positive impetus to the development of economic and political relations.
Dialogue was supported by important political statements, including Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin’s statement in the context of the Russian chemical attack in Salisbury (March 14), the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement on the expulsion of 13 Russian diplomats (March 26), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement on the conclusions about Russia’s involvement in the attack (September 7). It is worth noting a large number of favourable for Ukraine statements issued by the British government, including on the results of the MH17 investigation (May 25) and its anniversary (July 17), on political prisoners (June 6, August 21), on the UK’s support for the US declaration condemning the illegal annexation of Crimea (July 25), calls for new sanctions on Russia (August 21), on the condemnation of the illegal elections in separate regions of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (November 12), the call for Russia to stop delaying or preventing access for ships to the Sea of Azov (November 19); numerous speeches and comments by the prime minister and other government officials and members of Parliament.

The UK support was especially valuable after the Russian aggression in the Black Sea (November 25). Foreign Secretary B. Johnson penned an article entitled “Four years since the illegal annexation of Crimea” (February 22) and former Defence Secretary M. Fallon wrote a column following his visit to Ukraine on December 20-23. Symbolic support in the form of British paratroopers’ participation in the Independence Day Parade (August 24) became a tradition.

The United Kingdom actively supports Ukraine in multilateral formats and international organisations, including in NATO, the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, G7 and others. It co-authored the UN Declaration on the Eighty-Fifth Anniversary of the Holodomor (December 7), and supported the UN GA Resolution (December 17) etc.

As part of security cooperation, Minister of Defence S. Poltorak paid an official visit to the United Kingdom (November 20-21), Deputy Minister A. Petrenko also undertook visits (including for participation in the Ukrainian-British military-political consultations). As for the UK, Secretary of State for Defence G. Williamson visited Ukraine twice (September 17, December 21), there was a visit by the delegation of the British Armed Forces headed by Vice Chief of the Defence Staff G. Messenger (October 31). Negotiations were held on the current status and priorities of bilateral cooperation, which intensified on the eve of and after the Russian aggression in the Black Sea in late November. The sides discussed preparations within the operation ORBITAL, military-technical cooperation, an opening of the Office of Friends of Ukraine to coordinate Ukrainian defence reform, naval cooperation for the sake of security in the Black Sea, advisory assistance, and support to the Navy in coastal defence. Ukrainian military transport aircraft provided logistic support for the British Armed Forces. On December 19, HMS Echo called at the port of Odesa. British experts and members of Parliament also provided consultations on the Law "On National Security and Defence". Other noteworthy contacts of security agencies included negotiations between Minister of Internal Affairs A. Avakov and Minister of State for Security at the Home Office B. Wallace on the expansion of cooperation (October 2) and a meeting between the
Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, O. Turchynov, and Director General, Consular and Security at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office P. Barton (July 6).

There was active interparliamentary cooperation, marked by the first since 2009 visit of Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada A. Parubiy (June 12-14). Head of the Friends of Ukraine group G. Whittingdale initiated an urgent parliamentary debate after the Russian aggression in the Sea of Azov on November 27, which confirmed interparty support for Ukraine. Whittingdale also together with former Secretary Fallon visited Ukraine (December 20-23) due to the the UK Friendship Group members in the Parliament of Ukraine, S. Zalishchuk and O. Ryabchyn, he met children of servicemen and IDPs in London, and sent letters to the imprisoned sailors (December 2018-January 2019). The UK Friendship Group in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine co-hosted together with the British MPs a roundtable on counteraction to misinformation (September 17). A delegation of the British MPs also visited Donbas (May 29). First Deputy Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada I. Gerashchenko met representatives of the Scottish National Party in Kyiv (November 7).

Expert consultations on a future free trade agreement, which would meet two objectives – to give Ukrainian goods broader access to the UK markets than they have under the EU Association Agreement, and to increase trade by at least 1bn hryvnyas – were important to Ukraine. Ukraine considers as a success to be in a group of 40 priority countries for settling trade relations and says that there is a preliminary agreement of the British colleagues for a more ambitious agreement.

The Embassy, together with the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, takes active part in the organisation and promotion of events, in particular it continues active efforts to ensure recognition of the Holodomor as an act of genocide. In the course of the year, human rights activists, relatives of political prisoners, MPs, Naftogaz managers, researchers, artists and others visited London with the support from the Embassy. Also, the Embassy actively monitors and responds to negative information trends in the UK and stands out among other embassies thanks to its informative Facebook page full of quality content.

Results

The United Kingdom remains one of the most consistent and active partners of Ukraine in confronting Russian aggression, providing unprecedented, in comparison with other big EU member states, security and political support concerning sanctions, release of prisoners, condemnation of aggressive actions of the Russian Federation, etc. At the same time, the difficulties associated with Brexit have somewhat put Ukraine on the back burner, and the intensity of contacts at the highest level has decreased. Instead, cooperation within multilateral formats and international organisations has intensified. Catalysts for Ukrainian-British solidarity in 2018 were the Russian chemical attack in Salisbury and the Russian aggression against Ukrainian ships near the Kerch Strait.
The United Kingdom continues to provide technical assistance to Ukraine (worth more than 35 mln pounds in 2018) to support civil service reform, transparency and accountability, human rights and the fight against disinformation. About 14 mln pounds were allocated to conflict resolution and security sector reform projects, and 5 mln pounds to the development of independent media.

One of the main achievements in security and defence is a decision to expand training under the operation ORBITAL by 2020 by adding new courses, including for the Navy and the Air Force of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, to continue training for Ukrainian military personnel in British military educational establishments, to establish a permanent position of the naval attaché in charge of cooperation programmes and enhancing Ukrainian Navy’s defence capacities. The British Defence Secretary announced that marines would be sent to Ukraine and the Royal Navy would expand its presence in the Black Sea. Joint counteraction to cyber threats, military-technical cooperation, strengthening of intelligence cooperation, investment projects in the defence industry remain the important tasks of security cooperation.

A future trade agreement is still at its early stage. Active lobbying efforts with regard to a visa liberalisation plan, which should at least simplify the existing procedure by opening a visa centre in Kyiv or reducing visa fees, have not yet yielded results despite the need to address an issue of visa-free regulations for the UK citizens after March 29, 2019.

Important objectives in the work of the Ukrainian diplomats are to encourage the UK to use opportunities provided by the Magnitsky Act, which was integrated into the British law (May 2), to develop UK national sanctions after the withdrawal from the EU (the process was initiated on November 16), to create a working group in the British Parliament to counteract Russian hybrid threats and disinformation (Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada A. Parubiy has already proposed several additional formats for cooperation).

Ineffective attempts were made to use the format of the Budapest Memorandum (on November 7, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged the signatory countries to hold urgent consultations). Also, the Ukrainian Embassy to the United Kingdom unsuccessfully called for an investigation into a terrorist activity of propagandist G. Phillips.
In 2018, the Italian government continued to support Ukraine’s European integration aspirations, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, facilitated an exchange of experience in confronting Russian hybrid threats, did not recognise the annexation of Crimea and, at the official level, supported sanctions against Russia. In addition, in the context of its OSCE chairmanship, Italy took a more proactive stance with regard to the situation in Ukraine, including in respect of key reforms. The focus was on security, military and socio-humanitarian dimensions of cooperation.
Political Interest / Engagement

Political interest towards Italy was prompted by its support for reforms in Ukraine and Ukraine’s European integration. In 2018, MPs and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expressed their interest in Italy. They focused on ensuring further support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, keeping sanctions against the Russian Federation, as well as on economic cooperation between the two countries and on Ukraine's European integration aspirations.

The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada mentions Italy only briefly in the context of energy security, increase in tourist flow, and as a choice of country for education of Ukrainian students and employment of migrant workers.

Working meetings at the parliamentary level were not numerous, which has to do with the new Italian parliament and government elections. On the one hand, the Italian side of the Inter-Parliamentary Group on Ukraine-Italy Friendship has not been established yet. On the other hand, Ukrainian representatives did not insist on this too much. Certain interest was demonstrated by MPs from the factions of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc and Samopomich (Self-Reliance).

Institutional cooperation

Counteraction to hybrid threats and "fake" messages remained an urgent and complicated task for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both countries. The embassies held consultations and clarifications to mitigate the populist statements made by some Italian politicians from such parties as the League, the Five Star Movement and the Brothers of Italy who alleged that sanctions against Russia can be lifted.

Strategic vision

A strategic vision of further interaction between Ukraine and Italy after the implementation of the roadmap for cooperation between Ukraine and Italy for 2016-2017 is not present in the documents for the next period because the sides took a wait-and-see attitude. Despite the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the parliaments of Ukraine and Italy in 2017, it is too early to say that in 2018 both countries were able to strengthen dialogue at the level of political parties.
Activities

In 2018, relations between Italy and Ukraine evolved both at the bilateral level and within the framework of Italy's OSCE chairmanship. In particular, on January 30, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy A. Alfano during his visit to Ukraine in the capacity of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, held talks with Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine P. Klimkin on the situation in Donbas and the future of a peacekeeping mission.

In 2018, Italian leaders continued to declare support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and extension of international sanctions against the Russian Federation until the Minsk agreements are implemented in full, as seen from the statements made by ministers of the previous and current governments of Italy, including A. Alfano, E. Moavero Milanesi and others. In most cases, Italy supported Ukraine's position in the OSCE, the UN GA and the NATO PA, including on non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea, condemnation of Russian aggression in Donbas, massive abuses of human rights in Crimea and Donbas by the occupying authorities, all of which attests to cooperation with Italy in addition to activities within the framework of international organizations.

At the same time, the MFA of Ukraine and the Embassy of Ukraine in Italy had to make numerous official statements because of the negative remarks by Italian high-ranking officials (for example, Italian Minister of the Interior M. Salvini) who brought into question the territorial integrity of Ukraine or called for lifting sanctions against Russia.

The visit to Italy by the Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs H. Hopko contributed to a presentation of the Ukraine's position and to the Italian support of Ukraine security and European integration aspirations (November 3-14). During the meetings with the Ukrainian Ambassador, Italian MPs from various political parties were invited to visit Ukraine, including its eastern region.

Ukraine and Italy have been discussing expanding military-political, agricultural and medical cooperation. The importance of confronting hybrid threats was identified as a priority during a meeting at the level of deputy heads and political directors of the MFAs of Ukraine and Italy. In addition, there were meetings at the level of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Italy and Ukraine (September 28 and December 7).

A Ukrainian-Italian business forum was held in Kyiv in February. Its participants included representatives of 150 Ukrainian and 50 Italian companies, as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine, a Head of the State Agency on Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving, the Deputy Ministers of Energy and Agrarian Policy. In July, Padua hosted the Ukrainian-Italian business forum "Ukraine: New Strategies for International Cooperation for Veneto Entrepreneurs".
Results

The analysis of the development of relations between Ukraine and Italy in 2018 shows that, despite some specific issues concerning interpretation of events in Ukraine and pro-Russian sentiments of a part of influential Italian political forces, Italy continued to pledge support for Ukraine's European course, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as for the continuation of the EU sanctions policy with regard to Russia.

Cooperation between Italy and Ukraine has intensified at the regional level, resulted in better understanding in Italy of Ukraine's challenges. In particular, it concerns the creation of advisory councils in the Veneto and Apulia. At the same time, developments of the previous years for the Ministries of Finance, Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, which were prepared in partnership with Italian counterparts, were not used effectively in 2018. Accordingly, relations at the level of chambers of commerce and industry and other associations of companies of both countries (an opening of the office of Confindustria Ucraina in October) were the most successful.

Trade between the two countries increased a little in 2018, with exports and imports reaching USD 2.6 bln and USD 2.03 bln respectively.
Ukraine’s relations with Canada in 2018 continued at the high level of a privileged partnership. In addition to strong international support for counteracting Russian aggression, they focused on interparliamentary contacts, economic, energy and military cooperation. Canada continued to help Ukraine in reforming and strengthening its defence capabilities and initiated new assistance programmes. The first year of the implementation of the bilateral Free Trade Agreement has stimulated the growth of trade and strengthened business contacts between the two countries.
Political Interest / Engagement

Canada, traditionally, was in the foreign policy focus of Ukraine, with the Ukrainian Government considering it a global privileged partner. The Analytical Report to the 2018 Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU described a close nature of the relations between Canada and Ukraine as "exemplary". President P. Poroshenko mentioned Canada during the closed part of the XIII Ambassadorial (August). Along with the President, Ukrainian ministers and VRU MPs visited Canada. They showed the greatest interest in developing cooperation in areas of countering Russian aggression, Euro-Atlantic integration, security and defence, energy, IT, agriculture and education, cooperation within the framework of international organizations and cultural diplomacy. This is confirmed by the statements they made during the visits and reports by the Embassy of Ukraine to Canada.

Institutional Cooperation

During the year, Canada was at the centre of attention of all branches of power in Ukraine, which activities on the development of the Ukrainian-Canadian relations can be called as sufficiently coordinated. The Embassy of Ukraine in Ottawa played a key role in this. Active bilateral contacts were maintained by the President of Ukraine, ministries, parliament, NGOs, which demonstrated shared approaches. At the same time, despite agreed in principle position to expand the Free Trade Agreement to include services and investment, which had been reached during P. Poroshenko's visit to Canada in September 2017, the first meeting of the bilateral commission that would manage the Agreement met only in October 2018. Negotiations on the extension of the scope of the Agreement have not started yet.

Strategic Vision

Priority partnership concept within a strategic vision of the Ukrainian leadership was implemented in the areas of Euro-Atlantic integration, counteraction to Russian aggression and attraction of Canadian investments. The main steps under the ANP NATO-Ukraine 2018 identified Canada as a key partner, in particular in providing Ukraine with legal assistance and mutual protection of restricted information. Both sides have a clear understanding of the priorities of cooperation.

Activities

The schedule of bilateral contacts with Canada in 2018 was busy on every level of the Ukrainian authorities. The first overseas visit by Canadian Governor J. Payette to Ukraine in January and the working visit of President P. Poroshenko to Canada in February focused on intensive political dialogue, counteraction to Russian aggression, Canadian military support and technical assistance to Ukraine (within the framework of the project "Support to Judicial Reform" in Ukraine). On the eve of the G7 Summit
(Charlevoix, June 8-9), the President of Ukraine and the Prime Minister of Canada coordinated their positions, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine took part in a special meeting on the situation in Ukraine in the framework of the heads of the G7 MFA meeting in Toronto in April and Halifax International Security Forum in November.

As far as parliaments are concerned, the delegation of the Ukraine-Canada Friendship Group, headed by First Deputy Chairwoman of the VRU I. Gerashchenko and co-chairman of the Ukraine-Canada Parliamentary Friendship Group I. Krulko paid the first-ever parliamentary visit to Canada in June. During the visit, they met ministers, parliamentarians, diaspora, etc.

The two ministers of defence supported working contacts, including in the framework of NATO meetings. Ottawa is actively involved in the process of advancing the Ukrainian army, in particular within the framework of the UNIFIER mission, which Canada extended to 2019. The contacts between the special services have intensified, including with regard to countering hybrid threats and cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure facilities. In particular, Canadian representatives come to study in Ukraine.

An unprecedented six-day visit by Canadian Minister of International Development Marie-Claude Bibeau (responsible for all technical assistance to Ukraine) to Ukraine took place in July. For the first time, a member of the Government of Canada visited the front line in Donbas. In addition, she discussed issues of the Canadian investment and business involvement in energy, mining, agricultural and processing sectors in the context of the Free Trade Agreement. These issues formed the key agenda during the visits to Canada by Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin in September and the First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development and Trade S. Kubiv in October.

In the framework of the Free Trade Agreement implementation, the Joint Commission for the Administration of the Agreement convened its first meeting and signed the Rules of Procedure of the Joint Commission to identify key principles for further work. Toronto hosted the first Canadian-Ukrainian investment forum, CUTIS Investment Roadshow. In November, the Ukrainian Embassy in Canada organized a business event "Ukraine: Your Trading Partner" in Vancouver.

The effectiveness of public diplomacy in bilateral relations was confirmed by the traditionally active Ukrainian diaspora in Canada.
Results

Ukraine achieved major results in relations with Canada in the security, economic, consular, medical and transport sectors. Canada provided Ukraine with continued international support, co-sponsored a number of international resolutions and initiated a G7 foreign ministers statement on Russia’s aggression in the Kerch Strait.

Ukrainian MPs invited Canadian colleagues to monitor parliamentary and presidential elections in Ukraine in 2019. In turn, Canada decided to allocate USD 24 mln to election monitoring in Ukraine, achieving gender equality and improving public administration, including USD 2.5 mln in support of efforts to combat Russian propaganda. The parties signed a memorandum of cooperation on improving availability and quality of medical care in the Ukrainian countryside and subventions from the state budget.

During eight months of 2018, the export of goods from Ukraine to Canada increased by 45.8%. Within the framework of a targeted programme, Canada allocated USD 30 mln to support innovative projects in Ukraine.

The Consulate General of Ukraine was opened in Edmonton in September. Consultations on visa-free travel have been continued. There have been direct flights from Kyiv to Toronto since June.

During her visit, Minister M.-C. Bibeau announced a new package of technical assistance to Ukraine, which became the first new large-scale package after the victory of Prime Minister J. Trudeau in the 2015 elections. The flagship assistance projects are support for the National Police, legal aid centres, support for local authorities, and support for small- and medium-sized businesses (CUTIS).

After including Ukraine in the Automatic Firearms Country Control List, substantive negotiations on the supply of firearms to Ukraine began. The first contract for the supply of Canadian sniper rifles was signed (first deliveries are expected in spring 2019).

It was announced that the annual International Conference on Reforms in Ukraine would be held in Toronto in July 2019. It promises to become a key international event for coordinating support for Ukraine next year. There will also be a Government Conference in its framework.
The year of 2018 was characterized by a very intense political dialogue and an increase in mutual trade turnover by about 25% compared with 2017. One of the key problems of bilateral relations was a construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Ukraine has demonstrated consistency in advocacy of its position on this issue abroad, but there has been no rapid progress in reforming the Ukrainian gas transport system in 2018.
Political Interest / Engagement

Germany is a key partner for Ukraine, given the very important role of Chancellor A. Merkel in negotiating Donbas settlement within the Normandy format, coercion of Russia to implement the Minsk accords and organization of a UN peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine. This priority is confirmed by numerous speeches and the working agenda of representatives of the executive power and the vast majority of MPs and local politicians regardless of their party affiliation. Ukraine's interest in cooperation with Germany in 2018 was focused on extending sanctions against Russia as an element of containment of aggression, development of economic cooperation and attraction of foreign direct investments. The focus was also on opposing the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. The Ukrainian political class perceives Germany, first of all, as a country that can really help Ukraine restore its territorial integrity and effective control over the temporarily occupied territories, as well as one of the largest investors in the Ukrainian economy.

Institutional Cooperation

In 2018, cooperation between various institutions of the Ukrainian power in the development of relations with Germany was quite active, given the personal involvement of President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko. In addition, thanks to the close cooperation between the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the MFA, the MinToT, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Education during the Ukrainian-German intergovernmental negotiations on cooperation for development (November), an agreement was reached to allocate 84.8 mln euros to help Ukraine (loans and grants). Ukrainian institutions also showed solidarity in energy security issues. Based on the results of meetings and roundtables held by the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Decision "An Appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the International Community on the Inadmissibility of Construction of the Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline and the Russian Federation's Monopoly at the World Gas Markets" was adopted (April) and a public discussion on the matter was held in Brussels with the participation of the Mission of Ukraine to the EU and Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Groysman.

Strategic Vision

In 2018, no significant changes were made to the sufficiently developed legal framework of relations between Ukraine and Germany (about 90 documents are in effect). At the same time, the areas of cooperation between Ukraine and Germany correspond to the goals and priorities of the medium-term Governmental Action Plan until 2020, including economic growth (ensuring energy efficiency and energy saving) and good governance (decentralisation). It should be noted that in pursuance of the Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers and the Government of Germany on Cooperation in Combating Organised Crime, Terrorism and Other Crimes of Medium Gravity, Grave Crimes and Felony, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Federal Police of Germany signed the Bilateral Cooperation Plan for 2018-2019.
Activities

The year of 2018 was characterized by a large number of high-level visits (Prime Minister of Ukraine, leadership of the MFA and other ministries, the Armed Forces of Ukraine) and active cooperation between agencies. On April 10, President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko became one of the first foreign leaders to visit Germany after the re-election of Chancellor A. Merkel for the fourth term in office. One should also recall the Chancellor's visit to Ukraine in November 2018, the first one since 2014, as well as visits by other German senior officials not only to Kyiv but to eastern Ukraine too.

In addition, the 10th meeting of the Ukrainian-German High-Level Group and the third German-Ukrainian Business Forum took place in Berlin in November. Ukraine also hosted a joint radiation safety training. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and the Export Promotion Office organized a trade mission to Germany to open business opportunities for Ukrainian food companies. Over 60 Ukrainian cultural events were held in Germany, including Ukraine's participation in the Frankfurt Book Fair, concerts of Ukrainian classical music and a presentation of the new novel, "Internat", about the war in Donbas by S. Zhadan.

Results

Economic relations between Ukraine and Germany show significant growth. In January-October 2018, the export of goods to Germany increased by 22.4%. Mutual trade was also active, exceeding more than USD 8 billion. Frequent political and economic contacts at all levels and the inclusion of Ukraine in the coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD emphasize the unique nature of Ukrainian-German relations. In 2018, Germany remained among the key partners supporting Ukraine in its efforts to peacefully settle the armed conflict in Donbas, restore territorial integrity and control over the temporarily occupied territories. Berlin also hosted the first since February 2017 meeting of the foreign ministers of the Normandy Four and a meeting of political directors. The main issues on the agenda included support for ceasefire, exchange of prisoners, the OSCE SMM and the modality of a future peacekeeping operation under the UN mandate.

Thanks to the active efforts of the Embassy of Ukraine in Germany, Germans' awareness of Ukraine, its economic and cultural potential increased significantly, and a Ukrainian-language audio guide became available on the Berlin City Circle tour buses for the first time in Europe. In addition, it was agreed to allocate part of the loan (totalling 500 mln euros) to the construction of the Zaporizhzhya-Mariupol motorway.

Stopping the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is still an unreachable task. However, the issue of guaranteeing some volumes of gas transit to the EU via Ukraine was raised.
As in the previous year, 2018 was marked by active engagement in the Ukrainian-American dialogue. High political interest was demonstrated at all levels. It was important that the US Department of State released its Crimea Declaration about the continued non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea by the United States and unanimous condemnation of the Russian aggression against Ukrainian ships in the Kerch Strait. In addition, it extended the list of sanctions against the Russian Federation over the annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine.
Political Interest / Engagement

As in the previous year, active Ukrainian-American dialogue continued in 2018. In his Annual Address to the VRU, President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko noted a "very high level of trust" between Kyiv and Washington and importance of the US support for Ukraine. In particular, an emphasis was placed on security assistance. In the Analytical Report to the Annual Address, much attention was paid to the USA as a key ally and global partner, relationship with which "continues to maintain high dynamics" on all issues of the agenda, especially in the context of stopping Russian aggression against Ukraine. In addition, it highlighted US efforts to keep the Ukrainian issue on the agenda of leading international organizations. In his speech at the 15th annual meeting of the Yalta European Strategy, P. Poroshenko emphasized that "relations between Kyiv and Washington have never been [...] as close and effective as in recent years".

High political interest in bilateral relations with the USA was demonstrated at all levels. The USA was constantly on the agenda of the Head of State, the Government, the Verkhovna Rada, including the Foreign Affairs Committee, the MFA, the MoD, the NSDC, the Embassy of Ukraine in the USA, etc. At the same time, according to the Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States V. Chaly, in 2018, there were some inconsistencies in the statements made by certain politicians in the context of the presidential and parliamentary elections concerning issues of national security and defence support.

Institutional Cooperation

Given the strategic importance and priority of bilateral relations with the United States, dialogue with Washington is generally characterized by coherent institutional cooperation at all levels. However, a situation around the suspension of trade preferences for 155 types of Ukrainian goods has demonstrated the need to respond timely to potential critical moments and sometimes to take efforts to prevent them. Despite the steps taken by the MFA of Ukraine in 2018, the lifting of the US restrictions largely depended on the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of Draft Law No 7466 aimed at establishing an effective and transparent system of collective management of property rights with regard to copyright and related rights in Ukraine. In the end, the law was passed but later than necessary.

Strategic Vision

The USA remains the key strategic partner of Ukraine. There was no change in Ukraine's strategic vision of this partnership in 2018. References to the USA in key strategic documents correspond to the current level of bilateral dialogue and cooperation. For example, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine says that "deepening strategic partnership with the United States as a guarantor of international security in the Euro-Atlantic area" on the basis of the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership is
Ukraine's main foreign policy priority. The Military Doctrine underlines US support, which Ukraine may count on in the context of settling the armed conflict in the east.

Activities

As in the previous year, issues concerning security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine in conditions of the Russian aggression remained central to Ukraine-US dialogue. The issue of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline construction remained to be relevant too.

Throughout the year, there were regular meetings between Ukrainian and US officials at all levels, in particular P. Poroshenko met D. Trump on the side-lines of the NATO Summit in Brussels (July) and Paris Peace Forum (November). In Kyiv, P. Poroshenko met the US National Security Advisor J. Bolton, who visited Ukraine on Independence Day. US Special Representative for Ukraine K. Volker also visited Ukraine.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine P. Klimkin had an important meeting with US Secretary of State M. Pompeo in Washington on November 16, ahead of a plenary meeting of the renewed US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission. During the meeting, they worked out mechanisms for further achievement of goals in relations between Ukraine and the United States, which were set by the presidents of the two countries during their previous bilateral meetings. Three new bilateral working groups on security and counteraction to Russian aggression, human rights and humanitarian issues, economy and energy were launched.

Energy dialogue, a wide range of issues ranging from cybersecurity and nuclear energy to coal export developed actively with the US partners. The USA and Ukraine held the second US-Ukraine dialogue on cybersecurity in Kyiv (November 5). The President, the Prime Minister and other Ukrainian high-ranking officials met US Secretary of Energy R. Perry in November to discuss, among other things, strengthening of Ukraine's energy independence. At the meeting with R. Perry, A. Parubiy invited US investors to co-manage the Ukrainian gas transport system (November 12).

Members of the US-Ukraine Business Council met Ukrainian MPs in Washington (February 9). In New York, President P. Poroshenko met representatives of the US-Ukraine Business Council and leading companies (September 26). The eighth meeting of the US-Ukraine Trade and Investment Council was held under the chairmanship of First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine, Minister of Economic Development and Trade S. Kubiv and Deputy US Trade Representative for Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Industrial Competitiveness J. Gerrish (October 23). During the meeting a wide range of issues concerning bilateral trade and economic relations, outlining areas where trade can be increased were discussed, as well as further steps to facilitate mutual access to markets coordinated.
The Ukrainian Embassy in the USA continues to work actively in various spheres in order to secure Ukrainian interests. In particular, it responds to information attacks and influences (for example, the Embassy debunked fake news about the detention of representatives of the Ukrainian space industry, exposed fake requests for phone conversations with US governors made allegedly on behalf of the ambassador, and commented on counteraction to the manifestations of anti-Semitism in Ukraine in response to the letter of 57 members of the US Congress to the Department of State accusing Ukraine of financing anti-Semitism).

Results

The United States does not recognize the annexation of Crimea and continues to condemn the Russian aggression in Donbas. On July 25, the US Department of State announced Crimea Declaration ("Pompeo Declaration") on further non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. In addition, it extended the list of sanctions against the Russian Federation over the annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine. It is noteworthy that for the first time the sanctions were imposed on individuals who are "supporting Russia's attempt to integrate Crimea region" through private investment or those that are engaging in serious human rights abuses. Also, the USA officially condemned the so-called "elections" held in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in November.

The US Senate unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the Russian aggression against Ukrainian ships in the Kerch Strait in November.

The USA approved USD 250 mln in security assistance to Ukraine, which is foreseen by the US defence budget for 2019, although it is less than previous year. The sale of the Javelin portable anti-tank missile systems to Ukraine for USD 47 mln was approved. The USA handed over two Island-class coast guard patrol boats to Ukraine.

The holding of a meeting of the US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission, which Ukrainian diplomats had worked hard to revive, was a significant achievement. Following the meeting of the US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission, a Joint Statement was published, saying, among other things, that "a robust UN-mandated international security force in the areas of Donbas controlled by Russia, including the Ukraine-Russia international border, would create the necessary security conditions for the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements".

Following the negotiations, P. Klimkin and R. Perry signed a joint declaration of intent to extend the Agreement between the governments of Ukraine and the US on Operational Safety Enhancements, Risk Reduction Measures and Nuclear Safety Regulation for Civil Nuclear Facilities by five years.
Additional agreements to the Agreement on the fulfilment of tasks in the sphere of development between the Governments of Ukraine and the United was signed to step up transparent and accountable governance with broad citizen participation. This was preceded by relevant instructions developed by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade in connection with the intention of the US Government to provide additional funds for the implementation of the Agreement objectives.

The United States continues to resist the construction of the Russian pipeline Nord Stream-2 and the second line of the Turkish Stream pipeline. The US House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution opposing completion of the Nord Stream-2 pipeline.

In order to increase sustainability of the local economy, to intensify development and to unite Ukrainian communities in Donbas, the USAID continues to provide assistance to Ukraine. Bilateral trade is growing: over nine months of 2018, exports have amounted to USD 797.5 mln and imports to USD 2.16 bln.

It was agreed to further cooperate in the implementation of the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), the Global Women’s Mentoring Partnership and the Future Leaders Exchange programme (FLEX) to train Ukrainian leaders. At a meeting between the Ambassador of Ukraine to the USA V. Chaly and the newly appointed US Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs M. Royce, the importance of continuing in Ukraine a special programme for students, J-1 Visa Summer Work Travel Program, was emphasized.

The resolution recognizing the Holodomor of 1932-1933 as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people was passed by the US Senate in October and by the House of Representatives in December. To date, 21 US states have recognized the Holodomor of 1932-33 as an act of genocide.
In 2018, France and Ukraine stepped up their relations in several areas: intensification of trade and investment, interparliamentary cooperation and ambitious cultural diplomacy. These initiatives failed to overcome the strategic gap regarding objectives of relations or primary focus on issues related to the settlement of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, however, they are creating a positive basis for favourable changes in the years to come.

### FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political interest/engagement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional cooperation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic vision</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General score</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>B-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political Interest / Engagement

Interest in France has slightly decreased compared with the previous year, however, it remains stable given the country's importance in the EU and its participation in the Normandy format. The involvement of ministries and agencies, stimulation of regional cooperation (Kherson-Normandy, Dnipro-Toulouse, etc.) and intensive cooperation with the French parliament, which was updated last year, are positive indications. Months-long attempts by French and Ukrainian political and civil circles to facilitate the release of Oleg Sentsov and other political prisoners were a good example of political engagement. The Annual Address of the President to the VRU did not mention France, while the Analytical Report to the Address only mentioned it in a perfunctory and descriptive manner.

Institutional Cooperation

There were no inter-institutional conflicts or disagreements over Ukraine's foreign policy with regard to France in 2018. However, various ministries and agencies worked in parallel rather than in a coordinated manner.

Strategic Vision

The situation with the absence of strategic vision has remained unchanged.

Activities

President P. Poroshenko met President E. Macron twice during multilateral events: as part of a working visit to Brussels for the NATO Summit (July 13) and during a visit to Paris for trilateral negotiations together with German Chancellor A. Merkel as part of the working visit on the occasion of Peace Day (November 10-11). They mostly discussed the Minsk agreements, a peacekeeping mission in Donbas, sanctions, the release of prisoners, etc. Two meetings were held within the Normandy format: talks between the ministers of foreign affairs (June 11) and a meeting of the MFAs political directors (July 26).

The ministers of foreign affairs exchanged visits in the first quarter of the year. P. Klimkin visited Paris (February 4-5; meetings with Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Le Drian, Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly, M. de Sarnez, Chairman of the Senate’s Committee for European Affairs, J. Bizet). The settlement of the situation in Donbas remained the main issue, but they also discussed expansion of economic and cultural cooperation, plans to launch the Year of the French Language in Ukraine and the Year of Ukrainian Language in France, involvement of France in the administrative reform.
French Minister of Foreign Affairs Le Drian visited Ukraine on March 23, met P. Poroshenko to discuss projects in the area of military-technical and economic cooperation, support for reforms. He also met Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin, First Deputy Speaker of the VRU I. Gerashchenko, and others. The ministers of foreign affairs of Ukraine, Germany and France planned to meet at the beginning of 2018, however this did not happen.

Parliamentary cooperation was active. A delegation led by Chairman of the France-Ukraine Friendship Group in the Senate H. Maurey and Chair of the France-Ukraine Friendship Group in the National Assembly V. Faure-Muntian visited Ukraine in early April. Within the framework of their visit, they met Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Bodnar (April 5), visited Donbas close to the occupied areas, and Odesa region. Chairman of the VRU A. Parubiy and a delegation of MPs visited Paris at the invitation of the Senate president (June 10-11).

A number of meetings took place for the first time after 2011: the Ukrainian-French Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation on French investment in Ukraine (October 30, Kyiv; chaired by the Minister of State Attached to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-Baptiste Lemoyne, and Vice Prime Minister H. Zubko), the Ukrainian-French Working Group on Agricultural Cooperation (October 23), the Ukrainian-French Business Council in the HQ of the National Business Association MEDEF (June 25, which included a discussion of infrastructure projects). Ukrainian delegations took part in business events in France such as "Ukraine – New Generation" conference (October 22), the SIAL Food Exhibition (October 23), and the French-Ukrainian economic forum for French companies (December 10).

Two visits by Minister of Internal Affairs A. Avakov (May 29 and October 5, together with the head of the State Emergency Service) related to the purchase of the Airbus helicopters and a working visit to Paris by a Kyiv delegation to study experience in the creation and functioning of capital agglomerations (November 4-8) deserve a separate mention.

The Embassy of Ukraine in France was engaged in active political dialogue in 2018. In particular, it held such events as a colloquium for French politicians and businessmen (January 24), meetings with members of the France-Ukraine Friendship Group in the Senate (November 14), members of the Eurasia Commission of the National Council of French Trade Advisers (December 12), with Director General for Political Affairs and Security at the French MFA N. de Riviere and with Director General for International Relations and Strategy at the French Ministry for Armed Forces A. Guitton (November 26), with members of the France-Ukraine Friendship Group in the National Assembly (November 27) and others. The ambassador met regional politicians (Ile-de-France, Dijon, Normand, and Brittany) and opened the Honorary Consulate in Toulouse (October).
The active involvement of French politicians, diplomats and the Ukrainian diaspora in France in the efforts to secure the release of O. Sentsov and other political prisoners (a hunger strike in shifts in front of the Russian Embassy in Paris, screening of O. Sentsov’s film "Gamer", an initiative of the Ambassador-at-large of France for human rights in Russia, articles in Le Monde newspaper (August 21, November 9), appeals to President Macron (August 20), who raised this issue during phone conversations and personal meetings with V. Putin) formed an important part of the French-Ukrainian agenda.

The embassy and its cultural centre, in particular, were extremely active in terms of cultural diplomacy. This concerns the honouring of Ukrainians killed in France during World War II, Days of Anne of Kyiv in Senlis (May 9-20) and an opening of the Monument to Anne of Kyiv in Toulouse (October 2), and events commemorating the Holodomor. There were art exhibitions, screenings of Ukrainian films, a stand at the Paris Book Fair, also Nouvelle Ukraine (New Ukraine) online platform was launched. The Francophone Week was held in Ukraine in February, and the Year of the French Language began on September 1 with the support of the Ministry of Education of Ukraine. Former President of France F. Hollande, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of France in 2014-2017 J. Audibert and Head of the France-Ukraine Friendship Group in the National Assembly in 2012-2017 R. Pauvros were decorated with orders.

At the same time, there were incidents at the local level: French MPs attended the opening of the Kerch Bridge, the signing of the agreement on fraternal relations between Marignane and Yevpatoriya, and a French court's refusal to close down the so-called "DPR representative office in Marseille" (September 6). However, the French MFA distances itself from such events and constantly emphasizes its support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. In addition, the Embassy and Ukrainian organisations in France responded to negative situations in cultural sphere (a participation of DPR militant Z. Prilepin in the Paris Book Fair, a presentation of Ukrainian ballet dancers as Russians, a screening of propaganda films, etc.).

Results

In 2018, Ukraine failed to overcome a trend of the French leadership having low interest in intensifying bilateral relations outside of the Normandy format. Despite repeatedly renewed invitations, President E. Macron did not visit Ukraine in 2018 (but made two visits to Russia), while the prime ministers did not have any direct contacts. However, France’s position on the key issues for Ukraine concerning the conflict remains satisfactory: the MFA issued a critical statement on the eve of the fourth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea (March 18), condemned construction of the Kerch Bridge by Russia (May 15), E. Macron and A. Merkel made a joint statement on the eve of the illegal elections in the occupied territories (November 11), France along with other G7 nations issued a tough statement on the Russian aggression in the Black Sea (November 27). At the same time, France still aims at a principled dialogue with Russia, expansion of bilateral economic cooperation and civil society contacts, thus opposing stronger sanctions and tougher policy with regard to the aggressor. As a side
effect of this, it is cautious about the European integration prospects of Ukraine, which is often referred to as a neighbour or a partner of the EU. France is not interested in the eastern direction of the European Neighbourhood Policy and this is unlikely to change unless business contacts reach a large scale.

Some successes have been achieved in intensifying economic cooperation, launching more ambitious cultural diplomacy in France and establishing inter-parliamentary cooperation, which, if successful, will create a basis for greater interest in bilateral relations or prospects of European integration of Ukraine at the highest political level.

Several agreements were signed during the year, in particular the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the French Republic on Official Support for the Establishment of a Unified Aviation Security and Civil Protection System in Ukraine (May 29), according to which Ukraine will purchase 55 helicopters from Airbus Helicopters to be used for border protection, civil protection and search and rescue operations. The first batch was received in December and handed over to the National Guard and the State Emergency Service. Ukravtodor and the French company Bouygues Construction signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the construction of toll roads (June 25). The work on new projects, in particular on the construction of a solar power station in Chornobyl, railway transport, water resources management and recycling, agricultural production, and so on was announced.

In terms of trade, there is an increase in French exports to Ukraine (+18% in 2017, +20% over nine months of 2018) primarily thanks to the AA and the FTA. However, it is not so good with Ukrainian exports for France: over nine months of 2018, they fell by almost 8%, which further tilts the trade between the two countries. France is the fourth biggest foreign investor and remains one of the biggest foreign employers.
In 2018, Ukraine managed to keep cooperation with Japan at an appropriate level thanks to government initiatives. However, political engagement and strategic vision of this direction are traditionally underperformed. The intensification of interaction in educational, medical and environmental sectors is a positive aspect. A significant contribution was made to the development of the National Police. An important component of fruitful cooperation is Japan’s active international support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Political Interest / Engagement

Traditionally, the involvement of various government bodies in this foreign policy direction was rather high and did not undergo any significant changes in 2018. It is clearly said in the Analytical Report to the Presidential Annual Address to the VRU that Ukraine has a political interest in Japan as one of the largest importing countries and an important world power, with which Ukraine has global partnership and which is not only one of the key partners in confronting Russian aggression but also the largest financial donor of Ukraine.

The introduction of modern energy saving technologies in the energy sector, industry, the municipal sector, attraction of Japanese investments in development of Ukraine's transport and energy infrastructure, as well as in the agrarian sector, in particular its facilities and equipment, remain promising areas of cooperation.

The political elites of both countries are aware that there is an objective connection in terms of the international legal context between the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and a problem of the Kuril Islands and it is used by the Russian Federation in the negotiation process.

Institutional Cooperation

Institutional interaction is non-systemic and happens largely outside the scope of coordinating structures, which quite surprisingly does not prevent certain governmental institutions from making significant progress in implementing Ukraine's foreign policy with regard to Japan. In 2018, the ministries of foreign affairs, defence, education, agrarian policy and food, internal affairs, environment and natural resources of Ukraine displayed high level of activity.

Strategic Vision

In strategic documents, Ukraine's bilateral relations with Japan are not considered separately. There were no comprehensive bilateral agreements signed in 2018.

Activities

The governments continued to cooperate in a traditionally very active manner: modernization of the Bortnychi aeration station is underway as well as reconstruction of inverted tunnels across the Dnipro River. This issue was raised at a press-conference on the allocation of USD 3.6 mln in assistance to Ukraine from the Government of Japan. The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Ukraine and Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Utilities took part in that press-conference (February 19).
Minister of Internal Affairs A. Avakov met Ambassador of Japan to Ukraine Sh. Sumi regarding the transfer of digital trunking communication equipment to the National Police (March 15).

During a working visit to Japan with a view to expanding Ukrainian agricultural and food exports, the head of the State Service of Ukraine for Food Safety and Consumer Protection held talks with representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan (April 19).

May was full of meetings. In early May, the Ukrainian delegation headed by Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources O. Semerak was on a working visit to Tokyo where they met the State Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan and the Minister of Environment of Japan, as well as representatives of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA, a governmental agency that issues technical grant assistance and preferential loans to foreign governments).

The Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry held a working meeting with representatives of the Embassy of Japan in Ukraine in May. The Head of the State Agency on Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving of Ukraine and representatives of the Japanese Embassy in Ukraine discussed positive dynamics in the development of renewable energy in Ukraine, legislative incentives and prospects, as well as opportunities for cooperation between Ukraine and Japan in the framework of "green" projects, especially on bioenergy and waste treatment (July 16).

The delegation of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan audited the state control system in the production of poultry and related products (July 16-23).

The first Ukrainian-Japanese security consultations were held in October during a visit to Japan by the delegation of the MoD of Ukraine headed by the Deputy Minister of Defence on European Integration. The delegation of the MoD and the MFA led by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs took part in the meeting and negotiations with the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the MFA, during which they discussed the topical issues of Ukrainian-Japanese bilateral relations and a possible start of cooperation between the naval forces of the two countries.

During her visit to Japan, Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine L. Hrynevych and newly-appointed Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan discussed recognition of diplomas, cooperation within international organizations and a resumption of the joint Ukrainian-Japanese Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, as well as a signing of the Agreement on Research Cooperation (October 9).
Results

Judging by this year’s results, the governments of Ukraine and Japan have worked fruitfully both bilaterally and within the framework of international organizations. In particular, Ukraine strongly condemns Pyongyang’s actions, calls on the world community to take additional measures to bring North Korea to responsibility and expresses full support for Japan in this regard. Japan consistently supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and the inviolability of its internationally recognized borders, and condemns a capture of Ukrainian ships in the Kerch Strait.

In 2018, the Japanese government allocated USD 3.6 mln to the implementation of seven projects by six UN agencies in Ukraine (IOM, the UNDP, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, the UN Office for Project Services, WHO) to support people and communities affected by the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

B-

European Union | A-
Eastern Partnership | B-
European Energy Community | C+
### EUROPEAN UNION

**A-**

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POLITICAL DIALOGUE

The year of 2018 was rather fruitful for EU-Ukraine relations, given a wide range of issues, which the sides could agree as mutually acceptable for cooperation. An important acknowledgment of Ukraine’s European integration success was signature of 1 bln euros in macrofinancial assistance by the EU. At the same time, because of the continuous Russian threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and a slower than expected pace of reforms, Ukraine’s initiatives to further deepen digital, energy and customs cooperation and join the Schengen Area remain open in the short term.

Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, Ukraine’s commitment to European integration continued to enjoy full support from all branches of power in Ukraine. As in the previous years, the President of Ukraine, the Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and the Minister of Foreign Affairs remained the key actors in this area.

After the President of Ukraine suggested on September 3 that the VRU should include in the Constitution Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic development direction, we can say that the country’s top leadership is consistent in its desire to make the chosen course irreversible. The fact that the President's initiative was supported at the first reading on November 22 by 311 votes of MPS, after the Constitutional Court found the proposals under consideration legitimate, proves the overwhelming unity in the parliament regarding Ukraine’s European integration.

Although the presidential election starts officially in the end of December 2018, a majority of candidates planning to compete for the president’s post have been declaring choice of further deepen relations between the EU and Ukraine in case of their victory. The most straightforward statements to this effect are made by the incumbent President.

Institutional Cooperation

In terms of institutions, the course for European integration has not changed essentially over the year. The year saw the first visible results of the Government Office for the Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration work that was set up in late 2017. In particular, the Government Office began to coordinate the systemic planning and implementation of state policy efforts in accordance with Ukraine’s commitments on European integration. Its most important achievement is the government-approved Action Plan for the implementation of the Association Agreement, which sets a clear framework and outlines responsibility of the sides. It includes around 2,000 activities, each referring to a particular article of the Association Agreement or introducing the EU’s acquis communautaire in 27 areas. The implementation of the activities is assigned to 77 responsible and 29 additional public offices, given their consent. The
Action Plan thus creates a full picture and simplifies not only the understanding of the algorithm of Ukraine's European integration progress but also control over implementation of tasks by both the government and civil society.

Still, according to the most optimistic assessments, the Government have implemented the Association Agreement by less than 50%, which attests to significant obstacles to the practical implementation of plans and negatively affects the image of "European integration officials" as well as casts doubt on the Ukrainian authorities' capacity to deliver on their promises.

**Strategic Vision**

In the coming years, there is no reason to expect a more strategic treaty with the EU than the existing Association Agreement. Its timeliness is a different issue. In 2018, for the first time in five years, the Association Council decided to review the AA where it talks about energy, digital market and mutual recognition of certificate of conformance for industrial output, which opens new prospects and opportunities for Ukraine.

The adoption of a roadmap of legislative support for the implementation of the AA for 2018-2019 deserves a separate mention. It lists 57 legislative acts, which Parliament should adopt by the areas of their conformity to the articles of the Association Agreement and the Annual Plan to the Communication Strategy in the sphere of European Integration for 2018-2019. The latter outlines the plan and procedures for a public outreach campaign.

**Activities**

The volume of contacts between Kyiv and Brussels has remained traditionally high since 2014, but in 2018, the number of meetings, joint events and phone conversations between the Ukrainian leadership and the EU partners and member states increased compared with the previous years. However, active efforts to promote the bilateral agenda gave way to the need to discuss more burning issues such as protection of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty and counteraction to the Russian aggression due to the escalation of the situation in the Sea of Azov. Therefore, efforts to transfer to practical domain the initiatives on Ukraine's integration into the Digital Single Market, the Energy Union, the Schengen Area and deeper customs cooperation have slowed down significantly.

**Results**

The Joint Statement following the 20th EU-Ukraine Summit in Brussels on July 9, 2018 contains the most exhaustive summary of Ukraine's European integration successes. In particular, it mentions positive results of reforms in the areas of health, pensions, decentralisation, public administration, as well as public procurement and
environment. However, it says the EU looks forward to the further efforts by Ukraine to improve the business and investment climate and protect the rights of economic operators, to continue reforms in the energy sector and so on.

The Ukrainian leadership also managed to launch a joint discussion on deeper interaction to prevent interference in elections in Ukraine and the EU as well as on initiatives for the EU member states to become "patrons" of towns and districts within the government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In September, the European Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Ukraine for Macro-Financial Assistance of 1 bln euros (which was of economic as well as political significance) and approved the first tranche to Ukraine in late November.

**ECONOMIC COOPERATION**

Positive trends in the development of economic cooperation between Ukraine and the EU continued in 2018. Political unity and proper inter-institutional cooperation in the implementation of European integration policy are maintained. There is a stronger trend towards higher foreign trade. A number of agreements on infrastructure, energy efficiency and technical cooperation were signed based on the results of the fifth meeting of the EU-Ukraine Association Council. The slow pace of the Association Agreement implementation, in particular in terms of the DCFTA and attraction of European investments remain an issue of the bilateral agenda.

**Political Interest / Engagement**

Ukraine's European advancement remained a trend in 2018. All political actors (the President, the parliament and the government) demonstrate interest and engagement in the process of European integration. The Association Agreement, as regard the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, and attention of the main stakeholders to its implementation remain a foundation of economic cooperation with the EU. Economic rapprochement with the EU covers a wide range of issues, including outside of the scope of the DCFTA (small and medium business, digital economy, financial services, transport, regional and cross-border cooperation, social and labour relations, etc.). The use of economic levers in deterring Russian aggression and supporting reforms in Ukraine with macro-financial assistance remains a topical and effective direction of joint efforts with the European partners. Unlike in 2017, this year's Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU does not set new tasks for the development of economic cooperation with the EU.
Institutional Cooperation

In 2018, the authorities ensured an adequate level of institutional cooperation, without any significant confrontation. In particular, an agreement was reached and a sensitive issue for Europe concerning a moratorium on the export of untreated timber was lifted. The Government Office for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and the MEDT ensure internal coordination on European integration. Inter-institutional cooperation on economic matters is implemented through such formats as the Export Promotion Council and the Export Facilitation Office. Dialogue between the authorities and the EU-Ukraine Civil Society Platform and Ukrainian National Platform of the EaP CSF is expanding. At the bilateral level, cooperation with the European Commission's Support Group for Ukraine continues, formats provided by the AA and the EaP projects are in operation, new formats created in line with the requirements of the Association Agreement – Council on Trade and Sustainable Development and Advisory Group on Trade and Sustainable Development – were established.

Strategic Vision

The strategic vision for economic cooperation with the EU continues to be based on the provisions of the Association Agreement as regard to the DCFTA, which main implementation document is the Association Agreement Implementation Action Plan approved by the CMU a year earlier. The medium-term objectives include the provisions of the Joint Working Document "Eastern Partnership – 20 Deliverables by 2020: Focusing on key priorities and tangible results", where economic issues are included in Priority I "Economic development and market opportunities". The Export Strategy of Ukraine (Roadmap for Strategic Trade Development) for 2017-2021, which was approved by the CMU on December 27, 2017, contains separate clauses concerning the development of cooperation with the EU. The MEDT holds national consultations on the development of sectoral and cross-sectoral export strategies. A draft Strategy for Ukraine's Integration into the Single Digital Market of the EU and a plan for its implementation were presented at the "Ukraine in the European Digital Single Market" forum (December 18). The 2018 Annual Priority Action Plan of the Government focuses on implementation of the tasks inside the country. Initiatives on joining the EU Customs Union, the Energy Union of the EU and the European Common Aviation Area in 2018, which were announced a year earlier, remain unchanged.

Activities

The 20th EU-Ukraine Summit summed up the results of previous activities rather than determined further steps how to deepen the economic integration of partners. The EU said in the joint statement that it looked forward to the further efforts by Ukraine needed to improve the business and investment climate and to protect the rights of economic operators, including intellectual property rights, geographical indications and maritime port services and treatment.
The fourth meeting of the EU-Ukraine Association Committee discussed the progress in implementation of the AA, economic and sectoral integration, strategic communications and further cooperation. The emergence of new cooperation formats materialized in the form of the inauguration meeting of the Council on Trade and Sustainable Development and a meeting of the Ukrainian side of the Advisory Group on Trade and Sustainable Development. In addition, the second meeting of the EU-Ukraine Trade and Sustainable Development Sub-Committee and the fifth meeting of the EU-Ukraine Association Council took place in 2018. During the year, numerous business events took place, including meetings of platforms, panels, and workshops at ministerial and expert levels. Work was carried out on the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine as the Borrower and the EU as the Lender and the Loan Facility Agreement between Ukraine as the Borrower, the National Bank of Ukraine as the Borrower’s Financial Agent and the EU as the Lender (regarding the EU’s macro-financial assistance of up to 1 billion euros to Ukraine). In its place, the situation with the implementation of the AA as regards to the DCFTA is becoming complicated because its pace is not in line with commitments assumed by Ukraine.

Results

The EU Association Implementation Report on Ukraine notes some progress in sanitary and phytosanitary issues, corporate law, public procurement and environment. In particular, Ukraine improved the management of state assets as a result of consistent economic reforms (big state-owned enterprises continued to increase profits under the management of independent supervisory boards, hundreds of smaller enterprises were successfully privatised), the legislation on energy efficiency was enacted with operationalisation of the Energy Efficiency Fund. However, there has been little progress in creation of independent gas and electricity transmission system’s operators.

Additional funding to the tune of 1bln euros became available to Ukraine as a result of the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding and theLoan Facility Agreement concerning the fourth programme of macro-financial assistance to Ukraine. Based on the results of the fifth meeting of the EU-Ukraine Association Council (December 17), a number of agreements on infrastructure, energy efficiency and technical cooperation were signed. The EU’s share in Ukraine’s foreign trade exceeds 40% with a stable upward tendency. The EU’s intentions to strengthen investment-related support with the help of the External Investment Plan remained declarative. In 2018, the EU again renewed economic sanctions against Russia, which is a success of Ukrainian diplomacy in conditions of counteraction to hybrid threats because maintaining European unity on this issue is becoming an increasingly more difficult task.
The Eastern Partnership lost attention in comparison with the previous year, which is traditional for the periods between the summits. In 2018, activities within the initiative shifted to the operational level and concerned the implementation of "20 Deliverables by 2020", with the main focus being on evaluation of the first results. The monitoring by the European External Action Service arrived at positive conclusions regarding an approval of the investment plan for the TEN-N transport network, an increase in trade between the EU and partners, and stronger financial support for small and medium-sized businesses. Strategic prospects of the initiative remain uncertain given a low interest of Ukraine and other member states and the absence of new ambitious goals.
Political Interest / Engagement

Ukraine continues to view the Eastern Partnership in the context of additional opportunities for deepening European integration outside the Association Agreement framework. Therefore, the initiative as a whole and its sectoral components do not evoke significant interest among the key stakeholders. Despite a statement by the EU High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission F. Mogherini that the EaP is a key component of the EU’s foreign policy, the reality shows the lack of interest among the main political actors in Ukraine with regard to engagement in its implementation. Traditionally, the year between the summits of the Eastern Partnership is marked by a decline in interest in the issue. The year of 2018 was an exception to a certain extent only because of the first progress evaluation on implementation of the Joint Staff Working Document "Eastern Partnership – 20 Deliverables by 2020". Ukraine's main attention is still focused on the implementation of provisions of the AA, which reflects both on the domestic agenda and on bilateral relations with the EU.

Institutional cooperation

As in the previous years, inter-institutional cooperation is ensured by the Government Office for Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. The Office is subordinated to the Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and jointly with the MFA oversees domestic coordination. It also works with deputy ministers for European integration although it does not have a separate department dealing with the EaP. Attempts to coordinate positions with partner states are mostly registered on the part of civil society and above all concern the signatories of the Association Agreements. Structured interaction with a wider range of civil society organisations has an additional impulse as a result of institutional support from the EU's Civic Synergy Project, which facilitates stronger cooperation with decision makers both in Ukraine and at the level of the European institutions.

Strategic Vision

The Joint Staff Working Document "Eastern Partnership – 20 Deliverables by 2020: Focusing on key priorities and tangible results" currently plays a role of the roadmap for cooperation in the Eastern Partnership. The document has an added value for Ukraine in comparison with the Association Agreement and relevant implementation documents. Some deliverables complement and clarify the scope of cooperation and tools envisaged by the AA, they also contribute to the deeper reforming of areas that are essential to Ukrainian society. However, its provisions have not been extrapolated to national official documents of either strategic or tactical level. The 2018 Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU does not give new guidelines, which could be achieved within the framework of the Eastern Partnership. As before, there is no strategy for developing relations with partner states, which once again confirms that Ukraine (and other EaP participants) is more interested in the bilateral track of the EaP rather than a multilateral one. Strategic planning within the Eastern Partnership
is virtually impossible due to the EU’s uncertainty about the future of the initiative. Even the next summit, which was to take place in the anniversary year of 2019, was postponed until 2020.

Activities

The main activities within the Eastern Partnership currently focus on the implementation of "20 Deliverables by 2020", which are divided into four priorities and three crosscutting points. Despite the absence of clear legal commitments regarding their implementation, Ukraine tries to use the proposed instruments, which, to various extents, contribute to the implementation of initiated reforms and the Association Agreement. The most significant official event in 2018 was the meeting of the EaP ministers of foreign affairs within the framework of the EU Council meeting on the evaluation of results of the initiative and its prospects for the future.

The international dimension included traditional formats such as formal and informal ministerial meetings, thematic platforms and panels, EURONEST, CORLEAP (the 8th meeting was held in Kyiv); there is cooperation with the Civil Society Forum (Ukrainian National Platform).

In 2018, it was civil society that mostly set the tone in relations within the EaP. In particular, it presented its own assessment of Ukraine’s progress in implementing the 20 Deliverables of the Eastern Partnership by 2020. Pushing forward the issue of the necessity of joining efforts by the Association Agreement signatories in the framework of the EaP continued in the format of the Second Forum of Associations as an expert platform for discussing common challenges and successful practices.

Results

In the absence of new ambitious initiatives and low political interest in the EaP, main results relate to the implementation of "20 Deliverables by 2020". The monitoring by the EEAS lists examples of positive change such as an approval of the investment plan for the TEN-N transport network, an increase in trade between the EU and partners, stronger financial support for small and medium-sized businesses, and the launch of the Eastern Partnership European School. The smallest progress has been registered in anticorruption reforms and the reform of the judiciary, media freedom and human rights. According to local civil society experts, Ukraine is most actively advancing in the areas of fighting corruption, reforming public administration, security, developing small and medium-sized business, establishing a free trade area with the EU, environmental protection, visa liberalisation and so on. There was little progress in the following three areas: judicial reform, energy supply and harmonisation of digital markets. There are no noticeable shifts in the consolidation of partner states’ efforts to develop internal interaction within the framework of the EaP and to promote mutual interests at the EU level. As a result, it is an urgent task to identify the Eastern Partnership’s prospects after 2020 on the agenda of cooperation with partners in the EU and EaP states is.
In 2018, Ukraine and the Energy Community continued to cooperate in the context of the implementation of the EU legislation on electricity, gas and oil, the guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, security of supply, environmental protection, energy efficiency, renewable energy and statistics. The Energy Community Secretariat as an operator of the EU4Energy project (that replaced INNOGATE) expanded its activities in Ukraine, noting some achievements (the Energy Efficiency Fund) and unfinished projects (unbundling of Naftogaz of Ukraine) in 2018.
Political Interest / Engagement

Political interest concerning the Energy Community is high due to the continued reform of the gas and electricity markets, an introduction of energy efficiency practices, environmental protection, existing challenges to energy security, in particular, an urgency of the issues concerning the effective functioning of the gas transport system. MPs from the Committee on Fuel and Energy, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety of the VRU were active, holding hearings and working meetings on specific issues of the implementation of the European energy legislation. The Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Regional Development and the State Agency on Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving demonstrated great interest and participated in numerous events of the Energy Community. An additional interest was prompted by the expansion of cooperation between the Energy Community, the EU4Energy project and the International Energy Agency on the organization of training for employees of public offices, the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities and energy companies.

Institutional Cooperation

During the year, there was a higher level of interaction between individual central executive bodies, the CMU and the Verkhovna Rada on the elaboration of issues related to the Energy Community.

Representatives of the authorities took an active part in the events organized in Ukraine and in the EU, in particular, in MPs' working meetings in Vienna to elaborate amendments to the Law on "Renewable Energy" concerning the introduction of auctions.

However, there is still a problem with the quality of legal drafts, in particular, coordination of energy and environmental issues with the medium and long-term objectives of economic development. Such a situation slowed down the preparation of documents. In some cases, the Energy Community even sent back the cabinet-approved documents with critical remarks.

Strategic Vision

The blueprints confirm the strategic vision of the Ukraine's place within the EU single energy market and expand a list of integration directions. In particular, the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU sets a goal of integration into the Energy Union, while the 2018 Government Action Plan envisages specific actions for completing the unbundling of Naftogaz and sets out clear criteria for its implementation.
According to the Association Agreement, which envisages a reform of the electricity market, the implementation of requirements of the Law "On the electricity market" concerning the separation of functions of generation, transport, distribution and supply of electricity continues. Central authorities and businesses have begun preparing legislation on auctions for renewable energy.

Activities

In 2018, the Ukrainian authorities and the Energy Community continued to cooperate in the implementation of energy legislation. EU experts took part in a series of training events for representatives from Ukraine, such as EC Summer School and EC Regulation School. Active cooperation has begun in new directions such as cyber security and investment security of the energy sector. Relevant tools and programmes are being prepared.

Secretariat heads J. Kopač and D. Buschle had numerous meetings with Ukrainian officials during which they in particular discussed the monopoly of regional gas distribution companies, the delay in the Ukrainian energy reform, disputes between state-owned companies and the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities. For their part, the heads of the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Ecology, representatives of the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities and state energy companies took an active part in the EU’s thematic events, presenting achievements in reforms implementation in such spheres as gas market, electricity market, integration of renewable energy sources, ecology, climate protection, development of the regulatory framework, etc.

The EU4Energy Governance project prepared a national action programme for Ukraine and conducted a series of thematic events for representatives of government, business and civil society. In order to facilitate implementation of the law, six rounds of high-level political negotiations were organized.

Results

In 2018, the overall dynamics of relations remained positive. The EU estimates the level of legislation implementation for gas at 43% (moderate progress), for electricity at 25% (early stage), for oil at 10% (implementation in the oil sector is only commencing), for energy efficiency at 68% (good progress), and for renewable energy sources at 59% (moderate progress). An important result was an adoption of the secondary legislation for a new electricity market (market rules, transfer system codes, commercial accounting). The removal of regulatory barriers after the adoption of the Law "On public procurement" ensured development of energy services market in Ukraine. A single national register of environmental impact assessments was created.
The EU focuses mainly on internal issues, ignoring the important factors of supply security during the construction of bypass pipelines (Nord Stream 2), neglecting Ukraine's interests in the development plans for EU infrastructure under the Association Agreement and bringing relations with Gazprom in line with the EU law.

The reason for this is the contradiction between the provisions of the AA, in particular Article 273 "Transport", Article 274 "Cooperation on infrastructure" and Article 278 "Relationship with the Energy Community Treaty". They say that the Energy Community Treaty prevails while the signatoryy-states are not considered a part of the European energy space. Accordingly, Ukraine's requirement to apply principles of the Third Energy Package to contracts with Russian Gazprom (an independent operator, direct contracts with European companies, tariffs on the basis of European network codes) are not perceived by the EU member states as part of their obligations, but only as a possible option in case of substantiation of their economic rationality.
In 2018, Ukraine and NATO continued active cooperation at all levels. The integration of Ukraine into NATO and security sector reform in accordance with the Alliance standards remained among the country’s priorities. Voting for amendments to the Constitution and a new procedure for the preparation of the Annual National Programme were important steps. Active efforts at all levels, as well as constant contacts at the highest level, have contributed to NATO’s unchanged position with regard to Ukraine despite the blocking of the NATO-Ukraine Commission by Hungary.
Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, cooperation with NATO remained one of the key issues on Ukraine's foreign policy agenda. In his Annual Address to the VRU and other numerous speeches, the President touched upon the issue of cooperation with NATO, where Ukraine is a "solid partner making a significant contribution to the overall continental and transatlantic security", as well as future membership and military reform according to NATO standards. The President paid equally significant attention to Euro-Atlantic integration in his speech at the 13th Ambassadorial (August 28). The issue enjoys a fair amount of attention in the Analytical Report to the President of Ukraine's Annual Address to the VRU.

The 2018 Government Action Plan includes the issues of Ukraine's integration into NATO, reform of the Armed Forces in accordance with NATO standards and diplomatic support for the NATO-Ukraine dialogue.

Representatives of the majority of political parties, heads of factions and the Verkhovna Rada Speaker spoke in favour of Ukraine's accession to NATO, continued reform of the security sector in line with NATO standards and more active cooperation, especially after the aggression against Ukrainian Navy personnel in November. However, there are certain differences in their views about the possible timing of such accession, conducting a referendum and so on.

Despite the lack of consensus on Euro-Atlantic integration among the parliamentary parties, as seen during a discussion on amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (the Opposition Bloc did not give a single vote in support of the amendments to the Constitution regarding the strategic course of the state for acquiring full-fledged membership of Ukraine in the EU and NATO), the fact that a constitutional majority of 311 votes passed the bill in the first reading attests to a significant political interest in the issue and a consolidated position of the majority of political forces.

Institutional Cooperation

There was high-level institutional cooperation on Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation with NATO. Most of the coordination and work took place at the level of the Government Office on Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The 2018 Government Action Plan pays particular attention to various issues of reforming the Armed Forces and other agencies of the security sector, as well as informing the public about Euro-Atlantic integration. The MFA, the MoD and the MEDT were involved in the implementation of state policy on Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation with NATO.

In October, the President of Ukraine signed Decree No 298/2018 "On Annual National Programmes under the auspices of the NATO-Ukraine Commission". It introduces a new procedure for the development and evaluation of Annual National Programmes.
and is expected to facilitate better planning by various government offices involved in the implementation of the programme.

There was coordination of efforts on mitigating consequences of the blocking of the NATO-Ukraine Commission by Hungary.

**Strategic Vision**

NATO takes a significant place in all strategic documents adopted in Ukraine in previous years. The main focus is on reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the security sector as a whole in accordance with NATO standards, cooperation and possible membership. In 2018, there were two significant changes. The Verkhovna Rada passed in the first reading the changes to the Constitution of Ukraine, which enshrined Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic choice. Another important step was a signing of the decree on a new procedure for the preparation of Annual National Programmes under the auspices of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (October 2).

**Activities**

In 2018, Ukraine and NATO actively cooperated at all levels. The President of Ukraine held a number of meetings with NATO’s Secretary General, including in Munich (February) and Brussels (July, December), as well as a series of phone conversations. Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin met with a head of NATO in March and October, Defence Minister S. Poltorak met the NATO Secretary General in May. On December 4, P. Klimkin took part in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council with Georgia and Ukraine in the NATO HQ. The discussion focused on Russian aggression against Ukraine in the Black Sea and NATO’s comprehensive answer to systematic Russian threats to security in the Black Sea region.

There were regular working visits and meetings at the level of Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration I. Klympush-Tsintsadze and representatives of the Government Office. In particular, in March they discussed cooperation in the framework of NATO's Science for Peace and Security Programme, NATO-Ukraine dialogue on cyber and energy security, and on enhancing the role of women in security. In December, they focused on the implementation of the 2018 Annual National Programme.

Speaker of the Parliament A. Parubiy met NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg in Brussels on November 27. They discussed issues of the Russian aggression and an introduction of martial law in Ukraine.

The Ministry of Defence and the General Staff continued active efforts at the level of consultations, joint activities, foreign advisers’ work in Ukraine, adaptation of relevant standards and procedures. General Staff Commander V. Muzhenko took part in two meetings of the NATO Military Committee in Brussels (January). Despite
the continued blockade of the top-level NATO-Ukraine Commission meetings by Hungary, there were regular meetings at the level of ambassadors and representatives, as well as tripartite meetings with the participation of Georgia. In 2018, the meetings focused not only on assistance to Ukraine but also on the issue of regional security and participation in international operations, in particular in Afghanistan.

In March, Brussels hosted a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Military Reform, which discussed priorities in the development of the Ukrainian defence industry and the state enterprise Ukroboronprom, etc. On May 14, the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee and the Ukrainian delegation met in the NATO HQ as part of the Planning and Review Process (a key mechanism for achieving interoperability of particular forces and means of partner countries). A plenary meeting of the NATO Aviation Committee in November 2018 was attended by representatives of the State Aviation Service of Ukraine and the Ukrainian State Air Traffic Services Enterprise (Ukraerotsentr).

A scheduled meeting of the management board of the NATO Programme for Professional Development of Civilian Personnel in the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine took place in December. Main attention was paid to new modalities in the development of Annual National Programmes and organization of the Champions 100 training module.

A big delegation from Ukraine took part in the NATO Brussels Summit in July. MPs and experts also attended a parallel conference.

On February 14, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted an action plan to implement the Concept on Improving Public Awareness on Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic Integration in 2018. At the same time, this issue is given much less attention than European integration and the Association Agreement.

At this stage, the Ukrainian national contingent and personnel carry out missions in NATO's Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and the KFOR peace-operation in Kosovo. Support for the Operation Sea Guardian continues as well.

In November, the Government of Ukraine hosted the conference "Lessons from the Hybrid Decade: What to Know for a Successful Movement" within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Platform on countering hybrid warfare.

Results

In 2018, Ukraine and NATO continued their high-level cooperation with the aim of reforming Ukraine's security sector, enhancing interoperability and responding to security challenges. NATO continued providing financial and advisory assistance to Ukraine and conducting joint training.
On September 20, the VRU adopted the Resolution "On inclusion in the agenda of the draft law on amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (regarding the strategic course of the state for acquiring full-fledged membership of Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and its referral to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine". The bill was declared constitutional in November.

On September 6, Commander of the Land Forces of the AFU, Col. Gen. S. Popko, and Commander of NATO's Allied Land Command, Lt. Gen J. C. Thomson III, signed the Letter of Cooperation between the Commands, an agreement aimed at improving interoperability of the command and units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and NATO's member states, in particular through the introduction of NATO standards, as well as exchange of experience in preparing for and conducting combat actions.

On December 13, representatives of Ukraine, Slovakia and the NATO Support and Supply Agency signed in Brussels a series of agreements that will enable a start of the practical implementation phase of the NATO Trust Fund NSPA – Ukraine EOD & Counter IED.

The development of a new type of NATO-Ukraine Annual National Programmes in accordance with the principles of strategic planning has begun. A meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the ambassadorial level with participation of NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg and Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration I. Klympush-Tsintsadze took place in Brussels on December 18. It focused on the evaluation of Ukraine's implementation of the Annual National Programme in 2018 under the auspices of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. The participants highly assessed the implementation of the ANP 2018 and welcomed the introduction of new methodologies for the development of the ANP 2019.

The Declaration of the NATO Summit in Brussels (July) sounds favourable to Ukraine, clearly defines Russian aggression against Ukraine and regional security, outlines further steps for cooperation in combating hybrid threats, support for reforms and cooperation. Despite the fact that the document confirmed the decision of the NATO Bucharest Summit 2008, there are noticeable differences in the wording of clauses on Georgia (Article 65) and Ukraine (Article 66), where Ukraine's aspirations are "acknowledged" while Georgia is called an "aspirant country", which "will become a member of the Alliance".

Although under the 2018 Government Programme, Ukraine had planned to join the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in 2018, procedures have not been completed. Therefore, it is not expected to join the Centre until the summer of 2019. The issue of Hungary blocking the NATO-Ukraine Commission remains unsettled.
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In 2018, Ukrainian-Belarusian relations stabilised while human cooperation restored its positive dynamics. The main event of the year was the Forum of Regions of Ukraine and Belarus in Homel with the participation of the heads of the states and numerous official delegations from both sides. During the year, security issues moved down the bilateral agenda, giving place to traditional trade issues.

**Belarus**

**B+**

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Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, political interest in Belarus decreased to some extent, which can be linked to a lessening of newsworthy security-related events (in contrast to 2017 – Zapad military exercises and other events). Ukraine demonstrated reactive approach to the actions or statements made by Minsk (for example, traditional voting in the UN GA against Ukrainian resolutions or the manipulation of data on the number of Ukrainian refugees in the Republic of Belarus).

At the end of 2018, Ukraine paid particular attention to the escalation of the political conflict between Belarus and Russia, which caused a wave of panic in the Ukrainian media regarding a possible seizure of the neighbouring state by the aggressor.

Institutional Cooperation

Preparations for the First Forum of Regions of Ukraine and Belarus required active institutional cooperation between the MFA and other central and regional authorities. The official Ukrainian delegation at the forum had over 700 members: respective representatives of ministries and agencies, the leadership of 17 regions and a number of Ukrainian companies.

Traditionally active was the Ukrainian part of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Belarusian Mixed Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation. At the end of 2018, the interagency coordination of efforts with regard to Belarus benefited from the need to develop scenarios for response to a sudden escalation in relations between Belarus and Russia.

Strategic Vision

Despite the fact that during the First Forum of Regions of Ukraine and Belarus in October, the President of Ukraine called Belarus a strategic trade partner, Belarus is not mentioned in strategic documents. However, active bilateral interagency contacts contributed to continued medium- and short-term programming and planning. In addition to a number of documents prepared last year, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Belarus approved a plan of consultations for 2018-2019 and a perspective plan for the demarcation of the state border between Ukraine and Belarus for 2018-2026.
Activities

In the beginning of 2018, P. Poroshenko and A. Lukashenko had two phone conversations. In October, the President of Ukraine went on a working visit to Homel where he met the President of Belarus and took part in the First Forum of Regions of Ukraine and Belarus. The forum has become a new large-scale project for improving interregional and inter-agency cooperation.

The 26th meeting of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Belarusian Mixed Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation, chaired by the respective vice prime ministers, was held in October before the forum. The final Protocol was signed at the end of the event.

The two foreign ministries had active contacts. In February, Belarus hosted general consultations at the level of respective deputy ministers, and in September, there were consultations on consular issues. At its 17th meeting in June, the Joint Ukrainian-Belarusian Demarcation Commission decided to begin in 2019 a demarcation of the Ukrainian-Belarusian state border in the exclusion zone of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant.

The Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Belarusian Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation had its 11th meeting in September. During the Forum of Regions, the 7th meeting of the Ukrainian-Belarusian Advisory Council for Business Cooperation, as well as a number of sectoral events took place. Meetings of the Ukrainian-Belarusian expert forum with the participation of diplomats and experts took place in November and December.

Days of Ukrainian Culture in the Republic of Belarus, including concerts, film screenings and other events, were held in July. Ukraine’s Embassy to the Republic of Belarus worked closely with representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora.

In 2018, the sides continued negotiations on the launch of a Ukrainian foreign broadcasting TV channel in Belarus. However, no final decision has been made by the end of the year.
Results

In 2018, Belarus traditionally voted against Ukrainian resolutions in the UN, demonstrating significant coordination of diplomatic efforts with Russia. However, Minsk did not abandon the idea of actively moderating the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict despite Ukraine's scepticism regarding this initiative.

Belarus also tried to help Ukraine overcome consequences of the conflict in a practical way. In June, it sent 55 tonnes of the second batch of humanitarian aid to residents of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Within the framework of the First Forum of Regions of Ukraine and Belarus, the sides signed the Readmission Agreement. Overall, they signed contracts worth more than USD 100 mln, as well as nine documents on cooperation between individual regions and cities of the two states. The parties initiated creation of a joint Ukrainian-Belarusian working group on interregional cooperation, as well as a working group on anti-dumping restrictions. The latter is especially important considering that the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Belarus is a member, introduced seven anti-dumping measures and opened three investigations with regard to Ukrainian goods.

Trade turnover between the countries reached almost USD 5.1 billion in 2018. At the same time, exports of Ukrainian goods grew by 14% compared with the previous year, having reached USD 1.3 billion. Imports from Belarus showed positive dynamics at the level of 18%, amounting to USD 3.8 billion.
In 2018, Ukraine’s foreign policy with regard to Georgia was based on a certain breakthrough in bilateral relations, which took place a year earlier. Active effort taken by the Ukraine’s Embassy in Georgia on the 100th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two states significantly improved the quality of bilateral dialogue and prepared the ground for its further development after the presidential elections in Georgia at the end of 2018. As a year earlier, thanks to a joint position on a wide range of issues, both countries confirmed their preparedness to continue cooperation in the framework of strategic partnership.
Political Interest / Engagement

Alongside the traditional areas of cooperation and a broad bilateral agenda, the year of 2018 was marked by high interest in future development of bilateral relations due to the presidential elections in Georgia. Ukrainian-Georgian relations (albeit indirectly) have until recently been under the strong influence of domestic politics. Considering the factor of Russia's influence on both states, Ukraine objectively cannot stay aside of political processes in Georgia while certainly respecting the friendly state's sovereignty. Ukraine's official representatives monitored the presidential election in Georgia. However, at the level of parliamentary forces, Ukrainian politicians did not make any meaningful statements on the situation in Georgia or on the development of bilateral relations. President P. Poroshenko in his Annual Address to the VRU traditionally mentioned Georgia only in the context of the Russian aggression against this country in 2008. However, in his congratulatory message to the newly-elected President of Georgia S. Zurabishvili, the President of Ukraine wished her "every success in serving Georgia for the sake of the democratic European development of the country and consolidation of society" and expressed conviction that a "strategic partnership between our countries will further deepen".

Institutional Cooperation

The appointment of Ukraine's ambassador to Georgia in 2017 facilitated the work of those public offices, which were in charge of further promotion of Ukrainian-Georgian relations in 2018, including the Administration of the President of Ukraine, the CMU and the VRU. Responsible ministries and agencies worked on the bilateral agenda in a regular mode. There was multilateral cooperation in such international organisations as the PACE, the BSEC, GUAM and under the aegis of NATO and the EU.

Strategic Vision

The Declaration on Strategic Partnership signed by Ukraine and Georgia in 2017 laid the foundation for further development of joint measures aimed at the implementation of strategic priorities by both states in the process of getting closer to NATO and the EU. However, since the declaration was signed, the level of its implementation has largely been timed with a view to 2019 and subsequent years, taking into account domestic political processes in both countries. Three new documents were added to the scope of legal regulations and agreements.
Activities

Active efforts continued to be put into relations with Georgia at all levels in 2018. Ukraine managed to keep the high pace of official visits to Georgia and top-level bilateral meetings. First Deputy Speaker of the VRU I. Gerashchenko and other MPs monitored the presidential elections in Georgia as PACE observers. On December 16, an official delegation of Ukraine headed by First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine S. Kubiv attended the inauguration of the newly-elected President of Georgia S. Zurabishvili.

In early October, a delegation of Ukrainian MPs including Parliament Speaker A. Parubiy paid a working visit to Georgia to attend the inauguration session of the Georgia-Moldova-Ukraine Interparliamentary Assembly. The previous working visit to Georgia by the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament took place on May 25-27, during which he attended a solemn ceremony marking the 100th anniversary of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine P. Rozenko paid a solidarity visit to Georgia in August on the 10th anniversary of the Russian occupation of a part of its territory.

During a meeting between Minister of Internal Affairs A. Avakov and Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia Gю Gakharia in September, the Ministries of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and Georgia agreed to cooperate in fighting organized crime and "code-bound criminals". In October, Ukraine and Georgia agreed to set up a quadripartite interstate group on fight against transnational crimes, which would also involve Azerbaijan and Turkey. Ukrainian diplomats were quite active in terms of the MFA efforts. On March 27, the Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine under the MFA S. Korsunsky, met Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia V. Makharoblishvili. Ukrainian MPs, representatives of the MoD and the National Police of Ukraine, and Ukraine’s Ambassador to Georgia I. Dolhov took part in the International Conference "Ukraine-Georgia-NATO: Modern security challenges in the Black Sea Region" held as part of the Ukraine-Solidarity-NATO Project in Batumi on April 24.

Results

Based on the results of 2018, Ukrainian-Georgian relations continued to gather momentum. In October, Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Groysman and his Georgian counterpart M. Bakhtadze signed an agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of Georgia on the mutual cancellation of visa requirements. The signing ceremony took place in Chisinau where the two heads of the governments were taking part in the GUAM summit. In accordance with the agreement, citizens of Georgia and Ukraine are no longer required to have international passports to visit either country. Also, in 2018, the sides signed the Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation between the MinTOT and the State Ministry for Reconciliation and Civic Equality of Georgia and the Memorandum of Cooperation in Competitive Policy between the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine and the Competition Agency of Georgia.
There is a new multipartite platform for subregional cooperation within the framework of the Georgia-Moldova-Ukraine Interparliamentary Assembly. After Russia detained 24 Ukrainian navy sailors in late November 2018, the newly-established Georgia-Moldova-Ukraine Interparliamentary Assembly issued a joint resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov. Ukraine and Georgia once again lent each other support on their path to NATO and the EU and condemned Russia’s aggressive policy in the region. However, the future of strategic bilateral relations will in many respects depend on the succession of state priorities in the entourage of the newly-elected President of Georgia as well as in Ukraine.

Ukraine ranks first by the number of tourists who visited Georgia in nine months of 2018. The total trade increased in 2018, with exports reaching USD 480 mln and imports USD 133 mln. The balance of trade was positive for Ukraine.
ISRAEL

B−

Despite the existing activity at government and parliament levels, the degree of political engagement with regard to Israel has decreased compared with the previous years. Ukrainian government agencies' activities were focused on preparations for the set-up of the free trade zone. Interaction in priority areas of bilateral cooperation continues. Relations with Israel have potential to become strategic, considering the country’s capacity for lobbying and experience of development in conditions of a permanent threat to national security. However, low activities at the top level and nearly non-existent political interaction show that this potential is yet to be unlocked.

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**Political Interest / Engagement**

In 2018, Ukrainian politicians expressed lower interest in Israel. The interest in cooperation was only seen in issues concerning deeper trade and economic cooperation, namely the intensification of preparations for the signing of the Free Trade Agreement. In particular, President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko touched upon the issue at a meeting with Minister of Environmental Protection and Minister of Jerusalem Affairs and Heritage of Israel Z. Elkin. There is marked interest in cooperation in particular sectors, as Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Groysman said listing the priority areas of mutual interest (agriculture, tourism, hydrocarbon processing, communications, healthcare, energy efficiency, and environmental protection).

The 2018 Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU mentions Israel in the context of necessity to expand foreign trade ties. It says there is interest in attracting investments, obtaining innovative technologies and using the country's lobbying potential. The signing and ratification of the FTA were identified as priority tasks. However, Israel is not on the list of key allies or regional partners. Israel is mentioned in the geopolitical analysis of the international security environment where it is described as one of the key actors in the Middle East.

**Institutional Cooperation**

Government agencies interacted within the framework of the priority task for bilateral relations, that is a setup of the FTA, in line with the 2018 Governmental Action Plan. Effective communication in this context was built within the President-Cabinet of Ministers-Verkhovna Rada triangle. A number of ministries (the MFA, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Culture, the MEDT) was involved in the practical implementation of the aforementioned task.

**Strategic Vision**

The key foreign policy documents of Ukraine do not mention Israel, which attests to the absence of strategic dimension in the bilateral relations. The country's significance is determined in terms of Ukraine's economic interests, as proven by the inclusion of Israel into the list of top 20 promising export markets according to the Export Strategy of Ukraine, including the Strategic Trade Development Roadmap for 2017-2021.
Activities

This year Ukraine's activities regarding Israel were focused on preparations for the signing the Free Trade Agreement, the priority task on the bilateral agenda. In this context, the Head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine I. Raynin met Co-Chairman of the Joint Ukrainian-Israeli Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation, Minister of Environmental Protection of Israel Z. Elkin to discuss practical steps towards a faster signing of the agreement. On June 19, Jerusalem hosted the 11th meeting of the Joint Ukrainian-Israeli Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation, during which the sides agreed that at the political level the FTA, which had been negotiated for almost six years, was ready for signing. As soon as on August 1, Ukraine and Israel completed the legal review of the text of the agreement.

Interaction at the level of heads of state took place only in the framework of the meeting on the sidelines of the 48th World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos and was of declarative nature. President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and Prime Minister of Israel B. Netanyahu discussed the issues of bilateral cooperation and the ways of its further development.

There were activities on the part of representatives of the legislative branch. On May 29-31, Speaker of the VRU A. Parubiy paid a visit to Israel where he met Speaker of the Knesset Y. Edelstein, Deputy Speaker and Head of the Israel-Ukraine Parliamentary Friendship Group T. Ploskov, President of Israel R. Rivlin and others. On February 6, Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs H. Hopko met Political Director of the Israeli MFA A. Ushpiz to discuss intensification of bilateral ties.

A series of ministerial-level meetings was held with a view to deepening cooperation in priority areas. Minister of Education and Science L. Hrynevych visited Israel to meet Minister of Science, Technology and Space O. Akunis. On May 29, Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine P. Rozenko met Minister of Immigrant Absorption of Israel S. Landver. Their attention was focused on cooperation in social issues. To take cultural cooperation to a new level, Minister of Culture Y. Nyshchuk met the Ambassador of Israel.

For the same reason, Ukraine had active presence at exhibitions and conferences. On February 6, a Ukrainian delegation took part in the annual international tourism exhibition IMTM 2018. At the first Ukrainian-Israeli Innovation forum on March 18-19, Ukraine sought to popularise its technological products and services in the international arena, to form and promote its international brand. The Israeli-Ukrainian Educational Conference 2018: Shaping the Future of Education was held in Tel-Aviv on April 16.
Results

The main achievements were the completion of negotiations on the creation of the FTA and the finalization of the text of the agreement. On November 21, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the draft FTA and authorised Ukraine’s First Vice Prime Minister S. Kubiv to sign it.

Following the visit of Minister of Education and Science L. Hrynevych to Israel, the sides agreed to resume the work of the Ukrainian-Israeli Committee for Research and Technical Cooperation and hold a joint contest of research projects. Seven directions in research cooperation were identified: development of new technologies for energy transport, energy efficiency, new technologies for high-tech transport systems, space industry, innovative technologies for production and processing of materials, creation of nanomaterials, technological renovation and agricultural development.

According to the State Statistics Service, trade between Israel and Ukraine over nine months of 2018 reached USD 605 mln, or USD 42.5 mln more than in the same period last year. The balance of trade is positive for Ukraine, standing at USD 309.5 mln.
In 2018, Ukraine’s policy toward Iran was passive and aimed at demonstrating political solidarity on sanctions with the USA, Ukraine’s main transatlantic partner, rather than at resolving its own economic needs.
Political Interest / Engagement

Compared with the previous years, Ukraine's interest in cooperation with Iran has decreased to some extent. In 2018, Iran was not mentioned in the overwhelming majority of important political documents and speeches by the country's leadership, which can be explained by the United States' final withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran and introduction of trade sanctions, particularly in the energy sector. Considering itself one of the closest US partners outside of NATO, Ukraine interpreted the renewal of Washington's sanctions against Iran as a signal to reduce activities with regard to Iran. For Ukraine, Iran remains, first of all, an interesting partner for energy supplies, therefore the renewal of sanctions has significantly affected the overall decline in Ukraine's interest in cooperation with Iran.

Institutional cooperation

The Ukrainian-Iranian relations are developed by the MFA, the Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining, the MEDT, the Ministry of Infrastructure, and the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food. Their activities are coordinated by the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Iranian Joint Commission for Economic and Trade Cooperation whose meetings were postponed twice in 2018.

Strategic Vision

Ukraine's strategic vision of Iran was outlined during the visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin to Tehran in 2016. In particular, it is based on three principles: friendly nature of relations between the two states; prevention of interference in cooperation by third parties; and mutual interest (Iran as a contributor to Ukraine's energy security and Ukraine as a contributor to Iran's food security).

Today Ukraine's interest in energy cooperation with Iran has fallen critically as a result of the sanctions, which cannot but affect the practical development of relations.

Activities

In particular, Ukraine's declining interest in cooperation with Iran in 2018 was evidenced by an indefinite postponement of two visits by Ukrainian high officials: Minister of Energy and Coal Mining I. Nasalik and Minister of Infrastructure V. Omelyan. The double postponement of a meeting of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Iranian Joint Commission (it last met in March 2017) was also quite telling.

Notable political contacts worth highlighting include two meetings between Ambassador of Iran to Ukraine M. Morady and President of the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry H. Chizhykov (October 17) and Co-Chairman of the VRU's MP group for interparliamentary ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran L. Kozachenko.
As a result of these meetings, joint statements were made regarding the need to use new opportunities to intensify cooperation. However, these statements have not been given a sense of purpose yet.

The only exception is agriculture. In particular, based on the indicators for 2018, Ukraine increased agricultural exports to Iran from 1.3% of total exports in 2017 to 1.4% in 2018. In addition, Iranian enterprises leased 1,200 hectares of farmland in Ukraine (Odesa region) to grow crops in the framework of the implementation of the agreement on the development of extraterritorial economy.

Results

The year of 2018 saw a significant decline in the level of relations between Ukraine and Iran primarily because opportunities for energy cooperation were blocked due to the introduction of a package of the US trade sanctions against Iran and companies cooperating with it.

It should be noted that despite statements about continuing economic cooperation, Ukraine has in fact aligned itself with the US position, which is why a number of governmental visits to Iran in 2018 was postponed. Moreover, Ukraine has slowed down the work of the Ukrainian-Iranian Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Trade Cooperation, which coordinates the entire system of economic relations between the two countries in practice. A distinctive proof of the decline in trade and economic cooperation is the reduction of the trade balance from USD 482.5 mln in 2017 to USD 360.2 mln in 2018. It is possible to speak only about continued active cooperation in agriculture and education of Iranian students in Ukraine.
Despite the significant political interest in Ukraine-China relations and the high level of activity in this direction, institutional cooperation among the Ukrainian authorities was insufficient and sometimes controversial, and results of bilateral cooperation are not fully in line with the stated ambitious goals.
Political Interest / Engagement

Political interest in China in 2018 was manifested at the level of the executive and legislative powers. The 2018 Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU draws attention to the global projects of the PRC, in particular to the fact that 56% of all Chinese foreign investments were directed to countries participating in the New Silk Road project. The document also mentions China's regional initiatives, especially the 16+1 format, and suggests that Ukraine should join the initiative.

Members of Parliament (the Group on Interparliamentary Relations with China is the largest in composition, consisting of 215 MPs) expressed their interest in cooperation with China. In particular, Y. Tymoshenko mentioned China in the context of her initiative to expand the format of negotiations on the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. On the other hand, O. Lyashko mentioned China in a negative context when he suggested that focus should be made on the creation of jobs for Ukrainians rather than on signing multi-million dollar deals with China.

Prime Minister V. Groysman said in his statements that Ukraine and China plan to double trade up to USD 10 billion and consider new opportunities for cooperation in agriculture, energy, construction, first of all, of infrastructure, and in other areas. First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine S. Kubiv, who considers China to be the top most promising market for Ukrainian products, was quite actively promoting the Chinese agenda.

Institutional Cooperation

The positive examples of institutional cooperation include interaction between the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and the Ministry of Infrastructure in the process of attracting Chinese investments and contractors for infrastructure projects (road maintenance and construction, port dredging).

At the same time, the year exposed inconsistencies between the Export Strategy of Ukraine adopted in late 2017 and the Strategy and Roadmap of Strategic Trade Development for 2017-2021 with regard to China. Contradictions in the positions of the Government and the APU regarding announcing 2019 the Year of China in Ukraine were also exposed.

Strategic Vision

There were no changes in the strategic vision. The vision of relations with the People's Republic of China, which has been outlined in strategic documents, corresponds to reality.
Activities

In 2018, Ukraine's activities with regard to China focused entirely on economic issues. In this context, the work of the MEDT of Ukraine deserves attention. Ukraine's participation in China International Import Expo 2018 on November 5-8 was one of the remarkable results of the year. The EBRD supported Ukraine's participation in CIIE 2018 within the framework of the EU's EU4Business initiative, which helps Ukrainian companies to enter new markets.

On July 5, First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine S. Kubiv met Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade J. Zengwei. During a visit to Beijing on November 8, S. Kubiv met Chinese Vice Prime Minister Liu He. During the visit, it was proposed to start joint consultations on preconditions for the creation of a free trade area between Ukraine and China.

It was also agreed to sign an agreement on road transport by the next forum of the Belt and Road Initiative in May 2019.

Results

During the eight months of 2018, bilateral trade in goods between Ukraine and China increased by about 21% up to USD 5.8 billion dollars. According to First Vice Prime Minister S. Kubiv, in five years Ukraine and China plan to bring this figure to USD 10 billion a year. The largest item of Ukrainian exports to China is food. However, the negative balance of foreign trade with the China continues to be. In January-September, it reached USD 3.2 billion.

There was a notable slowdown in certain areas of cooperation. In particular, at a meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission in December 2017, China said that it was ready to invest around USD 7 billion in Ukraine. However, most of the relevant projects are still in the stage of approval or in the early stages of implementation, while no proper results were achieved in 2018.
Foreign policy relations between Ukraine and Lithuania are exemplary of ideal interstate cooperation. The dynamics of this cooperation has been sustained and intensified over the last few years.

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<th>Category</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political interest/engagement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional cooperation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic vision</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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Political Interest / Engagement

Ukraine and Lithuania celebrated a centenary of restored independence in 2018. In addition to that, they marked 10 years of bilateral strategic partnership accompanied by a number of statements from the political leadership of both states. On the Ukrainian side, the vast majority of such statements came from Ukraine’s President P. Poroshenko and VRU Speaker A. Parubiy. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU includes a separate paragraph dedicated to Lithuania. The intent of the Verkhovna Rada delegation to PACE to support a nomination of A. Kubilius, ex-prime minister of Lithuania, currently MP in its Seimas and co-author of what is known as the New Marshall Plan for Ukraine, for Secretary General of the Council of Europe is an evidence of the political interest in regard to Lithuania.

Institutional Cooperation

Successful institutional cooperation was illustrated in 2018 by the preparation for the Eleventh Meeting of the Council of Presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Lithuania and for the Fourth Ukrainian-Lithuanian Economic Forum, as serious coordination efforts had taken place to shape the agenda for relations with Lithuania.

Strategic Vision

Lithuania has traditionally been Ukraine’s strategic ally in protecting its territorial integrity, confronting Russian aggression and strengthening sanctions against Russia, as well as in Ukraine’s EU and Euro-Atlantic integration. However, Ukraine’s fundamental documents do not mention the strategic nature of its partnership with Lithuania. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU in 2018 did mention that cooperation between Ukraine and Lithuania was gaining the format of strategic partnership.

Activities

In 2018, Lithuania and Ukraine strengthened bilateral cooperation in trade, energy, security, culture and other sectors.

Cooperation and communication are active between the states at almost every level of all branches of power. The visit of Ukraine’s President Poroshenko to Lithuania for the centenary of independence restoration in the early 2018 was important and symbolic.

VRU Chairman A. Parubiy took part in the plenary session of the Lithuanian Seimas. Seimas Deputy Speaker J. Liesis attended the event dedicated to the 85th anniversary of the Holodomor in Ukraine. The delegation of the Republic of Lithuania led by Prime Minister S. Skvernelis held a number of meetings with the political leadership of Ukraine.
Lviv hosted the 18th meeting of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Lithuanian Commission on Trade and Economic, Science and Technical Cooperation. Lithuanian top officials visited conflict zone on multiple occasions. In addition to Lithuanian Prime Minister S. Skvernelis and Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Linkevicius, Defense Minister R. Karoblis visited Donbas in 2018. The 13th meeting of the Lithuania-Ukraine Commission for European Integration took place in Vilnius, co-chaired by I. Klympush-Tsyntsadze, Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister for European and Euroatlantic Integration.

The Embassy of Lithuania in Ukraine in December 2018 successfully completed its service as NATO Contact Point Embassy in Ukraine, having performed these functions for four years.

**Results**

The Republic of Lithuania remains an important advocate of reforms in Ukraine and of its EU and Euroatlantic integration, and a friendly supporter in confronting Russia’s aggression and restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In 2018, Lithuania actively helped treat the injured Ukrainian servicemen. An agreement was reached for Lithuania to provide 1 mln euro worth of humanitarian assistance to the towns and villages in Ukrainian Donbas affected by the Russian aggression.

The Lithuanian Seimas approved the Ukraine-2027 initiative. Its purpose is to prepare Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. Together with Poland, Lithuania has been proactive in trying to stop the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and in promoting energy independence of the EU member-states from Russia. Kyiv hosted the Fourth Ukrainian-Lithuanian Economic Forum chaired by Lithuania’s President D. Grybauskaite. It was attended by representatives of government, business and expert community from both countries. A number of bilateral agreements were signed there. In addition to that, the Council of Presidents took place in Kyiv and a number of important interstate documents were signed there as well. Trade between Ukraine and Lithuania increased by 15.6% in 2018 compared to 2017, reaching USD 1,216.8 billion.
Relations between Ukraine and Moldova during the year were marked by high dynamics of activities. The situation with inter-institutional cooperation has improved. At the same time, there was a certain decline in political interest while high bilateral activities and declarations usually did not yield significant results.
Political Interest / Engagement

The 2018 Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU contains references to the Republic of Moldova. First of all, they concern Ukraine’s interest in predictability at its south-western border (including the Transnistrian sector of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border) in the context of the parliamentary elections in Moldova (February 2019) and the destabilising role of the Russian Federation in this regard. It also describes the progress in the implementation of joint customs control at Transnistrian sector of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border with the active support of EUBAM.

There was a proper level of mutual engagement and cooperation among parliamentary groups. A joint meeting of the Verkhovna Rada’s MP group for interparliamentary relations with the Republic of Moldova was held in Chisinau in late November. The launch of the Georgia-Moldova-Ukraine Interparliamentary Assembly also indicates the interest in cooperation.

At the same time, Ukrainian politicians mentioned Moldova in their speeches significantly less often compared with the previous year.

Institutional Cooperation

Among ministries and agencies, it is worth noting the efforts paid by the MFA of Ukraine to ensure activities of the Joint Ukrainian-Moldovan Demarcation Commission, which held its 62nd meeting in Chisinau in October and the 63rd one in Kyiv in December. During the work of the Joint Commission, the parties discussed the implementation of decisions and the preparation of final demarcation documents. They also approved the demarcation plan for the Ukrainian-Moldovan state border in 2018 and priority tasks for 2019.

During the year, the Commission on the Protection and Sustainable Development of the Dniester River started its work, the MoD of Moldova and Ukroboronprom signed the Memorandum of Cooperation, the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Moldovan Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation was also active. The above-mentioned facts, among other things, testify to the increase in institutional cooperation between the ministries and agencies of Ukraine with regard to Moldova.

Strategic Vision

There was no change in the strategic vision. At the strategic level, Ukraine remains concerned about the presence of a limited military contingent of the Russian Federation in the breakaway Transnistrian region and plans for a federalisation of Moldova based on scenarios imposed from the outside, which could create negative precedents for Ukraine.
Activities

Interstate dialogue is at a rather high level. From January to December, there were eight high-level official meetings. At the parliamentary level alone, there were three meetings involving the Ukrainian and Moldovan speakers: two on the sidelines of the interparliamentary conference of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, and another one on the sidelines of the newly-established Georgia-Moldova-Ukraine Interparliamentary Assembly.

In addition, representatives of the Republic of Moldova paid official visits to Ukraine and Ukrainian officials visited Moldova. In April, Prime Minister of Moldova P. Filip paid a working visit to Kyiv where he had a number of meetings, including with President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Groysman. In October, V. Groysman paid a one-day visit to Moldova to take part in the summit of the GUAM heads of government.

During P. Filip's November visit to Ukraine, the prime ministers of the two states acknowledged the due progress in the implementation of the border cooperation roadmap. Also in November at the consultations in Chisinau, representatives of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova agreed to jointly resolve problems related to the restoration of the territorial integrity of the three states.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine P. Klimkin and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova T. Ulianovschi held a number of meetings and phone conversations.

Results

This year's achievements include mutual support during voting at the UN GA, progress in economic cooperation (over 11 months of 2018, Ukraine and Moldova have increased trade to almost 838 mln hryvnyas), signing of the intergovernmental protocol on regular international transport and increasing the number of days transport crews are allowed to stay in Moldova. A jointly operated border crossing point Palanca-Mayaky-Udobne was opened. The Commission on the Protection and Sustainable Development of the Dniester River was launched, and the MoD of Moldova and Ukroboronprom signed the Memorandum of Cooperation.

In addition, during his official visit to Ukraine, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova T. Ulianovschi and his Ukrainian counterpart P. Klimkin signed a plan of consultations aimed at the development of cooperation in European integration for 2019-2020.

At the same time, an incomplete demarcation process and the protracted introduction of the joint customs control mean that results of work sometimes do not correspond to the level of activity of the sides.
Polish-Ukrainian relations continue to develop in the framework of dichotomy, which took shape last year, on the one hand there is active practical cooperation in security issues in the international arena and at the local level, on the other hand, acute conflicts at the political level around historical events. Despite this, the sides managed to sustain foreign political support and develop sectoral cooperation. However, elections in both countries in 2019 are expected to influence further development of relations.
Political Interest / Engagement

Ukrainian-Polish relations are traditionally of great interest due to the attention politicians and media pay to the issues of mass labour migration of Ukrainians to the Republic of Poland, general interest to the development of security cooperation and European integration support, but also because of disagreements over history policy. In particular, the adoption of amendments to the Polish Act on the Institute of National Remembrance prompted public response from the key political actors in Ukraine: the MFA and the President offered critical comments while the VRU issued Resolution No 7553 on February 6.

Institutional Cooperation

In terms of intra-Ukrainian interinstitutional cooperation, it is worth noting intensive contacts at the level of ministries and agencies. The Ukrainian part of the Partnership Forum, the Ukraine-Poland Parliamentary Assembly and the State Interdepartmental Commission on Commemoration Sites regularly met the Minister of Foreign Affairs before bilateral meetings in 2018.

Strategic Vision

Domestic policy dominated the elaboration of strategic approaches to the development of relations between Ukraine and Poland. In two articles, Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin focused on his view of the conflict over historical matters (zbruch.eu on March 1, UNIAN on March 10). Joint work on the creation of the macroregional strategy of the EU for the countries of the Carpathian Region (the Declaration of Intent was signed on September 5), infrastructure projects to connect Ukraine to Europe-Asia logistics networks and new content of the Eastern Partnership can be called relatively strategic. A comprehensive strategy for the development of bilateral relations has not been formulated yet.

Activities

In 2018, discrepancies in the interpretation of World War II historical events were a significant deterrent to broader top- and high-level cooperation between the two states. The two presidents met on the sidelines of multilateral forums (in Vilnius on February 16, Brussels on July 12; a phone conversation on November 26). President P. Poroshenko met Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland M. Morawiecki in Munich on February 17. The depth of discrepancies was exposed by the parallel rather than joint commemoration of victims of Polish-Ukrainian conflicts: A. Duda honoured the memory of Poles killed in Volyn while P. Poroshenko unveiled a monument to Ukrainian victims in Sahryń (July 8).
The prime ministers held phone conversations. At the level of vice prime ministers, P. Rozenko, who in 2019 became a key figure of historical dialogue, S. Kubiv, I. Klympush-Tsintsadze, as well as a number of ministerial and departmental delegations, visited Poland in 2018. The foreign offices were engaged in active interaction at both the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin and J. Czaputowicz (seven meetings, including official and working visits) and their deputies V. Bodnar and B. Cichocki. In addition, there were consultations of consular service heads, political directors and legal department directors.

In the framework of interparliamentary dialogue, Deputy Speaker of the VRU O. Syroid had two meetings with Deputy Marshal of the Sejm R. Terlecki (in Kyiv on June 9 and in Warsaw on October 8) and Deputy Marshal of the Sejm B. Mazurek paid a working visit to Ukraine on November 5-6. Ukraine and Poland held a meeting of the Interparliamentary Assembly (June 12-13), Ukrainian delegations took part in a meeting of parliament speakers of Central and Eastern Europe (July 13) and a meeting of the Lithuania-Poland-Ukraine Interparliamentary Assembly (November 12-13).

There were meetings of the Ukrainian-Polish Partnership Forum (December 1) and the Intergovernmental Coordination Council for Interregional Cooperation (February 15-16).

Ukraine's Ambassador to Poland A. Deshchytsia was active in various directions of bilateral cooperation, thus keeping the level of contacts with the Polish leadership high.

Results

Poland remains a supporter of the European and Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine, as well as a key ally in counteracting Russian aggression. Poland criticised the construction of the Kerch Bridge and actively supported Ukraine after the Russian aggression in the Black Sea (November 25). Cooperation with Poland as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council was important.

However, in 2018, the conflict around history escalated to a new level after the adoption of amendments to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance of the Republic of Poland, which introduced criminal liability for the "denial of crimes committed by Ukrainian nationalists from 1925 to 1950". Although historical dialogue was taken to the level of vice prime ministers at the request of Poland, the issues concerning permission for Polish researchers to search for and exhume bodies in Ukraine and for Ukraine to restore its monuments in Poland remains in a deadlock. In turn, Ukraine took a tougher stand on historical issues. In particular, three visits were made to commemorate Ukrainians shot dead by the Polish underground.
At the same time, Poland demonstrates good will on uncontroversial issues, in particular it awarded O. Sentsov with Pro Dignitate Humana, commemorated Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people (the Polish Senate's Decree on the 85th anniversary of the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine issued on November 21, A. Duda’s letter to P. Poroshenko on November 24), honoured servicemen of the Ukrainian People's Republic and victims of Soviet repressions.

Infrastructure successes include the development of railway and aviation links, Ukraine’s accession to the infrastructure transport project Via Carpatia. At the same time, there were mixed results as far as the development of the border is concerned. On the one hand, the parties signed an agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers and the Government of Poland on the maintenance of border road bridge facilities at the Ukrainian-Polish state border and the declaration of intent between the Ministries of Infrastructure on the creation of new railway connections. On the other hand, the problem of the limited capacity of the existing border checkpoints and their insufficient number remains to be settled.

According to the estimates of the Polish government, there were 1.2 mln labour migrants from Ukraine and 40,000 students in Poland in 2018. Poland remains the fourth biggest trade partner of Ukraine and the world’s second largest market for Ukrainian exports. In 2018, exports of goods from Poland increased by 19.6% whereas imports from Ukraine only grew by 5.2%. Ukrainian investments in Poland increase but Polish investments in Ukraine remain low.
Bilateral relations with Romania have maintained their positive dynamics. Perhaps the only controversial issue on the agenda in 2018 was the problem with the implementation of the Law of Ukraine “On Education”. In other areas, relations match the level of strategic partnership.
Political Interest / Engagement

The 2018 Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU recalls that Bucharest clearly expressed its full support for the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine, as well as for its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. It also recalls that, at the initiative of Bucharest, amid the rising military tensions in the Black Sea region and aggression on the part of the Russian Federation, Bucharest put the problems in bilateral relations between Ukraine and Romania on the back burner.

Chairman of the VRU A. Parubiy mentioned Romania in his statements, describing it as one of the states "on the front line of fight" against the Russian aggression.

Institutional Cooperation

In terms of institutional cooperation, the work of the MFA deserves a separate mention. The co-chairmen of the Mixed Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Romanian Commission on national minorities met in April. At the meeting, the sides touched upon the issue of the implementation of the Minutes VI of the commission's meeting and discussed a number of topical issues, in particular those concerning science, education and culture.

Thanks to the proper work of the Ukrainian MFA, the State Border Guard Service and the MoD, the first joint Ukrainian-Romanian exercise Riverine-2018 was held on the Danube in early September. Romania was represented by the Navy and Border Police vessels, and Ukraine by vessels of the Navy of the AFU and boats of the Sea Guard of the State Border Guard Service.

At the same time, because of the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, despite Romania's invitation, a MEDT representative did not attend a business forum on the sidelines of the Three Seas Initiative summit in Bucharest in September.

The lack of coordination between the MFA and the Security Service of Ukraine resulted in a misunderstanding with Romania regarding the June searches by the SBU at the Romanian Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi Culture Centre in Chernivtsi.

Strategic Vision

There was no change in the strategic vision. The references to Romania in the strategic documents correspond to the current level of partnership.
Activities

The priorities for 2018 included security cooperation, economy and infrastructure, as well as resolution of conflicts concerning educational sphere. Both countries’ ministries of foreign affairs paid intensive efforts. In early January, the ministers of foreign affairs of Ukraine and Romania, P. Klimkin and T. Meleșcanu met in Chernivtsi to hold negotiations on the rights of the Romanian national minority in connection with the adoption of the new Law of Ukraine "On Education". The expert groups from Ukraine and Romania followed up on these agreements at their meetings in spring and autumn 2018, where they discussed the Protocol on Cooperation in Education between the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and the Ministry of National Education of Romania. A preparatory meeting of the co-secretaries of the Mixed Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Romanian Commission on national minorities took place in Bucharest in September. The 7th meeting of the commission took place in Bucharest in September. The co-chairmen of the commission agreed to adjourn the current meeting and continue negotiations with a view to signing the protocol, being at its final stage.

In addition, the Ukrainian-Romanian Working Group on Transport and Infrastructure met on May 17-18. The sides agreed to launch two pairs of trains (four trains) in both directions as of January 1, 2019 to provide a connection between Suceava (Romania) and Chernivtsi (Ukraine) with a change at the Vadul Siret station.

The 10th meeting of the Main Border Representatives of Ukraine and Romania took place in December 2018.

Also, Ukraine and Romania took part in four multinational exercises in Romania and the Black Sea.

Results

Although this year has not brought a major breakthrough in bilateral relations, Ukraine and Romania continue constructive political and economic dialogue. In January-September 2018, the volume of trade between Ukraine and Romania increased by 11.6% compared with the corresponding period of 2017.

Also, joint three-day exercises of border guards on the Danube River can be mentioned among the notable results.

During a working visit by the Head of the State Border Guard Service, P. Tsygykal, to Bucharest in December, the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Anti-Corruption General Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Romania signed the Protocol on Cooperation in the Prevention of and Counteraction to Corruption, which was being approved during 2018.
It is also worth taking into account the statement of Transgaz, a company operating the gas transport system of Romania, regarding the possibility of constructing another gas interconnector, which will connect Romania and Ukraine. Under Transgaz's development plan for 2018-2027, the gas transport systems of Romania and Ukraine are to connect in the direction of Gherăeşti-Siret.

At a multilateral level, Romania continued to support Ukraine and traditionally co-sponsored draft resolutions of the UN GA initiated by Ukraine. Romania was also one of the first countries to express concern over the direct aggression and seizure by the Russian Federation of three ships of the Ukrainian Navy along with their crews near the Kerch Strait. It also supported the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and the right of Ukraine to use its territorial waters.
Relations with the Slovak Republic remain free from serious problems. Most of both countries’ strategic interests match (regarding the reverse gas flow, prevention of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the settlement of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict on the principles of restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine, etc.). After the start of the reverse gas flow from Slovakia in 2014, the absence of “big issues” continues to determine the bilateral agenda. Attempts to add the transport component to the energy theme in the context of the development of combined connection between China and Europe across Ukraine and the Slovak Republic have not been put into practice yet. The main dimensions of cooperation are political and diplomatic: Ukraine sees Slovakia as a key partner in Eastern Europe and relies on its support on international platforms, especially in the context of Slovakia’s OSCE Chairmanship, presidency in the Visegrad Four and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in 2019.
Political Interest / Engagement

The general approach to Ukrainian-Slovak issues in Ukrainian political and expert circles remained positive, although political interest was fragmentary and situational. It is emphasised that there are no problems between the two countries. The main dimensions of cooperation are political and diplomatic: Ukraine sees Slovakia as a key partner in Eastern Europe and relies on its support on international platforms. From mid-2018 to mid-2019, Slovakia presides in the Visegrad Group, in 2019 it will chair the OECD Ministerial Council, as well as the OSCE, where, according to its declared priorities, it focuses on the conflict in Donbas. There is appreciation of the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs M. Lajčák's position as the head of the UN GA on the adoption of resolutions on Ukraine. Bratislava's firm position on the need to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine and to continue the EU sanctions policy with regard to Russia in connection with its aggression against Ukraine is also appreciated.

Energy remains another important dimension of cooperation, with the President and the government officials continuing to mention Slovakia as a key partner in ensuring energy security. There is an interest in possible coordination in the energy sector to prevent the construction of the Russian pipeline Nord Stream 2. Ukraine is interested in the participation of Slovakia in the projects concerning the management of the Ukrainian gas transportation system.

In addition, one of the issues discussed at the highest level was the protection of social rights of Ukrainians, in particular migrant workers, in Slovakia.

Institutional Cooperation

Although there were no open manifestations of the obstructionist position by any individual Ukrainian government body, it is obvious that progress in some areas of cooperation has been too slow. As far as Ukraine is concerned, this can be explained by traditional inertia and low political interest in Slovakia.

For example, stalling coordination is evident in the introduction of joint control and infrastructure development at border crossing points at the Ukrainian-Slovak border, which falls within the competence of the State Border Guard Service, the Ministry of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Utilities of Ukraine, etc. The problem of Ukrainian labour migrants in Slovakia needs more attention from the Ministry of Social Policy. In this regard, it would be important to respond to the Slovak invitation for the Minister of Social Policy to pay a long-awaited visit in order to discuss this issue.

A good indicator of coordination of efforts between the MFA and the expert community can be organization of the Slovak-Ukrainian Forum in Bratislava (September 2018) together with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and the Slovak Foreign Policy Association with the participation of deputy ministers of both countries, as well as the presence of Ukrainian experts and government officials at other events.
Strategic Vision

Despite Ukraine's moderate political interest in Slovakia, there are areas where Ukraine and Slovakia almost do not cooperate, for example, economy, transport and investment, security and defence, etc. It is necessary to have a comprehensive assessment of bilateral relations, which would provide an opportunity to develop strategic documents for strengthening cooperation in those areas. The plans for Ukrainian-Slovak inter-agency consultations between the MFAs of Ukraine and Slovakia (the last one was approved in April 2018 for the period of 2018-2019) are of formal nature. There is also a lack of interest in signing other bilateral agreements in such strategic areas as economic or military-industrial. Ukraine and Slovakia do not have a history of full-fledged bilateral cooperation; on the contrary, there is a history of lost or underestimated opportunities. There are some signs of prejudices of the past, when Ukraine had an image of the unimportant partner in Bratislava, while Slovakia was a little-known neighbour for Kyiv. There is a feeling in the Slovak establishment that Ukraine perceives their country as a small neighbour, which, not being a big donor, cannot offer any substantial assistance to Ukraine in conditions of war.

Activities

Bilateral political dialogue developed in a moderate manner during the year. The practice of friendly meetings between the presidents continued: in particular, President A. Kiska visited Kyiv to express solidarity at the commemoration of the anniversary of the Holodomor. During his visit, he said that "over the past four years, much more has been done in Ukraine than in the past decades" and confirmed his position that the Ukrainian issue should be raised at all international meetings. There were also meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the speaker of the VRU and the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, while the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine visited Bratislava, etc.

A meeting of the bilateral Ukrainian-Slovak intergovernmental commission on economic, industrial and scientific-technical cooperation, which was to take place in 2017, did not happen. At the same time, a number of bilateral bodies resumed their work: the Ukrainian-Slovak Committee for Combined Transport, the Ukrainian-Slovak Mixed Commission on International Motor Service, the Ukrainian-Slovak Commission on Water Management, and the Ukrainian-Slovak Intergovernmental Commission on Cross-Border Cooperation. The first meeting of the Ukrainian-Slovak Joint Tourism Commission was held.

No significant progress has been achieved in introducing common border and customs control at the Ukrainian-Slovak border. Transport cooperation in the context of the development of combined connection between China and Europe across Ukraine and Slovakia has not been put into practice yet. Military-technical cooperation remains minimal.
Results

After the incident in the Kerch Strait on November 25, Slovakia strongly condemned Russian aggression. An important event was the launch of NATO-Ukraine Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Counter-improvised explosive devices (C-IED) Trust Fund after the CMU and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency signed an implementation agreement. Within the framework of NATO, Slovakia is responsible for the work of the Fund and has taken care of raising funds for it. Slovakia continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.

Slovakia continues to be a key Ukrainian partner within the Visegrad Four. Slovakia's official policy of support for Ukraine's European integration and Euro-Atlantic aspirations as well as its territorial integrity remained unchanged despite a political demarche by individual members of the coalition government (for example, National Council Speaker A. Danko). The fact that there is still a foreign policy consensus in Slovakia with regard to Ukraine can be considered as a serious achievement.

A tendency towards higher trade in goods between Ukraine and Slovakia has strengthened. In 2018, it increased by 35% up to USD 1.4 billion. The launch of a new Lviv-Bratislava flight operated by WizzAir in addition to the existing Kyiv-Bratislava flight was also a positive development. The two countries are discussing the recommencing of Uzhhorod airport, which would require international permits.

A new form of interaction is collaboration in archive and historical research, which became possible after Ukraine opened the NKVD-KGB archives in 2015. A respective project supported by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic opens opportunities for cooperation between the National Memory Institutes of both countries.
The dynamics of Ukrainian-Turkish cooperation is steadily high; relations are not limited to one component but cover a wide range of aspects. Along with the traditional areas of cooperation, intensification of interaction in the defence industry is observed. Despite a strategic partnership declared by both parties, there is no complementarity of their foreign policies, which is noticeable, for example, in the field of energy security (Turkish Stream and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant), as well as plans for the purchase of the Russian air defence systems S-400, which both NATO and Ukraine see as a direct threat to security. The dualism of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Russia and the West can be considered as the main limitation to a strategic dialogue with Ukraine.
Political Interest / Engagement

As before, the bilateral relations are described as "strategic", "friendly" and "good neighbourly" in the Ukrainian political discourse. It is noted that there are no fundamental problems or competition between the countries. Cooperation with Turkey is based not on one component but covers several areas. Bilateral meetings on a wide range of issues, including security, defence, economy, tourism, education and culture, indicate a serious interest in cooperation. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU traditionally paid considerable attention to Turkey as a strategic partner.

In terms of politics and diplomacy, Turkey is of interest due to its support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and protection of Crimean Tatars' rights. Ukraine counts on Turkish support for the release of Ukrainian hostages held by Russia. This question has been repeatedly raised at the highest level, the President of Ukraine personally handed over the list of hostages to the President of Turkey.

Analysing the statements made by government members, the President and MPs, one can speak about a qualitative transformation of the former perception of Turkey as a purely economic partner towards a recognition of the entire range of interests connecting the two countries. The main slogan is the pragmatization of the Ukrainian-Turkish relations. In the economic sector, the main issue is a finalization of the Free Trade Agreement on mutually beneficial terms. The potential involvement of Turkey in infrastructure development, including in Donbas, is of interest. Although the economic component remains important, security cooperation is on the forefront. According to the high-ranking officials' statements and existing activities, cooperation in defence industry, joint military exercises, etc. becomes a priority.

Institutional Cooperation

The Turkish direction of the foreign policy is characterized by high dynamics of contacts in many areas, which involve various bodies of state power in Ukraine. The quality of interagency coordination can be described as satisfactory. The most pressing issue is signing of the FTA with Turkey, therefore the Ministry of Economic Development carries particular responsibility. The declared reform of joint intergovernmental commissions can be considered as a positive development. In particular, Ukrainian delegations will now include representatives of companies and business associations. The opening of the Ukrainian Consulate in Antalya is an evidence of the implementation of the state course to secure Ukrainian interests in Turkey.
Strategic Vision

The existing Ukrainian legislative framework concerning cooperation with Turkey and the new bilateral agreements signed in 2018 show an adequate strategic vision of Turkey’s role and place in the system of foreign policy preferences of Ukraine. One of the expected results listed in the National Transport Strategy of Ukraine until 2030, which was adopted in May 2018, includes an increase in shipping containers and other goods through the territory of Ukraine, including in the framework of developing transport routes between the EU and Turkey. Turkey is among the top five trading partners of Ukraine in terms of export growth. The Export Strategy rightly sets it apart as a "focus market" for Ukrainian exports. Although the delay in signing the FTA with Turkey is not a positive factor (according to the recent statements of the President and other government officials, the Agreement should have been signed by the end of 2018), this has to do with a search for a mutually acceptable, compromise version of the Agreement.

Activities

The year of 2018 was marked by the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Turkey. The dynamics of bilateral contacts was indicative. In particular, Presidents P. Poroshenko and R. Erdogan held four meetings, including a meeting of the High-Level Strategic Council. Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin visited Turkey several times, including for the meeting of the Joint Strategic Planning Group under the co-chairmanship of Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs M. Çavuşoğlu and other meetings.

The year was fruitful in terms of security and defence cooperation. More than 20 joint defence and industrial cooperation projects are being implemented now. Based on the work of the Joint Ukrainian-Turkish Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation, the sides signed a memorandum on the supply of unmanned aerial vehicles to Ukraine and on the creation of a joint venture. The state-run design bureau Luch took part in the development of a new combat module in partnership with Turkish Aselsan, the state-owned enterprise SpetsTekhoEksport signed a memorandum with Aselsan on the manufacturing of radiocommunication equipment in Ukraine. The project on the modernization of Mi-17 helicopters is being implemented.

The first Ukrainian trade mission to Istanbul was held under the chairmanship of Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine S. Kubiv with the participation of Ukrainian heavy engineering, electronic, energy, chemical, pharmaceutical, IT, food and other manufacturers.

Religious diplomacy in the context of Tomos granting to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine by the Ecumenical Patriarchate was a separate important form of interaction.
Results

Turkey co-authored the UN GA resolution condemning the militarization of Crimea and the Sea of Azov by Russia in December 2018. However, the Turkish reaction to the Russian attack near the Kerch Strait on November 25 was typical: Turkey called for de-escalation but avoided mentioning Russia as such. Despite the high level of political interest in Turkey, the hope that it will counterbalance Russia in the region is not justified. Objective restrictions that impede the realization of the Ukrainian-Turkish relations’ potential are still in place. Turkey continues to increase its economic and political cooperation with Russia, considering it has a sovereign right not to take sides in the confrontation between the West/ NATO and the Russian Federation and seeing itself as a "bridge" for communication between them. There was no complementarity in energy policies. In particular, Ukraine supports the launch of the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) as an instrument of reducing dependence on Russian gas (President Poroshenko took part in the solemn launching ceremony during his visit to Turkey in June) but sees the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, which Russia is promoting with the help of Turkey, as a threat.

There is positive dynamics with regard to the growth of trade, investments and tourist flows. In 2018, the trade turnover amounted to USD 4.1 billion. However, it is important to note that Ukrainian exports decreased by 7% compared with 2017. There is an increase in tourist flows, in particular due to an increase in the number of Turkish tourists visiting Ukraine.

There is progress in the transport sector, in the area of liberalization of bilateral freight transport. More than 180 flights are operated between the two countries each week.

The sides failed to agree a compromise version of the FTA. After the Strategic Council meeting, President P. Poroshenko stressed that the positions of the two countries on the Agreement converge by 96%. The countries have settled contradictions on metal and steel but are still to find a common ground on agriculture and the textile industry.

It is worth noting the new agreements signed in 2018, namely the Memorandum between the state-owned enterprise Ukroboronprom and the Turkish Undersecretariat for Defence Industries on mutual bank guarantees (a document required for the implementation of projects in defence industry), as well as the Cooperation Agreement in the area of development between the Governments of Ukraine and Turkey (a document that will provide the legal basis for the establishment of the Office of Programme Coordination in Ukraine by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) to implement technical and financial cooperation projects). The Ministers of Internal Affairs signed a declaration on combating terrorism, transnational crime and cyber-threats.
The year of 2018 was a crisis one in relations between Ukraine and Hungary, which prompted Ukrainian diplomats and officials to pay significant efforts to preserve intergovernmental dialogue while continuing to defend the state interests of Ukraine. In spite of a number of problems, they succeeded, and Ukraine did not lose its positions in relations with Hungary, although there was no breakthrough either.

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Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, the Ukrainian leadership had to pay much attention to bilateral relations and take significant efforts to normalise them and continue constructive cooperation. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU points out the need to establish intergovernmental dialogue and move towards a settlement of the conflict situation, which arose due to the Hungarian authorities' reaction on the adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On Education", and expresses hope to quickly overcome mutual contradictions, which would make it possible to restore bilateral partnerships and alleviate Hungary's reservations regarding the further development of cooperation between the EU, NATO and Ukraine. However, in most cases, Ukrainian officials insist on the need to protect Ukraine's interests and demonstrate a negative attitude towards Hungary's ultimatums regarding the state language policy, a massive issuance of Hungarian passports in the Transcarpathian region, an appointment of the respective official for Transcarpathian Region, and foreign policy demarches against Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration.

Institutional Cooperation

Institutional cooperation with regard to Hungary was focused on the coordination of efforts between the Ministry of Education and Science and the MFA due to the need to overcome the crisis in relations with Hungary after the adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On Education" in 2017. Institutional cooperation at the regional level, mainly in Transcarpathian region, was quite intensive due to the presence of the local Hungarian community and local elites' interest in raising financial assistance from Hungary. Local authorities, including the head of the Transcarpathian Regional State Administration H. Moskal, demonstrated a pronouncedly friendly attitude to Hungary and created favourable conditions for the implementation of Hungarian projects in the region. These activities were not coordinated with and often contradicted the position of the central authorities.

Strategic vision

Official strategic documents do not separately mention Hungary. However, as far as the sectors that are important to Ukraine are concerned, they mention EU member states, among which the neighbouring countries are the closest to Ukraine in terms of development, as a model for achieving the desired economic and social level. This also applies to security and energy supply.
Activities

Foreign policy with regard to Hungary mostly had the form of intensive bilateral relations. There were no top-level contacts due to the crisis in relations. Instead, there were meetings, bilateral consultations and contacts between officials of various governmental agencies. The ministers of foreign affairs, other ministers and deputy ministers had numerous meetings. In particular, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine P. Klimkin had seven meetings with Hungary's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade P. Szijjártó, including the June 22 meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission on the Law of Ukraine "On Education", which was also attended by Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine L. Hrynevych and Minister of Human Capacities of Hungary M. Kásler.

The Hungarian media published several interviews with Ambassador L. Nepop and articles, in which she explained Ukraine's position on the language issue. There was active cooperation between the Embassy and the Ukrainian community in Hungary, Ukrainian artists and civil activists visited Hungary to take part in roundtables and other public events organized by the Embassy of Ukraine.

There were contacts between Ukraine and Hungary on defence policy, gas supply, implementation of infrastructure projects, development of construction and agricultural spheres as well as other business sectors. Military personnel took part in joint international military exercises. The sides continued cooperation within the framework of regional initiatives, in particular V4 and the Multinational Engineer Battalion Tisa.

Results

Foreign policy with regard to Hungary in 2018 was active and often tense as Hungary tried to exploit the issue of bilateral relations to put pressure on Ukraine by blocking the meetings of the Ukraine-NATO Commission and other events. The Ukrainian MFA decided to appoint ambassador at large M. Baltazhi as a representative responsible for cross-border cooperation. Hungary was persuaded to stop issuing Hungarian passports to Ukrainian citizens in its consulates in Ukraine. At the request of Ukraine, Hungary had to change the title of the government official in charge of cooperation with Ukraine for Transcarpathian Region. The appointment of a new ambassador of Hungary to Ukraine was approved, and I. Íjgyártó took the post in November 2018. The sides also agreed to open honorary consulates in Ternopil and Siófok.

The sides continued to develop cooperation in energy security (the agreement to increase reverse gas supply in 2019) and transport cooperation (opening of the Beskidy Tunnel in Ukraine, which is part of a transport corridor crossing Hungary, and opening of a regular direct rail link between Mukachevo and Budapest).
Foreign trade between Ukraine and Hungary in January-August 2018 displayed an upward trend thanks to the increase in imports and exports. Foreign trade between Ukraine and Hungary accounted for 4% of Ukraine’s total trade.

The treatment and rehabilitation of servicemen wounded in the course of counteraction to the Russian aggression in Donbas as well as health recovery of ATO participants’ children continued. Significant funds were invested in medical and educational institutions in the Transcarpathian region. It should be noted that Hungary continues to direct most of its financial support to Transcarpathian region, however it also provided funds for the implementation of projects in Donetsk region. The main achievement of bilateral relations is the fact that the "educational" crisis neither led to the end of intergovernmental dialogue nor it affected Hungary’s support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.
RUSSIA

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POLITICAL RELATIONS

The year of 2018 did not leave any prospect for the continuation of political dialogue in Ukrainian-Russian interstate relations. The escalation of the hybrid military and political aggression on the part of the Russian Federation not only turned Ukraine into a main target of the Russian propaganda, but also led to a direct Russian military assault on the Ukrainian Navy's ships, a capture and an illegal detention of Ukrainian sailors. Bilateral interstate relations will remain at the critically low level without a prospect for change, at least in the medium term, up to a possible severance of diplomatic relations.

Political Interest / Engagement

The continuing threat from Russia has created a situation in which the political interest of the Ukrainian ruling elite in the "Russian issue" is dictated by the already established awareness of this threat among the country's politicians. This awareness results in the absence of a "pro-Russian" foreign policy strategy and minimises prospect of the "Ukraine's non-bloc status" in the manifestos and activities of parliamentary political forces.

The Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada and the Analytical Report to the Address traditionally pay extraordinary attention to the "Russian issue". At the same time, the political interest is only focused on a problem of counteraction to the aggression and on participation in negotiations rather than on establishing bilateral dialogue. In the Address, the President mentioned the decision not to prolong the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. He also highlighted the complexity of the Russian threat both through external influence and through a possible revival of the pro-Russian forces within the country. The Report identifies Russia's foreign policy strategy as a hybrid aggression against Ukraine, outlines key tasks and priorities of counteraction to the Russian aggression.

Institutional Cooperation

The systemic and unprecedented Russian military and political aggression against Ukraine obliges the Ukrainian political environment to build high-level inter-institutional coordination and cooperation with regard to the "Russian issue". The peak of institutional cooperation concerning Russia in 2018 was the termination of the Ukrainian-Russian framework Treaty. This decision followed the respective resolution of the NSDC on September 6 and the MFA's suggestions on the termination of the Treaty by Ukraine. On December 6, a qualified majority in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine supported the termination of the Treaty.
Strategic Vision

The current level of Ukrainian-Russian relations generally reflects the status of political relations between the two countries being at the "hybrid war". The strategic legal documents (the Law of Ukraine "On the basis of domestic and foreign policy", the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, etc.) identify the Russian Federation as a significant long-term threat to Ukraine.

Because of the yet another act of the Russian aggression, which was committed against vessels of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Navy near the Kerch Strait on November 25, and considering further threats to the national sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine enacted the Decree "On the introduction of martial law in Ukraine" (November 26). At an extraordinary meeting (November 26), the VRU approved the president's bill No 9338 On the approval of the Decree of the President of Ukraine "on the introduction of martial law in Ukraine" and declared 30-day martial law in Ukraine's regions bordering Russia and Transnistrian region of Moldova.

Activities

Considering the Russian military and political aggression, diplomatic representation in both countries' embassies is currently at the level of chargés d'affaires ad interim while the diplomatic staff was significantly cut. The diplomatic activities of the Ukrainian consulates remain the main institutional component for dealing with urgent matters in bilateral relations (legal support for the defence of Ukrainian hostages held in the Russian territory, representation of interests of Ukrainian citizens in the Russian Federation and so on). At the same time, the issue of security of Ukrainian institutions in the Russian Federation remains high on the agenda. Namely for security reasons, the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine abolished down polling stations in Russia on December 31.

The decrease in Ukrainian-Russian political dialogue shifts interstate communications to multilateral formats and contact groups (the Minsk format, the Normandy format, etc.) and increases the level of confrontation between the two countries within the framework of international organisations, primarily in the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the PACE and others.

Results

Political dialogue in bilateral relations was curtailed to a level where it is logical not only to terminate the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, but a prospect of a full severance of diplomatic relations is quite possible. The decisive event that destroyed the prospect of preserving the Ukrainian-Russian political dialogue was the Russian open military aggression against the Ukrainian naval ships, the capture of the Ukrainian sailors and their illegal detention in violation of international conventions.
Some of the significant results of 2018 are 1) a positive vote on the updated Resolution "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine" in the Third Committee of the UN GA (the updated resolution recognises the situation in Crimea as an ongoing occupation and an international armed conflict, confirms Ukraine's territorial integrity and a non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and urges the Russian Federation to put an end to abuse of human rights in Crimea); 2) the adoption of the Resolution "The problem of militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine), as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov" at the UN GA meeting (December 17), which urges the Russian Federation, as the occupying power, to withdraw its military forces from Crimea and to end its temporary occupation of Ukraine's territory without delay; 3) the adoption of the Resolution "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine", which condemns politically motivated prosecutions of Ukrainians and urges the Russian Federation to immediately release Ukrainian citizens who were unlawfully detained in occupied Crimea and the Russian Federation.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Ukraine's foreign economic policy with regard to Russia in 2018 is characterized by curtailed cooperation, extension and expansion of sanctions, emergence of new lines of confrontation, in particular in the Sea of Azov and internationally because of the implementation of bypass gas projects by Russia. The search for a strategic vision of bilateral economic relations began, but systemic policy is still absent. Against this backdrop, the Russian Federation remains one of the largest trade partners and continues to play an important role for the Ukrainian economy.

Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, the level of political interest of the main stakeholders concerning the Russian hybrid war against Ukraine, in particular its economic component (albeit to a lesser extent), remained high. The Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU contains many references to the Russian Federation, in particular to the economic aspects of relations, while the Analytical Report to the Address includes a clause on "Realities of the economic war," but mostly they are presented as a statement of facts. The executive authorities ensure the adoption of official decisions aimed at counteracting the aggression. Civil society keeps a constant focus on threats from Russia. Parliamentary political forces also raise the Russian issue in their rhetoric. Economic cooperation with the Russian Federation and compensation for losses are still viewed in the context of Ukraine's European integration, the pace and progress in the implementation of the Association Agreement in terms of the DCFTA.
Institutional Cooperation

Institutional cooperation between the key actors is well-organized and focuses on maintaining an international consensus on extending and expanding sanctions against the Russian Federation as well as ensuring that necessary decisions are taken at the national level. Interinstitutional cooperation is best characterized by consistent coordination with the international community on the expansion of sanctions against the Russian Federation, there is coordinated interaction between the key actors in the implementation of foreign policy in this regard (the NSDC of Ukraine, the VRU, the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the NBU and the Security Service of Ukraine). The authorities provide coordinated support for legal proceedings against the Russian Federation in international courts. At the same time, Ukraine failed to ensure systemic counteraction to the Russian gas projects Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream and their promotion campaigns.

Strategic vision

Unlike in the previous year, when senior officials suggested that Ukraine should not completely abandon trade with Russia, in March 2018, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that economic cooperation with Russia should be minimized and only concern protection of our citizens’ interests. A few days later, the CMU terminated the Programme of Economic Cooperation with Russia for 2011-2020. A strategic vision of economic relations was thus defined, but the economic strategy in relation to Russia has not been formalized in any official documents. Despite considerable attention to the issue of the Russian aggression in the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU, it hardly gives any strategic guidelines. The tactical elements of the confrontation are still the judicial and sanction wars, which in 2018 continued with an approval of the lists of individuals and legal entities that are subject to special economic measures. However, in the context of hybrid warfare and maintaining significant economic ties with the aggressor state, Ukraine needs to take much more decisive steps towards the introduction of strategic planning.

Activities

The judicial and sanction wars were the main leitmotif of economic relations between the countries in 2018, as reflected in the relevant decisions of both sides. In May, the National Security and Defence Council approved the decision to introduce new sanctions on Russia and prolong the existing ones. In October, the President of the Russian Federation issued a decree in response to the anti-Russian sanctions introduced by Ukraine. Also, the ban on imports of certain types of agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs of the Ukrainian origin was still in effect from January 1 to December 31.
The year was marked by legal disputes in the Stockholm arbitration between Gazprom and Naftogaz of Ukraine and on "Yanukovych's debt" in the English Court of Appeal, as well as a number of court proceedings to recover Ukrainian companies' losses incurred as a result of the annexation of Crimea. Also, Ukraine filed a memorandum with the International Court of Justice in the case against Russia over the violation of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

The Sea of Azov (in particular, obstruction of navigation and access to Ukrainian ports) marked a new line of confrontation between the countries, with Russia using it as an element of economic pressure on Ukraine. From the outset of the tension, the authorities' official reaction was weak, being mainly influenced by the public opinion. As a result, the conflict escalated at the end of the year, resulting in the introduction of the short-term martial law in the regions of Ukraine that border Russia.

**Results**

Ukraine emerged as the winner of court disputes against the Russian Federation: the Stockholm arbitration ordered Gazprom to pay Naftogaz of Ukraine USD 2.56 bln; the Court of Appeal in London upheld Ukraine's appeal against Russia in the Eurobonds case to the sum of USD 3 bln; the International Court of Arbitration in Paris ruled that USD 1.3 bln should be recovered from the Russian Federation in favour of the State Savings Bank of Ukraine; the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ordered the Russian Federation to pay USD 159 mln to Ukrainian companies to compensate the losses they incurred as a result of the annexation of Crimea. At the same time, Ukraine's efforts to counter Russia's plans in Europe proved to be insufficient, which allowed Russia to make a notable progress in the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 and the Turkish Stream gas pipeline projects.

Despite the court disputes and aggressive rhetoric, Russia remains the key trade partner and Ukraine continues to depend on it in terms of important commodities (energy, mineral and metal products) against the backdrop of rising imports and a negative trade balance. Recently, the authorities have been paying more attention to promoting an opinion that at this stage, it is necessary to maintain economic ties with the Russian Federation in certain areas and sectors that are vital to the functioning of the national economy.
ENERGY RELATIONS

The year of 2018 was marked by the further imbalance of foreign policy towards Russia in the energy sphere. Continuing the struggle against Russian gas monopoly and forming a foundation for separation in the electricity sector, by the end of the year Ukraine is left with obscure nuclear energy contracts and a completely failed policy to diversify oil and oil products supply.

Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, political involvement in the issues of energy relations with Russia remained low as evidenced by the lack of legislative decisions on forming a strategic stock of oil and oil products to overcome the critical dependence on Russia. At the end of the year, with the support of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the VRU, the President initiated the termination of the Treaty on Friendship with the Russian Federation, which contained provisions on “the development of cooperation in ensuring functioning of the national fuel and energy sectors” (Article 20), but a comprehensive assessment of possible consequences and Russian actions after this decision takes effect in April 2019 remains a topical issue.

MPs, acting in particular on the initiative of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, made a number of statements regarding political context of the Russian bypass gas pipeline projects at domestic and international events and called for to counter them due to security threats. Some MPs warned about new threats from Russia with regard to oil and coal imports (S. Leshchenko, N. Katser-Buchkovska and others), however their statements found no support from the parliamentary majority.

Institutional Cooperation

The continuation of Russian aggression and the lack of opportunities for constructive dialogue with Russia in 2018 determined directions of institutional cooperation: the minimum required by the Minsk dialogue and an initiation of discussions on international platforms in order to draw attention to yet more crimes and acts of provocation committed by Russia. Government representatives took an active part in counteraction to the implementation of the Russian bypass gas pipeline projects. For this, they mostly used official and working visits to the EU member states and Brussels, international conferences and several tripartite ministerial meetings in the EU-Russia-Ukraine format. At the same time, an internal Ukrainian consolidated team, which would make this work more effective under the lead of the relevant vice prime minister has not been formed.
Strategic Vision

At the official level, all public offices continue to see Russia as a source of threat to Ukraine's energy security. The Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU and a number of adopted legislative acts (the Energy Strategy of Ukraine until 2035, the National Security Strategy) strengthen the country's course towards a further reduction of energy dependence on Russia.

Despite this, the national nuclear energy generating company Energoatom and the Russian company TVEL signed an additional agreement, which was criticized by the MFA of Ukraine. Also, the Verkhovna Rada did not react to the investigation into the monopolization of supply of Russian oil products through companies controlled by Rosneft and pro-Russian politician V. Medvedchuk.

The Ukrainian authorities recorded cases of coal exports from the temporarily occupied territories of Donbas but did not develop an effective mechanism for the systemic monitoring and prosecution of offenders, in particular, from Turkey and the Russian Federation.

Activities

Ukraine's key efforts were aimed at counteracting the construction of the Russian Nord Stream 2 pipeline project by raising this issue at international events in the EU and the USA, including by national diplomatic missions, as well as at maintaining the sanctions pressure on Russia concerning technological equipment for the energy sector. Attempts by Gazprom to create another gas crisis in March 2018 faced a consolidated response from both public offices and society. The use of the Early Warning Mechanism foreseen by the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement allowed Ukraine to minimize the effect of Russian propaganda, which tried to present the Ukrainian gas transit route as unreliable.

The testing of equipment for storage of spent nuclear fuel on the territory of Ukraine is underway at the Centralised Storage Facility. Ukraine expects to reduce its dependence on Russia in terms of nuclear waste storage.

Results

The continuation of Russian aggression against Ukraine objectively keeps the overall dynamics of relations at a very low level. Russia has continued to block the gas talks and has not complied with the ruling of the Stockholm arbitration. At the same time, Russia has achieved success in backdoor relations, making Ukraine even more dependent on its imports of oil products, and at least caused another misunderstanding between Ukraine and the USA in the nuclear sector because of non-transparent negotiations.
between the relevant state companies, as a result of which Energoatom and Rosatom
signed an agreement in September and the share of Russian fuel imports has increased
again.

The fact that during the tripartite talks in July Ukraine and the EU coordinated a
joint position on the transport of gas across Ukrainian territory solely on the basis of
European principles was a positive development. Instead, the lack of a constructive
approach to overcoming the dependence on Russian oil and coal did not alleviate the
risk of using this sector against Ukraine in the near future, especially given Russia's
full control of companies, which export these products.

Ukraine is entering 2019 with no strategic stock of oil products, a complicated
geopolitical situation around support for the further use of its gas transport
infrastructure amid consolidated efforts by Russia and Germany to promote the Nord
Stream 2 project, as well as the efforts by Russia, Turkey and Bulgaria with regard
to the Turkish Stream project, the growth of the share of the Russian nuclear fuel
imports, heavy dependence on imports of coal from Russia-controlled sources and a
growing practice of coal smuggling from the occupied territories of Donbas.
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Ukraine’s political interest, institutional cooperation and strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific region did not change in 2018. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies stepped up their efforts, thus boosting political dialogue and cooperation, in particular with Indonesia, South Korea and Australia (for Japan, see separate section). Nevertheless, the potential of this region requires more attention.
Political Interest / Engagement

The Asia-Pacific region was traditionally mentioned in the President of Ukraine's Annual Address to the VRU in the context of trade liberalization. The Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Korea were considered separately because close cooperation with them creates broad opportunities at the international level. Indonesia is recognized as one of Ukraine's largest trading partners in Southeast Asia, while Australia's experience and active support facilitates the development of the National Police of Ukraine in line with international standards.

During the official visit to South Korea, Speaker of the Parliament A. Parubiy discussed relevant questions of cooperation, including possible steps towards visa liberalization for tourists, further intensification of economic and investment cooperation, and further political dialogue.

Institutional Cooperation

Institutional cooperation in 2018 did not see any significant changes and is observed at the level of individual ministries and departments. The President made requests to the CMU to provide humanitarian assistance to Indonesia after the earthquake and tsunami. The Government set up the Financial Oversight Committee together with representatives of the Australian Government and other countries involved in the investigation of the Boeing MH17 air crash under the Memorandum of Understanding to capture the harm done to all victims. However, the lack of coordination bodies and documents explains a low evaluation of institutional cooperation. On November 27, D. Senik, the Ambassador of Ukraine to Singapore presented credentials to Governor-General of New Zealand P. Reddy, thereby taking over responsibility from the Ambassador of Ukraine to Australia. It should be noted that the ambassadors in Vietnam and Indonesia have not been changed since 2010 and 2012, respectively.

Strategic Vision

Strategic documents do not mention the Asia-Pacific region. There are occasional references that are formulated in general terms together with other priorities. No comprehensive agreements were signed, however the Memorandum of Understanding between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea came into effect in December 2018.
Activities

The main activities focused at the government and parliamentary level.

On February 21-22, Kyiv hosted the Third Meeting of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Indonesian Commission on Economic and Technical Cooperation, political consultations between the MFA of Ukraine and the MFA of Indonesia, and the bilateral Business Forum. In March, the delegation of the People’s Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia visited Ukraine. In November, an official Ukrainian delegation headed by the director-general of the state concern “Ukroboronprom” visited India to take part in the Indo Defence 2018 international defence exhibition and forum. In December, VRU Speaker A. Parubiy paid an official visit to Seoul to meet the Prime Minister and Speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. In April, the First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, S. Kubiv, headed a government delegation during a working visit to participate in the fourth meeting of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Korean Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation. He also met the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Strategy and Finance of the Republic of Korea, the Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation and the Chairman of the Korea Importers Association. The 6th Ukrainian-Korean Economic Business Forum took place in April and was attended by the heads or deputy heads of the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry, the Ministry of Infrastructure, the State Service for Food Safety and Consumer Protection, the State Service for Energy Efficiency and Saving, the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the National Academy of Agrarian Sciences, etc. During a visit to Seoul in February, Minister of Internal Affairs A. Avakov discussed prospects for cooperation between law-enforcement agencies. The Embassy of Ukraine was busy with educational and cultural activities in Seoul.

The head of the State Service for Food Safety and Consumer Protection met the delegation of the Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority of Singapore, which was auditing the system of state control over poultry products (July 30). During his visit to Singapore, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine met the Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs, and also visited the Interpol Global Complex for Innovation (October 28-30). During the official meeting, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the Minister for Home Affairs of Singapore discussed hybrid threats in the modern world and agreed on the cooperation of cyber police units.

On April 25-26, Deputy Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine V. Dovhan was on a working visit to Vietnam. The parties discussed the development of bilateral cooperation and the involvement of Ukrainian enterprises in the development of urban infrastructure in Ho Chi Minh City. On August 27-30, Deputy Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine O. Trofimtseva paid a working visit to Vietnam. A delegation of the VRU, representatives of the parliamentary group on Ukraine-Vietnam relations, headed by O. Yurynets, also visited Vietnam in April. They discussed the development of interparliamentary relations.
The head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs H. Hopko met the Representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia D. Lewis and the Australian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Ukraine (June 22) to discuss the Dutch investigation into the Boeing MH17 air crash and identify priority directions in bilateral relations with the aim of their further deepening. In addition, the Prime Minister of Ukraine met the President of the Senate of Australia in the framework of the latter’s first official visit to Ukraine (October 2). The Head of the National Police of Ukraine and the Deputy Commissioner for the Australian Federal Police met to discuss a joint programme for systematic cooperation against terrorism and cybercrime (October 23).

A government delegation visited Australia in October during the Invictus Games. During the visit, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the Minister for Home Affairs of Australia discussed the mutual recognition of driving licenses and other IDs, assistance from the Australian Government to ensure the psychological and physiological rehabilitation of ATO/JFO servicemen and policemen, as well as a possible training of Ukrainian policemen under an intensive programme of the Australian Federal Police (October 25). The Defence Ministers of Ukraine and Australia met to discuss an expansion of cooperation and reached an agreement on the allocation of USD 250,000 to Ukraine for the development of medical and sports rehabilitation of wounded servicemen. During her visit, Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine I. Klympush-Tsintsadze met the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, representatives of the Australian-Ukrainian Friendship Group in the Federal Parliament, and visited the Australian Institute of International Affairs to meet academicians, experts and diplomats.

Cooperation with Malaysia moved on due to the high activity of the Embassy of Ukraine, which held regular meetings with relevant ministers and company representatives. In addition, Ukrainian companies took part in the Defence Services Asia Exhibition and Conference 2018 (April). Representatives of Ukrainian food companies held a presentation of Ukrainian products (January).

Ukraine took part in the 3rd Asian Defence, Security & Crisis Management Exhibition and Conference (Manila, the Philippines, September 26-28).

The countries where Ukraine is not represented directly hardly had any attention from Ukrainian diplomats and government representatives.
Results

Results of 2018 include the Memorandum of Cooperation between the Council of Exporters and Investors under the MFA of Ukraine and the Singapore Food Manufacturers' Association (January 23); the Protocol on Plant Quarantine and Protection between the State Service of Ukraine for Food Safety and Consumer Protection and the Agricultural Quarantine Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Indonesia (April 18); the Memorandum of Understanding on the Knowledge Sharing Programme between the MEDT of Ukraine and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance of the Republic of Korea (24.04); the Memorandum of Understanding between the VRU and the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (December 12); the Agreement on the Transfer of Technology for Peat Processing into Fertilizers and Fuel between the Institute of Engineering Thermophysics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and Vietnam's Institute of Technology (October 8); the Agreement on Cooperation on Physical Culture and Sports between the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism of Vietnam (January 16).
In 2018, Ukraine’s Middle East policy focused on intensification of trade and economic relations, industry cooperation, corresponding with the objective of expanding economic cooperation. The President’s visits and activities of the Government helped to intensify cooperation on investments, energy, agriculture, military and technical industry, and education. A number of agreements illustrate this. Ukraine’s special focus was on the Gulf states, including Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. However, the absence of a clear strategy for developing relations with the Middle East hampers full use of cooperation potential.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political interest/engagement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional cooperation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic vision</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General score</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political Interest / Engagement

The Middle East is not a priority of Ukraine's foreign policy. It is illustrated by the lack of systematic engagement in this region. Interest in cooperation is driven by the increase in trade and economic interaction and intersectoral cooperation (statements by the NSDC First Deputy Secretary O. Hladkovsky about the importance of military and technical cooperation; by Vice Prime Minister P. Rozenko on necessity to intensify trade, economic, science and technology cooperation, among others with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Ukraine does not view the Middle East comprehensively, primarily focusing on cooperation with individual countries. Meanwhile, the President of Ukraine has spoken about the need to develop stable and constructive relations with the countries of the Arab world in general. He underlined Ukraine’s interest in obtaining an observer status with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, what is an evidence of taking cooperation with the region to a new level.

Interest in the region does not translate into an official position of the Ukrainian politicians or representatives of the Ukrainian authorities. The VRU and its Foreign Affairs Committee show no systemic interest in it.

Oppression of Crimean Tatars in occupied Crimea forces the Ukrainian side to seek international support for solving this problem. Middle Eastern countries are especially interesting in this context. The President and the Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine have drawn their attention to this aspect, calling on the region’s leaders to help protecting the rights of fellow Muslims.

The 2018 Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU focused on the Middle East more than in previous years. However, it did not define the region’s countries as key allies or regional partners. However, the need to intensify free trade talks with Egypt and other Maghreb countries, and to deepen cooperation with the Gulf states in order to expand economic ties and to strengthen Ukraine’s position in important regions of the world as it befits its national interests is mentioned. In the security context, the geopolitical situation in the Middle East was analysed and its negative impact on Ukraine, including economic, was described.

Institutional Cooperation

The lack of a strategy for developing relations with the Middle Eastern countries has a negative impact on the interaction between Ukrainian governing institutions. The Administration of the President and the Government coordinate their actions to draft and implement specific objectives. The President issued Decrees on interaction with specific countries of the region empowering Justice Minister P. Petrenko to sign a series of agreements with Morocco and establishing a delegation for negotiations with Jordan. The legislative branch, i.e. the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs has been active in ratifying bilateral agreements, including the pre-ratification
preparations for the Agreement on Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Qatar.

**Strategic Vision**

No mentions of the Middle East in key foreign policy documents and no strategic bilateral agreements point to the lack of a strategic dimension in Ukraine’s relations with the region. The Military Doctrine makes a small mention of the Middle East in the context of a complex and dynamic security environment. Saudi Arabia is mentioned separately in the list of priority countries under the sectoral export strategy. Signing of numerous bilateral agreements with the UAE and Kuwait in 2018 illustrates the improvement of strategic vision of the region. Nevertheless, the absence of a clearly defined Ukrainian position on other strategic regional issues, including on the situation in Syria, the Kurdish question, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the status of Jerusalem, etc. hampers the development of long-term partnership with the regional countries.

**Activities**

Ukraine’s activities on the Middle East focused on deepening cooperation in the key spheres of interest, including trade and economy, investments, energy, agriculture, military and technical industry, tourism and humanitarian sector. In this context, Ukraine was most proactive in intensifying its cooperation with Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt. President P. Poroshenko visited Kuwait on March 18-19 as the first presidential visit to this country in 15 years, and Qatar on March 19-20, to meet with their leaders and business. Ukrainian government officials had a number of visits to these countries to deepen cooperation in their respective areas. Ukrainian ministers of infrastructure and internal affairs visited Qatar, Vice Prime Minister visited Kuwait, and Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Egypt. Intergovernmental commissions had regular meetings on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation with these countries.

There is interparliamentary cooperation. On February 7, members of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs met with the delegation of the Lebanese National Congress, responsible for ties with Ukraine to discuss importance of intensified cooperation. On October 8-9, Ukrainian MP S. Semenchenko visited Iraq where he met with H. K. al-Kaabi, First Deputy Speaker of the Congress of Representatives, to discuss possible establishment of an interparliamentary friendship group and to deeper cooperation.

To intensify trade and economic cooperation with the regional countries and to expand Ukraine’s export potential Ukrainian delegations participated in international exhibitions and conferences, including food products exhibition Gulfood in UAE; the international defence exhibition IQDEX in UAE; in the economic forum “On the Way to Practical Implementation of the Jordan Economic Growth Plan” in Jordan, and others.
Results

The key accomplishments in the Middle East include a series of agreements signed after the President’s visits to Qatar and Kuwait. Ukraine signed a visa-free travel agreement, an agreement to avoid double taxation and income tax evasion, and an agreement to establish a Joint Commission for Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation, Agreement on Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments with Qatar. With Kuwait, Ukraine reached an agreement to ease the visa regime and signed an agreement on cooperation in the military and other spheres, as well as a memorandum of understanding and cooperation in the sphere of youth and sports. The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research signed a memorandum of understanding and cooperation in science.

A series of important agreements on cooperation in certain areas were signed following the meetings of intergovernmental commissions. The CMU signed the Agreement on Cooperation in Culture and Arts and the Agreement on Cooperation in Tourism with the Government of Kuwait; the Memorandum of Understanding on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with the UAE; and the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Sports with Saudi Arabia. The National Bureau for Air Incidents Investigation signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the Saudi Arabia Aviation Investigation Bureau. The Hennadiy Udovenko Diplomatic Academy under the MFA of Ukraine signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation with the Emirates Diplomatic Academy under the UAE MFA.

According to the State Statistics Service, overall trade with the countries in the region amounted to USD 4.7 billion in nine months of 2018. This included USD 4.3 billion of exports (13% of Ukraine’s total exports) and USD 376 mln of imports, pointing to a serious trade surplus. Trade (exports and imports) with Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan has increased significantly. Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and UAE are Ukraine’s main trade partners.
In 2018, Ukraine’s main foreign policy focus in the Western Balkans was on raising support for international counteraction to the Russian aggression, promoting Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations and soliciting help to overcome consequences of the Russian aggression. Economic cooperation between Ukraine and the countries of the region remained at a rather low level. The vast majority of bilateral agreements concluded with the Balkan countries concerned economic, scientific and technical spheres and consular affairs.
Political Interest / Engagement

Political interest in the Western Balkans in 2018 was at an average level and fragmentary in terms of sectoral approach (counteraction to Russian aggression, and European and Euro-Atlantic integration). Croatia received priority attention. This approach was clearly reflected in the Analytical Report to the President of Ukraine’s Annual Address to the VRU in 2018, where Croatia was named a traditional partner of Ukraine in the region, while Serbia, FYR Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro were mentioned in the context of Russian active measures to destabilize the situation in the region and in the context of progress of the named states towards the EU membership. During their visits to the countries of the region, the President, the Vice Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine pointed to a similar security agenda, European integration and the need for mutual support in the international arena. The MFA of Ukraine closely followed the situation with Macedonia and welcomed signing of the Greek-Macedonian agreement to rename the country as the Republic of North Macedonia. Unlike in the previous year, the Ukrainian leadership showed higher interest in Serbia in order to expand regional support for countering Russian aggression. However, it criticised the Serbian delegation’s vote against the UN GA Resolution on Crimea (Serbia is the only state in the region that voted against it), as expressed in a relevant statement of the Embassy of Ukraine in Belgrade.

Institutional Cooperation

Ukraine does not have diplomatic missions in some countries of the Western Balkans region: the Ukrainian Embassy in Athens oversees cooperation with Albania, while the Embassy in Zagreb is in charge of cooperation with Bosna and Herzegovina. The diplomatic mission in Montenegro is still headed by a charge d'affaires ad interim. This state of affairs objectively reflects a low interest in the mentioned countries in contrast to those where Ukraine has full-fledged embassies. Of all the countries in the region, the only country with which Ukraine has not formed an interparliamentary group is Bosnia and Herzegovina. In general, there was coordinated institutional cooperation with countries of the region, all branches of government paid certain attention to the countries of the region and took steps to develop relations with them. Although all Ukrainian institutions have a shared agenda, which included the protection of Ukraine’s interests in the international arena and counteraction to Russian aggression, the Government of Ukraine also focused on European integration and energy cooperation while parliament developed cooperation within international organizations.
Strategic Vision

With the exception of Croatia, the Western Balkans region is not on the list of Ukraine's strategic priorities. The countries of the Western Balkans are not mentioned in Ukraine's strategic documents approved during the year, for example, in the 2018 Government Action Plan, although Ukrainian politicians declared the goal of expanding regional support to counter Russian aggression. This vision also does not sufficiently take into account the EU and NATO membership of some countries in the region, and progress towards this membership on the part of the other countries. Current relations between Ukraine and the countries of the region were broadly in line with the existing legal framework, which, however, required further elaboration, for example, with regard to the Free Trade Agreement with Serbia and visa-free regime with Macedonia.

Activities

Ukraine carried out foreign policy activities in the Western Balkans region in respect of Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia, focusing on counteracting Russian aggression, European and Euro-Atlantic integration, economic cooperation, energy security, humanitarian demining, science and education. During the official visit to Serbia in July, President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko sought mostly to secure Serbia’s support for countering Russian aggression and increasing Ukrainian-Serbian economic cooperation. However, the visit was hardly effective. Out of all regional leaders, only Slovenian President B. Pahor visited Ukraine.

Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine I. Klympush-Tsintsadze visited Croatia (April, December) to promote development of economic cooperation, implementation of joint energy projects, in particular, for the construction of a LNG terminal on the Croatian island of Krk. The MFA of Ukraine maintained active working relations with colleagues in the region, primarily in the form of political consultations. To hold the consultations, Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin visited Macedonia (April) and Croatia (August), while Deputy Minister V. Bodnar visited Montenegro (May), Croatia (May) and Serbia (June). However, only Ambassador O. Aleksandrovych represented Ukraine at a meeting of the South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial in Belgrade on October 11.

Interparliamentary cooperation with the countries of the region was traditionally rather high. Ukrainian MPs paid a number of visits to Croatia (January, May), Serbia (May) and Montenegro (October). The highest number of visits at various levels was made to Croatia. It was visited by First Vice Prime Minister S. Kubiv (June), the Minister of Temporarily Occupied Territories V. Chernysh (July), Minister of Social Policy A. Reva (November) and Minister of Defence S. Poltorak (January).

Ukraine has been actively developing public diplomacy. The president of the Ukrainian World Congress E. Czolij visited the region in spring 2018. The Joint Ukrainian-
Slovenian expert group studying the historical facts of World War I was active. Groups of ATO participants' children went for recreation to Serbia (August) and Croatia (June). Ukrainian higher educational institutions established cooperation with their counterparts in the region, including Croatia and Slovenia. In the economic sector, the bilateral commissions on trade and economic cooperation held meetings in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a bilateral business forum was held in Serbia. Preparations were carried out for a regular meeting of the joint Ukrainian-Slovenian commission on trade and economic cooperation.

Results

The most significant results were achieved in Ukraine's relations with Croatia and FYR Macedonia. Ukraine received unreserved support from Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Montenegro to counter Russian aggression. An agreement was reached with Macedonia to further implement there large-scale gasification and heating network modernisation projects. A Memorandum on cooperation was signed between the diplomatic academies of the two countries and the Joint Declaration between the MFAs.

The consular sector was effective. The First Lady of Ukraine and the Minister of Foreign Affairs took part in the opening of the Honorary Consulate of Ukraine in Split, Croatia, in August. Under the auspices of the Presidents of Ukraine and Serbia, the two countries signed an agreement on the extension of visa-free travel from 30 to 90 days and agreed to launch a direct aviation connection between Kyiv and Belgrade. In June, an agreement was signed on functions and responsibilities of the Honorary Consul of Ukraine in the city of Tirana (Albania). Ukraine extended visa-free regime for Macedonian citizens for one more year.

The MEDT of Ukraine and the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology of Slovenia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Economic Cooperation, as well as a Memorandum of Understanding and Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the State Service of Ukraine for Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre and the Surveying and Mapping Authority of the Republic of Slovenia. The Croatian company Industrija Nafte held negotiations on investment in the Ukrainian mining industry. Amendments to the existing bilateral Free Trade Agreement were agreed with the Macedonian leadership to ensure its full liberalization. Bilateral trade with the countries of the region, except for Croatia, increased.
The year of 2018 can easily be named as one of the most productive and intensive years in terms of Ukraine’s foreign affairs with the Baltic States, as illustrated by the visits of leaders of all three states to Ukraine. The Baltic States have remained traditionally active in supporting Ukraine with regard to the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russian aggression in Donbas and the release of Ukrainian political prisoners held in Russia.
Political Interest / Engagement

The perception of the Baltic States as Ukraine’s most important and values-oriented allies on the international arena intensified in 2018. Interest in the region and the accent on common challenges shared by Ukraine and the Baltic States both remain in place. The 2018 Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU includes a specific paragraph dedicated to the Baltic States by contrast to the 2017 report where these countries were analysed together with countries of Central Europe and the Black Sea region. Ukraine’s interest in the Baltic States is not limited to security and humanitarian components, but covers economy, expert and IT spheres too. Speaker of the VRU A. Parubiy continuously demonstrates considerable interest in the region, but it is mostly within the Ukraine-Poland-Baltic states triangle known under the concept of the Baltic-Black Sea Union as a format of subregional cooperation.

Institutional Cooperation

A clear evidence of institutional cooperation was a preparation for the Eleventh Meeting of the Council of Presidents of Ukraine and Lithuania and the Fourth Ukrainian-Lithuanian Economic Forum. Overall, Ukraine’s institutional cooperation with the Baltic States was mainly on bilateral basis while no forms of cooperation with the region as a whole have been set up.

After some delay, the Ambassador of Ukraine to Estonia was appointed. The Ambassador to Latvia has not been appointed yet.

Strategic Vision

Traditionally, the Baltic States are de facto Ukraine’s strategic allies in terms of protecting its territorial integrity, strengthening sanctions against Russia and accelerating Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. This alliance is not recorded in any official documents, but it is constituted by political statements at the highest level. The Medium-Term Governmental Priority Action Plan to 2020 does not mention the region.

Activities

The year of 2018 was marked with the visits of the presidents of all three Baltic countries. Two of them were the first state leaders to visit a zone of the Joint Forces Operation in Donbas. Latvian President R. Vējonis visited Maryinka, while Estonian President K. Kaliulaid visited Mayorsk checkpoint. All three leaders of the Baltic States met with Ukrainian political leadership. President Vējonis participated in the commemoration of the Holodomor victims in Ukraine. In her visit to Ukraine along with nearly thirty representatives of Estonian business as part of the official delegation,
President Kaliulaid paid significant attention to economic cooperation between the countries. President Kaliulaid’s second visit of the year in September 2018 was also mostly focused on trade and economic cooperation.

Ukraine and Baltic States cooperate productively at the parliamentary level. The VRU’s Speaker A. Parubiy participated in a plenary meeting of the Lithuania’s Seimas. H. Hopko, Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, participated in the Riga Conference where she held a series of meetings with the leadership of the Latvian Seimas Committee on Foreign Affairs. The leaders and officials of the National Defence Committee of Estonia paid an official visit to their Ukrainian peers from the VRU National Security and Defence Committee. Parliament speakers from Ukraine and the Baltic states have preliminarily coordinated a joint official visit to the US in 2019.

Cooperation in 2018 was not limited to the parliament dimension. In 2018, the delegation of the Republic of Lithuania headed by Prime Minister S. Skvernelis held a number of meetings with the political leadership of Ukraine. The delegation visited Avdiyivka, a frontline town. Two months later, Lithuania’s Foreign Affairs Minister L. Linkevicius paid a symbolic visit to the Donbas region of Ukraine.

At the end of 2018, the Fourth Ukrainian-Lithuanian Economic Forum headed by Lithuania’s President D. Grybauskaitė took place in Kyiv. Government officials, representatives of business and experts from both countries attended it. The Ukrainian-Estonian Business Forum took place in 2018 as well.

On the Ukrainian side, Prime Minister V. Groysman and Minister of Education and Science L. Hrynevych visited Latvia. The visit ended with signing a number of agreements.

Riga hosted the second meeting of the Ukrainian-Latvian Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. It resulted in signing of the Protocol of Intentions between the Ministries of Education and Science of Latvia and Ukraine.

Results

The visit of President Poroshenko to Lithuania to mark the 100th anniversary of the restoration of Lithuanian independence at the beginning of 2018 was symbolically important.

The important results of cooperation with the Baltic States included the launch of the Train of Four Capitals (Kyiv-Minsk-Vilnius-Riga) with the prospect of extending the route to Tallinn in 2019. The announcement of the route followed a meeting of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Lithuanian Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation in 2017.
During the visit of Prime Minister Groysman to Latvia, the General Agreement on Academic Cooperation between the Riga Technical University and Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute was signed and the intergovernmental program of bilateral cooperation in the sector of agro-industrial complex for 2018-2019 were signed, among other things.

In 2018, the Action Plan for strengthening cooperation between Ukraine’s Ministry of Agricultural Policy and Food and Estonia’s Ministry of Rural Affairs for 2018-2023 was adopted.

The trend of increasing trade turnover between Ukraine and the Baltic states continued in 2018. Total trade between Ukraine and Latvia amounted USD 409.1 million in January-September. Trade between Ukraine and Lithuania increased by 15.6% compared to 2017, hitting USD 1,216.8 billion.

It was agreed that Lithuania to provide in 2019 humanitarian aid for Donbas communities hit by the Russian aggression worth around EUR 1 million. Estonia and Latvia continued helping in the rehabilitation of Ukrainian military personnel. Importantly, 2018 can be considered a success in terms of how Ukrainian authorities combined comprehensive perception of the region and individual format of cooperation with each of the three Baltic States.

The governments of all of three Baltic States declared illegitimacy of the so-called “elections” in the separate districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Also, they condemned Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukrainian naval vessels in the Black Sea.
In 2018, the level of cooperation with the Visegrad Four remained rather low, largely due to Hungary’s presidency in the first half of the year, which blocked the expansion of Ukraine’s cooperation with the V4. Although the transfer of presidency to Slovakia in the second half of the year prompted cautious optimism, no significant intensification of contacts has been observed. However, it is important to note that, despite certain misunderstandings in bilateral relations with members of the group, the V4 demonstrated a consolidated political position in support of Ukraine in connection with Russian aggression in the Sea of Azov.
Political Interest / Engagement

Ukrainian politicians' interest in the Visegrad Four was rather low. It mostly concerned certain aspects of bilateral cooperation with closer focus on Poland and Slovakia. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU "On the Internal and External Situation of Ukraine in 2018" briefly mentions the Visegrad Four in several respects, in particular, in the context of strengthening cooperation with Slovakia in defence sphere, an implementation of the Association Agreement and the institutionalization of the Baltic-Black Sea region.

Institutional Cooperation

The low level of contacts in the V4+Ukraine format negatively affected the number of projects in different areas that would require interagency coordination. Traditionally, the coordination of Ukrainian efforts was focused either on bilateral formats or on more general regional initiatives (CEE, the Three Seas Initiative, NATO, etc.).

As a result of cooperation between the MFA of Ukraine and non-governmental experts, in the autumn of 2018, they prepared and presented to their Slovak counterparts proposals on how to strengthen bilateral dialogue in view of Slovakia's presidency of the Visegrad Four.

Strategic Vision

Strategic documents contain references to the Visegrad Four countries in the context of social, defence, security and energy cooperation. The National Security Strategy of Ukraine says the purpose of cooperation with the Visegrad Four is to ensure national security in foreign policy sphere at the subregional level. The Strategy for Sustainable Development "Ukraine 2020" and the Energy Strategy 2035 stresses that Ukraine's energy systems need to be integrated into the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG), which includes the Visegrad Four member states. In addition to these references, currently Ukraine has no clear strategic document, which would indicate attempts to deliberately use the Visegrad Four opportunities to promote Ukraine's national interests. For example, the idea of Ukraine joining the Visegrad Four was not developed despite the fact that there is support for the initiative to transform the V4 into the V5 (with Ukraine) inside the Group itself (in particular, at the expert level). There are rather blurred political ideas regarding the use of the V4 for the institutionalization of the Baltic-Black Sea region.
Activities

No high-level meetings in the V4+Ukraine format took place in 2018, and cooperation at the expert level was rather low. This may be explained by the fact that while Hungary was preparing to chair the V4 in 2017-2018, it rejected a number of Ukraine’s proposals to strengthen cooperation in the V4+Ukraine format. Also, Hungary did not initiate an invitation for Ukraine’s official representatives to attend political events held within the group framework, limiting cooperation to technical and expert levels.

However, the Commander of the Ukrainian General Staff, V. Muzhenko, took part in a meeting in the V4+Ukraine format at the level of general staff commanders, which was held in Hungary in June.

In September, Bratislava hosted a Ukrainian-Slovak forum, which paid particular attention to the prospects of cooperation between Ukraine and the Visegrad Four. Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Bodnar and the State Secretary of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, L. Parízek, took part in the meeting. The V4 deputy ministers of ecology and environment, as well as Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources M. Kuzio, met in Slovakia in October.

A meeting at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the V4+Eastern Partnership format did not take place in 2018, although it was foreseen by the programme of the Slovak presidency for 2018-2019. It was decided to hold this meeting in 2019 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Eastern Partnership (to be held in Bratislava on May 6, 2019).

The political directors of the MFAs of Ukraine and the V4 held consultations in Kyiv in November. One of the key issues on the agenda was an act of the Russian armed aggression against Ukraine in the Black Sea on November 25, 2018.

In 2018, Ukrainian non-governmental organizations continued to receive support from the International Visegrad Fund for the implementation of project initiatives.
Results

Despite rather different dynamics of bilateral relations with the Visegrad Four at the regional level, its member states display support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. In particular, the Slovak minister of foreign affairs presented this joint position following a meeting of the V4 Ministers of Foreign Affairs in November 2018, which is in line with the spirit of joint statements made by the EU and NATO.

However, V4 MFAs high-ranking officials paid no joint visits to Ukraine during the year, which negatively affected the development of multilateral cooperation. Given this, consultations at the level of political directors of the MFAs can be considered as an achievement.

Overall, Slovakia’s programme of presidency in the Visegrad Four, compared with the previous Hungarian presidency, gave rise to greater optimism regarding the resumption of the V4+Ukraine cooperation format. In this document, Slovakia clearly says that during its presidency, more attention will be paid to strengthening Ukraine’s security cooperation with NATO, as well as to deepening the European integration of the EaP countries, which signed the Association Agreements.

Slovakia initiated the resumption of thematic roundtables in Ukraine focusing on the V4 member states’ experience of reforms in selected sectors (Roadshow V4 for Ukraine). During these thematic events, the V4 states divided responsibility for certain directions of reforms in Ukraine, as well as for events scheduled for 2019.

Unfortunately, due to the unconstructive position of Hungary, Ukraine was practically removed from participation in the standby duty of the Visegrad EU Battlegroup in the second half of 2019 despite the previous successful experience in 2016. The issue of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ participation in the Visegrad EU Battlegroup can only be raised with a view to the next standby duty in 2023.
The year of 2018 saw an evident intensification of Ukraine’s cooperation with the countries in the region. Just like in the previous years, drafters of the Ukraine’s foreign policy strategy underestimated human and resource potential of Latin America. This results in slow growth of Ukrainian exports to the region, and in the loss of international support for Ukraine in its resistance to the Russia’s aggression on part of the region’s ruling elite, including in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Chile, etc. It is proven by their voting on the resolution “Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov” at the 73rd session of the UN GA on December 17, 2018, and on the resolution “Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine” on December 22.
Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, Ukraine did not outline Latin America as a specific vector in its foreign policy. By contrast to the previous years, the 2018 Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President to the VRU made no mentions of Latin America as a region, nor of its individual countries or organizations. Minutes of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs meetings also showed that Latin America was not a priority for Ukraine’s MFA or VRU. The interest in this region was still primarily driven by economic priorities, restoration of Ukraine’s export potential, and a search for new markets and expansion of the existing ones (the President’s Address to the 13th Ambassadorial meeting, 2018 Government Priority Action Plan).

The only direct mention of the region was in the 2018 Government Priority Action Plan. It said that Ukraine needed to ensure participation of 100 Ukrainian athletes in the 2018 Third Summer Youth Olympics in Argentina. Also, Ukrainian leadership was hoping for the diaspora to lobby the region’s governments to recognize man-made famines as acts of genocide against the Ukrainian people as Ukraine was commemorating the 85th anniversary of the Holodomor. Ukrainian leaders asked the diaspora for support (Ukrainian diaspora in Latin America counts nearly 1 million people today) at the XI Ukrainian World Congress. The Cabinet of Ministers-approved State Program for Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad till 2020 focusing on intensification of cooperation with the diaspora (May 2018).

Institutional Cooperation

Ukrainian diplomatic missions to Latin America finally received ambassadors in 2018 (except for Cuba with which Ukraine does not have sufficient scope of political cooperation). However, when new Ambassador to Peru was introduced to the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, MPs once again emphasized the lack of consultations between the MFA, the APU and the Parliamentary Committee during a selection of candidates for the ambassadorial positions, despite early reached arrangements. The Export and Lending Agency was not launched by the end of the year (the decision to establish it dated February 7, 2018), as the VRU did not support the allocation of funding for its first shares issuance in 2018. Potentially, this damaged the promotion of Ukrainian business interests in the region.

Strategic Vision

The official documents on Ukraine’s foreign policy strategy do not mention Latin America as a potential area of focus in the short-term prospect. The Export Strategy of Ukraine: Roadmap for Strategic Trade Development for 2017-2021, approved by the CMU, does not mention Latin American markets as a priority. Nor does the newly-established Ukrainian Institute plan to open its offices in Latin America.
Activities

The year of 2018 saw an intensification of intergovernmental and interparliamentary cooperation with individual countries in the region. S. Kyslytsya, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, participated in the 4th round of political consultations between Ukrainian and Chilean MFAs at the level of deputy ministers. Ukraine held regular consultations with the Mexican MFA, negotiations with the State Secretary of Argentina’s Ministry of Justice, as well as meetings with the leadership of the MFAs of Peru, Guatemala, Colombia and Belize, and representatives of National Congresses from Chile and Mexico. Ukrainian delegation led by Deputy Minister Kyslytsya took part in the inauguration of the presidents of Chile and Mexico.

VRU’s Rada First Deputy Speaker visited Colombia. Co-chair of the parliamentary friendship group and a member of the Parliamentary Committee on Education and Science visited Argentina and Brazil. Deputy Minister of Education and Science and Director of the Ukrainian State Center for International Education visited Brazil. Minister of Justice went to Argentina and Brazil. Minister of Youth and Sports visited Argentina. A delegation of the State Emergency Service visited Brazil. Director of Ukraine’s MFA Consular Service Department visited Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico. Head of the State Space Agency visited Chile. Head of Dnipro Region Council visited Brazil. Heads of the Ukraine’s diplomatic missions to Latin America (except for Cuba) had regular meetings with national and local authorities, members of parliaments, representatives of regional authorities and business; they spoke to the media, students and the public.

Ukraine was represented as an observer at the XIII Pacific Alliance Summit in Mexico. As a move to protect its manufacturers, Ukraine’s MEDT sent its position statements to Mexico, Brazil and Colombia as these countries implement eight anti-dumping measures. Ukrainian delegation raised the issue of Mexico’s anti-dumping practice at the WTO Committee meeting on October 24.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Agricultural Policy received a delegation from Mexico while the State Emergency Service hosted a delegation from Brazil. In 2018, Embassies of Argentina, Brazil and Cuba have become more active in Ukraine as they met with Ukrainian ministries, agencies and regional authorities.

Still, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade did not host any meetings of the six joint Intergovernmental Commissions on Trade and Economic Cooperation in 2018 (Ukraine-Argentina, Ukraine-Brazil, Ukraine-Paraguay, Ukraine-Peru, Ukraine-Mexico, and Ukraine-Chile). The MFA did not host thematic sectoral meetings of the Investors and Exporters Council to promote Ukrainian products in Latin American markets. While the parties agreed to hold the Ukraine-Brazil video conference in February 2018 and to resume the work of the Ukraine-Brazil cooperation commission at the WTO summit in Argentina, no such steps were implemented. No reports on
the work of groups on relations with Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile, were presented at the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs meetings.

Results

As Argentina hosted this year’s G20 summit with international media coverage focused on it, the “Ukrainian theme” broke into the media space of Latin American countries due to the Russia’s attack against Ukrainian navy vessels in the Kerch Strait and the response of global leaders. Nevertheless, Brazil’s MFA was the only one to express its concern over the escalation of tensions in the Azov and the Black Sea region.

In March 2018, Ukraine opened in Chile the Office of the Embassy of Ukraine in Argentina. In May 2018, the Parliament established MP’s groups for interparliamentary relations with Paraguay and Uruguay (with 6 and 7 members respectively). National parliaments of Argentina and Chile also established groups of friendship with Ukraine.

Ukraine signed three bilateral agreements of cooperation in criminal justice with Argentina, while Ukraine’s MEDT agreed to cooperate with the National Institute of Intellectual Property Protection in Peru in 2018. Visas were cancelled between Ukraine and Antigua and Barbuda, and between Ukraine and Uruguay.

Ukrainian delegations took part in XX Air and Space Fair – FIDAE-2018 in Chile, and the 44th International Book Fair in Buenos Aires in Argentina. For the first time, Ukrainian delegations attended educational fair “Faubai-2018” and “EuroPos 2018 Recruit Higher Education from Brazil” (both in Brazil). An agreement was reached to provide a free stand for Ukraine at the aerospace exhibition FAMEX-2019 (Mexico). In December 2018, Kyiv hosted the First Ukrainian-Cuban Pharmaceutical Forum.

In trade and economic sphere, Ukraine improved the exports of its goods and services to the countries of Central and Latin America and the Caribbean by almost 137% in the nine months of 2018 compared to the same period of 2017 (or by USD 816 million in money terms), while imports from there shrank by USD 17.3 million.

All these efforts, however, failed to change the position of the region’s countries on Ukraine’s fight against the Russian aggression. This resulted in the generally negative voting on the abovementioned UN resolutions and their positions at other fora. It looks like only consistent political work on the top levels can change this.
The year of 2018 was a year of sustainable development of institutional cooperation between Ukraine and Northern European countries. These states significantly increased support for Ukraine in its counteraction to the Russia’s aggressive actions. Also, Northern European countries increased their support for reforms in Ukraine and enhanced cooperation with Ukrainian institutions. Despite the objective shrinking of the top-level contacts compared to 2017, political dialogue at other levels has intensified, including at the parliamentary level. At the same time, Kyiv is still not considering Northern Europe as a united region, and most of Ukraine’s interaction with the countries is happening on the bilateral basis.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political interest/engagement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional cooperation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic vision</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>General score</td>
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</tbody>
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Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, Ukraine’s political interest in cooperation with the Nordic countries remained relatively high.

The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU repeatedly mentioned the countries of the region (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland) in the context of cooperation in various areas. However, comparing to 2017, the Analytical Report reflected neither the security role of the region, nor its position on Ukraine’s EU and Euro-Atlantic integration policy.

At the same time, the President, the Prime Minister, and the VRU Speaker made a number of statements, predominantly during the bilateral interaction, pointing to Kyiv’s high interest in cooperation with the region’s countries. The list of the key interests included the following: support in countering Russia’s aggressive actions and restoring territorial integrity of Ukraine as well as extension of sanctions against Russia, halt of the Nord Stream-2 construction, financial and technical assistance to reforms in Ukraine.

In the context of Ukraine-Finland relations and preparation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine for autocephaly, an interest in a stronger dialogue with the autonomous Finnish Orthodox Church appeared. This culminated in a meeting of Ukraine’s President with the Primate of the Finnish Orthodox Church.

Institutional Cooperation

Traditionally, Ukraine cooperated with the Nordic countries on bilateral basis. Kyiv does not consider the prospect of establishing separate structures for cooperation with the region as a whole.

Cooperation with Finland and Norway at the government level is coordinated through intergovernmental commissions, which meetings took place in 2018. Other examples of successful intergovernmental coordination are the Norwegian-Ukrainian Dialogue on European Integration established in 2017 and the Mechanism of Interagency Cooperation under the framework of the Ukraine-Denmark Energy Centre (UDEC).

Ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark was finally appointed in 2018 (the position had been vacant since 2014). Ukrainian ambassadors have thus by now been accredited to all countries of the region.

Overcoming the episodic and non-systematic nature in relations with Iceland remains on the table.
Strategic Vision


The legal framework of Ukraine’s relations with the countries of the region includes over 160 bilateral agreements and largely matches the scope of interaction with these countries in key areas. The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement acts as a certain framework treaty in the relations of Denmark, Finland and Sweden with Ukraine. The EFTA-Ukraine free trade agreement plays the same role in relations with Norway and Iceland.

The Development Cooperation Agreement between Ukraine and Sweden sets the framework for Sweden’s support of reforms and EU integration of Ukraine through the end of 2020. The vectors of trade and economic cooperation between Ukraine and Norway were outlined in the 2018 “Joint statement -- priorities following the results of the second meeting of the Ukrainian-Norwegian Intergovernmental Commission on Cooperation in Trade, Entrepreneurship and Economy”.

Activities

Political dialogue among Ukraine and the Nordic countries developed actively throughout the year. Top-level contacts were the exception as the President of Ukraine made just one working visit to Finland. There is an objective reason for this downturn as P. Poroshenko had official visits to all countries of the region, except of Iceland, during previous two years.

Instead, dialogue between heads of governments and parliaments intensified. Prime Minister V. Groysman paid an official visit to Denmark, where he met his colleague L. Rasmussen, while Head of the Norwegian Parliament T. Wilhelmsen Trøen visited Ukraine.

Visits of the Danish, Finnish and Norwegian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and a working meeting of the Ukrainian and Finnish Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the UN GA session demonstrated continued sufficient dynamics in the bilateral political dialogue. In this context, an intensity of the dialogue with Sweden slightly decreased. However, it is worth mentioning a visit of the Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration to Stockholm and of the Sweden’s Minister of Defence to Ukraine. The only significant event in relations with Iceland was a visit of Ambassador Á. Sigurðsson to Ukraine to present his credentials.
The leadership of the VU and its respective committees intensified dialogue with the parliaments and governments of the Nordic countries. VRU Speaker A. Parubiy, First Deputy Speaker I. Gerashchenko and Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs were the most active. During the year, MPs held joint events with representatives of parliaments and governments from all five Northern European countries.

Results

Kyiv succeed in getting active and generally strong support from the Nordic states for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and counteraction to the Russia’s military aggression during 2018.

These countries made more statements to support Ukraine, and the tone of these statements became stronger. These included statements of Finnish and Norwegian Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the 4th anniversary of annexation of Crimea, a statement from the Swedish Foreign Minister with a call to release O. Sentsov, an informal meeting of the representatives of Sweden and a number of other UN SC member states on the anniversary of the Crimea annexation in New York, a statement of the Norway MFA condemning illegal “elections” in the “people’s republics” in Eastern Ukraine, a statement by the Foreign Ministers of Norway, Sweden and Denmark condemning Russia’s aggressive actions in the Sea of Azov, and co-authorship of the “Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine” Resolution of the UN GA Third Committee by all five countries of the region.

At the same time, Kyiv has not accomplished significant results in working with the Northern European capitals to prevent the construction of the Nord Stream 2. Out of the three countries of the region (Finland, Sweden and Denmark), Denmark is the only one refraining from issuing the necessary permission.

In 2018, Northern European countries expanded their support to reforms in Ukraine in scope and diversity. Copenhagen hosted “A Driver for Change” International Ukraine Reform Conference. Denmark, Finland and Sweden traditionally provided strong and comprehensive support of energy reforms in Ukraine. An agreement between the governments of Ukraine and Finland pertaining to secondary education reform “Finland’s Support to the Ukrainian School Reform” was signed, ratified and entered into force in 2018.

Northern European countries helped Ukraine in some other important spheres, including e-governance (Sweden), IT education (Sweden), inclusive labour market (Denmark), demining in Eastern Ukraine (Finland and Denmark), support in civil service reform (Norway), development of Administrative Service Centres (Sweden), criminal justice (Norway), farming (Norway), funding of the humanitarian activities of the UNDP in Eastern Ukraine (Denmark).
Cooperation on geothermal energy with Iceland initiated in 2015 needs another push.

In economic and trade sphere, in the nine months of 2018, exports of Ukrainian goods increased slightly to Denmark (6.8%), Finland (10.1%) and moderately to Norway (22.3%). Exports to Sweden at the same time was just 89% comparing to the same period of 2017. Ukrainian exports to Iceland grew significantly to triple the amount of 2017.

Support from the autonomous Finnish Orthodox Church is an important accomplishment in Ukraine’s struggle for the autocephaly of its Orthodox Church.
In 2018, Ukraine intensified military-industrial cooperation with India and Pakistan and developed relations with Bangladesh in this area. Cooperation was enhanced between Ukraine and India at the governmental level following the 6th session of the Ukraine-India Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological, Industrial and Cultural Cooperation. Parliamentary friendship group visits stimulated political dialogue between Ukraine and Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, some of the region’s countries, including Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives, receive barely any attention.
Political Interest / Engagement

In his 2018 Annual Address to the VRU, President P. Poroshenko mentioned Asia as a promising region for trade partnership. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address makes several references to South Asian countries and the region overall. In particular, the document says that the “multidimensional” South Asian vector requires more attention given its growing demand for modern military equipment and specialists, where the Ukrainian defence industry had opportunities. The Report also stresses on the need for Ukraine to promote itself more proactively in the Indian market and to develop comprehensive relations with India, including by intensifying political dialogue. The establishment of a group for interparliamentary relations with Pakistan and visits to Sri Lanka reflected the political interest on behalf of parliament representatives.

Institutional Cooperation

Both the Parliament and ministries worked together to improve relations with the regional countries on various levels and in diverse spheres. The 6th session of the Ukraine-India Intergovernmental Commission was an important accomplishment (February 6, Kyiv). The Session covered different issues (projects of the aviation industry, new spheres of goods imports and cooperation between culture, youth and sports ministries). An agreement was reached to establish a Working Group on Agriculture under the Commission umbrella. Ukraine’s Embassy in New Delhi is somewhat understaffed while covering six countries of the region (in addition to India, there are Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bhutan). Ahmed Akbar Sobhan, the Honorary Consul of Ukraine in the Republic of Bangladesh, left his position in June and has not been replaced yet.

Strategic Vision

While Ukraine has not developed a single strategy to work with South Asian countries yet, a number of important documents specify the key sectors of cooperation between Ukraine and the region (trade and economy, defence industry and aviation). Ukraine’s Defence Industry Development Strategy till 2028, adopted in 2018, defines development of the Asian markets, that need military-industrial products, as one of the goals to focus on in the long run. The Export Strategy 2017-2021 defines the markets of India and Bangladesh among the top 20 that “can deliver fairly quick results provided the right choice of forms and instruments of working with them.” In terms of bilateral strategic documents, Ukraine held two rounds of talks on the Bilateral Investment Agreement between Ukraine and the Republic of India, an important document for potential investors.
Activities

There were no top-level meetings between Ukraine and the region’s countries in 2018. However, a number of important thematic meetings did take place. The 6th session of the Ukrainian-Indian Intergovernmental Commission included a meeting between First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine S. Kubiv, and Minister of State for External Affairs of India M. Jawed Akbar, a co-chair of the Commission on the Indian side. The participants discussed a series of issues in trade and economic cooperation. Minister Kubiv presented Ukrainian investment projects to the Indian side. On October 9, the 7th meeting of the Joint Ukrainian-Indian Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation took place.

At the international defence exhibition “Defexpo India 2018” (April 13), O. Gladkovsky, head of the Ukrainian delegation and First Deputy Secretary of the NDSC, met with India’s Minister of Defence N. Sitharaman to discuss Ukraine’s participation in the defence industry development program “Make in India”. In 2018, India participated in the Ukrainian-American Sea Breeze 2018 exercises.

Ukraine and Pakistan held important talks during the at the defence expo IDEAS-2018 (November 27-30, Karachi). Joint production of armoured equipment was outlined as a promising vector of cooperation at the meeting of the Ukrainian delegation led by O. Gladkovsky and Pakistan’s Minister for Defence Production Z. Jalal Khan. In addition to this, the Ukrainian delegation met with M. Anwar Khan, Chief of the Air Staff of Pakistan Air Force on the margins of IDEAS-2018, to discuss cooperation in an aviation sphere.

I. Polikha, Ambassador of Ukraine to India, met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bhutan Tandi Dorji on November 26-28 to discuss prospects of cooperation. Bhutan is the only country in the region to vote in favour of the UN resolution on human rights in Crimea in 2016.

Intergovernmental cooperation with other countries in the region has become somewhat more active. In 2018, the Afghan side appointed its head of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation established in April 2017. Ukraine and Pakistan appointed heads of the Ukrainian-Pakistani Commission on Economic Cooperation.

The year of 2018 saw some improvement in interparliamentary cooperation with the region’s countries. A group for interparliamentary relations with Pakistan was established (October 24). The Parliamentary group of interparliamentary relations with Sri Lanka visited it on July 19-20 for the first time in the history of bilateral relations. In addition to the inaugural meeting of the interparliamentary friendship association and signing of the memorandum on cooperation, the participants also met with Sri Lankan Parliament Speaker and Prime Minister as part of the visit. The Sri Lankan parliamentary group of friendship visited Ukraine (September 25-30), meeting with the VRU Speaker and in the ministries of education, defence, culture, youth and sports. Kyiv hosted the First Ukraine-Sri Lanka Business Forum.
Results

In 2018, cooperation between Ukraine and countries in the region intensified at the business level and in the sphere of military-technical industry. In October, State enterprise “SpetsTekhnoExport”, that is part of “UkrOboronProm”, opened its second office in India. India was a destination for nearly half of the export of this enterprise in the past years. After Defexpo India 2018, Ukraine and India signed USD 20 million worth of defence contracts, while representatives of Ukrainian military and defence industry will be involved in the construction of a new Indian tank. In nine months of 2018, India was the largest importer of Ukrainian foods accounting for 10% of total exports. In the first seven months of 2018, India was among the top three importers of the Ukrainian goods, ahead of China. After the 6th session of the Ukrainian-Indian Intergovernmental Commission, the Protocol on Cooperation in the near future was signed.

In early 2018, Ukraine opened a service centre for maintenance of Mi-8/Mi-17 helicopters in Bangladesh, based on the respective request from the Command of the Bangladesh Air Force.

Ukraine continues active military-technical cooperation with Pakistan. During defence expo IDEAS-2018, the prospect of joint production of tanks and cooperation in aviation were on the table. Ukraine offered Pakistan possible education and training of Pakistani specialists in Ukraine's universities.

Students from India and Pakistan make one of the largest groups of foreign students in Ukraine.

Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives received barely any attention from Ukraine in 2018.
The Sub-Saharan Africa remains on the periphery of the Ukrainian top leaders’ interests, although there is a certain level of interest in expanding cooperation with the countries of the region. The package of measures implemented by the Ukrainian state bodies to intensify the relations with the African countries is limited and mainly tactical. Some positive shifts are associated with the goals to pay more attention to the African states, which appeared in the strategic documents on the development of the military and industrial complex of Ukraine. Trade and economic cooperation remains the foundation of the bilateral relations. The Ukrainian side also revived the humanitarian contacts. The trade turnover between Ukraine and the Sub-Saharan African states is gradually increasing, but the range of the Ukrainian trading partners in the region is not stable. The Ukraine-Africa dialogue development within the multinational formats and the international organizations’ framework remains to be another acute issue.
Political Interest / Engagement

The Sub-Saharan African region is out-of-focus of the Ukrainian political forces. An analysis of programme documents of the political parties represented in the VRU revealed that they had any provision related to the development of relations with the African countries. The Parliament leadership in their statements and speeches during the year omitted any Africa-related issue, though it was flagged by some MPs, in particular, A. Antonyshchak (Petro Poroshenko Bloc) touched on a topic in his speech about the migration policy of Ukraine, A. Shkrum (All-Ukrainian Union Batkivshchyna) – while explaining to the African parliamentarians the problems of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, and L. Zubach (Samopomich), when while referencing the African anti-corruption courts experience.

The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU states that expansion and intensification of cooperation and partnership with the African states are an important part of the Ukraine’s foreign policy. The Ukraine’s priorities system in relations with the African countries should be based predominantly on the economic pragmatism. The main attention should be paid to the states, cooperation with which has significant advantages for the development of the Ukrainian economy, and facilitate Ukrainian exports, and involving of the Ukrainian companies in the infrastructure projects implementation. The document notes that the Sub-Saharan economic interests’ focus group envisages establishing of the close contacts with the African Continental Free Trade Area secretariat, bringing together 44 countries. Ukraine has to look for the reliable trading partners and points of support in the regional markets, demonstrating high growth rates and demand for the Ukrainian products. In regards to the Sub-Saharan African region, further steps in this direction will be the intensification of negotiations on the free trade areas with Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa, as well as trade regimes liberalization. Additionally, the northern Africa countries, especially Morocco, can serve as the intermediary supply points to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Institutional Cooperation

The interinstitutional cooperation of the Ukrainian state institutions in the context of the development of relations with the Sub-Saharan African countries was focused on trade and economic cooperation and education.

In April 2018, a group of high-level government and business delegates paid a weeklong visit to Ghana and Nigeria under the auspices of the MEDT of Ukraine. Besides the government agencies officials, it included 14 Ukrainian companies’ representatives. The main task of this trade mission was to introduce Ukrainian goods and services on the African market, and to promote trade relations expansion during the B2B and government meetings.
In August 2018, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine established an interagency delegation of the Ukrainian government representatives (consisting of the MEDT of Ukraine, Ministry of Justice, and the CMU Secretariat officials) to negotiate on creation of the Joint Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation with Kenya.

In July 2018, the MFA, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, and other state bodies of Ukraine met with twenty Middle East, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region countries’ representatives and ambassadors. They discussed principles of the foreign students selections, who wish to come to Ukraine for studying, the educational intermediaries’ activities, enrolment requirements, and recognition of the documents on secondary education.

A positive move was a long-awaited appointment of the Ambassador to South Africa by the President of Ukraine. The ambassadors' rotation in Kenya and Algeria was carried out promptly as well. At the same time, three Ukrainian embassies (in Ethiopia, Angola and Senegal) still lack their heads.

**Strategic Vision**

In 2018, the regulatory and legal framework consolidation of the long-term tasks for the development of relations between Ukraine and the Sub-Saharan African states moved forward. This region was mentioned in two strategic documents, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. In particular, the Military-Industrial Complex Development Strategy until 2028 approved on June 20, 2018, states that the key marketplaces for the Ukrainian military-industrial complex products fundamentally changed after 2015. Due to abandoning the Russian market, exports to the African countries increased. The Strategy states that to use the existing aviation industry companies’ potential by 2023, it is necessary to strengthen the positions on the African markets. As for the development of the non-lethal weapons segment, the long-term priority (up to 2028) is set for meeting the African region export supplies needs. The foreign trade operations with a number of African countries should facilitate Ukrainian shipbuilding.

Another governmental strategic document called "Action Plan for Realization of the Strategy for the Revival of the Ukrainian Aircraft Construction up to 2022", approved on 10.05.2018, set a clear task: to organize in-depth modernization and domestic production of Mi-2MSB and Mi-8MSB helicopters to export them to the Asian and African states.
Activities

Political contacts with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in 2018 were mainly supported by the government and some ministries, primarily by the MFA and the MEDT of Ukraine.

In May 2018, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine P. Klimkin paid an official visit to the Republic of Kenya, the first one in the history of the bilateral relations. The MFA also added to widening contacts with such African states as Sudan, South Africa, and Libya.

One of the means to maintain a dialogue with the African states within the MFA framework was an art exhibition devoted to the 55th anniversary of the Organization of African Unity – Africa Day 2018. The Ukrainian embassies in the African states took active part in the international action "Let’s Burn a Candle of Memory!" dedicated to commemorating the 1932-1933 Holodomor victims.

Within the framework of the Ukrainian trade mission to Nigeria and Ghana, three business forums were held: the Ghanaian-Ukrainian in Accra, and the Nigerian-Ukrainian business forums in Lagos and Abuja.

Important changes happened in the Ukrainian peacekeeping in Africa: the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine reported on the completion of the Ukraine’s participation in the UN Mission in Liberia. The personnel of the 56th separate helicopter detachment returned to Ukraine. Instead, the MoD of Ukraine informed that following the UN Secretariat proposal, it approved the decision on participation of the Ukrainian personnel (a staff officer and a military observer) in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. In total, as of December 2018, the number of the Ukrainian peacekeepers on the African continent, taking part in three missions (DRC, Southern Sudan, and the Abyei Area), equalled 274.

Results

In general, development of the relations between Ukraine and the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa can be characterized with the restrained optimism. At the same time, the Russian Federation proceeds its hybrid expansion on a significant number of the African countries. For example, the Russian private-military companies consolidate their gains in such strategically important countries as the Central African Republic, the DRC, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Eritrea, and Angola. Against this backdrop, the Ukrainian side’s efforts to maintain the partnership with Africa seem insufficient, with extreme lack of the political dialogue at the highest level between official Kyiv and the African countries’ leadership.
The UN GA voting on the resolution on "Militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, the Black and Azov Seas", initiated by Ukraine, confirmed the thesis that Ukrainian diplomacy should put more efforts in development relations with the countries of the region. As it was a year before, in 2018, only three states of the region (Botswana, Liberia, and Djibouti) supported Ukraine on a principally important issue. Due to the Russian diplomatic activity, both at the UN level and in the African states as well, Burundi, Southern Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe voted against the resolutions.

In the context of the consular activities, the MFA makes arrangements for establishing a visa centres network in 17 major African region cities.

On November 22, 2018, the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko signed a decree No 380 “On Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to the Republic of Yemen, the Republic of Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo”. The document stipulates that the State Emergency Service of Ukraine delivers the humanitarian aid to overcome hunger in these countries.

It should be emphasized that in the analysed period, the Ukrainian exports to Sub-Saharan Africa grew by 13%. The share of the region in the overall structure of exports is 2.5%, and in absolute figures, it exceeded USD 1 billion. The visible trade balance was positive for Ukraine and amounted USD 489.3 million. Senegal, Nigeria, Liberia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania, Kenya, and Sudan were the largest importers of the Ukrainian goods in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the Ukrainian export positions on traditionally oriented African markets, such as South Africa, Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Kenya, somewhat weakened.

National Energy Company “Energoatom” and the American company "Holtec International" signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the use of small modular SMR-160 reactors in Ukraine. They plan to build in Ukraine a hub for the small modular reactors equipment of domestic production with its further distribution, including the African markets.

As in the previous years, the students from Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly from Nigeria and Ghana, actively join the Ukrainian universities.
The obvious dependence of the Central Asian authoritarian regimes on the Russian Federation and the absence of joint regional and political projects between Ukraine and countries of the region make this foreign policy vector look less promising. The geographic remoteness of the region and the actual blockade by Russia of Ukraine’s transit and trade access to it, largely continue to affect the negative dynamics of the development of interstate relations with the Central Asian countries.

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<td>Strategic vision</td>
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Political Interest / Engagement

Ukraine's political interest in Central Asia is at a critically low level. The development of relations with Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) is absent from the current manifestos of the Ukrainian parliamentary political parties and practically absent from official speeches or statements by influential Ukrainian politicians. The Ukrainian political class came to believe that any full-fledged partnership with the Central Asian states is impossible unless the "Russian question" is settled. It is also obvious that the foreign policy of the political elites in Central Asia remains predominantly pro-Russian. Because of the tangible political "pro-Russian" bias, the development of political dialogue and economic relations between Ukraine and countries of the region is extremely complicated. In fact, no one in the Ukrainian political elite currently considers the Central Asian vector of foreign policy cooperation as a self-sufficient direction or as a goal of political investment. The Analytical Report to the 2018 Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU only mentions the Central Asian countries in the context of lost trade and economic, transport and logistic opportunities.

Institutional Cooperation

The level of coordination between Ukrainian government institutions concerning cooperation with the Central Asian countries can be described as low. It should be noted that Ukrainian public offices do not show any meaningful coordination in the format of bilateral relations. But there are no open conflicts or confrontation among them on the current issues of cooperation with the region either.

Positive developments of 2018 include an appointment of the ambassador to Kazakhstan after a five-year absence and an ambassador to Kyrgyzstan after a year pause. At the same time, ambassadors to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have held their posts for more than eight years.

Strategic Vision

Recently, Central Asia lost its strategic appeal for Ukrainian business and political circles and takes a marginal place in their strategic plans. Similarly, bilateral interstate relations with countries of the region are not considered to be promising or strategic. The strategic package (the Law of Ukraine "On the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy", the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, the Ukraine 2020 Strategy, the Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine, the Export Strategy of Ukraine: Roadmap of Strategic Trade Development for 2017-2021) has no mention of Central Asia. Not least, this is due to the "pro-Russian dependence" of the Central Asian regimes and their position on the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Activities

Taking into account the generally low level of interstate relations between Ukraine and the Central Asian countries, cooperation mostly takes place at the level of diplomatic missions, some executive authorities, businesses and civil society. There was practically no high-level dialogue between leaders of the countries of the region and Ukraine in 2018. Also, there were not enough active and promising contacts between the executive and legislative branches of power. The most notable intergovernmental bilateral event was the visit by Minister of Justice of Ukraine P. Petrenko to Kazakhstan (October 29) and the signing of two interstate agreements between Ukraine and Kazakhstan: on extradition and on legal assistance in criminal cases. Also, a telephone conversation took place between First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine S. Kubiv and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan A. Aripov (December 5), during which they discussed issues of mutual access of goods to the markets of Ukraine and Uzbekistan, as well as the importance of forming predictable trade relations between the countries.

The main issues currently being addressed by Ukraine in the framework of bilateral formats with countries of the Central Asian region concern mainly the economic and humanitarian-legal dimensions.

Results

The year of 2018 was not marked by Ukraine's return to Central Asia. The stagnation of foreign political and economic relations between Ukraine and countries of the region has become a firm reality. The lack of a common agenda in relations with countries of Central Asia and the objective difficulties in communication at the interstate level have created a situation in which Central Asia is no longer a strategic prospect of the Ukrainian policy. The volume of export and import operations, as well as transport and logistic opportunities between Ukraine and the countries of the region has been extremely limited in recent years. A separate problem is the lack of direct flights between Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which naturally complicates economic and people-to-people cooperation.

Central Asian states' negative attitude to the Ukrainian resolutions in the UN has become traditional. In particular, on November 15, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Turkmenistan did not vote) voted against an updated resolution entitled "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine)" in the Third Committee of the UN GA. On December 17, during the adoption of the UN GA Resolution "The problem of militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine), as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov", Uzbekistan voted against it, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan abstained (Turkmenistan and Tajikistan did not vote at all). On December 22, during the adoption of the UN GA Resolution "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Ukraine", Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan voted against it (Turkmenistan did not vote).
In 2018, the Black Sea region became one of the priority areas for Ukraine’s foreign policy. The main focus was on counteraction Russia’s threat to free navigation in the Kerch sector of the Black Sea–Sea of Azov basin. Seeking to ensure security for Ukrainian citizens and territorial integrity, Ukraine deepened cooperation with NATO countries, above all. As before, all foreign policy decision-makers continued the search for the best ways of protecting national interests in the Black Sea region on all available international platforms.
Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, the key state and political institutions of Ukraine paid much more attention to the strengthening of military security and securing of Ukrainian interests in the region in the context of Russia’s growing presence, in particular in the Sea of Azov. However, this was actually the only aspect of the Black Sea region vision. In the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU "On the Internal and External Situation of Ukraine in 2018", P. Poroshenko said that "the short-term agenda now includes the strengthening of defence of the Ukrainian part of the water area and the coast of the Sea of Azov". As in previous years, the Address does not include the Black Sea region as a separate foreign policy unit, however, the President for the first time, rather as a consequence, proposed to take out the clause that allows the Russian Black Sea Fleet to be stationed in Ukraine from the Constitution, with a view to Crimea’s return under Ukraine's sovereignty.

During the year, parliamentary forces tried to propose mechanisms to protect the country’s Azov interests in conditions when Russia is actually blocking Ukraine's Azov coast and its key ports. In particular, a bill on the denunciation of the agreement with Russia on cooperation in the use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, which was put forward by Samopomich MPs, was registered in the VRU on July 10, 2018. The litmus test and true challenge for all Ukrainian authorities was the Russian attack against Ukrainian warships and the seizure of Ukrainian sailors on November 25. These unlawful actions of the Russian Federation led to the introduction of martial law in certain regions of Ukraine. In addition, these events were used by certain political forces in the Parliament to criticize the current authorities ahead of the 2019 presidential election in Ukraine, which cannot but weaken the foreign policy effect of the Ukrainian regional activities. However, only the Opposition Bloc did not support the presidential decree on the introduction of martial law.

Institutional Cooperation

Institutional cooperation in 2018 (in particular, between the Administration of the President of Ukraine, the MFA, the Cabinet of Ministers, the VRU) was quite productive and generally continued the tendency for more effective coordination of actions, the course for which had been taken in 2017. However, one cannot disregard the factor of future elections in Ukraine and the speculative behaviour of some representatives of the VRU, which shows discord in the defence of national interests at the legislative level. For example, the President of Ukraine’s decision to declare martial law after the incident in the Kerch Strait prompted a hot debate. Besides, the MFA, the NSDC and the Naval Forces, which had inconsistent versions of the event, needed some time to work out common position and possible response to the Russian attack immediately after it was carried out. Nevertheless, certain centralization of power and political flexibility of the main decision-making centres created conditions for settling regional problems by means of collective efforts in a more consistent manner. In particular, thanks to the effective and timely coordination of efforts between the central
executive authorities and diplomatic missions abroad, the task of protecting national interests on the global level was fulfilled, when the UN Son the Kerch incident was held at the request of Ukraine on November 26. Ukraine's representation in regional organizations was further enhanced by practical cooperation between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, relevant committees and the MFA, while the Cabinet of Ministers in cooperation with the APU could promptly defend Ukraine’s interests in the framework of regional organizations such as BSEC (including PA BSEC) and GUAM.

**Strategic Vision**

The year of 2018 finally saw the prerequisites for establishing a state-level comprehensive mechanism for addressing topical regional issues. It is in this strategic context that the decision of the National Security and Defence Council "On Urgent Measures to Protect National Interests in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait", which was put into effect by the President of Ukraine on October 12, should be considered. This is a harbinger of the emergence of a "Black Sea" doctrine of Ukraine's foreign policy in the future (as a separate document or as part of an updated National Security Strategy of Ukraine). In addition, the Navy Strategy of Ukraine 2035 was presented. It focuses on the capacity for the realization of national interests in the Black Sea region and prospects for cooperation with partners in this area.

**Activities**

The state authorities' efforts with regard to the Black Sea mostly focused on the security sphere in 2018. Ukraine's determination was reinforced by the fact that most of its partners extended sanctions against the Russian Federation during the escalation of its unlawful actions against Ukraine in the Black Sea region, especially at the end of 2018. However, the commissioning of the so-called Kerch Bridge this year notably complicated attempts by the Ukrainian authorities to resist Russia's unilateral illegal actions.

Nevertheless, the authorities' efforts to implement their plans and intentions aimed at strengthening the military capability of Ukraine to protect its integrity and sovereignty were quite powerful. In addition to the annual Sea Breeze maritime exercise, the first ever joint training of the Ukrainian and Romanian Navies on the Danube River, Riverian 2018, in early September, was a noteworthy event. In general, thanks to international political support in 2018, NATO member states' military presence in the Black Sea region became more apparent. Throughout the year, ships of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups and key allies, in particular the USA and the UK, called at local ports in the interests of strengthening Ukraine’s security. On September 17, the Ukrainian government announced plans to build a naval base on the Azov coast.
The process of building a "mosquito fleet" and strengthening the entire coast guard infrastructure, including through the exchange of experience, in particular with the relevant bodies of the Republic of Turkey, continued. At the international Black Sea Intelligence Forum hosted by the Main Intelligence Department of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry in early June, representatives of military intelligence of the Black Sea region countries identified practical measures to counteract Russian aggression. The 19th Black Sea Littoral States Border/Coast Guard Agencies Cooperation Forum (BSCF) was held in Odesa in the beginning of November. It discussed the issues of interaction between the departments of border and coast guard services of the littoral states in the context of current challenges. Ukraine took the presidency over from Romania for the next year. The problems of information security in the Black Sea region caused by the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation were discussed at the security forum "Modern Wars and Old Conflicts of the Black Sea Region" in Odesa in early September. The First Deputy Minister of Information Policy of Ukraine took part in the forum.

Traditionally, representatives of all branches of power at the level of ministers and their deputies participated in the work of regional organizations. In particular, First Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine S. Kubiv met the BSEC Secretary-General of the PERMISM, Christides on September 26. At the sub-regional level, in order to strengthen its position, Ukraine actively joined the establishment of regional working platforms at the level of the interparliamentary assemblies (Ukraine-Georgia-Moldova) and at the level of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Ukraine-Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan).

Results

The year of 2018 was quite controversial in terms of the work performed and results achieved in relation to the Black Sea region. A certain increase in activities and quite logical strategic decisions, although belated, which were adopted during the year, did not automatically improve the ensurance of national interests. They will have a long-term impact, but today Ukraine alone cannot resist the Kremlin's aggressive policy in the Black Sea region either strategically or tactically. In particular, the 2017 plans to prevent Russia from completing the Kerch Bridge were not implemented because Ukraine is in no position to confront the openly hostile Russian fleet at sea. Under these circumstances, the only positive result of 2018 is international partners' support at the interregional and UN levels, as well as an increase in the naval presence of Ukraine's partners from among NATO countries in the Black Sea region. The US and the UK governments' support for the development of the Ukrainian Navy and its infrastructure in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, as well as their commitment to a more active presence in the Black Sea are also among the positive trends. Thus, despite the lack of an immediate improvement in the security situation in the context of external aggression, some positive results of 2018 include increased attention to the Black Sea region both in the country and in the world, a long-term strategy for the development of the Navy, the formation of a strategic vision for the region and attempts to create regional forms of cooperation to rule out Russian influence.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OSCE | B+
United Nations | B+
Council of Europe | A−
In 2018, Ukraine’s foreign policy with regard to the OSCE was marked by an interest in solving a key foreign policy task of countering Russian armed aggression. During the year, contacts were held at the level of the OSCE Secretary General, the President of the OSCE PA and the Italian OSCE Chairman-in-Office who visited Ukraine. The OSCE made efforts to resolve the conflict by taking part in the work of the Trilateral contact group and the monitoring activities of the OSCE SMM. The OSCE platform was used to maintain political and diplomatic pressure against the aggressor state. The government received support for domestic transformations in the format of joint project activities of the Office of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine.
Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, Ukraine paid a great deal of attention to cooperation and activities within the framework of the OSCE, which was mainly driven by the key role of this organization in counteracting Russian aggression at the international level, the settlement of the conflict waged by Russia, and the protection of human rights in the temporarily occupied territories. It was the context in which political interest was expressed at the presidential level, as reflected in the 2018 Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU, within the Ukrainian parliament and government. Among the parliamentary political parties, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, the People's Front, Samopomich and the Radical Party, whose MPs are members of the Permanent Delegation to the OSCE PA, paid more attention to cooperation with the OSCE.

Institutional Cooperation

Steps taken by various branches of power with regard to Ukraine's cooperation with the OSCE were generally coordinated in 2018. Contacts with the OSCE were supported through the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the International Organizations in Vienna, as well as in the framework of cooperation with the OSCE SMM and the Office of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, as well as with the OSCE PA, the ODIHR, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

Strategic Vision

In recent years, Ukraine's strategic goal in relation to the OSCE was to make full use of its capabilities to resolve the conflict and put pressure on the Russian Federation in order to stop aggression and to ensure the return of hostages and prisoners to Ukraine. Although the Analytical Report to the President of Ukraine's Annual Address to the VRU notes the limited ability of the Organization to influence the conflict, it also mentions the key importance of its role in the settlement process. In particular, the 2018 Government Action Plan and the NATO-Ukraine Annual National Programme stipulate that cooperation with the OSCE in the conflict zone constrains the escalation of Russian aggression, contributes to the maintenance of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and exposure of Russian criminal acts against Ukraine, provides for the solution of important humanitarian and human rights issues and sustains international attention to the problems of occupied Crimea, which Russia does not allow OSCE SMM monitors to visit, at the same time hampering the fulfilment of their mandate in separate districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. This vision has become a signpost for Ukraine's foreign policy with regard to the OSCE in 2018. At the same time, Ukraine's vision of how to use the OSCE potential in other spheres remains limited.
Activities

During the year, Ukraine's activities in relation to the OSCE, including within the framework of the Trilateral contact group, were aimed at ending Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, ensuring the OSCE SMM monitoring of the temporarily uncontrolled section of the Ukrainian-Russian border, and ensuring the protection of human rights and freedoms in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. This issue was also on the agenda during the visits by Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Alfano at the beginning of the Italy's Chairmanship in the OSCE and OSCE PA President G. Tsereteli in January.

To draw attention to the human rights situation in Crimea, the delegations of Ukraine and the United States to the OSCE, with the support of the EU member states, Canada and Georgia, held an event entitled "Violations of human rights in Crimea and parts of Donbas" in the OSCE HQ in February.

The OSCE remained an important platform for weekly meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council and the Security Cooperation Forum, which discussed specific facts of Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, including based on the SMM reports.

On November 12 and 26, Ukraine initiated the special sessions of the OSCE Permanent Council to discuss Russia's violations of its obligations in connection with the illegal elections held by the Russian occupying administration in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as the act of unprovoked armed aggression against Ukraine near the Kerch Strait.

At the 25th OSCE Ministerial Council meeting (December 6-7, Milan), the delegation of Ukraine with the support of 11 states co-organised a thematic ministerial event "The problem of militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine), as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov", during which the international community saw the evidence of Russia's militarization of illegally occupied Crimea and direct armed aggression against Ukraine in the Kerch Strait.

In pursuance of provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ukraine and the OSCE on the establishment of a new form of cooperation signed July 13, 1999 and with the consent of the MFA of Ukraine, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine implemented a number of important projects for Ukraine, in particular in the following areas: judicial reform, de-mining, defence reform, social adaptation of ATO/JFO servicemen, fight against terrorism and human trafficking; improvement of environmental safety in Ukraine, border security, elections, proper public administration and gender equality, assistance to IDPs, law-enforcement reform and the development of new police forces, development of civil society and fight against corruption, etc. (with a total budget of 3.6 mln euros). Officials of various levels took part in the OSCE events, for example, on security, protection of people with disabilities, etc.
Results

Although in his statement at the traditional meeting with the heads of diplomatic missions, the President of Ukraine thanked Austria, which chaired the OSCE in 2017, and expressed hope for close cooperation with Italy during its chairmanship in 2018, which included the settlement of the conflict in the list of priorities for its chairmanship, no significant shifts even in the de-escalation of tension in the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine took place. The conditions of fulfilment of the SMM mandate have not improved due to persistent obstacles put by the Russian Federation and supported by its militants.

Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Alfano once again condemned the occupation of Crimea and unrecognition of attempt to annex it, while OSCE Secretary General T. Greminger confirmed support for Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty at a meeting with Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Bodnar in July. The OSCE condemned the so-called illegal "elections" held in separate districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in November.

Taking into account the decision-making procedure by a majority vote, the Parliamentary Assembly was effective in relation to Ukraine, as reflected in the Berlin Declaration and the Resolution "Ongoing violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)" adopted in July, which insists on the de-occupation of Crimea and separate districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as on "the full withdrawal of Russian military forces from Ukrainian territory". During the OSCE Ministerial meeting on December 6-7, much attention was also paid to this issue by the President of the OSCE PA, which testified to the effective work of the Ukrainian MPs in the OSCE PA.

Ukraine's initiative to push for a decision to ensure permanent monitoring along the entire section of the Ukrainian-Russian border, which draft has been introduced for the third year in a row, continues to be blocked by the Russian Federation.
In 2018, Ukraine managed not only to keep the Ukrainian issue on the permanent agenda of the UN institutions, but also to achieve positive results in the adoption of important UN General Assembly resolutions on human rights in Crimea and the militarization of Crimea. Despite a decline in political interest, activities and statements focused on the prospect of deploying a UN peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, expanding humanitarian assistance and on human rights issues. Ukraine was elected to the UN Economic and Social Council for 2019-2021.
Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, political interest in the UN has declined to some extent, focusing mainly on the issue of the possible deployment of a peacekeeping mission and with no attention to other aspects of cooperation. Like a year earlier, in 2018, President P. Poroshenko in his Annual Address to the VRU paid attention to the prospect of the UN peacekeeping mission deployment in Ukraine. The Analytical Report to the President's Address devotes a separate chapter to the prospects for the UN peacekeeping mission deployment in Donbas and its format. It also identifies the main priority of Ukraine's activities within the United Nations, which is "targeted comprehensive work aimed at using all available means of the Organization to protect sovereignty and territorial integrity, advocate national interests of Ukraine in the context of active reforms in domestic politics and the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conflict".

At the same time, high interest in the UN activities is underlined by the participation of the President of Ukraine in the opening of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September, where he, in particular, spoke about Russian aggression, a peacekeeping mission in Donbas, respect for the principles of the UN Charter, the 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development, and the UN initiatives aimed at overcoming hunger in the world. Unlike in the previous years, the President did not touch upon any of the issues of the general security agenda.

Ukrainian MPs (including Y. Boyko, O. Vilkul, Y. Tymoshenko, A. Teteruk) and Prime Minister V. Groysman mentioned the UN only in the context of the deployment of a peacekeeping mission in Donbas, however they had different approaches. Y. Tymoshenko also spoke in favour of reforming the UN. There is no controversy about the UN among various political parties.

Institutional Cooperation

The issues of the UN agenda and Ukraine's activities within the UN system do not cause contradictions among various branches of power. For the most part, different ministries and agencies focus on fulfilling their obligations under the relevant sectoral UN Conventions, as evidenced in particular by the Government Action Plan for 2018. Positive examples of cooperation between the MFA, the Ministry of Justice and others include the preparation of a memorandum, as well as the proper processing of evidences in accordance with the procedural requirements of the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
Strategic Vision

In 2018, the strategic vision of Ukraine's work within the UN has not changed. The UN is mentioned in most of Ukraine's existing strategic documents, except for the Law "On the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy". Ukraine and the UN cooperated, in particular, on the basis of the UN-Ukraine Partnership Framework 2018-2022 signed at the end of 2017. However, due to the reform of the UN Resident Coordinator System (announced in September), the 1992 Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the United Nations on the establishment of a United Nations Interim Office requires revision.

Activities

As usual, out of Ukraine's three missions to the UN (New York, Geneva and Vienna), main activities took place in the New York headquarters. Taking into account the fact that Ukraine has ceased to be a non-permanent member of the UN SC, Ukraine's Permanent Mission to the UN focused its efforts more directly on Ukrainian issues and revived its activities in the format of the UN GA. At the same time, the issue of Russian aggression remained on the agenda of the UN SC.

Ukrainian high-ranking officials took part in the UN meetings in New York. In particular, on March 15, 2018, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine O. Zerkal took part in an open Arria-formula meeting of the UN Security Council on the problems of the temporary occupation of Crimea. The meeting was called by the delegations of Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, Poland and the US on the initiative of Ukraine. On April 23, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine S. Kyslytsya spoke at the open debate on youth, peace and security in the UN SC and assured the audience that the Government of Ukraine is carefully studying the UN recommendations on further transformation of national youth policy. A briefing was held at the UN Security Council on May 29 under the chairmanship of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland J. Czaputowicz and with the participation of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine P. Klimkin. The briefing held on the initiative of Ukraine once again turned attention of the UN SC member states to the blatant violations of the Minsk agreements by the Russian Federation. Based on the results of the briefing, the president of the Council issued a statement on the Ukrainian issue on June 6.

First Deputy Speaker of the VRU Rada I. Gerashchenko represented Ukraine at the UN Security Council open debate on women, peace and security in October. On December 5, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs O. Zerkal chaired an event in the UN HQ, which turned attention of the international community to challenges and threats posed by the Russian Federation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

The delegation of Ukraine also initiated emergency meetings of the Security Council on two occasions: on October 30 (under the chairmanship of Bolivia) in connection with Russia's intentions to hold unlawful elections in the occupied territories of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions and on November 26 (under the chairmanship of China) in connection with the act of armed aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the seizure of Ukrainian ships in the Black Sea. Both events took place despite the objections of Russia, which lost two procedural votes in a row, and allowed Ukraine to turn additional international attention to the situation in the Sea of Azov.

As part of the 40th session of the UN Committee on Information at the UN HQ on May 9, a discussion initiated by Ukraine focused on the phenomenon of Russian propaganda and fake news. It was attended by representatives of Ukrainian nongovernmental organizations and the MFA.

Although Ukraine’s Mission in Vienna mainly focuses on activities within the framework of the OSCE, in 2018 it paid sufficient attention to activities within individual UN institutions. In particular, the Ukrainian Mission took a regular part in IAEA meetings (see Section "Nuclear non-proliferation"). In addition, the Week of Ukraine in the UN was organized at the Vienna International Centre in November. Its key goal was to present and popularize Ukrainian culture, science and contemporary Ukrainian artists on the UN platform through the prism of promoting the empowerment and leadership of women. On March 14, an official presentation of the Strategic Framework of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime for the countries of Eastern Europe for 2017-2020 took place in the framework of the 61st session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The high-level event brought together representatives of the governments of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. This programme will provide an opportunity to further strengthen partnership dialogue with the Commission, in particular, in the area of receiving technical assistance and implementing joint projects with Ukraine.

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine in Geneva was actively involved in the activities of the relevant UN institutions headquartered in the city, including those concerning human rights, intellectual property rights protection, refugees, indigenous people, sustainable development, etc. The Ukrainian delegation led by Health Minister U. Suprun took part in the 71st session of the World Health Assembly.

In 2018, the number of Ukrainian peacekeepers involved in the UN peacekeeping operations decreased to 306 people (five missions). The largest number of them, 265, is in DR Congo.

In its turn, the UN Office in Ukraine actively carried out its activities and cooperated with Ukrainian ministries and the public sector, especially in the areas of assistance to IDPs, fight against domestic violence, gender equality, the achievement of goals of sustainable development, human rights and humanitarian assistance in eastern Ukraine.
Results

Most of the set tasks and priorities in Ukraine's activities within the UN were fulfilled in 2018. On January 16, Ukraine officially joined the Global Container Control Programme carried out by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Customs Organization with the financial support of the Canadian Government. A trilateral Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the State Fiscal Service of Ukraine, the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and UNHCR. Ukraine's involvement in the Programme will strengthen the national set of tools for combating smuggling, illegal drug trafficking and psychotropic substances.

For three years in a row, the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly (November 16) and the UN GA (December 22) A supported the Resolution "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine", which contains much stronger clauses on the aggressor state and includes the names of three Ukrainians. On December 17, the UN GA adopted the Resolution "The problem of militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine), as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov", which highlights security threats posed by Russia to Ukraine, the Black Sea region and the whole of Europe, as well as concerns about the militarization of Crimea and the seizure of Ukrainian vessels and sailors.

In December, 39 UN member states signed the Declaration on the 85th Anniversary of the Holodomor, which for the first time condemned the Stalinist regime (eight countries more than last year). On the initiative of the Ukrainian delegation, the Second Committee of the General Assembly for the first time added a provision to the text of the Resolution "Agriculture development, food security and nutrition" regarding the need to prevent the death of people from starvation in the future.

On June 13, Ukraine was elected to the UN Economic and Social Council for 2019-2021. Ukraine’s membership was supported by 176 states.

In February, Ukraine joined the Group of Friends Leading on Environmental Management in the Field, an informal association of around 30 states that will facilitate the introduction of the state-of-the-art technologies of environmental protection and strengthen peacekeepers' safety.

On September 21, the UN GA approved the agenda of the 73rd session, to which a new item initiated by Ukraine – "The situation in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine" – was added as a result of successful vote. It facilitates the organization of further meetings on Crimea and Donbas, since now all the issues can be considered by the UN GA in a system within the framework of a separate item.

In 2018, the Japanese government allocated USD 3.6 mln to the implementation of seven projects by the six UN agencies in Ukraine (the International Organization for Migration, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, the UN Office for Project Services and the WHO) to support individuals and communities affected by the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
The agenda of Ukraine’s cooperation with the Council of Europe was largely implemented in 2018. The Council of Europe, in general, and as far as sanctions against Russia are concerned in particular, provided support to Ukraine. Not without criticism, it actively promoted reforms and fight against corruption, as well as further strengthening of democracy in Ukraine. In the future, it would be advisable for Ukraine to strengthen the analytical and information components of its activities in the Council of Europe.
Political Interest / Engagement

There was high political interest at all levels in interaction with the Council of Europe in 2018. All leading political forces and parliamentary factions, the CMU, Prime Minister V. Groysman, Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration I. Klympush-Tsintsadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin paid attention to the Council of Europe.

The CoE is also mentioned in this year's Analytical Report to the Annual Address of President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko to the VRU. In particular, the Council of Europe is described as an "important front for Ukraine's diplomatic fight against the Russian aggressor".

Institutional Cooperation

Institutional interaction between the MFA, the VRU and its Ombudsman, the Central Electoral Commission and the Ministry of Justice can be considered effective. The Ministry of Regional Development and Construction and the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting were among the institutions that were more involved in cooperation with the CoE in accordance with the Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine for 2018-2021. In the context of judicial reform, which the Council of Europe pays particular attention to, it is necessary to note the openness to cooperation by the High Qualification Commission of Judges and the new Supreme Court. Coordination and cooperation between the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe headed by D. Kuleba and the Permanent Delegation of the VRU to the PACE were effective. One can also note the openness of the Delegation to cooperate with journalists and expert community. The work of the Ukrainian delegation to the PACE under the general leadership of V. Aryev was marked by particular political sharpness and argumentation. At the same time, a typical problem of debriefing the MFA on the activities concerning the Council of Europe events, in which they take part remains unresolved.

Strategic Vision

On February 21, the Committee of Ministers of the CoE approved the Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine for 2018-2021, thus laying the foundation for the entire system of relations between Ukraine and the Council of Europe in the years to come. The key partners in Ukraine are central and local government bodies and non-governmental organizations. The estimated budget of the Action Plan is 29.5 mln euros. On the initiative of Ukraine, the Action Plan for the first time clearly states that it should contribute to the achievement of the objectives outlined in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. In accordance with the Action Plan, the CoE will continue to help Ukraine in reforming the judiciary, law-enforcement agencies, enforcement of court rulings, as well as in the area of decentralisation and fight against corruption, protection of the rights of IDPs and journalists' safety.
Activities

In February, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the Council of Europe, D. Kuleba, introduced a series of steps that could be taken to improve the human rights situation in Crimea for consideration by the member states and leadership of the Council of Europe. The steps initiated by Ukraine include the efforts the Secretary-General, the Commissioner for Human Rights, human rights organizations and the CoE member states can take to stop the repressions launched by the Russian occupying authorities in Crimea.

Sectoral cooperation is expanding. In particular, in December, the Council of Europe and the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine signed a memorandum of cooperation on strengthening the Commission's ability to organize and hold elections in accordance with European standards.

The MFA of Ukraine was very active with regard to the CoE, ensuring the high level and dynamics of contacts with representatives of the Council of Europe.

A sensitive issue for the Council of Europe was the question of Russia's return to the PACE, around which there has been an exhaustive intrigue. In particular, Ukraine's position was strengthened by the VRU's decision on the inadmissibility of the return of the Russian Federation delegation to the PACE, particularly by means of amending the PACE regulations. The substantiated anti-Russian protest by the Ukrainian delegation worked, and on October 9, the PACE rejected a draft resolution on changes to the Rules of Procedure that would allow Russia to resume its participation in the PACE.

Cooperation within the framework of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the CoE, both at the level of participation of Ukrainian representatives in congressional meetings and at the level of events, seminars, workshops and other forms of assistance to local communities in Ukraine, took place at an active pace.

Results

Mutual expectations of the sides have largely been met and there are solid reasons to speak about the success of this year's policy of Ukraine within the framework of the Council of Europe and the principled political atmosphere in the CoE, which, despite Russia's enormous efforts, does not allow it to fall into disrepute. Kyiv enjoys understanding and support on the overwhelming majority of issues and, most importantly, on the issues that are key to political stability, national security, and the priority of international law over force.

The Council of Europe recognizes achievements in the projects it launched in Ukraine with a view to developing the Ukrainian media environment, decentralization reform, the creation of an anti-corruption court, etc. At the same time, CoE institutions draw Kyiv's attention to a number of problems: weak penitentiary reform, legal policy in
terms of requirements to financial reporting, and loopholes in anti-corruption policy (in particular, disclosure of information about anti-corruption activists).

The Council of Europe's project "Support for reform of the system of judicial accountability in Ukraine" was launched on February 18. One of the key partners in the implementation of this project is the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine.

On June 28, the PACE adopted the Resolution "On Ukrainian citizens detained as political prisoners by the Russian Federation".

To ease the burden of the financial blackmail that Russia has applied to the Council of Europe since 2017, Ukraine made a voluntary contribution of USD 400,000 to the Council of Europe on September 4.

On November 27, the Committee of Ministers of the CoE expressed unequivocal support for Ukraine after the act of Russian aggression in the Kerch Strait. The member states of the Council of Europe condemned Russia's unjustified use of force and called for the immediate and unconditional release of Ukrainian sailors and return of the ships to Ukraine.

In 2018, the Council of Europe adopted a series of pro-Ukrainian resolutions, the main ones being No 2198 "Humanitarian consequences of the war in Ukraine"; No 2203 "The progress of the Assembly's monitoring procedure"; No 2209 "State of emergency: proportionality issues concerning derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights"; No 2214 "Humanitarian needs and rights of internally displaced persons in Europe"; No 2226 "New restrictions on NGO activities in Council of Europe member States"; No 2231 "Ukrainian citizens detained as political prisoners by the Russian Federation".
MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES

Human Rights  B-
Climate Change  C
Nuclear Non-proliferation  C
International Security  C-
In 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other institutions focusing on ensuring Ukraine’s compliance with its international commitments on human rights protection continued to be highly active. The platforms provided by the UN, the Council of Europe and the OSCE still offered the main mechanisms for the promotion of human rights in Ukraine. Emphasis was placed on the release of Ukrainian hostages, political prisoners and prisoners of war detained in the Russian Federation, Crimea and in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Political Interest / Engagement

Like in the previous year, in 2018 almost all fractions of the VRU were involved in the implementation of Ukraine's international commitments on human rights and in the invoking of human rights as an instrument of foreign policy. Representatives of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc Solidarity, Batkivshyna and People's Front remain highly active. Similar to 2017, this fact can be explained, in particular, by the involvement of the MPs of these parties in matters related to the Minsk process, the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Ethnic Minorities and Interethnic Relations, as well as participation in the PACE. I. Gerashchenko, one of the most active MPs of the VRU, continued her consistent efforts to secure the release of Ukrainian hostages, political prisoners and prisoners of war detained in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Crimea and the Russian Federation.

The year of 2018 demonstrated the complexity of inter-fractional and even intra-coalition interaction during the election of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights (in a "package" with two other vacancies), which revealed the lack of strategic vision of the role of this institution in respect of the human rights protection, including in terms of foreign policy.

There was an increased interest in improving the mechanisms of implementation of state policy and actions of state bodies with regard to imposing sanctions on persons involved in illegal politically motivated persecution of Ukrainian citizens on the temporarily occupied territories and in the Russian Federation.

At the same time, despite the numerous mentions of the fact and consequences of the Russian aggression, issues of human rights and violations caused by the aggression were not reflected in the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU.

Institutional Cooperation

The Ministry of Justice remains the key institution that coordinates activities concerning the fulfilment of Ukraine's international legal commitments on human rights. Within the framework of the MFA, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the Council of Europe remains highly active. In addition, there is a high level of cooperation between MPs representing Ukraine in the PACE. Like in 2017, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons took an active part in the implementation of human rights programmes. In particular, the ministry's programme for the integration of IDPs was highly praised by international organizations.

At the end of 2018, the agenda was extended to include the need to develop an institutional mechanism for cooperation in investigating offenses committed by the occupying authorities against Ukrainian citizens in the annexed Autonomous Republic.
of Crimea and in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The National Police of Ukraine, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, in particular the Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, continued to investigate such crimes in 2017-2018.

**Strategic Vision**

The National Human Rights Strategy adopted in 2015 for the period of up to 2020 remains the only strategic document focusing on human rights. Despite the annual reporting on the implementation of the Action Plan to it, the development of indicators for assessing the implementation of the strategy is still on the agenda, which creates certain problems in measuring the progress. According to the Ministry of Justice, the relevant indicators were developed in 2018 in cooperation with the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission. At the same time, the ministry admitted that the reporting on the implementation of the Action Plan to the National Strategy is quantitative rather than qualitative. In addition, in other strategic documents defining the foreign policy of Ukraine, human rights remain among the cross-cutting issues, although they are not mentioned directly.

**Activities**

In 2018, following consultations with civil society organizations, recommendations on the application of international humanitarian law were added to the National Human Rights Strategy. Given that the Government of Ukraine cannot ensure human rights in uncontrolled territories, in 2018 the Ministry of Justice notified international organizations on the derogation of international commitments by Ukraine. A relevant commission is to decide in which proportion the derogation should be applied.

The MFA was highly active within the framework of the Third Committee of the UN GA, including in adding new content to the Resolution “Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine” and mentioning individual political prisoners by name (O. Sentsov, V. Balukh, E. Kuku).

The issue of the release of illegally detained citizens of Ukraine in the Russian Federation and in Crimea, as well as ways of protecting human rights and reducing the humanitarian impact of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, were in the focus of the Human Rights Dialogue between Ukraine and the EU (the first annual dialogue since the entry into force of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement took place in Brussels on May 31, 2018).
Results

In 2018, the release of Ukrainian political prisoners, hostages and prisoners of war saw less practical progress than in 2017 because of the factors beyond Ukraine’s control. At the same time, international institutions (the UN GA, PACE) adopted a number of important resolutions, which may be interpreted as certain "immunity" of the Kremlin's prisoners and the retention of sanctions over human rights abuses. In addition, the new stages of human rights strengthening programmes in Ukraine were continued or started. A resolution adopted at the PACE summer session calls on the Russian authorities to release the citizens of Ukraine illegally detained by the Russian Federation. The PACE Resolution 2198 (2018) entitled "Humanitarian consequences of the war in Ukraine" explicitly states that these detentions take place in the context of armed aggression. It calls "to release all Ukrainian prisoners captured and imprisoned in the Russian Federation and in annexed Crimea in the context of the war."

The adoption of the UN GA Resolution "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine" on December 22 is a serious achievement in the process of liberating Ukrainian hostages. Despite the low practical progress on this issue due to a number of factors beyond the MFA control, the achievement of this resolution is that it calls on the Russian Federation to provide international experts from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Ukrainian consular officials with information on the prisoners’ health and conditions of detention, as well as access to them. The resolution also calls on Russia to allow the Ukrainian Ombudsman to visit political prisoners in Crimea and the Russian Federation, and to uphold the rights of Ukrainian prisoners in accordance with international law. It also calls upon all international organizations and specialized agencies of the UN system, when referring to Crimea in their official documents, to refer to "the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation".

In accordance with the procedures of the International Court of Justice, the consideration of the case filed by Ukraine in January 2017 over violations of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Financing of Terrorism and the Convention on the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination by Russia continued in 2018. Despite the court order on April 17, 2017 to allow the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People to resume its operation, this has not been done.

As of December 2018, Ukraine has filed five inter-state complaints against Russia with the European Court of Human Rights (concerning human rights abuses in Crimea and Donbas). One of them concerns the violation of the rights of 71 Ukrainian citizens illegally prosecuted in temporarily occupied Crimea or in the Russian Federation. Given the complexity of the cases, the large number of facts to consider and the long-standing practice of considering inter-state cases for years (from 10 to 40 years), one should not expect any fast court rulings. At the same time, the scheduling of the first hearing for February 27, 2019 can be seen as a positive signal that draws attention to human rights
abuses in Crimea at the level of the ECHR as an institution. The complexity of the consideration of inter-state lawsuits causes a delay in the consideration of individual lawsuits filed against Ukraine over human rights violations (in particular, regarding the identification of the subject exerting effective control over the territory) caused by the conflict and, in some cases, the restoration of rights that fall under Ukraine's commitments (if Ukraine is proven guilty of violations). In addition, the fact that the Ministry of Justice missed the deadline for reporting on the enforcement of the ECHR judgments caused criticism of Ukraine's handling of the ECHR rulings in 2018.

On December 12, the European Parliament approved a resolution calling for broader EU sanctions against Russia, condemning the deliberate act of aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in the Kerch Strait on November 25, and demanding the immediate and unconditional release of all Ukrainian vessels and sailors who should be treated as prisoners of war.
In 2018, the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine continued improving the legal framework for counteraction to climate change and taking active part in international events, in particular, in meetings of the Energy Community and international conferences under the UN auspices. The main achievements include the approval of the Concept for the Implementation of State Policy on Climate Change until 2030, the development of the draft laws on the regulation of emissions of ozone depleting substances and fluorinated greenhouse gases, on the principles of monitoring, reporting and verification of greenhouse gas emissions, etc. Ukraine committed to develop integrated energy and climate plans in line with the EU practices as of 2020. In the international arena, an important task was to foil Russia’s attempts to include occupied Crimea in the UN climate reports.
Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, climate policy remained largely the prerogative of the Ministry of Ecology, while leading political forces did not express enough support for the bills approved by the Cabinet of Ministers and the relevant parliamentary committee. Despite the initiatives of individual MPs, climate issues do not play a significant role in the political programmes of parties planning to nominate their candidates for the presidential election. Parliamentary hearings on the implementation of Ukraine’s international commitments on climate protection also revealed a low interest in the issue on the part of most MPs.

No political party paid due attention to the preparation for and participation in the UN Climate Change Conference in Katowice, nor did they make any public statements about plans to change state climate policy in the context of the Paris Climate Agreement.

Institutional Cooperation

The Ministry of Ecology continued the systematic development of climate policy and interaction with other government offices in the process of approving draft legal acts. Given the complexity of the tasks and the need for fundamental changes in the vast majority of policy areas, cooperation with other central executive bodies develops slowly and not always produces documents that simultaneously take into account both international commitments and national demands, in particular, for the modernization of manufacturing. An interagency working group was set up to consider targeted environmental (green) investment projects. Systematic efforts to embed state environmental policy into sectoral programmes and regulatory acts of other executive bodies continued.

Strategic Vision

Ukraine gradually forms a strategic vision of its own development as part of the global community of signatories to the Paris Climate Agreement but mainly through international commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions rather than by developing its own initiatives. In 2018, Ukraine became the ninth country of the world to adopt the Low Carbon Development Strategy by 2050, placing it among the top-20 global climate policy leaders.

Activities

In 2018, the Ministry of Ecology continued within its competence to actively interact with international and domestic climate protection partners and take part in international climate action, which ensured Ukraine’s representation and engagement in efforts at the level of the Energy Community and the UN climate institutions.
A number of regulatory acts were developed at the national level, and the National Cadastre of Anthropogenic Emissions from Sources and Absorption of Green-house Gases Absorbers in Ukraine for 1990-2016 was adopted. The Interagency Working Group on Targeted Environmental (Green) Investment Projects held two meetings.

On July 5, the VRU held parliamentary hearings on the implementation of international commitments on climate change, which were initiated jointly by the Ministry of Ecology and the relevant parliamentary committee and supported by individual MPs.

At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities did not ensure creation of the special fund for financing energy efficiency projects for industry at the level of state and local budgets in addition to a fiscal instrument (a higher environmental tax on CO2 emissions).

Results

The Ministry of Natural Resources has worked hard to set in place a regulatory framework to ensure a systematic reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in Ukraine’s industry through the implementation of a system of monitoring, reporting and verification of greenhouse gas emissions and the trading system for greenhouse gas emission quotas.

However, courts put a limit on its ability to control compliance with international emission reduction commitments when they invalidated the single Methodology for Calculating Refund for Losses Inflicted on the State as a Result of the Emission of Excessive Air Pollutants.

At the same time, there was no reassessment or renewal of the national contribution to the global climate change effort under the Paris Climate Agreement contrary to the environmental community’s expectations. The implementation of the system of monitoring, reporting and verification of greenhouse emissions has come to a halt at the stage of the development of draft regulatory acts for the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The adopted law on the increase in fees for CO2 emissions from UAH 0.4 per ton to UAH 10 per ton did not provide a mandatory mechanism, which would channel these funds into the modernization of polluting enterprises.
In 2018, the Ukraine’s foreign policy on nuclear non-proliferation was passive and aimed at fulfilling its international obligations. Particular attention was paid to the issues of physical protection, export control, and non-proliferation guarantees strengthening.
Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, the Ukraine's political interest in the nuclear non-proliferation regime significantly declines. On the one hand, this can be explained by the Kyiv's disappointment with the security guarantees system obtained as a result of the nuclear disarmament and which were considered almost the main mechanism for the conflict prevention until 2014. On the other hand, the Ukraine's position on a number of issues was affected by the attempts to support the Western partners' position, in particular of the United States. These issues include, for example, uncertainty about the position on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and the unconditional support of the Washington's position on leaving the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) as a result of the Russia's violations.

The Ukrainian interest shrank to just two areas. On the one hand, there were politicians' statements about the need for an appeal to the states-guarantors in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum on compliance with their obligations, as repeatedly stated, for example, by the Batkivshyna leader, presidential candidate Y. Tymoshenko. On the other hand, there was a reaction to the Russia's capture of the Ukrainian sailors, which renewed exploitation of the "pro-nuclear" slogans (the nuclear status return) in the election campaign, in particular, by such presidential candidates as I. Kiva and O. Lyashko.

It is also possible to notice some modification of the traditional support of the treaties preservation principle concerning the arms control regime preserving. In particular, in response to the U.S. President D. Trump statement about the United States' desire to withdraw from the 1987 INF Treaty (which Ukraine is a part of), the Foreign Affairs Minister P. Klimkin noted his "understanding" of the U.S. intention provoked by the Russia's failure to fulfil its obligations in this area. Such a statement differed from the leading European powers’ positions (for example, France and Germany), which, on the contrary, called for the Treaty to be maintained as an important element of the strategic stability.

Institutional Cooperation

In 2018, the institutional cooperation took place in the manner prescribed by the law. The Interdepartmental Expert Working Group on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism and the Protection of Critical Infrastructure (IEWG) proceeded its activity. On June 26, a regular IEWG meeting on the issues related to the critical infrastructure protection and the provision of interoperability between the national/state security systems and the crisis response was held.

Particular attention should be paid to the Memorandum on cooperation, partnership and information exchange in combating the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials between the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine
(SNRIU) and the Institute of Nuclear Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, which was signed on November 21.

By its decision, dated November 26, the NSDC called on the VRU to introduce a martial law and stressed the need for the consultations with the states-guarantor under the Budapest Memorandum.

The 2018 ANP under the aegis of the Ukraine-NATO Commission, also mentions non-proliferation and arms control as the priority agreements and treaties area Ukraine intends to abide.

Active cooperation was carried out by the MFA and the State Space Agency of Ukraine, that resulted in technical assistance from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (April).

**Strategic Vision**

The Ukraine’s strategic vision of the nuclear non-proliferation regime obviously lacks clarity. There is still no clear-cut state position on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was signed in the UN a year before, which Ukraine abstained from voting (what is quite understandable given that all the nuclear power countries shied away from the Treaty’s support).

There is a certain correlation between the state position on the non-proliferation regime and the Ukrainian general solidarity with the United States and NATO positions. At the same time, in a number of cases Ukraine avoids clear stating of its own position.

**Activities**

In particular 2018 activities, a number of political decisions and agreements mentioning non-proliferation should be noted. In the reporting year, Ukraine continued its active cooperation with the IAEA to strengthen the non-proliferation safeguards. For example, on June 13, the IAEA reported on the Ukraine’s confirmation of the extended conclusion on the results of the use of safeguards for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in 2017, indicating compliance with the appropriate level of the state system of nuclear materials accounting and control and the level of cooperation with the Agency. And on June 15, a meeting of the Working Group (SIRG) on the IAEA safeguards application in Ukraine was held.

The Ukrainian delegations took part in the IAEA Board of Governors meetings in Vienna (March, June, and September). The Ukrainian delegation led by the head of the State Inspectorate for Nuclear Regulation of Ukraine G. Plachkov took part in the 62nd regular session of the IAEA General Conference (September). The delegation also included some representatives of the SNRIU, the Ministry of Energy and Coal
Industry of Ukraine, the State Agency of Ukraine Exclusion Zone Management, and the state enterprise "Energoatom". In all the speeches, in particular, they raised an issue of safety of the nuclear materials and objects in Crimea and at the uncontrolled territories, as well as attempts of the Russian Federation to extend its jurisdiction, which is categorically not accepted by the Agency.

The Ukrainian delegation led by the head of the State Inspectorate for Nuclear Regulation of Ukraine G. Plachkov took part in the Sixth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and presented at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna a National Report with summary information on the proper fulfilment by Ukraine of its obligations under the Convention for a three-year period. As for the physical protection, accounting and control of the nuclear materials, it should be noted that the Ukrainian nuclear power plants held some tactical and anti-terrorist trainings. On September 24-28, in the framework of the XV Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in Energodar, they discussed some up-to-date issues regarding this area and recommendations for the future. On November 7, a two-day regular meeting of the Ukrainian-American Working Group on Non-Proliferation and Export Control (WGNEC) took place in Kyiv.

Results

During the 62 IAEA General Conference, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspection of Ukraine and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) signed the Administrative Agreement according to the already existing Agreement between the governments of Ukraine and Australia on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The agreement sets the procedures for providing reports on the nuclear material transfers and establishes the legal framework for the contracts on uranium concentrate supply to Ukraine.

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation confirmed the provision of the USD 76,000 technical assistance to Ukraine in the form of the specialized equipment for the needs of the Ukrainian seismic station of the International Monitoring System PS45 (April).

Another important step – in the export control – was connected with the entry into force on October 19 of the amendments to the Procedure for the implementation of state control over international transfers of dual-use goods, which were approved by the Cabinet of Ministers Decree No.1 dated January 11. These changes, in particular, led to the introduction of a Common List of Dual-Use Goods including goods that can be used to create a nuclear weapon.
In 2018, Ukraine’s general political interest and activities with regard to the international security agenda decreased significantly. The focus was on cooperation in combating hybrid threats, work within the UN framework and cooperation with NATO. There is no articulated state position on most of the international security issues. Attention is typically paid to the issues related to Russia’s activities.
Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, Ukrainian politicians continued to view the issues of international security through the prism of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and its attempt to annex Crimea. In his Annual Address to the VRU, the President does not actually raise the issue of international security but only touches upon the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Among other things, he mentioned the situation in Syria and the Salisbury poisoning case in the context of Russian politics. The Analytical Report to the Address does not pay attention to international security, except for Russian aggression.

In his speech at the opening of the 73rd session of the UN GA, the President of Ukraine spoke about connection between international security and sustainable development, Russia's aggression against Ukraine, and the consolidation of the international community to punish violators of the UN Charter. Unlike last year, the President did not touch upon other security issues on the global agenda at all.

Representatives of the parliamentary political parties of Ukraine do not actually pay attention to international security. Syria, Iran, North Korea, Nagorno-Karabakh, the withdrawal of the United States and Russia from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, refugees were all outside the scope of their political interest. They displayed some attention to Transnistria and conflicts in Georgia only because of the consolidation of efforts within the framework of international organisations and interparliamentary contacts with Moldova and Georgia. Occasional comments were made for the media about negotiations with North Korea and the Salisbury poisoning case.

Institutional Cooperation

Institutional cooperation in international security matters remained sporadic in 2018. Coordination was mostly carried out as part of cooperation with international organizations (the UN, the OSCE, and NATO).

In terms of countering hybrid threats, there is a certain level of parallel, uncoordinated efforts by the MFA and the Ministry of Information Policy.

Despite last year's statements by representatives of the MFA regarding extension of Ukraine's participation in peacekeeping activities, this did not happen.

Strategic Vision

The strategic vision of the issues of international security and Ukraine's involvement in their settlement did not change in 2018. The documents adopted in the previous years view these problems mainly in the context of subregional security or the country's Euro-Atlantic course. The absence of a definite foreign policy strategy results in the absence of a position on most international security issues.
Activities

Cooperation in combating hybrid threats and sharing Ukraine's experience was one of Ukraine's main activities in the field of international security. At the same time, this activity is caused by internal factors and seeks to attract international support for counteracting Russian aggression.

Ukraine's efforts in the context of international security challenges in 2018 were largely concentrated within the framework of the UN and NATO. As Ukraine's membership of the UN Security Council ended, attention to the problems of other regions has dropped significantly.

The total number of Ukrainian peacekeepers decreased in 2018. As of 2018, Ukrainian peacekeepers were involved in eight international peace operations (a total of 339 servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine), namely in the UN missions in DR Congo, Kosovo, Southern Sudan, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, the KFOR Multinational Battle Group in Kosovo, and the NATO-led train-and-advise Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, as well as in the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in the security zone of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. The MoD reported on the end of Ukraine's participation in the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia (105 peacekeepers and three Mi-8 helicopters). The Ministry of Defence said that, at the invitation of the UN Secretariat, a decision was reached on the participation of Ukrainian personnel in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, but they did not start their duties in 2018.

Forty-four peacekeepers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (31 National Police officers and 13 servicemen of the National Guard) are taking part in the UN and the OSCE peacekeeping missions, in particular in Cyprus, Kosovo, Southern Sudan and DR Congo. The chief of the National Police of Ukraine, S. Knyazev, met the chief of the Police Division in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, L. Carrilho (June). It was emphasized during the meeting that Ukrainian law-enforcement agencies are ready to increase the number of their representatives in peacekeeping operations and, if necessary, to provide training for peacekeepers from third countries, taking into account the experience received during the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

On February 13, the delegation of Ukraine took part in the meeting of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. In particular, it was stressed the need for peacekeeping missions to have clearer mandates, necessary rather than just available capabilities, and broader mandates beyond the security tasks.

Ukraine aligned itself with statements by the EU and other partners on the use of chemical weapons in the British city of Salisbury (March) and, in solidarity with other European states and the USA, expelled 13 Russian diplomats and barred all Russian diplomats expelled from other countries.
In 2018, a large number of joint international exercises were held with the participation of representatives of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which facilitates better preparation and coordination.

In 2018, the command of the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade was handed over to a colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The brigade took part in three international exercises.

Ukraine stepped up cybersecurity cooperation with certain states (for example, Australia) and international organisations.

MPs, the MFA and the President took part in numerous international forums and conferences on security issues (in particular in Munich, Brussels, Warsaw, Tallinn, Halifax, London, etc.).

On November 7-8, an international conference called "Lessons from the Hybrid Decade: What to Know for a Successful Movement" was held in Kyiv on the initiative of the Ukrainian government within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Platform on countering hybrid threats.

Results

In fact, Ukraine's results in the area of international security are limited to its activities within the framework of international organizations, primarily the United Nations, and cooperation with NATO (see the relevant sections). The focus on its own security in the context of the ongoing Russian aggression limited Ukraine's involvement in the settlement of other conflicts and cooperation in fight against terrorism, illegal migration, participation in peacekeeping activities, development of a political position on the main issues of the international security agenda.

Despite last year's statements that Ukraine will increase its participation in NATO's Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, this did not happen.

In December, the VRU ratified the Agreement on Amendments to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine regarding the establishment of a joint military unit. In particular, the sides agreed to add the provisions stating their readiness to take part in international operations, which comply with the principles and norms of international law in case of unanimous agreement.
In 2018 it became evident that the international support provided to Ukraine in its countering the Russian aggression remains to be an important factor of influence on Russian authorities. Despite the Russia’s repeated attempts to weaken the sanctions restraint, within the year the sectoral and personal restrictions expanded. Meanwhile, expansion of the military and technical cooperation, as well as the military and political support from the countries of North America, the EU, and NATO became an important component of the international support to Ukraine in countering the Russian aggression. The international organizations and formats play their extremely important role in it. Thus, the EU once again extended its anti-Russian sanctions and restrictive measures, NATO continued to support Ukraine in its opposition to the Russian military aggression, and the UN GA adopted a resolution condemning the Russian aggression and supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

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<th>2017</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political interest/engagement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional cooperation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic vision</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General score</td>
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Political Interest / Engagement

In 2018, the international support for countering Russian aggression confirmed being an important factor in protecting the Ukrainian statehood. Formation and preservation of the "pro-Ukrainian coalition" not only within the transatlantic community, but in the broader military and political geography is a priority task. Unfortunately, on the fifth year of the Russian aggression, the parliamentary parties and political groups still have no understanding of the importance to establish such a foreign policy direction in their parties' policies. A large number of public political statements by the parties' leaders had no room for the purposeful communication with donors of the international support to Ukraine. The state institutions and public initiatives of the national civil society and the Ukrainian diaspora communities, especially in the transatlantic community countries, remained to be the main driving forces behind the formation of the international support.

President P. Poroshenko almost entirely devoted his Annual Address to the VRU "On the Internal and External Positions of Ukraine in 2018" to review the unprecedented Russian threat, then noted the need to "fight daily" for the support provided by the West, and to ensure that Ukraine’s path to the EU and NATO membership is irreversible, in particular, by incorporating the relevant amendments in the Constitution of Ukraine. The Analytical Report to this Annual Address, in such sections as "Implementation of the strategy of reforms. Implementation of the EU and Euro-Atlantic choice" and "Primary tasks and priorities of activities", summarized and defined the “international sanctions effects”, "strengthening of mutual understanding with the key allies", "ensuring Ukraine’s interests in the international organizations", "public diplomacy achievements", "sanctions as a tool of a peaceful conflict settlement", etc.

The public statements and appeals of the Chairman of the VRU A. Parubii, the Prime Minister V. Groysman, and others who advocated for strengthening of the sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation at the international level, became an important element in the build-up of the international support for countering the Russian aggression.

Institutional Cooperation

The Ukrainian authorities are in no small way mobilized by the absence of the alternative foreign policy means to deter the Russian aggression and to search for the international support for Ukraine in its confrontation with the Russian threat. Given the high level of public demand for strengthening of the Ukrainian government branches institutional cooperation, this cooperation gradually acquires new institutional quality and systematic nature. The power and institutional triangle, the President — the Cabinet of Ministers — the VRU, during the year mainly demonstrated to the international community its consistency and strategic unanimity in elaboration and adopting decisions that proof for the Ukraine's partners a need to continue the
sanctioning deterrence of the Russian aggression both against Ukraine and the other European countries.

At the same time, it should be noted that during the whole period of the external military aggression, Ukraine does not fully realize the potential of the public diplomacy tools.

**Strategic Vision**

Given the lack of the sufficient domestic resources to deter the Russian aggression and impossibility of symmetrical responses from the Ukrainian side, the situation requires the following actions: 1) to institutionalize the international support and means of its receipt, despite the challenges and risks of the political conditions in the donor countries; 2) to continue the elaboration of the political and institutional international support ensuring system, and further integration into the European and transatlantic development and security space. Build-up and receipt of the international support remains to be a strategic direction of the political and legal instruments for countering the Russian aggression. The strategic and regulatory package of laws (the Laws of Ukraine "On the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy ", "On National Security of Ukraine", the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, the Strategy Ukraine-2020, the Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine) defined target directions of interaction and strategic integration of Ukraine with the key actors, meaning main international donors of the Ukrainian state further development.

**Activities**

The effective diplomatic and military -political cooperation with the key partners of Ukraine, which are the countries of North America, the EU, and their main allies from other continents, as well as close communication with the partner countries within the UN, the OSCE, PACE and NATO framework, remain to be the key direction in building-up the international support to Ukraine in counteracting the Russian military aggression. Two long-overdue and necessary decisions adopted by the VRU Rada were: the pre-approval of the draft law on amending the Constitution on the issues of “strategic state course on a full-fledged membership of Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (22.11), and adoption of a new Law of Ukraine "On National Security of Ukraine" (21.06), naming "Ukraine’s integration into the European political, economic, security, legal space, gaining the EU and NATO membership, and development of the equal and mutually beneficial relations with the other states" as basic ones among all national interests.
Results

In 2018 it became clear that in its countering the Russian aggression Ukraine was supported at the international level, and the Ukrainian diplomacy could effectively accept it. Despite some risks, both personal and sectoral anti-Russian sanctions during the year were expanded, strengthened and prolonged without serious discussions.

Among the important Ukrainian diplomacy achievements of the year we can name the following adopted resolutions: the PACE confirmed that uncontrolled by the Ukrainian government areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions are "territories under the effective control of the Russian Federation" (24.04); the European Parliament demanded from the Russian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release O. Sentsov and other illegally detained Ukrainian citizens in Russia and on the Crimean peninsula (14.06); the European Parliament also required from the Russian Federation a guarantee of freedom of navigation through the Kerch Strait and the Azov Sea, and appealed to the EU and its member states in regard of closing access to the EU ports for the Russian ships leaving the Azov Sea – in case Russia does not restore freedom of navigation through the Kerch Strait and the Azov Sea (12.12).

On July, 11, the annual OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at its session adopted the Berlin Declaration, which includes as its important part a Ukrainian delegation resolution on "continued violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol" with demands to immediate "release of the Ukrainian political prisoners and other Ukrainian citizens who have been unlawfully detained or imprisoned under the fabricated charges by the de facto authorities in occupied Crimea ".

A lot of achievements were earned within the UN framework. On July 19 the International Court of Justice called on the Russian Federation to comply with the paragraph of the ICJ decision on the Mejlis restoration, and to inform the Court about the measures taken in this regard by January 19, 2019.

On November 15, the Third Committee of the UN GA voted for the updated draft resolution on "Situation of Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine", naming current situation in the Crimea as an ongoing occupation and an international armed conflict, confirming the territorial integrity of Ukraine, non-recognition of the Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and calling the Russian Federation to stop the human rights’ violation in Crimea. On December 17, the UN GA adopted the resolution "The problem of militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine), as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov ", calling on the Russian Federation, as an occupying power, to withdraw its armed forces from Crimea and immediately cease the temporary occupation of the territory of Ukraine. On December 22 the UN GA adopted the resolution “Situation of Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
Ukraine”, condemning politically motivated persecution of Ukrainians, and calling for the release of all the Ukrainian citizens unlawfully detained in occupied Crimea and the Russian Federation.

The international political and legal support of Ukraine in its countering the Russia’s aggression is growing, strengthening the Russian Federation’s isolation in the international arena, affecting its image, and limiting business and humanitarian relations. At the same time, a number of influential regional and world leaders (China, India, South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina), and associated with them Asian, African, and Latin American states, remain out of the Ukrainian diplomacy influence. The governing state bodies in general and the MFA in particular did not present their vision of changing this situation.
An export-oriented nature of the economy stipulates the increased attention to the foreign economic activity. The new Law of Ukraine “On Diplomatic Service” expanded the economic component of the country’s diplomatic activities. As a partial response to that the MEDT, in particular the Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade – the Trade Representative of Ukraine N. Mykolska, intensified their activities in this sphere. She led several trade missions of Ukraine abroad aiming to fulfil the tasks defined in the Export Strategy of Ukraine and facilitated the launch of the Export Promotion Office, which in December 2018 received a status of the government agency. At the same time, the foreign economic activity remains in the hands of the large oligarchic groups, controlled by the numerous administrative bodies and limited by the imperfect legislation.
Political Interest / Engagement

In the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine it is stated that there is a global tendency of the foreign policy towards "economization". In such conditions the task of the “economization” of Ukrainian diplomacy became more relevant, meaning the advancement of the Ukraine’s economic interests, exports in particular, on the world markets.

On August 28, at the 13th Ambassadorial meeting, the President of Ukraine emphasized the growing role of the diplomacy’s economic component, first of all, in terms of creating new opportunities for attracting investments to Ukraine.

The potential candidates for the 2019 presidential elections also drew their attention to the economic component of the diplomatic activity. Thus, the economic program of Y. Tymoshenko in a populist way describes the need to intensify the diplomatic efforts for changing the structure of the external support provided to Ukraine in favour of the grant component – as opposed to the credit one.

Institutional Cooperation

Adopted on June 7, a new edition of the Law of Ukraine "On Diplomatic Service" expanded the economic component of the country’s diplomatic activities, by adding provision and coordination of trade and economic activities carried out by the Ukrainian foreign diplomatic missions to the main functions of the diplomatic service. Besides that, the law introduced a requirement to get an approval from the MFA of Ukraine for the appointment of heads and staff of trade missions of Ukraine. At the same time, the number of the trade specialists at the diplomatic missions had no significantly increase.

In 2018, on the basis of the Advisory Body “Export promotion Office” under the MEDT of Ukraine, the Export Promotion Office of Ukraine as a state institution was established. Since December 2018 it commenced its independent work to support Ukrainian business and to promote Ukrainian exports.

Strategic Vision

The Export Strategy of Ukraine (a roadmap for the strategic trade development) for 2017-2021, approved by the CMU on December 27, 2017, defines a vector for the development, trade potential realisation, and export growth. The document is called to contribute to the development of strong and efficient economy of Ukraine.

The 2018 Government Action Plan, approved by the CMU by its resolution No. 244-p on March 28, includes, among other things, a number of measures in the field of economic diplomacy, first of all, the development of a draft resolution "On the
Implementation of a Pilot Project to Improve the Representation of the Ukraine's Economic Interests Abroad”. On December 20, during the MEDT of Ukraine end-of-the-year press-conference, the First Vice Prime Minister S. Kubiv announced an intention to introduce a trade representative position at the foreign diplomatic missions. It should be noted that such a task was part of the Action Plan for the previous year, but it had not been implemented.

Moreover, there is any strategy for the specific regions, and the government’s programs of cooperation (similar to the Ukraine-Africa Cooperation Program 2013-2015) had no updates, despite declarations to do so. The issues of the trade cooperation with the Russian Federation and Crimea are still unresolved as well.

**Activities**

In 2018, the trade missions’ visits abroad continued. In early April 2018, the first Ukrainian Trade Mission to Ghana and Nigeria, led by N. Mykolska, involved representatives of 14 Ukrainian companies.

During the year there were also trade missions visits to Vienna (beginning of July), Israel (end of July), Turkey (end of September), and Germany (October).

During the year there were a number of economic forums and meetings of the intergovernmental commissions aimed to maximize trade, economic and investment cooperation of Ukraine and other countries from various continents.

The official web-sites of the Exporters and Investors Council under the MFA of Ukraine and the Export Promotion Office provided information on exhibitions and other events in many countries of the world, where Ukrainian business can take part.

**Results**

In total, during 2018, Ukraine increased its foreign trade but at the same time it worsened its foreign trade balance. According to the results of the year, the exports of goods increased by 9.4%, and imports – by 14.8%. The exports growth was registered in all sectors of economy, but unevenly. The most significant revenues growth was reached in metals (by USD 1.5 billion) and the agricultural products (by USD 670 million) exports. These two industries made 57% of the total revenues from the exports of goods from Ukraine. Thus, the raw material and the agricultural nature of the national exports are preserved. The lack of a clear vision for the trade partnership with the Russian Federation led to a trade turnover increase by 5.4%.

Providing the Export Promotion Office with the state agency status signified special attention to the foreign trade area.
On November 21, the CMU approved the draft agreement on a free trade zone with Israel, which was signed on January 21, 2019. After its entry into force, Israel will cancel import duties for 9.2% of agricultural products (fish, vegetable oils, canned vegetables) and about 80% of industrial goods (medicines, fertilizers, building materials, etc.). Additionally, there will be a transition period envisaged until the full cancellation of custom duties – a partial liberalization of customs duties and exceptions to this trade regime. At the same time, despite the statements of the Turkish and Ukrainian leaders on signing a free trade agreement by the end of 2018, it hasn’t been finalized in time.
As a result of 2018, it is possible to state that Ukraine gradually strengthens the institutional capacity of its state policy in public diplomacy, that is by all means an extremely important task in the context of the hybrid war with Russia and an uneasy political situation with some strategic partners and neighbours. As in 2017, the Public Diplomacy Department of the MFA of Ukraine can be considered as a driver of the practical activities. Such important steps as an approval of "UKRAINE NOW" brand, adoption by the CMU of the State Program of Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad until 2020, and selection and appointment of an executive director of the Ukrainian Institute, who was active and increased media presence during the year, confirmed the positive trend in capacity building.
Political Interest / Engagement

This year political discourse of the Ukrainian public diplomacy was evaluated in the Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU. In particular, it is interesting to note that in the President’s Annual Address itself, the public diplomacy efforts for the first time were mentioned as a key tool in obtaining autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. In his speeches and interviews, the guarantor of the Constitution repeatedly emphasized the need to maintain a positive image of Ukraine, in particular, in the context of such cases as a murder of Kherson activist K. Gandzyuk or a fake murder of Russian journalist A. Babchenko.

However, in contrast to the significant involvement of the APU in promotion of the Ukraine’s positive image, the level of such interest among the fractions’ and political parties’ leaders is rather modest. Several MPs continue to pay close attention to this issue, with the Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs providing substantial personal contribution to it. At the same time, the public diplomacy issue remains outside of the agenda priorities of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, which makes it impossible to claim that it is a satisfactory level of involvement at the moment.

Despite the fact that in 2018 this sphere was funded at the same level (UAH 77 million), the increase of funding in the 2019 State Budget Law could be called a breakthrough: the expenditures for the Ukrainian image promotion amount UAH 147.019.05 million, with up to UAH 90 million allocated to the Ukrainian Institute development.

Institutional Cooperation

The approval of the "UKRAINE NOW" single brand of Ukraine by the Interagency Commission on the Promotion of Ukraine in the World under the MIP of Ukraine, and this single brand (and the brand book) adoption at the CMU meeting on May 10, can be considered as an extremely important achievement of the year. The Ukraine’s brand book development became a prerequisite for more effective coordination of efforts in public diplomacy.

According to the joint initiatives results, the closest cooperation in the Ukrainian public diplomacy is observed between the MFA and the MIP of Ukraine. The following implemented projects demonstrate their effective interagency interaction: the Days of Ukrainian Cinema in the USA, presentations of the visual art project "Ukraine. Overcoming" (in the USA, Poland, and Czech Republic), presentations of the documentary film about Ukraine "Thank you" (in Japan, Latvia, and Romania), presentations of the "UKRAINE NOW" brand (in Warsaw, Berlin, and London), etc. Nevertheless, there is also a tendency within the ministries to implement the initiatives on their own.
The decision on the Ukraine's participation in the World Expo-2020 (14.02) also provided an additional platform for the coordination of public diplomacy between the MFA, the MEDT, and the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine.

**Strategic Vision**

Unlike in the previous year, which was quite fruitful in development of the important strategic public diplomacy documents (the Information Security Doctrine of Ukraine, the Action Plan for implementing the Concept of Ukraine's popularization in the world and promotion of the Ukraine's interests in the global information space, etc.), in 2018, such activities significantly slowed down. After the appointment of the Ukrainian Institute director, the approval of the Concept of the Ukrainian Institute Development, with its short and medium-term priorities, became another positive contribution. The Ukrainian Institute also had its first strategic session, with participation of the representatives of the organizations implementing public diplomacy initiatives.

It should be noted that the State Program of Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad until 2020 (approved by the CMU resolution No. 344 on 10.05.2018), developed to mobilize the Ukrainian diaspora potential in strengthening the positive image of Ukraine and promoting Ukrainian culture abroad, became another achievement.

The cornerstone, which Ukraine lacks for consolidation of the responsible institutions' efforts to promote the image of Ukraine is the general public diplomacy strategy. Though the absence of such a document is partly justified by the fact that a separate document with the relevant Ukraine’s foreign policy strategic principles is not approved yet either.

**Activities**

In 2018, the MFA of Ukraine carried out numerous communication campaigns, covering about 14 million foreigners with the campaign to support de-occupation of the Crimea (#CrimeaisUkraine, #CrimeaisBleeding), support the Ukrainian prisoners of conscience (#FreeUkrainianPOWs), correct the Ukrainian toponyms transliteration (#CorrectUA, #KyivnotKiev), and others.

The MFA of Ukraine in cooperation with the international festival "Anne de Kiev Fest" held the fourth annual festival "MFA OpenAir", devoted to honouring the heritage of Ukraine abroad.

The effective public diplomacy cooperation with the international partners was demonstrated by the MFA of Ukraine and the Hennadii Udovenko Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine under the MFA. In 2017-2018, more than 80 Ukrainian diplomats and civil servants were trained in public diplomacy within the Ukrainian public diplomacy capacity building project, carried out in cooperation with the American Councils for
International Education. It was later modified into the Transfer of Public Diplomacy Knowledge project until 2019-2020. In the beginning of summer 2018, supported by the Ukrainian Fulbright Alumni, the Renaissance Foundation, and Europa Nostra, the DAU held the Fourth Forum for Cultural Diplomacy in Ukraine, dedicated to the European Year of Cultural Heritage.

Additionally, in 2018, the Ukrainian embassies in several countries organized archival documents’ exhibitions devoted to the 100th anniversary of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Ukrainian diplomacy, and in a lot of cases also to the 100th anniversary of the diplomatic relations establishment between the Ukrainian People Republic and other states. This, in particular, contributed to the idea of independent Ukraine existence a hundred years ago. Considerable attention, as in the previous years, was dedicated to events (exhibitions, screenings, round tables) on the Holodomor, the return of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars’ rights, and hybrid threats.

The civil society, non-governmental organizations, publishing houses, initiative groups, and others continue to play a remarkable role for the public and cultural diplomacy of Ukraine. Since the external broadcasting channels’ development is supposed to be one of the main public diplomacy elements, the launch of the foreign broadcasting UA TV channel’s website in 2018 should be noted as well.

Results

In 2018, the public diplomacy activities gained more systematic approaches. Ukraine is making significant progress in such areas as liaison, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, and broadcasting. However, there is still a gap in the state unified coordination of the educational and scientific exchange programs, cultural exchanges, etc.

The Public Diplomacy Department of the MFA of Ukraine continues its active work. An expert commission was created to elect a candidate for the Ukrainian Institute director position established in 2018. Since the Ukrainian Institute’s establishment, the development of a sufficient legal and regulatory framework for starting the institute’s branches abroad has been hampered. However, a team of the institute was formed, a strategic session was held, and active communication activities in Ukraine were launched (launch of the web-site, social networks, press-conferences, etc.).
The Ukrainian leaders keep their attention on the Ukrainians worldwide in the context of the Russian aggression and the European integration aspirations, as it can be evidenced by the country leaders’ meetings with the Ukrainian diaspora representatives and by the Government’s approval of the State Program of Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad until 2020. The established constant communication with the Ukrainian diaspora organizations is being used to promote Ukraine, its interests and the Ukrainians in the world, and to attract attention to some important security issues. However, the political interest in cooperation with the Ukrainians abroad is insufficiently determined and has no prior importance. Work with diaspora is non-systematic.
Political Interest / Engagement

The Ukrainian leaders keep their attention on the Ukrainians abroad, based on the attempts to consolidate diaspora for countering the Russian aggression and support the European integration aspirations and reforms in Ukraine, since diaspora can contribute to the Ukraine's interests and its international image.

Thus, the Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU "On the Internal and External Situation in Ukraine in 2018" states the importance of diaspora involvement in the Ukrainian society consolidation. A significant migration outflow of the labor-pool Ukrainians, which adversely affects the economic development, was noted there as well. Despite the state leaders’ efforts to establish cooperation with diaspora, there is any such interest among the leading political parties and movements.

Institutional Cooperation

The National Commission for matters concerning Ukrainians worldwide consists of the central executive bodies’ representatives, MPs of Ukraine and NGO representatives continues to work. The Commission decides on whether to grant, refuse or terminate the status of a Ukrainian living abroad. The priority tasks and measures for the institutional cooperation with the organizations of Ukrainians abroad are defined by the State Program of Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad until 2020. The program is coordinated by the MFA, supported by the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education and Science MIP, Ministry of Youth and Sport of Ukraine, and a number of regional administrations and Kyiv City State Administration.

Great hopes for the Ukrainian language and culture popularization abroad, country image promotion and the international dialogue development were laid on the Ukrainian Institute, established in 2018.

Strategic Vision

The Ukrainians abroad are mentioned in the strategic official documents. The Ukrainian Constitution and the Law “On the Principles of Internal and Foreign Policy” emphasize meeting national, cultural and linguistic needs of the Ukrainians living abroad. The Strategy for Sustainable Development "Ukraine-2020" and the Concept of Ukraine's popularization in the world and promotion of the Ukraine's interests in the global information space keep their focus on the constant communication with the Ukrainian diaspora, using its potential to promote Ukraine, its citizens and their interests in the world. The main principles of cooperation with the Ukrainian diaspora are determined by the Law "On Ukrainians Abroad", which, in addition to the above-mentioned issues, states the parity in the rights and needs of the Ukrainians abroad and national minorities in Ukraine provided by both foreign countries and Ukraine.
In May 2018, the Government of Ukraine approved the State Program of Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad until 2020. In the coming years, the priority is given to countering anti-Ukrainian propaganda and asserting positive image of Ukraine in the world. The specific tasks are planned to be implemented by providing financial support to the diaspora communities (at the expense of the state and local budgets of Ukraine).

However, the existing official documents lack the measures for protection of the Ukrainian labour migrants, whose number constantly increases.

Activities

Several meetings with the diaspora representatives, conducted at the highest level (with the President of Ukraine participation as well) in Ukraine and abroad, played an important role for the cooperation with the Ukrainians abroad and contributed to its intensification. Thus, in September 2018, during his visit to the USA, Ukrainian President P. Poroshenko met some leaders of the Ukrainian diaspora organizations. In June 2018, the President of Ukraine and a number of senior statesmen met the President of the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC) E. Czolij, in November 2018, they took part in the work of the World Congress in Kyiv and met the newly elected presidium and its new President P. Grod. During the meetings, they discussed a number of current questions, providing special attention to the issues of cooperation with the Ukrainians abroad as an important means for strengthening the Ukrainian interests in the world.

The activity of such organizations as Global Ukraine and the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC) should be emphasized as well. Diaspora responded to all the events important for the international position of Ukraine: receipt of Tomos of autocephaly by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, demands to release the Ukrainian political prisoners in Russia, the recognition of the 1932-1933 Holodomor as an act of genocide, an opposition to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, etc.

It was the Canadian diaspora’s effort that helped put the issue of the Russian aggression against Ukraine on the agenda of the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting, and keep it in sight in the future. The vast majority of the institutional activities with the Ukrainian diaspora are carried out by the MFA and diplomatic missions abroad treating it as a separate task.

Results

The continued support of the Ukrainians abroad for fighting the Russian hybrid aggression, as well as in the promotion of a positive image of Ukraine became the main results of the year. The established constant communication with the Ukrainian diaspora organizations added to popularization of Ukraine, the Ukrainians, and the Ukraine’s interests in the world. It also attracted attention to some important security issues, especially in the context of the Russian aggression. The cultural and information
departments of the Ukrainian missions abroad held a number of cultural events and flash mobs with the participation of the Ukrainians abroad’ civil society organizations.

Another positive result is the adoption of the State Program of Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad until 2020, which provides UAH 105 million funding. Also, by the end of 2018, the National Commission for Ukrainians Abroad granted a status of a Ukrainian abroad to 220 people. Finally, supported by the MFA of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Institute started its work.

However, the 2018 results in cooperation with the Ukrainians abroad actually equal to the Ukrainian foreign missions’ activities, which were often organized with limited budget and human resources. There were some complaints on the mechanisms and conditions of funds distribution under the State Program of Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad until 2020, meaning they limit the availability of funds and their effective use. Another point of concern is a unilateral character of the relations with the diaspora organizations and government officials’ too high expectations on diaspora activities and support with no actions in return.

The lack of the assistance programs for the migrant workers also remains to be an unresolved issue, essential to the diaspora natural renewal and strengthening. Still there are no programs to promote preservation of the national identity of the Ukrainian descent citizens in the post-Soviet area, in particular, in the Russian Federation.
SUMMARY TABLE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY EVALUATION IN 2018
### GENERAL SCORE OF FOREIGN POLICY PERFORMANCE IN 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Policy Direction</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>Political interest</th>
<th>Institutional Cooperation</th>
<th>Strategic vision</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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### EVALUATION OF FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTIONS IN 2018

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RECOMMENDATIONS
The year of 2019 was a special year for further establishment and development of Ukraine’s foreign policy agenda, definition of its mid-term goals, and the role of Ukraine in the world. 2019 marks the fifth anniversary of the important events that changed Ukraine and its foreign policy, including the occupation of Crimea, Russia’s aggression in Eastern Ukraine, and the first sanctions from the EU, the US and other Ukraine’s partners against Russia. At the same time, it has been five years since Ukraine clearly defined its vector towards the European and Euro-Atlantic integration, reform of its diplomatic service and building of the coalition of Ukraine’s partners and allies in the world. This has been the time of reflection and discussions, assessment of the path undertaken, honest recognition of mistakes, as well as time for subsequent mature and strategically thought-through steps in foreign policy.

The year of 2019 is a year of elections in Ukraine. The presidential and the parliamentary elections will define a continuation or a change of Ukraine’s foreign policy trajectory.

The year of 2019 offers every precondition for strengthening a role of three important components of the successful foreign policy. These include increasing the interest and engagement of Ukraine’s political actors in its foreign policy and the definition of Ukraine’s interests in the foreign policy dimension; strengthening of well-thought-out coordination between institutions involved in shaping and implementation of the foreign policy; and developing a strategic vision of the foreign policy as a comprehensive system outlining priorities, vectors, resources and timeframes.

Strengthening political engagement

1. Introduce foreign policy consultations and briefings for political parties – participants of the elections’ process. Despite an unofficial start of the parliamentary race, political parties in Ukraine are in no rush to draft their party platforms and manifestos to disclose their positions on most crucial foreign policy issues. We expect many young political projects to bid for seats in the Verkhovna Rada for the first time. This places certain responsibility on non-governmental think tanks involved in foreign policy and international security analysis, pushing them to hold informative events and awareness-raising campaigns for the groups within the parties responsible for foreign policy and security. It would be useful to offer a number of training sessions for these target groups during the preparation for the elections and the election campaign.

2. Help political parties intending to run for the Verkhovna Rada to structure and to develop their election programs. The analysis of election platforms of the political parties that entered parliament after the 2014 elections shows little interest in foreign policy issues that go beyond the traditional topics of Russia’s aggression, relations with the EU and NATO, and economic diplomacy. The expert community can prepare a list of foreign policy questions and to invite the parties intending to run in the elections to answer them and to include them in their platforms within one month before the registration with the Central Election Commission.
3. **Try to specify foreign policy priorities and tasks in the coalition agreement.** Once the decision is made to form a coalition majority in the Verkhovna Rada and before work on the coalition agreement begins, it would be useful to hold consultation and advocacy events with potential representatives of the coalition partners to include foreign policy priority themes essential to the development of Ukraine’s foreign policy in the coalition agreement.

4. **Resume the practice of providing foreign policy and international affairs expertise to the leadership of parliament and its respective committees.** Once the Verkhovna Rada speaker and deputy speakers, and its foreign affairs committee members and a head are elected, the provision of foreign-policy expertise could be resumed upon request of these parliamentarians, based on their specific areas of work. A similar practice of expert assistance for the Verkhovna Rada’s foreign affairs committee proved positive in 2017. Moreover, ad hoc consultations with MPs and experts can take place both within the committee hearings, and on a regular basis.

5. **Hold annual parliamentary hearings on the implementation of foreign policy in the respective year (in the end of the first quarter of the following year).** Although MPs can raise foreign policy issues with the leadership of the MFA at the “Q&A with the Government” sessions, this neither provide comprehensive understanding of the annual results, nor of priorities and plans for the year to come. In order to engage MPs in understanding and shaping their personal and party position more actively, the practice of holding parliamentary hearings on annual results in the sphere of the foreign policy can be introduced. These hearings can involve representatives of other ministries and government bodies, as well as non-governmental experts, aiming at discussing and drafting recommendations. This format can become more inclusive compared to the practice of the Foreign Affairs Minister’s reports at the session of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Coordination and strengthening of interinstitutional cooperation

1. **Relaunch coordination mechanisms in the sphere of public diplomacy and communication work abroad.** Unfortunately, the practice of holding events to promote Ukraine around the world proves that coordination is poor among the ministries and institutions involved. Adopted in 2016, the Concept of Promoting Ukraine and Its Interests in the Global Information Space and the 2017 Action Plan to implement the Concept often fail to fit in the vision of these efforts by the actors involved in the actual work. This makes these documents merely an initiative from the Ministry of Information Policy rather than a strategic roadmap. Established at the Ministry of Information Policy in 2017, the Intergovernmental Commission for Promotion of Ukraine has failed to get to the point of coordinating efforts and planning of Ukraine’s image campaigns abroad (the creation of Ukraine’s brand is one exception). This slows down the work and often results in competition between ministries. Therefore, the next meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission should hear the MIP’s report on
the implementation of the Action Plan, and offer amendments to the Action Plan based on specific working plans of ministries and government agencies.

2. Audit the existing bilateral instruments of cooperation and practices of coordination within the Ukrainian sides of the commissions. Analysis shows that the Ukrainian side has a wide network of joint commissions, working groups and others for bilateral relations with some countries or international organizations. In practice, however, some joint groups or commissions do not meet for years. The MFA and the VRU should audit existing instruments of bilateral cooperation, define positive and challenging aspects, and outline best practices that can be used in relations with other countries. Strengthening coordination within Ukrainian sides of bilateral initiatives deserves special attention.

3. Resume expanded meetings of the MFA Board. The MFA has done serious work to improve its transparency in the past years. Examples include annual reports of the Minister to the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and briefings for the media. Experts believe, however, that there is still a need for the MFA to play a leading coordinating role in the implementation of the Ukraine’s foreign policy. The new Law on the Diplomatic Service of Ukraine stipulates this. The MFA’s Board, as stipulated by the Provision on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, can hold regular expanded meetings with the leaders of the VRU, its Foreign Affairs Committee and representatives of the Public Council to review ongoing issues, quarterly plans and specific foreign policy projects.

4. Launch full operations of the Ukrainian Institute abroad. Despite the approved budget and the staffing by the early 2019, the Ukrainian Institute is still in the bureaucratic process of developing the legal framework for seamless work abroad. Similar to the first strategic session to define the goals and the areas for the Ukrainian Institute in 2019-2021 that focused on cultural diplomacy, the same sessions should be held for public and expert diplomacy. Best efforts should be taken to integrate this institution into the coordination of communication and image projects abroad.

5. Introduce bilateral expert fora with neighbour countries. In 2018, active work was launched to establish bilateral expert fora with the neighbouring countries in cooperation with the MFA and the Public Council under it. This work aims at regularly bringing together experts and diplomats to discuss important issues on bilateral agendas. The initiatives launched as projects supported by international partners, including the EU, should be integrated into the respective instruments funded and supported by the MFA (the Ukrainian part of the Polish-Ukrainian Partnership Forum provides a good example).

6. Allocate funding within the MFA budget to commission external expertise from non-governmental think tanks. Given the positive experience of setting up budgets for public diplomacy, trips of Ukrainian experts and international cultural events, the MFA leadership and MPs should envisage the respective funding for commissioning outsourced expertise to cover the needs of the MFA geographical departments.
7. **Coordinate efforts between the National Institute for Strategic Studies and the MFA** in drafting the Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU on the foreign policy bloc. The goal is to coordinate the vision of Ukraine’s foreign policy development prospects.

**Strategic Vision**

1. **Develop Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Strategy until 2025.** Compared to 2017, the drafting of the conceptual mid-term document on foreign policy was present on the expert agenda in 2018. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU On Domestic and International Position of Ukraine in 2018 contains a section on the need to revise Ukraine’s foreign policy strategy. Experts of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine and the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” regularly addressed this topic throughout 2018. However, the official political actors showed no will to create such profound and comprehensive document. Regardless of its outcome, the presidential elections in Ukraine creates a window of opportunity to start working on such strategic document. The non-governmental think tanks capable of offering the necessary parameters of the concept can generate demand for such a document and hold advocacy campaigns. The Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine launched the project to prepare Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Concept jointly with different analytical centres in 2018.

2. **Develop working documents on regional and functional priorities of Ukraine’s foreign policy.** Despite accomplishments in the areas outlined by the Ukrainian authorities as strategic and priority, the approach towards many regions and individual multilateral initiatives is relatively passive. This leads to low support for Ukrainian initiatives within the international organizations while the potential of new markets for Ukrainian products is underused. Similar to the preparation of the Export Strategy of Ukraine. A Roadmap of Strategic Development of Trade for 2017-2021, regional and thematic (functional) roadmaps/policies should be designed as part of the efforts to draft Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Strategy. They should outline Ukraine’s interests in different regions of the world or within multilateral international initiatives, and to specify mechanisms for implementing them. Ukrainian diplomats need such regional roadmaps for the Middle East, the Black Sea region, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, peacekeeping activities and more. These strategic documents should specify a place and a role of the abovementioned regions and thematic areas in Ukraine’s foreign policy, the existing and expected level of political dialogue with countries in any given region, a list of available and promising instruments for bilateral cooperation, a potential of using them, and an extent to which cooperation with these regions complies with Ukraine’s overall foreign policy priorities.

3. **Intensify work with countries that are regional leaders beyond the EU.** Experts believe that it is necessary to strengthen work with global and regional leaders that are not in the focus of the Ukrainian authorities now. These include Brazil, Egypt, Israel, India, Morocco, Kazakhstan, China, South Africa, Peru and others.
4. **Develop neighbourhood policy.** While Ukraine has neighbours with different foreign policy interests, experts believe that it needs to develop a special diplomatic approach to these countries in order to establish a pool of partners supportive of Ukraine’s security and economic development. The disputes with Poland and Hungary over history and language clearly indicate that Ukraine needs to pay more attention to its neighbour states, seek compromise solutions and additional joint vectors in common areas. Neighbourhood policy should be proactive and envisage specific measures and funding for the projects aimed at developing relations with neighbour countries. This policy should be embodied in a roadmap as part of the Foreign Policy Strategy.

5. **Complete the second stage of framing sectoral and cross-sectoral strategies as part of the Export Strategy of Ukraine.** In 2017, the Export Strategy of Ukraine. A Roadmap of Strategic Development of Trade for 2017-2021, a fairly inclusive strategic document on trade, was adopted. In 2018, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine should focus on implementing the second stage – drafting of sectoral strategies for promotion of Ukrainian exports abroad. However, there is barely any information on the results of this work. It makes sense to intensify work on sectoral strategies, making it as open and inclusive as the work on the Export Strategy.
### Abbreviations

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<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORDLO</td>
<td>separate territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE PA</td>
<td>Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE SMM</td>
<td>Special Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN GA</td>
<td>General Assembly of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN SC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V4</td>
<td>Visegrad Group (Visegrad Four)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRU</td>
<td>Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>the United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>the UN Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Authors

Nadiia Bureiko, PhD in Political Science, Head of Europeanisation Studies at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’, deputy head at the NGO ‘Quadrivium’ (the USA)

Yaroslav Chornogor, PhD in History, Deputy Head at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’, Senior Researcher at the Department of the Trans-Atlantic Studies at the World History Institute at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Hungary, Ukrainians Abroad)

Dmytro Chumak, Academic consultant at Odessa Center for Nonproliferation (Nuclear Non-proliferation)

Sergii Gerasymchuk, Deputy Head of the Board, Head of the South-East European Studies programme at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’, Board member at the Strategic and Security Studies Group, (China, Moldova, Romania)

Anastasiia Gerasymchuk, Assistant to the Editor-in-chief at UA: Ukraine Analytica (Israel, Middle East)

Sergiy Glebov, PhD in Political Science, Deputy Dean of the Department of International Relations, Political Science and Sociology, Odessa National Mechnikov University, Associate expert at Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’ (Georgia, Black Sea Region)

Oleg Grytsaenko, Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary Envoy of the second class, independent expert (Northern Europe)

Maksym Kiyak, PhD in Philosophy, Co-Founder of the Public Diplomacy Network «Global Ukrainians», Deputy Director of the Institute of Central Europe, Associate expert at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’ (Lithuania, Baltic States)

Nadiia Koval, Head of Central and Western European Studies programme at Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’ (Poland, United Kingdom, France)

Mariia Koval, Project Coordinator, Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine, Member of the Board of the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’ (Germany)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Areas of Expertise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oleksiy Krysenko</td>
<td>PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Head of Russia and CIS countries Studies programme at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’ (the Russian Federation. Political aspects; Central Asia; Build-up of the international support against Russian aggression)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hennadii Maksak</td>
<td>Head of the Board, Head of the Eastern Partnership programme at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’, Head of the Public Council under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine; Coordinator of the National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (Belarus, Visegrad Four)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitalii Martyniuk</td>
<td>Head of the International Programs of the Centre for Global Studies &quot;Strategy XXI&quot;, Associate expert at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’ (Canada, Western Balkans, OSCE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaroslav Matiychyk</td>
<td>Executive Director of «Strategic and Security Studies Group» (Council of Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oleksandr Mishyn</td>
<td>PhD in Political Science, Co-founder of the Africa Research Centre (Sub-Saharan Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iuliia Serbina</td>
<td>Human rights expert, Head of the Human rights program at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’ (Human Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polina Sinovets</td>
<td>PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations, Odessa National Mechnikov University, Head of Odessa Center for Nonproliferation (Nuclear Non-proliferation, Iran).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nataliia Shevchenko</td>
<td>PhD in History, Associate professor, Kyiv National Shevchenko University (Latin America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanna Shelest</td>
<td>PhD in Political Science, Head of the International Security Studies programme at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’, Editor-in-chief of UA: Ukraine Analytica journal, (NATO, the UN, International Security, Asia-Pacific Region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igor Stukalenko</td>
<td>Head of the Energy programmes at the Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” (European Energy Community; Climate Change; the Russian Federation. Energy relations)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ivan Us, Senior consultant at the Department of foreign economic policy at the National Institute for Strategic Studies; Associate expert at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’ (Economic Diplomacy)

Yurii Vdovenko, PhD in Economics, Associate Professor, Head of the EU economic integration of Ukraine programme at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’ (European Union. Economic cooperation; the Russian Federation. Economic relations; Eastern Partnership)

Victoria Vdovychenko, PhD in History, associated expert at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’ (Italy)

Maryna Vorotnyuk, PhD in Political Science, Head of the Black Sea Studies programme at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’, Researcher of the Centre for European Neighbourhood Studies, Central European University, Budapest (Turkey, Slovakia)

Olga Velyka, Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Political Science and Sociology, Odessa National Mechnikov University (Japan, Asia-Pacific Region)

Maryna Yaroshevych, Head of Benelux countries Studies programme at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’, Representative of the Ukrainian World Congress at the European Union (European Union. Political dialogue)

Olga Vorozhbyt, foreign affairs columnist at the «Ukrainian Tyzhden» («Ukrainian Week»), expert at the East European Development Institute (South Asia)

Mariia Zaiets, analyst of consolidated information in the international relations (Public Diplomacy)
### Consultants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Additional Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O. Genchev</td>
<td>Head of the NATO Expert Group at the Government Office for Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y. Gaber</td>
<td>PhD in Political Sciences, Deputy Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y. Filipenko</td>
<td>Director of the Department of International Organizations, MFA of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Konyshev</td>
<td>Counsellor, Head of the Trade and Economic Mission at the Embassy of Ukraine in the Slovak Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korsunskyi</td>
<td>PhD in Mathematics, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Kuleba</td>
<td>PhD in Law, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Lupak</td>
<td>Councellor, Embassy of Ukraine to Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z. Makaruha</td>
<td>Head of the Expert Group, High Level Dialogue, Government Office for Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Nikiforak</td>
<td>Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Orlov</td>
<td>Acting Head of the MFA Representation in Odessa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y. Poyta</td>
<td>Head of the Asia-Pacific Department at the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies; Member of the Board at the Ukrainian Association of Chinese Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Sayenko</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Department of the EU and NATO at the MFA of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Shevchenko</td>
<td>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Trojan</td>
<td>First Secretary, Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Veselovskyi</td>
<td>PhD in Political Science, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Director of the Centre for International Studies at the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Zvarych</td>
<td>Councellor-minister at the Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Poland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”

The Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” is a network-based nongovernmental analytical centre, the goal of which is to participate in providing democratic ground for developing and implementation of foreign and security policies by government authorities of Ukraine, implementation of international and nationwide projects and programs, directed at improvement of foreign policy analysis and expertise, enhancement of expert community participation in a decision-making process in the spheres of foreign policy, international relations, public diplomacy.

The activities of the “Ukrainian Prism” are:

- provision of sustainable collaboration between the expert community and the bodies of executive and legislative power of Ukraine, which are involved in the development and implementation of the foreign policy of Ukraine;
- research on the foreign policy, diplomatic service, international relations and security, development and publication of respective recommendations;
- assistance to the state authorities of Ukraine in spreading reliable information about Ukraine abroad, creation of public diplomacy channels.
- facilitating improvement of legislation, which regulates foreign and security policy of Ukraine, the basics of diplomatic service and public diplomacy.
- informational, organizational and consulting support of public authorities, civil society organizations, educational establishments and other subjects of foreign policy and security issues.

The Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” is officially registered as a nongovernmental organization in 2015, while analytical work and research had been carried out within the network of foreign policy experts “Ukrainian Prism” since 2012.

At present, the organization united more than 15 experts in the sphere of foreign policy, international relations, international security from different analytical and academic institutions in Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Chernivtsi, as well as associate experts in Ukraine and abroad.
Friedrich Ebert Foundation

**Friedrich Ebert Foundation** is the oldest political foundation of Germany, which has had rich social-democratic tradition since the day of its foundation in 1925. The foundation was started as a political will of Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of Germany, whose name the Foundation bears.

The key activity of our political Foundation is the implementation of basic ideals and values of social democracy: freedom, justice, solidarity. The Foundation operates in close connection with social democrats and organizations of independent trade unions. As a non-profit, the Foundation organizes its activity on the principles of independence and self-governance.

The Foundation fosters the development of:

- free society, which is based on the principles of solidarity and gives all its citizens the opportunity to participate in the political, economic, social and cultural life, regardless of their background, gender or religious beliefs;

- active and strong democracy, sustainable economic growth and decent job opportunities for all citizens;

- welfare state with developed education and health system, which at the same time strives at overcoming poverty and provides shelter against endeavors and hardships that citizens have to face during lifetime;

- a state that holds responsibility for peace and social progress in Europe and the whole world.

The Foundation supports and enhances the ideals of social democracy, in particular by means of:

- political awareness-building with the aim of strengthening the civil society. Political awareness-building programs of the Foundation in Germany are focused on motivating citizens, developing their independence, informing and teaching them best practices of active participation in political life, activities of trade unions and civil society. We promote citizens’ participation in discussions on social issues and in decision-making processes;

- political consultations. The foundation holds strategic research on main issues of economic, social and educational policies, as well as on the ways of further development of democracy. Due to engagement of academic circles and active politicians, the Foundation creates conditions for a broad discussion on the issues of building a fair and sustainable economic and social pattern in certain countries, Europe and the whole world;
• international collaboration. Due to international offices of the Foundation, which carry out their activities in more than 100 countries of the world, the Foundation supports the policy of peaceful collaboration and human rights protection, promotes creation and reinforcement of democratic, social and constitutional bodies. The Foundation is in favor of independent trade unions and strong civil society. Within the framework of European integration process the Foundation actively promotes socially-oriented, democratic and competitive Europe;

• support for talented youth by providing scholarships, in particular to students and post-graduates from underprivileged families or migrants;

• preservation of collective social democratic memory. Archives and libraries of the Foundation, as well as works on contemporary history allow to preserve the roots of social democracy and trade unions, at the same time they are information sources for conducting social-political and historical research.

At present, there are head-offices of the Foundation in Bonn and Berlin. Besides, in Federal Republic of Germany the Foundation has 6 educational centers as well as 12 county and regional offices. Apart from that, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation possesses its own library in Bonn, which comprises 650 000 volumes. “The Archives of Social Democracy” of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn includes the biggest collection of materials from the history of the European labor movement.
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Contacts
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Office in Ukraine
34 Puschkinska str., 01004 Kyiv, Ukraine
Tel.: +38 044 2340038 Fax: +38 044 4514031
http://www.fes.kiev.ua
Contacts: mail@fes.kiev.ua

Foreign Policy Council "Ukrainian Prism"
http://www.prismua.org
info@prismua.org