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Introduction
The nationwide poll “Youth of Ukraine 2017” conducted by the New Europe Center and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in cooperation with the sociological company GfK Ukraine is one of the most comprehensive attempts to understand and assess the sentiments of Ukrainian youth not only in recent years, but perhaps also for the entire period of Ukraine’s independence.

In addition to a wide range of topics covered, from family and leisure to foreign policy, this survey has both temporal and methodological peculiarities. Focusing on young people aged 14 to 29, it provides a snapshot for several generations: Generation Y, including people born in early 80’s until the early 90’s (the oldest respondents in this survey were born in 1987-1988) and Generation Z, born between the early 90s and mid-2000s. While these generation categories are quite typical for the Western world, they acquire additional meanings in the Ukrainian context, as they represent people of the same age as Ukrainian independence and those who are a decade younger; those who participated or witnessed two revolutions in the modern history of Ukraine (the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity) and those who were children during both events. It should be noted that in this age range, as of January 1st, 2017, there were almost 8 million people, which makes up virtually a fifth of the entire population of Ukraine.
Methodologically, this research is part of a series of surveys conducted with the support of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in the Balkans, South Caucasus, and Central Asia. The Ukrainian survey is the sixteenth in this series. All of them are based on the “Shell Youth Study” methodology, conducted in Germany regularly since 1953. Accordingly, the age group of respondents is 14 to 29, and not 14 to 35, as youth is defined by the legislation of Ukraine. This condition imposes certain limitations on possible comparisons and parallels with previous surveys of youth in Ukraine; however, it offers opportunities for valuable comparisons and generalizations between countries and regions participating in surveys based on the “Shell Youth Study” methodology.

This publication consists of eight sections on issues related to leisure, family, education and employment, migration, values, as well as the attitudes of young people toward the political system in general and toward foreign policy; including Ukrainian-Russian relations against the backdrop of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine. Despite the unique focus of each section, certain topics are recurrent: for example, the issue of corruption was cross-cutting for topics like migration, education and employment, and political system and values.

The results of this survey, consisting of a quantitative poll with 2,000 respondents, four regional focus groups, and literature review, which allowed us to put the attitudes of Ukrainian youth in the general European context, are ambiguous and definitely not black-and-white. Sometimes, youth of Ukraine is very similar to their peers in other European countries: for example, in terms of apathy toward politics; in other aspects, such as values and tolerance, youth of Ukraine is more likely to retain a conservative, “traditional” mentality, e.g. where same-sex relationships are considered worse than corruption.

The purpose of this publication is not to evaluate, whether the sentiments and attitudes of Ukrainian youth are good or bad, but rather to identify and communicate them for a broad audience of decision-makers, journalists, scholars, international and Ukrainian organizations dealing with problems of youth, etc. The youth of 2017 will be among those making key decisions in Ukraine in 2030, and therefore, it is critically important today to understand their problems, ambitions, and intentions.

Below we present key findings of the survey, discoveries and generalizations that have attracted our attention. This list, however, is only the tip of the iceberg, as the nuances and detailed analysis are contained in the respective sections.

Key findings

FEARS AND CONCERNS

- Issues as earning money and securing a decent quality of life are the primary concerns of young Ukrainians.

Economic issues, i.e. the need to make a living are the primary concerns of young people in Ukraine. The level of income is a key priority in job search for 96% of young Ukrainians. According to participants of the focus groups, the financial indicator determines whether a country is good, i.e. the one that provides employment, social package, and opportunities to earn money. This position is not surprising, given that only 1% of respondents stated that they “can afford to buy whatever we need for a good living standard”. One in five (21%) respondents admitted that they only have enough money to pay utility bills and buy food, while half of young Ukrainians (53%) have enough money to buy clothes and shoes, but not more expensive things like a TV or a refrigerator.

- War and corruption are the greatest fears; however, young Ukrainians are willing to tolerate the latter.

The major fears of Ukrainians are corruption (37%) and war in the region or in the world (36%), getting seriously ill (34%), and social injustice and unemployment (32%). Accordingly, the top demand of Ukrainian youth for the government is fight against crime and corruption, as 70% of respondents believe that it should be the government’s number one priority. The second and third demands for the government are economic growth and development (68%), as well as reduction of unemployment (66%).

On the other hand, only one third of Ukrainians believe that bribery can never be justified. In this case, regional differences are also evident: while in the North, over 50% of respondents are critically negative toward bribery, the respective figures in Kyiv and the East of Ukraine are 19% and 15%. As one of the participants of the focus groups noted, corruption and bribery are present in the life of most Ukrainians since childhood, which leads to tolerance to this phenomenon.

ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS

- Apathy toward politics as a ground for national unity.

Most young Ukrainians are disinterested in politics. Nonetheless, the highest rate of interest is in national-level politics, rather than local: those who are very interested or rather interested make up 13% of respondents. Being politically active is important for only one in five young Ukrainians. As for political leaders, the level of distrust toward them sets a record: they are strongly or relatively distrusted by three quarters of Ukrainian youth (74%).

TOLERANCE AND DISCRIMINATION

- Young Ukrainians show the lowest levels of tolerance toward drug addicts, ex-prisoners, Roma, and LGBT; however, 10% of respondents have never been discriminated against on any ground, except for their economic status and age.
On the other hand, 90% of respondents have never experienced discrimination for political views, spoken language, sexual orientation, religion, social activity, or ethnic origin. Discrimination based on economic situation or age has been sometimes experienced by 16% and 13% of respondents respectively, while over 80% have never experienced it. Importantly, just 1% of the respondents chose the option “often” about the experience of discrimination based on all attributes included in the poll.

LANGUAGE

- Ukrainian is the preferred language for the relative majority of young people. Neither in the East, nor in the West do young people consider spoken language to be an obstacle to national unity.

Overall, half of young people (50%) speak Ukrainian at home, while one third (30%) speak Russian, and one in five (18%) uses both Russian and Ukrainian. Beyond the family circle, this balance shifts towards bilingualism (25%). These results indicate that the portion of young people that use Ukrainian as the main spoken language is growing: in 2010, the rate of the use of Ukrainian language within the family circle was 30%, with 23% outside. Furthermore, language does not stand in the way of national unity, as confirmed by both focus groups and the quantitative poll: only 5% of young Ukrainians have been ever discriminated based on their spoken language. It is noteworthy that 65% of young people believe that they have a comprehensive knowledge of the Ukrainian language (51% in the East and the South), while only 49% of young Ukrainians consider themselves proficient in Russian.

EUROPEAN UNION

- Young Ukrainians like the European Union, but do not trust it.

Most Ukrainian young people (60%) believe that Ukraine should join the European Union (according to almost a half of young Ukrainians, this would lead to economic development of Ukraine). This is the opinion of an absolute majority in all regions, except for the South and the East, where this statement is supported by fewer people (42% and 33% respectively). Comparing Ukraine to the European Union via a range of indicators of political system and standard of living, young Ukrainians give the EU an advantage in everything, especially in terms of economic prosperity, where the gap between evaluations of Ukraine and the EU is 60%. On the other hand, only a third of young people (29%) trust the EU, while 28% do not trust, and 31% neither trust nor distrust; as the focus groups showed, this distrust is partially based on the belief that Ukraine is not wanted in the EU, and membership is considered a dream more than an achievable goal.

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE

- Most young Ukrainians believe that Russia is responsible for triggering the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

61% of young Ukrainians believe that Russia is responsible for triggering the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine is blamed by only 5%. However, it should be noted that in the South and the East, the rates of those who did not answer this question set a record (51% and 58% respectively). We could assume that people in these regions might evade discussing certain topics to avoid conflicts. Surely, silence could also be provoked by simple confusion: people had long been sympathetic to Russia and do not know how to treat it after the events of recent years.

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

- North is the new West.

In answers to numerous questions, youth in the North appeared to be more “pro-Western,” “pro-European,” “pro-Ukrainian,” and “anti-Russian” than their peers in the West, a region traditionally considered to be the major supporter of such views. For instance, the North shows a higher rate of opposition to the annexation of Crimea by Russia than does the West (85% vs. 77%); furthermore, more young people in the North are convinced that Russian aggression against Ukraine cannot be justified (70% vs. 50% of those who strongly agree with this statement). Both the North and the West have the highest rates of those who identify themselves fully as Europeans (40%). Residents of the North even consider themselves better experts in Ukrainian language than the “Westerners” (82% vs. 74% who consider themselves proficient in Ukrainian), and show the greatest intolerance toward corruption and tax evasion (over a half of residents of the North vs. about a third of respondents in Western regions).

- Young people in the East are less happy than their peers in other regions.

Youth in the East clearly differ from peers in other regions, and this distinction is neither ideological, nor linguistic. In the East, the level of happiness is critically lower, and it goes far beyond the spheres of life that have been affected by armed conflict. For example, young people in the East are the least satisfied with their family life: only a half (51%) against 77% in the West, for instance. Furthermore, youth in the East are the least satisfied with the quality of education in Ukraine (about 10% less than in other regions) and with life in general, and have the least optimism about their future: only 54% expect improvement in their lives in the future, while in the South the respective figure is 62%, and in other regions it varies from 70% to 86%. As for the general situation in the country, only one third of young people in the East expect improvement (vs. almost a half (46%) in the South).
THE PORTRAIT OF UKRAINIAN YOUTH

- 91% of Ukrainian youth use social networks
- 61% of Ukrainian young people are proud or rather proud of their citizenship
- 80% have never experienced discrimination
- 50% half of young Ukrainians pray
- 61% of respondents believe that Russia is responsible for triggering an armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine
- 46% of respondents believe that the best age for marriage for both women and men is 25
- 60% of young people support Ukraine’s accession to the EU
- 58% of respondents strongly agree or rather agree that democracy in general is a good form of government
- 46% of respondents believe that education and education institutions in Ukraine meet the needs of the labor market

THE PORTRAIT OF OUR POLL PARTICIPANTS IS AS FOLLOWS:

- **Place of residence**
  - 52% of respondents are residents of cities, while 35% live in rural areas.

- **Level of education and cultural capital**
  - 60% of respondents did not participate in any training at the time of the poll, while 36% indicated that they were studying. The highest completed level of education among the respondents ranged from elementary school to completed higher education. The largest number of respondents with completed higher education lives in Kyiv, the North and the West, making up about one in five respondents in these regions.

**Graph 1.** How would you describe the place where you live?
- Rural (village)
- More rural than urban
- More urban than rural
- Urban (city)
- Don’t know / No answer

**Graph 2.** What is your highest education level completed so far?
- No formal education / Incompleted elementary school
- Primary school
- Secondary school: 8-9 grades of secondary school
- Secondary school: 10-11 grades
- University-level education: Bachelor degree or similar
- University-level education: Master degree
- University-level education: Bachelor degree (MA, MSc degree)
- Don’t know / No answer
We also asked how many books the respondents have at home (the place where they grew up). As we found out, one in five young Ukrainians (19%) have more than 100 books in their homes (the highest rate is observed in the capital, one third of participants), while another third (31%) has between 31 to 100 books. One third of young people have fewer than thirty books, and 18% could not answer this question.

**Graph 3.** How many books do you have in the apartment/house you grew up in?

**Graph 4.** Youth employment status

The situation with employment of young people is as follows: over a half of young people have full-time or part-time jobs, almost 40% do not work, while three-quarters of those who do not have a job are not looking for it (28% of all respondents). In the older age group (25-29), the rate of unemployment is lower, and among them 6% are searching for a job and 12% do not work and are not looking for a job.

**Graph 5.** Where do you live?

Most of survey participants (65%) live in their parents’ homes. The remaining 35% have different housing conditions. One in ten respondent rent housing or lives in an inherited apartment or house. The largest proportion of respondents living in their parents’ homes (77%) reside in Western regions.

**Graph 6.** Who of the following persons live with you?

On the other hand, only 5% of respondents live alone. Over a half of respondents live with their parents, while one third reside with their husbands or wives or partners. Overall, the most frequently observed (60%) number of people in households of respondents is 3-4 persons.
Nationality and language situation

Most respondents (95%) consider themselves Ukrainians by nationality (94% in the South and 88% in the East), while only 2% (4% in the South and 8% in the East) named themselves Russian. On the other hand, only 86% of respondents have citizenship of Ukraine (87% in the South and 90% in the East). It is noteworthy that in the East and the South, there are young people who consider themselves Ukrainians, even though their parents are Russian by nationality.

As for language, the situation is more diverse. For instance, in Northern, Western, and Central regions, the most popular language of domestic communication is Ukrainian (73%, 93%, and 53% respectively), whereas in Kyiv, Southern, and Eastern regions, Russian prevails (50%, 63%, and 84% respectively). Beyond the family circle (at school, at work, or with friends), the same trend is present in all regions, except for Kyiv, where the percentage of those who speak both languages is higher (46%). Overall, half of young people (50%) speak Ukrainian at home, one third (30%) speak Russian, while one in five (18%) speak both Russian and Ukrainian. Beyond the family circle, this balance slightly shifts towards bilingualism (23%). For language situation infographics see p. 30-31.

METHODOLOGY

The poll was conducted in July-August 2017. The sample consists of 2,000 respondents aged 14-29 and represented the population of Ukraine of this age group by gender, age, region of residence, and size of the settlement (excluding population of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and uncontrolled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions). The poll was conducted via personal interviews at respondents' homes. The theoretical error does not exceed 2.2%. In addition to the quantitative poll, four focus groups with youth aged 18-29 were conducted in Lviv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv in October 2017.

The oblast composition of the regions is as follows:

West:
Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi oblasts

Kyiv: the city of Kyiv

North:
Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv oblasts

East:
Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv oblasts

Center:
Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Khmelnytsk, Cherkasy oblasts

South: Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson oblasts
Introduction

Whereas youth are often referred to as “agents of change” almost by default, especially with regard to the democratic transition of post-Communist countries like Ukraine, their potential to bring change in society and state should not be taken for granted. Rather, youth’s attitude and relations with politics and political institutions should be the object of careful and continual study.

While the youth were active participants of three Ukrainian revolutions in its modern history (the Revolution on the Granite (1990), the Orange Revolution (2004) and the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014)), it is noteworthy that youth are the most electorally passive group in Ukraine and the most significant decrease in the voter turnout at parliamentary elections of 2014 comparing to those held in 2012 was observed among those aged 18-29 years old. Ukraine’s youth also demonstrate the lowest rates of trust towards institutions and government, even in comparison to other young generations from post-Soviet space, including Russia and Azerbaijan – e.g., in 2010 Ukrainian youth demonstrated dramatic lows in trust towards the President, the Verkhovna Rada and the political parties.

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This chapter looks into the Ukrainian youth's attitude towards politics and democracy and draws parallels across age groups and regions in Ukraine as well as comparisons with tendencies among other nations.

**Key findings**

- **Ukrainian youth do not trust political leaders more than people of any other nationality, religion or political views.** Almost half of Ukrainian youth (49%) strongly distrust Ukrainian politicians, while 22% strongly distrust people of other political beliefs; strong distrust towards people of other religion is felt by 19% and toward people of other nationality – by 13%.

- **Most young Ukrainians are disinterested in politics.** Nonetheless, the highest rate of interest is in national-level politics, rather than local: those who are very interested or rather interested make up 15% of respondents.

- **Ukrainian youth also struggle to define whether they lean to "right-wing" or "left-wing" political views:** 38% of respondents refused to answer or chose the «don't know» option. Relative majority of the respondents (37%) believe that they rather share the "right-wing" views. However, when providing their position on a number of statement, they revealed actual leaning towards the leftist positions on economic equality and the role of the state in providing welfare.

- **Only 7% of respondents believe that the interests of young people are well or very well represented in Ukrainian politics.**

- **Television still dominates the internet as a key source of information for Ukrainian youth** (60% vs. 50%); young Ukrainians prefer Ukrainian television programs (49%) over Russian (2%) or Western (1%) ones. Even in the East and South of Ukraine, Russian television is popular among 4% and 1% of young people respectively.

- **Approximately the same proportions of young people (about a half) believe that democracy is a good form of government and, at the same time, supports the thesis that Ukraine requires a "strong leadership."**

- **Primarily, young people expect the government to fight crime and corruption (70%), provide economic growth and development (68%), and reduce unemployment (66%).**

- **Overwhelming majority of young people (65%) strongly agree or rather agree that youth should have more opportunities to make their voice heard in politics; however, they are not ready for politics (only 4% of respondents expressed their willingness to engage in political activities).**

- **Local and regional identities of Ukrainian youth are stronger than the national one:** while 73% of respondents fully perceive themselves as citizens of their home town, 69% view themselves as citizens of their region and only 66% consider themselves as citizens of Ukraine. On the other hand, when defining their nationality, Ukrainian youth are virtually unanimous: 95% of respondents consider themselves Ukrainians, while 2% regard themselves Russian.

- **The youth of Ukraine remain multilingual:** in the Northern, Western and Central regions, spoken language is mostly Ukrainian; Kyiv, Southern and Central regions are dominated by Russian. However, compared to the previous polls, the rate of young people using Ukrainian as their main spoken language is growing. Only 5% of the respondents have ever felt discriminated against on the ground of spoken language.

**INTEREST TOWARD POLITICS**

The youth of Ukraine is mostly not interested in politics. For instance, 65% of young people are not interested at all or rather not interested in politics. With age, this rate decreases: while 55% of the age group of 14-17 are not interested in politics at all, only 36% of the age group of 25-29 agree with this statement. However, none of the proposed issues of domestic and foreign policy (Ukraine’s politics on a national level, Ukraine’s politics on a regional level, politics of the EU, the US, or Russia) draws any significant interest among young people: the rate of respondents choosing the option "very interested" does not exceed 5% in all listed cases. The most interesting issue for Ukrainian youth is Ukraine’s politics at the national level: 13% of all respondents chose options "very interested" or "rather interested." Only 7% of respondents believe that the interests of young people are well or very well represented in Ukrainian politics (there was no definition of the "interests" provided in the poll, so every respondent could define them as they wished).
Hanna, 22, Odesa:  
I am bored and not interested in reading about politics, because I don’t see anything good in it. For me, it is enough to hear a summary from my relatives or friends, since I already know that there is nothing good in it anyway.

Oleksandr, 29, Kharkiv:  
Perhaps, here it is impossible not to be interested in politics... They [young people] think they don’t follow it, while there is information in social media, on the Urk.net, on billboards, in newspapers. They all put everything into their ears.

The respondents assess their awareness of politics accordingly: 56%, i.e. over a half of respondents, strongly disagree or rather disagree with the statement “I know a lot about politics.” As for the sources of information on political events, the Internet (50%) is still less popular than television (60%), except for Kyiv, where the Internet prevails as a source of information. Results of previous polls indicate that television is slowly losing ground as a key medium of information: in 2010, television was the major source of information for 90% (!) of young Ukrainians. Other popular sources of information are talks with friends (21%) and family discussions (15%), as well as social networks (12%). Radio and daily newspapers draw no interest of youth at all, they are the source of information about politics for only 7% and 4% of young people respectively. Moreover, the influence of Russian television and websites on Ukrainian youth is minimal; for instance, 49% of respondents watch Ukrainian TV and only 2% prefer Russian television. Such significant difference is observed even in the East and South of Ukraine: while Ukrainian television is popular among 30% and 37% of young people respectively, Russian is preferred by only 4% and 1%.

Graph 1.1.  
How much are you personally interested in political affairs?

Graph 1.2.  
What are your main sources of information on political events? (more than one answer possible)

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ATITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY

58% of respondents strongly agree or rather agree that democracy is a good form of government in general, while 49% believe that political opposition is necessary for a healthy democracy. However, 51% of respondents support the idea that Ukraine requires “strong leadership”: in this case, respondents could mean both dictatorship and a strong democratic leader, such as Margaret Thatcher or Konrad Adenauer. It is noteworthy that contrary to stereotypes, this thesis is mostly supported by young people in the North (63%) with the least supporters in the East (38%).

Focus group participants tend to be more sceptical toward democracy, as they see discrepancies between its theoretical definition and the real situation.

Ukrainian youth assess the state of democracy in Ukraine with “C”: when answering the question “On the scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very dissatisfied” and 5 is “very satisfied,” how satisfied are you with the state of democracy in Ukraine in general?,” the relative majority (58%) chose the option “3.” Moreover, democracy did not make it to the top three most important social values of Ukrainian youth; instead, the top three included economic prosperity of the citizens (28%), employment (21%), and security (16%).

In terms of left-wing and right-wing political views, uncertainty and contradiction is observed in the minds of the youth. The question “On the scale from 1 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing), how would you assess your political views?” deadlocked most of respondents: 38% refused to answer or chose the “don’t know” option; another 37% chose numbers between 6 and 9, thus stating that they lean to the right-wing views. However, when evaluating other statements, the respondents demonstrated a distinct tendency toward left-wing views on economic equality and the role of the state in ensuring the wellbeing of its citizens: 72% strongly agree or rather agree that the government should assume more responsibility in order to meet the needs of everyone; 65% strongly agree or rather agree that the incomes of the poor and the rich should be even; and 53% strongly agree or rather agree that the share of state property in business and industry should be increased. However, most of Ukrainian youth still lean toward the ideas of meritocracy: 54% strongly agree or rather agree that hard work usually brings a better life.

Khrystyna, 27, Chernihiv:
“It seems that in some countries democracy is beautiful, and in others it is not really. Well, one cannot stick to the definition, while the minds of so many people are messed up.”

Iuliia, 25, Odesa:
“In theory, it is true [democracy is the best form of governance], but it is possible only if the government is adequate and considers what their citizens think and knows what their citizens think through voting. Anyway, the name itself is not enough.”

ATTITUDES TOWARD STATE INSTITUTIONS

As noted in previous polls on the attitudes of Ukrainian youth, the level of trust toward the state institutions is critically low. The regions differ in terms of which region distrusts more: while in Kyiv the President, the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers are not trusted by a third of the respondents, in the North there are more than 50% of those. The absolute distrust to these three institutions in the North is even higher than in the East, where it fluctuates between 41% and 46% of respondents. When answering the question of the level of their trust toward the stated persons or institutions on a 5-point scale, where 1 is “strongly distrust” and 5 is “strongly trust,” the lowest scorers were the Verkhovna Rada (1.81), political parties (1.85), the Cabinet of Ministers (1.87), courts (1.98), and the President (2.00) (see Graph 1.3). Young people mostly trust the church (2.99), volunteers (2.98), and the army (2.86), although none of these institutions managed to reach even 3 points on average at the national level, not to mention 4 (rather trust) or 5 (strongly trust).

One should notice the regional distribution in the youth’s attitudes toward security authorities, the army and police (see Graph 1.4). For instance, the level of trust toward the army in the Southern region, that is traditionally opposition-minded toward the central government (3.11), is the same as in Kyiv, where the highest level of trust toward the army (3.19) is observed, while in the Eastern region, it has the lowest score.
As for the police, a major reform is still ongoing since 2015, and this institution managed to reach 3 points only in Kyiv, while in the Northern region, the level of trust toward the police has been evaluated with only 2.04 points.

As for the priority tasks for the government, the top of the list of requirements of Ukrainian youth is occupied by the fight against crime and corruption: 70% of respondents believe that this should be the government’s primary focus. A significant portion of the focus group participants admitted having witnessed bribery in terms of both education and employment. A woman from Chernihiv, Mariia, 22, shared her experience:

“I’d like to say that I have been extorted for a bribe once, in exchange for a grade. Yes, it was extortion. I came to the teacher once, and they asked for a bribe. I strongly refused. I came next time, and they ask for a bribe again. I don’t know, it happened like five times, but I never agreed to give a bribe.”

Moreover, the youth evaluate receiving or giving bribes and tax evasion rather negatively, but does not resent completely: when answering the question, whether they could justify such actions on a 10-point scale where 1 is “never” and 10 is “always,” these two phenomena scored 4.01 and 3.91 points respectively. The majority of the youth who do not tolerate bribery live in the North (53% of the respondents there believe that giving and accepting bribes can never be justified, in Kyiv and in the East only 19% and 15% of the youth respectively have an equally strong position on this issue).

The next top priorities for the government, according to the youth, are economic issues: economic growth and development (68%), unemployment reduction (66%), ensuring human rights and freedoms, social security, and social development for all (61% each). On the other hand, young people show lower (52%) expectations toward the government to strengthen the military force and national security (only 36% in the East); even preservation of the environment (57%) is more important for Ukrainian youth than security.
At the last parliamentary election, two thirds of young people with the right to vote participated in the voting (45% of the respondents), while one third did not (21%), another 25% were not eligible for voting. Overall, 56% of young people with the right to vote as of the time of the poll would vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada if they were held at that moment. The top scorer is the North (78%), and the lowest are the South (40%) and East (42%). Furthermore, 61% of young people with the right to vote as of the time of the poll would vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada if they were held at that moment. The top scorer is the North (78%), and the lowest are the South (40%) and East (42%). Furthermore, 61% of young people with the right to vote as of the time of the poll would vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada if they were held at that moment. The top scorer is the North (78%), and the lowest are the South (40%) and East (42%). Furthermore, 61% of young people with the right to vote as of the time of the poll would vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada if they were held at that moment. The top scorer is the North (78%), and the lowest are the South (40%) and East (42%). Furthermore, 61% of respondents strongly agree or rather agree that voting is a responsibility of every citizen in a democratic society.

**Graph 1.6.** To which extent should the Government focus on the realization of each of the following objectives?

- Fight against crime and corruption: 70%
- Economic growth and development: 68%
- Reduction of unemployment: 66%
- Social justice and social security for all: 61%
- Securing human rights and freedoms: 61%
- Preservation of natural environment: 57%
- Strengthening of military power and national security: 52%
- Improving the position of young people: 50%
- Development of private entrepreneurship: 41%
- Improving the position of women: 40%
- Fostering national identity: 37%

At the last parliamentary election, two thirds of young people with the right to vote participated in the voting (45% of the respondents), while one third did not (21%), another 25% were not eligible for voting. Overall, 56% of young people with the right to vote as of the time of the poll would vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada if they were held at that moment. The top scorer is the North (78%), and the lowest are the South (40%) and East (42%). Furthermore, 61% of young people with the right to vote as of the time of the poll would vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada if they were held at that moment. The top scorer is the North (78%), and the lowest are the South (40%) and East (42%). Furthermore, 61% of young people with the right to vote as of the time of the poll would vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada if they were held at that moment. The top scorer is the North (78%), and the lowest are the South (40%) and East (42%). Furthermore, 61% of young people with the right to vote as of the time of the poll would vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada if they were held at that moment. The top scorer is the North (78%), and the lowest are the South (40%) and East (42%). Furthermore, 61% of young people with the right to vote as of the time of the poll would vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada if they were held at that moment. The top scorer is the North (78%), and the lowest are the South (40%) and East (42%). Furthermore, 61% of respondents strongly agree or rather agree that voting is a responsibility of every citizen in a democratic society.

As for the voice of young people in politics, 65% of respondents strongly agree or rather agree that young people should get more opportunities to make their voice heard in politics, while 54% believe that politicians ignore the position of the youth. On the other hand, most of respondents are not ready to take on a political function: 67% chose the answers "not at all" or "rather not," while only 4% chose the option "gladly." None of the sample respondents confirmed being on such a function.

**Khrystyna, 27, Chernihiv:**
Well, young people don’t understand that it is a good instrument to change the policies. I mean, we can change everything with our votes. But they don’t use it. I mean, a lot of people I know tell me "Well, I just checked the box I liked."

As for the voice of young people in politics, 65% of respondents strongly agree or rather agree that young people should get more opportunities to make their voice heard in politics, while 54% believe that politicians ignore the position of the youth. On the other hand, most of respondents are not ready to take on a political function: 67% chose the answers "not at all" or "rather not," while only 4% chose the option "gladly." None of the sample respondents confirmed being on such a function.

**Iuliia, 25, Odesa:**
There is no point in voting; they will distort the results and appoint whoever they want anyway. We have no government and no law enforcement at all.

As for the other ways to express political position, such as signing of political demands and online petitions, participation in the demonstrations, volunteering or working for an NGO, or political activity on the Internet and in social networks, less than 4% of young people resort to those. The only exception is boycotting goods for political and environmental reasons: 8% of respondents confirmed that they had done that at least once. Thus, among all methods of expressing a political position, Ukrainian youth mostly tend to the "consumer activism," which means the expression of a position through economic action or inaction, although there are few supporters of this method overall. 24% of young Ukrainians confirmed that it is very important and rather important for them to take part in civic initiatives (not specifying, which ones).

Civil activism is unpopular among Ukrainian youth. Only 6% of respondents confirmed having done any volunteering over the past year, while 92% did not. Among those who volunteered, the majority is doing that in their schools (26%) or within civil initiatives (32%).

**National Identity and Language Issue**

The poll indicated that local and regional identity of Ukrainian youth is stronger than the national one. For example, 73% of respondents fully consider themselves residents of their city, 69% see themselves as residents of their region, and only 66% see themselves as citizens of Ukraine. Ukrainian citizenship is most strongly felt in the Northern (79%) and Western (70%) regions, with the lowest score in the East (48%) (percentage of those who chose the option "see completely"). Only 61% of Ukrainian youth feel proud or rather proud of the fact that they are citizens of Ukraine. 54% of young Ukrainians see themselves completely or rather as citizens of the world. As for the European identity, only 32% of young people of Ukraine fully consider themselves Europeans. Feeling as a citizen of world and feeling European is the most common in Kiev and West of Ukraine and the least common in the East and the South.

**Graph 1.7.** Did you or would you try one of the following ways of political engagement?

- Signed a list with political requests/Supported an online petition: 76% (4% 3% 3%)
- Participated in a demonstration: 77% (14% 3% 3%)
- Participated in volunteer or civil society organization activities: 75% (16% 3% 3%)
- Worked in a political party or political group: 82% (10% 2% 3% 3%)
- Stopped buying things for political or environmental reasons: 76% (9% 8% 4% 4%)
- Participated in political activities online/social media: 81% (9% 5% 5% 4%)

- No
- Don't know
- I haven't yet, but I would
- I've done this
- No answer

- Civil activism is unpopular among Ukrainian youth. Only 6% of respondents confirmed having done any volunteering over the past year, while 92% did not. Among those who volunteered, the majority is doing that in their schools (26%) or within civil initiatives (32%).

The poll indicated that local and regional identity of Ukrainian youth is stronger than the national one. For example, 73% of respondents fully consider themselves residents of their city, 69% see themselves as residents of their region, and only 66% see themselves as citizens of Ukraine. Ukrainian citizenship is most strongly felt in the Northern (79%) and Western (70%) regions, with the lowest score in the East (48%) (percentage of those who chose the option "see completely"). Only 61% of Ukrainian youth feel proud or rather proud of the fact that they are citizens of Ukraine. 54% of young Ukrainians see themselves completely or rather as citizens of the world. As for the European identity, only 32% of young people of Ukraine fully consider themselves Europeans. Feeling as a citizen of world and feeling European is the most common in Kiev and West of Ukraine and the least common in the East and the South.
younger respondents tend to consider themselves Ukrainians more often than older generation\(^9\).

It is also interesting that young Ukrainians were divided evenly around the statement «The real Ukrainian is only a person who has Ukrainian blood», i.e. the definition of citizenship based on ethnicity. 35\% and 36\% agree and disagree with this statement respectively, another 30\% were undecided or couldn't answer. It is peculiar that in the East there is the smallest number of those who agree with the definition of the citizenship in ethnics terms – 60\% disagree while only 13\% agree.

Instead, language is the major issue that distinguishes Ukrainian youth regionally, as the poll showed distinct regional differences. For example, while in the Northern, Western, and Central regions, the main language of domestic communication is Ukrainian (73\%, 93\%, and 53\% respectively), Kyiv, Southern and Eastern regions are dominated by Russian (50\%, 63\%, and 84\%). Outside the family (at school, at work, or with friends), this trend continues, except for Kyiv, where the percentage of those who speak both languages increases (46\%). In general, in Ukraine half of young people (50\%) speak Ukrainian at home, one third (30\%) speak Russian, and about one fifth (18\%) speak both Russian and Ukrainian. Outside the family, this balance leans toward bilingualism (25\%). Overall, these results indicate that the proportion of young people who use Ukrainian as the main spoken language is increasing: in 2010, the percentage of Ukrainian youth using Ukrainian within the family circle (including 51\% of the respondents in the East and in the South) while only 49\% of the youth think so about their Russian skills.

Importantly, young people who participated in regional focus groups noted that, although there are certain stereotypes regarding Ukrainian-Russian language distribution or prejudice against the "minority language" speakers in the respective regions, the language issue is not an obstacle for the national unity of Ukraine. Only 5\% of the respondents have ever felt discriminated on the ground of spoken language.

Some researchers suggest that the dominance of local identity may be associated with the post-Soviet legacy. It is noteworthy that when answering questions about attitudes toward the collapse of the Soviet Union, 34\% of young people did not answer or could not decide, while the same share showed positive or very positive attitude toward this event.

Remarkably, in the context of the issue of national identity, two simultaneous and contradictory phenomena are observed: while young people feel their national identity remarkably unanimously, regional language differences remain. For instance, 95\% of respondents consider themselves Ukrainians and 2\% see themselves as Russians. This trend continues even in the Eastern Ukraine, where 88\% of respondents view themselves as Ukrainians and 8\% regard themselves Russians. In the South, this ratio is 94\% to 4\%. It is noteworthy that only 86\% of the respondents have Ukrainian citizenship (87\% in the South and 90\% in the East). It is also noteworthy that there are people in the East and in the South who consider themselves Ukrainian even though their parents have Russian nationality. These results are consistent with a recent poll conducted by the Gorshenin Institute, which found that

\(^9\) However, it should be noted that these trends of greater identification with local region than with the state in general are observed in other countries, e.g. in the UK (Easton M., “UK is becoming 'more local and global'”, BBC, 7.04.2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26883743)


Graph 1.9. Which language do you speak…*
Conclusion

Results of this poll revealed a significant level of apathy among Ukrainian youth towards politics: although young people complain about the representation of their interests in politics and do not trust political parties and government institutions, they are not ready to engage in political activities and are not even interested in political events. Ukrainian young people are less politically active than, for instance, their peers in Central and Eastern Europe: while Ukrainian national elections of 2014 have been attended by 45% of young people, this figure was about 60% in Poland, over 50% in Hungary, above 70% in the Czech Republic, and slightly less than 80% in Slovakia. Therefore, Ukraine is quite likely to get stuck in the vicious circle of political non-participation: “if young people do not vote, they are more likely to be ignored by politicians and policymakers, which leads to greater disillusionment among younger citizens – and the cycle continues.”

As for other ways to express political position, for example, through social activities, the efforts of Ukrainian youth are rather low – only 6% of the respondents did any volunteering in the previous 12 months.

It is important though not to rush to conclusions about the political apathy of the young people. Some studies emphasize that the adult definitions of citizenship do not necessarily fit teenagers, who indeed were part of the survey. Certain “apathy” to politics can well be a form of resistance or even a protest, which will manifest itself later.

As for the national identity of young Ukrainians, here our findings are rather positive – 95% of the youth identify themselves as Ukrainians by nationality. Regional language differences persist but the share of youth who speak Ukrainian as their first language is growing.

Ukraine that is not aligned to Russia’s interests. The Russian narrative on Ukraine has frequently anchored itself on domestic causes for the “Ukrainian crisis” and been used to justify Russian aggression and failures of Ukraine’s policies.16

Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU triggered mass protests and a domestic political crisis, which resulted in a change of regime after the violent crackdown of the state against protesters. In terms of foreign policy, the Revolution of Dignity meant more than a simple turn towards the EU. The Euromaidan was a turning point for Ukraine, which opted in favor of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and against the EU/Russia dichotomy.

Nevertheless, the pro-EU policy of Ukraine does not mean that Ukraine’s relations with the EU in general, the Member States, and the US are taken for granted, nor unconditional support for Kyiv by Ukraine’s partners. Recent research17 shows that foreign observers see a number of challenges for Ukraine’s foreign policy, and the top three are domestic issues (implementing reforms and fighting corruption), conflict with Russia, and lack of foreign policy strategy.

The level of support for overcoming these issues and the modernization of Ukraine will depend to a great extent on the ability of Ukraine to implement the Association Agreement with the EU, as well as to develop a robust and cohesive policy aimed at stabilization and development. The chances of successful implementation of Ukraine’s commitments remain high if Ukrainians and civil society generally, including young people, keep pressure on political elites to deliver on promised reforms. Unlike certain countries in the region, especially Russia, young people in Ukraine are more independent of older generations and represent a cornerstone of “pro-democratic movements and calls for change that culminated in anti-regime protests, elections, and revolution.”18 Moreover, the success will also depend on the extent to which young people will be able to institutionalize their participation in the decision-making process, a process that has been problematic in the past.19

Earlier opinion polls confirmed that the majority of youth in Ukraine is oriented towards the EU.20 The analysis below offers a more nuanced picture. While the EU remains the only widely accepted model of development able to mobilize support and generate long-awaited change, the youth of Ukraine has a lot of grievances towards the EU, not just Ukraine.

This research also showed that, while Ukrainian youth have a high interest in foreign policy of Ukraine and international politics, their views are often contradictory and reactionary, similar to older fellow citizens. They tend to be highly politically charged in certain cases, puzzled and confused in others, and sometimes polarized, even within a single community (as proved by focus groups). Ukrainian youth therefore represent a valuable source of reflection on the foreign policy options available to Ukraine.

Key findings

- In all regions of Ukraine, there are more supporters than opponents of EU membership (60% of Ukraine’s youth support it), except for the East of Ukraine, where 53% are in favor and 44% are against.
- Even in the East of Ukraine, more respondents (23%) agree with the assumption that EU membership of Ukraine will bring economic development, against 19% that disagree.
- A relative majority of respondents (38%) think there is no serious argument against Ukraine’s membership of the EU.
- One in three young Ukrainians is willing to see their country in NATO, compared to 19% who don’t support Ukraine’s NATO membership, 21% who chose neutral position, and 22% who couldn’t answer at all.
- Half of the respondents think that the EU makes sufficient efforts to reform Ukraine, and it is time for Kyiv to do more.
- There is no dominant attitude among Ukrainian youth in terms of trust towards the EU: numbers of “trustful,” “non-trustful” and “undecided” are almost equal (29%, 28% and 31% respectively).
- While the level of trust towards Western international organizations remains low in the East of Ukraine, the EU is the most trusted international actor there (15%).
- Over half (52%) of young Ukrainians agree or rather agree with the statement that the national interests of Ukraine are not sufficiently defended at the international stage.
- In key areas, Ukraine is overwhelmingly overrun by the EU, according to the perception of respondents. The most striking difference is economic well-being, which in the case of Ukraine is assessed positively by 9%, while the same indicator in the EU is favorably assessed by two thirds of young Ukrainians, which means a gap of almost 60%.
- There is a high level of frustration with the situation in all important areas that matter for a comfortable, free, and self-sufficient life in Ukraine; however, paradoxically, Ukrainians are quite positive in their forecasts for the future.

TRUST TOWARD FOREIGN ACTORS

- The European Union

Despite the widespread idea that Ukrainian youth are supportive of the EU, results of the poll show that the portions of young people who strongly trust (7%) or rather trust (22%) the EU reaches 29%, while the share of those who don’t trust at all (15%) or rather distrust (15%) is 28%. The largest portion of respondents (31%) stated that they neither trust, nor distrust the EU. This data illustrates three distinct groups with more or less equal representation: 29% rather trust or strongly trust; 28% don’t trust at all or rather distrust; and 31% are neutral.

This division of opinions among the three groups shows that Ukrainian youth do not have a consolidated approach towards the EU, demonstrating an ambivalent attitude. It is noteworthy that unlike in the case of gender

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This phenomenon is difficult to explain based on age. The older the age group, the most noteworthy findings is the variation in attitudes toward the UN are quite polarized among young people in Ukraine. As with the EU, the largest group of Ukrainian youth (32%) is neutral towards the UN. Those who trust or rather trust the UN make up only 23%, while those who distrust or rather distrust make up 29% of the respondents. Interestingly, in three regions of Ukraine the number of respondents who don’t trust the UN at all is quite high compared to other regions. In the Centre of Ukraine, 16% don’t trust the UN at all; in the North and in the East, the respective figures are 18% and 22%. The only region where the share of young people who don’t trust the UN at all is lower that 10% is Kyiv, where only 7% strongly distrust this organization. Overall, the lowest level of support for UN is observed in the East of Ukraine, where 22% don’t trust at all and 26% rather distrust. It could be explained by the fact that the East of Ukraine is affected by Russian aggression, and the UN is perceived as an international institution that is in charge of peace; therefore, to certain extent lack of stable cease-fire in Donbas is associated with the UN’s inability to secure peace in the East of Ukraine.

### The United Nations

The attitudes toward the UN are quite polarized among young people in Ukraine. As with the EU, the largest group of Ukrainian youth (32%) is neutral towards the UN. Those who trust or rather trust the UN make up only 23%, while those who distrust or rather distrust make up 29% of the respondents. Interestingly, in three regions of Ukraine the number of respondents who don’t trust the UN at all is quite high compared to other regions. In the Centre of Ukraine, 16% don’t trust the UN at all; in the North and in the East, the respective figures are 18% and 22%. The only region where the share of young people who don’t trust the UN at all is lower that 10% is Kyiv, where only 7% strongly distrust this organization. Overall, the lowest level of support for UN is observed in the East of Ukraine, where 22% don’t trust at all and 26% rather distrust. It could be explained by the fact that the East of Ukraine is affected by Russian aggression, and the UN is perceived as an international institution that is in charge of peace; therefore, to certain extent lack of stable cease-fire in Donbas is associated with the UN’s inability to secure peace in the East of Ukraine.

### OSCE

While in the cases of the EU and the UN, the distribution of opinions is mostly balanced and neutral attitudes the most common, in the case of the OSCE, negative views prevail (37%). The second top group (after those who don’t trust or rather distrust the OSCE) are the “neutralists” who make up 27%, while those who rather trust or strongly trust are the smallest group (19%). Attitudes toward the OSCE are rather negative in all age groups; another surprise is that this organization is least trusted in Northern regions of Ukraine (35% don’t trust at all and 32% rather distrust), and not in the East, unlike in the cases of the UN and the EU. Interestingly, the OSCE is most trusted in the South of Ukraine (8% strongly trust and 18% rather trust), while in other regions the level of support fluctuates between 9% and 21%. It is noteworthy that only 5% of respondents strongly trust and 8% rather trust the OSCE in the East of Ukraine, the region where this organization is most represented and focused through the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. As in the case of the UN, frustration due to the protracted conflict in the East of Ukraine is the major reason of poor image of the OSCE, despite their efforts aimed at the conflict settlement. Moreover, the fact Russia is part of the OSCE generates additional suspicion towards the OSCE.

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**Graph 2.1. How far do you trust the European Union?**

- Not at all: 23%
- Rather distrust: 32%
- Neither trust, nor distrust: 29%
- Rather trust: 34%
- Strongly trust: 19%
- Don’t know: 10%
- No answer: 10%

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**Iuliia, 25, Odesa:**

I trust them, because everything is stated in the law. If there is a conflict in any country, all troops are sent there. But we do not have it.

**Oleksandr, 29, Odesa:**

I absolutely do not trust NATO, because it is not governed by our country. It is governed jointly by other states, and, for example, if we let NATO into our country, this means that in the event of any conflict of NATO all our young boys will be obliged... well, some of them, who are military, will be obliged to engage in that conflict for NATO, for that country. We have enough of our own conflicts. Considering that young people are fleeing our country, I think that it will not lead to anything good. I’m strongly against it.
The IMF remains an actor that young people discuss issues related to the IMF, and if they do, the context is rather negative, as the IMF is often portrayed in a negative light in Ukrainian public discourse. The level of strong trust toward the IMF is 4%; if we add 10% who rather trust, it makes up 14%, quite a low figure. On the other hand, the level of distrust is 39% (20% strongly distrust and 19% rather distrust), which shows that young Ukrainians are skeptical toward the IMF, while almost every third respondent is neutral (28%) and almost every second is unable or doesn’t know how to answer. The regional distribution also looks interesting: in Kyiv the level of distrust toward the IMF is 16%, while in all other regions, the attitudes are much more negative, peaking in the North with 58% (strongly distrust or rather distrust). As shown by focus groups, the major source of distrust toward the IMF is related not to their activities per se, but to the Ukrainian Government in terms of how they spend IMF money and how many generations will have to pay for recent credits.

**The International Monetary Fund**

The IMF remains an actor that young people don’t know much about. It is quite rare that young people discuss issues related to the IMF, and if they do, the context is rather negative, as the IMF is often portrayed in a negative light in Ukrainian public discourse. The level of strong trust toward the IMF is 4%; if we add 10% who rather trust, it makes up 14%, quite a low figure. On the other hand, the level of distrust is 39% (20% strongly distrust and 19% rather distrust), which shows that young Ukrainians are skeptical toward the IMF, while almost every third respondent is neutral (28%) and almost every second is unable or doesn’t know how to answer. The regional distribution also looks interesting: in Kyiv the level of distrust toward the IMF is 16%, while in all other regions, the attitudes are much more negative, peaking in the North with 58% (strongly distrust or rather distrust). As shown by focus groups, the major source of distrust toward the IMF is related not to their activities per se, but to the Ukrainian Government in terms of how they spend IMF money and how many generations will have to pay for recent credits.

The current level of development in Ukraine is not attractive compared to the EU. To understand it, we need to see how various aspects of life in Ukraine and in the EU are perceived by young people. In key areas, according to respondents, Ukraine is overwhelmingly outrun by the EU. The state of democracy has been evaluated as good or rather good in Ukraine by 17%, compared to 57% in the case of the EU. Only 1% think that democracy in the EU state is in a very bad state, compared to 12% in the case of Ukraine. In terms of the rule of law, the perception gap is even wider. While in the case of the EU, only 1% of Ukrainians think that the situation with rule of law is very bad and 5% think it is bad, in the case of Ukraine, 21% think the situation is very bad and 25% think that it is bad (46% overall). In this context, distribution of results at a regional level is noteworthy. All regions consider the state of the rule of law to be bad or very bad, and the level of support for these statements varies from 22% to 51%, except for Northern regions of Ukraine. In the North, 75% of young Ukrainians assess the situation negatively, which is clearly a significant difference to the rest of Ukraine. Furthermore, we should note the difference based on age: the younger the respondents, the less critical they are towards the situation with the rule of law in Ukraine.

In terms of human rights, 59% assess the situation in the EU as good or rather good, compared to only 14% in the case of Ukraine. The results for other areas also seem negative for Ukraine and positive for the EU. For instance, the situation with employment in the EU is assessed positively at 62%, compared to 8% in the case of Ukraine. The same applies to equality, where the EU gets 53% and Ukraine gets just 13%. Other areas include security, which is perceived as positive in the case of the EU by only 9% of respondents, compared to 51% in the case of the EU. A similar situation is observed in the case of individual freedom. However, the most striking difference is observed in the case of economic well-being. The overall positive
assessment for Ukraine reached 9%, while economic well-being in the EU is favorably assessed by two thirds of young Ukrainians, i.e. the gap between the EU and Ukraine is almost 60%. Moreover, economic well-being is the key area, one of the most important for the young generation (28% among 8 options).

EU INTEGRATION

Despite the low level of trust toward the EU, the integration project demonstrates higher figures among the youth of Ukraine regarding potential EU membership. Along with their older fellow citizens, young Ukrainians consider that their country belongs to the EU. An overwhelming majority (60%) thinks that Ukraine should join the EU. 12% oppose this statement, while 24% find it hard to answer. In all regions of Ukraine, there are more supporters than opponents of EU membership, except for the East, where 33% are in favor of integration and 44% are against. Nevertheless, the gap between the two options (membership and non-membership) in the East of Ukraine is insignificant, especially taking into account the influence of Russian propaganda. However, the main problem from the perspective of Ukrainian youth is that EU membership is desirable, but not realistic, as the EU is not willing to accept Ukraine as a member.

Graph 2.3. How good or bad is the status of following listed values in Ukraine and the EU?

In terms of benefits, Ukrainian youth believe that Ukraine’s membership of the EU would be profitable. Most (49%) of respondents consider that EU membership will bring economic development, compared to 16% who oppose this statement. It is noteworthy that in the Northern and Western regions of Ukraine, two thirds of respondents support this statement, while the most interesting data comes from the East, where the largest portion of respondents (23%) agree with this statement, compared to 19% who don’t support it. Economic development is also associated with better quality of life (52%) and better opportunities for employment (54%). In terms of good governance, half (49%) of respondents agree that EU membership would speed up the democratization of society. A little more (52%) believe that Ukraine as an EU member state would provide better protection to human and minority rights. The cultural aspect is also strongly considered: 52% expect better education and 57% hope for better opportunities for travel and new acquaintances.

Graph 2.4. Do you think Ukraine should join the European Union?

In terms of benefits, Ukrainian youth believe that Ukraine’s membership of the EU would be profitable. Most (49%) of respondents consider that EU membership will bring economic development, compared to 16% who oppose this statement. It is noteworthy that in the Northern and Western regions of Ukraine, two thirds of respondents support this statement, while the most interesting data comes from the East, where the largest portion of respondents (23%) agree with this statement, compared to 19% who don’t support it. Economic development is also associated with better quality of life (52%) and better opportunities for employment (54%). In terms of good governance, half (49%) of respondents agree that EU membership would speed up the democratization of society. A little more (52%) believe that Ukraine as an EU member state would provide better protection to human and minority rights. The cultural aspect is also strongly considered: 52% expect better education and 57% hope for better opportunities for travel and new acquaintances.
This opinion poll shows that young Ukrainians hope for EU membership, and 49% believe that Ukraine should be offered membership prospects (another 10% do not support them). They find inspiration in the EU and consider it to be a model in the context of overcoming problems that taint everyday life for average Ukrainians. On the other hand, respondents were asked about potential disadvantages associated with Ukraine’s membership in the EU. The perception of the EU is quite positive in terms of potential issues, which largely reflects the answers to the questions related to the EU membership benefits. That is confirmed by the support of a relative majority of respondents (38%) who believe that there are no serious arguments against Ukraine’s membership of the EU, while 19% disagree with this statement. Among the major fears associated with EU memberships is the massive emigration of the country’s population (24% (9% strongly agree and 15% rather agree) compared to 31% who disagree or rather disagree). It is noteworthy that at a regional level, Kyiv is most concerned with this prospect (32% agree with the statement and 32% disagree). Other fears include massive influx of refugees from the Middle East to Ukraine (21% agree and 31% disagree) and the possibility that Ukraine will become dependent on other EU member states in economic, political, and cultural terms (21% of young people are worried about that, compared to 40% who do not share this perception). Threats to national identity and...
Ukraine's sovereignty are among the least concerning issues, with only 13% showing concern. Strangely, when it comes to details and debates, young Ukrainians appear very meticulous and skeptical (as observed in the focus groups). It is even more worrying that the fears of young Ukrainians are guided by the fake arguments that were massively spread by Russian propaganda in 2013. The focus groups provided us with several conspi-

focus groups). It is even more worrying that Ukraine's sovereignty are among the least concern. Strangely, when it comes to details and debates, young Ukrainians appear very meticulous and skeptical (as observed in the focus groups). It is even more worrying that the fears of young Ukrainians are guided by the fake arguments that were massively spread by Russian propaganda in 2013. The focus groups provided us with several conspi-

Hanna, 22, Odesa: I don’t know the nuances, but I know that it is when several countries decide something together, consulting with each other. I think they are not doing well really, because, as I heard, Greece left the European Union. [...] They will use us. We won’t have any benefits, because we are nobody. We will be outsiders. Our products won’t be bought. They will sell us theirs for cosmic prices, and as we won’t have any opportunity to earn more, we won’t be able to buy anything. Plus, utilities will be very expensive.

Oleksandr, 29, Odesa: Of course, our bills will be as high as they are in the European Union, it’s clear. But our earnings and everything else will remain the same. I mean, the European Union adjusts everything to their standards, but they don’t adjust our salaries as well. [...] Our industries are not oriented toward them. We won’t be able to sell them the Motor Sich engines that we sold to Russia. They do not have airplanes that use them. All our businesses were not oriented toward the West. Even in Kherson, I know cotton industry enterprises that work with Kazakhstan.

SECURITY AND INTEGRATION INTO NATO

One in three young Ukrainians is willing to see their country in NATO, compared to 19% who don’t support Ukraine’s membership, 21% who are neutral, and 22% who couldn’t answer. Unlike the case of EU membership, the polar-

ization of opinions in the context of NATO is much greater, especially at regional level. The East (13%) and the South of Ukraine (22%) show very little support for NATO membership, despite the fact that support for NATO in these regions has grown since 2014. Interestingly, in these regions, the share of those who don’t know how to answer or can’t answer at all reaches one third of respondents, which allows one to conclude that there is a problem with understanding of what NATO is. The East and the South of Ukraine also believe that NATO membership will not stop Russian aggression in Ukraine, whereas other regions show more confidence.

Overall, at the national level, NATO membership is perceived as a positive step. Among the benefits of NATO membership are: strengthening of Ukraine’s security (46% vs. 14%); contribution to the settlement of the conflict with Russia (39% vs. 17%); new foreign investments (41% vs. 14%); modernization of Ukrainian army (46% vs. 12%); and assistance with countering Russian aggression (58% vs. 17%).

Dmytro, 29, Chernihiv: Because it is a military-political union. Accordingly, if we can develop to the standards of NATO, we will be accepted, then it will be a true recognition of Ukraine as a global power, not a regional quasi-state. Accordingly, in this case, our representatives will be in NATO management, and we will have modern army. And there will be no precedents like Crimea, because the “one for all” will work for us.

The data obtained on perceived disadvantages of NATO membership cause some confusion, especially if we evaluate it alongside the benefits. For instance, young people are willing to join NATO for various reasons stated above; however, the same people do not want Ukraine to join, as the Ukrainian army will have to participate in NATO operations (38% vs. 18%). On the other hand, respondents believe that Ukraine’s mem-

Graph 2.7. Ukraine’s accession/getting closer to the NATO is desirable because...
There are certain confusing security considerations related to the neutral status of Ukraine. Ukrainian youth are quite polarized on this issue, as 32% believe that Ukraine should become a neutral state, while 29% don’t support this statement, 30% are neutral, and 10% do not have any answer. There is also further confusion where most respondents support NATO membership, while a portion of them supports the neutral status, although we do not know if those are the same people. This issue is further galvanized by the fact that the neutral status is not applicable to Ukraine’s situation, since it can only be adopted by a party outside of a conflict, while Ukraine is already a target of Russian aggression.

Interestingly, most young people (54%) oppose joining any Russian-led economic project, while the number of those who oppose a potential military alliance between Ukraine and Russia is even higher (57%). These figures are a direct result of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, Russia, which was considered a security provider up to a few years ago, had lost its soft-power and influence in Ukraine.

Strengthening of security is another important topic for Ukrainian youth. The renewal of nuclear status is a contradictory issue, supported by 19% and disapproved of by 20%. It is noteworthy that Kyiv is a top supporter of this idea with 45%. This issue is widely discussed in Ukrainian society, as the good will of Ukraine giving up its nuclear arsenal was not compensated. The major world powers provided security assurances for Ukraine, which were at worst never, and at best partially, executed. The example of Ukraine is also a blow to non-proliferation efforts; therefore, young Ukrainians have mixed feelings about nuclear status.
REFORMS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

In terms of the EU’s leverage on implementation of reforms in Ukraine, the respondents are more heavily weighted on the EU side and critical toward the Ukrainian government. Half of respondents believe that the EU makes sufficient efforts to reform Ukraine, and it is time for Kyiv to do more. This negative trend continues with the opinion (36%) that the EU should stop giving money, while 30% disagree with this statement. Moreover, 45% believe that the EU should stop funding Ukraine, as this money will be siphoned off by ruling elites. Furthermore, 51% think that the EU should put more pressure on Ukrainian political elites. On the other hand, 54% believe that the EU and its member states should confront Russia more openly, while 56% believe that the EU must show greater interest in the protection of Ukrainian borders and provide the Ukrainian army with weaponry.

Young people also demand political incentives, as 55% believe that the process of reforms will be boosted by EU membership prospects. Moreover, they expect the EU to support civil society that influences reforms (57%), young talent (65%), and exchange programs (62%). Only 9% agree with the statement that the EU should stop assisting Ukraine because its future is with Russia. 49% disagree with the statement that no-one is able to help Ukraine.

Graph 2.10. What should the EU do to accelerate reforms in Ukraine?

- To support talented young people more. They are Ukraine’s future
- To initiate long-term programs of experience exchange
- To support civil society and non-governmental organizations that influence reforms in the country
- To be more interested in protection of Ukraine’s border and should provide Ukraine with weapons
- To provide membership perspective
- To confront Russia more openly
- To exert more pressure on the Ukrainian government
- EU does enough, now it’s time for Ukraine’s authorities to act
- To stop giving money because they get stolen by people in power
- To send more advisers
- To give more money
- I believe more in help by Americans, not the European Union
- There is no way to help Ukraine
- I am totally against EU assistance. Our future is with Russia

Conclusions

Polarization, confusion and desire for change – these are the words that best describe understanding of Ukraine’s foreign policy among its youth. Ukrainian youth have a passive position on many issues, while remaining frustrated by modest results in implementing reforms and defending Ukrainian national interests globally.

This situation is also influenced by rapid changes in foreign policy options due to Russian aggression and the challenges imported by the conflict. In this context, the EU option, which used to be one of several foreign policy alternatives, is now the only choice.

Young Ukrainians have distinct opinions about international stakeholders, more so than Ukrainian society as a whole. For instance, a certain ambivalence is observed in young people’s views: they support the EU and Ukraine’s membership thereof when it comes to concrete benefits, but at the same time, they approach Western international organizations with caution.

The perception of young people from the East of Ukraine, which is the frontier of Russia-backed conflict, are especially noteworthy. In the East, all international actors have weak support; however, a certain variation of attitudes is observed. The level of trust towards NATO and the IMF is 9%, while the EU is the most trusted Western actor with 15%. This allows one to assume that the EU has a chance to become an international institution that is trusted nationwide.

The EU is also the entity which is most trusted in all the regions of Ukraine, except the East, where trust is lower. However, when it comes to EU membership of Ukraine, the majority of respondents, including in the East, think that it will bring economic development. Moreover, a relative majority (58%) think that there are no serious arguments against Ukraine’s membership in the EU. That makes the EU the most credible organization that is seen as a model of development, modernization and to some extent, empowerment of the younger generation.

Ukrainian youth believe that their country deserves much more. We observe high levels of frustration regarding the situation in all key areas that affect comfortable, free, and self-sufficient life in Ukraine. The problems in such areas as the rule of law, democracy, economic well-being, employment opportunities, etc. are particularly noticeable when compared to the situation in the EU, or to the perception of the situation in the EU. On the other hand, despite the negative attitude towards the current situation, Ukrainian youth are confident about the future, since many young people believe that Ukraine will play a greater role in the international arena.

NATO is considered the only organization capable of strengthening the security of Ukraine and provide the necessary support to counter and stop Russian aggression. Ukrainians support NATO in all contexts, except for participation of the Ukrainian army in NATO operations. This attitude might have various explanations, including the fact that Ukraine cannot send troops abroad in the middle of a war with the aggressor. According to young Ukrainians, NATO remains the only viable model to overcome security issues. Therefore, issues such as a neutral status or renewing the nuclear status divide opinion. Moreover, there is a large portion of the “undecided” (up to a third in certain cases), which might be caused by lack of information and awareness of the issues in question.
The data on support for reforms reveal distrust toward the Government of Ukraine due to the slow pace of reforms. Moreover, the distrust is so deep that a significant portion of respondents believe that the EU should put more pressure on Ukrainian political elites and stop financial support, because the money would be siphoned off. Instead, young people advocate for decentralization of EU support, and its redirection towards young, talented people, exchange programs, NGOs, etc.

Introduction

The armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine is one of the five major issues that concern Ukrainian youth today, along with such challenges as the state of economy (63%), general decline in living standards (60%), problems with employment (52%), corruption, and incompetence of the authorities (51%)\(^\text{21}\). Evidently, such factor as the conflict between the two countries has and will have a great influence on the formation of political guides of the younger part of Ukrainian society. Moreover, this part is quite numerous: our poll covers citizens of Ukraine aged 14 to 29, and as of January 1, 2017, there were almost 8 million of them, which is a fifth of the country’s population.

The events of recent years that affected a part of Ukrainian youth personally, such as the Euromaidan, annexation of Crimea, the anti-terrorist operation in Eastern Ukraine, and forced relocation due to military actions in Donbas, could not but influence their perception of relations with Russia. The opinion poll, analyzed by the New Europe Center, reflects the sentiments that are already affecting and will further influence domestic and foreign policy priorities of Ukraine.

\(^{21}\) The Values of Ukrainian Youth. Results of the Representative Sociological Research of the State of Ukrainian Youth. Kyiv, 2016. This research has been conducted by the Centre for Independent Sociological Research Omega, on request of the Ministry of Youth and Sport of Ukraine. http://dsmsu.gov.ua/media/2016/11/03/23/2016-03-23-desilidenya_2016.pdf
Russia was recently among the most visited countries (40%), while other countries had a significant gap in terms of young visitors from Ukraine (28% for Poland, 15% for Turkey, 8% for Egypt, and 7% for Germany)\(^\text{21}\). Therefore, Ukrainian youth discover Russia through the contrasting phenomena or events: while some people are affected by communication with relatives in the neighboring country, others are on the front line of the conflict in Donbas, while the rest are influenced by both. Probably, that is the reason why about a third of the respondents chose the neutral or middle options and avoided absolute support or absolute negative attitude when answering most of the questions.

This opinion poll shows how complex the picture of the attitudes of Ukrainian youth is: such simplistic notion as “the East and the South are pro-Russian, while the West is pro-European and pro-American” is not confirmed by our research. There are, certainly, differences between Ukrainians from various regions in certain issues, but they are not dramatic enough to assume any public split in the society. Moreover, some of the questions concerning relations between Ukraine and Russia combine the positions of the East and the West, and the general critical attitude toward Russian aggression and, in particular, to the annexation of Crimea, is the common denominator.

In 2015, the British Council arrived at the same conclusion based on the poll conducted among Ukrainian youth: “The annexation of Crimea by Russia and conflict in the Donets and Luhans regions may superficially give credence to the simplistic divisions…”\(^\text{22}\) Moreover, this poll also showed that young people consider Russian invasion as the greatest challenge for Ukraine’s development (59%)\(^\text{23}\).

Ten years ago, sociologists stated that Ukrainian society still have not lost the feeling of “belonging to the former Soviet state”. Researchers assumed that the release from this feeling would occur along with the change of generations\(^\text{15}\). Our research may show that young people are increasingly relieved of the burden of nostalgia for the Soviet Union. While nationwide polls show that a significant number of Ukrainians over 35 still regret the collapse of the USSR, surveys conducted among the youth show an opposite trend. For instance, a poll conducted by Sociological Rating Group in 2017 demonstrated that every third respondent from the age group of 36-50 regrets the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rate of nostalgic respondents among the group of over 50 was even higher, almost a half (49%)\(^\text{24}\). Our poll shows that only 13% of young people have negative feelings about the collapse of the USSR, which is consistent with the results obtained by the Rating Group, where 14% of the age group of 18-35 stated that they regret the collapse of the USSR.

There is another, even more interesting trend: the respondents from the South and the East started manifesting itself long ago. In their opinion, people could really be afraid to talk on political topics (one of the potential reasons is anxiety due to proximity to the front line: “What if there will be an invasion?” or “What if Russia occupies other territories, and my words are recorded somehow?”). Sociologists explain that in these regions the greatest polarization of opinions is observed, and therefore people can evade discussing certain topics to avoid conflicts. Certainly, silence could be also provoked by simple confusion: people have long been sympathetic to Russia and do not know how to behave after the events of recent years.

However, this poll revealed a trend of avoiding the answer, which is especially typical for respondents from the South, and even more for participants from the Eastern region. For example, in the East, almost 60% did not answer the question: “Who is responsible for the current military conflict in the East of Ukraine to the most extent?” This phenomenon has been previously encountered by researchers who conducted a poll among internally displaced persons. “The displaced persons are silent, since they want to merge with the new environment faster and not to feel their difference. To achieve that, they are ready to suppress their dignity, sacrifice their own views and their system of values. However, this does not mean that people sacrifice it forever. This is a “delayed action” situation,” the sociologists conclude\(^\text{25}\). It is likely that respondents are afraid to answer due to certain reasons, despite the anonymous nature of the poll.

Sociologists who organized the poll noted that the trend of silence in Eastern and Southern regions started manifesting itself long ago. In their opinion, people could really be afraid to talk on political topics (one of the potential reasons is anxiety due to proximity to the front line: “What if there will be an invasion?” or “What if Russia occupies other territories, and my words are recorded somehow?”). Sociologists explain that in these regions the greatest polarization of opinions is observed, and therefore people can evade discussing certain topics to avoid conflicts. Certainly, silence could be also provoked by simple confusion: people have long been sympathetic to Russia and do not know how to behave after the events of recent years.

\[22\] Ibid., p. 54.
\[23\] Ibid., p. 19.
Most young people (60%) believe that Russia's aggressive policy toward Ukraine cannot be justified (see Graph 3.1). Only 6% admit that there could be certain grounds justifying the aggression. Eastern regions of Ukraine demonstrate the greatest dispersion of opinions on this issue: one third of respondents do not consider any justification acceptable, 19% chose a neutral position, suggesting that there could be certain legitimate reasons, while 17% believe that Russia's policies can be justified. Furthermore, the East also shows the highest rate of those reluctant to answer, as 34% of respondents did not respond at all.

Participants of the focus groups mostly justified Russia's actions by the fact that the residents of Crimea or the occupied territories could support separation from Ukraine. The justification for separatist sentiments was also voiced in regard to other regions (residents of Odesa discussed a possibility of their city's autonomy, as well as the transition of Western Ukraine to Poland). Another quite popular idea was that politicians from both Russia and Ukraine are equally guilty because of "big money," "profit," etc.

**PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE CONFLICT**

Most young Ukrainians (65%) are confident that Ukraine and Russia are at war. Only 4% disagree with this statement. The Northern part of Ukraine contains an absolute majority of those who support the statement (almost 80%), while in the East this rate is much lower, 35%. In the East, there is the greatest number of those who disagree with the statement that Ukraine and Russia are at war (9%), while in other regions, this figure does not reach 5%.

Iuliia, 25, Odesa:
**Crimea was never ours. It is an independent Republic of Crimea; they wanted to join Ukraine, they did, then they wanted to leave, and they did. Surely, they could add up some votes, but anyway I think that at least half of the residents would rather support increase in salaries and the quality of life.**

Oleksandr, 29, Odesa:
**If the Western Ukraine leaves us and joins Poland, and if the people will have a better life, why not? At least, they will have a better quality of life. They should not struggle forever. However, I consider myself Ukrainian.**

An absolute majority of young Ukrainians (68%) do not support the annexation of Crimea by Russia (see Graph 3.2). It is noteworthy that most of the questions in our poll have rather dispersed answers, which shows considerable pluralism and diversity of thoughts. Therefore, such unanimity in the assessment of the annexation of Crimea is exceptional. Only 3% strongly disagreed with this statement. There is a slight divergence in regional attitudes, but it does not affect the main trend. For example, 43% of the respondents from the East chose the "strongly agree" option, but this does not mean that the other half perceives the annexation of Crimea positively, as only 4% did not agree with the statement "I do not support the annexation of Crimea by Russia." 18% of respondents from the East chose a neutral position (choosing 3 on a 5-point scale). In the Southern region,

Graph 3.1. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: «The Russian aggressive policy towards Ukraine cannot be justified»?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Rather agree</th>
<th>Neither agree, nor disagree</th>
<th>Rather disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the attitude towards the unlawful behavior of Russia is more definite, as 58% strongly disapprove of the annexation of Crimea. The record rate, however, has been observed in the Northern region, where 85% of respondents strongly supported the statement (in the West, the respective figure is slightly lower, 77%).

Most Ukrainians are unanimous that Russia is acting unfairly by taking land from Ukraine. Overall, 67% agreed with this statement, while only 9% disagreed. Interestingly, the rate of respondents that consider such actions fair is approximately the same in all regions, both in the West and in the East (11%).

Probably, the sense of injustice is the reason why most Ukrainians consider it necessary to maintain sanctions against Russia until justice is restored. For instance, every third young Ukrainian is convinced that sanctions against Russia should be maintained until Ukraine regains territorial integrity (see Graph 3.3). An absolute minority of respondents consider the sanctions useless or groundless: the option "sanctions should have been lifted long ago" has been selected by 2%, and the option "sanctions should have not been introduced at all" is supported by only 3% of respondents. There is no gender difference in the answers to this question, with a slight exception: men choose the option "never" twice as often as women (7% vs. 4%)\(^8\). Almost every tenth (12%) young Ukrainian believes that sanctions could be lifted according to the Minsk Process, i.e. when Russia complies with the relevant requirements for settling the situation in Donbas. Similarly, nearly every tenth respondent (11%) admits that sanctions could be lifted after Putin resigns. 7% are convinced that sanctions should not be lifted until Moscow returns Crimea. Overall, there is a noticeable trend on the positive attitude of Ukrainian youth toward the sanction policy. Lifting sanctions before the restoration of territorial integrity of Ukraine takes place could lead to a dramatic disappointment among young people (although similar sentiments are also characteristic of older age groups of Ukrainian society).

There is interesting regional distribution of responses to the question about sanctions. Among all the regions, the North shows the highest rate of such popular option as the "first restoration of territorial integrity of Ukraine, and then lifting the sanctions" algorithm (53%). The option of Putin's resignation as a prerequisite for revision of the sanction policy is also quite popular in the North (15%); 18% of the youth from the Central region also supported this option. Kyiv shows the highest (compared with other regions) rate of those who assume that implementation of the Minsk Agreements would be sufficient (22%). The "never" option is the most popular in the Western region (11%), while in the Eastern region, this option is shared by only 2% of young people. In Eastern and Southern regions, we observe the largest rate of negative attitudes toward the sanctions against Russia; however, the number of those respondents is extremely low, since only 3% in the Southern region believe that sanctions should have been lifted long ago and 10% of respondents in the East believe that sanctions should have not been introduced at all. Evidently, respondents from the East were the most likely to find it hard to answer this question, as we observe relatively low level of support for virtually every option: for instance, only 10% agreed to link the revision of sanction policies to the issue of territorial integrity of Ukraine (although in other regions the respective figure ranges from 27% in the South to 53% in the North). Almost half of respondents from the Eastern region chose "don't know" or "no answer" (20% and 29% respectively) options instead.

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\(^8\) With this exception, the attitude towards Russia-Ukraine relations doesn’t vary across gender.
Most Ukrainians tend to believe that Russia has too much influence in the world. For instance, every fifth young Ukrainian strongly agrees with this statement, while almost the same number (17%) of respondents agree. A quarter of respondents chose the neutral option “3” (26%). Overall, 19% disagree with this statement.

Opinion polls conducted in Russia have long demonstrated critical attitudes of Russians toward the West, as over 70% of Russia’s citizens consider the United States, Germany, Japan, and the UK to be hostile states. Moreover, the number of those who support distancing of Russia from the West increases: 31% last year, compared to a twice lower rate in 2013. 54% of Russians still believe that their country should strengthen mutually beneficial relations with the countries of the West. In this context, it is interesting to look at the perceptions of young Ukrainians, whether they agree that Russia should position itself as the opposition to the West. In fact, 30% disagree with this statement, while only 10% strongly agree with it. Evidently, there is no rigid binary perception of “Russia against the West” among Ukrainians, a significant portion of them believe in the interaction between the two parties. Interestingly, the respondents from Northern Ukraine, who are mostly very critical toward Russia, show the highest rate (36%) of those who disagree that Russia and the West should oppose each other. Even in the East and the South, the respective figures are much lower (12% and 11%).

A popular opinion among the respondents is that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is profitable for political elites, and responsibility for it is often placed upon Ukrainian authorities. This explanation was evident from focus groups from different regions. To explain the conflict, respondents often resort to conspiracy theories or speculations: “there could be certain arrangements,” “it seemed that Crimea was just given up, like it was lost in a poker game.” Quite often, respondents were lost in their own interpretations: first they place full responsibility for the conflict upon Ukraine, and then mention some unknown mercenaries in the occupied territories, thus countering the opinion they expressed before.

**CONFLICT SETTLEMENT BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA**

Most young Ukrainians (61%) believe that Russia is responsible for the current armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine (see Graph 3.4). Ukraine is blamed by only 5%. Many respondents were unable to answer this question: 21% chose the option “hard to answer,” and 7% did not answer at all. In the North and the West, almost 80% consider Russia guilty, while in the South and the East this figure is much lower (36% and 22%); however, respondents from Southern and Eastern regions do not tend to blame Ukraine (only 6% of respondents in the South and 13% in the East). On the other hand, it should be noted that the South and the East demonstrate the greatest numbers of those who did not answer this question (51% and 58%).

**Graph 3.4. Who has greater responsibility for escalation of the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Both (Ukraine and Russia)</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Hard to answer</th>
<th>Can’t answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hanna, 22, Odesa: Ukrainian government is responsible. They are dividing the powers in regions and districts among themselves to make more money and take it without any problem.

Oleksandr, 29, Kharkiv: I think it is geopolitics. One side is NATO, the other side is Russia. And we are stuck in the middle.

Khrystyna, 27, Chernihiv: Ukrainian government is probably guilty. When the first wave hit Crimea, it seemed like it was lost in a poker game. It was there, and now it’s not. Surrender. Pass. Well, perhaps, there was some Russian influence. Probably, not perhaps, but definitely, because there could have been some agreements, and they are still in place.

Viacheslav, 23, Kharkiv: They are all guilty. The Government of Ukraine, the Government of Russia. In fact, they will earn colossal money, while the boys die or return home without arms or legs. Utilization of Russian weapons costs huge money.

Kynylo, 21, Kharkiv: We should do something with people who launder money through the war. No more money means no more war.

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Respondents from different regions showed a peculiar unanimity when evaluating the statement that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia has been triggered only by the politicians, while ordinary citizens have nothing to do with it. Overall, this opinion is supported by 41% (West) to 74% (Kyiv) respondents; at the same time, this interpretation of the conflict is supported by 45% in the East, 52% in the Center, 59% in the South, and 62% in the North. This is a rare case where the West and the East are united, as their results are virtually identical. The same applies to the South and the North, as their results not only do not show any differences, unlike in other cases, but also demonstrate complete solidarity. Negative attitudes of the citizens toward the politicians seems to open the largest window of opportunity for internal dialogue and elimination of mutual distrust or prejudice, revealed by answers to other questions.

Most young Ukrainians believe that the conflict with Russia can only be settled after Russia returns Crimea and withdraws the military forces from Donbas. Overall, this statement is supported by 56%, while only 9% disagree. Even in the East, the rate of those who disagree is only 10%. Due to respondents from the East and partly from the South, the portion of those who support this statement is less than it could be: for instance, without the Eastern and Southern regions, overall 64% of respondents support this vision of conflict resolution. In the East, the respective figure is 27%, and in the South, it is 47%.

Every fourth young Ukrainian either strongly agrees (11%) or rather agrees (14%) that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia can only be resolved by force. 32% of respondents disagree with this statement. 21% admit the possibility of the use of force as a conflict resolution tool (the middle option, “3”). On the average, 30% support resolution by force: in the North, this figure reaches 34%, which is higher than in other regions, while the East shows the lowest number of those who consider conflict resolution by force acceptable (14%).

Most participants of the focus groups opposed military resolution of the conflict. Respondents accepted the idea of separation of the occupied territories for peace in the entire country. However, such assumptions often led to controversy: “who to negotiate with,” “what if Russia makes further territorial claims” etc. It was easy for the respondents to find arguments against the military scenario, but only a few could come up with recommendations on further actions to settle the conflict (we did not take into account such general suggestions as “stop stealing”).
Only 19% agree with the statement that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia can only be resolved at the expense of compromises to Russia. 23% of respondents chose the neutral position, suggesting equivalent arguments for and against this statement. 37% of respondents do not support such a vision of conflict resolution. On the one hand, it is evident that such actions of Ukraine will not be perceived positively by a very significant number of young people, over a third of respondents. However, the survey also showed a rather high rate of those who do not believe in any settlement other than through compromises. Here, obviously, there are different explanations: on the one hand, respondents may consider Ukraine responsible for triggering the conflict; on the other hand, such respondents could attribute themselves to the realists, believing that Russia cannot be brought to compromise, although the Kremlin is responsible for the conflict, and therefore, Ukraine will have no other choice but to make concessions.

The focus group confirmed that self-criticism prevails among Ukrainian youth along with skepticism and criticism toward Ukrainian authorities. However, criticism toward Ukraine does not mean approval of Russia’s actions. Only a few of respondents believed in Ukraine’s ability to defend their position.

We observe a rather controversial dispersion of opinions on this issue in the Eastern regions of Ukraine: 8% of respondents strongly agree with the statement that Ukraine should make concessions to Russia, which is little different from the respective figures in other regions, as the West shows the same rate. However, the option “strongly disagree” has not been favored by respondents from the East (only 8%), while in the North, for instance, the respective figure is 50%. Young people from the East preferred to avoid this question, as over 30% could not answer.

There is a significant discrepancy in the young Ukrainians’ opinions regarding Ukraine’s efforts to settle the conflict. 28% believe that Ukraine makes sufficient efforts, but 32% disagree with it, while another 24% cannot decide. The regional picture is even more diverse: Ukraine’s efforts are evaluated with the highest score by respondents from the North (54%), while the West (34%) and Kyiv (27%) show lower level of support, and Central, Southern, and Eastern regions are even less supportive (17%, 18%, and 21% respectively). Interestingly, most of respondents who are critical toward Ukraine’s peace-building efforts reside in Kyiv (47%) and in the Center (42%). In the East, the rate of those who are dissatisfied with Ukraine’s efforts to resolve the conflict is about the same as in the West (26% and 32% respectively).

The interview conducted in the focus group showed noticeable simplification of the reasons for certain phenomena: mostly it comes down to financial reasons (“it’s all about the money” or “it’s money laundering”), or the calls for change of power, as “this would contribute to the settlement of the conflict.” Almost none of the focus group participants from different regions looked beyond those reasons.

When evaluating Russia’s efforts to settle the conflict with Ukraine, young Ukrainians were rather unanimous. Only 8% agreed that Russia is making sufficient efforts, while 58% of young Ukrainians do not agree with this statement. Moreover, the rate of those who positively assess the peaceful efforts of Russia is close to zero in virtually all regions of Ukraine.

Most young Ukrainians tend to consider the statement regarding the existence of separatist movements in Eastern regions a fabrication of Russian propaganda. Although there is a peculiar variety of responses to this statement, it is rather obvious that very few young Ukrainians did not support it. Only 8% strongly disagree with it. In contrast, 29% strongly agreed, while another 16% chose option “2,” which also means consent; therefore, overall, almost half (45%) of Ukrainian youth believe that Ukrainian separatism is the product of Russian information warfare. Every fifth young Ukrainian, however, chose the neutral option “3.” The regional distribution follows the trend noted in other questions: respondents...
Graph 3.8. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

«Russia is doing enough to settle the conflict with Ukraine?»

No answer

Don't know

Neither agree, nor disagree

Rather disagree

Rather agree

Strongly agree

Strongly disagree

63% (in the South) chose the neutral option "3," which means that about every fourth respondent does not agree with the statement, while in the North, only 14% disagreed with it. We suggest comparing the rate of respondents from the Western region who fear for their lives because of the conflict is almost 20% lower than the respective figure in the North (41% vs. 60%).

Most young people do not feel sympathy for those who are fighting against the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Eastern regions. 52% show absolutely no support; 10% would rather not support them, and only 6% expressed their support. In the Eastern and Southern regions, the level of non-acceptance of the struggle against the Ukrainian Army is slightly lower (32% in the East and 42% in the South), which is not comparable with 75% in Kyiv or 69% in the North. The East and the South also show the highest rate of those convinced of the propaganda nature of separatism than in the North (35% vs. 32%). In the North, respondents were more likely to choose the neutral option "3" than in other regions (34%), which obviously confirms the validity of the statement, but does not rule out the fact that certain portion of residents of the East still oppose being a part of Ukraine.

A similar picture is observed in the case of the statement "I fear for my life because of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea." 26% of respondents in the Eastern region agree with this statement, while in the North, the respective figure is twice as high (60%). Every fourth respondent in the East did not support the statement, while in the North, only 14% disagreed with it. We suggest comparing the East with the North, and not with the West, since the Northern region shows greater difference. For example, the rate of respondents from the Western region who fear for their lives because of the conflict is almost 20% lower than the respective figure in the North (41% vs. 60%).

THE ROLE OF THIRD STATES IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

Overall, Ukrainian youth react rather positively than negatively to the third parties contributing to the resolution of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, some young people have positive attitudes toward not only assistance, but also intervention in relations. For instance, 37% of respondents did not agree with the statement that "NATO and other states should not intervene into Russian-Ukrainian relations," while 23% agreed, which means that about every fourth respondent opposes any intervention; however, it is almost twice as low as the rate of those who are more
loyal toward the intervention by the Western states. Another 18% chose a neutral position, seeing arguments both for and against such an intervention. Given the following clarifying questions, we could assume that Ukrainian youth generally have a positive attitude toward intervention aimed at reconciliation between the two sides, while reacting negatively to any intervention in other cases.

In general, young Ukrainians find it hard to answer the question regarding their evaluation of the West’s support in the settlement of Ukrainian-Russian conflict. Most respondents chose a neutral position (the medium score, “3”). Overall, 36% did not support either the maximum positive or the maximum negative position.

However, it is evident that the smallest portion of respondents (only 5%) preferred the option with the highest, most favorable assessment, while the remaining options had 10-12%. For instance, the most negative option (“I don’t think that the West supports Ukraine”) has been chosen by 12% of respondents, about every tenth. Regional differences are not significant, but still noticeable. Although the neutral option (“3”) retained leadership in most regions, there were certain deviations in the South, where respondents were less likely to choose the median option (only 23%), while the same portion chose the most negative answer. Therefore, we can assume that one in five respondents from the South is critical toward the West’s support. In the Eastern region, by the way, the respective figure (14%) is within the nationwide “norm” (compared with 13% in the Center and 10% in the North). The North shows a distinctive difference, as its residents did not support an extremely negative option, but chose the option “4,” which is the closest to the negative option (23%). Respondents from the North were the least likely to choose the approval option (only 1%). The Western region, which hypothetically should have been more optimistic, confirms the negative option trend, although it does not fall into the extreme negative that is noticeable in the responses of participants from the North and the South. 9% approve of the West’s support, 40% selected the option “3,” and only 5% lean to the most critical option, suggesting that the role of the West is minimal.

Only 15% of young Ukrainians believe that the West is doing enough to resolve the conflict, 38% of respondents are more critical toward the role of the Western states, and 29% chose a neutral position (evidently, they see important steps made by the West, but they do not consider them sufficient). The West’s efforts were evaluated as inadequate mostly in Northern Ukraine (51% of respondents), but in other regions, respective figures are also significant: about 40% in all regions except the East (24%, however, this region showed the highest rate of those who could not answer the question).

There are twofold impressions about the West’s efforts: on the one hand, young people are skeptical toward them and consider them insufficient or dictated by the dependence of Western countries on Russia, while on the other hand, respondents hope that the West could help improve the situation in Ukraine. There are also opinions close to the Russian narrative that the West, on the contrary, is interested in the conflict, and Ukraine is a test ground for the showdown with Russia.

When evaluating the efforts of Germany and France (participants of the Normandy Format), respondents confirmed the opinions expressed in their answers to the previous question. 19% consider the efforts of Berlin and Paris sufficient, while 35% disagree with this statement.

THE VALUES OF RUSSIANS AND UKRAINIANS

There is no dominant opinion among Ukrainian youth on the difference between the values of Russians and Ukrainians. The results of the poll are rather dispersed: roughly a third of Ukrainian young people consider the values of the two nations incompatible (29% overall), 27% chose the middle option, believing that

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**Graph 3.9. How do you assess the Western support to conflict settlement in Ukraine? (5 – The West supports Ukraine as much as possible; 1 – I don’t think the West supports Ukraine)**
the values of the two peoples are partly divergent and partly consistent, and almost a third (27%) believe that the values of the two nations are rather similar. The middle option (somewhat compatible and somewhat incompatible values) dominates in all regions, reaching the maximum of 34% in Kyiv. The East demonstrates the highest rate of those who believe that the values of the two countries are compatible (27%). However, in Kyiv this indicator is also relatively high, as every fifth citizen of Kyiv considers the values of the two nations compatible (27%). In any case, this question did not lead to any polarization of opinions among the respondents.

Similarly, young Ukrainians could not take a definitive position regarding the statement that "Many Ukrainians feel more involved with Russia than with Ukraine." On the one hand, every fourth respondent (23%) strongly disagrees with this statement; if we add those who simply disagree, this figure will reach 36%.

Certainly, this figure is larger than the number of those who agree with the statement (22% either strongly agree or agree). Another 20% chose a medium position, which reflects the major trend that young people avoid radical simplifications and try to find more nuanced opinion to assess the situation more accurately. Obviously, this is the very reason why we observe such a "scattered" palette of opinions.

When asked to evaluate the statement "I would have problems to move to a region where many Russians are living" over a third of young Ukrainians (33%) answered affirmatively. 24% disagreed with this statement, and 25% chose the neutral position. The results also show fragmentation of opinions; naturally, the highest rate of those who would not want to live among the Russians is observed in the West (56%) and in the North (52%). In the South and the East, this statement is supported by absolute minority (10% and 11% respectively).

One third of young Ukrainians could not define their attitudes toward the dissolution of the Soviet Union: 22% found it difficult to answer this question, and 12% simply did not answer. However, there is a noticeable trend on approval of this event, as 20% refer to this fact as "very positive" and another 14% view it as "positive," while the neutral option has been chosen by 19%. The negative opinion has been shared by small number of respondents, as 7% chose "4," which shows a negative attitude in this poll, while "very negative" attitudes has been observed in only 6%. It is also worth noting that the younger Ukrainians are, the more difficult it is for them to answer this question: the youngest generation that knows about the events of 1991 only from history textbooks or stories of their relatives is not burdened with any emotions regarding the USSR. For example, only 9% of Ukrainians in the 25-29 age group did not answer this question, while respondents from the 14-17 group were twice as likely to choose this option (20%), while a broader range of respondents from younger age groups (26% of the 14-17 group and 27% of the 18-20 one) found it hard to answer.

The regional distribution revealed another trend: respondents from the South and the East were much more likely to choose the options "hard to answer" or "can’t answer." In the South, the total number of such respondents is 51%, and in the East the respective figure is 40%. As expected, the Western region demonstrated the highest rate of positive responses to the collapse of the USSR (36%). In the rest of the regions, the neutral option ("3") dominates within the range of 20-25%: this option has been chosen by 24% of respondents in the East, by 25% in the Center, by 22%, in the North, with a little lower rate of 18% in the South. Negative response to the collapse of the USSR has been demonstrated by more or less the same number of respondents in all regions, and this figure never exceeds 10%. The ten-point maximum has been reached in the East, while in the North, the West, and the Center, the respective figures don’t reach 5%.
On the other hand, the East and the South set records on the "silence camp", i.e. "don’t know" and "no answer" options. We could assume that respondents (in certain cases, over 50%) have not yet processed the recent changes, have difficulty accepting the new reality, and therefore are still formulating their assessments. There is also an opinion that respondents do not want to demonstrate their views, fearing the unfavorable reaction of their environment. In the East, one can equally fear to express opinions if they sympathize with Russia (as it does not correspond with the "official line" of the state), as well as if they are critical of Moscow’s actions (as such an opinion may go against the supposedly pro-Russian discourse of the East). Overall, we observed a high level of distrust and frustration: frustration regarding the powerlessness of Ukraine in defending the national interests, and distrust toward the politicians and the media that inform about the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

Conclusion

Among the opinions of the younger generation, we observe a rather broad plurality of views regarding various issues concerning relations between Ukraine and Russia. Virtually a third of young Ukrainians responded to various questions with the middle option ("3"). This fact, probably, emphasizes the respondents' willingness to avoid polarization.

However, there are noticeable regional differences in the perception of events around the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Sometimes, the youth of the West and the East demonstrate a unique unity: for example, when blaming politicians for triggering the conflict between the two countries. Among the explanations of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the most popular option is financial interests of political elites of the two states. We also observe regional unity in evaluation of the efforts of various actors to settle the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. The youth of the East and the West are unanimous in very negative assessment of Russia’s efforts to end the conflict. Furthermore, Ukrainians of both the East and the West have negative attitudes regarding the annexation of Crimea.
According to a poll conducted in 2015 among young people aged 14-35, 67% of Ukrainian youth were completely satisfied or rather satisfied with their education, while 14% were disappointed. As shown by our research, 72% are satisfied or very satisfied with their education, but only 44% of young Ukrainians are satisfied with the quality of education in Ukraine in general, and only one third believe that Ukrainian education meets the needs of the modern labor market. For comparison, according to the Eurobarometer poll of 2014, 73% of young people in the EU agreed that their education provided them with the skills they needed to find jobs in line with their qualifications.

Furthermore, in 2016 59% of young people in the EU stated that their national education systems were adapted to the modern labor market.

Education in Ukraine is considered to be riddled with corruption. Unfairness of the education system is manifested at all levels, especially in higher education. For instance, according to opinion poll conducted in 2013, over 80% of Ukrainians believed corruption existed in secondary schools and 90% thought the same about higher education institutions in Ukraine.

The introduction of the External Independent Testing (EIT) system as the main criterion for admission to higher education institutions in 2008 has led to certain positive changes, and perceptions of the availability of education have changed significantly. According to a poll conducted by the Civil Network OPORA in 2016, 90% of test participants trust the EIT system.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) named the EIT a Ukrainian success story. According to another poll conducted in 2015, 76% of students support the system of admission to higher education institutions based on the EIT results.

However, it was not possible to fully overcome corruption in Ukrainian universities: according to a poll conducted in 2015, 34% of students directly encountered corruption, and another 26% heard about it from their peers.

In addition to corruption, another problem of Ukrainian educational system is the poor quality of services. According to the CEDOS research, the main problem of the school system in Ukraine is inequality between rural and urban population in terms of higher education. Furthermore, performance of students is influenced by their financial situation, including family income. Results of the EIT show that rural school students have lower grades than students from cities, and the best results are recorded among students from the capital. 29% of the EIT participants believe that school knowledge is not enough to pass the testing, and 7% of those believe that this knowledge is not enough even for obtaining minimum scores; thus, parents often have to hire tutors at their own expense. Consequently, the quality of school education in Ukraine is directly dependent on the social and economic environment of children.

As for higher education, a public opinion poll conducted in 2013 showed that among all violations of student rights, violations of the right for quality education is the top one. 62% of respondents stated that educational services are not compliant with current standards, 60% named lack of material, technical, financial, and other provision of the universities, while 52% complained about lack or formal nature of practice.

Despite this, most students still strive for higher education. 83% of respondents believe that special knowledge and expertise are important factors in finding a job, while 76% think the same of the level of education. On the other hand, young people do not underestimate the importance of connections for employment: relations and connections are considered among the top 3 factors with key roles in job search, along with experience and the level of education.

The rate of youth (under 35) unemployment in Ukraine is 22.8%. For comparison, the rate of youth (25-29) unemployment in the EU is 19.7%. Out of those young Ukrainians who do have jobs, slightly more than a half (56%) are satisfied with them, while 5% are dissatisfied (the rest chose a neutral option or provided no answer).

Key findings

- Young Ukrainians are mostly dissatisfied with the quality of education in Ukraine: only one third (33%) believes that education and educational institutions in Ukraine meet the needs of the modern labor market.

- Young people tend to have a better opinion about their own education (education, which...

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40 To Which Extent is Corruption Widespread in the Following Spheres? Opinion poll. http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll/poll_50093


44 Ibid.

45 I. Samokhin. Demographic Crisis and Inequality in Ukrainian Education System: Analysis of the New Database "School Map of Ukraine". https://cedos.org.ua/edustat/graph


they received, including trainings, self education etc.) (72% are satisfied with their education) than about education in Ukraine in general (only 44% are satisfied with its quality).

- Less than a half of respondents (37%) participated in workshops or internships during their studies.
- Almost one in five young Ukrainians (21%) studied or would like to study abroad.
- Young people believe that employment primarily requires special knowledge and experience (83%), and connections (79%).
- When choosing a job, most young people are looking for income (96% consider it important, and 82% of them consider it very important), while the least important factors are as follows: an opportunity to do something valuable for the society (72% consider it important, and only 38% of them consider it very important) and work with people (68% consider it important, and 42% of them consider it very important).
- Only 15% of Ukrainian youth believe that using connections to find employment can never be justified, 82% believe that this is justifiable to a bigger or lesser extent.
- Slightly more than half of young Ukrainians (56%) are satisfied with their jobs, 5% are dissatisfied (the rest chose a neutral position or provided no answer).

**ATTITUDES TOWARD EDUCATION**

This poll has been conducted among respondents from a variety of educational levels, from incomplete secondary school bachelors and masters. A quarter (26%) of young people aged 25-29 have bachelor’s degrees, another 29% have specialist/master’s degrees, and 28% acquired vocational education. 71% of this age group do not plan to continue their studies. Among those who have not yet received higher education, 18% plan to obtain a master’s degree, 14% specialist degree, 7% bachelor’s degree, and 2% PhD.

Focus group participants pointed out that many young people do not want to spend time studying if they have already found a job with a good salary and can simply attend advanced training courses or master a new profession.

Most young Ukrainians think that education in Ukraine in general is worse than the education they received (including trainings, self education etc.). For instance, less than half of Ukrainians (44%) are satisfied with the quality of education in Ukraine, including 12% of those who are very satisfied. This indicator is virtually independent of the age of the respondent. The East of Ukraine is the least satisfied with the quality of Ukrainian education (about 10% less than in other regions). However, when it comes to their own education, the figures are higher. For example, most young Ukrainians (72%) are satisfied with the level of their knowledge (33% of them are very satisfied), while only 4% are completely dissatisfied.

Many participants of the focus groups explained that education rather provides a “paper” (diploma) than proper skills required for their future jobs.

Dissatisfaction with education is explained by corruption, lack of good practice and innovation in education, and unnecessary courses that are not related to the respective specializations.

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Khrystyna, 27, Chernihiv:
**Basically, things I’ve been taught at the university are not applied in normal life, since all that knowledge is very ethereal and impractical.**

Valerii, 25, Chernihiv:
**We studied programming. But how can one study the material that was developed 20 years ago? Who needs it at all? Every year, everything is developing, every year it is necessary to redevelop the program. There is no reason to study those things.**

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**Graph 4.1.** What is your highest education level completed so far?

**Graph 4.2.** Do you think that in Ukraine, training, school and university education are well adapted or not to the current job market?

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54 Results of the focus group in Chernihiv, October 13, 2017.
55 Results of the focus group in Odesa, October 13, 2017.
Results of the focus group in Chernihiv, October 13, 2017.

56 Results of the focus group in Chernihiv, October 13, 2017.

57 Results of the focus group in Odesa, October 13, 2017.

Focus group participants noted that only a few people see the point in the second higher education, preferring courses and online educational resources, with better price-quality rate[56].

Less than half of respondents (37%) participated in workshops or internships during their studies. Among the older age group (21-29), about 45% had internships. Focus group data show both awareness of the need for quality internships to acquire the experience required for employment and the skepticism toward the internships offered by higher education institutions.

**Corruption in the Educational System**

Another explanation of the depreciation of education by young people could be their own experience of bribery in higher education institutions. Over a half of Ukrainians (62%) believe that there are cases where grades and exams are purchased in higher education institutions of Ukraine. The highest rates of those who agree with this statement is observed in the North (58%) and in the East (44%). In other regions of Ukraine, the respective figures vary from 27% (Kiyiv) to 37% (Central Ukraine).

The existence of corruption was also confirmed by participants of the focus groups. Some of them stated that corruption is voluntary, i.e. students can take the exams or pay for them if they have no time or desire to study. Some argue that corruption has been an integral part of their academic process in the university, as they had to pay for their grades even if they possessed sufficient knowledge and could pass the exams[57].

Most (72%) young Ukrainians have never studied abroad and do not seek foreign education or training. 17% would like to study abroad, while 5% have this experience (2% of them had it during their higher education). Moreover, the older the respondents are, the less they want to study abroad. In the academic year of 2015/2016, at least 68,000 Ukrainian citizens were studying abroad, according to CEDOS. Most of them were in Poland, Germany, Russia, Canada, Italy, Czech Republic, USA, Spain, Austria, France, and Hungary[58].

Focus group participants stated that it is often necessary to pay a bribe to get a job.
Overall, young Ukrainians believe that the keys to finding a job are special knowledge and experience (83%), and relations and connections (79%). Other important factors are the level of education (76%) and luck (72%). According to respondents, education and working experience abroad (36%), place of birth (32%), and membership in a political party (20%) are considerably less important. It is noteworthy that Kyiv shows the lowest rate of those who believe that place of birth is very important for employment (6%). For instance, in other regions of Ukraine, the respective figures exceed 14%.

15% of Ukrainian youth believe that using connections to find employment can never be justified, 82% think it is justifiable to a bigger or lesser extent The highest level of tolerance toward using connections to find employment is observed among the residents of Eastern and Central regions, and Kyiv (5%, 7%, and 10% of respondents respectively believe that such actions can never be justified). Residents of Northern Ukraine are the most intolerant toward using connections to find employment (27% of respondents totally disapproved of this).

HOW DO YOUNG PEOPLE CHOOSE THEIR JOBS?

When choosing a job, young people are guided primarily by economic considerations. Among the factors that young Ukrainians consider the most important when choosing a job, the top one is income (96% consider it important), and the least important are the opportunity to do something valuable to the society (72% consider it important, and only 38% consider it very important) and working with people (68% consider it important, and 42% of them consider it very important). Other key factors that influence the employment choices are job security (94%), having the feeling of achieving something (84%), career opportunities (82%), and working coworkers you like (82%).

Career opportunities are of greatest importance for the residents of Kyiv (71% consider it important, while in other regions the respective figures vary from 41% to 62%).

YOUTH EMPLOYMENT: THE REAL PICTURE

Two thirds of young people (64%) aged 18-29 work, but only 42% have a full-time contract. 10% currently have no job, but are looking for it,
while 19% don’t have a job and are not looking for it. In the older age group (25-29), the rate of unemployment is lower: 6% are searching for a job, while 12% do not have a job and are not actively looking for it.

On average, respondents aged 22-29 (i.e., those who could have already completed higher education), got their first temporary job at 18, while their first permanent employment started at 20.

According to participants of the focus groups, those respondents who are not looking for a job and are no longer studying live at the expense of their parents or partners (“they just don’t want to work and take responsibility”)

Overall, slightly more than half of young Ukrainians (56%) are satisfied with their jobs, while 5% are dissatisfied. Half of young Ukrainians work in their profession or in a job quite close to their profession. 37% do not work in their profession. The lowest rates of respondents working in their profession are recorded in Kyiv, the West, and the East (21%). Slightly over a half of young Ukrainians (56%) have jobs that require the same level of education they have (among the population aged 25-29, the respective figure is 59%). One in five young Ukrainians has a job that requires lower level of education than they have.

Most Ukrainian young people (71%) work in the private sector, while almost one fifth (17%) is employed in the public sector. Most of the public employees reside in the North (25%), and the lowest rate of those is recorded in Kyiv (11%).

7% of respondents work in the non-governmental sector. Almost one in ten (9%) respondent aged 25-29 works in the civil society sector. The number of people working in the non-governmental sector is very different in various regions of Ukraine. The East shows the highest share of young people working in NGOs, compared to other regions, probably due to increase in their numbers after Russian aggression. In the West and the North, the lowest number of young people are working in the non-governmental sector.

Conclusions

Although most young Ukrainians (72%) are satisfied with their own education, less than a half (44%) are satisfied with the education system in general. This discrepancy is explained by the fact that the poor quality of education can be compensated only through self-education, additional training, and courses, including ones taken during work. Therefore, only one third of Ukrainian youth believes that education system in Ukraine meets the current conditions of the labor market.
Low appreciation of the education system among Ukrainian youth reflects not the appreciation of knowledge as such, but rather the low esteem of the higher education system that fails to meet the labor market demands and is riddled by corruption. Although the EIT system was introduced nearly 10 years ago to avoid corruption during admission to the universities, over a half of young Ukrainians believe that there are cases of buying grades in the higher education institutions: 39% of respondents strongly agree with this statement and 23% agree with it. This data has been confirmed by the participants of the focus groups.

On the other hand, young people believe that special knowledge and skills are vital to find a job (83%). However, they do not underestimate the importance of connections (79%). The key factor for choosing a job, according to young Ukrainians, is income. Overall, only a half of young Ukrainians are satisfied with their jobs, and one in five young Ukrainians has a job that requires lower level of education than they have.

Introduction

A mixture of personal, social, economic, and cultural factors has been identified as drivers for emigration. These factors could be grouped in three main clusters: physical and social security; self-development, including desire to grow in terms of knowledge and skills; and materialism, which implies financial well-being. A commonly used indicator developed by the United Nations Development Programme, the Human Development Index, i.e. a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and income, is most frequently cited when assessing an average well-being in a country. In 2016, Ukraine ranked 84th of 188 countries (to compare, Ukraine’s neighbor Poland ranked 34th and Georgia was 70th). Ukraine’s GDP, despite improvement in 2016, has showed significant decrease between 2011 and 2015 (see Graph 6.1), while real wages have been decreasing since 2012 until recovery in 2016 (see Graph 6.2).


Ukrainian “Generation Z”: Attitudes and Values

is ranked 132nd of 155 countries in terms of happiness of their citizens61.

What does it mean for Ukraine? The migration picture looks the following way: the conflict in Eastern Ukraine triggered political and economic relocation of resources which affected configuration of migration, especially within the country62. However, according to the official data, net emigration rates have been decreasing in Ukraine (see Graph 6.3). As the graph shows, the number of emigrants for the past years have been decreasing, although it still exceeds the number of immigrants. According to CIA World Factbook, it is expected that in 2017 net migration in Ukraine will amount to nil.

Graph 6.3. Net migration figures

Graph 6.1. Ukraine GDP annual growth rate (%)62

Graph 6.2. Average annual wage in Ukraine (%)63

Although since the beginning of the conflict the number of trips to Russia has been decreasing

the number of trips to the EU continued growing, according to State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.

Moreover, labor emigration is extremely common in Ukraine and is on the rise. For instance, labor migration to Poland, the second main destination for Ukrainians, has been immensely increasing in the past years, from 200 000 in 2013 to 1,3 mln in 201667.

Is it good or bad news for Ukraine? Emigration, including labor emigration, positively affects unemployment rates in Ukraine and accounts for a significant share of household income; however, it also causes loss of population of high education level and the most active age, and negatively affects demographics68. As a result, Ukraine may face workforce deficit by 202069.

The objective of this section is to examine perception of well-being and intention of emigration among Ukrainian youth. Multiple factors are examined, including satisfaction with education and financial situation, expectations regarding personal future and future of the entire country, and perception of security; including experience of discrimination and desire to leave the country.

However, well-being is defined not only by objective factors, but even more importantly by subjective assessment of the quality of life64. The World Happiness Report 2017 published by the UN shows an even gloomier picture, as Ukraine

Key findings

» About one in three young people thinks that they have less money than their peers;
» 83% of youth are generally satisfied with their life, 72% are satisfied with their education, and only a half (56%) is satisfied with their jobs (5% are dissatisfied and the rest chose a neutral mark or didn’t answer);
» 71% of Ukrainian youth express optimism about their personal future; 58% express optimism about future of Ukrainian society, while 37% believe that economic situation in the country will improve during the next 10 years;
» Youth in the Eastern region are less optimistic about their future (only 54% of the youth in the East expect improvement in contrast to 86% in the North and less satisfied with their life than the youth in any other region of Ukraine (30% expect improvement there in contrast to 76% in the North). Young people in the East are also the least optimistic about Ukraine’s economic situation in the future, with only 30% expecting improvement and 45% expecting either deterioration or status quo;
» Corruption and war in the region or in the world are the main concerns for young population;
» Over nine in ten respondents stated that they have never been discriminated against based on their sexual orientation, regional origin, spoken language, social engagement, political views, or gender. 18% of youth experienced discrimination due to their economic background;

61 Source: State Statistics Survey of Ukraine
64 Source: World Statistics Survey of Ukraine
67 Poland hopes to benefit from surge of migrants from Ukraine. Financial Times, 28.05.2017 https://www.ft.com/content/d3afbe-fb07-11e7-a389-501c6f75ee8c
72% of youth stated that they have no desire to emigrate, while 25% expressed certain desire;

One in five respondents considering moving abroad would stay there for lifetime, which makes up 5% of the entire Ukrainian youth;

Primary motivators for relocation to another country are improvement of the quality of life and higher salaries;

The most desired destinations for those who are willing to relocate (23% altogether) to another country are Germany (18%), USA (15%), and Poland (12%).

HAPPINESS AND SATISFACTION WITH LIFE

To examine the relative financial situation of youngsters in Ukraine, young people were asked to assess the amount of money they have for personal needs compared to other Ukrainians of the same age. 41% of youth think that they have similar amount of money as other people of their age. Every third respondent (33%) thinks that they have less money than other young Ukrainians, while 15% of Ukrainians consider themselves better off.

There is no gender difference in this perception; however, young people aged 14-20 are more likely to feel that they have less money for their personal needs (about 40%), while the respective figures for older youth groups are lower. This research also shows that young people who think that they have more money for personal needs than their peers are more likely to live in Kyiv.

Graph 6.4. In comparison to people of your age in Ukraine: how much money do you have for your personal needs?

In terms of the actual consumption capacity the picture is even gloomier. Only 1% of the respondents felt that they can afford buying a car or an accommodation. Every fifth (21%) respondent admitted having barely enough money to pay the bills and buy food, while half of the Ukrainian youth (53%) have enough money for shoes and clothes but not for more expensive purchases, like a TV or a fridge.

To examine satisfaction with life, young people were asked to evaluate their satisfaction with their education, job, and life in general.

This research shows that over four fifths of young Ukrainians are relatively satisfied (45%) or very satisfied (38%) with their life in general. Furthermore, high share of young population (72%) are satisfied with their education, while every second young Ukrainian is satisfied with their job (56%).

Comparison of satisfaction levels in terms of geographical location shows that the highest level of satisfaction with their education is observed in Central Ukraine (79%), while the lowest figure is recorded in the East (60%). Young Ukrainians in Kyiv, Southern and Western Ukraine tend to be more satisfied with their jobs than their peers in Northern and Eastern Ukraine, whereas the level satisfaction with life in general remains high in all regions, although it is lower in Eastern Ukraine (71%) than in any other region (between 81% and 86%).

A good country for living, according to participants of the focus groups, is a country where citizens are protected and supported by the state, in particular, in terms of employment, a country with low crime rate and high standards of living. Ukraine, according to unanimous opinion of participants of Odesa focus group, does not comply with the definition of a good country for living. While naming numerous problems and criticizing the authorities, they stated that ideas of emigration are popular among the youth who...
seek a better life. On the other hand, different focus groups showed regional differences in terms of emigration, as in the South, the ideas of emigration are more popular than in the North.

In Chernihiv, the focus group participants evaluated Ukraine as a place for a happy life more positively and did not express clearly negative assessments of the situation in the country.

Valentyna, 29:
Here, when you graduate from the institute, acquire a higher education, you don’t have any guarantee to find a job in your specialization and in normal sphere.

Valentyna:
Or get more money. In normal, developed countries, if you become an engineer, you automatically earn 500 dollars more.

Moderator:
So, the guarantee of having a job after acquiring higher education?

Valentyna:
Yes, after higher education. And some kind of prestige of this job. You will no longer work as a vendor with an institute diploma.

Serhii, 18:
There is a social package, normal job with normal schedule. Normal state.

Valentyna:
There is a social package, normal job with normal schedule. Normal state.

Moderator:
Is Ukraine such a country?

Valentyna:
Even Ukraine is. If I achieve something by myself, I will be able to live well in Ukraine. If I have such an opportunity, I will be able to live normally in any country.

Maksym, 24, Chernihiv:
It is possible to live normally in Ukraine if you earn enough. You can have a pretty good life. There are private clinics, organizations. If something happens, in general, you have to pay everywhere - abroad or in Ukraine - to cure anything serious.

Valentyna:
Or get more money. In normal, developed countries, if you become an engineer, you automatically earn 500 dollars more.

Moderator (Odesa):
How do you imagine a good country for a happy life?

Hanna, 22:
A happy country is the one where you can develop and earn as much money as you want. I mean, it does not matter to me, in general, which country it is.

Moderator:
To me, a happy country is the one where I can develop and earn as much money as I want. I mean, it does not matter to me, in general, which country it is.

Moderator:
So, the guarantee of having a job after acquiring higher education?

Valentyna:
Yes, after higher education. And some kind of prestige of this job. You will no longer work as a vendor with an institute diploma.

Most young Ukrainians remain optimistic about their personal future. 71% of Ukrainian youth think that in 10 years their personal future will be better than now, while only 1% expect worsening. Gender does not make a difference in terms of expectations, as young Ukrainians tend to be more optimistic, compared to older age groups. Comparison by geographical location shows important differences. Although the level of optimism is generally high in almost all regions, it is much lower in Eastern (54%) and Southern (62%) Ukraine, compared to other regions (between 70% and 86%). Accordingly, almost every third respondent in Eastern Ukraine (29%) thinks that their personal future will remain the same as their present in the next 10 years.

FEARS AND CONCERNS OF YOUNG UKRAINIANS

Young Ukrainians were asked to express their fears or concerns in relation to several parameters. These parameters included: being a victim of physical violence, getting robbed, getting seriously ill, being unemployed, terrorist attacks, war in the region or in the world, pollution and climate change, increasing poverty, influx of migrants and refugees, social injustice and corruption.

According to the poll results, Ukrainian youth are the most concerned about corruption, as

Graph 6.6. How do you see your personal future in 10 years? (regional variation)

Graph 6.7. How do you see your personal future in 10 years? (regional variation)

Well-being and Migration
37% of respondents stated that they are strongly concerned about it, followed by war in the region or in the world (36%), getting seriously ill (34%), and social injustice and being unemployed (32% each). If we compare different parameters, Ukrainian youth are the least concerned with influx of immigrants and refugees (38% claimed that they were not concerned about this issue), being a victim of physical violence (29%), and terrorist attacks (27%). However, overall, women are more concerned with corruption and war dominate in all regions. The top concern in Kyiv, Western and Eastern regions of Ukraine is war, whereas corruption dominates in Northern, Central and Southern Ukraine. Furthermore, young people in Eastern Ukraine tend to be more concerned about physical violence and being robbed, while young Ukrainians in the North are the least afraid of these two factors. Being unemployed is a major concern in all regions of Ukraine, with highest rates in Kyiv (39%) and Eastern regions (39%). The same is true for terrorist attacks. Kyiv also shows highest figures in terms of fears for war, pollution and climate change, increasing poverty, influx of immigrants and refugees, and social injustice. Youth in Kyiv, as well as in Central and Southern Ukraine, tends to be more concerned about corruption, whereas Ukrainians from Eastern and Western regions express less fears regarding corruption than their peers in any other region.

The poll results also show that concerns about corruption and war dominate in all regions. The top concern in Kyiv, Western and Eastern regions of Ukraine is war, whereas corruption dominates in Northern, Central and Southern Ukraine. Furthermore, young people in Eastern Ukraine tend to be more concerned about physical violence and being robbed, while young Ukrainians in the North are the least afraid of these two factors. Being unemployed is a major concern in all regions of Ukraine, with highest rates in Kyiv (39%) and Eastern regions (39%). The same is true for terrorist attacks. Kyiv also shows highest figures in terms of fears for war, pollution and climate change, increasing poverty, influx of immigrants and refugees, and social injustice. Youth in Kyiv, as well as in Central and Southern Ukraine, tends to be more concerned about corruption, whereas Ukrainians from Eastern and Western regions express less fears regarding corruption than their peers in any other region.

The respondents were asked about their experience of discrimination based on the following reasons: gender, economic background, age, religious beliefs, ethnic origin, level of education, political views, regional origin, social engagement, political convictions, social orientation, and spoken language.

According to the results, majority of Ukrainian youth has not been discriminated against based on any listed parameters. Eight or more of ten respondents have never been discriminated against due to their sexual orientation (95%), regional origin (94%), spoken language (93%), ethnic origin (93%), religious beliefs (93%), social engagement (92%), political views (90%), gender (90%), level of education (87%), age (85%), or economic background (80%). Among those who stated that they have been discriminated against on the ground of their gender, there were more women than men. However, gender difference is not observed in any other reasons for discrimination.

It should be noted that more young people often or sometimes experienced discrimination based on their economic background (18%) or age (15%) than for any other reason. As expected, more young people feel that they have been discriminated due to their age than their older fellow citizens. About one of ten young Ukrainians (11%) has been discriminated due to the
level of their education and 8% often or sometimes experienced discrimination based on their political views.

Comparison between different regions of Ukraine showed certain differences. Young people in Northern Ukraine consider themselves the least discriminated against on any ground compared to respondents from all other regions. It should be noted that young people from Kyiv are more likely to be discriminated based on their gender, age, economic background, or spoken language than their peers from any other region of Ukraine. Economic background has been a basis for discrimination for one in five young persons in the West (21%) and the South (23%). In Kyiv and Eastern Ukraine, more young people stated that they have been often or sometimes discriminated against based on their level of education than in other regions.

FORECAST FOR UKRAINE

Over a half of Ukrainian youth expressed optimism about the future of their homeland, as 58% of them believe that future of Ukrainian society in general will be better than now. One in five young Ukrainians (20%) thinks that the situation will remain the same, while 5% expect deterioration. Although no differences are observed by gender or age, geographical location determines certain discrepancies. Northern Ukraine remains the most optimistic, as 76% of local youth expect improvement and only 1% expect deterioration. On the other hand, in Eastern and Southern regions, youth are the most pessimistic, as in the East only 30% expect improvement and 45% expect either deterioration or status quo, whereas in the South 46% expect improvement and 31% chose one of the two pessimistic options.

Expectations for economic improvement are lower than general optimism. 37% of respondents expect that economic situation in Ukraine is going to improve in the next 10 years, whereas about one of ten young people (9%) expects deterioration. It should be noted that gender and age do not make significant difference in these opinions. Whereas all other regions show more or less similar opinions, Kyiv remains relatively the most optimistic with almost half of youth (48%) expecting improvement of economic situation and 7% expecting its deterioration. Eastern regions of Ukraine are the least optimistic, as only one in four local respondents (25%) expect improvement of economic situation, while 16% expect deterioration.

EMIGRATION

Aside from potential motivating factors for emigration, young Ukrainians were also asked directly about their experience of being abroad and their intentions regarding future migration.

Being abroad is not the most frequent activity for Ukrainian youth. Most young Ukrainians (96%) stated that they have never been abroad. 21% of the youth have ever been abroad, another 3% were have been abroad often and very often. These numbers do not differ significantly based on gender or age, but in terms of geographical location, youth from Kyiv and Western Ukraine travel the most frequently, while their peers from Northern Ukraine demonstrate the lowest rate.
Most young Ukrainians (93%) have never been abroad for more than six months. Those who have been abroad for this period only comprise 5% of the entire young population.

Furthermore, majority of Ukrainian youth (72%) stated that they have no desire to relocate to another country and leave Ukraine for more than six months. However, about one in four respondents (25%) reported desire (from weak to very strong) to emigrate. Whereas men are slightly more inclined to move to another country than women, younger groups of Ukrainians have more desire to leave the country than relatively older groups. It should also be noted that the share of those who want to emigrate is the highest in Kyiv and the lowest in Central, Southern and Eastern regions of Ukraine.

Most of the youth who could imagine leaving the country, would like to do that within the next 2-5 years.

One in five young Ukrainians who would consider moving abroad would stay there for lifetime, which makes up about 5% of the whole sample. Moreover, about one in five Ukrainians (19%) would stay abroad for one to five years, while about 15% would stay there for more than 5 years.

A third of young people who wish to emigrate have taken some positive steps to leave the country. The most frequent activity is contacting friends and relatives to get help for relocation, followed by contacting potential employers or universities and schools. However, majority of those who wish to emigrate (60%) have not taken any relevant action.

As for reasons for emigration, the major factors are improvement of living standards (26%) and higher salaries (22%). Although there are no gender differences in these cases, the youngest group of Ukrainians aged 14-17 is more likely to desire emigration for educational purposes than other age groups. Such factors as standards of living and higher salaries are the main motivators for emigration in all regions of Ukraine.

The most desired destinations for those willing to relocate to another country are Germany (18%), USA (15%), and Poland (12%).

Young Ukrainians were also asked about their knowledge of their desired country of destination. Cultural norms and values (38%) and employment opportunities (27%) of the potential host country have been named as the most known factors. Youth are the least concerned with healthcare opportunities and welfare benefits, as 45% of respondents are not at all or rather not concerned about these two factors.
basic communication skills in the official language of the desired host country. 17% of them have either good or excellent command of the respective language.

61% of respondents who do not speak the language of their desired host country are willing to learn it.

Most young people (67%) who wish to emigrate have no invitation or support from their personal acquaintances living in the desired host country. However, one in five of those respondents (19%) has such contact persons. Moreover, young people from Kyiv and Western Ukraine know more people living in desired host countries, compared to their peers from other regions of Ukraine.

Young Ukrainians believe that they would contribute the most to development and prosperity of the host country through high working performance (73%) and specific knowledge and skills (69%). The least appreciated contribution to the host country is accepting a job that is less desired by local population. However, half of respondents still find this option acceptable.

**Conclusion**

The survey of the migration attitudes of the Ukrainian youth has revealed mixed results. On the one hand, the majority of Ukrainian youth is satisfied with their life in general (83%) and education (72%), as well as with their jobs (56%) while only 5% are dissatisfied.

On the other hand, the survey revealed clear dissatisfaction of the youth with their financial situation. Every third young Ukrainian believes that they have less money than their peers and only 13% of the young Ukrainians can afford to buy some expensive things like a car or an apartment. This attitude is only made worse by the fact that corruption is one of the key concerns of the young population (alongside a war in the region), so it may be both a security and a financial concern. While a big share (71%) of the respondents expect the improvement of their personal future in the next 10 years, only 56% are positive about the future of the Ukrainian society and 37% expect the improvement of economic situation of people in Ukraine.

As a result, almost three quarters of young Ukrainians don’t have a desire to move to another country, however, 25% do have such a desire, albeit with a different intensity. The key driver for emigration, according to the respondents, is the improvement of one’s financial situation. Paradoxically, respondents in Kyiv belong to the group that is the most satisfied with their life and the most optimistic about the future, while still demonstrating the greatest desire to emigrate; we could assume that residents of Kyiv are also more exposed to such opportunities, and hence, are more motivated. These results reveal the intentions of at least a part of the young population to search for a better life abroad, temporarily or for good, unless better conditions are created in Ukraine for employment, self-fulfillment and good standard of living, which, according to participants of the focus groups, characterize ‘a good country’.

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**Introduction**

For a decade, researchers and media have been talking about a family crisis in Ukraine, referring to declining birth rates, significant number of divorces, birth of children outside marriage, and popularity of civil marriages. In fact, assessment and explanation of these trends largely depend on ideological orientations of the researcher and their attitude to modern transformation of the Western civilization. Influenced by such newest tendencies of social development as pluralization, individualization, and emancipation, the world is reinventing marriage, family, and roles and functions of the woman and the man. Most western scholars, being advocates of the “postmodern demography,” believe that changes in the sphere of marriage and family are natural results of demographic development, and therefore, should not be dramatized.

However, their opponents, followers of the familyism, who advocate primacy of family interests over individual ones, evaluate these processes as a global crisis of family as an institution that threatens normal functioning of society. Ukraine, where decline of population has been recorded since the very first years of...
Ukrainian “Generation Z”: Attitudes and Values

independence, is generally dominated by the views of the conservative camp, and therefore, new forms of marital partnership are often interpreted negatively.

Ukraine has a relatively high marriage rate, being at the same time among the leaders in the number of divorces in Europe (only Russia and Belarus have higher rates). According to sociologists, a steady trend of increase in the number of divorces has been traced for several decades. The Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine claims that 50-60% of all divorces occur in young families that often make this decision within the first 1.5 years of their marriage73. In 2016, 229,453 marriages were registered, while 129,997 couples divorced74. Although according to statistics, men most often marry in the age of 25-29 and women in 20-24, the peak of divorces is observed in the age group of 30-34. Among the main reasons for divorce are alienation (cheating), alcohol abuse, financial troubles75, as well as unjustified expectations of the partners. The most serious consequence of divorce among young couples is that more and more children are brought up in single-parent families. According to statistics, there are nearly 1.5 million of them, which is about 20% of the total number of children in Ukraine76.

Ukrainian women most often give birth at the age of 25 to 29. The highest rates of babies per 1000 people are registered in Volyn, Zakarpattia and Rivne regions, and Kyiv (12.5 and more). Although a significant increase in rates of extramarital births is observed in Ukraine, the clear majority of children are born in marriage. In 2016, 397,037 babies were born, and 80% of them came from parents who registered their relations77. For comparison, more than 40% of children in Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Norway, France, and Sweden are born outside of marriage78. The highest rate of births in unregistered marriages have been observed in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Donetsk, and Kharkiv regions and Kyiv, i.e. in the most urbanized regions. On the other hand, the lowest rates are in the West, specifically in Ternopil, Volyn, Rivne, and Chernivtsi regions. A significant number of extramarital children are born by 15-19 years old girls; therefore, we can assume that childbirth outside of the marriage is often a forced step, and not a conscious choice of a young mother.

The decrease in the number of children in Ukrainian families is explained by both financial troubles and the competition of priorities, when parents focus on their personal interests, in particular, on their careers. In 2009, the Institute for Demography and Social Studies conducted a poll to find out how would the improvement of financial situation contribute to the implementation of child-bearing orientations of Ukrainians. The poll showed that if respondents had an opportunity to spend more money, only 8% would use them to have a child. The rest would spend this money to improve their own well-being and self-development79. The only material factor that matters is the availability of a separate accommodation.

Ukrainian youth is becoming increasingly free in terms of choice of lifestyle, form of family relations, and scenario for development of their own families. This pluralization allows them to choose the model of life that is best suited to their personal interests and aspirations. For example, living together without official registration of a relationship can be a positive phenomenon, but only if it is a mutual voluntary decision. According to a previous research, among those living in civil marriage, one fifth (17% of men and 25% of women) claim that their partners don’t want to register their marriage, while another 7% indicated that it is impossible to register a marriage, mostly for financial reasons80.

Key findings

- Ukrainian youth prefer official marriages. Getting married after 30 years, especially for women, are perceived as anomalies. They believe that the most optimal age for marriage and childbirth is 25. An absolute majority (86%) sees their future "in marriage with children";
- Less than 7% of young people live in civil marriages, and only 2% of respondents explicitly prefer this type of marriage to the official one. Although a significant number of young people have positive attitudes toward civil marriage (living together without registration of relations), for most of them it is rather a pivotal test before the formal marriage than a final objective;

- In Eastern and Southern regions, as well as in Kyiv, young people are significantly less satisfied with their family life, with the lowest rate in the East (51%). However, only a small number of respondents (1-3%) openly admitted the existence of problems;
- According to young people, the most important factors for the choice of a husband/ wife are common interests (84%) and personality (79%). This approach is generally supported by representatives of all age groups, both men and women;
- The poll showed that modern youth grew up in an atmosphere of parental care and attention, while physical punishment was a rarity, as well as excessive indulgence of children’s desires. Physical force as punishment for disobedience was often used at only 5% of respondents, and another 10% experienced it sometimes;
- Most respondents described their relations with parents as good or normal. The rate of dysfunctional families with frequent quarrels or conflicting relations, generally does not exceed 5%81 (at least such percentage of respondents admitted having serious problems).

78 State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Statistical bulletin “Natural Population Movement 2016”
81 This could also be due to concealing of the problems by respondents in an act of denial and self-protection.
Parents retain significant influence on important decisions of Ukrainian youth (77%). However, for most respondents, mothers’ decisions are crucial: 51% chose their mothers and only 25% chose fathers. Among male respondents, both parents got 40%.

Even in adulthood, single young Ukrainians are generally staying with their parents, and the majority explains this by convenience, rather than financial reasons. The main reason for separation from parents is establishment of their own families.

Most young people plan to follow their parents in the upbringing of their children: 22% plan to do it in the same way, and 45% in almost the same way. Only one in five respondents wants to bring up their children in a different way.

Almost a third (27%) of respondents are officially married, and another 7% live in civil marriages. Half of respondents (51%) evaluated their family status as “single”. Only one in ten (9%) said that they have a relationship but do not live with their partner. This distribution indicates that young people are looking for serious relations and prefer registered marriages. The lowest rate of civil marriages is observed, as expected, in Western and Northern regions (only 4% and 5% respectively). The East (11%), the South (10%) and Kyiv (9%) have twice as high figures. However, while the South also has a high rate of those who formalized their relations (29%, only the West has higher figure of 33%), in the East, only one in five (20%) is married. The largest number of singles is in Kyiv (57%).

The most popular age for marriage is 25-29; in this age group, half of respondents (51%) are married. On the other hand, gender distribution between married and single respondents shows that women get married earlier. Men show a significantly higher rate of singles (58%, with 44% among women), while only 21% are married. As of the time of the poll, only one in five (19%) had a child and 5% had two children.

The overwhelming majority of respondents (68%) are satisfied with their family life, and 39% are very satisfied. One in ten (11%) are neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied, while 18% couldn’t answer. And although the difference is only a few percent, the highest level of satisfaction with family life is recorded in the oldest age group of 25-29 (70%). As mentioned above, it is the age when Ukrainian young people most often marry and have children, as they consider it to be the best age to start a family.

However, if the difference is insignificant in case of distribution by age, in the regional one, the situation is rather different. The highest rate of those satisfied with their family life in observed in the West (77% with 46% of those who are very satisfied), along with the lowest number of those who did not answer this question (only 7%). For comparison, in the East and South the respective figure is more than a quarter. In Eastern and Southern regions, as well as in Kyiv, young people are significantly less satisfied with their family life, with the lowest rate in the East (51%). In Kyiv, there are 65% of satisfied respondents, and in the South, the respective figure is 61%. Moreover, only a small number of respondents (3%) openly admitted the existence of serious problems. The poll included young people under 29, and according to official statistics, the peak of divorces is observed at 30-35.

The focus group participants said they met their partners through friends, social networks, or travels. After a certain period of dating, their relations gradually grew into serious relationships. The decision to live together was often based on the desire to improve their lives after graduation. In turn, long-term living together leads to thought that it’s time to formalize relations.

Valentyna, 29, Odesa:
In hectic student years, I lived in a dorm, but I wanted family coziness, and somehow gradually they [relations] grew into marriage. First, I wanted a family, not that dormitory.

According to participants of the focus groups, the elements of a happy marriage are mutual understanding, common interests, mutual support, care for each other, and love.

Ukrainian youth are almost unanimous in the way they see their family’s future, as 86% of respondents chose the option “marriage with children.” In this case, both official marriage...
and children are important. Options “marriage without children” and “civil marriage with/without children” have minimal support of 3%. Kyiv stands out of the rest of Ukraine, as 6% of local respondents are ready for marriage, but without children. The capital also has the highest rate of those who couldn’t answer this question (14%), while in other regions, this figure did not exceed 6%. Most of undecideds are male, while women are more unambiguous about their family future (90% vs. 82%).

Focus groups in the South and the North demonstrated different understandings and attitudes toward civil marriages among young people. While participants from Odesa talked about living together for a long time as a test period before marriage, their peers from Chernihiv view it as an alternative to official marriage. Therefore, the difference in interpretation influenced their attitudes. In Chernihiv, participants emphasized civil marriage is not reliable, and only registration guarantees certain responsibilities and accountability of the partners. In this case, the main role in relations is given to the husband as the initiator of marriage.

Hanna, 22, Odesa:
Before such serious step as registration of relations, there is an opportunity to live together and learn more about each other, see if we can live together or not.

Oksana, 29, Chernihiv:
Official marriage is certainly more reliable. Overall, everything is completely different if we live in a civil marriage. We are like separated. And if the marriage is formal, there are some common goals, discussions.

Graph 6.2. How many children do you plan to have in your life?

Graph 6.3. What is the best marriage age for women/ men?

In addition to the desire to test the strength of the relationship, young people are in no hurry to register marriage due to lack of money.

A family with two children remains the most desirable option. Almost half of respondents (48%) said that they plan or would like to have two children. Among women, this rate is slightly higher than among men (51% vs. 45%), and there are less those who couldn’t answer. 12% would like to have only one child, and 8% plan to have three. Residents of Northern regions are quite unanimous in their plans, as 70% would like to have precisely two children.

The respondents (both male and female) named 25 as the best age for marriage. For women, this age was chosen by 21% of respondents, and by 25% for men. However, this is the only common point for men and women, as 72% of respondents think that women should get married between the ages of 18 and 25, and only 8% chose older age, while for men, the respective figures are 41% and 40%. The figures for the North stand out, as local residents most often chose 20 as an optimal marriage age for women (54%) and 25 for men (58%). It should be noted that there is no significant difference between the answers of men and women in terms of the best marriage age for men, while in case of the best marriage age for women, women mostly chose 25, while the most frequent option chosen by men was “don’t know.” A significant number of respondents (about 20%) could not decide.

Young Ukrainians believe that the most important factors for the choice of a spouse are common interests and personality. The first factor is very important for a half of respondents (52%), and important for one in three (32%). Personal qualities are important for 79% and very important for 43% of them. This approach is generally supported by representatives of all age groups, both men and women. In the regional context, the importance of these factors was particularly emphasized in Kyiv.
and Southern region. Only 5-4% believe that common interests and personality are absolutely or rather unimportant. The third most popular factor is appearance: it is important for 45%, but very important only for 29%. Only 7% stated that they are not concerned with the attractiveness of their partner.

Such factors such as family approval (important or very important for 55%), education (important or very important for 54%), economic status (important or very important for 55%), economic status or very important for 55%), education (important or very important for 54%), economic status or very important for 29%). Only 7% stated that they are not concerned with the attractiveness of their partner.

Young people pay less attention to such factors as nationality or religion. Only 38% believe that nationality matters for the choice of a husband/wife, while 31% consider it irrelevant. Almost the same number of respondents (29%) chose the option "neither important, nor unimportant." The North stands out in this context, as 45% of local respondents believe that nationality should not be ignored. Similar results are observed in terms of religious beliefs. The number of respondents that consider religion of their future husband or wife important is equal to the rate of those who do not care about it (36%). Moreover, only 22% do not consider religious beliefs at all, and this answer is most often observed among respondents from Kyiv and the East. One in four respondents chose the option "neither important, nor unimportant." In terms of regional distribution, the East stands out, as over a half of local respondents (53%) consider premarital virginity irrelevant, while in the West and in the Center the respective figures are only 33% and 35%.

Most respondents (72%) consider having children very important, and another 20% chose the "important" option. Among women, the rate of those who do not see their future without children is higher than the respective figure for men; also, having a husband and children are equally important to them. For instance, 94% of female respondents said that children are very important or Important for a happy life, and the same number of respondents stated that it is important to have a husband. Among male respondents, the respective figures are 87% and 88%. Awareness of the importance of children and marriage for a happy life increases in parallel with the age of respondents.

Moreover, economic factor received slightly more attention from representatives of older age group (25-29 years) (55%), and residents of the South (65%). For comparison, only 46% and 45% of residents of the West and the East consider it a significant factor in choice of a partner. Family approval is least important for respondents from Kyiv (22% consider this factor irrelevant or completely irrelevant) and the East (24%). The level of education is most appreciated in the capital, where this factor is very important for 39% of respondents.

Ambiguity of opinions may indicate that the attitude will depend on particular nationalities and religions. In one of the regional focus groups, only few respondents said that they would like their wife/husband to be of the same nationality as them. In the other group, participants, at first, almost unanimously stated that nationality does not have a fundamental role for them. However, in both cases, after additional questions from the moderator, it became clear that certain nationalities cause a strong negative association, e.g. Caucasian countries, India, and African states.

When choosing a partner, Ukrainian young people pay the least attention to virginity. It is important or very important for 28% (29% of men and 26% of women), while 39% (36% of men and 43% of women) consider it irrelevant. 7% of them did not answer or chose the option "hard to answer." In terms of regional distribution, the East stands out, as over a half of local respondents (53%) consider premarital virginity irrelevant, while in the West and in the Center the respective figures are only 33% and 35%.
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The housing issue, i.e. with whom and where young people live, plays an important role in this context. According to our poll, 67% of young people aged 21-24 live in their parents' homes, as well as 46% in the age group of 25-29. For some young people of these two age groups, parents bought an apartment/house (7% and 16% respectively), and only 12% of respondents older than twenty-five live in an apartment they purchased independently or with their partner, while another 16% reside in an inherited house/apartment. 12% of respondents over 20 rent an apartment/house at their own expense. The highest rate of those who live with parents is observed in the West (77%), and the lowest is recorded in the South (57%): there young people can afford to rent an apartment/house at their own expense more often than in other regions.

Respondents were also asked to name the number of people living with them. Every third stated that besides them, two more people live in the household; 27% live with three other people, while options "one" and "four" were chosen by 11%. Only 5% live independently, with the highest rate in Kyiv, the South, and the East (7% each). Most often young people live with their mothers: 65% of respondents named their mothers among the persons they live with, while fathers were mentioned by a slightly smaller number (54%), 32 named their partner or spouse, and 32 mentioned brothers/sisters. One in ten young persons (11%) lives with their grandmother. It is noteworthy that the rate of young people living with their grandparents is twice as high in the West as in other regions (20%).

We also tried to find out how deliberate or coercive the decision of young people to live with their parents is. One in four respondents (24%) admitted that they would like to live separately, but it is not possible due to lack of money. However, 68% (equal numbers among respondents, both parents got 40% each. For 22% of women and 18% of men, opinion of their husband or wife is decisive. With age, the influence of parents decreases, but remains substantial. Over a half of respondents (56%) in the age group 25-29 named their parents as those who have the greatest influence on making important decisions. Only 24% of men and 17% of women said that they make important decisions independently at their own discretion. The most independent young people live in Southern Ukraine, where one in four respondents (26%) stated that they decide on their own. In Kyiv, the respective figure is only 17%, and the lowest rate is in the North (14%), where every third respondent named their husband/wife as the most important decision maker.

However, when responding to the question regarding parents' influence on decisions about their future life, young people most often chose one of two options: either "my parents and I make decisions together" (45%), or "I make my own decisions" (43%). Among teenagers under 18, 18% admitted that they don't influence decisions on their lives, as their parents decide for them. However, an absolute majority (64%) of teenagers stated that important decisions are taken together.

In general, we do not get along, we often argue

We get along, although sometimes we have differences in opinion

We get along very well

Don't know

No answer

Very conflictual relationship

48%

43%

9%

9%

6%

2%
men and women) stated that this is the simplest and most comfortable option. More than half of respondents over 20 support this statement: 66% in the age group of 21-24 and 53% in the group of 25-29. Only 26% and 38% of respondents in these age groups admitted that this decision was dictated by financial troubles. The highest rate of those who would like to live separately, but can’t is recorded in the East (38%).

The lack of serious differences seems to be one of the factors why Ukrainian youth are generally ready to live with their parents. For instance, 48% of respondents described their relationships with parents as very good. Another 43% evaluated the relationships as normal with rare differences in opinions. Only 4% admitted that there are frequent quarrels in their families. Compared to other regions, young people from Eastern Ukraine and Kyiv describe their relationships with their parents as slightly less positive (8% and 7% respectively). In Western regions, people get along very well, as confirmed by at least about half of respondents (56%). However, these minor fluctuations do not change the fact that overall, the share of dysfunctional families, where quarrels or very conflicting relationships are frequent, does not exceed 5% in Ukraine.

**PARENTING**

The relative well-being of Ukrainian families is evidenced by the fact that a significant number of young people plan to follow their parents in terms of bringing up their children. 22% plan to do it in the same manner and 45% in almost the same. Only one in five respondents want to bring up their children in a different way, and 3% have completely different plans. The family has significant impact on development of children’s personalities. Problems in the family, neglect, physical abuse, psychological pressure, quarrels, and conflicts have negative effects on child’s psychological state, which may lead to deviant or addictive behavior in the future.

Respondents were asked to describe in detail the process of their education at early age (elementary school). Almost 40% said that their parents explained many times why it is necessary to obey the rules. 27% said it was happening quite often. The highest rate is observed in Kyiv (83%). Overall, only 9% of respondents had such conversations rarely or did not have them at all. 43% of respondents participated in the joint development of family rules; however, 25% had almost no such experience. This practice is the least spread in Western regions, where only one third responded positively.

Parents of the majority of respondents (56%), according to the latter’s statements, knew (more or less) about their troubles at school. Only 15% stated that parents rarely (or never) were aware of school problems. It is evident that considerable attention to children’s studies is paid by parents from Kyiv and the South; however, in other regions the respective figures are also quite high. In terms of parenting methods, physical force as a punishment for disobedience was often used only in case of about 5% of respondents, while another 10% experienced it sometimes. However, the overwhelming majority (63%) never or almost never encountered it. It is noticeable that the rate of those whose parents never educated them “with a belt” is slightly higher among teenagers under 18 (75%), which may indicate a change in approaches to parenting. On the other hand, according to 29% of respondents, parents often promised to punish them, but almost never realized their threats.

Only 27% experienced pressure from their parents due to unfulfilled expectations (e.g. in studies) and were abused or criticized. On the other hand, 39% never or almost never experienced such pressure. 30% chose the “both yes and no” option. The highest frequency of such behavior is observed among parents from Kyiv (35%); they are the most demanding of their children, and they have the highest rate of shouting at their children, compared to other regions (34%). Overall,
every fourth (24%) respondent stated that their parents often or relatively often shouted at them while being angry. 45% declared that such behavior occurred rarely or never happened at all.

On the other hand, parents did not hurry to do anything to please their children. Only one in four (24%) said that they almost always succeeded in getting what they wanted, while 34% never or almost never succeeded. However, most often (37%) respondents answered “both succeeded and not.” The least spoiled children are in the West, where only 18% claimed to have gotten what they wanted. It should be remembered that due to the economic hardships of the 1990s and early 2000s, parents did not always have the opportunity to fulfill their children’s needs. Only 28% mentioned that Ukrainian parents often or quite often used various rewards (toys or sweets) as stimuli for good behavior. 35% stated that this never happened or almost never happened. Another third (34%) of respondents chose the option “both yes and no.” Again, parents from the West tend to be the least inclined to use this tactic.

In the teenage age group (14-17), the rate of those who were rewarded by parents for proper behavior is slightly higher. However, this gap is not yet significant enough to assume any fundamental change in the approach to parenting. Our poll showed that modern youth grew up in the atmosphere of parental care and attention, while physical punishment was rare, as well as excessive indulgence of children’s desires.

Conclusions

The assumption that the “western fashion” for more free relationships, late marriages, and child-free life is spreading among Ukrainian youth seems to be exaggerated. Trends that have long become normal in Western Europe are still new in Ukraine. Our poll, as well as discussions in the focus groups, show that while young people are in no hurry with marriage and childbirth, wanting to finish their studies, acquire a profession, and achieve certain career success, the absolute majority considers children and family indispensable conditions for a happy life. They believe that the best age for marriage and childbirth is 25. The unregistered marriages are still practiced by only a small portion of the general population, at least among young people. Only 2% of respondents openly prefer unregistered marriage. Most of young people who had registered or unregistered marriage are completely satisfied with their relationships.

The nuclear or simple family that consists of two generations (parents and children) is the most widespread in Ukraine. Also, results of the poll don’t allow to assume replacement of the traditional type of family with a gender equality based egalitarian model. When identifying important factors in choosing a partner, women were much more likely to name economic one, compared to men. The breadwinner function is attributed to men who should ensure financial well-being of the family. Therefore, traditions of the family lifestyle persist in Ukraine, which, however, does not exclude a certain transformation of family relations with orientation towards self-development, individualization, and freedom of choice.
Recent research defines leisure as something that young people are working for, and not vice versa: leisure, not work, becomes a vital priority. Understanding this trend will help understand how global labor market and economy will be transformed in the nearest future. On the other hand, we way people spend their free time demonstrates forms and practices of this process and reflects political and economic development of the society, including the uniformity of access to public goods, specifically the ability to spend quality free time.

On one hand, the opinion poll conducted among 8,000 millennials from 30 countries shows that young people in developing countries are more optimistic than their peers in developed states: 71% of them believe that they will feel better financially and 62% emotionally than their parents. Instead, in developed economies, the respective figures are only 56% and 31%.

On the other hand, research data shows that millennials in the US and in Europe spend less time on entertainment and leisure than the previous generation. Primarily, this is due to lower income. At the same time, half of the millennials in the world still live with their parents, which allows them to spend half of their income (48%) on entertainment and shopping.

According to the research of young people in Ukraine conducted in 2015, young people could not afford many kinds of leisure activities due to lack of money. This is primarily about traveling abroad (62%), traveling within Ukraine (50%), and going to concerts or shows (35%). The results of this poll confirm that traveling abroad remains an impossible dream for many young people: as of today, 76% of Ukrainian youth have never been abroad. It should be noted that in 2017, the process of liberalization of the visa regime between Ukraine and the European Union have been completed, and in the upcoming years we will see how the visa-free regime will help young Ukrainians start traveling to the EU even amidst rather problematic economic situation in the country.

Today, young Ukrainians spend their free time mostly listening to music, spending time with family and friends, or watching movies. Compared to the results of previous polls, the priorities in spending free time have changed. For instance, in 2003, the youth mostly watched TV (76%), went out with friends (54%), visited other people or hosted guests (46%), and listened to radio (41%).

In terms of social activity, according to the poll conducted in 2015, 56% of young people were engaged in volunteering at any time in their lives, and 22% have been volunteering during the previous 12 months (the most popular volunteer activities among young Ukrainians were money collections for participants of Anti-terrorism operation in Ukraine, grounds cleaning, and relief of poverty). As of 2015, this indicator was consistent with the same indicator in the EU: 25% of young adults have been involved in volunteering over the past 12 months. In the US, about 22% of young people (aged 16 to 34) have been volunteering.

Both previous studies and the poll conducted by the New Europe Center showed that most Ukrainians (83%) consider healthy lifestyle important. This is a specific attribute of the millennials in general, as health and physical activity are of particular importance to them.

Key findings

- In their free time, young Ukrainians mostly listen to music, go out with friends, and watch movies;
- Almost one in five young Ukrainians (18%) never read books;
- 76% of Ukrainian youth have never been abroad;
- The older young people are, the less time they spend on virtually any kind of leisure, from reading and spiritual development to sports and watching movies;
- 80% of Ukranyans aged 14 to 29 never volunteer. This indicator has the highest value (almost 90%) in the South of Ukraine;
- Women spend their leisure time more beneficially than men: they read books and newspapers, do sports, pray, read spiritual and personal development literature, and engage in creative activities. On the other hand, they spend more time on shopping. Instead, men play video games, visit cafes and bars, and hang out/do nothing more often;
- Half of young Ukrainians pray. The most religious youth lives in the West of Ukraine, where the church traditionally has greater influence on the family, while the least believing young people live in the South and in the East;
- An absolute majority of Ukrainian young people (86%) have permanent access to the Internet (daily or always). They mostly use Internet to listen to music, watch movies, communicate with friends, and use social media.

85 The poll enrolled such developed countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, The Netherlands, UK, US; the developing countries polled were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, Peru, Russia, South Africa, the Philippines and Turkey.
88 The poll enrolled 12 countries representing the three major global regions
networks, and rarely to receive information and read news or to study and work. People of younger age (14-20) are more likely to use the Internet for communication, email, uploading or sending photos, videos and music than their older peers (21-29);

- One in five young Ukrainians never use the Internet to study or work;
- Most young Ukrainians (91%) use social networks;
- Over a third of young Ukrainians do sports on a regular basis: 25% do it often and 8% do it very often;
- Smoking is less widespread among Ukrainian youth than drinking. 63% of young people do not smoke (55% of them have never smoked), while 28% never drink alcohol. 92% of Ukrainian youth do not use soft drugs. The lowest number of those who have never used drugs is recorded in Kyiv (86%) and in the East of Ukraine (83%);
- Half of young Ukrainians always use birth control methods – 53% of those who have had sex.

LEISURE AND HOBBIES

Ukrainian youth most often spends time with their beloved ones or listens to music. 71% of young Ukrainians spend their free time with their families, 61% communicate with friends, and 77% listen to music. Another popular type of leisure is cinema and television. Over a half of young Ukrainians (38% do it often and 21% very often) watch movies, including on a computer. Moreover, 70% of young people watch television on a regular basis, and one in three young Ukrainians spend one to two hours watching TV daily. 51% of the youth watch TV for two or more hours a day.

The rest of possible types of leisure don’t get more than a third of supporters among Ukrainian youth. For instance, slightly more than a third of young Ukrainians do sports regularly: 25% do it often and 8% do it very often. It is noteworthy that the older the respondents are, the less they tend to do sports regularly: for example, 35% do it often and 13% do it very often in the age group of 14 to 17, while in the group of 25-29, the respective figures are 19% and 6%. Evidently, responses of the younger age group (14-20) are associated with the fact that physical education classes are usually included in school and university curricula.

A quarter of young Ukrainians often hang out and do nothing: 19% do it often and 6% do it very often. However, the older the respondents are, the less they are likely to waste time: the respective rates are only 16% in the age group of 25-29, and 40% in the group of 14-17. This kind of leisure is the most popular in the East of Ukraine: 38% of local youth do it often or very often. For comparison, the respective figures are 25% in Kyiv, 26% in the North, 21% in the West, and 23% in Central and Southern Ukraine.

Only a fifth of Ukrainian youth read books quite frequently (17% do it often, while 6% do it very often), 27% read rarely, and 31% read sometimes. Almost one in five young Ukrainians (18%) never read books. Even fewer young Ukrainians read newspapers and magazines: only 2% do it very often and 12% do it often.

Graph 7.1. How often do you engage in the following activities?

Leisure and Lifestyle
The highest rate of those who read books often or very often is observed in Kyiv (37%); furthermore, young people from Kyiv are the most likely to be frequent readers (14%), while in other regions of Ukraine the respective figures range from 17% in the South to 26% in the Center.

Surprisingly, the older the respondents are, the less frequently they read books.

Focus group participants also stated that they mostly read in Russian (often due to lack of or poor quality of Ukrainian translations), while some of them read in English. Among the genres that interest young people are business, fiction (detectives and contemporary Ukrainian literature), psychology etc.

It should be noted that studying outside the educational institution (homework, self-education, etc.) also takes a certain portion of the youth’s time. Less than a fifth of young Ukrainians (18%) study after classes for more than three hours. Among young people aged 25-29 the respective figure is 8%. One third study for 1-2 hours, and another third study for 2-3 hours. The highest rates of young people who study for more than three hours are recorded in Kyiv (25%) and Central Ukraine (24%), while the lowest figure is observed in the East (8%).

Almost one in five Ukrainians play video games (13% do it often and 5% do it very often), while 39% never do it. Video game fans are more likely to be male than female: 25% of men play often or very often, while the respective figure among women is 11%. Similar to other leisure activities, the older are the respondents, the less they play video games: 33% of youngsters aged 14-17 play video games often or very often, while in the age group of 25-29 the respective figure is 13%.

Although a half of young Ukrainians (53%) pray, a portion of those who do it often or very often is very small (9% and 4% respectively). Among those who never pray, there are more men (51%) than women (38%). 84% of the respondents acknowledged their belonging to any religious denomination.

Only one in six Ukrainians are engaged in creative activities (12% do it often and 4% do it very often), while 38% have never done anything creative (they do not play, do not write, do not paint, and do not play musical instruments). On one hand, women are more creative than men: 31% of women and 44% of men are never engaged in creative activities; on the other hand, 20% of women do something creative often or very often, while among men the respective figure is only 13%. The older the respondents are, the less time they devote to creativity: 24% do it often and very often at 14-17, while in the age group of 25-29 the respective figure is 14%.
The highest rate of religious youth lives in the West of Ukraine, where the church traditionally has greater influence on the family: 34% of local youth pray often or very often; the lowest numbers or religious youth are in the South (6%) and in the East (4%).

In the end, the least popular leisure activities for Ukrainian youth are visits to youth centers and volunteering. 80% of Ukrainian youth have never engaged in volunteering in social projects or initiatives. only 4% are often volunteering, and 1% do it very often. The South of Ukraine has the least socially active youth: 90% have never engaged in volunteering.

According to the participants of the focus groups, the main reason why young people do not engage in volunteering is the lack of time. Moreover, they prioritize their own income over volunteering. It is especially difficult to volunteer for those who have little children that require time and care. Respondents also noted that encouragement for volunteering should start in the childhood.

Participants of another focus group noted that people should volunteer, but only if the process is focused, and volunteer organizations or funds (in the case of financial aid) are accountable.

One in ten young Ukrainians are often shopping or visiting cafes and clubs, which could reflect both tastes and preferences of young people and their financial situation, as according to the poll, only 13% of young people can afford expensive purchases and only 1% (!) stated that they can buy anything they need for a decent standard of living.

Accordingly, 76% of Ukrainian youth have never been abroad. 14% travel rarely, 4% travel sometimes, and 3% do it often or very often. This data does not differ significantly based on gender or age. A slightly higher percentage of those who travel abroad is observed in Kyiv (7% travel often or very often) and in the West (4%), compared to other regions of Ukraine (in the North and the East, none of respondents stated that they travel abroad often or very often). The main reason for this, according to the focus group participants, is financial situation.

Although some focus group participants noted that introduction of the visa-free regime with the European Union is an unconditionally positive event, others were disappointed, as the visa-free regime does not provide for employment opportunities in the EU, and hence, for “travel earnings.”

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61% of Ukrainian youth often or very go out with their friends (22% of them do it very often), while 25% do it sometimes. The amount of time young people dedicate to their friends is significantly dependent on their age. The older the respondents are, the less time they have for friends: while in the age group of 14-17, 85% of young people meet with friends often or very often, in the group of 25-29, the respective figure is 46%.

At the same time, most Ukrainians (85%) are satisfied with their friends and treat friendship seriously: 89% of young Ukrainians believe that being faithful to friends is “rather important” or “very important.”
About a quarter of young Ukrainians (27%) believe that social networks do not mishandle their personal data, while almost the same number of respondents (26%) do not believe it, and another 32% have doubts.

**INTERNET**

Most young Ukrainians (86%) have permanent access to the Internet: 42% use it (almost) every day and 44% have access all the time. 4% of young people do not have access to the Internet. In the North, this figure is the highest (9%). The intensity of Internet use ranges from one hour to six and more, but most often young people spend two or three hours a day on the Internet (35%).

79% of respondents use the Internet for school or university and work. Moreover, the older the respondents are, the less they use the Internet for these purposes. 19% of respondents never use the Internet to study or work.

Much more young Ukrainians use the Internet for another purpose: for entertainment or communication with friends and relatives.

The highest rate of those who often read news and receive information from the Internet is recorded in Kyiv (50% of local young residents).

This poll showed that the younger the respondents are, the more they are digitalized. For instance, the older the respondents are, the less frequently they use the Internet for communication: 72% of respondents aged 14 to 17 and 58% of their peers aged 25 to 29 often use the Internet for communication. Similarly, older young people are less likely to use email: 53% of teenagers aged 14 to 17 and 35% of adults aged 25 to 29 often use email. The highest rate of those who use email frequently is recorded in the East of Ukraine (57%), while the lowest figure is observed in the North (30%). The same trend of decrease in the use of the Internet with age is observed for other types of online activities, such as watching and downloading movies or music, using social networks, etc.

The most widespread social network among young people is Vkontakte, although it is banned in Ukraine and special programs should be installed to access it. Primarily, this is due to its music library (which can be downloaded without any property rights), various topic groups (from education to cooking), communication with friends, or a simple habit. Most participants of the focus group opposed the ban of Russian web resources.

The social networks used by young people are Vkontakte, Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter; the most popular messengers are Viber, WhatsApp, and Telegram.

**Sviatoslav, 25, Lviv:**

This violates my rights. What makes us worse? We will be like North Korea. In no time, we will be told to not go out after 10PM and all sites will be blocked. They will create their networks. Then Facebook will be blocked, so that people would not protest. It all starts with little things. It is my personal opinion.

**Viacheslav, 23, Kharkiv:**

This is ridiculous. There are many urgent issues in our country that are not solved by him [the President], but we are not allowed to use Vkontakte. As if Russians came out of Donetsk and Luhansk and said “OK, since Vkontakte is no longer available, we are leaving. End of war.”

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HEALTH

For most Ukrainians (83%), healthy eating is important. Among them, 51% consider healthy eating very important. Among women, this figure is higher (55%) than among men (47%).

Slightly fewer young people (60%) consider sports important (half of them consider it very important). Doing sports has virtually the same value for both men and women. 13% of young people do not consider sports important.

According to the participants of the focus groups, healthy lifestyle is now fashionable and trendy. 85% of young Ukrainians consider healthy eating very important. Among women, this figure is higher (55%) than among men (47%).

Most young Ukrainians (76%) are positive about their health; 49% of them believe that their health is in good condition, 19% believe that they have very good health, and 8% consider their health excellent. 22% assess their health as satisfactory, and only 1% believe that they have poor health. Women are more likely (25%) than men (19%) to evaluate their health as satisfactory.

Over a half (54%) of young Ukrainians use alcohol periodically. Another 11% use it on weekends, 3% drink several times a week, and 1% drink on a daily basis. 28% of young people never drink alcohol. Among women, the rate of those who never drink alcohol (34%) is higher than among men (21%). Among those who drink alcohol more often (several times a week or on weekends) there are slightly more men than women. With age, the rate of people who use alcohol increases. A quarter of young Ukrainians consider drinking alcohol unacceptable. Among women, this figure is higher (29%) than among men (22%). The older the respondents are, the more likely they are to consider alcoholic beverages acceptable. For example, 42% of respondents aged 14-17 consider alcohol unacceptable; in the age group of 18-20, this figure is 29%, in the group of 21-24, it is 23%, and in the group of 25-29, it is 19%.

Graph 7.8. How much are the following things important to you?

Graph 7.9. Do you smoke?

Graph 7.10. Do you drink alcohol?

Ukrainian “Generation Z”: Attitudes and Values

92% of Ukrainian youth do not use soft drugs. With age, this figure decreases. For instance, in the age group of 14-17, 98% don’t use soft drugs, while among people aged 25-29, the respective figure is 91%. The lowest rate of those who never use soft drugs is recorded in Kyiv (86%) and the East of Ukraine (83%).

SEXUAL RELATIONS

Half of young Ukrainians (54%) aged 14 to 29 are sexually active, and 20% of respondents had sex with only one partner. 17% have never had sex. It should be noted that almost a third of respondents (29%) refused to answer or indicated that answering this question was uncomfortable to them (interestingly, in the age group of 14-17 answering this question caused less discomfort (5%) than in all other age groups (13-14%)). Evidently, the number of chaste people decreases with age, while the number of those who have more than one sexual partner increases.

Most often, the first sexual experience occurs at 16-18, as this age of the first sexual experience was stated by 36% of respondents. One third of respondents refused to answer this question, while 7% stated that it was hard to answer.

Only half of young Ukrainians (53%) always birth control methods, 31% use them sometimes and 9% never do. No significant gender difference was revealed. 5% of the youth aged 14-17 know nothing about birth control methods.

Among respondents who had sex, older respondents are more likely to answer questions about the beginning of their sexual life, the use of condoms, and about sexual life in general.

Every tenth young Ukrainian considers abstinence before marriage a virtue for both partners, and another 17% consider it to be a virtue for girls. In both cases, more women than men support the respective statement.

Almost half of the respondents do not consider abstinence before marriage a virtue: 29% believe that this is an obsolete concept, while 15% consider it an unnecessary psychological burden. With age, more people support these statements. While in the age group of 14-17, 29% of respondents do not consider it a virtue, in the group of 25-29, this figure increases to 52%. Furthermore, 28% could not answer this question or abstained from the answer (with 42% in the age group of 14-17).

Conclusions

Young Ukrainians are similar to classic millennials: they have almost permanent access to the Internet and constantly use social networks. At the same time, the younger generation is not reading much, as one fifth of young Ukrainians never read. The love for reading specifically decreases with age.

Young Ukrainians consider healthy lifestyle important and even trendy (as virtually all their peers in the entire world), and most of them (76%) assess their health positively. However, less than a third of young Ukrainians regularly do sports, almost one fifth (17%) smoke, and only half (53%) always use condoms and other birth control methods, although Ukraine is the most HIV/AIDS affected country in Europe97.

Residents of post-industrial countries with a high level of economic well-being are focused on secular and rational values and self-expression, although this does not necessarily mean the altogether decline of traditional values. Assessments and views of a society depend to a large extent on philosophical, religious,

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Introduction

The values and views of people play a key role in economic development, establishment and strengthening of democratic institutions, promotion of gender equality and efficiency of governance98. This is the conclusion of the World Values Survey (WVS) conducted since 1981 and having already covered almost 100 countries. To evaluate every society, researchers use two main dichotomies: traditional versus secular and rational values, and values of survival versus values of self-expression.

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Residents of post-industrial countries with a high level of economic well-being are focused on secular and rational values and self-expression, although this does not necessarily mean the altogether decline of traditional values. Assessments and views of a society depend to a large extent on philosophical, religious,

98 World Values Survey. Findings and Insights http://www.worldvaluesurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp

Traditional values emphasize the importance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority and traditional family values. People who embrace these values also reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. Secular-rational values have the opposite preferences to the traditional values. These societies place less emphasis on religion, traditional family values and authority. Divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide are seen as relatively acceptable. Suicide is not necessarily more common.) Survival values place emphasis on economic and physical security. It is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and tolerance. Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, growing tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality, and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life.
Ukrainian “Generation Z”: Attitudes and Values

and political ideas that dominate the country. Therefore, a significant part of the responsibility for the place of every country on the world value map lies with its political and intellectual elite99.

Ukraine, included in the list of countries participating in WVS in 1996, was placed in a group of secular and rational countries dominated by survival values. This means that most citizens prioritize economic and physical security. At the turn of the millennium, Ukraine showed positive dynamics, i.e. moved toward self-expression values; however, in 2011, a certain recession was recorded100. After the Euromaidan, SOCIS, a sociological research company in Ukraine, conducted a WVS-based survey and found that the positive dynamics has been restored, but changes were slower compared to average change pace in the world101. On the other hand, when people are forced to focus on daily survival and security, democratic values and principles may remain in second place. The survey “What Ukrainians Know and Think of Human Rights” conducted in 2017 by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Human Rights Information Centre under initiative of the Ombudsperson, showed that such value as tolerance, compared to others, was on the last (!) place (its importance has been confirmed by only 25% of respondents of the nationwide poll), while the top places were occupied by freedom (80.3%), security (71.9%), and justice (70.1%)102.

Together with the middle class and the residents of big cities, the youth tends to support the values of self-expression, and thus, according to SOCIS findings, is a potential agent of change. Polls of the earlier years show that new generations of Ukrainians inherit their parents’ (traditional) values and, at the same time, produce modern (postmodernist) ones, like independence and self-sufficiency103. Throughout the years of Ukraine’s independence, the top life priorities of young people included family, friends, work, leisure, while religion and politics occupied the second tiers. However, success and independence have been confidently making it to the top tiers of youth’s values. For instance, according to the poll conducted in 2016, most (71.7%) young people responding to the question “What would you like to achieve in life?” chose family happiness, 48.1% selected successful career, 38% pointed out freedom and independence in their decisions, and 52% chose the opportunity to apply their talents and abilities104. Only one in four respondents prioritized wealth. Thus, Ukrainian young generation is close to their peers in European countries in terms of the focus on such postmodern values as self-sufficiency and self-realization.

This poll does not claim to comprehensively define the values of Ukrainian youth. On the contrary, it focuses on certain value clusters: the attitude towards “the Other” (tolerance), human rights, religiosity and civic responsibility. The results partially confirm the conclusions of previous surveys, refine and deepen the understanding of known trends, and reveal new ones.

Key findings

- Three top priorities of life for young people are independence, relationships career, and family.
- Young Ukrainians do not feel discriminated: around 90% of respondents have never experienced discrimination for their political views, spoken language, sexual orientation, religion, social activity, or ethnic origin.
- Sexual minorities are the category of population that suffers from critically low level of tolerance among the young people. Ukrainian youth shows less tolerance only to drug addicts, Roma, and ex-convicts. Moreover, young people are more likely to justify corruption or abortion than homosexuality.
- Only one third of Ukrainians believe that corruption and bribery can never be justified. The highest rates of support for this statement is recorded in the North of Ukraine, with the lowest in Kyiv and the East.
- Over 50% of young Ukrainians believe that poor people and people with disabilities in Ukraine do not have sufficient rights.
- One in four young women believe that women in Ukraine lack rights.

Graph 8.1. How much are the following things important to you? (only answers «Very important» and «Important»)

- Being faithful to partner — 92%
- Being faithful to friends — 89%
- Being independent — 89%
- Having children — 85%
- Having a successful career — 83%
- Taking responsibility — 82%
- Getting/beiing married — 79%
- Getting/beiing rich — 78%
- Graduating from university — 69%
- Participating in civic actions/initiatives — 24%
- Being active in politics — 22%
84% of the respondents belong to a certain religious denomination. However, only 43% of youth attend church on big holidays and only 8% weekly.

**GENERAL VALUES AND PRINCIPLES**

Today’s Ukrainian youth prioritize such non-material values as loyalty to friends and personal independence; these values are important or very important to 89% of respondents. Family is also one of the top value guides of young people. 74% of men consider marriage important or very important, while among women, the respective figure is 83%. Even more young people attach great value to having children: 81% of men consider having children important or very important; among women the respective figure is 88%. It is noteworthy that in age groups of 21-24 and 25-29 being rich or having a successful career is less important than having children.

Higher education is important for a half of respondents. This statement is shared by 69% of them. Having a successful career and being/becoming rich are also among the top priorities of Ukrainian youth. Career success and economic well-being are also among the top priorities for young Ukrainians. Successful career is considered important by 83% of respondents, while. 78% consider becoming or being rich important or very important. This data confirms that for Ukrainian youth, education is not the only preconditions for a successful career and wealth (see Education and Employment chapter).

As for the "civic" values, Ukrainian youth prioritizes a combination of survival and secular rational values: the top three values for young people in Ukraine are economic well-being of citizens (28%), human rights (18%), and security (16%)\(^{106}\). It is noteworthy that democracy didn’t enter the “top three league”; moreover, it was usually the last pick, chosen by up to 7% of the respondents, while economic well-being has been selected by almost one third of participants (28%).

When choosing from various priorities, the smallest percentage of respondents pointed out the importance of being politically active and participate in civic initiatives: 22% and 24% of respondents consider these values important or very important.

\(^{106}\) Which are the three most important values (listed above) for you personally: democracy, the rule of law, human rights, economic welfare of citizens, employment, equality, security, individual freedom?

57% of respondents stated that they belong to certain religious denomination (76% defined themselves as Orthodox). On the other hand, God is important for 65% of young Ukrainians. Regional differences about this issue are rather evident: God is most important for the respondents in West (32% said He was very important for them) and least important in the South (8%), East (11%) and Kyiv (13%). 13% of respondents consider themselves atheists. Atheistic attitudes are particularly strong in Kyiv (25%), the South (18%) and the East (20%). Thus, in terms of religiosity Ukrainian youth is somewhere in the middle compared to their peers in other European countries: for example, 95% young people in Greece consider themselves religious, in Sweden the respective figure is 60%, in Russia it’s 57%, and in Germany it is 53%\(^{107}\).

67% of respondents also noted that they originate from more or less religious families, where the parents were moderately religious or rather religious. However, it is entirely anticipated that faith in God and church attendance are not related for young people: only 43% of them, i.e. less than a half, visit church only for major holidays, and only 8% do it every week, which is not even one in ten young people.

**RELIGIOSITY**

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**HUMAN RIGHTS, TOLERANCE, AND DISCRIMINATION**

The highest level of trust among young people is observed toward family members and decreases with the distance from the family circle and circle of relatives. For instance, when answering the...
question regarding the extent of trust toward close family members, 93% of respondents chose the option "fully trust" (72%) or "rather trust" (21%). The same options were chosen by 69% and 71% of respondents respectively in the case of trust within the extended circle of family and friends. For neighbors and "permanent environment" (classmates or colleagues), the level of trust is lower. The most popular answer in this case is "neither trust, nor distrust" (37% and 39% respectively).

Individuals with identities other than the identities of the respondents (other nationalities, religions, or political views) do not enjoy the trust of Ukrainian youth. For instance, young people in Ukraine almost equally distrust people of other religions and political views: they are distrusted and rather distrusted by 43% and 46% of youth respectively, trusted and rather trusted – by 12% and 11% of the respondents. People of other nationalities are slightly more trusted by the young people in Ukraine: 17%, while not trusted by 34%.

In terms of tolerance toward different categories of population, the poll shows that Ukrainian youth demonstrates the lowest level of tolerance toward drug addicts and former prisoners.

The only national group included in the poll that does not have the trust of young people is the Roma: 56% of Ukrainian youth would feel bad or
Most young Ukrainians (43% and 45% respectively) disagree and rather disagree that Ukraine would accept more refugees and immigrants. This perspective is supported by only 15% and 13% of respondents respectively.

On the other hand, when answering the question on whether they have ever been discriminated, 90% or more responded “no” in terms of discrimination based on political views, spoken language, sexual orientation, religion, social activity, or ethnic origin. It should be noted that 92% of respondents in the South and 90% in the East have never experienced discrimination on ethnic grounds. Similarly, 89% of respondents in the East and 92% in the South have never experienced any discrimination based on their spoken language. The only exception is the economic situation and age: discrimination based on these attributes has been sometimes experienced by 16% and 13% of respondents respectively, while more than 80% have never had such experience. Importantly, no more than 1% of respondents chose the answer “often” when answering the question on the experience of discrimination based on any attribute included in this poll. This confirms that young people in Ukraine grow up and mature in a tolerant environment.

The attitudes of the younger generation of Ukrainians toward ensuring the rights of vulnerable groups of the population are also quite interesting. First, according to young Ukrainians, most of the vulnerable groups in Ukraine have sufficient rights. These groups include women (69% of respondents believe that women have sufficient rights), religious people (67%), ethnic minorities (64%), internally displaced persons (57%), children (57%), and young people themselves (54%). However, while majority of respondents believe that children and young people, i.e. themselves, and children have sufficient rights, the percentage of those who do not share this opinion is much higher than in the previous categories. For example, 35% and 31% believe that young people and children (respectively) do not have sufficient rights. Also, one in four women believe that women in Ukraine do not have sufficient rights.

As for those who are the most deprived of rights in Ukraine, young people mentioned people with disabilities and poor people, as more than a half (51% and 52% respectively) of respondents believe they have insufficient rights, while 36 and 38% believe that these categories of population have sufficient rights.

Finally, the LGBT category of the population received the most ambiguous response from young people. In case of this category, the largest number of respondents, 13%, noted that it has too many rights, compared to the respective figures for other categories of the population. 42% of young Ukrainians believe that the LGBT community has sufficient rights, 19% stated that they need more rights, and 27% were unable to answer this question.
The attitudes toward corruption among young people show certain ambiguous trends. When answering the question on the possibility of justification of giving or receiving a bribe, only 29% of respondents chose the “never” option, while the rest could justify bribery depending on the circumstances. Interestingly, respondents from the North show higher level of non-tolerance toward corruption compared to other regions of Ukraine: 54% or respondents from Northern regions believe that bribery could never be justified, while in the West, the South, Center, Kyiv, and the East, the respective figures are 33%, 33%, 20%, 19%, and 14%. Moreover, most of respondents could justify tax evasion if it is possible, as only 26% believe that such behavior can never be justified. This question also shows dramatic regional differences: while in the North, 53% condemn tax avoidance, in other regions, the respective figures are as follows: 26% in the West, 24% in the South, 21% in the Center, 16% in Kyiv, and 14% in the East.

On the other hand, young Ukrainians are not loath to the possibility of using connections to find a job or to achieve their goals in various state institutions. For instance, only 15% of respondents consider such actions inappropriate. Moreover, 79% consider working connections not only justifiable, but even necessary precondition for employment.

The indicators that could be attributed to social responsibility are also quite ambiguous. Among positive trends, we should note respect for private property. 88% of young people have never deliberately damaged or destroyed property that they do not own. Moreover, 91% of respondents have never stolen anything from stores. However, petty cheating in school or university and skipping lessons are quite popular among young Ukrainians, as only 12% have never cheated on exams or skipped classes.

Conclusions

The poll on the value guides of Ukrainian youth shows that young people in Ukraine still carry both traditional and post-Soviet values: traditional in terms of family and relationships, and post-Soviet in cases of corruption and civic responsibility. Overall, the results of this survey confirm the findings of the recent poll conducted by the Gorshenin Institute\(^\text{108}\) that confirmed that although most Ukrainians share the basic values of the European community, their perception of the European values is fragmented and controversial.

Our poll shows the preservation of existing positive and negative trends among Ukrainians aged 14 to 29. For instance, the new young generation of Ukrainians continues attaching special importance to family and related events (e.g. marriage or child birth), as well as to work and career. In this case, if we take the results of opinion polls of late 1990s and early 2000s as a benchmark, the situation hasn’t changed\(^\text{109}\). Those polls recorded that the top three priorities were also family, friends, and work.

Importantly, young people in Ukraine do not feel discriminated: 90% of respondents have never experienced discrimination based on their political views, spoken language, sexual orientation, religion, social activity, or ethnic origin. This contrasts with the relatively low level of tolerance among the youth: we see reluctance to accept migrants and refugees to Ukraine, as well as a low level of trust toward them. Level of tolerance towards the representatives of the LGBT community should be also noted. Among all minorities, the level of tolerance toward them is the lowest, exceeding only the levels observed in cases of drug addicts and former prisoners. Furthermore, Ukrainian youth lack trust toward social groups with “other” identities, i.e. those that differ from their own: people of another nationality, religion, political views, etc.

The tolerance toward corruption, tax evasion, and other forms of “unfair play” is a rather worrisome tendency among the youth in Ukraine. For instance, only a third of respondents consider tax avoidance or bribery unjustifiable. More latent forms of the “unfair play,” such as using connections for employment, cheating on exams, etc., enjoy even lower rate of opposition and rejection.

The contradiction between the results and the boom of political activity, declarations of support for the “European values,” and the unity of all citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin, spoken language, or religious beliefs that have been observed during the Revolution of Dignity, could be explained by Moghaddam’s principle of changes on macro and micro levels\(^\text{110}\). According to this principle, in the post-revolutionary period, the pace of change at the micro level of psychological processes and social practices is usually significantly lower than the pace of change at the macro level of economic and political systems. Confirmation or refutation of this hypothesis could be the basis for further research on the values of Ukrainian youth.
