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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRAGMATIZATION OF THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE .................................................. 3  
*Maksym Khylko*

WHAT DONALD TRUMP’S “PRINCIPLED REALISM” WOULD MEAN FOR TRANSATLANTIC UNITY ................................................................. 11  
*Mykola Kapitonenko*

US POLICY TOWARDS NATO UNDER DONALD J. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION: CAUSES, EUROPEAN RESPONSES, CONSEQUENCES ...................... 18  
*Mykola Bielieskov*

RUSSIA’S CHALLENGES TO THE TRANSATLANTIC UNITY ............................. 26  
*Ihor Todorov*

CHANGE OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE TRANSATLANTIC REGION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF UKRAINE .......................................................... 34  
*Valeriy Kravchenko*

THE NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS AFTER THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA .... 42  
*Agnieszka Legucka*

GAME CHANGERS: THE FACTOR OF NATO AND UKRAINE’S NATIONAL IDENTITY TRANSFORMATION .............................................................. 50  
*Olga Vasylchenko*
Evolving Partnership

Though Donald Trump’s politics drew attention of politicians and experts to the state of transatlantic relations, it would be incorrect to assume that current changes are caused merely by the position of the new US president or that after the end of his term everything will return to its previous place. Transatlantic relations constantly evolve according to the changes in global and regional environment and tendencies in economic development, responding to international crises and reflecting the social-demographic trends in both the US and European allies. Actually, there has never been a “golden age” in the transatlantic relationship.¹

The share of the EU countries in the US external trade turnover has been gradually declining since the 1970s, against the backdrop of the increase in the Asia-Pacific countries’ share, especially China (with Taiwan), South Korea, Singapore, as well as Mexico.² The

US share in the EU external trade has been also gradually decreasing, while the share of China and other Asian countries has been increasing.3 Until 1991, the US-EU ties were supported not only by trade, but also by a vital military and political alliance in the face of a common threat posed by the USSR. After the collapse of the latter, the feeling of the transatlantic security dependence began to loosen, giving way to enhancing Europe’s strive for emancipation and the growing concern of the US over the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region.

Absorbing Central and East European nations into the Western integration projects as well as establishing peace in the Balkans helped to maintain the transatlantic unity

The then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her program article “America’s Pacific Century” (2011) shaped the US priorities for the 21st century:

*The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action. [...] The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. [...] Just as Asia is critical to America’s future, an engaged America is vital to Asia’s future. The region is eager for our leadership and our business – perhaps more so than at any time in modern history.*

Though she lost the presidential election of 2016, the US economic, military, and political interests in the Asia-Pacific region remain in place. And the new American president shows no intentions to retreat from a strategically more and more important region in favour of China.

Analysing Donald Trump’s abandoning the Paris climate agreement and his warnings to review the US commitment to NATO if the European allies do not contribute fair share in defence spending, let us remember that George W. Bush in his first year of presidency publicly announced his opposition to the Kyoto protocol on climate change. The Bush Administration also warned that it might review the US commitment to NATO if the EU created a security policy separate from that of the Alliance.5 Nobody knows where it would have led the transatlantic relations if it was not for the 9/11 terrorist attacks that left behind the tough controversies among the allies, all of which declared solidarity with the US and supported invoking Article 5 –

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until it turned out that George W. Bush was not going to limit his war on terrorism by invasion of Afghanistan. The transatlantic relationship had to pass the tests of the Iraqi and the Libyan wars, and currently it is being tested with the security crisis caused by the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

US Vision of Pragmatization

Reduction in the US global-leadership capabilities amid domestic economic problems and China's rising competitiveness in the Asia-Pacific region take Washington to the need of transferring a part of its responsibility for security in Europe to the transatlantic allies. The idea of a common European army outside of NATO is logically perceived in Washington as a competitor rather than a continuation of the transatlantic unity. Hence, the US concentrates efforts on strengthening the European NATO pillar.

Donald Trump is not the first American president to consider the European allies' contribution to the transatlantic security as not fair. Withdrawal of the US troops and armament from Europe began more than a decade prior to Trump's presidency. More than two years prior to this, at the Wales NATO Summit (2014), the allies agreed to move towards spending a minimum of 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defence with no less than 20% of their annual defence spending on major new equipment. While the manner of Donald Trump's criticism of European allies is questionable, the logic is clear. In 2016, the US accounted for 45.9% of the allies' combined GDP and 68.2% of the combined defence expenditure. For the second largest NATO economy, Germany, the proportion is 10.2% and 5.1% respectively, Italy 5.6% and 2.6%, Canada 4.9% and 2.1%, etc. In 2016, only the US, Greece, Estonia, the UK, and Poland spent more than 2% of the GDP on defence, and France and Turkey were close to that point.7

The focusing of Donald Trump's criticism on Germany is quite logical in terms of his perspective of a fair distribution of costs and responsibilities in transatlantic relations. Germany's share in global exports is only 1% less than that of the US (9% for the US vs. 8% for Germany), and Germany has an incomparably better external trade balance.8 With that, Berlin spends 16 times less on defence than Washington does.9 Germany's 1.2% of GDP defence spending is considerably below the NATO guideline, and the situation with annual spending on major new equipment is even worse – with 12.2% Germany is ranked only 21st among the allies. It might seem enough given Germany's huge GDP, but a sharp criticism of the poor situation with combat readiness of the Bundeswehr's equipment indicates the opposite.10

Donald Trump's pragmatism in relations with the allies was exemplified by the announced $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia.11 Though Brookings' experts insist that it is just about letters of interest

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6 Wales Summit Declaration, NATO, 2014, [http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm].
For Eastern European countries, it may be a clear signal that Washington is going to be more specific about the price (not necessary in terms of money) that should be paid for the assistance. On the one hand, this means that it will be much more difficult to get assistance in exchange for promises to promote democracy, freedoms, and other common values. On the other hand, it may open new opportunities, because the customer, unlike the applicant for help, has more freedom to choose the goods that it exactly needs. Moreover, the vendor, unlike the grantee, feels much freer from the restrictions imposed by moral dilemmas of humanitarian nature – business is business. In other words, Kyiv has more chances to get the highly desired “Javelins” as a customer than as an assistance seeker. With that, nobody restricts the right to bargain over the price and terms of loans for the purchase of weapons.

Actually, it is about turning security clients into partners. From a long-term perspective, it would be far better for the East-Central European countries to pass this transit. By the way, Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland, a Ukrainian by origin, gave a clear vision of why it is better to invest in one’s own defence rather than just rely on allies: “To rely solely on the US security umbrella would make us a client state. And although we have an incredibly good relationship with our American friends and neighbours, such a dependence would not be in Canada’s interest. That is why doing our fair share is clearly necessary.”

**EU Strategic Autonomy Ambition**

Germany got out of the economic crisis of 2008 in the status of the EU leader, which has capabilities to impose on weaker partners its recipes for the solution of problems, initially in the economy and subsequently in foreign and security policy, including, for instance, the refugee crisis. Therefore, it seems quite logical for Washington to charge Berlin with more responsibility for the affairs in Europe. Berlin itself tends to assume more responsibility; however, its vision of such responsibility differs much from Washington’s view. Germany sees itself not as a European pillar of the transatlantic Alliance, but primarily as a leader of the emancipated Europe, which independently defines its policy.

Donald Trump’s attempts to impose his game and reluctance to follow the allies’ initiatives such as the Paris climate agreement provoked a harsh reaction of German Chancellor A. Merkel, who concluded shortly after the Taormina G-7 Summit that “the times when we could fully rely on others have passed. [...] We Europeans really have to take our fates in our own hands.” Actually, this Germany’s vision of evolution in transatlantic relations was shaped prior to D. Trump’s presidency, and was reflected in a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security

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Policy, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,” published in June 2016. The document set an ambitious aim of building the EU’s own security and defence capabilities to gain the “strategic autonomy” in these issues, resorting to security collaboration with the US mostly at the global level.\(^\text{16}\) In November 2016, the Commission presented a European Defence Action Plan, which outlined establishing the European Defence Fund and other actions to strengthen the EU’s joint defence capabilities.\(^\text{17}\)

However, it remains to be seen how exactly the EU will implement its intention to gain the “autonomy of decision and action” in security issues, especially after Brexit, and given the reluctance of the major European powers to sharply increase defence spending. So far, the EU remains strongly dependent on the US military capabilities, and this was vividly illustrated several times in the past decades, including the wars in the Balkans, the Libyan campaign, and the latest security crisis in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

It is also unclear how the EU is going to keep the strategic balance with Russia, which is building up its military presence near the EU borders. For the East-Central European nations, the EU’s aim at gaining “strategic autonomy” from the US and NATO poses a risk of a temporal emergence of a security vacuum that might be filled by Russia before the EU manages to build its own defence capacities.

The EU’s Global Strategy envisages a more active policy in conflict prevention and resolution, promising to neither recognise Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, nor accept destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. But actually, Kyiv should not count on considerable additional practical support, given that the EU’s “key tools” in conflict prevention and resolution would remain the restrictive measures (“carefully calibrated” sanctions), coupled with diplomacy. More promising is the EU’s intention to “enhance the resilience of our eastern neighbours,”\(^\text{18}\) which should naturally envisage the assistance to Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries, but most probably not of military nature.

In May 2017, the European Council adopted the “Conclusions on Security and Defence in the Context of the EU Global Strategy,” which inter alia reiterates the commitment to develop a more strategic approach of the Common and Security Defence Policy cooperation with partner countries “that share EU values” and “are able and willing to contribute to CSDP missions and operations,” with full respect to the EU’s “decision-making autonomy.”\(^\text{19}\) This is an important position to be taken into account by the Eastern European countries including Ukraine while shaping security and defence cooperation with the EU.

Amid the EU’s steps on developing its security capacities, the issues of EU-NATO relations and redistribution of responsibilities arise. NATO and the EU shared members might have to face a difficult dilemma of choice between investing more in strengthening the NATO European pillar (as Washington demands) and developing the EU’s own


capacities (as Berlin proposes). In practice, it might be quite a task to avoid duplication of functions between the EU and NATO, not to mention the issue of decision making and operative command over the military forces, especially in crisis.

**East-Central European Security Dilemmas**

The dilemma is even more difficult for the Eastern and Central European NATO and EU shared member-states, the security of which strongly depends on NATO and the US, while their economies depend on the EU, with Germany as one of the most valuable trade partners and investors.

Following the Warsaw Summit decisions (2016), four multinational battlegroups were deployed in the NATO countries on the Baltic Sea. It is indicative that just one of them is led by a European continental power, Germany (in Lithuania), while the other three are led by the UK (in Estonia), Canada (in Latvia), and the US (in Poland). It should be also mentioned that initially Germany opposed the idea of deploying NATO battlegroups in these countries.

A spring 2015 Pew Research Center survey revealed the reluctance of key European NATO members to use force to defend allies if Russia got into a serious military conflict with them. Some 58% of the Germans, 53% of the French, and 51% of the Italians opposed the idea of responding with armed force to defend the ally. Only 38% in Germany, 40% in Italy and 47% in France agreed that military force should be used. Compare this with the 56% support in the US, 53% in Canada, and 49% in the UK (the opposition to responding with armed force in these three countries is at 36%-37%).

This is also taken into account by the countries of the NATO and EU Eastern flanks when considering the reliability of the security development options proposed by Washington and Berlin.

A closer subregional cooperation may be an option to promote common interests of the East-Central European nations, and it has already proved to be effective in pushing joint initiatives within NATO. In 2015, NATO’s Eastern flank countries joined efforts to demand strengthening the Alliance’s military presence in the region. In November 2015, in Bucharest, at the summit of nine Eastern and Central European NATO member-states, the presidents of Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, and the president of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament issued a joint statement in which they expressed a grave concern about Russia’s “continuing aggressive posturing” and called for “a robust, credible and sustainable” NATO military presence in the region, as well as the deepening of cooperation between NATO and the EU.

In several months, the 2016 Warsaw Summit decisions gave positive answers to these calls, unlike the 2014 Wales Summit, which rejected similar but at that time poorly coordinated Eastern allies’ proposals.

Another subregional initiative that may become a success is the Three Seas Initiative, proposed by Poland and Croatia. In August 2016, in Dubrovnik, leaders of the 12 EU member-states located between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas, namely Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, adopted a joint

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W. Szary, CEE and Baltics Say Gravely Concerned by Russia’s ‘Aggressive’ Atance, “Reuters”, 04 November 2015, [http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/04/us-nato-cee-bucharest-idUSKCN0ST1EW20151104#tWd87y6kQ4k05D57.97].
statement endorsing the Three Seas Initiative as an informal platform for securing political support and decisive action on cross-border and macro-regional projects of strategic importance in energy, transportation, digital communication, and economic sectors in Central and Eastern Europe, aiming at making the region “more secure, safe and competitive.”22

This initiative may remind in a way of the old Polish Intermarium project, but with important distinctive features: it is pragmatically oriented, focuses on promoting certain areas of strategically important economic cooperation (including in the energy sector, LNG projects), and includes only the EU member-states that operate in a single political and business environment (though it is stressed in the joint statement that the Initiative is “open to partnerships in specific projects” with other interested state or business actors). Noteworthy is the fact that Liu Haixing, China’s Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of relations with Central and Eastern European countries, and US General James L. Jones, president of Jones Group International and President Barack Obama’s former advisor on national security, took part in the Dubrovnik summit.

The next Three Seas Initiative summit is to be held in Warsaw in July 2017, and US President Donald Trump is expected to be a guest at the summit. Poland’s President A. Duda declares that this initiative should help the region be more secure and assertive, to add to the stability and growth of the Euro-Atlantic world.23 Given Trump’s disagreements with A. Merkel on defence spending, the US interest in pushing LNG projects in Europe, and the latest Senate’s act actually authorising sanctions against companies engaged in Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, the plans of the US president to visit the Three Seas Initiative summit may indicate his resoluteness to pragmatically promote the US economic interests and play a key role in the region without a regard to the leadership ambitions of Berlin.

Conclusions

East-Central European countries have to deal with the fact that transatlantic partnership has never been and will not be constant, continuously changing in its nature and level of solidarity. With that, there are objective long-term trends, which do not depend on individual presidents and heads of governments. Among these trends is the growing economic importance of the Asia-Pacific region for both the US and the EU, as well as the social and demographic changes in Europe and the US that leave less space to the historical-ideological sentiments, and a sense of moral obligation to maintain transatlantic unity due to the common values and traditions.

The pragmatization of the transatlantic relations is a difficult and sometimes painful but still necessary process in terms of their improvement through adapting the existing pattern of partnership into a more reliable and long-lasting model.

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improvement through adapting the existing pattern of partnership into a more reliable and long-lasting model taking into account modern global realities and trends.

Given the intentions of both the US and the EU to pragmatize the transatlantic relations, the East-Central European countries including Ukraine should be prepared for communication with the Western counterparts in the business parlance, where all requests and proposals have their respective price, more often in terms of economy or security, than in terms of ideology, values, or identity.

The evolution of the transatlantic partnership will continue to affect the situation in East-Central Europe, but it is highly probable that the impact of this factor will gradually decrease, and this should be properly considered. Since Russia is not as strong as a global player as the Soviet Union was, the containment of it will hardly be listed among the top priority tasks of the US and the EU in the long run. The East-Central European countries including Ukraine should be prepared to rely mostly on themselves in providing their own security. Their ability to ensure security and stability at home and in close neighbourhood without costly interventions of the world’s major powers will be among the important factors determining the value of the East-Central European countries as allies and partners – and not only for the US and the EU.

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WHAT DONALD TRUMP’S “PRINCIPLED REALISM” WOULD MEAN FOR TRANSATLANTIC UNITY

Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko
UA: Ukraine Analytica

Donald Trump’s first foreign visit can be considered as a moment to finally provide some conceptual insight into his external policy. It has been wrapped as “principled realism”. So far, it seems to generate additional uncertainty, rather than make things more clear, especially in what concerns the future of the transatlantic strategic partnership. Undermining mutual long-term commitments is always easier, while an alternative agenda would require additional efforts. It looks like the American-European relations are heading into a crisis, marked by a lack of trust and growing strategic differences over issues that for decades used to be on a joint agenda. This article provides an assessment of how American foreign policy based on “principled realism” can affect transatlantic ties.

Introduction
Since Donald Trump was elected president, everybody has kept guessing about how his foreign policy would be different from Barack Obama’s. Lack of vision accompanied his first months in the office.

In his speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit in Saudi Arabia on 21 May, Donald Trump referred to “principled realism” as a new approach for American foreign policy. Another thing mentioned in the same speech was a $110 billion defence contract with the Saudis, which referred to realism in a more quantifiable way. Trump’s later speech at NATO Headquarters focused on the GDP percentage spent by the countries for collective defence, while falling short of sending a clear signal to NATO member-states as to whether the US should consider Article 5 of the Washington Treaty binding. Earlier and later the rhetoric by the American president on the US relations with Europe makes one wonder how “principled realism” would affect transatlantic partnership,

1 President Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit, White House, 21 May 2017, [https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/21/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit].
arguably the most important partnership for both the US and Europe.

**What “Principled Realism” Is About**

A combination of values and interests under the notion of “principled realism” is challenging, at least from the international relations theory perspective. The phrase clearly points at a pragmatic foreign policy, which takes values, norms, and principles into account. But it is exactly the way it does so, as well as the exchange ratio for values and pragmatic interests, which is at the centre of debate. How easy is it to combine pragmatism and principles?

Fundamentally, realism is about states pursuing their interests, defined in terms of power. There are several distinguishing things a realist observes in world politics.

First, there is anarchy. No supranational institutions or world government can prevent states from doing what they want or make them do what they do not want. Rules of the game are defined by the balance of power, and are as unstable and flexible as the latter. Lack of institutions and norms leads to lack of trust, mutual fear, and preventive actions. In words of K. Waltz, anarchy is a permissive cause of war, and neorealists heavily rely on this assumption. A realist foreign policy takes anarchy for granted and has no illusions about the efficiency of multilateral regimes or international norms. In an anarchical environment, states can rely only on themselves.

Secondly, international politics is state-centric. There are thousands of non-state actors in the world, from international corporations to lobby groups, but only relations among states matter. States shape agendas, define priorities, and monopolise diplomacy and warfare. Consequently, bodies, which are installed by states, e.g. international organisations, are either instruments or facilitators of states’ goals, desires, and intentions. For a realist, international regimes matter very little, while international norms are relative and weak. Breaking them is easy if it brings about relative gains.

Relative gains, in turn, are better than absolute ones, according to the realist perspective. It means that a realist carefully examines not so much what he or she can get from a partnership, but how a mutual gain would be shared. What really matters is the relative size of a gain, comparing to others. Gaining a smaller part is a bad option, since it will make one weaker compared to someone getting a bigger one. From this point, it is better to abstain from any cooperation at all. Not surprisingly, realists are sceptical about long-term cooperation, just as they are about international regimes and institutions, which may arise from it.

Thirdly, in shaping the agenda of international relations, states prioritise security concerns. Among a variety of spheres, they pick political and military as the key ones. This hierarchy of issues dominates any agenda.

Finally, negative scenario thinking is a common feature of realism. Since states do not trust each other and there are no supranational institutions to install that trust, the best strategy would be the most cautious one. It is always better to assume the worst intentions among one’s partners and to be ready for a possible backstab.

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The realist line of thinking is quite difficult to merge with principle-guided policy. The latter presumes norms and values as high priorities, be it ideological, religious, or any other. Shared principles help create common identities, at least in what concerns security issues. Partly that is why democracies almost never fight each other, just as Canada and the US are friends, not enemies. Common values and principles make it easier for states to trust each other and make their policies more sustainable and predictable. The security dilemma, so common and destructive within the realist worldview, may be ameliorated by shared norms.

Taking these considerations into account, “principled realism” would hardly be a comprehensive strategy. Realism demands suspicion, while common principles require trust; realism is about relative gains, while principles are about shared values; and last but not least – shared principles allow free riding, while realism strongly discourages from it.

Theoretically doubtful, this formula nevertheless may become a reflection of the US grand strategy and, in particular, its policy towards the European allies.

**Free Riding Effect on Transatlantic Agenda**

Applying “principled realism” to the US relations with the European allies may cast doubts over the long-term loyalty and durability of this strategic partnership. This is the most dangerous part. American policy towards NATO, guided by a mix of interests and principles, may actually take different forms. A new approach will surely provide Washington with additional space for manoeuvre. Probably, this is the level of flexibility D. Trump is after; however, the price may go too high.

At the heart of the current disagreement, or at least at what seems to bother the US president regarding NATO, lies the issue of free riding. This is the effect that enables different agents to enjoy the same level of consumption of some common good, even without equal contribution into generating it. This is usually the case with non-divisible resources. In the case of NATO, such common good is security. Since NATO is a collective defence system, it

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> “principled realism” would hardly be a comprehensive strategy. Realism demands suspicion, while common principles require trust; realism is about relative gains, while principles are about shared values;

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maintains the same level of commitment to all its members. No matter how big or small a member of alliance is, joint forces of the rest will protect it. This is a powerful deterrent for any potential adversary. Ability and readiness of the members of the Alliance to stand for each other is a matter of strategic and utmost importance. Credibility of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is the main reason for NATO’s overwhelming record.

This creates opportunities for free riding. Only five NATO member-states – the United Kingdom, Estonia, Greece, Poland, and the US – spend no less than 2% of their GDP on defence. Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg spend less than 1% of the GDP, while Iceland almost spends nothing, with less than 0.1%. Per capita annual spending is highest in the US (over $1,800) and Norway (about $1,400), with all the rest below the $1,000 level. In Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Romania, per capita spending is less than $200.6 Clearly, there is a huge distance,
and that opens a gap for free riding. There are member-states in NATO that care little about defence, save money, and enjoy the same level of security as the champions of military spending. But does that mean that NATO is a deal that benefits some of the states at the expense of the others?

NATO’s overall military budget is about $1.4 billion; civilian budget is over $250 million; and the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) budget adds another $700 million to the total. The US covers about 23% of direct contributions to the NATO budget, while second-placed Germany’s share is about 15%.\(^7\) The structure of the Alliance’s budget looks much less unbalanced, with major European contributors – Germany, France, and Great Britain – spending no less than the US. Moreover, it was the decision of the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014 to gradually move towards 2% of GDP level of military spending for all member-states.\(^8\) For some states, this has been unrealistic to achieve immediately.

However, NATO’s main deterrent is the military power of the member-states combined and the readiness to employ it, not the Alliance’s operational forces and peacekeeping missions. From this perspective, simply having the American security guarantees is a huge advantage for most of the small and medium European states. They may pursue a flexible foreign policy within that framework and also save money by lowering military spending.

From the current American perspective, that should be changed. President Trump is not the first among the US leaders to raise the issue of a fairer burden-sharing within NATO. That has been around for some while, even at the times of the Cold War. What make Trump’s rhetoric different are the speculations about the possible lowering of levels of US commitment to the Alliance. If the American president utilises this as an argument to persuade the allies to spend more, it may not be the best tactics. Side effects will include weakening of trust within NATO and undermining the US strategic interests.

**European-American Unity: What is at Stake**

Global security, nuclear non-proliferation, and democratic values are the most important outcomes of the transatlantic strategic partnership. Each of them may to a certain extent be endangered if the newly adopted “principled realism” is based much more on realism than on principles. A strategic alliance within NATO gave way to the world’s most institutionalised security network, which now encompasses several multilateral organisations and regimes on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. More than 70 years of durable peace in Europe, a continent that previously hosted the most devastating wars in history, is the result.

Stability may fall the first victim to D. Trump’s understanding of realism in foreign policy as making everybody pay for security. Unlike money, security is indivisible.
indivisible. Free riding will always be there. But the riding may not necessarily be so free. NATO members pay for their security with readiness to take joint risks and to be militarily involved if necessary. A high level of solidarity is the common good created within the Alliance and enjoyed by all its members. This, in turn, generates a high level of trust. The member-states know what to expect from each other and adapt their policies respectively. Trust allowed the Europeans to shift from a traditional Realpolitik of the 19th century to the current neoliberal paradigm, and NATO has played a crucial role in this.

Some global security issues are also at stake and will heavily depend on the future of transatlantic partnership. The most important of them from the US perspective is the non-proliferation regime. One of the utmost strategic interests of the US is to keep the number of states with nuclear weapons as low as possible. For about seven decades, American efforts have been quite effective, and the number of states with nuclear arsenal is strikingly low, given the importance of the technology and the desire of many to possess it. Extended security commitments work perfectly well to discourage states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Arguably, Germany and Japan are still non-nuclear due to American security guarantees. It is critically important for the non-proliferation regime to function properly to keep credible US security commitments in Europe.

Democracy is probably an institution that can stick interests and principles together. Democratic values and procedures do help to frame and channel foreign policy aspirations of states and tools they use to achieve desired outcomes. Shared democracies on a bilateral level generate mutual trust and help construct positive perceptions. In security terms, mutual democracy helps ameliorate security dilemma in relations between two states. It remains to be seen whether “principled realism” will be principled enough to keep emphasis on democratic values.

**Contours of Possible New Transatlantic Security**

If a more realistic approach is taken by the US Administration, Europe will have to respond. A drift away from neoliberalism, already visible in Europe, will be reinforced. Strengthening of states, more emphasis on hard power, and less institutionalised security could be a likely outcome.

Consolidating security policy on a state level would further weaken the EU’s common security and defence policy. It is already facing serious problems in dealing with Russia’s revisionism and the refugee crisis. Both challenges require concerted actions and similar priority setting, while the level of cohesion among the European states remains low. A general framework, within which the European Neighbourhood Policy is being carried out, may collapse. So far, it has been based on the common interest of the European states to have a friendly, democratic, and prosperous environment and application of the EU’s normative power to that end. However, with a weakened CSDP, the member-states’ priorities may split. With a growing pressure from Russia, geopolitical considerations may become more important, at least for some European states. The understanding of security may also change: While for some it will remain broad and transnational, for others it may become more traditional, with emphasis on hard power.

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Departure of the United Kingdom from the EU would enhance those trends. First, the UK was a transatlantic bridge without which the Americans and Europeans would find it more difficult to speak the same strategic language. Secondly, without the UK, a balance within the EU will be disturbed, and its restoration may go along the lines of countering the Berlin-Paris tandem. In this case, European politics may over time return to a more traditional balance of power model, which will result in increasing differences over strategic issues.

More realism for European security will result in more emphasis on hard power and growing military spending.10 Proceeding from worst-case scenarios and entrapped into the security dilemma, the European states will become more inclined to unilateral decision making. The rising value of military advantage will result in further increase of military budgets, which in some cases may lead to local arms races. It should be noted that geography will contribute to divorcing strategic interests: The EU member-states in Eastern Europe and/or the Black Sea region will feel less secure due to neighbouring Russia. If any major crisis appears on the horizon, it will become an uneasy test for the credibility of collective defence systems in Europe.

Tackling the Russian threat and elaborating a long-term strategy towards the current Eastern Partnership states will be another challenge for a more realist European security. Recent events in Ukraine proved that Russia is ready to pay a high price for securing geopolitical control over the post-Soviet space, of which Ukraine is the most important element. A new stability in Europe will in that case resemble the Cold War type of bilateral balancing, rather than the recent neoliberal models. Risks of local and regional conflicts will continue to rise.

The already existing regional conflicts would be harder to resolve. That will be even more so in the sphere of Russia’s perceived interests. Post-Soviet frozen conflicts have never been close to any sort of resolution, but for now, each of them will become a zero-sum game. Geopolitical rivalry, imagined or real, will accompany any regional conflict.

The weakening of the transatlantic ties will reinforce almost every negative trend in European security. American commitments, involvement, and institutional support generated a broader approach to security, helping it overcome hard-power realist limitations. With the weakening of those, Europe may find it much more difficult to manage a balance-of-power system.

Conclusion

A. Merkel’s speech in Munich, days after Trump’s voyage to Europe, indicated that the American message on “principled realism” has been delivered and properly received. The German chancellor stressed that times have changed and the Europeans have to take care of themselves.11 This surely has a pre-election connotation. Nevertheless, the essence is also here: There is a growing gap between the US and Europe, the world’s closest and most durable allies. This may result in a tectonic geopolitical shift with far-reaching consequences, including growing security risks for both.

Donald Trump’s realism may be too realistic to handle the strategic alliance with the Europeans, in which values used to play a crucial role. On the other hand, “principles” may not be enough to fix the damage done to mutual trust. It is easy to start doubting the intentions and reliability of each other, while it will be much more difficult to get confidence back.

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US POLICY TOWARDS NATO UNDER DONALD J. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION: CAUSES, EUROPEAN RESPONSES, CONSEQUENCES

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In this article, the attempt is made to study the causes of US policy towards the North Atlantic Alliance under the administration of the 45th US president. American policy is analysed through the prism of renegotiation/new bargain concepts and from the standpoint of US domestic political considerations. This article also provides an analysis of European policy alternatives in response to the current US policy towards NATO and dilemmas inherent to each alternative. The article also features a brief analysis of why NATO still corresponds to US national interests to make a case that a policy of undermining this Alliance would run counter to American long-term strategic considerations.

NATO, as any international intergovernmental organisation, is in constant need to prove its worthiness to its member-states and by this preserve its very existence. The 21st century presents distinct challenges to the North Atlantic Alliance in this regard – the ongoing debate over which issues it should tackle (terrorism and instability emanating from North Africa and the Middle East or Russian revisionism in all forms) is amplified by the fact that most members do not spend the bare minimum on defence to make the Alliance more capable to confront those challenges. US President Donald Trump’s approach towards NATO not only makes those dilemmas more urgent but also creates additional risks, which concern the very foundations of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Donald Trump’s New Consensus on NATO

The incumbent president of the US has come to office with an idea to renegotiate

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1 The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the IWP.

agreements that in his opinion are inimical to the true American national interests. First of all, this approach concerns free trade agreements signed by the US. But in a broader sense Donald J. Trump's administration's policy towards NATO can be interpreted as another attempt to renegotiate core tenets underpinning the North Atlantic Alliance.

The incumbent president of the US has come to office with an idea to renegotiate agreements that in his opinion are inimical to the true American national interests.

New modus vivendi suggested to NATO allies by the new US presidential administration comes to two provisions in essence. First, the North Atlantic Alliance has to switch its attention and resources to fighting terrorism from the original task of territorial defence of its member-states. In Donald Trump's view, terrorism (especially the one tightly connected with Islam) is an existential threat to the US in the 21st century. And as the threat from the USSR, a raison d'être of the North Atlantic Alliance's creation and existence, disappeared long ago, NATO must find a new mission, which would prove its worthiness under new circumstances. Combating terrorism serves this task perfectly well according to the new US president. Second, any mutual defence assistance by the US under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (1949) should be contingent upon and more tightly bound to the fulfilment of the pledge agreed upon by the member-states in 2006 to spend at least 2% of their GDP on national defence. Now only five of the 29 member-states spend this amount of annual wealth on defence. But even those countries which do spend the necessary share of the GDP, such as Great Britain, attain this benchmark using special accounting methods by including in the defence spending things like social benefits to retired servicemen, which has nothing to do with national defence and security itself. This state of affairs, in Donald Trump's view, is unfavourable to US national interests and needs to be remedied. At the same time, this very state of affairs in Trump's view has made NATO obsolete.

That is why representatives of the Trump Administration, such as Minister of Defence James Mattis and Vice President Mike Pence, while recognising US obligations under Article 5 towards its allies during the reassuring tour in Europe in February 2017, also stressed the urgent need for them to comply with the 2% pledge. The US minister of defense was especially blunt at the meeting in Brussels when he stated: "If your nations do not want to see America moderate its commitment to this alliance, each of your capitals needs to show support for our common defence".

The US president’s new terms of engagement with NATO allies were clearly articulated in the address delivered at the Alliance mini-summit on 25 May 2017. The major part of his speech was dedicated to the problems of fighting terrorism and the issue that most North Atlantic Alliance members underspend on defence. The US president specifically stated that at least 119 billion dollars should be paid by European allies for defence to meet the 2% target. On the other hand, Donald Trump barely paid attention to the core mission of NATO – territorial defence – though the European allies first of all anticipated that the US president in his speech would reiterate commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. But what is more important, this speech at the NATO headquarters can be interpreted as the parameters of a new consensus with regards to this collective defence organisation promoted by the US presidential administration.

Europeans’ Response to New Terms of Engagement

The Europeans’ reaction to these new parameters of the North Atlantic Alliance consensus suggested by the US up until recently was largely a very specific case of bandwagoning, where the Europeans try to accommodate US demands in order to preserve its commitments under the Washington Treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance in general. The Europeans and officials at the NATO headquarters tried to present recent moves specifically as a response to Donald Trump’s demands. In the case of fighting terrorism, NATO inaugurated at the February 2017 meeting the Hub for the South at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples. This hub will work specifically with the threats emanating from North Africa and the Middle East, where terrorism is the major issue. Moreover, NATO has been already engaged in fighting ISIS by committing AWACS planes and conducting training of the Iraqi army. In addition to these steps, NATO at the mini-summit in May 2017 agreed to officially join a US-led anti-ISIS coalition. All these measures give NATO officials the arguments to prove their usefulness in fighting terrorism, which is one of the major priorities of the US foreign policy under Donald J. Trump administration. Nonetheless even American think tanks closely affiliated with this administration admit that NATO can play only a partial role in combating terrorism, as its core mission and organisational structure are dedicated to the task of territorial defence of its member-states first of all.

As to the issue of the unmet 2% target of the GDP for defence, member-states reiterated the promise to gradually increase the spending – Germany pledged to do it by 2024 and France


11 A. Beesley, NATO to Formally Join Anti-ISIS Coalition, “Financial Times”, 24 May 2017, [https://www.ft.com/content/5c32e42e-40a3-11e7-82b6-896b95f30f58 access: 18 June 2017].

by 2022. At the abovementioned NATO summit, it was agreed that till the end of 2017 all member states that underspend on their defence would present a plan on how they are going to remedy this situation.

Towards a New Equation That Did Not Materialize

Based on the transactional approach favoured by Donald Trump, the European allies anticipated that the American president would clearly commit the US to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Europeans tried to create an impression of assuaging all concerns stated by the White House with regards to NATO functioning and expected reciprocal acts from the head of the White House. Public statements of the US president in February-April 2017 were very promising in this regard. In his State of the Union address on 28 February 2017, Donald Trump declared that NATO European allies started to pay more money for their defence, "But our partners must meet their financial obligations. And now, based on our very strong and frank discussions, they are beginning to do just that. In fact, I can tell you, the money is pouring in". Also at the meeting with NATO Secretary General on 12 April 2017, the US president stated that he no longer considered the North Atlantic Alliance obsolete. This change of attitude may be explained by the fact that NATO allies, according to the US president, started to fight terrorism: “The Secretary General and I had a productive discussion about what more NATO can do in the fight against terrorism. I complained about that a long time ago and they made a change, and now they do fight terrorism”. This in turn led to the specific anticipation on the part of US’s European allies that in his speech in Brussels the US president would explicitly reiterate American commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and that he would do it while emphasising the automatic armed response in case of aggression to strengthen the deterrence effect to overcome the ambiguities embedded in Article 5. But Donald Trump in his speech did not mention the obligations of collective defence, despite the fact that the text cleared by the Minister of Defence, Secretary of State, and National Security Adviser included a passage with the Article 5 commitment. This undermined the very approach of conditionality and transactionalism favoured by the incumbent US president – while the European allies try to live up to their part of the bargain promoted by Donald Trump, the head of the White House in turn refuses to reciprocate with acts expected by the partners in return. The damage done at the NATO mini-summit

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14 Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meeting of NATO Heads of State and/or Government in Brussels on 25 May, NATO, 26 May 2017, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoq/opinions_144098.htm access: 18 June 2017].


16 Joint Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of the United States, Donald Trump, NATO, 12 April 2017, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoq/opinions_143135.htm access: 18 June 2017].

17 T. Wright, Trump’s NATO Article 5 Problem, Brookings Institution, 17 May 2017, [https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/17/trumps-nato-article-5-problem/ access: 18 June 2017].

18 S. Pifer, Is Trump Undoing Trans-Atlantic Relations?, Brookings Institution, 31 May 2017, [https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/31/is-trump-undoing-trans-atlantic-relations/ access: 18 June 2017].
was only partially compensated by the statement made by President Donald Trump to uphold commitments under Article 5 two weeks later at the press-conference with the president of Romania.\textsuperscript{19} The request of the Department of Defence made the same week as the NATO mini-summit as to a 41\% increase in the funding for the European Reassurance Initiative in the fiscal year 2018 to a total of 4.8 billion dollars also could not improve the situation.\textsuperscript{20} This new state of affairs was best exemplified by German chancellor Angela Merkel's statement on 28 May 2017 that Europe no longer can rely on outside powers.\textsuperscript{21}

**Europeans' Alternatives**

This erodes the very foundation of the new consensus concerning NATO promoted by the US presidential administration. It also forces the Europeans to look for a back-up plan in case of a need. The idea to revive the common defence policy within the framework of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy was gaining traction all along 2016, even before Donald J. Trump was elected US president.\textsuperscript{22} But it got much more urgency after November 2016 amid strategic ambiguity promoted by the statements of the new White House head.\textsuperscript{23} Before the NATO mini-summit, the most optimal alternative for the Europeans was just to pay more and require reciprocal steps under Article 5 on the part of the US. However, the Brussels mini-summit in May 2017 demonstrated that this strategy might not deliver appropriate results in the end. That is why separate measures undertaken by the EU to increase its strategic autonomy and strengthen defence capability make sense.

On 7 June 2017, the European Commission proposed two major initiatives, which would help to decrease redundancy and ensure that funds allocated for defence are spent more efficiently.\textsuperscript{24} One plan envisages financial assistance if at least eight EU countries agree to develop new military technology together. Another scheme will allow to jointly develop and buy new weapons systems starting from 2019. These measures, despite being very limited in terms of actual funding, in the view of Brussels might help to nudge separate EU countries to use their defence budgets more efficiently.

For instance, currently the Europeans have 19 (!) different types of infantry fighting vehicles. This favours national military industrial complexes but hardly the interests of common European defence. This is only one example when interests at the national level prevail over the interests at supranational one in the field of defence.\textsuperscript{25} And this is one of the reasons why despite spending 226 billions of dollars on defence and having more people in

\footnotesize{19} S. Glasser, Trump National Security Team Blindsided by NATO Speech, Politico, 05 June 2017, [http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/05/trump-nato-speech-national-security-team-215227 access: 18 June 2017].


\footnotesize{24} G. Baczynska, R. Emmott, Trump and Brexit Give Momentum to EU Defense Push, "Reuters", 7 June 2017, [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-defence-research-idUSKBN18Y0SA access: 18 June 2017].

arms than Russia, it would be still difficult for the EU to confront Russian aggression in case of a need without the US assistance. There are a number of areas in the defence field where the EU countries lag behind the US – such as intelligence and reconnaissance, strategic airlift, precision weaponry, low observability technologies, etc. These capabilities are very critical in securing the ability to fight a high-intensity war with a near peer competitor. The EU can alleviate the situation in these areas only through a constant financing of new projects over long periods of time. This will require major reforms to reduce redundancy and waste of resources and it will be counter to vested interests of national military industrial complexes. Moreover, increased defence spending will magnify the burden on the already indebted countries of the EU and run against pacifism embedded in the strategic culture of many European states. Yet, on the other hand, it will strengthen the negotiation position of the EU countries and provide them with alternatives in case the US would not uphold its part of the proposed bargain. In the end, uncertainty created by the US policy towards NATO under the new presidential administration pushes the EU allies in the direction of strategic autonomy. However, the hypothetical EU policy of attaining strategic autonomy carries its own dilemmas.

**Does NATO Still Correspond with US Interests?**

In the end, loosening of the transatlantic alliance may negatively affect the US position in the world, despite the popularity of free riding ideas among the European allies. First of all, Europe allied with the US and protected by American security guarantees helps to uphold a balance of power in world politics favourable for Washington. The combined GDP of the European allies and the US is more than 50% of world accumulated wealth, and bilateral trade accounts for 30% of all world trade, while foreign direct investment from the EU amounts to 80% of all FDI in the US economy. Thus, the American security umbrella protects mutually beneficial flows of trade and investment.

Permanent presence of the US forces in Europe through NATO allows Europeans to project power in other neighbouring regions and parts of the world such as North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Arctic in case of a need. Ensuring a physical ability to project power in any corner of the world means retaining the super power status. On the other hand, only 5% of the US forces (two brigades and one armoured brigade combat team in Europe) are dedicated specifically to the defence of NATO allies now. At the same time, the budget of the European

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Reassurance Initiative in 2017 was only 3.4 billion dollars, which means that defence of Europe costs for Washington rather little in terms of both manpower and finances compared to the Cold War period.

In turn, it gives the US not only the ability to project power in other flashpoints but also tips the balance of power in world politics in its favour. The EU also provides annually 2/3 of humanitarian aid and funding to international organisations, which together helps the US in upholding order in the world. Support from the European allies in a broad range of issues also makes it easier for the US to promote its position and make decisions previously discussed with the Europeans more legitimate. So despite the fact that majority of the European allies do not comply with the 2% target, preservation of NATO corresponds to the US national interests if those interests are centred at maintenance of a liberal world order.

**NATO as a Domestic Policy Issue – the US and German Contexts**

On the other hand, Donald Trump’s new proposed bargain to the European allies and his constant criticism of NATO may be explained through the prism of US domestic politics. During the election campaign, the necessity to fight terrorism and force allies around the world to pay their fair share for defence were among the major recurrent topics. Electoral triumph is seen by the current head of the White House as a mandate to enforce changes in the abovementioned fields. Later, this sense was reinforced by the need to show practical results of the presidency while progress on the major issues of domestic politics was largely blocked. Donald Trump’s declaration in February and April 2017 that allies started to pay up money and fight terrorism might be interpreted, first of all, as the attempts to show his voters in the US that he delivers results according to the promises made during the presidential campaign. All this is despite the fact that an increase in defence spending by the European allies in 2016 has nothing to do with the US president’s policies and is, first of all, the fulfilment of the pledges made during the 2014 NATO Wales summit. The same is happening with the fight against terrorism as NATO started to confront this challenge during the last decade after 9/11, but not after Donald J. Trump assumed office. However, for the US president, those details are of secondary importance, while his interpretation of the situation with the defence spending or fighting terrorism by NATO facilitates him in presenting himself as an effective president.

This approach of exploiting foreign policy issues in domestic politics carries another set of risks as domestic consideration of allies may make it harder to achieve stated aims. The current situation in Germany perfectly illustrates the inherent risks. First of all, Germany is the main target of the US criticism when it comes to the issue of defence spending among the Europeans – there is a major discrepancy between the German economic potential and the funds allocated to defence. The government of Angela Merkel admits the existence of the problem and promised in 2014 to meet its obligations concerning the defence spending in 10 years. But the readiness of the Christian Democratic Union

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to accommodate American demands on defence came under criticism by the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Leaders of this party disagree with the need to fulfil the 2% obligation, arguing that Europeans do much more in the field of humanitarian security, which compensates for its unmet obligation of 2% of the GDP for defence. This debate in Germany concerning the need to meet NATO obligations is taking place in the context of the 2017 parliamentary elections. According to the polls, more than 60% of all Germans are strongly against increasing defence spending. The SDP is trying to exploit these sentiments among the general population, trying to lure pacifist voters through drawing a contrast with the CDU. This context creates a very difficult situation for Angela Merkel, who has to strike a balance between the need to respond positively to demands of the White House and conducting policy corresponding to the prevailing sentiment among the German population.

Conclusions

The US policy towards NATO under the current administration is creating additional risks not only to the functioning but also to the very existence of the North Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, this very policy can be explained from two standpoints – an approach to NATO as a process of renegotiation and making a new bargain with the European allies and the exploitation of NATO-related issues in the context of US domestic politics.

The process of NATO tenets’ renegotiation and a new bargain with the European allies as part of a broader US foreign policy was undermined at the Brussels mini-summit by Donald Trump. As the US president did not reiterate unambiguously the commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, he called into question the utility of European efforts to accommodate the US demands in the context of NATO. This creates more incentives for European countries to approve measures to strengthen their strategic autonomy from the US, which in turn might undermine the transatlantic alliance. Only the dilemmas inherent to the policy of achieving a strategic autonomy constrain the EU from adopting a more radical approach of distancing itself from the US in the defence field. At the same time, the preservation of NATO continues to correspond to the US national interests.

Attempts of Donald Trump to use issues related to NATO in US domestic politics can also explain the current approach adopted and pursued by the White House towards the North Atlantic Alliance. But such attempts may backfire as domestic political contexts in the European countries may inhibit such policy – Donald Trump’s demands to pay more for defence may strengthen those political parties in the EU countries that are against increasing military expenditures, with all respective consequences.

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Introduction

Transatlantic unity that has been hardened by the Cold War and the fight against terrorism is going through hard times. Based on common values including democracy, individual freedom, human rights, and rule of law, the Euro-Atlantic community is under growing pressure from the Russian Federation. Russia’s reluctance to follow the generally accepted rules and norms of behaviour in the modern world follows from its intention to return to a model of the world order dominated by the right of force, where a stronger state can interfere in internal affairs of a weaker one, where economic incentives are replaced by threats and blackmail. Russia, with its nuclear potential and energy capabilities, has become a significant threat to democratic values. International mechanisms established to maintain peace and stability did not prove to be ready for such a development.

Leading security institutions, especially the UN and the OSCE, have demonstrated their inability to counter the military aggression, their reaction coming to nothing more than showing concerns, anxiety, and appeals to stop aggression. Events around Ukraine also revealed the lack of effectiveness of the European Union and NATO’s policy. The policy of Russia’s “engagement” or appeasement, which was based on the general attitude of treating it as a predictable and reliable partner, failed. Evidence suggests the growing threat of a large-scale armed clash, especially in Europe.

Recent steps by the Kremlin not only undermine regional security in Europe, but they also put transatlantic unity under the test. Partly this is a result of the overall degrading of international institutions in times of crisis, but also it is an effect of Russia’s deliberate efforts to dismantle key transatlantic institutions. Moscow’s revisionist policy is challenging foundations of the world order, in which long-term partnership between the US and Europe has always been a key element. Whether American and European strategic interests will still be overlapping is a focus of this article.
Reunification or War

In 1992, there was a conversation between the first Ukrainian ambassador in Moscow Volodymyr Kryzhanivsky and the Russian deputy Sergey Baburin. When the ambassador asked how Russia saw the prospects of the two countries’ relationship, the deputy replied, “Reunification or war.” When Kryzhanivsky asked, “Don’t you anticipate that we can cooperate as good neighbours?”, Baburin answered, “I have explained to you clearly: reunification or war”.

In 2007, Russia withdrew from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which removed control over the movements of its armed forces and lifted all flanking restrictions. This created conditions for holding Russian full-scale military exercises in the Caucasus, regrouping large forces, and the invasion to Georgia in 2008. A similar scenario was implemented in Ukraine in 2014. Using the absence of accountability under the said treaty, Russia is now taking steps to accommodate powerful military groups and carriers of nuclear weapons in Crimea. By increasing its own military potential, Russia stimulates a new arms race and thus increases the risk of an armed conflict in Europe. Another worrying fact is that Russia’s military doctrine involves the use of nuclear weapons even in an ordinary course of an armed conflict or when there arises a threat to its citizens’ interests on the territory of other countries. The threat of nuclear blackmail is becoming higher in view of the statements of Russian politicians and journalists within Russia’s confrontation with the West. Russia argues that new threats at the perimeter of its southern borders require modernisation of its nuclear arsenal.

Russia is positioning itself as a global power that seeks to change the world order at its discretion. Military tension at the borders of Russia with neighbouring countries is not reduced, because the Kremlin supports it consciously. Challenges from Russia are increasing. Russia wants to participate in decision making concerning all important global issues. They believe that they are entitled to the right to influence the post-Soviet countries, and these countries have limited sovereignty. Russia also believes that it is a civilised alternative to the West. In our opinion, Russia’s main tools of influence are nuclear weapons and modernised army. A policy of deterrence and the North Atlantic Alliance’s protection guarantee would be a response to such provocations.

The Russian Federation sets the tasks to undermine the European and transatlantic unity, dilute the values on which the Western society is based. And so far Russia has received no adequate response from the West. By escalating violence in the east of Ukraine, Russia continually tests the strength of the transatlantic unity, quite successfully so far. Only Russia has benefited from any “Normandy format” meetings. Therefore, Western leaders can really express nothing but “deep concern”.

Russian propaganda is extremely widespread and convincing. Russia aims not so much to distort the image of Ukraine specifically, but to use war – informational and actual fighting in Donbas – as a means of splitting the Euro-Atlantic space. It looks like Russia has long pretended to be a responsible partner to deal with and a systemic political play, without in fact being it. Russia has an extensive experience in subversive activities. The Soviet Union conducted massive propaganda in

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1 День – 2015. 23 червня.
2 Военная доктрина Российской Федерации от 25 декабря 2014 г. [https://rg.ru/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html].
3 Ядерное оружие и безопасность России в 21 веке, [http://www.geopolitica.ru].
Western countries, in particular, by influencing left-wing and right-wing political movements in Europe. It would be simplistic to explain everything by corruption, though sometimes the corruption component is also obvious. Russian propaganda in the West effectively influences the European society. Russia skilfully uses different information means, playing on differences in Europe and on the differences between the US and Europe. Russia is trying to divide the transatlantic alliance, supporting the parties with Eurosceptic and anti-American rhetoric. All our activities are aimed to counter Russian propaganda and should be aimed to combat it.

An important factor of the Russian influence is the fact that it remains one of the largest suppliers of hydrocarbon energy to the EU, which is still largely dependent, in this respect, on Russian supplies. The Old World’s energy dependence on Russian energy has become a factor that contributes to many European governments’ loyalty to Moscow and its policy. In some capitals, especially in Budapest, Vienna, and Rome, they fear the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian gas wars and want to safeguard themselves by setting a regime of “special relationship” with Russia. Many European producers urged politicians to restore good relations with Russia and abolish restrictive measures.

The EU tends to greatly exaggerate their losses from the sanctions imposed on Russia and “food” embargo in response. Amounts of money in the billions are mentioned, which are not proven by facts and often include not only lost profits but also the indicators of reduced Russian exports to a particular country, scoring them as their own losses. Without really figuring out what actually the EU banned to sell in Russia, the European manufacturers moan about the falling sales of cars and footwear, building materials and furs, clothing and perfume, and even jewellery in Russia. However, the EU sectoral sanctions against Russia cover only the products and technologies for military and dual-use, as well as high-tech equipment for oil extraction in the Arctic, in the deep shelf, and for shale oil extraction. The EU also tightened restrictions on lending and investment services of a number of Russian banks and companies (defence concerns primarily).

**Russia’s Attempts to Divide Europe**

Aiming to create the “right” mood in the European society, the Russians exploit the Europeans’ disposition to pacifism, using conservatism and anti-Americanism, call for common “spiritual braces” and the traditional “family values”, use Slavophil and Russophile sentiments, and manipulate on the fears of new EU enlargement and “neo-Nazis” in Kyiv. Using elements of soft power via its embassies and missions of Rossotrudnichestvo, the Kremlin is trying to change public opinion in the EU countries. Financial opportunities of Gazprom, Russian Railways, Rosneft, Lukoil, and other representatives of big Russian business let the Russians in Europe to promote the “Russian world” and spread myths about the “American-sponsored coup in Kyiv”. The struggle for the minds and hearts of the Europeans is also led by propagandists of the TV broadcaster Russia Today, who not only visualise the loss of European business resulting from mutual sanctions, but also relentlessly revile Ukraine.

Referendums in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the elections in the United States, Austria, Bulgaria, and France were held under pressure from the Kremlin, extremely interested in changing the moods in Europe. An American historian Timothy Snyder believes that the attack on Ukraine

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4 Т. Силіна, В. Кравченко, Викрадення Європи, [https://gazeta.dt.ua/international/vikradennya-yevropi-1-_.html].
is part of Moscow’s massive plan to divide Europe. If the EU collapses into many countries, Russia will look stronger on their background.\(^5\)

The escalation of the conflict in Donbas is the Kremlin’s attempt to assert itself as a key player in the international arena once again, especially given the changes in the geopolitical situation. At this stage, such attempts do not bring the Russian Federation the expected results, the sanctions remain in force, the international community, in majority, continues to support Ukraine. However, according to M. Demjanenko, the fact that Ukraine has become a hostage in the game of the ‘heavyweights’ in world politics calls for a response and strengthening the position of Ukraine as an independent and influential entity in the international arena. The favourable attitude of the newly elected US President D. Trump could significantly contribute to this.\(^6\)

At the same time, it is indicative that the US Secretary of State R. Tillerson voiced a controversial idea that the United States cannot achieve the objectives of the national security policy if the acceptance of the American values is put forward as a condition. However, he added that Americans in no way will abandon their core values (i.e., it does not mean that “we are not committed to freedom, human dignity, and proper treatment of people worldwide”). Therefore, the US should and will require other countries to take “specific actions concerning the behaviour of their people” if they want to cooperate with the United States. Meanwhile, the US will act “in support of their values, without using them as a lever”.\(^7\) Formally, the US and the EU will follow the principles of borders’ inviolability and the world order. But it is the United States as a global leader and responsible nuclear superpower influencing the formation of the world politics that should play a more active role.

To add to this, the EU has not had its own security policy so far, which is actively used by terrorists. There is no single transatlantic community’s vision, as some people would like to return to the policy “as usual” with the Russian Federation, and to turn away from Ukraine.

NATO officials insist on the need to act carefully and cautiously “to avoid conflict with Russia”. It may seem that Putin managed to intimidate the Alliance, and they see no other way than to negotiate with the aggressor or act according to his script. The West has to understand that Putin’s Russia is not a partner, but a real threat to the world order. In the NATO Warsaw Declaration on the transatlantic unity, adopted and unanimously supported by all 28 allies in July 2016, it was stated the countries faced an unprecedented number of security challenges, including Russia’s operations, especially in Ukraine, intended to undermine the rules-based order in Europe. Combining their strong transatlantic ties, commitment to democracy, individual freedoms, human rights, and the rule of law, the Alliance will continue to strive for peace, security, and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. However, at the same time, there was

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discussed the readiness for a constructive dialogue with Russia to clearly explain their position and, above all, to minimise the risks of military incidents, including through appropriate measures of transparency. Such provisions of the declaration showed the lack of adequate perception of modern Russia. However, the document stated an optimistic belief in the whole, free, and peaceful Europe. NATO will provide even greater assistance to Ukraine and Georgia, and will continue to assist Moldova.8

Transatlantic Strategic Partnership

It is extremely important to recognise the need to deepen the strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union, particularly in the fight against hybrid threats, through operations in the Mediterranean, by helping partner countries to ensure their own security. Among the new threats to the world, President of the European Council Donald Tusk mentioned primarily an aggressive policy of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine and its neighbours. Under the Russian influence, anti-European trends and Eurosceptic sentiments are growing. National ‘egoism’ is becoming an attractive alternative to integration.

Various NATO members have different views on solving the problem that seemed to have been solved long ago: protection against Russia’s military pressure. Some seek opportunities to pacify Russia (those who are far from the Russian borders); others (who are closer and have their own historical experience of Russian aggression) call for resolute resistance to Moscow. However, not everyone falls into these two groups. Hungary, for example, which experienced the Soviet invasion in 1956, openly cooperates with Putin. The Black Sea countries are also not so united in their assessments of the Russian threat. Bulgaria and Turkey tend to favour some NATO presence in the region; so NATO struggles to find a compromise. Both countries have close commercial ties and political contacts that significantly affect the development of relations between them and Russia. Overall, under current conditions, NATO has somewhat limited capabilities to respond most adequately to the challenges and threats that appear in the Black Sea area. So far, the main goal is to choose the most economically viable and militarily effective way to ensure security in the region that would allow NATO to demonstrate the Alliance’s solidarity and to ensure the deterrence of further aggressive actions of Russia in the region. Moderate military build-up in the region is an appropriate response to the current situation.9

A somewhat provocative slogan “United Europe - from Lisbon to Vladivostok” can be heard not only from the Kremlin but also from many European capitals. Obviously, the task to build protection against the aggressive policy of Russia cannot be combined with the task of intensive political and economic cooperation with Russia. Ukraine is interested in a rigid and monolithic NATO and EU policy towards Russia, because it is an essential factor of its independent existence. Ukraine’s position is shared by many in the European Union, particularly in Eastern European

countries, but there are many people who simply neglect the Ukrainian (and, to a large extent, their own) interests.\(^\text{10}\)

According to President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, the cost of aggression should increase until Moscow begins to respect international norms. Sanctions are a tool that can deter the Kremlin and force it to change its behaviour. Strategic patience is required in order to restore peace and the rule of law. Poroshenko urges the West to wake up and understand that Russia is not going to stop its policy of aggression:

The more we hesitate now, the more challenges we are going to face tomorrow. We need to act proactively and not simply react to further provocative steps by Moscow. We should not be afraid of Russia, and should not give in to it, either now or in the future. Let us surprise Russia with our determination, surprise Russia with the strength of our unity, and surprise Russia with our solidarity in the face of aggression. The West should recognize that security in Ukraine means security across the whole transatlantic community. Granting Ukraine modern facilities, including electronic equipment, radar blocker systems, is an investment in our common security, not only in the security of our state, because Ukraine is fighting not only for its independence but also for the future of the free world.\(^\text{11}\)

The West is to demonstrate that Russia is going to pay a high price for its aggressive behaviour; not only in the case of large-scale attacks involving weapons, but also in case of making so-called hybrid or cyber war. The policy of appeasement will not stop the aggressor, and any agreement with Russia behind Ukraine's back will only worsen the situation.

Consequently, only joint efforts of Brussels and Washington might stop Russia. There should be one common position as to how to oppose it. This means not lifting sanctions until the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas are returned. The West could also help Ukraine become more resilient to the challenges and threats. The transatlantic community wants to see Russia as a partner that, firstly, respects the territorial integrity of its neighbours and does not use military force to intimidate; secondly, as a constructive partner in addressing both regional and global challenges; thirdly, as a transparent and reliable energy supplier to Europe; and finally, as an economically open, pluralistic state which respects human rights. However, such expectations are far from becoming true in the foreseeable time. In the coming years, the post-Soviet area will remain the zone of conflict, as Russia undermines all attempts of the region to reform and integrate itself into the Western system.\(^\text{12}\)

One cannot help noticing some positive changes in the West's consolidation to respond to Russian actions. The economic influence of Russia on its neighbours and Europe is being reduced and this is caused both by the sanctions and by the falling prices of energy resources. Because of the sanctions, the European producers had to quickly shift to new markets, including the Chinese one. Western sanctions against Russia had at first seemed short-lived: The business community opposed them, and the attitude toward Russia in the European Union, which requires unanimity in foreign policy decisions, was anything


but unanimous. But now, it seems unlikely that the transatlantic sanctions will end as sceptics predicted. The EU, which is so often perceived as “soft” towards Russia, has become a stronghold of the consolidated West.\(^{13}\)

At the beginning of May 2017, the former FBI Director James Comey stated that Russia is the biggest threat to all on the Earth, based on its intentions and capabilities. The words by Comey mean that the world is beginning to see the light as far as Russia is concerned.

Russian aggression is evolving according to a scenario, which the transatlantic community cannot respond to. Therefore, the events in Ukraine have emphasised the need to analyse all possible scenarios that may unfold beyond this hybrid war. New fundamental challenges to the unity of the transatlantic community are primarily associated with the Russian military aggression in Ukraine. Russian aggression has demonstrated clearly that the country has not only ignored the attempts to integrate to the Western partnership, but has rather attracted strategic investments in new military equipment and reduced the previous democratic reforms. The West should draw several conclusions from the events of recent years. First, Russia is deliberately trying to destabilise the European continent; so the United States and Europe must radically change their views on the European security. Second, the Russian party is showing a tendency towards unexpected actions and the West should carefully prepare for this. Third, Russia is using the full range of conventional and unconventional tools of intimidation and influence on its neighbours, and the West should develop innovative ways to confront these instruments.

The New Transatlantic Strategy includes first the renewal of transatlantic unity between the US and Europe, which has significantly weakened in recent years. The second component is a recovery of the deterrence strategy applied by the US and Europe in the Cold War. The third component is a resilience of the transatlantic community, which means the ability to prevent and solve the growing challenges ahead. This component also implies involving the expertise and cooperation of many participants, including those outside NATO. However, the Russian challenge does not yet seem to have been comprehended completely.

The final declaration of the G7 summit at the end of May 2017 is indicative in this respect. G7 leaders believe that the duration of sanctions against Russia are directly tied to the latter’s fulfilling its Minsk obligations and its respect for the sovereignty of Ukraine. They are ready to take additional measures to further increase Russia’s financial losses if it is required by Russia’s actions. Meanwhile, G7 reaffirmed their commitment to the policy of non-recognition of the Crimea annexation; however, sanctions were not mentioned. It was even noted that despite differences with Russia, they favour its involvement in resolving regional crises and common challenges.\(^{14}\)

Thus, first, it is necessary to restore transatlantic unity, which has weakened in recent years. Also, it is necessary to transform the containment strategy applied by the US and Europe in the Cold War. The transatlantic community should be able to prevent and solve the growing challenges in advance. In this context, it is important to attract expertise and cooperation of many participants, including those outside NATO.

\(^{13}\) We Built the Russia Sanctions to Last, “WSJ”, 20 March 2017, [https://www.wsj.com/articles/we-built-the-russia-sanctions-to-last-1490050833].

\(^{14}\) G7 Taormina Leaders’ Communiqué, 27 May 2017, [http://www.g7italy.it/sites/default/files/documents/G7%20Taormina%20Leaders%27%20Communique_27052017_0.pdf].
Therefore, it is necessary to not only confirm transatlantic solidarity verbally, but also to ensure effective deterrence of the aggressor, increase the speed of NATO decision making, deepen the EU and NATO policies’ coordination toward Russia. Russia is constantly trying to prove its case to the international community, using all possibilities. The power of propaganda, money, and other influences leads to the fact that Russia’s standpoint is advocated not only by certain layers of the population, but also by certain political forces and politicians. The United States can play a central part in resolving the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, as well as in the negotiation and strategic efforts to create conditions for its firm and final decision.

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CHANGE OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE TRANSATLANTIC REGION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF UKRAINE

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The article includes a research of the main trends and their components of the change in the European security environment; it considers political steps of the main international actors within the sphere of the regional security architecture. The author describes the possibilities of enhancing regional cooperation, an implementation of multilateral initiatives in the context of modern security challenges. The report reviews the effect of these changes on the defence policy of Ukraine, suggests and substantiates appropriate recommendations for Ukrainian public authorities on the need of a more active involvement in the formation of a new sub-regional security system.

Introduction

Current trends in the Euro-Atlantic security environment are dangerous for both the West and Ukraine. Understanding the gravity of the "Russian threat", which was a result of consistent anti-Western aggressive rhetoric of Moscow, as well as the demonstration of military campaigns in Ukraine and especially in Syria, contributed to the development of a new policy of physical restraint of the Russian expansionary aspirations by Western countries. NATO received a new impetus for existence, increasing unprecedentedly its Eastern flank. However, actually Europe is far from unity of political positions in the face of new threats, demonstrating destructive tendencies connected with the dominance of populism and Euroscepticism, which are typical for most of the states in the region. In this case, special attention should be paid to the position of Eastern European countries, which are the closest neighbours of Ukraine and are considered traditionally as lobbyists of its interests. There is an urgent need for analysis of modern socio-political trends in the European region and their impact on the change of foreign and security policy of Ukraine.

Populism

Today's populism in Europe and the US is a result of politicians' concentration on the issues of destructive criticism and rejection of positive rhetoric. Populism is an ally of
paternalistic societies, mainly the rich, and provokes the creation and popularisation of so-called “anti-movements”. The rhetoric of the latter aims at the destruction of the existing world order, which is considered as unfair, but without a distinct alternative. The political embodiments of “anti-movements” are the left parties and the radical right parties with chauvinist orientation that use the national idea and historical discourse as opposed to globalisation trends. Some of these political actors are institutionalised and even represented in parliaments of their countries (“Jobbik” in Hungary, “Kukiz’15” in Poland). The Kremlin actively supports them (including financial support) and takes advantages of them, using the emotional imbalance.¹

The latter is shown in today’s society where the deconstructive prevails over the constructive; irrationalism prevails over rational behaviour. Among the EU residents aged 20 to 32 (the main electorate of the populists), there is a popular accusation of enlightened bureaucrats for all problems in their lives.² Instead, there is an increasing popularity of forms of revolutionary struggle against the system such as manifestations and demonstrations, including using force, as evidenced by the increasing violence on the streets of European cities. Russia successfully uses the mentioned trends by means of the “hybrid war” instruments, basing its position on the realistic concept, while the Europeans continue to live in a utopian liberal world.

The catalyst of populism in Europe is the theme of immigrants. The most negative perception is directed to the immigrants from the Middle East and Africa seeking asylum in Europe and mostly being not able to assimilate and integrate into the host society, living in compact communities, original ghettos, and practicing their own religion. The implementation practice of allocating national quotas by the EU for the location of refugees showed a negative perception of immigrants in Central Europe, particularly in conservative societies such as Polish or Hungarian. The main reason of this is the result of excessive openness in the liberal European society, which created comfortable conditions for terrorists, extension of ethnic suspicion and hostility.

**Waiving Liberal Values**

During the last decade, the European Union and the United States show quite a selective and free interpretation of liberal values on which they are based. Thus, economic development is a constant of the market-economy liberal model. For keeping and strengthening a resource base in case of increasing competition from China, Western countries have begun to use the model of “development cooperation” ambiguously. On the one hand, the latter is intended to be an instrument of direct financial assistance to countries that are in trouble (African failed states), or in a transition period of building democratic institutions, social and economic reforms (fight against corruption), achieving the rule of law, human rights and freedoms.

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On the other hand, the purpose of direct assistance (non-investment) is to strengthen the spheres of economic influence in the regions that are rich in natural resources. As centre-peripheral connections that ensure a sustainable supply of raw materials to Europe today are weakened, Germany, which is the richest European economy, invests big funds in the third world within such “development cooperation”. The state does that primarily because of fear that the German economy, based on the processing and production, will quickly lose its positions without African and other resources. The German example of such using “development cooperation” is successfully used by European countries, even those which only yesterday were the recipients of foreign assistance (Poland, Czech Republic, etc.).

The logic of exhausting resources dictates another liberal course, connected with the interest of the ecology. The purpose of large-scale projects regarding renewable energy is to avoid dependence on energy supplies, which are exhaustible and geographically located outside Europe. A complete rejection of fossil fuel is the prospect of decades. Today, along with the challenges of diversification of energy carriers, there is a problem with the dependence of technological industries on oil and gas imported from Russia. For stability, European politicians are ready to negotiate with anyone, even those who undermine international order. As a result, there is a threat for Kyiv connected with the weakening of support from the European partners in a policy of sanctions against Moscow.

These practices of covering up realistic interests by humanism and progress significantly undermine the credibility of liberal values, indicating a waiving by the Western world of its own postulates. Russian counterpropaganda uses such liberal tendencies as the fight for the rights of sexual minorities and gender politics to bring the EU into discredit.

As to the first value, Moscow uses the traditional conservative Orthodox rhetoric, which is opposed to the Western liberals. Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans practice their own traditions; their population largely espouses conservative family values. So the Kremlin and its comprador agents that are hostile to the LGBT community increasingly win over the West in political rhetoric in these geographical areas.

Another component of the struggle between liberals and realists is the gender issue. The battle of the West to achieve gender equality in politics did not justify itself not only in the US, where Hillary Clinton lost to Donald Trump, but also in Eastern Europe, where female candidates in Bulgaria and Moldova lost to...
male candidates in presidential elections. In both cases, the women maintained a pro-European vector of development, whereas the men – socialists – mainly agitated for a revival of relations with Russia.5

Growth of Left Rhetoric Popularity

The dominance of left centrist parties in Eastern Europe becomes more significant. In fact, centre-right conservatives hold political leadership only in Hungary and Poland. Even in the Baltic countries, which traditionally are not supporters of the left ideologies, the populists that use the left rhetoric (the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union) won the elections. The growing popularity of the left politicians can be explained by a low level of living standards. In Central and Eastern Europe, people compare their standards of living with the prosperous EU countries, which look much more attractive. In the absence of borders, it causes a significant outflow of young people to the West and the ageing of the population in Eastern Europe. Left politicians have been already approved in power in Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria. They have significant prospects in Germany, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Latvia. In the conditions of intrusion by the Russian propaganda, creating an image of Ukraine as a state of “right radicals”, the prospects for strategic partnership of our country with the mentioned states become much more complicated.

Euroscepticism

An important trend in recent years is the crisis of the European identity based on liberal values. That crisis was embodied by the strengthening of sceptics’ political movements that criticise the foundations of united Europe, which “undermines the national identity” of member-states. The popularity of Euroscepticism is directly linked with the three previously mentioned trends – populism, the waivering of liberal values (or their free interpretation), including protection of human rights, and the growing popularity of the Left.

Euroscepticism has grown in Central and Eastern Europe on the topic of the “full-fed” Western Europe that takes more than gives. Old member-states demand more from new members than the latter receive in preferences and direct assistance. First of all, this concerns the countries that are in the Eurozone. Another category of troubled countries includes the member-states that do not fully overcome corruption, in particular, Bulgaria and Romania. The influx of immigrants from the Middle East to Europe intensified contradictions within the EU, which had existed because of the imbalance in the economic policy. This in turn leads to the radicalisation of society, spread of terrorism and extremism threats in Europe. The result of the aforementioned events is the wish of some EU member-states to implement a more independent policy, which increases the popularity of the Eurosceptic parties.

Growth of Social Consciousness

The aforementioned trend is typically occurring in the Central and Eastern European states, which are the most vulnerable regions in the context of political changes in Europe. The trend relates to the determination of citizens in various countries of the region to defend their position publicly. The phenomenon of “Maidan diplomacy” with different slogans spread in 2016 from Ukraine to Poland (freedom of speech), Hungary (anti-immigrant demonstrations), and Romania (anti-corruption platform). People are ready to stand for justice, truth, to fight against corruption at mass rallies. In fact, this practice of population mobilisation within the struggle against injustice is a dangerous political technology that can be used for the purpose of manipulating on behalf of their...
interests. Populists and Eurosceptics are the biggest beneficiaries of the growing social consciousness, speculating on the European values. Russia, which seeks to undermine the European unity from within, can use this regional phenomenon also.

Mitigation of Attitude towards Russia

Despite the fact that Russia, whose ultimate goal is securing its status as a global actor and the recognition of Russian interests and “zones of influence”, chose a path of aggressive confrontation with the West, the state is considered a threat mainly by military experts of the NATO member-states, and only sometimes – by politicians. The main motivation behind these various attitudes is the economic component, as Europe needs the big Russian market, which is closed due to sanctions. The logic of taking benefits from trade with Russia often dominates under the instinct of self-preservation in the European countries in as far as Russia acts destructively not only in relation to Ukraine.

Moscow often encourages disintegration processes in Europe, provoking economic and political separatism of individual states in the EU or the regions. Russia is interested in a weak and unconsolidated West, where it can use the weaknesses of the EU in its own aggressive purposes. First of all, it concerns undermining the political system, reducing attractiveness, impairing the image of international subjectivity of Europe in the world. For this purpose, Russia is ready to establish corrupt links with representatives of the European elite, to provide sponsorship to Eurosceptic movements and its political satellites in different European countries.

Russia tries to use the destruction of unity in the EU for recognition of its own geopolitical ambitions, aimed to review the existing borders in Europe. Legitimisation of the existing balance of power assumes the intrusion of phobias to Europe, its intimidation through, for example, placing offensive nuclear forces in Kaliningrad region and the occupied Crimea. This practice leads to the reduction of the Europeans’ will and determination to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Weakening of Transatlantic Relations

The countries of the “new Europe” went the way of post-socialist transformations and democratisation and consequently became the EU and NATO members through the support of the United States. It has highly likely determined their dependence on the positions of the overseas partner in issues of foreign policy. The election rhetoric of the new US president Donald Trump left many questions, including the degree of involvement of Washington in the European affairs in the context of the Russian hybrid aggression. US Vice President Mike Pence

at the Munich Security Conference in February 2017 partially dispelled doubts about reducing the role of the United States in Europe, de facto adopting a peculiar doctrine of deterrence of Russia rather than prevention.6

NATO, as an unconditional guarantor of security in the region, should go through a new powerful development in the near future. In this context, it is very important to implement decisions adopted at the NATO Warsaw Summit-2016, in particular increasing the US military presence on the continent and permanent deployment of multinational contingents in the Northern and Eastern European states. Instead of this, the Southeast flank remains a zone of less attention, where Russia increases the support of the pro-Russian Left in Bulgaria, Greece, the Balkans, and partly in Romania, weakening transatlantic relations. Another factor of weakening, which can be used in the region by Moscow, is the neo-Ottoman Turkey, with which Russia is developing strategic bilateral relationships.

Russia is ready to encourage the creation of tension in transatlantic relations with a view to minimize the political influence of the US in Europe. The latter, in the absence of support and protection of the United States, can be the next easy victim of the imperial policy of Russia, which tries to restore its spheres of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. For this purpose, Moscow tries to undermine the unity of NATO from within, as the greatest threat for an effective approval of solutions in NATO is the principle of consensus.

In such conditions, Ukraine continues to be in the “grey zone” of security without prospects of becoming a member of NATO in the near future. The country risks to be an object of trade in the conditions of “reset” relations between the US and Russia.

**Inertness of Security Architecture**

Along with the prolonged crisis of major international security institutions, such as the UN Security Council, NATO, the OSCE, in providing support to the existing international order, the international environment demonstrates a lack of initiatives, proposals, opinions concerning the stabilisation of European and global security. Traditional forms of conflict resolution through mediation of international organisations, third countries, international conferences (such as the Geneva format), and other crisis mechanisms do not operate in the conditions of dual tactics of Russia. On the one hand, there is a simulation of the desire to sit at a bargaining table and negotiate in a traditional way. On the other hand, Russia secretly finances terrorist groups around the world, becoming the leader of anti-Western views.7

This coincides with a decline of the security situation in Europe (a growth in the number and dimensions of terrorist attacks), which requires a maximum concentration on internal security issues. The latter reduces the ability of European states to lobby actively the values and the resistance to the Russian influence. Therefore, there is a possibility of semi-compromise solutions in favour of pacification of the situation (a thesis about the lack of alternatives in implementation of the Minsk agreements). It potentially contributes to the creation of security “buffer zones” with non-bloc countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the South Caucasus, and the Central Asia, which will be used by Russia for strengthening its sphere of influence. Such developments will create further dissemination of the following transatlantic security threats:

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• continuing Russian provocations including cyber warfare, information operations, and other forms and methods of hybrid war in the region of Central and Eastern Europe against the democratic West;

• undermining political and social stability in member-states of NATO by Moscow with the aim to destroy a compromise between the allies and to discredit the contemporary role of the organisation;

• violation of the NATO-Russia military balance on the Alliance’s Eastern front and deteriorating the whole security environment in the transatlantic region.

Ukraine in Times of Change

The course towards the European and Euro-Atlantic integration is not only uncontested in the context of Russian aggression but is also a conscious, civilised choice of Ukraine. Of course, in the conditions of the increasing crisis in the EU and dominance of Eurosceptics and populists, the EU enlargement is not a priority for European states. However, Ukraine’s way to Europe is a way of reforms, which are important per se. Achievement of certain economic standards, transparent business rules, rule of law, and reforms in the defence sector are significant for Ukraine.

In today’s circumstances, support from the United States is at the first place, as it has practical importance for our country. Kyiv continues to implement systemic reforms at the national level through financial support among others from the United States. However, diplomatic support of Washington is a guarantee of international nonrecognition of the Crimea annexation by the Russian Federation. The US’s position and the level of its involvement in conflict resolution in Ukraine is a landmark for the Western neighbours of Ukraine in supporting its sovereignty in the conditions of Russian aggression.

In this case, NATO becomes a major military institution, and the development of relationships with it accords with the strategic vision of Ukraine. Achievement of NATO standards in the military field significantly increases the defence of the state. For Kyiv, the decision of NATO’s strengthening on the Eastern flank (placement of additional regular forces in Poland and the Baltic countries) to counter the military preparations of Russia has a great strategic and symbolic importance, increasing the military presence of the Alliance forces in a close proximity to the national territory. Entry into NATO is a long-term goal of Ukraine, while Kyiv evaluates realistically and realises practically the contemporary perspectives of cooperation.

Today the regime of anti-Russian sanctions is unprecedented considering the number of participants and the dimensions of their actions. However, the current trends threaten to preserve and strengthen this regime. The presence of pro-Russian factions in parliaments of Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, which try to defend the removing of sanctions against Moscow, may have a long-term negative effect for conflict resolution in Ukraine. It is necessary to prepare for Moscow’s attempts to legalise the annexation of Crimea through its European agents of influence. Otherwise, further militarisation of Moscow as well as its continuous violation of the international law will lead to the aggravation of the security environment not only in Eastern and Central Europe but also in the whole transatlantic region.

Conclusions

The vulnerability of Western democracies consists in the disjunction of basic liberal values and realpolitik. Value-based vision of the world, which is inherent for the post-bipolar era, cedes to the return of the aggressive realpolitik under the pressure
of threats and challenges, whose number and scope are unprecedented. The younger generation of leaders of the Western world, educated in the traditions of liberalism and humanism, cannot adequately react and respond to the challenges. As a result, populists and nationalists, whose activities are not limited by the value-based understanding of the liberal world, get a chance to have power. The Kremlin stakes on the latter in a long struggle between realists and liberal utopians.

The ostentatious inertness of the architecture of international security contributes to a further extenuation of the attitude of major international actors towards violations of the international law in the case of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its support of military operations in Donbas, and in Syria. In these conditions, the position of the new US presidential administration, which still shows restraint and ambiguity, comes to the foreground. The US must take the burden of the deterrence policy against the aggressor in Europe.

The foreign policy of Ukraine must take modern transatlantic trends into account. However, since the change of the world balance of power and affirmation of Russia as a global geopolitical actor take place on the Ukrainian soil, Ukrainian diplomats must not only fix the security environment changes but also actively participate in forming a new system of sub-regional security, relying on the unique experience of Ukraine.

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The article tries to answer the question of how Ukraine created cooperation with NATO in the perspective of freezing the Donbas conflict in the East. Pursuant to the decisions from the Newport and Warsaw summits, NATO returned to its traditional functions of defence and strengthened the Eastern flank of the Alliance. In the context of the Ukraine crisis, East and Central European countries have called for a significant strengthening of NATO’s deterrence and defence policy and for the non-permanent deployments of Allied troops in the region. NATO decided to maintain its open-door policy toward Ukraine; however, its membership has been postponed due to geopolitical change in Europe.

Ukraine has balanced between Euro-Atlantic integration and closer cooperation with Russia on both a declarative and practical level.1 At the beginning of the political crisis in Ukraine in the autumn of 2013, NATO was not present in the debate about the future enlargement of Euro-Atlantic structures concerning Ukraine. The question was, when or if the president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych would sign the associated agreement with the European Union, not with NATO. Nevertheless, during the Ukrainian crisis, Russia has redefined the concept of the West. D. Trenin once said that Russia saw the European Union in opposition to NATO. The EU and Europe composed the “Good West”, and the “Bad West” was considered as America and NATO.2 The revolution on the Maidan in Kyiv changed that profile, and the European integration started to be seen by Russians as a Western involvement in the post-Soviet area without any distinction, in accordance with the idea that first the European Union will come and just after NATO and the Americans will follow.

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2 D. Trenin, Russia – EU Partnership: Grand Vision and Practical Steps, “Russia on Russia”, Issue 1, Moscow School of Political Studies and Social Market Foundation, February 2000, p. 106.
Western Solidarity or Decomposition of the West

Several months of demonstrations on the Maidan in Kyiv, held from November 2013 to February 2014, resulted in the overthrowing of Viktor Yanukovych’s regime. A dramatic turning point in the protests came at the end of February, when the state’s authorities sent in the Berkut special forces to “clear” the students and others occupying the square (over 100 were killed in gunfire).³ The United States and Western European countries condemned the use of force against the demonstrators and initially introduced visa sanctions for those associated with the government. Under pressure from the Western public opinion, as well as the wave of indignation in the country, V. Yanukovych decided to restore the Constitution of 2004, in which president had more prerogatives, and this led to early elections. On 21 February, militia was removed from the streets of Kyiv, and Viktor Yanukovych left the capital. On 22 February, the Ukrainian parliament removed him from his office. At that time, the optimistic reaction in Europe was an opposite to Russia’s, which interpreted the Ukrainian revolution as a coup d’etat and decided to react by taking over Crimea, being concerned about the future status of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. In late February 2014, Russia began to send troops and military equipment into the peninsula. After the referendum, the Russians took control over Crimea and then annexed it on 21 March 2014.⁴

⁶ Ibidem.
half a year; they started cooperating again. So where are the differences between the situations with Georgia and Ukraine?

The first difference was the cooling of relations with Russia, which by some scholars was called the beginning of a new Cold War. In the spring of 2014, in response to the annexation of Crimea, the United States suspended trade talks with Russia and interrupted military cooperation. The European Union suspended negotiations on visa waiver and a new agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Program. Western Europe stopped the preparation of the next EU-Russia Summit and the G7 countries refused to take part in the G8 Summit. The evidence of the worsening of Western-Russian relations were the sanctions (which were absent during Georgia’s war in 2008). US President Barak Obama had a strong support of both chambers of the American Congress, and they jointly approved, on 03 April 2014, legal support for Ukraine in countering Russia’s aggression. The new law is called the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 and provides the State Department with prerogatives to refuse visas to Russian officials. This Act is focused on American loans and other economic assistance to Ukraine.

Apart from Kremlin decision-makers and advisors, sanctions are targeted at entities in Russia’s financial, energy and defence industry sectors, which, in the American assessment, were engaged in military and economic aggression against Ukraine.

European sanctions were concentrated on visa limitation, and have been less complex and less deep than Americans ones. They practically resulted in the prohibition of entry into the EU or the freezing of financial assets of legal entities, which seriously limited Russian access to the European market. Specialists underline that those sanctions affected the Russian economy not as much as did the counter-sanctions, introduced by Moscow.

Secondly, NATO supported the newly elected power in Ukraine, President Petro Poroshenko (elected in May 2014) and the government formed after the parliamentary elections (in November 2014). What is more, NATO also explicitly condemned the elections in the separatist republics in eastern Ukraine, which took place in May 2014. The crisis in Ukraine has been also discussed in the NATO-Ukrainian Commission (NUC) forum. On 02 March 2014, NATO and Ukraine convened an extraordinary meeting of the NUC. At their meeting in April 2014, foreign ministers of the NUC condemned Russia’s illegal and illegitimate “annexation” of Crimea and stated that NATO and Ukraine would intensify cooperation and promote defence reforms through a capacity building and capability development programme.

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9 Y. Boguslavskaya, op. cit., p. 209.
The support given to the new Ukrainian government was also manifested in the area of defence; however, for a couple of months there was no harmony among the NATO member-states on whether this support should include supplies of weapons. Secretary General Rasmussen on 24-25 June 2014 decided to create several new NATO trust funds to help develop the Ukrainian defence capacity, including in the areas of logistics, command and control, cyber defence, and assisting retired military personnel in adapting to the civilian life. During the meeting of foreign ministers, NATO Secretary General underlined that “NATO’s doors remain open and no third state has a veto to NATO’s enlargement”. Some allies in Central and Eastern Europe have called for a more robust demonstration of NATO’s willingness and capacity to defend them. Especially leaders of Poland and the Baltic States have advocated for NATO troop deployments on their territories. Other allies have cautioned against a further “militarisation” of NATO relations with Russia. Officials in Germany, for example, have said that the permanent troop deployments in member-states formerly aligned with the Soviet Union could represent a counter-productive provocation of Russia.16

Finally, the Ukrainian parliament in December 2014 repealed the non-bloc status. It was a very important signal for the future membership of Ukraine in NATO.17 The dramatic situation on the front in summer 2014 led authorities in Kyiv to redefine the Ukrainian defence policy. The intention to apply for the NATO membership was announced by Prime Minister A. Yatseniuk at the end of August 2014, while the proper draft of a special law on this issue was addressed to the Ukrainian parliament. Finally, it was emphasised that the current situation requires changes in Ukrainian law, which would lead to the creation of a legal basis to join NATO. Debates in spring and early summer of 2014 about responding to the Ukraine crisis exposed differences within the Alliance. Some officials have spoken in favour of pro-Russian arguments (Hungary, Greece). While Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Romania have called for a significant strengthening of NATO’s deterrence and defence policy and for permanent deployments of Allied troops in the region, the position of other Central and Eastern European NATO members was different.18 Similar to Western European countries, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia did not feel as threatened by Russia’s actions and did not support moves that could damage their political and economic relations with Moscow.19

**NATO Newport Summit**

Ukrainian statements concerning the NATO membership coincided with the Newport Summit, scheduled for 04-05 September 2014. During the meeting, President Poroshenko of Ukraine held a series of talks with Western politicians, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission

15 NATO Secretary General - Doorstep Statement, Foreign Ministers Meeting, 25 June 2014, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v=uc5wewKx3mE access: 27 March 2017].
17 The Razumkov Centre 2015, Newsletter, No. 2, p. 5.
18 H. Praks, Estonia and NATO: Back to Basics after a Decade of Membership, [in:] R. Czulda, M. Madej (eds) op. cit., p. 198.
meeting was also arranged. After the meeting, a communiqué was issued accusing Russia of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and of unlawful annexation of Crimea. It said: “Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of Europe as a whole, free, and peaceful continent”. Russia was accused of deliberately destabilising the Eastern flank, which – as emphasised – influenced the level of security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area. Leaders of NATO’s member states reaffirmed the commitment to further development of the special partnership with Ukraine, which “will promote the development of a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe”.

The Ukrainian president thanked the leaders of the Alliance for supporting the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Ukraine. He also expressed gratitude for the statements of financial aid: The summit confirmed previous reports of the launch of four NATO trust funds aimed to support the defence and security system of the country. The funds will support the system of command, control, and communications, as well as logistics, protection against cyber threats, and the treatment and rehabilitation of soldiers involved in the fights. The trust fund is to be called C4, since it funds operations and equipment in the areas of command, control, communications, and computers. Secretary General of NATO A. Rasmussen announced that in addition to the bilateral support for Ukraine, NATO assistance would amount to 15 million euros (NATO Trust Funds). He also added that the possible supply of military equipment would depend on the individual decision of the members of the Alliance.

This diplomatic statement made by P. Poroshenko confirmed the unofficial reports indicating that the idea of Ukraine obtaining the NATO membership has not been enthusiastically seen in many capitals of the Alliance’s states. Kyiv will probably strengthen its cooperation with the Alliance, but without a clearly defined membership perspective. The accession will be extremely difficult. It was clearly manifested during the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, and recent actions in Ukraine, such as the ongoing war with Russia, strengthened the
existing concerns among Western leaders. It turns out that aggression against Ukraine and increased threats to European security reduced the chances of Kyiv to quickly obtain membership in the Alliance.26

**Political or Military Help for Ukraine?**

While some Americans were convinced of the need for military support to Ukraine, it was definitely the "diplomatic" solution that was preferred by the most influential capitals in Europe. This support was declared by the US president in September 2014, who argued that "NATO must make concrete commitments to help Ukraine modernise and strengthen its security forces".27 The Europeans supported peaceful solutions as part of the Normandy Four28 (Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine). They conducted peaceful talks on resolving the conflict in Donbas: Minsk 1 (September 2014) and Minsk 2 (February 2015). It is true that Germany spoke on behalf of the European Union, and the agreement was to be supervised by the OSCE, but European multilateral organisations were moved aside, and instead the "Concert of Europe" format was adopted and accepted by Russia. The confirmation of a "peaceful" and not "military" solution to the crisis in Ukraine was a statement made by German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Munich Security Conference in February 2015, when she spoke about the need for a diplomatic solution to the crisis and not for rearming Ukraine.29 Conversely, the commander of NATO forces in Europe, US General Philip Breedlove said with emphasis in his speech that the West should not exclude the military option in Ukraine. Such statements were judged negatively by Russia. Vladimir Putin claimed in January 2015 that "NATO's foreign legion" operates in Ukraine.30

**NATO’s Assistance for Ukraine**

Pursuant to the decisions in Newport, NATO returned to its traditional issues of defence and strengthened the Eastern flank.31 In the context of the Ukraine crisis, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Romania have called for a significant strengthening of NATO’s deterrence and defence policy and for permanent deployments of Allied troops in the region.32 The partnership with Ukraine will still remain a result of both NATO’s "open door" strategy and the relations with Russia.33 Russia wants to delay the process and is ready to use military means to protect its vital interests in the near abroad area.

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26 P. Bajor, op. cit.
28 Normandy Four (Germany, France, Russia, Ukraine) was established in June 2014, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Allied landing in Normandy. The format initially consisted of talks meeting of the presidents, then foreign ministers.
30 A. Łabuszewska, Śmierciowy rating supermocarstwa, Blog 17 mgńięń Rosji, „Tygodnik Powszechny”, 21 January 2015; K. Rękawek, Neither "NATO's Foreign Legion" Nor the "Donbass International Brigade" (Where Are All the) Foreign Fighters in Ukraine?, “Policy Paper PISM”, No. 6 (108), March 2015.
31 Generał USA: zostaniemy w krajach bałtyckich jak długo będzie trzeba (US General: We Stay in the Baltic States as Long as It is Necessary), „PAP”, 09 March 2015.
33 A. Tsyganukov, Vladimir Putin’s Last Stand: The Sources of Russia’s Ukraine Policy, "Post-Soviet Affairs", 04 February 2015.
including the most crucial state – Ukraine.\textsuperscript{34} Until now, armed conflicts in the post-Soviet area have been used instrumentally against the countries of the region, as part of the influence on the countries involved: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova.\textsuperscript{35} It seems likely that Russia is trying to repeat the scenario of a new “frozen conflict” in the post-Soviet area, this time in the form of the Ukrainian Donbas and Luhansk Republic.

Among the NATO member-states the ones that decidedly want to support Ukraine are the US, the Great Britain, Canada, Poland, and the Baltic states. A report published by the Razumkov Centre in Kyiv at the beginning of July 2014 confirmed this trend. As major allies, Ukrainians specified Washington and Warsaw. Almost 3/4 of the respondents thought that Russia is a threat to their country. Some 53\% of Ukrainians were in favour of joining the European Union, and 54\% in favour of joining NATO. For the first time the support for the membership in the North Atlantic Alliance was so high. For the first time also, the support for membership in the European Union was higher, although not much so.\textsuperscript{36}

Also, on 19 September 2014, Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine signed an agreement to set up a joint brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG), designed for operations of NATO, the EU, or the UN. The work on the establishment of common units started in 2007, referring to the experience of a Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion (POLUKRBAT) and acting under the auspices of NATO Kosovo (2000-2010). Involvement in the creation and operation of the brigade was to support the efforts of Ukraine’s integration with NATO, to strengthen the military cooperation of these three countries, and to lay the foundations for the establishment of the EU Battle Group. The 4,500-strong brigade will have its headquarters and staff in Lublin.

In April 2015, Ukraine and NATO decided to sign the agreements that included military-technical cooperation, communication, and intelligence. This was a support agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and NATO, providing for the implementation of four trust projects with NATO, including military cooperation, communications, new communications, and information technology.\textsuperscript{37} Before that, in March 2015, a group of 35 British instructors began training the Ukrainian military in Mykolayiv, and according to Director of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine Marcin Kozhiel, as of April 2015, eight NATO advisors had already been working in the security sector in Ukraine (in the Ukrainian government, Defence Ministry, Ukrainian Armed Forces, and other security sector institutions).\textsuperscript{38}

To summarise the questions posed earlier, it should be emphasised that as a non-NATO member-state, Ukraine cannot expect to engage Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The United States and Western Europe are trying not to use “NATO’s far stronger military” to counter Russia’s aggression.

\textsuperscript{34} Křž Zdeněk, NATO Enlargement: Disaster or Success? Evaluation of Worst Case Scenarios, [in:] R. Czulda, M. Madej (eds.), op. cit., p. 129.

\textsuperscript{35} A. Legucka, Geopolityczne uwarunkowania i konsekwencje konfliktów zbrojnych na obszarze poradzieckim (Geopolitical Factors and Consequences of the Military Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Area), Difin, Warsaw 2013, p. 350-408.


Former American ambassador to NATO (2001-2005), R. Nicholas Burns argues that NATO will do two things: imposing sanctions and strengthening itself.\(^3^9\) According to the experts, the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO, in the context of the armed conflict in the east, is fading away.\(^4^0\) At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO decided to maintain its open-door policy toward Ukraine; however, its membership has been postponed due to geopolitical change in Europe. Instead, cooperation will focus on adopting NATO standards and strengthening the military capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces. “It provides for granting additional support in five areas: advisory (including critical infrastructure protection), defence and security-sector reforms, education and training, demining and countering improvised explosive devices, as well as explosive ordnance disposal.”\(^4^1\)

**Conclusions**

The Revolution of Dignity in Kiyiv, annexation of Crimea, and war in the Eastern Ukraine became turning points for the Ukrainian nation, the geopolitical situation in the region, and the country's foreign and security policy. Ukraine had to choose one direction for its external relations, and has definitely opted for the special contacts with the West. The previous Ukrainian (multidimensional) foreign policy had to change. At the official level, the West took a strong stand for Ukrainian independence, territorial integrity, and sovereign choice. The Ukrainian crisis brought to the agenda the question of NATO's ability to react in such crises and to assist partners in spheres other than the security sector reform. NATO approved the establishment of a common fund for long-term modernisation of the Ukrainian armed forces, but this did not fulfil the Ukrainian aspirations towards NATO. Ukraine looks for a closer cooperation with NATO to guarantee its national security and military transformation.

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GAME CHANGERS: THE FACTOR OF NATO AND UKRAINE’S NATIONAL IDENTITY TRANSFORMATION

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The nature of relations between Ukraine as a social and political agent and NATO as a security community is based on a complex structure of behavioural norms, frames, and values. A number of those, inherent to NATO, have been incorporated by Ukraine through its intensive discursive practices with the Alliance. The latter caused sufficient changes in Ukraine’s national identity on different levels. Triggered by the Russian aggression, Ukrainian public once again has prioritised NATO as the state’s ontological security issue. However, a question remains: What is the best possible way to use this transformation?

Introduction

International relations as a specific form of social relations by definition provide that all their actors are social agents, bound by a complexity of social norms and rules. Thus, through their communication – namely, discourse practices – such agents are able to introduce, share, adopt, and inculcate their behavioural norms and visions in order to reach their aims. For instance, Ukraine since its independence has completed a long way concerning structuring and developing dialogue with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), having joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council back in March 1992. However, considering the issue of their relations, it is crucial to keep in mind the very nature of NATO as a security community – in its turn, a particular type of emotional community, – because it influences the way we think of Ukraine’s national identity transformation under such interaction.

Therefore, this article focuses on definition of the key semiotic parameters of change within the Ukrainian national identity brought by the partnership with NATO. The principal aim will be to characterise the key framing elements and techniques implemented therein in order to promote Ukraine's further successful Euro-Atlantic integration. This implies answering the following questions: What are the levels and channels of the NATO values’ and narratives' incorporation in Ukraine's national identity? How did such a metaphorical framing under the discursive interaction with the organisation influence the Ukrainian social and security background, in particular in 2013-2017? Which instruments should be
used to enhance the ties between Ukraine and NATO in the socio-political dimension?

**The Nature of the Ukraine-NATO Dialogue**

Considering the question, we are to recognise theoretical findings of social constructivism that imply that social agents are involved in constant shaping of their own social reality. The latter takes place via implementation of some specific social norms and rules as behavioural settings, brought about by numerous repeated speech acts within their discursive practices on different interaction levels.\(^1\) Furthermore, given the cognitive origin and dimension of political discourse, it is necessary to understand thereby that within the process of a state’s national identity transformation metaphorical framing is widely applied along with repeated speech acts.\(^2\) The majority of such frames, which structure individual or collective experience, are unconscious and reflexive, being embodied in the neurophysiological features of human consciousness.\(^3\) Thus, turning inter alia to the critical theory of world politics\(^4\), it is important to understand how Ukraine’s relations with the Alliance can be understood as an attempt to reshape the state’s national identity.

It should be highlighted that hereunder we consider NATO as a security community, moreover, a special form of emotional community.\(^5\) Emotional communities may be defined as “groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value – or devalue – the same or related emotions”.\(^6\) In such social entities, emotion norms serve the role in a way similar to the common social rules and norms. Furthermore, those emotion norms play a crucial role in producing symbolic meanings and establishing social hierarchy, power, and status between certain agents.\(^7\) Besides, it is known that security communities are built around "cores of strength that possess material and moral authority due to their superior material power, international legitimacy, and acquired norms and practices".\(^8\) This means that by incorporating a certain complex of parameters, specific to an emotional (security) community, it is possible for a state to achieve efficiently its aims in relations with the former. It is caused by the fact that emotional knowledge and power proved to be interwoven, for by communicating and transferring emotional knowledge, both within and between social agents and groups thereof, power relations are maintained.

First of all, the Partnership for Peace ( PfP ) Framework document between Ukraine and NATO serves as a vivid example of the abovementioned international politics features. It provides those actors’ mutual confidence in the necessity of securing

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3 Ibid., p. 249.
6 Ibid., p.534.
7 Ibid., p.538.
8 Ibid., p.544
common justice, values, and active cooperation for the maintenance of both stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region.9 Thus, by officially enhancing trust between the Alliance and Ukraine, – after its acceptance to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1992 – a solid background was established for the framing of the Ukrainian national identity in line with its Euro-Atlantic integration.

Even more crucial within the context of creating the necessary symbolic basis for Ukraine’s national identity transformation was the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine.10 The reasons are as follows:

1. The document has vividly promoted and recognised the Ukrainian objective to develop the process of its integration to the majority of the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

2. While admitting the sufficiency of NATO in maintaining peace and stability in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic, the emphasis was made on the openness of the former for cooperation with new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, while independent, democratic, and stable Ukraine was recognised as a key stability factor on the continent.

3. Ukraine has resolutely confirmed its will to proceed with military reform in order to reach the coherence of its armed forces with the NATO standards and received the respective Alliance’s support. Moreover, the parties’ cooperation was agreed upon regarding numerous political issues, as well as those concerning Euro-Atlantic security and stability and the entire range of conflict prevention and regulation.

4. What is also important for the shaping of the Ukrainian national identity, the Charter has stressed the role of Ukraine as a non-nuclear-weapon state, and security assurances were given to it under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. It was stated that Ukraine’s decision to abandon nuclear weapons has created its special image in the eyes of the international community.

Thus, it can be understood that through discursive practices in the form of normative documents (i.e. legislative discourse) between Ukraine and NATO, a background was established for incorporation of specific parameters to the Ukrainian national identity so that it could be assimilated with those recognised and used by NATO as a security community. Actually, as of May 2017, there are 51 key documents regulating the relations between the parties,11 all of which do provide a confirmation and obligation to promote common values, vision, and cooperation. However, we are to recognise that on its way of developing a dialogue with NATO, Ukraine has suffered numerous obstacles, often caused by the inability to reform its institutions and fight corruption, as well as by the influence of Russia, which was actually interested in keeping Ukraine out of the Euro-Atlantic integration due to its security concerns. That is why, for instance,

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after the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, whose policy was much oriented towards joining NATO, the pro-Russian regime of Viktor Yanukovych has altered its official course, even adopting a non-bloc status in 2010.

Only four years later, after the Revolution of Dignity, some key amendments were made to the laws of Ukraine regarding its image as of a state with a firm vision of its European and Euro-Atlantic future. 12 Namely:

1. The Law of Ukraine “On the National Security Fundamentals” now provides that Ukraine aims at integration into the European political, security, economic, and legal dimensions in order to achieve membership in the European Union.

2. In its turn, in the Law of Ukraine “On the Fundamentals of Internal and External Policy” it was stressed that Ukraine as a European state conducts open foreign policy and seeks an equal and mutually beneficial partnership with all the parties concerned.

3. Moreover, that same law on internal and external policy of Ukraine stated that the enhancement of cooperation with NATO aimed at reaching the criteria necessary for gaining membership in the organisation.

Thus, essential shifts have occurred in Ukraine within the realm of its social norms embodied in the legislative discourse, which, however, relates only to one level of the state’s national identity.

**Framing the Issue of Change**

As it was mentioned, the nature of any political dynamics and transformation is seen in the article as occurring through discursive practices between agents that reshape both individual and public conscious towards some specific visions, perceptions, and decisions. Therefore, in order to grasp the character of gradual reframing of Ukraine’s national identity in line with NATO as an emotional (security) community, it is necessary to look into some instruments applied with that aim in mind.

Vivid examples thereof can be found in a couple of national programs, namely:

- The State Program on the Issues of the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine (in operation during 2004-2007);

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• The State Target Program on Public Awareness Regarding the Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine (2008 and 2011).

However, it was widely mentioned in the public discourse that the main flaw of all the informational initiatives and programs aimed at raising public awareness regarding NATO was the deep-rooted formalism and unwillingness of public officers to engage actively in the realisation of such projects. For instance, in 2008 a poll showed that 62% of Ukrainians had not changed their negative attitude towards NATO in 2004-2007, and 47% admitted their low awareness level regarding NATO, while 10% had no idea of the organisation at all. Moreover, in 2012, after the second information campaign on the Euro-Atlantic integration launched by the state, only 13% of the population supported the idea of joining NATO.

The picture has changed significantly after the Euromaidan, annexation of Crimea, and Russian aggression in the east of Ukraine. In 2015, it became clear as a result of a survey that 45% of Ukrainians consider NATO as a source of security, which is almost a double growth comparing to 2012. What is particularly interesting, it turned out in 2016 that 62% of the population would take part in a referendum regarding Ukraine’s joining NATO with 72% affirmative vote, 23% negative vote, and 6% undefined. Meanwhile, the survey proved that only 26% of Ukrainians support the non-bloc status. It might have been that due to such results that the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko stated in February 2017 that he was planning to initiate a referendum on Ukraine’s joining NATO. In addition, he promised to do everything possible in order to gain NATO membership. This kind of official narrative supports the national identity project, which includes the parameter of a state relentlessly seeking NATO membership, as it was reaffirmed in the respective legal acts after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014.

However, it should also be taken into account that such a shift in Ukrainian public conscious, defining the very core of national identity, is considered a reaction to the Russian aggression and annexation of Crimea, rather than a success of some state information campaign.

14 Ibid.
16 Порошенко планує ініціювати референдум щодо вступу України в НАТО (Poroshenko is planning to initiate referendum on Ukraine joining NATO), "Ukrinform", 2 February 2017, [https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-politics/2168073-zmi-porosenko-planue-iniciuvati-referendum-sodo-vstupu-ukraini-v-nato.html access: 12 May 2017].
Nevertheless, we should admit that some specific attempts have already been made with regard to reshaping directly a number of frames as to NATO in Ukrainian public conscious.

For this matter, the Concept of Public Awareness Development as to the Issues of the Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine for the Period of 2017-2020 provides a set of issues that can be seen as parameters of the current Ukrainian national identity. Such are:

1. The Revolution of Dignity is defined as a momentum that has triggered new perspectives for considerable enhancement of Ukraine’s strategic course in the European and Euro-Atlantic integration\(^{18}\).

2. Moreover, joining NATO is proclaimed to be a long-term objective of the Ukrainian policy, and, therefore, the state is constructing new approaches to guarantee its national security.

3. Importantly, the Concept outlines the role of informing the public of NATO member-states about Ukraine as a trustworthy agent sharing their core democratic values, thus being worthy of developing the partnership ties in order to promote security through all the Euro-Atlantic. This very point highlights the understanding of the respective nature of NATO as an emotional (security) community and the necessity to meet its values so as to strengthen mutual ties with the former.

4. Another significant point that reflects the current Ukrainian national identity project, reflected in the Concept, concerns reforms. Fundamental democratic reforms together with the transformation of Ukrainian defence and security sectors to the standards of the Alliance are seen as a result of developed cooperation with NATO and assistance from its member-states so as to counter the Russian aggression.

5. The idea was even proposed in the Concept to introduce a holiday that would commemorate the signature of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine on 09 July. Therefore, the memory policy is also concerned hereby, demonstrating shifts in the current Ukraine’s national identity project as a social construct.

6. Consequently, the government of Ukraine has approved a draft presidential decree “On the State Program of Public Awareness regarding the Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine for the Period of 2017-2020”\(^{19}\) on 28 December 2016, which was mainly based on the abovementioned Concept.

Additionally, the First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Television and Radio of Ukraine B. Chervak stressed that the adopted program for 2017-2020 differs sufficiently from its previous historical analogues. The key reason is that it will frame the public opinion not about the expediency of joining NATO but directly about its necessity

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for guaranteeing Ukrainian security in military, informational, economic, and political dimensions.²⁰ In his turn, Director of NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine A. Vinnikov mentioned that NATO always respected “the Ukrainian national choice” to cooperate with the Alliance.²¹ On the Ukrainian part of the official political discourse, I. Klympush-Tsintsadze, the Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, while speaking on the matter of the 20th anniversary of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership paid attention to the fact that the NATO membership is considered to be Ukraine’s strategic objective.²²

Therefore, the very construct of Ukraine’s national identity was changing gradually within the course of interaction with NATO as an emotional (security) community, resulting today in quite a dualistic state. First, the greatest change has really occurred at the level of legislative discourse and political narratives of the highest rank. Secondly, the proclaimed rapprochement with NATO still lacks both the depth of public awareness – which is being actively fixed nowadays – and acceptance on the part of NATO. The question remains: What are the possible measures to be taken to use the already occurred shifts in the Ukrainian national identity toward NATO in order to meet the state’s interests in the existing conditions?

Manoeuvre Options

Especially as an emotional (security) community, NATO is ready to accept only such agents that will guarantee that the new membership unites the community and strengthens the NATO collective security system.²³ That is why Ukraine needs to adjust its visions and parameters, incorporated through discursive interactions with NATO, both to proceed with the process of the national identity transformation and to build further effective relations with the organisation.

Hereunder are some proposals concerning the abovementioned matter:

- Ukraine should still pay greater attention to fulfil some more pragmatic forms of cooperation with NATO. Furthermore, some failures in fighting corruption in Ukraine undermine constructive and liable perceptions of the state on the part of the NATO member-states. That is why communicating a successful national transformation in accordance with the Alliance’s standards within the fields of mutually crucial concerns – instead of mere declarations of aspirations to join – would serve a good service in effective reframing of the discursive field between Ukraine and NATO. An apt instrument here could be found in more consistent, timely, and effective governmental strategic communications.²⁴ One of the examples of

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²² Ibid.

²³ Б. Лейте, Як Україна може відкрити для себе двері НАТО (How Ukraine Can Open the NATO Doors), German Marshall Fund, 06 July 2016, [http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2016/07/6/7051712 access: 10 May 2017].

²⁴ Ibid.
the latter can clearly be seen in the adopted State Program of Public Awareness regarding the Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine for the Period of 2017-2020.

- Another vision is in a way contradictory to the current state of the Ukrainian national identity project, for it provides that instead of thrusting forth the idea of joining NATO, Ukraine should consider that “taking NATO off the table for some years could help secure peace”. Still, such an approach correlates nicely with an understanding of both Ukraine and Russia as social megaprojects, wherein the NATO parameter, – which includes numerous ontological security issues for the two parties, – is a critical one in their relations. Thus, the abovementioned manoeuvre proposal implies that Ukraine could declare it would not seek NATO membership for some period of time in order to both reframe the public conscious of the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone and reach with Russia a successful “arrangement that brought peace to eastern Ukraine and restored full Ukrainian sovereignty there”. However, given the current state of political discursive field in Ukraine, the latter proposal seems to be unrealistic to implement.

- Therefore, an additional proposal on how to use efficiently the current national identity project of Ukraine is as follows. Keeping the existing stance on a firm aspiration to join the European and Euro-Atlantic political and security space in future, it is necessary for Ukraine to add a couple of crucial parameters to its image, which would definitely contribute to the relations with NATO as a security community. First, given the existing experience, Ukraine has to pose itself as a party with a unique experience of fighting psychological wars through effective governmental communications and establishing respective multinational profile institutions. Today in that sense, it is mostly the point only of hybrid war to build Ukraine’s image upon. So the point is in finding and – what is particularly important – outlining and communicating correctly the features and concrete resources Ukraine is able and willing to offer to NATO as a security community in order to contribute to the objectives of the latter.

Conclusions

Despite the fact that it is impossible for the time being for Ukraine to join NATO, the very record of their mutual discursive practices has changed effectively the character of the Ukrainian national identity, first, at the level of legislative discourse, and, secondly, in the field of public opinion. Moreover, it contributed to the intercourse of Russia-Ukraine relations in both ways, because it constitutes a crucial (though opposite by quality) ontological security issue for both states. Additionally, in a number of cases, the rise of aspirations to proceed more actively with the Euro-Atlantic integration was caused by the factor of Russian aggression, which obviously mobilised the Ukrainian public opinion towards a significant shift in attitudes and perceptions of NATO. The latter was employed in a timely manner by the state’s political powers in numerous informational campaigns and schemes of governmental strategic communications.

26 Ibid.
However, it is particularly in the current conditions that Ukraine should choose wisely its ways of framing and embodying the issue of cooperation with NATO and its national identity affiliated with the latter, for it will influence directly its perspectives to address the most crucial political and security problems it faces nowadays.

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