• CHANGE OF THE SECURITY PARADIGM
• NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
• EUROPEAN SECURITY AND VALUES
The Change of Security Paradigm

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What are the main challenges to the current security system in Europe?

Nowadays, we are facing a gloomy situation. The international order, which was set up after World War 2, has been shaken. Russia, a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has violated the very fundamental principles and norms that this order rests upon. Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol as well as its direct military aggression in Donbas did bring a conflict onto the Ukrainian soil. Yet, these outrageous acts challenged the entire democratic world and instigated global insecurity.

By prompting violence first in Georgia and then in Ukraine, the Kremlin seeks to substitute the rule of law with the rule of force and revive the concept of spheres of influence as an organizing principle of the international order. This throws the world back to the gloomy Cold War epoch where big states were clashing over global control while small states were deprived of freedom to make independent foreign and domestic policy choices.

Looking to obstruct Ukraine’s European integration choice, Moscow also showed its opposition to the entire European project and apparently the core of democratic values behind it.

Today, Ukraine and the whole democratic world have joined efforts to resist Russia’s aggressive policies and make it honour the fundamental principles enshrined in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. It is our ability to maintain unity and resolve, which Russia persistently tries to undermine, that will determine, which rules of the game will prevail, civilized or barbaric, and which paradigm will succeed, progressive post-modernist or backward Realpolitik.

To outright repetition of such aggressive actions in the future, Ukraine has proposed a number of ambitious and badly needed measures.

The concept of the international responsibility should be reinforced with a clear set of sanctions on the offenders

First of all, the international community must apply all efforts to uphold the UN Charter’s Purposes and Principles. It is important to reaffirm their universal and unconditional validity as a basis for peaceful relations.

Besides, we must develop and put in place the mechanisms to ensure verification of compliance with the UN Principles against clear benchmarks as well as to ensure that the states that violate the UN Principles are brought to justice. The concept of the international responsibility should be reinforced with a clear set of sanctions on the offenders.

Moreover, we must jointly upgrade the security and defence policy instruments to effectively counter Russia’s hybrid warfare. It is crucial to keep up with this urgent
threat and promptly translate assessments into decisions and decisions into actions.

To be implemented, these initiatives clearly require time and efforts while Ukrainian military and civilians have been living under heavy artillery barrages of the joint Russian and militants' forces every day and every night for over a year now. Under these circumstances, we need continued comprehensive support of our international partners. We believe that this support should take a form of a "three mores" policy: more restrictive measures against the aggressor state with clearly defined triggers; more humanitarian visibility in Donbas; and more international presence on the ground via, in particular, deployment of the EU CSDP operation to support implementation of the Minsk agreements.

We also rely on our partners maintaining sanctions on Russia until Ukraine regains de facto sovereignty over Crimea, Donbas, and its border with Russia.

Furthermore, strengthening Ukraine’s military capabilities could serve to illustrate NATO’s readiness to respond to potential threats posed by Russia. At the same time, a delayed response to its challenges in the region, especially in Ukraine, may undermine NATO’s credibility. We are convinced that only in this way trust and order in the world will be restored.

Is Ukraine an object or a subject of the world politics?

Neither nor. Today Ukraine is an important and active part of the international network, and not just at the state level, but also at the level of people-to-people contacts.

During the Revolution of Dignity the Ukrainian nation demonstrated not only its aversion to the authoritarian rule but also their pursuit of the European model of development. They decisively rejected any foreign dictate. After Russia unleashed an invasion to punish them for this independent and freedom-loving choice, the Ukrainians proved that they were ready to fight for it and spill their blood. It is not an exaggeration to say that the European security and the European project’s endurance are being tested in Ukraine now and heavily depend on the Ukrainian people’s resistance to Russia’s attempts to disrupt both. I believe that Europe has already recognized Ukraine’s existential importance to this end.

Moreover, Ukraine is clearly capable not only of being a prominent regional power but also of serving a role model for many countries in the region. Ukraine matters for the world, as the world matters for Ukraine.

European integration is chosen as a priority of the Ukrainian foreign policy, what other priorities and regions of interests does it see for the world politics?

Indeed, European integration is our fate. Whether someone likes it or not, we are Europeans by geography, history, mentality, traditions. For everyone outside Europe, Europe is connoted with the European Union. Therefore, it is our place to be. By signing the Association Agreement with the EU, we took a historical decision for Ukraine’s current and future development. Our commitments under the Association Agreement align with the Ukrainian people’s demands to live in a democratic, free, and prosperous European country. As the Kremlin reciprocated with a military and propaganda aggression to this sovereign decision of the Ukrainians, we understand that our success in reforming Ukraine will be our best response to Russia’s expansionism.

It should be noted that the Russian aggression created an impetus for Ukraine
to join NATO. Ukraine rejected a non-bloc status; moreover, it named integration into the North Atlantic Alliance a national security interest and ruled to modernize its security and defence sectors in compliance with NATO standards. Now, over 60% of the Ukrainian people view alignment with NATO favourably.

As reforms advance, we also remain focused on expanding cooperation with partners worldwide. Maintaining stability and security in the Black Sea region is one of Ukraine's foreign policy priorities. Stemming from this premise, my country initiated the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea, joined BLACKSEAFOR and was among the first nations to join the Black Sea Harmony operation. We considered them as one of the cornerstones for the security architecture in the Black Sea, as well as a unique example of the navies’ effective cooperation in this region.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military aggression in Donbas has had a negative impact on the security situation in the region. Moscow is turning Crimea into a military base and threatens to deploy its nuclear weapons there. We are convinced that coordinated actions at the regional level as well as greater involvement of the EU and NATO are required to maintain peace and stability in the Black Sea basin.

We also see good prospects in establishing and maintaining the Baltic-Black Sea cooperation with the involvement of GUAM+, V4+ and NB-8 formats.

What main problems of the Ukrainian diplomatic service do you see and plan to reform?

I have spent about 20 years in the diplomatic service and am pretty much aware of all strengths and weaknesses of the Ukrainian diplomatic service. When I entered the building in Mykhailivska Square in Kyiv as a Minister, I thought that it was the right time to catch the wind of change blowing over Ukraine and establish a new highly professional and effective diplomatic service along the world’s best standards. This is not an easy undertaking. It requires consistent efforts and significant resources. Efforts do suffice. However, resources are obviously scarce, and this is a challenge for us.

I sought not to disrupt an integrated system and to dwell upon patriotism and commitment of the Ukrainian diplomats and their ability to perform well as a team. This was especially important given that the diplomats resolutely stood out resisting the Russian aggression at the diplomatic frontline.

our greatest success is that we are working here at the Ministry and worldwide together with people, who really care about what they are doing and who understand that there is no chance for going back to the old system.

Yet, to upgrade the system, we came up with a new draft law on diplomatic service, which requires the diplomats to possess more skills and qualifications, in particular to fluently speak at least two languages. Moreover, it seeks to amend the corporate logic and improve overall efficiency, namely encouraging the diplomats to take more initiative and, as a result, more responsibility, be more dynamic and creative, and keep learning at every stage of their careers. We improved our situation awareness capabilities by establishing a relevant unit and boosted our rapid response capabilities by paying attention to 24/7 work on providing all necessary assistance to our citizens abroad. We launched a StratCom unit and are
Working on establishing a public diplomacy department, which will also deal with cultural diplomacy. We not only became visible in the social media but also entered the top 5 online-active governmental institutions worldwide. In July 2015, I had a meeting with my Twitter followers. It was the first ever meeting of the kind. It is rewarding as I met five different young people, who basically are coevals of my country and have a fresh perception of crucial issues on our foreign policy agenda.

**What is your biggest success and failure as a Minister?**

For me, the real failure is that I can do nothing about the fact a day consists of 24 hours. I would be much more satisfied if it consisted of at least 72 hours. And our greatest success is that we are working here at the Ministry and worldwide together with people, who really care about what they are doing and who understand that there is no chance for going back to the old system.
A WORLD IN DISORDER

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In this article, we argue that Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine generates far-reaching consequences for both regional and global security. On the one hand, Russia appears as a revisionist state, which is challenging the existing world order, incompatible with an Anschluss. On the other hand, Russia’s capabilities of projecting power are limited mostly to its neighbourhood. Russia’s neighbours will be destabilized most, while the European security architecture will undergo large-scale transformations. At the same time, Russian revisionism is also threatening normative and conceptual foundations of the global security arrangements. Principles of state sovereignty, non-use of force, as well as non-proliferation regime are damaged – and that will surely produce long-term consequences on the global scale.

Introduction

The Russian President Putin took a risky decision with massive distant fallout late at night on February 22, 2014, on the eve of the closing ceremony of the 22nd Winter Olympics, hosted by the Russian city of Sochi. It still remains to be seen whether he recalled Winston Churchill’s words: “the statesman who yields to war fever must realize that... he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.”

That was a decision to openly intervene into a dramatic political crisis in Ukraine by annexing a part of a sovereign county’s territory, something Europe hasn’t seen since the times of World War 2. Putin’s further steps included waging a hybrid war on Ukraine’s territory, direct support for self-proclaimed puppet “republics” with the view to expand his power over the entire country, much in a way the USSR cemented its control over Eastern European states in the 1940-s. A success would have resulted in reinstating Russia’s sphere of influence over most of the post-Soviet space; while a failure would have seriously imperilled the Kremlin autocracy. The crossroad with no safe paths was constructed in Putin’s mind, and this zero-sum perception has been playing an increasingly important role in degradation of the regional security system ever since. So far, Ukrainians have paid with thousands of lives, millions of refugees, and one fifth of the country’s economy to protect their sovereignty. The price can still go higher.

For Europeans, all that may look a distant conflict with unclear or controversial narratives. Many of them believe Ukraine should find a way out by itself, while some consider Russia’s bid for regional hegemony justified. Both former and latter are confident that there is no serious danger further to the West of Ukraine’s border. They are wrong.

The key problem, which makes the Ukrainian crisis different from any other post-Soviet conflict, is that not only

Ukraine’s sovereignty and freedom are at stake. By annexing a neighbouring territory, Russia undermined the whole European security architecture firmly established seven decades ago. Before 2014, the Kremlin pursued its policy towards Russia’s neighbours within the assumed “game rules” of the world order. However, this has changed.

Regional Power with Global Outreach

President Obama labelled Russia “a regional power” during his speech at the Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague back in March 2014. This is a justified assessment. Russia’s GDP in 2014 totalled USD1860 bln, accounting for only 2.3% of the world’s economy. The country’s military budget was around USD 85 billion, eight times smaller than that of the US and comparable to Saudi Arabia’s. Finally, Russia’s foreign policy has been heavily concentrated on neighbouring countries, the so-called “near abroad.” Russia never got even close to the USSR’s ability in projecting influence far beyond its borders, and by almost all standards was a regional power. There were two exceptions, though: its nuclear arsenal and the UN Security Council permanent membership. The former made Russia the other side in the still bipolar system of strategic armaments; while the latter enhanced Russia’s institutional capacities, just as in cases of other regional players, such as Great Britain or France.

President Putin, however, had a different perception. Emphasizing Russia’s “unique role” in the world turned into the Kremlin’s rhetoric’s distinctive feature. Moscow openly regretted the collapse of the USSR and aimed at restoring its influence over neighbouring countries to enjoy a status of a great power as one of the centres of the multipolar world. Energy supplies and soft power – in a way the latter has been understood in Moscow – were designed as key instruments in fulfilling the task. Formally, the Kremlin’s influence has been ensured through a number of integration projects. Although comparing the Eurasian Economic Union to the European Union is a commonplace in the Russian political discourse, these are two fundamentally different institutions, given their basic principles, decision-making procedures, and balance of interdependence. At the same time, Moscow’s contradistinction to the EU made further deepening of the Union’s cooperation with Ukraine a geopolitical challenge to Russia’s extensive revisionist intentions.

The Weimar’s syndrome surfaced in almost every strategic choice Russia has made in its foreign policy. New developments in Ukraine’s foreign policy have become a severe test for Moscow’s self-awareness. Negotiations over the Association Agreement with the European Union were already finalized in 2013, with the document ready to be signed. That signing would

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6 Weimar’s syndrome refers to peculiarities of foreign policy of Germany under and after Weimar Republic (1919-1933), largely influenced by a perceived feeling of unfair world order and a resulting revanchism.
have put an end to Russia’s large-scale geopolitical projects of reintegrating post-Soviet countries under Kremlin’s influence. In turn, that would have meant, in Moscow’s view, a serious blow to Russia’s regional, let alone global, status.

Inability to control its immediate neighbourhood drove the Kremlin strategists more risk-taking. In attempts to get Ukraine back into the fold, Russia crossed a number of red lines. The way it struggles to retain its regional power status is now undermining foundations of the global order: the Kremlin’s regional aspirations brought about global consequences.

By heating escalation in the Eastern regions of Ukraine, controlled by Russian-backed separatists, Moscow is revealing its long-term strategy. It is about “Transnistrization” of European politics. Two decades ago, the Moldovan region of Transnistria claimed its independence unrecognized so far. Backed by Moscow, its authoritarian regime has been used to block Moldova’s intentions to join the EU. Gradually, Transnistria became one of Europe’s most depressed and corrupted regions while still being totally economically dependent on Russia. Later, the same fate was awaiting South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two territories torn away from Georgia as a result of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008. By utilizing neighbouring states’ weaknesses and actively exploiting their Russian-speaking minorities, the Kremlin is turning manipulations with territories into hands-on “diplomacy.” With extra revenues from oil and gas trade exhausting, economic sanctions gradually taking effect, and international isolation tightening, the Russian President's final choice seems to fall back to the good old Stalinist bet on hard power and direct control over annexed territories.

This option carries both an immediate danger for Russia’s neighbourhood and a long-term challenge for the international order. The first is mostly about vulnerability to a direct military threat from a much more powerful adversary. Russia’s neighbours, and especially the ones that are not members to NATO, now find themselves in a classical security dilemma and have to proceed from the worst-case scenarios. Such expectations will quickly turn regional politics into a very “realistic” endeavour, implying mistrust, suspicion, and growing tensions. Long-term challenges are mostly resulting from violations of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and risks to a number of international regimes and regulations.

**Status quo Challenger**

The power transition theory defines states as powers satisfied with *status quo* and dissatisfied challengers. As long as the former are much stronger than the latter, the system is stable in a sense that no major military conflict is probable. Behind this simple scheme, there is a rational choice model, according to which challenging powers calculate risks and chances of an attempt to modify the existing rules and refrain from any aggression if the odds are not in their favour. The calculation is not always accurate. Authoritarian and totalitarian leaders, for instance, tend to take more risky decisions than their democratic counterparts. Decision-makers overestimate their resources while underestimating their opponents’ resolve. All leaders face difficulties in calculating the allies’ commitments. Some resources are profoundly difficult to measure. Altogether, it is difficult to calculate the balance of power.

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According to the power transition theory, instability rises as the power balance approaches equilibrium. A rising challenger tends to overestimate his power while underestimating the status quo holders’ alliances. They are most likely to launch preventive wars before being taken over. Moments of rough equilibrium are dangerous, as the uncertainty level dramatically increases. In other words, major conflicts occur when a challenger is close to overtaking a status quo power.

By annexing a part of a neighbouring state’s territory, Russia made a desperate attempt to change the existing status quo – but only in Europe. The status quo that existed before March 2014 had been perceived by the Kremlin as rather uncomfortable. In two decades, it brought a series of EU and NATO enlargements, which Moscow saw as significantly encroaching on Russia’s sphere of influence. Following that perception, Russia felt compelled to compete with the European Union under quite unfavourable conditions. Since Vladimir Putin was elected President for the third time in 2012, Russia’s foreign policy has been concentrated on neighbouring states in an attempt to establish an alternative center of gravity in Europe. However, the Kremlin’s initiatives to launch several Eurasian integration projects failed to get anywhere near the EU’s impact and influence. Ukraine’s intention to sign the Association Agreement with the EU was seen in Moscow as a devastating blow to any further attempts to reinstate its sphere of influence.

Following the events of Euromaidan in Kyiv it became clear Ukraine would not participate in Russia’s integration projects. That meant a geopolitical defeat for Moscow, a defeat suffered within the European status quo, mostly based on non-use of force, soft power, and economic interdependence.

The Kremlin opted to challenge it. Turning European politics back to military force, annexations, blackmail – in other words to Realpolitik as it is perceived in the Kremlin – that was the essence of Moscow’s all-in gambling. By annexing Crimea, Russia not only violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but also forced putting revision of all key principles of the European security on the agenda. Betting on its military might, Russia is trying to turn Europe back to competitive bipolarity and cement its own sphere of influence – just as the Soviet Union did seven decades ago.

However, global consequences can’t be avoided.

**World Order Damaged**

While pursuing its regional goals, Russia is further undermining the world order, already significantly damaged in 2014. The key elements of this order have been accepted by the international community as following:

1. States are sovereign.
2. States are free to choose their foreign policy, alliances, and commitments.
3. Security is indivisible and broad.
4. Using military power is costly.
5. Acquiring nuclear weapons is extremely costly.
6. Using nuclear weapons is beyond any political rationality.

These, for the most part implicit, assumptions have been modus operandi for the international system since the end of the Cold War and earlier: some of them were laid down more than three centuries ago.

State sovereignty is an old principle. It goes back to the Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648. Since then, the world politics is mostly about relations between states and state-controlled agents. State sovereignty
implies that states are formally equal and exercise power over their territories by themselves. That does not exclude attempts of interference as well as policies of limiting sovereignty of others. However, these attempts implied a challenge to an accepted norm of international relations – a challenge, which proved to become more and more costly.

**Under the current world order, states are sovereign not so much in the meaning of “independent”, but in regard to their agency in the world politics.**

By now, state sovereignty remains a cornerstone of the world politics. An old principle of non-interference has transformed into a state’s freedom to choose partners, ways and forms of engagement as well as depth of cooperation. Under the current world order, states are sovereign not so much in the meaning of “independent”, but in regard to their agency in the world politics. Will, interests, and relative freedom of dozens of states that form the current anarchical international system, are what makes it different from historic examples of imperial rule.

In such a system, security becomes a result of complex strategic interactions, not one's unilateral actions. It goes beyond the military realm and encompasses a wide range of dimensions. Moreover, it becomes indivisible – in a sense that no single international actor can significantly enhance its security by undermining security or the others.

Such a complex vision of security creates a specific environment for states' foreign policies. Starting from the 20th century, it is no longer possible to bet on superiority in any particular field, even military. Often, possessing weapons makes a state less secure in the end. Arms races, military alliances, aggression, containment are all subject to a strategic logic of security. As a result, using military power proves to be costly. The high price for violence has been a characteristic feature of the world order, a stabilizer of the system, and a preventer of major armed disputes. Following the same logic, nuclear weapons have been too expensive to possess, both in financial and political senses. Rules of the game discouraged possessing weapons of mass destruction, providing cheaper and easier ways to protect a country's sovereignty.

The strategic nature of security, high cost for violence, and agency of nation-states have been the essence of the status quo after the Cold War. This status quo is under challenge, and each of these principles has been more or less severely damaged as a result of Russia's risk-taking policy. The Kremlin’s political goal is to limit Ukraine's sovereignty in a way that Kyiv is no longer able to choose and manage its international commitments. Neither Ukraine’s NATO membership, nor its closer association with the EU is acceptable to Russia. The events during and after the Euromaidan in Kyiv demonstrated how far Moscow is ready to go to deny Ukraine's right to pursue its own independent foreign policy. Earlier on, Russia used limited internal “frozen conflicts” to do the same with Moldova and Georgia, but in case of Ukraine, it went beyond the world order’s red lines by directly applying military force.

**The strategic nature of security, high cost for violence, and agency of nation-states have been the essence of the status quo after the Cold War.**
Annexation of Crimea violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity. That was not the first loss of territory by a state under the current world order, which, by and large, favours creation of new states. However, this was the first direct annexation of a neighbouring country’s territory since the end of World War 2. In this sense, the Crimean Anschluss is incompatible with the rules of the game and is not only the issue of bilateral relations, but also a challenge to the global security arrangements. Left unchecked, the Russian aggression will surely create a dangerous precedent.

The same is true for the use of force. As long as it is expensive, risky, and difficult from the procedural point of view, the current world order could be maintained. Otherwise, the world politics would deteriorate to Realpolitik. Russia’s use of force in Ukraine has surely been a risky enterprise. However, it should also become as expensive as possible. The higher price imposed on Russia, the less the damage inflicted on the existing rules. If political, economic, and reputational losses are not large enough, decision-makers around the world will surely reevaluate the use of military force, especially against weaker opponents. For the same reason, Crimea should not become Moscow’s prize for denying the founding principles of international politics.

Down this line of argument, we arrive to a nuclear issue. If the value of military force rises while costs for its misuse fall, states would be willing to possess and control as much arms as possible. Acquiring and developing nuclear weapons and strategic armaments would become the most rational way to ensure national security. If Ukraine – a country, which voluntarily gave up the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal in return for security guarantees, – ends up losing its sovereignty and parts of its territory, the non-proliferation regime would be undermined.

The cumulative effect of Russia’s revisionism is significantly stronger than one could expect, given the country’s modest share in the world economy and military expenditures. As it often happens, a revisionist state overestimates its capabilities and takes unreasonably high risks. However, even with almost no chances to win, it could damage or ruin the existing world order.

**Paradigm Changed?**

International politics is not only about resources, but also about ideas and perceptions. Dominant paradigms within the realm of international security shape threats, expectations, risks, and opportunities. Shifting the balance of hard power may take time, while transformation of the ways international actors perceive each other may happen much faster. International security is based upon these perceptions. Countries build up, develop, and use power in accordance with the views they hold about how the international system operates.

Until recently, European security has been maintained comparatively effectively under the neoliberal paradigm. High level of economic development and trade have generated strong interdependence, while raising the cost for violence. Repeated mutually beneficial cooperation produced stable networks and international regimes. States were following rather absolute than relative gains and maintained a high level of trust to each other, not least due to common values and norms. EU’s gradual enlargement expanded its area of security to most of Central and Eastern Europe. The continent enjoyed decades of stability and prosperity, experiencing few or none militarized international disputes in recent years.

This neoliberal paradise influenced the way European states approached security issues. In most European countries,
military expenditures have been steadily decreasing in recent years. The European Union's security instruments were primarily addressing soft threats. The hard power politics has been replaced with application of the normative power. The EU bet on influencing internal developments in the neighbouring countries with a firm belief that stable democracies would make a better security environment for the Union. Exploiting an interconnection between internal and foreign policies is a very neoliberal approach. According to it, security in Europe would be best achieved through promoting democratic norms, strengthening international regimes, enhancing integration and interdependence, and deepening international cooperation.

Russia is imposing a totally different vision of how European politics should operate. Geopolitical games, so popular in the Kremlin, generate a highly competitive and distrustful environment. Even if Kremlin's attempts to restore its greatness through oppressing neighbours fail, there is a danger of a paradigm shift, which will completely transform the way Europeans think of security.

What Moscow is offering is a well-known realism. It is about state-centrism, egoistic policies, principles of self-help and anarchy. States competing for security, primarily with hard power assets, form a hostile environment, where the level of trust is low and states proceed from worst-case scenarios. Such logic, applied by everyone, generates security dilemmas, when states have to build up military capacities and engage in preventive conflicts. Realism replaces common norms and mechanisms of interdependence with balance of power and military coalitions as primary tools for maintaining international security.

Regional arms races, suspicion, zero-sum thinking, and excessive use of military force are likely to become visible consequences of a security paradigm change.

**Conclusion**

Russian revisionism is a challenge at both conceptual and political level.

An adequate response to this challenge would include: 1) raising diplomatic, political, and economic pressure on the Kremlin; and 2) modifying criteria for NATO membership in such a way that contested territories can no longer prevent a country from joining the Alliance. Such combination will deprive Russia's strategy of most of its rationale and further increase its costs. In both cases, Ukraine can be an important solution.

Obviously, decision-makers in the Kremlin believe that the military backing of a puppet government in Transnistria in 1992, the aggression against Georgia in 2008, or annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 work well to keep Russia's influence in the region and block these countries from joining NATO. Although, we never know for sure whether destabilization of Georgia and Ukraine was a cause or a consequence of both countries' failure to join NATO, it is strongly believed in Moscow that such a card-playing is key for preserving Russia's sphere of interests. What does it mean for Europe?

First and foremost, it is ruining the European security arrangements, which for quite long have been pillared by non-use of force, freedom of choice, and normative
Power: With Russian revisionism on the rise, none of these is any longer so. Transnistria’s “frozen conflict” has been largely an exception to the European security system, but by now it is becoming commonplace. After succeeding in annexation of territories and creating quasi-states out of nowhere, Russia will not only further destabilize Eastern Europe, but also undermine the European security’s key principles, which have been in place since the end of World War 2. In this case, Europe will face security risks, including secessionism, terrorism, and hybrid warfare multiplied.

For quite some time, the EU’s attempts to construct a common foreign and security policy have been based on democratic values, economic and financial capabilities, and attractiveness of the way of life – what is shortly called “soft power”. Inability to curtail the Russian challenge will result in a quick depreciation of all that. Arms races, military build-ups, suspicion, and mistrust will form a new system of axes in Europe. It is already taking place, although on a smaller scale. New realities in security arrangements are being tested in the East of Ukraine, and the experiment is going to demonstrate the most likely ways of further development.

Russia’s immediate neighbourhood faces even higher risks. Countries like Georgia and Ukraine have already suffered loss of territories. Others are defenceless, and their security depends mostly not on their actions or choice, but on Russia’s intentions. That is a poor foundation for any regional security system. If a new reality imposed by the Kremlin comes into force, Europe as a whole will become a much more dangerous place.

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IS IT ALL ABOUT VALUES?
DIVERGING PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY AS REASON FOR NATO-RUSSIA CRISIS

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The Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that lack of trust between major regional security players like NATO and Russia overshadows most regional disputes and conflicts. The article’s main argument is that problems in the two parties’ relations stem from NATO’s and Russia’s existential search for a new role after the end of the Cold War, when their roles and sets of strategies used to be clearly defined. The clash between NATO’s liberal logic and Russia’s realist logic shows that the two players are acting in different systems of coordinates and the minimal common denominator is still to be found.

Introduction

Many experts refer to the Ukrainian crisis as at least a three-level crisis: 1) Ukraine’s internal crisis; 2) the crisis in relations between Ukraine and Russia; and 3) the crisis in relations between Russia and the West, or even as the crisis of the existing European security architecture. Although NATO, unlike the EU and the OSCE, is not an active player in settlement of the current conflict, Russia-NATO relations overshadow the ongoing crisis, as many commentators would suggest that Ukraine’s neutral status is viewed by Russia as a prerequisite for a peaceful solution. Besides, the famous US neorealist scholar John J. Mearsheimer claims that the NATO enlargement strategy was the key reason of the Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s reaction to it.

Almost absent from the Russian official discourse on the conflicts in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine since 2014, NATO’s possible enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine is perceived by Tbilisi and Kyiv as a major rationale for Russia’s recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and annexation/reintegration of Crimea (the choice of the term depends on the source of discourse). One of the reasons is because any territorial disputes

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1 For instance, this argument is used in the report published by the Russian International Affairs Council “Ukrainian Challenge for Russia”: one of the goals of the Russian foreign policy in relation to the Ukrainian crisis should be “to assure a neutral or a non-block status of Ukraine (maximal goal) and freezing of its Euro-Atlantic integration (minimal goal)” See in: Российский совет по международным делам (РСМД). – М.: Спецнага, 2015. – С. 8. (Ukrainian Challenge for Russia: Working Paper No 24/2015, ed. by Igor Ivanov. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). – Moscow: Spetskniga, 2015. – P. 8) [http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/WP-Ukraine-Russia-24-rus.pdf access 16 August 2015]

2 John J. Mearsheimer. Why the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault. “Foreign Affairs”, September/October 2014 [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault access 5 August 2015]. I build my argument in this article on Mearsheimer’s idea that Putin’s Russia and the West are operating by different playbooks: realist and liberal. I demonstrate how NATO switched from realist to liberal logic and in what way these different logics of NATO and Russia conceptually clash.
impede future NATO membership. Nevertheless, Tbilisi refers to the case of the German reunification as a precedent that gives hope.

"the Western countries were satisfied with the European security system until the Ukrainian crisis"

It seems that the Ukrainian crisis made the discussion of NATO-Russia security cooperation not relevant, because the parties are habitually trying on the status of potential adversaries again. The current relations between the West and Russia are often described as the new Cold War, which, on the one hand, allows experts to once again fall back to the well-known and many times tested analytical patterns of the Cold War to describe the current crisis and make predictions, but, on the other hand, undermines the future of the security architecture on the European continent. However, according to the Russian political elite, after the end of the Cold War, the European security system has never been a system of indivisible all-European security. Here lies the main contradiction: the Western countries were satisfied with the European security system until the Ukrainian crisis (even the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008 was perceived rather as a problem of bilateral relations at the regional, and not continental level), while Russia has been talking about the systemic crisis since as early as 1999 (Kosovo crisis). This article analyzes contradictions in relations between Russia and NATO at the level of values and interests. Different interpretations of the same events and high mutual expectations created two sets of interrelated problems in NATO-Russia relations: 1) problems of mutual relations (internal vector), and 2) problems related to the search for a role in the international relations after the end of the Cold War (external vector). Moreover, it is not always easy to distinguish, whether a specific problem belongs to the internal or external vector of relations.

"while Russia has been talking about the systemic crisis since as early as 1999"

Both NATO and Russia have a set menu of mutual political accusations.

Russia has the following list of claims:

- NATO gave a political promise not to enlarge eastwards in exchange for the German Democratic Republic joining NATO as part of the unified Germany.
- NATO does not cooperate with Russia as with an equal partner.
- NATO assumes functions of a global security organization, thus usurping the UN’s role.
- NATO continues to consider Russia a threat, reanimates the containment strategy but refuses to admit it openly.

3 Выступление и ответы на вопросы Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова в ходе дискуссии на 51-й Мюнхенской конференции по вопросам политики безопасности, Мюнхен, 7 февраля 2015 года (Speech and Q&A of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the 51st Munich Security Conference, Munich, 7 February 2015) [http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/5E26BDE162FEC0E643257DE5004B5FE0 access 5 August 2015]

4 Thus, almost all of these points have been enumerated in Vladimir Putin’s electoral article “Russia and the Changing World”, Moskovskie Novosti, 27 February 2012. http://www.mn.ru/politics/20120227/312306749.html (access: 05.08.2015)
NATO build up its own security at the sake of security of other actors, thus breaking the principle of building a single and indivisible security system in Europe.

The Alliance, in its turn, articulates the following issues in its relations with Russia:

- Russia’s criticism of NATO enlargement signifies that Moscow has neo-imperial ambitions and wants to retain control over not only the post-Soviet, but also the post-Socialist space in general. To do that, Russia is putting pressure on some post-Soviet states and even interfering in their domestic affairs to prevent these states from potentially becoming the Alliance members.

- Russia groundlessly wants to have a veto right on NATO’s decision-making.

- Russia is not a democracy, thus it is difficult for the Alliance to trust Russia.

Experts and politicians from both Russian and NATO countries mention lack of trust as one of the major reasons of difficulties in NATO-Russia relations. To address lack of trust as the result of the security dilemma, the realist logic suggests the only solution of trust-building measures and transparency. Liberal logic would suggest that common values might help to overcome mistrust. Did the liberal approach work after the end of the Cold War? Have Russia and NATO had a chance to assume that, after the end of bipolarity, they finally share common values, or do we have to return to the realist logic of a security dilemma?

**External Vector: Search for a Role in the Post-Cold War World**

After the end of the Cold War, the Alliance faced a necessity to find a rationale for its existence, which demanded to adapt its worldview accordingly. NATO’s transformation was accompanied by a search of factors that would present the history of the Alliance as a logical and uninterrupted process of development. These factors should have been present from the bloc’s very launching for it not to be confined to an external ideological and military threat. As a result, NATO’s history was re-conceptualized as a history not of a military bloc, but of a security community with a common identity on the basis of civilizational proximity, rooted in its members’ democratic regimes. Thus, the seemingly outdated realist logic of the Cold War balance of power was transformed into a liberal logic of a democratic community of states, which had to live through a historic period of the Cold War and take upon itself the responsibility to contain the USSR.

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5 On the veto right, see, for instance, the official note on NATO enlargement from the NATO Review Magazine: “The fundamental contradiction of all NATO-Russia bodies – that Russia was at the table and could co-decide, but could not veto, on key issues – could not be overcome”. NATO enlargement and Russia: myths and realities, “NATO Review Magazine”, 2014 [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/russia-ukraine-nato-crisis/nato-enlargement-russia/en/index.htm access 16 August 2015]. For arguments on a non-democratic regime in Russia and Russian imperialism as an attempt to stop NATO enlargement see: Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the ‘Brussels Forum’, ‘A strong NATO in a changed world’, 21 March 2014 [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_108215.htm?selectedLocale=en access 16 August 2015]

6 For example, see the press release from the 2006 seminar organized by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation: NATO-Russia cooperation still hindered by misperceptions and lack of trust, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 26 June 2006 [http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=969 access 16 August 2015]

Instead, Russia’s understanding of the NATO transformation is that bureaucratic inertia kept the Alliance together more than any other factor. Bureaucratic inertia would have had no negative connotation for Moscow, if NATO admitted the existence of such inertia. In this case, it would mean that, at least partially, NATO continues to function according to the Cold War thinking. NATO was reluctant to acknowledge that after the end of the Cold War, it kept the ‘balance of power’ logic, thus, the term “security” had to be re-conceptualized.

Since the 1990 London Declaration, NATO started to link security with the cultural and civilizational functions of the transformed Alliance. The new understanding was that stability was based on a democratic regime, thus lack of democracy was perceived as a potential threat to stability. Non-democratic states can spread instability because they lack the prerequisites for stability. Thus, threats to NATO come not from foes with the realist logic of balance of power, but from non-democratic regimes, which lack democratic institutions as the basis for stability.

This logic means that traditional realist conflicts of interests were substituted with contradictions related to the level of democratic development of domestic institutions and societies. A regime type is now the key divisive line for NATO. Formally, after the end of the Cold War NATO proclaimed that the Alliance did not have any adversaries, because all NATO neighbours were striving to become true democracies, thus there was no difference between NATO members and non-members. In this logic, NATO enlargement did not equal accepting new military allies but was perceived as an enlargement of a democratic stability area over those countries, which share the democratic values.

Russia does not understand this logic and differentiates between security and regime type, which is not always clear for Western counterparts. Thus, one of the problems of the Draft European Security Treaty proposed by Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 was that this treaty includes only more general norms of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-use of force, but does not mention human rights, civil society or democracy.

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8 Vladimir Putin called NATO a “vestige of the Cold War”. «Путин: НАТО – рудимент холодной войны». Голос Америки, 6 февраля 2012 (Putin: NATO is a vestige of the Cold War, Voice of America, 6 February, 2012) [http://www.golos-ameriki.ru/content/putin-novo-ogarevo-2012-02-06-138782814/250583.html access 16 August 2016]. The argument that NATO was not dissolved because of bureaucratic inertia is developed in: Igor Maksimychev. NATO and Russia in the beginning of the Third Millennium. Obozrevatel-Observer, 2006, N9, pp. 78-87 [http://observer.materik.ru/observer/N9_2006/78_87.pdf access 16 August 2015]


10 In the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation of November 1991, the following is proclaimed about the Alliance’ democratic role: “The world has changed dramatically. The Alliance has made an essential contribution. The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members’ security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity.” Provision 9 of the Declaration states that “We have consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We therefore applaud the commitment of these countries to political and economic reform following the rejection of totalitarian communist rule by their peoples. We salute the newly recovered independence of the Baltic States. We will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition.” The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, 8 November 1991 [http://www.wn.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm access 16 August 2015]

NATO Enlargement: Internal or External Vector Problem?

If we analyse NATO expansion as a problem of bilateral relations (internal vector) for Brussels and Moscow, solutions are limited, because one of the players obviously cannot veto the other one’s decisions. However, if we approach the enlargement issue as an external vector problem of searching for identity, the toolkit of solutions expands.

In the first half of the 1990s, in expert discussions and discussions within NATO about possible enlargement an opinion was popular that inviting new members would bring more negative consequences by setting new dividing lines in Europe and that this process could eventually frustrate Russia. These predictions have come true, so Russia believes that NATO consciously allowed for all the negative consequences and still decided to enlarge, despite discontent from Moscow. The fact that NATO officials were aware about Russia’s inevitable frustration in reaction to enlargement, created in Moscow an impression that the NATO expansion’s main goal was isolation of Russia, while the Alliance’ logic was somewhat different.

The former Socialist states’ desire to join NATO after the collapse of the Socialist bloc was an existential gift to the Alliance and acknowledgement of its significance at the moment of crisis and search for a new role in the world. In the context of lack of an external military threat, candidates for membership added new meanings to the Alliance, which otherwise would have been considered only as an outdated military bloc. At the same time, for Central and Eastern European states and the Baltic states, NATO membership was more an external acknowledgement of the minimum level of democratic development than a question of security guarantees. An external assessment is needed, when there are not enough grounds or clear internal criteria for independent self-assessment. Thus, both for "old" and "new" NATO members, enlargement was more a process of external assessment and recognition than a matter of military security.

In the 1995, the NATO official study on enlargement, clause 13, indicated that the Alliance "should underline that there can be no question of «spheres of influence» in the contemporary Europe", thus, NATO itself did not view its enlargement as an expansion of its sphere of influence. NATO’s approach is that enlargement, including the military agreements with new members, does not threaten anyone, but, on the contrary, will contribute to the broad inclusive system of the all-European cooperative security based on the principles of democracy. The logic is that if NATO left Central and Eastern European countries out of this cooperative security system, they could have become sources of instability. Thus, in its own perception, NATO is a source of domestic stability, democracy, and well-being.

In the process of NATO transformation, what remained unclear for Russia was how a military bloc managed to transform itself without abandoning its military functions. It is not clear for Russia how a military organization of collective defence can be a source of domestic stability and democracy.


and not just a defence system against external threats, regardless of the regime type of its members. According to the North Atlantic Treaty’s preamble, democracy is a prerequisite for NATO membership, and not a consequence of cooperation within the Alliance.15

Russia still perceives NATO as a military bloc and not a political organization, because, to Russia’s opinion, despite the transformation, Article 5 remains at the centre of cooperation.16 In Vladimir Putin’s words, if NATO was thinking that someone would attack post-Socialist or post-Soviet countries, it was enough to sign a bilateral treaty on friendship and mutual assistance, including military assistance, which would assure security of these states.17 What is interesting is that early in the 1990s, NATO’s ideas about enlargement were closer to the mentioned Russian approach. In the first half of the 1990s, the Alliance was going to expand stability to the former Socialist bloc in a format of political association and not in the Article 5 collective defence format and deployment of military infrastructure. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was conceived as a means to avoid creating new dividing lines in Europe and manoeuvre between membership-seeking countries and Russia dissatisfied with possible enlargement.18 But for many of the PfP countries, this program eventually turned into preparation for membership, and, in general, PfP was more oriented towards practical military cooperation and not political dialogue fostering creation of a security community. NATO created an instrument of cooperation in the field, where it had more expertise, which is military cooperation. This fact once again reinforces Russia’s perception that NATO is still mainly a military bloc that just wants to disguise itself as a political organization.

In reaction to NATO enlargement and deployment of military infrastructure on the territory of its new members, Russia’s efforts to assure its own security from NATO’s potential attack became more visible.19 In reaction to NATO enlargement and deployment of military infrastructure on the territory of its new members, Russia’s efforts to assure its own security from NATO’s potential attack became more visible.20 Here again we witness the clash of Russia’s realist logic of balance of power, where military infrastructure in a neighbouring country is a threat per se, and a Western liberal logic of a “peaceful” political expansion.

15 NATO members are “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area”. The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April, 1949 [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm, access: 5 August 2015]

16 See, for example, the comment by Vladimir Putin during his press conference in April, 2014: “In general I believe that the block system outlived itself. NATO was created some time ago to counterweigh the Soviet Union and the so-called Soviet policy in the Eastern Europe. In response to it, the Warsaw Treaty was created. Afterwards, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, while NATO remained. We are told that NATO is transforming and becoming a more political organization. But no one cancelled Article 5, and this article is about mutual military assistance. Against who are NATO actions directed, where does it enlarge closer to our borders, why?” Прямая линия с Владимиром Путиным, 17 апреля 2014 (Vladimir Putin’s direct line, April 17, 2014). [http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20796, access: 5 August 2015]

17 Ibid.


19 Vladimir Putin’s explanation of why Russia reacts to the NATO enlargement so nervously can be found here: Прямая линия с Владимиром Путиным, 17 апреля 2014 (Vladimir Putin’s direct line, April 17, 2014). [http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20796, access: 5 August 2015]

20 It is interesting that such Russian reaction was generally predicted by Western experts. For instance, Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam in their 1998 article write that in reaction to NATO enlargement Russia could form an alliance with China, and it would be the development that the US should fear most. As a solution, the authors suggest to include Russia in NATO. See: Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam. Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China. “Political Science Quarterly”, 1998, Vol. 113, No. 3, pp. 361-382.
The clash of two logics narrows a choice of Russia's possible reactions to NATO enlargement. In NATO's view based on interrelation of democracy and stability, Russia can either welcome enlargement and, thus, present itself as a progressive pro-Western state, ready to democratize, or it can criticize NATO's expansion, and present itself as a neo-imperialist state with anti-Western values, which wants to safeguard its sphere of influence. NATO's liberal logic made criticism of the enlargement from the point of view of the military strategy barely impossible, because such criticism would imply that Russia is against democracy in general. Interconnection of security and democracy in NATO rhetoric leads to a premise that only democracies need collective defence against external threats, because democracies themselves are peaceful by their nature and do not threaten anyone. NATO positioning itself as a defensive alliance leads Russia to perceive it as if there must be some external threats for NATO, and, probably, Russia is one of these threats.

Hence, in NATO's own logic, the democratic regime type of its members is an obvious and sufficient guarantee of non-aggression against other states. That is why all Russian requests of written guarantees that the US anti-ballistic missile system in Europe (Euro-ABM system) is not deployed against Russia are perceived in Brussels as doubts in the peaceful character of democracies. However, as the international practice of the last two decades demonstrated, the democratic peace theory does not prove the peaceful character of democracies; the theory just claims that democracies do not fight each other. Democracies do not hesitate to use force against non-democracies or regimes that they consider to be a threat, moreover, democracies are the first to resort to the use of force (Kosovo, Iraq and Libya are the cases most often cited in the Russian official rhetoric). Thereby, NATO's stance that an organization consisting of democracies is a peaceful and purely defensive organization does not work, especially, if due to Russia's criticism of its enlargement, NATO views Russia as a non-democratic state. Thus, in Russia's logic, if NATO considers Russia to be not a real democracy, it poses a clear threat to Russia's security.

Values versus Interests and the Problem of Trust

For NATO, the problem of trust is related to the regime type: the democratic peace

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21 A similar idea was put forward by Williams and Neumann, but they claim that in the early 1990s Russia's pro-Western orientation did not allow to criticize NATO enlargement, because officially Russia declared a political course of building democracy. See in: Michael C. Williams, and Iver B. Neumann, From alliance to security community: NATO, Russia and the power of identity. "Millennium: Journal of International Studies", 2000, 29 (2), p. 361. The current Russian elite proclaim that Russia builds "sovereign democracy", which allow not to be caught in this logic trap.


theory has been used in the US foreign policy rhetoric since President Clinton, and, later on, was included in the NATO official discourse. In practice, it means that only democratic states can be considered as reliable partners, and relations based on interests without taking values into account are not considered as an optimal means of interaction\textsuperscript{24}. In its turn, by the mid-1990s, Russia came to the opposite conclusion: relations with the West based on Western values create many constraints for Russia, in contrast to relations based solely on common interests\textsuperscript{25}.

A methodological question here is what basis for relations between democratic (NATO) and non-democratic (Russia in the Western approach) states could exist. In Russia's perspective, the same question could be paraphrased as following: is it possible to find common grounds between Russia’s interests-based foreign policy and the West’s values-based foreign policy? Analysis of NATO-Russia cooperation shows that interaction in the field of fight against common external threats and military cooperation are more efficient than political dialogue. However, each time a political problem occurs in relations between Russia and NATO, it is practical cooperation that is usually frozen until the political conflict is settled (cases of Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine). It seems that both Russia and NATO use practical cooperation as a tool of the manipulative strategy, when freezing of practical interactions is used to punish the other side for deviating behaviour.

NATO is not the only possible format of security cooperation for Russia; other security arrangements allow for bilateral and multilateral interactions, too. However, Russia values the political track of cooperation with NATO, simultaneously criticizing it for inefficiency. Russia blames NATO for not recognizing Moscow as an equal partner, whose opinion is important in the regional security system\textsuperscript{26}. An equal partner does not have to be a good friend, but an equal partner should be respected because of its status of a great power. Thus, the status of an equal partner in relations with NATO is important for Russia because it entails acknowledgement of Russia’s status as a great (or at least regional) power.

Why is Russia looking for external acknowledgement from NATO? After all, Russia has a higher and internationally recognized status of the permanent member of the UN Security Council. The problem is that while the US, France and Great Britain as permanent UN Security Council members recognize Russia as an equal partner, in the framework of NATO these very states seem to question Russia’s regional and global influence. Thus, for Russia it is unclear whether these three


\textsuperscript{26} The arguments about political cooperation of Russia with NATO and Russian willingness to be treated as an equal partner are presented by Dmitry Danilov in his article: Дмитрий Данилов. «Россия-НАТО: дилеммы стратегического партнерства», РСМД, 28 июня 2013 [Dmitry Danilov. "Russia-NATO: dilemmas of strategic partnership", RIAC, 28 June 2013] [http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=2032#top-content access 16 August 2015]
powers are hypocritical in the framework of the UN or in the framework of the Alliance. Russia wants to have unequivocal answers by requesting NATO to treat Russia on an equal footing. Otherwise, Russia would feel that its UN Security Council status is defective because of powers that have ambivalent positions on this issue. The NATO-Russia Council was an attempt to find a solution to this problem of Russian perceptions, but Russia considers this structure not efficient enough.

Conclusion

Most problems in Russia-NATO relations are analysed as problems of bilateral relations, while the idea of this article was to show that political problems in the relations of two parties could be better explained by looking at the search of NATO and Russia for a new place in the world after the end of the Cold War. Misunderstanding between NATO and Russia occurs because they base their strategies on different grounds: NATO’s liberal logic is based on values, while Russia’s realist logic is based on interests. After the end of bipolarity, both Russia and NATO wanted to look better in their own eyes and in the eyes of the international community by establishing and supporting a political dialogue, but it has not helped to build trust between the two players. Lack of mutual trust is a usual excuse for not making efforts to develop cooperation. At the same time, lack of trust can be used as a resource and an additional motivation to find mutually acceptable solutions without searching for external recognition and trying to please the other side.

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RUSSIA’S NEW SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE

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The article offers analysis of Russia’s military strategy based on the text of the Military Doctrine 2014 as well as the Kremlin’s public rhetoric. The issues of Russia’s identity as well as its vital interests and military development and engineering are touched upon. On the other hand, the United States’ National Security Strategy 2015 is regarded as a key element to understanding American intentions and resolve in response to the Russia’s challenge. The Ukrainian conflict is presented as a key element of Russia’s strategy.

Russia’s Military Doctrine and Strategic Worldview

The year of 2015 was marked by aggravation of the international relations’ conflict level, as well as publication of the main defence documents by Russia and the United States. Both documents presented updates of basic interests and security challenges these countries define in the modern security architecture. They also reflect shifts and changes in the international political environment that have taken place in the last two years.

Russia’s Military Doctrine was presented on December 29, 2014, on the New Year’s Eve, as if the Kremlin did not want to share it with the world. Still, it became known to the wider public in the beginning of 2015; that is why it is reasonable to regard the Document as the event of 2015. This document’s key ideas can be summed up in three main points:

1. Russia is rising. The central idea is to counterbalance the West presented as the one destabilizing the world order. Blaming the West (and, first and foremost, the United States) for building the unipolar world has become the Russia’s authorities’ main catchphrase in 2015. In particular, “To build the balanced system of interests and relations defined in the world long ago”, is how Putin articulated Russia’s current mission in his Valdai speech in 2014.1 Russia’s Military Doctrine, in its turn, addresses the West’s attempts to increase its geopolitical influence among the main “dangers” to Russia.2 Among the dangers ranked highest are NATO enlargement, deployment of the European missile defence, and implementation of the Global Prompt Strike concept. One of the newly added one is a regime change threatening Russia’s interests, which is a direct reference to the events in Ukraine. These events are presented to the Russian public as an artificial coup d’état aimed at increasing American influence and undermining Russia’s positions in the near abroad. The “Threats” chapter gives a similar message, where “special security

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services” of “certain states’ are blamed for “undermining spiritual and patriotic traditions in the defence of motherland”\(^3\). In general, the Military Doctrine’s main intrigue is very similar to a plot of an old good Hollywood movie, where the good guy has to stand up and defend himself against an evil power, which is doing its best to destroy his wealth.

No specific names are mentioned but the relations with the West, mostly reduced to NATO, are described as an “equal dialogue”, not as “partnership” or “cooperation” as it used to be called in the previous years. To be more precise, Russia admits a possibility of cooperation with NATO in separate spheres as, for example, the missile defence, however, the main condition remains the same – “equitable participation”\(^4\). This passage sounds hollow enough as the dialogue between NATO and Russia over missile defence hit a dead end a couple of years ago, when it became quite clear that the Alliance was not going to subjugate its security to the Kremlin’s will.  

2. The area of Russia’s vital interests is outlined. To quote Sergey Karaganov, the Dean of the Department of World Politics and Economy, Higher School of Economics, Russia is fighting “to preserve the territories considered to be of vital importance for its survival.”\(^5\) In particular, the Doctrine text defines these territories as “states bordering the Russian Federation.” Overall, it is necessary to mention several points:

The first one: the Russian Federation’s Military Doctrine directly refers to Ukraine and the Ukrainian events, drawing red lines to the West’s potential actions, which Russia will consider unacceptable. They can be found not only in the text of the Doctrine, but also in President Putin’ speeches. In particular, the Large-scale military exercises in the territories of the states neighbouring the RF and its allies\(^6\) are listed as military threats (the actions that can cause direct application of the military force) in the Doctrine. It regards regular Ukraine-NATO joint military trainings as potentially endangering Russia’s vital security. Moscow has already expressed its dissatisfaction with NATO-Ukraine military trainings “Rapid Trident-2015”, which took place in July 2015 in Lviv oblast, treating them as a provocation and support of the war spirit in Ukraine.\(^7\)

In addition, the “i” were dotted in President Putin’s revelations in the documentary “Crimea. The Way Back Home”\(^8\”: Putin said he was ready to use nuclear weapons if necessary to “defend” people in Crimea. Such Russian public figures and officials as Fyodor Lukyanov and lieutenant general Evgeniy Buzhinskiy both comment on their concern about the sort of NATO actions that can launch an actual war with Russia. In particular, Buzhinskiy believes that for Russia, Ukraine is a red line and especially

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\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) Сергей Карaganов, Причина этого конфликта – заблуждения Запада, поэтому русские не сдадутся (The reason of this conflict is the West’s mistake, that is why Russians would not surrender), Россия в глобальной политике, 24 September, 2014,[http://www.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Prichina-etogo-konflika--zabluzhdeniya-Za-pada-poetom-u-russkie-ne-sdadutsya-16975, acces: 25.02.2015].


\(^7\) Россия считает учения во Львовской области провокацией (Russia views the military trainings in Lviv oblast as provocation) [http://24tv.ua/ru/ukrainsa/rossija_schitaet_voennye_uchenija_vo_lvovskoj_oblasti_provokacij/ n59506; access: 25.08.2015]

“Ukraine that is hostile to Russia.” This is a crucial point, as these days, the Russia’s elites claim that the United States is doing its best to alienate Ukraine from Russia, driving a wedge between the two brother nations, or even one nation, as Academician Arbatov once called Russians and Ukrainians: “Even if there are two states, there is one nation.” In the Russian experts’ opinion, the United States underestimates Ukraine’s role to Russia. In particular, Lukyanov believes that America’s massive military help to Ukraine might cause a big war. In his opinion, Russia views Ukraine as a part of its territory, and even if not a part then still essential to Russia’s security.

Russia does not clearly outline the perimeter of its vital interests, perhaps in an attempt to preserve some strategic ambiguity for NATO.

While Ukraine may be essential, it is not the only dimension of Russia’s vital interests. In particular, as the war with Georgia in 2008 showed, all states of the former Soviet Union, especially those bordering with the Russian Federation are included in the perimeter of Russia’s vital interests.

The second point refers to those neighbours of Russia’s, which are already included in the vital interests of Russia’s main rivals, in particular, NATO. Russia does not clearly outline the perimeter of its vital interests, perhaps in an attempt to preserve some strategic ambiguity for NATO. Still, this ambiguity holds certain dangerous questions for the Alliance. Does “bordering states” mean those states of the former Soviet Union, which still do not have NATO membership? Does Alliance membership guarantee that there will be no “green men” on the territory of the NATO states? Yet again, is there a remedy against Russia’s “creeping aggression”? Russian expert Andrey Piontkovsky developed the so-called “Narva paradox” as a potential trigger of World War 3. In his opinion, Russia’s provocative strategy towards the Baltic states aims at creating a sort of Donbas scenario, where the “struggle of Russians for their rights” would be supported by the “little green men”. This situation might force NATO to decide whether to start an armed conflict with the nuclear Russia or to demonstrate non-credibility of the NATO defence commitments, which will all but bury the Alliance as viable organization.

In this situation, Russia flexing its military muscles serves as one of the most important tools of its strategy towards the West. One more strategic peculiarity of Russia’s culture is interconnection between the state’s greatness and its military power. This idea was borne out by the experience of the Russian Empire, when military power became the “chief institutional foundation of Russia’s statehood”.

Czar Nicolas II’s abdication in 1917, a decision taken by the General Staff instead of the State Duma, can be regarded as an obvious example here.

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10 Interview of the author with A. Arbatov.
14 Ibid.
Therefore, one of the main tasks of Putin’s regime is to restore Russia’s military might, at least to the level of its regional ambitions.

Until recently, conventional deterrence was considered one of the Russia’s weakest points, although the situation began to change. At first sight, Russia’s conventional arms procurement plans look very ambitious. Moscow is putting significant efforts into correcting its conventional imbalance with NATO. In particular, Russia’s 2015 federal budget allocates 3.286 trillion roubles to defence, equivalent to 4.2% of GDP. As a result, the Kremlin’s defence budget has doubled since 2004. Russia’s 2011-2020 arms procurement program stipulates the upgrade of up to 11% of the forces’ military equipment annually, and will boost the share of modern weaponry in the armed forces’ inventory to 70% by 2020.

At the beginning of the decade, the general feeling was that, within seven years, Russia would be able to catch up with the United States in implementation of the Prompt Global Strike concept. This statement was confirmed by the Russian military exercise Zapad-2013, which, unlike in previous years, was based on imitation of a conventional weapons scenario conflict. Moreover, the mention of conventional strategic deterrence as well as the Prompt Global Strike among military dangers seems to attract attention to Russia’s rapid development of its conventional arms capabilities.

Today, this idea sounds much less realistic, considering the actual international dynamics. The impact of sanctions against Russia as well as the consequences of the current prices for oil, which dropped by almost a half during the last year, blurs the conventional weapons development perspective. According to evaluations made in the end of 2014, due to the sanctions Russia is going to suffer a reduction of its GDP by 2-3% per year. Today, almost 80% of key sensitive technologies used by Russia to make precision-guided munitions are imported from the West, which will become unsustainable because of the sanctions.

Therefore, Russia still relies on nuclear weapons as the ultimate and undeniable tool of its power. Looking at the Doctrine text for the first time, it is possible to believe that Russia regards application of nuclear weapons as the last resort to defend itself against the conventional aggression, “when the very existence of the state is under threat.” Meanwhile, considered in the context of Russia’s actions in general, military training, and the Kremlin’s statements, it gains a much wider meaning. Vladimir Putin’s admitted readiness to use nuclear weapons to defend Crimea makes it clear, that for the Kremlin, existence of the state means preservation of the current political regime with its aggressive nationalist ideology. “Sovereignty, independence, and unity of Russia is undeniable. They are those “red lines” nobody is to cross.”

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question is what the Kremlin means by the word “unity”? If Crimea belongs to the historical lands of the Russian Empire, then all former Soviet republics can be regarded as potential elements of Russia’s unity, which can be defended by nuclear weapons. In this context, Moscow’s recent statements about checking legitimacy of the Baltic states’ secession from the USSR adds to the overall portrait of the Kremlin ambitions.

During the last year, the number of nuclear threats Moscow applies doubled as did military trainings with the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons, including their deployment in Kaliningrad oblast and even, according to some information, in Crimea. In June 2015, in his speech at the Military Technical Forum “Army-2015,” President Putin announced that this year Russia was going to add 40 new ballistic missiles to its strategic nuclear forces (24 ICBMs “Yars” and 16 SLBMs “Bulava”).

NATO took this announcement with great anxiety as the evidence of Moscow’s determination to start another arms race. Today, Russia’s nuclear arsenal amounts to 4,500 warheads, of which 2,000 are nonstrategic nuclear weapons and 1,643 are deployed on strategic vehicles. Still, taking into account Russia’s actual situation, where ICBM deficit is combined with the sanctions’ impact over the economy, there are all reasons to believe that by 2018 Russia will comply with the demands of START-3, which set the limit for the deployed warheads at 1,550 units. At the same time, START-3 will be the threshold Russia would be unable to cross in the nearest future, first of all, because of the mentioned economic and technical reasons preventing Moscow from replacing the old SS-18s with the new ICBMs before 2022. A couple of years ago it was planned that SS-18s would be decommissioned in 2017, then their service was prolonged till 2020, and now till 2022, when the new liquid-fuel missile “Sarmat” is supposed to replace them.

**The US Response**

Russia’s Military Doctrine was followed by the US National Security Strategy published in February 2015. The logic is understandable as the strategic environment has changed significantly since 2010, when the previous Security Strategy was published.

Among the main threats defined in the document, three key ones are: the threat to the US homeland and its critical infrastructure; the threat to the security of the US allies and citizens abroad; and the global economic crisis. The spreading of weapons of mass destruction occupies the fourth place, just above pandemic diseases and the climate change. It differs significantly from the previous NSS published in 2010, which stated that “there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction”, which could become an object of interest for terrorist organizations and certain states. Main changes are presumably connected with the “rise of Russia”, which is still the only peer to the US in regard to the nuclear arsenal.

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21 Путин: ядерные силы России пополнят более 40 межконтинентальных ракет (Putin: 40 ICBMs will be added to Russian nuclear forces ), «ТВЦ», 17 June 2015, [www.tvc.ru; access: 30.07.2015]
It is also possible to outline the US Strategy in two main messages:

1. US’ continued leadership, which is presented as a leadership by strength, by an example, and with capable partners. It is mentioned that, besides having the most dynamic economy in the world, the US has the strongest military might but its values make it an exceptional and undeniable leader. Such an aggressive style of the document seems as a reminder to Russia that all its criticism of the American global dominance is nothing but empty barking. Also, the United States’ budget capabilities are quite different from Russia’s. In particular, while at the end of the 1980s, the USSR’s military expenditures were about 70-80% of America’s, which was almost enough to reach the strategic parity, and in the 2000s, Russia’s expenditures decreased to 9-17% of America’s. These numbers show the depth of military disparity between the two states today, especially in the fields not related to nuclear weapons, which Russia has been keeping since the Soviet parity era.

2. America’s vital interests concentrate first on security of its homeland and security of its allies and partners. In particular, this point can be underlined as one of the most important messages to Russia, whose permanent provocations at NATO borders mentioned earlier pose a threat to credibility of the US defensive commitments to the Alliance, and, therefore, NATO’s cohesion. To a certain extent, the Russian President aggravated this concern by saying “if I wanted, the Russian troops would not only be in Kyiv in two days, but in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw or Bucharest, too.”

To stop Russia from further speculations, President Obama visited Estonia in September of 2014, where he reiterated the US pledge to defend the Baltics. “We’ll be here for Estonia. We will be here for Lithuania. We will be here for Latvia. You lost your independence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again.” Obama’s words were supported by the US sending troops to the Baltic states to participate in the 3-month military trainings “Atlantic Resolve” to demonstrate the United States’ readiness to act on its commitments to its NATO Allies.

Special attention is paid to support of partners, in particular, Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression. “Russia’s aggression in Ukraine makes it clear that European security and the international rules and norms against territorial aggression cannot be taken for granted. In response, we have led an international effort to support the Ukrainian people as they choose their own future and develop their democracy and economy.” At the same time, there is a strong determination in differentiating between partners and allies, as the latter are covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, obliging the US as a NATO member to respond to aggression against them. In this light, the United States reiterated its pledge to support its allies, although unable to help Europeans resist Russia’s coercion.

26 Юрий Фёдоров, Глазами либерала: вы слышите, грохнут сапоги (With liberal’s eyes: you hear the boots are rattling), “PIR Center Security Index”, June 2015, [pircenter.org; access: 15.07.2015]
27 Will Stewart, Moscow troops could be in five NATO capitals in two days, boasts Putin: www.dailymail.co.uk; access: 25.07.2015]
In this connection, the US military capabilities play a secondary role to its resolve, which to the White House seems to be the weakest element of its commitments’ credibility. Still, it is worth mentioning that conventionally the United States is much stronger than Russia and the only field, where relative parity still exists, is the nuclear arsenal. Today the United States possesses about 4,760 nuclear warheads and more than 800 ballistic missiles and aircraft. Among them, about 2,080 are deployed at strategic weapons and 180 are Europe-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons. It is necessary to mention that, unlike Russia, which is now in the middle of modernizing its nuclear arsenal, the US is just entering the modernization process. The Obama Administration adopted the plan of refurbishment of the nuclear weapons in 2010; also, there is a plan to spend USD 350 billion on modernization of the nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles in the nearest few decades. There are grounds to believe that in the light of the growing confrontation between the US and Russia, these modernization programs will bury the global disarmament idea.

Summing up, we can draw the following conclusions:

The Ukrainian events of 2014, which provoked Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intrusion to the East of Ukraine, opened a new chapter in Russia’s confrontation with the West. Russia’s political and military worldview is developed in the process of this confrontation and is partially reflected in the Russia’s Military Doctrine-2014. The Doctrine’s main idea as well as the Kremlin’s rhetoric is the rise of Russia, which serves as the grounds for its aggressive regional expansion.

In its turn, the United States’ National Security Strategy-2015 looks as an attempt to confront Russia’s coercive strategy, insisting that the US was, is, and will be an undeniable leader in the world as a result of its capabilities, responsibility and ideology.

In fact, “the rise of Russia” presents the Kremlin’s attempt to restore the dividing lines in Europe, isolating its sphere of vital interests from the West’s geopolitical expansion. Meanwhile, Russia’s interference in the Ukrainian conflict as well as its threats to security of the Baltic states can be regarded as a tool to compel the West to accept its rules of the game. Nuclear weapons play the role of a coercive instrument, which allows Russia not only to continue its war in Ukraine, but to remind NATO that in case of any military support to Ukraine, the situation might aggravate to a regional nuclear war between Russia and NATO. It takes place in the situation, when Russia is much weaker than it wants to show, reminding of the events of Khrushchev in power, when the aggressive nuclear rhetoric and great geopolitical ambitions were hiding Moscow’s significant military inferiority.

In its turn, the United States’ National Security Strategy-2015 looks as an attempt to confront Russia’s coercive strategy, insisting that the US was, is, and will be an undeniable leader in the world as a result of its capabilities, responsibility and ideology. Moreover, the NSS tries to compensate the vulnerability NATO used to have during the Cold War, which is easily overplayed by Russia.

This is Europe’s vulnerability to any regional application of nuclear weapons exacerbated by the former Soviet states’ historic fears of being conquered by Russia. The reiterated pledge to defend all NATO members as well as the US troops sent to Europe (which is more a symbol of resolve than an efficient military contingency) might be enough to make clear to Russia all possible consequences of its provocations towards NATO.

At the same time, the situation is very unstable: any aggravation or the other way around, the realization that the response towards its actions won’t be strong enough might push Moscow to further expand the conflict area in Ukraine or even take more aggressive steps towards the Baltic states to confirm its determination to stand for its vital interests.

NO SECURITY WITHOUT VALUES

Taras Mykhalniuk, Director, Open Ukraine Foundation

The article examines interdependence between values and security, as well as the ability of the existing international system and its actors to ensure protection of democratic values and thus security. The article raises questions of need for new international mechanisms for security protection. The problem of competition between state-centrism and human security concepts is examined through Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the international system’s inability to protect basic principles of international law and ensure peace.

Introduction

In international relations, as in any other human sphere, values play a decisive role. The decision-makers’ values determine their perception of what is good and what is evil, and this is key to relationships they establish. Values can differ but if you announce your affiliation to certain values like rule of law, democracy, liberal economy – you must believe in them, protect them and adhere to them. Security without values is impossible, since ‘might is right’ then becomes the overriding factor, and force determines the outcome.

Values ensure predictability – a key security condition. Rule of law is a value, which ensures that norms and agreements are implemented and systems regulated. It is possible to compromise on values, but if fundamental values are compromised, a dispute ends in chaos and violence. Good intentions can sometimes lead to extremely bad results.

Every system has its norms and regulations, and international relations are no exception.

Adherence to these norms is an important condition. If norms and regulations are to be changed, this should be done in a legal, publicly accepted way. Otherwise, it will bring the system to chaos.

If norms and regulations are to be changed, this should be done in a legal, publicly accepted way

Russia has brought chaos to the system of international relations. By invading Ukraine it violated the principles of territorial integrity, reliability of international agreements, and now is running political buffoonery at the UN, the existing international system’s key institution. Though Russia has always expressed adherence to democratic values, it was little more than lip service as in reality it acts as if the crucial voice belonged to the strongest participant demonstrating permanent readiness for military confrontation.


2 Tom Batchelor, Putin Celebrates Russia’s open Democracy... 12 June 2015 {http://www.express.co.uk/ access: 21 August 2015}

3 Gabriela Baczynska, Russia announces war games 1 December 2015 {http://www.reuters.com/ access: 21 August 2015}
Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, and the escalation of tension in the region, has revealed security gaps in the present system of international relations inherited from the Cold War and exposed unresolved problems, which allow conflicts to flare.

Raising Questions

Recent developments in the Russia-Ukraine conflict raise three sets of questions. First of all, what values does the whole international community share? Are different international players allowed to have different values? On what values is compromise impossible?

Another set of questions concerns the existing system of international relations. Is the international system with its norms, agreements and regulations stable and non-changeable or can it be flexible? Do mighty international actors possess more power to change the rules and do others just have to obey?

Finally, what is security – is it state security or human security? What should be our priorities between these two sometimes antagonistic notions? Moreover, how should security, as we see it, be reached?

System of International Relations. Breaking the Rules

Let us take a look at the key principle in the existing international system. The current system was established in the wake of WW 2 and to a significant extent is a product of the Cold War, so its main goal is to maintain the status quo and avoid escalation of conflicts. Thus, "since the end of World War 2, the international political system has been organized around the notion of equal sovereignty of states, internal competence for domestic jurisdiction, and preservation of existing boundaries...". This has been the key pillar for international relations for the last 50 years.

However, an international security system based on containment is unable to respond to many emerging challenges; it is passive rather than active and can be manipulated by actors oriented towards satisfaction of their interests and not towards global prosperity and security. The Russian Federation aspires to restore its influence within the former USSR space including Eastern Europe. It considers itself a founder of the existing world order, and believes that this fact and its nuclear arms give it the right to establish a new order.

Its totalitarian values and last-century vision is based on the worst aspects of the Cold War, when the whole system was an arena for competition and geopolitical fights for interests.

Russia emphasizes that its policies aim at a fair and democratic world order, and it is not challenging the international order. However, in reality it deems democratic behaviour a weakness. Democracy is for small states, its demeanour suggests, and

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has little to do with actual politics – it is simply a political show for ordinary people.

The international system allows such behaviour. Containment is its main achievement but it can guarantee neither effective prevention nor punishment of an aggressor. Russia’s threat of a nuclear war allows the other international players to concentrate on soft measures and wait for a resolution rather than act. From a state-centred point of view, current developments can be seen as optimistic – a dubious cease-fire has been reached in Ukraine with no further escalation, now is the time for efforts to move from a military conflict to political discussions and negotiations. However, it does not change the situation on the ground.

The problem is the international system’s state-centrism. Politicians and diplomats turn a blind eye to deaths of soldiers and civilians despite the cease-fire, to a million of IDPs and refugees and even to the Russian military units on the Ukrainian soil. If the system were oriented towards human security, in which every human life matters, different measures would have been adopted at the very beginning of the conflict. The international community’s focus on containing its economic and political losses has meant more human deaths and a million of IDPs and refugees 6.

One can find a proof of the present security system’s fixation on state interests in the fact that when the UN General Assembly voted in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity as of March 27, 2014, those who abstained were mostly African and Asian countries, and another 11 countries voted along Russia against the Resolution. When many UN members act according to their political interests, and neglect even such a crucial value as the territorial integrity of a UN member-state, it is clear that the state-centred international system leaves much room for manipulation as the states’ interests stay above the values and principles they declare to protect within the UN.

**Human Security Aspiration Movement of International System**

The last century saw consistent efforts to create a more people-oriented approach to international concerns. First came human rights, and then other issues became prominent, such as environmental protection and good governance. All of these comprise the human security approach. Further development of this concept was complicated by the fact that the system is determined and governed by states that are not ready to give up their interests (political/economical) and influences and let anybody interfere with their jurisdiction. Very often, human life does not count for much in comparison to economic and political interests.

A driving force for human security was the fact that the most developed countries have democratic governance and under democracy, a human-oriented policy is one of the main principles. The United Nations has also given strong support to the concept of human security – the UN General Assembly adopted the human security approach for the UN programs worldwide 7.

Conflicts in places like Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, or Syria emphasize the need for human security. The question remains unanswered – how to create

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7 Human Security Unit, UN, Overview of Human Security Concept {www.un.org access: 29 July 2015}
an international system/organization independent of state influences (which are politically oriented) and possessing enough strength to counter emerging threats to human life? At present, the most effective mechanism is the collective security mergers of the countries, which share democratic values, such as the European Union.

If we consider Russia’s war against Ukraine in this context, we will see that Russia is testing the international system’s human orientation. Its purely totalitarian approach to principles and interests and readiness to sacrifice lives and welfare of millions of people for its geopolitical interests follows in the footsteps of the worst Cold War policies.

**Democracies**

Can we rely on democratic countries to promote human security? To some extent, we can. But, unfortunately, double standards are flourishing in the democratic camp, too. One has to remember that once you have double standards and different sets of values for internal developments within your country and for external policies, you automatically become a fake democracy – losing one principle, you lose them all. Once a democratic country develops cooperation with a totalitarian regime, it thus supports its existence and creates a potential security threat for the other states. In terms of values, it starts to move into a fake-democracy direction, no matter how democratic it would be inside. Recent international developments clearly proved that due to weakness of states to promote their values it is necessary to vest the burden of implementing and protecting the human security principles in transnational international organizations and bodies or alliances less dependent on states.

A society is only democratic if it sees democratic values as fundamental, applies them itself, and works to spread these values around the globe. This may be seen as proselytism but it is a vital part of a value-based society that it works to extend the reach of dignity, rule of law, and freedom to societies, which do not adhere to these values. The United States does a lot to promote democratic values. Very often, non-democratic countries resist the US’ influence as they feel that in this new world order there is no place for their regime. At the same time, the intensity of the US’ engagement in certain regions of economic interests makes one concerned about real intentions behind the intervention.

The Budapest Memorandum that guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity (1994) was violated, yet there were no immediate and adequate responses by the guarantor nations, which included the US. The US is giving Ukraine immense assistance (both political and technical), without which Ukraine would have been long overrun by the Russian forces. But the US is reluctant to get into a direct military confrontation with Russia. Therefore, questions were raised whether such support was enough and how the US sees its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum. When signing it, they certainly did not expect it would force them to confront a nuclear state.

In Europe, the situation is much worse. The European Union is a powerful force in promoting democracy across the region, thanks to attractiveness of the

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9 Darren Boyle, Take that Putin! U.S. delivers ten armoured Humvees to help Ukraine’s defence against Russian-backed separatists as part of $75million non-lethal military aid deal. 26 March 2015 (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ access: 21 August 2015)
European integration. Nevertheless, its unwillingness to become a global player and take responsibility for security, at least, in Europe and those countries, which aspire to join the EU, create a security threat. They are well aware of Russia’s dislike of the European enlargement eastwards, and their reluctance to stand against Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia has contributed to a security collapse in the region.

The problem of the European Union is that, while maintaining democratic standards internally, it tends to put its economic and political interests first in its external relations. Sanctions should have been introduced as soon as Russia turned towards a totalitarian direction starting from 2005 with deterioration of the situation with political and civil rights. Had there been stronger international pressure at that time, Russia would have understood that the democratic community including the EU was united and determined to protect its values, and would have found it harder to invade Ukraine. Therefore, for Europe, the first recommendation for ensuring security on the continent is to strengthen the values not only internally but also internationally and to become a stronger international advocate for democracy and rule of law, at least on the European continent. Unwillingness to acknowledge that need will cause security collapse on the continent – like it happened with the World War 2.

The only sensible aim for negotiations with Putin’s Russia is to bring about a cease-fire. Beyond that, no compromises are possible until there are signs of democratic development in Russia, and tremendous changes in its foreign policy.

**Democratic Alliances**

As individual states, including leading world actors, often demonstrate weakness when it comes to the values, the effective way to uphold these values and thus security can be reached through transnational institutions and organizations.

If we examine one of the leading and currently the most effective democratic military alliance – NATO, its initially aims not to protect the values but to defend its members, which, in their turn, are united around the democratic values. Domination of such state-centrism is undermining even article 5 of the Washington treaty – one of NATO’s basic principles, which says that when any of its members is attacked it is an attack on all of its members. At least, at the research level, there have been ongoing discussions as to whether these guarantees will stand if an attacker is a large nuclear state. The example above with the Budapest Memorandum’s guarantees for Ukraine creates a fertile soil for such doubts.

Due to the above considerations, NATO can be also considered as one of the products of the Cold War era and, to become a real security guarantor, it needs to concentrate on protection and promotion of democratic values – as a basic condition for upholding a secure international environment. To our opinion, it can be an ideal development route for the organization, which can be seen

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11 Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2005 {www.freedomhouse.org/ access: 21 August 2015}
12 Ivo Daalder. NATO, the EU and the use of force. 1999 {www.brookings.edu access: 21 August 2015}
as a protector of democracy rather than a security umbrella. Presently, NATO is still on the way of transformation, and the Alliance is taking its first steps toward including promotion of democracy into its concepts as well as contributing to democratizations of states with membership aspirations through enlargement.

**Summary and Recommendations**

Russia posits a test for the democratic world, and countries under undemocratic regimes are closely watching these developments. Russia will not stop unless its interests in Ukraine are satisfied. The democratic world order will not recover unless the aggressor is punished for its aggression. Failure to dispense such punishment is a direct threat to the democratic states' credibility.

So, democratic states should understand that their weakness and readiness for compromise cannot bring peace and will result in chaos and insecurity spreading deeper into Europe and around the globe. If a state adheres to democratic values within the country but does not implement them in relations with other states, or is passive in protecting fundamental values abroad, it is festering tensions and insecurity in the region and worldwide.

Totalitarianism is no longer an internal issue, if it results in international aggression. Every measure should then be applied to reduce its ability to wage war. Etatism dominating in Russia will inevitably turn into totalitarianism. The state controls most of the spheres of civic life and politics and enjoys support by the huge propaganda machine and absence of pluralism. Totalitarian regimes should be tackled at every stage of their development as a potential threat not only to lives of their citizens but to the international community.

Conflict must be dealt with when it is still brewing. State centred systems should be replaced with human security oriented international relations. Human security should become a priority for international relations as a whole and no human lives should be sacrificed for geopolitical and economic interests. Democratic nations need to become stronger through alliances. No compromises on fundamental values are acceptable. Democratic values must be protected by all means. In such alliances, democratic values and human security principles should dominate over state interests, whose influence on the decision making process should be minimized.

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Prospective analysis is an important component of strategic long-term planning. There is a range of methodologies, techniques and models applied in the field with uneven results. The international experience underlines the difficulty of making predictions in a highly unstable period, when we can mark off the end of the holiday offered by the post-Cold war period and the renewal of the fight for a better position caused by the global players’ new economic and military capacities and their sheer multiplicity. The big challenge is how to elaborate prospective scenarios (and not predictions) in the middle of an evolving crisis, with the „depth” of these predictions to cover 6 months-1 year, 3-5 years, 10-15 years.

Experts tried to meet this challenge in a project related to prospective studies for the Ukrainian Crisis. The project was funded by the German Marshall Fund in 2014\(^1\). To make an assessment, an original methodology was used. It is described below and establishes the strong signals approach (continuity scenarios), weak signals approach (events that become relevant in the mid to long term, with a significant impact on the evolution of such a scenario), and black swan events approach (law probability events with high impact, if the scenario develops that way).

The way to address prospective studies on 3-5 years mid-term has been developed as a technique in a non-public context, for the intelligence institutions’ internal purpose. We looked into these experiences and tried to come up with a model of analysis of our own that could be tested and transformed in time into an acknowledged methodology. The project’s original aim was to develop suitable tools to anticipate events and launch prevention as early as possible. The target is to make prospective studies, not to predict the future (that is also our approach). The design is used for a mid-term evolution of 3-5 years.

The original technique is based on a two-session work, a creativity session – a type of professional brainstorming – which identifies all the factors that could influence the existing situation. The next stage is selection, also in an expert setting, of the key factors, filtering their plausibility and relevance, but also the impact and level of consequences. Finally, selection of a limited number of scenarios to be played – usually eight, of which 3-6 scenarios with the strong signals approach, 3-6 scenarios with the weak signals approach, and the rest along the scenarios conditioned by „wild cards” – elements of major impact that change our

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\(^1\) GMF BST Project “Ukraine. A prospective approach”.
way of thinking, which are plausible and consistent but rare in terms of probability.

In applying the technique, the trickiest part is to select from an enormous number of factors that could influence a process – the key variables. While working to make this selection, practitioners used relative certainties (aspects that could most probably be materialised), crucial uncertainties (crucial aspects but unpredictable in regard to evolution and impact); and „tipping points“ (events with a major impact on the issue but with minor chances to take place, for which there are no indicators for the moment being but if they do take place, they would modify fundamentally the basic paradigm). Looking into this screen would offer the possibility to select the key variables.

The model has some visible gaps: first, it is done only at an expert level, exposed to groupthink and limited ideas or arguments. Second, the technique leaves it up to the experts to find ways of selecting the key variables. Giving the compositions and framework, there is a big possibility that those key variables stay, to a significant degree, in the group's mainstream and less credible, „implausible“, unaccepted scenarios are rejected.

Third, there is a gap of selection. Once we have the key variables, there’s a third selection made in the same framework, involving the scenarios. In order to avoid playing some thousands scenarios that the combination of all the factors is offering or hundreds offered by the key variables, there is a selection of the most probable, in this three tiers framework. However, even limitation leaves out some important scenarios different from those played in mainstream.

The number of such scenarios analysed – 3-6 scenarios for strong and week signals, and 2-3 scenarios for tipping points, was established in a very aleatory way. In a turbulent world, one would be inclined to play the weak signals and tipping points more, since they could offer more grounds to avoid surprises than the strong signals, which lead to very common and obvious scenarios. Those two points are the most challenging from the point of view of the scientific support of the methodology, as well as limitation imposed on the number of scenarios.

Our project\(^2\) was less ambitious in terms of proposing and working with PLATO or prospective studies. It was a test case on bridging the gaps and solving the variables on the technique, in order to identify what is needed to elaborate an adequate methodology in a future project. Moreover, we also had to solve the problem of beginning not with an event well known and assessed, with a common approach adopted, but with a „moving target“, an event in an unstable and unpredictable situation, a real turmoil, with huge debates about its outcome: a crisis in evolution.

The project has been developed involving NGO representatives, think tanks, academia and students, using only open sources on the Ukrainian crisis, what allowed accommodating more opinions.

The method consists of two successive iterations of the same methodology, with an interval of about 45 days. This setting was designed to limit effects of the original assessment. By repeating the assessment twice, the results of prospective scenarios can be checked for the variables that the current situation and instability are imposing on the scenario building process.

Each iteration consists of an assessment of the current situation at the beginning of the analysis, then of an expert evaluation of

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\(^2\) GMF BST Project “Ukraine. A prospective approach”.
variables and factors that could influence its evolution. To avoid random collection of items and factors influencing the future of the Ukrainian crisis, we created a system for assessing influence factors in three clusters: short-term – 6 month – 1 year, mid-term – 3-5 years, and long term – 10-15 years. Then, we outlined global, regional, and national (local) levels; each with political, military, social, and economic factors of their own. With this cluster, we composed the overall chart of the factors that could influence the issue.

One of the major issues was to select the key variables using PLATO technique, to offer a scientific format that aims at having all important scenarios different between themselves enough to be worth considered and developed as such. We selected the essential indicators based on three successive processes:

The first one consists of responses to the most important and obvious problems related to the Russian-Ukrainian war: here, we selected how the border between Ukraine and Russia, or the West and the “Russian World” would look like – spiritualised, meaning with transit spaces under double control; or as an enforced border, containment-type, with weapons on each side, a defended and strong border, with very consistent spaces behind those lines. Then we considered, which way Ukraine would be moving: West, East or in the middle, a nationalistic, undecided or anarchic Ukraine. And third, we considered how much of its territory Ukraine will retain: the entire territory, without Crimea, without the East, or without the so-called Novorossia (eight Eastern and Southern regions – the term used in the Russian Empire and currently by pro-Russian forces).

Subsequently, we looked at all other factors in order to select those consistent with the previous ones and possibly useful for different scenarios. We came up with eight new essential indicators, each of them combinable with the first three. Then, the experts selected the ones falling into a minimalist system of different scenarios. Here we built a theory with a minimum range of hypotheses that are non-contradicting and complete in regard to explaining the space covered.

The last two essential indicators used by the team are: what kind of a country Russia is going to be – the revisionist one or the one returning to the basic principles of the international system (claiming that Crimea was just a „special case”, while Moscow still respects the international law). Second, what relations are going to be between Russia and the US: a competitive-conflictual one or a negotiation-big bargain type. Along the process, we put aside propositions related to NATO or the EU, or, say, China since their influence would not change the basic scenarios.

So, with those five essential indicators, which have more than two values (one with five possible values – which way Ukraine goes, and one with four values – how much of its territory Ukraine retains), we had a span of 160 possible combinations. Then,
we narrowed down these possibilities and kept only really different scenarios. Moreover, we did not rule out any scenario that would give us added values, so we avoided the 3-5/3-5/2-3 artificial split.

Therefore, we got the following scheme: seven continuity scenarios (based on strong signals), five weak signals scenarios with a significant impact, which could become relevant in the future, and, and six scenarios of black swan events (low probability, but with huge impact if they do occur). Moreover, for the long run, we elaborated on the existing scenarios developed for the mid-term in a trend development.

A. Continuity scenarios

1. **Ukraine going West**: as a unitary state, without Crimea or without another part of its territory, going West, with an enforced border with Russia and eventually going to the EU and NATO.

2. **Transnistrisation / federalisation under Russia's control** (the Eastern part involved). Curtailing Ukraine's policies of any kind due to the Russian control in Eastern Ukraine and a Transnistria-type reintegration system, or a federation with the Eastern territory's right to veto.

3. **“Stop and Go”**. Anarchy and the state’s weakness continue, as does Russia's involvement. Ukrainian citizens are leaving the East, and the level of support of Russia grows in those two regions, as the propaganda continues in other regions – Zaporizhzhya, Kherson or Odesa. Then, in six – twelve months, when Crimea’s annexation is absorbed, Russia takes Ukraine's East and begins the destabilisation in another region. Russia takes slices of Ukraine to reach the Novorossia plan, to link its border to Transnistria and the Danube, and deny Ukraine any littoral at the Black Sea.

4. **Escape**. Russia does not succeed in Ukraine and leaves, retaining Crimea, but Ukraine does not move towards the East, but embraces a rather nationalistic and ambiguous position, balancing between moving to the West and avoiding commitments.

5. **Finlandisation of Ukraine**. Ukraine develops its political and economic system in a pro-Western manner but adopts the non-bloc/neutrality policy and accepts control of its security by Russia.

6. **Transnistria singularity**. Troops and volunteers from the Republic of Moldova’s separatist region under the Russian control, together with Russian paratroopers and Kazaks are entering from Transnistria into Odessa oblast to create a land passage to Crimea. Ukraine decides, with or without Chisinau's knowledge or consent, to enter Transnistria and sterilise the enemy troops behind their back.

7. **International shared governance of Ukraine**. The balance of power in Ukraine is fragile, Ukraine cannot deal with its own issues, neither the pro-Russian separatists in the East nor other regions can prevail, so the Geneva type (EU, US, Russia) of international shared governance is established in the region. As a result, each time, when there is a problem on these territories or somebody wants a bigger share in Ukraine's influence, it stirs problems and instability through proxies in Ukraine and negotiates the issue directly or in a package with other files of interest.

B. Weak signals

1. **Replacing Putin**. The system of power in the Kremlin decides to replace Putin. This change does not happen overnight or in the period of the raging crisis, but just after the situation settles down. The sanctions applied to Russia’s establishment and Putin’s
close friends are driving the change, in order for a different figure to be able to cut a deal with the West on a different path, not the aggressive one Russia has already embraced. The replacement entails an eventual split of Russia in the long run and the European-NATO integration of Western Russia.

2. Cold War. A new cold war type period is occurring between Russia and the West, at a smaller scale, but it leads to Russia’s containment at regional and international levels, and physical containment by enforcing and heavily arming the frontline states in NATO-EU and providing military support to Ukraine with weapons and military organisation to enforce this border.

3. Anarchy without rules. Ukraine becomes a weak state; President Poroshenko and the central authorities lose their credibility and capacity to manage the situation in the regions; due to power vacuum, a whole system of local groupings and militias is taking over; Ukraine moves to anarchy with improvised local security forces.

4. Revisionist Alliance. At the international level, Russia succeeds in imposing its revisionist agenda and finding allies for this to question borders and international rules. Hungary becomes its first partner, and other dependent states are joining the ad-hoc non-institutionalised alliance (Bulgaria, Serbia).

5. Ukraine occupied. Step by step, or in a window of opportunity, Russia occupies Ukraine, imposes its governance and integrates it. Putin fulfils his plan for recreating the "Historical Greater Russia" in the post-Soviet space.

C. „Black swan events” type of scenarios

1. „Putin’s suicide” (figurative). Putin’s sudden disappearance from the forefront of the system. This scenario differs from the one of Putin’s replacement since it means a sudden change, a crisis of succession and a rivalry between different groups. However, it also allows Ukraine to choose its path since in this scenario, Russia would retain no capacity to maintain the pressure.

2. Unfinished business in Ukraine. We are talking about a singular event in a remote region, like a nuclear bomb explosion in South Korea or Japan as a result of an accident in North Korea on their first exercise with the launch of a nuclear missile. Here, we can consider any other type of an event that suddenly moves all the attention and resources of the global players – Russia, the US, and the EU – to a remote region like South-eastern Asia, leaving Ukraine on its own, with all the issues on the ground, since nobody has resources to spare. No funds from the EU or IMF, no weapons from NATO or the US, no support for the separatists from Moscow: Ukraine is left with the whole mess and without support to deal with the issue the way it is.

3. The West Abdicated. The EU and/or NATO pass the responsibility for a solution at the Eastern border to Central and Eastern Europe. NATO is split between the US and European allies that do not invest and do not take responsibility in their neighbourhood; Europe is split between Western Europe, more inclined to deal with Northern Africa and immigration, as well as with further integration and a Schengen 2.0 grouping, and Central-Eastern Europe, concerned with the Eastern border. Central-Eastern Europe acquires self-conscience and tries to deal with the East, with the US assistance, or realises that it is no longer in the paradigm of the old and new Europe of Rumsfeld’s times, but a region with internal differences: some countries depend on Russia’s gas and are inclined to adopt the “Russia first” approach, and some countries are concerned for their own security and consider Russia a threat. CEE has to join forces with Ukraine to address these threats.
4. **Coup d’état in Ukraine.** The Right Sector or a nationalist armed group in Ukraine kills Poroshenko and leaves Ukraine with power vacuum. If this happens before the new Parliament is elected, but with the Verkhovna Rada already dissolved, this creates a mess. With a new leader coming from the “good side”, the pro-Western forces, but still less supportive due to his xenophobic and unacceptable nationalist and militarist approaches, the West cannot stand by this power. Russia uses the arguments of “fascists” and “Nazis” to force Ukraine into its orbit and eventually integrate it.

5. **Turkey takes Crimea.** Using the conflict of Ukraine and Russia, with Russia weakened by the Western sanctions and its economy and military in disarray, without capacity to maintain the pro-Russian establishment in Crimea, and with an even weaker Ukraine, at the request of the strong discriminated Tatar community, Turkey invades Crimea and takes over, appointing the Tatar community to run the administration in Crimea.

6. **Big Bargain for Crimea.** Russia accepts Ukraine's stabilisation, but tries to obtain a quasi-official recognition of its ownership of Crimea. This is not formally possible but informally this approach could become a big bargain that would involve de-facto recognition of Crimea as a part of Russia. For this, the US would get a Syria deal: replacement of Bashar al-Assad and conservation of the territory it controls under Alawites' control as well as removal of Tartus base and Russia's control over the arms trade in Syria. This means Crimea in exchange for Russia's eviction from the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Ukraine is left under more Russian influence, but Russia loses its only support and presence in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.

7. **Ukraine wants back its nuclear arsenal.** The challenge to the guarantees of security Ukraine obtained in 1994 in Budapest by entering the Non-Proliferation Treaty and renouncing its nuclear arsenal inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union, could be a legitimate ground to claim re-nuclearization. Once Ukraine's territorial integrity has been violated by one of its guarantors from 1994 – Russia, which annexed Crimea and disrupted stability in Eastern Ukraine, a nationalist government, which could come to office in the upcoming elections, might try to use subtle and underground networks to get back its ability to wield nuclear weapons, claiming that deterrence and its own security proved to be guaranteed neither by the EU, nor by NATO, but by its own deterrence arsenal.

At this point, our endeavour, reached the level of transforming the technique into a model with theoretical grounds and scientific background. The results were tested in different environments: expert, academic, NGO, and think tanks, as well as in specialised institutional environments. The feedback was used and absorbed during our model's second iteration. Then, the final result benefited from a revision by two experts that did not participate in the exercise, and by two experts involved in the testing part. Moreover, it opens the possibilities for testing the model on a number of crises/issues revisited several times at different timeframes, a way to refine the model so that on the next stage of development, we could have a real methodology for prospective studies.

Finally, we do want to underline that this is still just an exercise, with solid grounds, but with a model, that does not have yet a clear analysis of the magnitude of errors. This is an approach to prospective studies with a huge added value, but not a prediction, and we refer to the possibility for something to happen as no more than to a possible scenario. Even the number and presentation of the scenarios implies no ratings in terms of probability, just covers the range of possibilities and different scenarios.
Moreover, this is a warning that false predictions are far more costly than recognizing the limits of charting such scenarios for the future. Overconfidence in the system can lead to a strategic surprise easier than accepting the limits and maintaining awareness that an exceptional event can happen at any moment. So this model and the future methodology for prospective studies is offering us a better understanding and helps preparedness and prevention but does not offer us certainties about the future. It could be better used in drafting plans in order to move to a desired future or to proactively avoid negative developments, preparing to use opportunities and bridge vulnerabilities. In any case, it is better to embrace the option of creating capabilities with enough strategic agility and capacity of adaptation to the circumstances in evolutions, with a possibility of a prompt reaction in the case of an event of great magnitude, than to use resources for excessively elaborate strategic planning formulas that could depend too much on predictions.

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As a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and instigation of an armed conflict in the East of the country, the Ukrainian case should be treated as a clear and evident threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and global security as a whole. It will trigger fundamental changes in the security architecture, and this impact deserves attention and research.

Back in 1994, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, related to Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), provided to Ukraine security assurances in exchange for joining the NPT as a non-nuclear party state. In 2014, one of the signatory states to the Memorandum, Russia, broke its promise to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, integrity and inviolability of its borders. Two other signatories – the U.S. and the United Kingdom, issued political protests and introduced partial economic sanctions against Russia, which appeared to be not sufficient to restore peace and order.

Thus, the NPT, based on trust and delicate balance of interests, risks to be discredited and undermined in the mid-term future, putting at risk the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime. The message to potential proliferators is clear – only force matters in this new reality, and nuclear weapons are the most efficient instrument of deterrence and defence.
Ukraine’s renouncement in 1994 of Soviet nuclear weapons deployed in its territory was the key decision to secure and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. Ukraine’s example was decisive for Belarus and especially for Kazakhstan, which possesses impressive uranium ore deposits, the nuclear industrial complex, and a nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk. Ukraine’s responsible policy opened a way for the successful NPT extension at the 1995 New York NPT Review and Extension Conference and helped prevent further nuclear proliferation.

Good will demonstrated by Ukraine, a legal successor-state to the nuclear power, the USSR, enabled the world community and its major actors to preserve the NPT – the basis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and to resolve an unprecedented situation created by the dissolution of a nuclear power – the Soviet Union. The NPT authors did not envisage such a situation. Theoretically, all former Soviet republics might have been treated as successor-states to the USSR and could have claimed their share of the all-Union property (in accordance to the 1978 Vienna convention on succession). In reality, though only Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, possessing vital parts of the Soviet nuclear complex, had chances to keep their share of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Should all of the former republics exercise their right, the NPT would have been doomed in the form it was designed and the risks of nuclear proliferation would have increased tremendously.

The Budapest Memorandum was signed on December 4, 1994, at the OSCE summit in Budapest. It contained security assurances the United States, the Russian Federation and Great Britain provided to Ukraine (as well as to Belarus and Kazakhstan in similar documents) in exchange for opting to become a nuclear-weapon-free country. The Memorandum contains reference (p. 1) to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The United States, the Russian Federation, and Great Britain confirmed their obligations in accordance with the Final Act principles “to respect independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Ukraine”. In p. 2 of the Memorandum, Russia, the U.S. and Great Britain confirmed their obligation: “to refrain from threat of force or its use against the Ukrainian territorial integrity or political independence”. P.6 of the Memorandum bound all parties to consult in case a situation threatening the above obligations develops1.

The Russian policy towards Ukraine in 2014 violated all the abovementioned obligations under the Budapest Memorandum and caused condemnation all over the world. On January 22, 2015, the German chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her indignation over Russia’s violation of the Budapest Memorandum. She asked rhetorically, “What country would be ready to follow the example (of Ukraine – S.G.) and renounce nuclear weapons?”2 after Russia broke the agreement.

On the Budapest Memorandum’s 15th anniversary in 2009, the former first deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine O. Chaly said that during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict over Tuzla in 2003, Ukraine addressed Russia and the United States with request for consultations. He believes, then informal consultations between Moscow and Washington led to conflict resolution. To support arguments over effectiveness of the Budapest Memorandum, he said,

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“Everybody understands that if Ukraine requests assurances in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum and such assurances are not provided, Ukraine will get moral, political and legal rights to leave the NPT,” while nuclear non-proliferation “is a key element of the global policy.”

Annetation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 and its interference into the events in the East of Ukraine led to re-emergence of the idea of renewal of Ukraine’s nuclear status. The issue has been under discussion by politicians and the expert community since then. For example, on March 12, 2014, the leader of the “Svoboda” party Oleh Tyahnybok said, “Ukraine renounced its nuclear arms in exchange for security guaranties. We address the guarantor-states with a demand to stand by their obligations. Otherwise, we reserve for ourselves the right to have weapons able to defend us.”

A week later, the bill was introduced to Verhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, on Ukraine renouncing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The move was motivated by Russia’s (one of the signatories to the Budapest Memorandum) violation of its obligations. In his explanation of the initiative, one of its authors S. Kaplin from the UDAR party said that Ukraine needed two years and USD 3.4 billion to develop nuclear weapons. As a legal ground for the move, a reference was made to the text of the Law of Ukraine “On Ukraine adhering to the July 1, 1968 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, which read, “threat of force or its use against territorial integrity... or political independence of Ukraine” on the part of any nuclear power will be treated by Ukraine, as “exclusive circumstances” threatening its “highest interests” – literally reproducing the formulation from Art. 10 of the NPT.

An actual strategic situation could serve as a legal basis for leaving the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which Ukraine adhered to as a nuclear-weapon-free state. But should Ukraine make this step?

Evidently, politicians will miss no chance to raise their rating and increase their chances for re-election, but the move does reflect wide-spread sentiments among the Ukrainian political elite. The experts prefer a more balanced approach to the issue of Ukraine’s nuclear status. On September 19, 2014, the Deputy Head of the State Inspection on Nuclear Safety of Ukraine O. Makarevska said that Ukraine was capable to develop nuclear weapons from the scientific standpoint. But from the expert standpoint, “that would be a politically wrong decision.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine was also against radical moves on the issue of nuclear weapons.

In the 1990-ies, the Ukrainian military establishment was mostly against Ukraine giving up the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. Nevertheless, they kept discipline then and are doing so now. One
can judge their real feelings by opinions expressed by the retired representatives of the Ukrainian military elite. One of the prominent figures of the military establishment, the former Head of the General Staff of Ukraine colonel-general A. Lopata believed that getting rid of nuclear weapons was a mistake.  

Taking into consideration the existing regional and global circumstances, raising the issue at the state level is not rational. It would provide Russia an opportunity to accuse Ukraine of undermining the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime and may be used as a pretext for a massive intervention by the Russian Armed Forces. 

It would also be very unrealistic to expect further support for Ukraine from the Western powers and the US, in particular. Such step by Ukraine would threaten the US national security. Nuclear non-proliferation has been among key foreign policy priorities of every Washington administration for the last 20 years and is mentioned in the National Security concepts. In the existing situation, finding itself virtually in isolation would be suicidal for Ukraine.

Conceptually, Ukraine leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be a disaster for the NPT and the regime in general, initiating the “domino effect”, as Ukraine’s renouncement of nuclear weapons in the 1994 was a “show case” for nuclear non-proliferation. 

What Ukraine should definitely do is insist on the U.S. and Great Britain, as well as on France and China, fulfilling their obligations under the Budapest Memorandum and on punishing Russia, as a state that threatens not only the NPT, but global peace and security. The Memorandum itself involves no direct legally binding security guaranties but signatures of the leaders of key nuclear powers and the mechanism of consultations envisaged by this document make it politically very important. 

An analysis of the international consequences of the Ukrainian crisis and of the Budapest Memorandum’s failure leads to conclusion that security assurances provided by the Budapest Memorandum and reiterated by separate letters from France and China demonstrated their low effectiveness (if not utter uselessness). Inability to guarantee sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, which voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons deployed in its territory, undermines the NPT’s framework based on agreement by the states that do not possess nuclear weapons not to seek their acquisition in exchange for negative security assurances from of the nuclear weapons states. The compromise enabling the NPT was based on the compromise between the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear states and mutual trust supported by the IAEA system of safeguards.

This shaky balance of interests was ruined by the latest crisis. Due to its non-block status, proclaimed in 2010, Ukraine (unlike Belarus and Kazakhstan, members of the Tashkent treaty) related heavily on security assurances provided in the Budapest Memorandum, as well as on the international law’s fundamental documents – the UN Charter, the Helsinki 1975 Final Act, etc.

Lessons potential proliferators will learn even in case the Ukrainian crisis ends with Ukraine in its officially recognized borders but perhaps without Crimea for the foreseeable period will definitely inform

9 Генерал Анатолий Лопата: Отказ от ядерного оружия был ошибкой 07.03.2014 http://news.liga.net/interview/politics/997124-general_anatoliy_lopata_otkaz_ot_yadernogo_oruzhiya_byl_oshibkoy.htm
their motives and decision-making. They will include re-assessment of reliability of negative and positive security assurances and reliability of key nuclear powers, and the United States, in particular.

This case will be treated in the books as a proof that a state possessing nuclear arms can neglect its obligations under the international law with minimal negative consequences. It definitely discredits the officially recognized nuclear states’ good will and potentially threatens the compromise between the “haves” and the “have nots”, laid in the foundation of the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime based upon the Treaty. Even if no immediate consequences for the NPT follow, the delayed negative effect would present an existential threat to the Treaty. Those who try ignoring the issue are launching a boomerang capable of smashing many seemingly solid structures.

A potential risk to the arms control agreements with a possibility of another arms race is another evident consequence of this crisis, as this sphere is closely connected to and interdependent with nuclear non-proliferation. The whole security architecture and the international system in general is under a risk of failure. That would bring about not only the failure of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but might ultimately lead to a nuclear chaos and catastrophic consequences for the humanity.

**Nuclear Component of the Cold War**

The bi-polar international system, known also as the Yalta-Potsdam system, was developed after the WW2 under the dominant influence of a nuclear factor. It was no coincidence that during the Cold War, the two confronting military-political blocks were established around the two existing nuclear powers – the United States and the Soviet Union, – each of them capable of providing the nuclear umbrella for their allies and destroying their enemies. It was their might based on nuclear deterrence that kept peace in Europe and blocked the risk of a global war for decades, providing relative stability to the international system.

Their respective allies – Britain, France and China (till the 1960-ies) – supposedly were under powerful protection by a nuclear superpower; but, nevertheless, opted for developing nuclear arms of their own. Motives for going nuclear were multiple and different, but all three shared two key ones – security and status. The status motive could have had a different meaning for them – preserving a significant role in the international system for the declining colonial powers – Britain and France, and compensating for their relative economic and military weakness and assuring the leading role in the future system for the rising power – China (relying heavily on its heritage as one of the most ancient and sustainable civilizations, huge territory, natural and human resources, and high self-esteem).

It is also true for India, when it made its pro-nuclear choice in the 1960-ies. Thousands of years of a self-sufficient civilization were pushing India’s elite towards development of nuclear arms as a guarantee for their country key role in the future international system. The Indian “peaceful” 1974 test and especially the five nuclear tests in 1998 should be treated as an evident claim for the future role of a powerful world player and, possibly, a superpower of the 21st century.

A very similar situation developed in the nuclear race between Brazil and Argentina in the 1970-80-ies. Now Brazil is a major economic power in Latin America, and its military nuclear program has been frozen, but not dismantled, in the early 1990-ies under the pressure from the United States.
Potentially, it may be relaunched by an appropriate political decision. The Iranian case, in its turn, provides arguments in support of the suggestion that a medium power, in addition to security reasons, might consider the nuclear option trying to re-establish itself as a regional leader.

Another rising Asian giant – Indonesia – known for its criticism of the NPT, especially in 1995, when Jakarta played an active role in the non-alignment movement, criticizing the nuclear powers’ attempts to push through NPT extension without taking into consideration opinions of the developing countries, – may also one day seek nuclear weapons due to security and status motives. Indonesia is facing a potential threat from China’s growing regional presence. Despite criticism, the country supported the existing non-proliferation regime, but the Ukrainian crisis and the Budapest Memorandum’s failure might force its leadership to revisit the issue of its non-nuclear status.

Despite the point of view popular in the 1990-ies, after the end of confrontation, that nuclear weapons are the weapons of the past, of the 20th century, latest developments in the Ukrainian crisis might provide a strong argument in favour of strengthening pro-nuclear tendencies in the world. Reconfiguration of the international system is closely connected to and largely determined by the nuclear factor. Correlation and interdependence between them can hardly be questioned.

**Crisis of International Organizations**

The Ukrainian crisis cast a shadow of doubt over the utility of the OSCE, which was steadily criticized for its failures since the war in the former Yugoslavia. Its role was in fact reduced to providing the ground for discussions, stating “faits accompli,” and observing elections. OSCE missions in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, etc. resulted in frozen conflicts with no solution in sight. The events in Ukraine made evident the crisis of the OSCE proper: The Helsinki 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe initiated the Helsinki process based largely upon the Final Act of the Conference. It proclaimed the principles for providing peace and security in Europe; inviolability of borders was a key one among them. The 2014 annexation of Crimea constituted a brutal violation of the international law in general and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular. By changing the existing European borders for the first time after the end of WW2, Russia has not only undermined borders in Europe, but opened a Pandora box, potentially inviting territorial claims to Russia itself in the future. OSCE’s reaction was ineffective. Sending a mission without an appropriate mandate, unable and seemingly unwilling to act resolutely, demonstrated that OSCE is incapable to deal with security problems in Europe, even if they threaten peace and stability on a regional and global level.

The situation Ukraine is facing now is characterized by an all but paralysis of the UN Security Council due to the Russian Federation’s exercise of its veto powers. Even the UN Security Council resolution calling for establishment of an international tribunal to address the shooting down of the Malaysian airliner over Eastern Ukraine in July 2014 was vetoed by the Russian Federation in July 2015. These failures enhance arguments of countries insisting on a deep reform of the entire UN system and of the Security Council, in particular.

These organizations established in the 20th century under different circumstances demonstrate inability to preserve peace and stability they were created for. The Ukrainian crisis has shown these organizations’ ineffectiveness in a critical situation and their uselessness as instruments in the security area.
NATO was not immune to the developing crisis, either. It is facing new challenges, necessitating rethinking of its mission. These events will result in deteriorating credibility of the security guaranties provided by the Washington Treaty (Art. 5). In fact, the reaction of Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states proves it is already happening. Despite NATO leadership’s attempts to reassure Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states and practical steps (military manoeuvres, moving limited contingents of NATO troops to their territory on a rotation basis), they are failing to meet the Alliance’ new members’ expectations.

During his October 2014 visit to Washington, the Head of NATO’s Military Committee General Knud Bartels said that after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine the security architecture in Europe has changed and NATO has to adjust to new circumstances. NATO is getting a chance to return to its initial goal – containment of Russia. Paradoxically, Russia will face precisely the result it feared – strengthening of the Alliance’ military component and moving of its troops closer to the Russian borders.

**Conclusion**

The Ukrainian crisis became a trigger of the process of transformation of the international system. These changes have deep roots and objective grounds, as the old system reflected circumstances of the middle of the 20th century, in essence – the results of WW2.

The Ukrainian crisis in general and the Budapest Memorandum’s failure, in particular, will have a long-lasting negative impact on the motivation of potential proliferators of nuclear weapons, especially on new emerging regional and global actors of the future international system, pushing them towards development of nuclear weapons as the most real guarantee of their security, which would also enhance their status in the world to come.

The new international system will have a more complex configuration and its development will take certain time. In fact, the system was evolving since the end of the Cold War confrontation, and the recent increase of tensions in the system may not only accelerate changes, but serve as a “coup de grace” for some European and global institutions in charge of the security and give birth to new ones. These incoming changes are doomed to closely correlate with changes in the economic, political, and military might of the “old” and “new” actors of the changing system, where the nuclear factor will play a key role in determining the new security architecture.

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10 Після дій РФ щодо України змінилася архітектура безпеки в Європі – генерал НАТО // http://www.day.Kiev.ua/ua.news/051014
UKRAINIAN CRISIS’ IMPACT ON THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

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The Ukrainian crisis definitely did not make the South Caucasus a safer place. Armenia’s dependence on Russia was exposed further, while Georgian-Ukrainian official relations suffered because of the Georgian authorities’ passiveness and the Saakashvili factor. All of the South Caucasus countries, and especially Georgia and Azerbaijan, felt uneasy with the annexation of Crimea perceived as an unprecedented violation of the territorial integrity principle. Russia, while engaged in Eastern Ukraine, has somehow distracted itself from the South Caucasus but it still keeps enough presence to maintain the current status quo and influence key developments. The Western sanctions, having badly hit the Russian economy, are indirectly affecting the South Caucasus too, especially Armenia and Georgia.

Ukraine and the South Caucasus Prior to the Crisis

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia has been playing a dominant role in the post-Soviet space. Theoretically, Ukraine was supposed to be the number two player; as in all regards being the second largest post-Soviet country. However, Ukraine has not played the expected role in the post-Soviet period. Some regional projects and organizations were built around Ukraine, evidently aiming to balance the Russian influence (like GUAM that brought together Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and, for some time, Uzbekistan) but they never actually made any significant impact.

Only after the Orange revolution in 2004, Ukraine did become a visible player that changed the balance of power in the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus. President Yushchenko forged a connection with Saakashvili’s Georgia (Russia’s main foe) and intensified the country’s ties with NATO. However, it did not last long – as soon as Yushchenko was defeated in the 2010 presidential elections, Ukraine once again returned to its rather passive stance. President Yanukovych restored friendly ties with Russia with all expected consequences. NATO was all but abandoned, and Ukraine focused on the EU instead, which was supposed to be “rather harmless” and “less irritating” for Russia.

President Putin decided to play it safe – in case Ukraine slipped away, Russia needed another success story. This success story had to be Armenia.

Nevertheless, Ukraine was to make a much bigger impact in 2013. As the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit was nearing, it was still unclear whether Ukraine would sign the Association Agreement with the EU or not. Still not quite sure about this,
President Putin decided to play it safe – in case Ukraine slipped away, Russia needed another success story. This success story had to be Armenia. Putin summoned the Armenian President and persuaded him to join the Customs Union instead of initiating the EU Association Agreement – something Armenia had been meticulously working on, obviously hoping that the EU was “rather harmless.” But both Ukrainian and Armenian hopes failed – Russia was irritated by the EU, as well. It worked on its own project, the Customs Union, which would be compromised by the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU.

Persuading Armenia was rather easy for Putin – the country needed Russia’s support vis-à-vis the resurgent Azerbaijan. Before summoning his Armenian counterpart, in September 2013 Putin notably visited Baku, where “growing military cooperation” was discussed, among other things. By this visit, Putin openly made it clear that Moscow’s support to Armenia could be easily withdrawn, and Russia would not mind selling arms to Azerbaijan on a massive scale. Facing this tough choice, Armenia had to give up its EU ambitions.

This was only the beginning of the chain reaction. Soon, as Yanukovych was also persuaded by Putin against signing the EU Association Agreement, a window of opportunity was suddenly widely opened for Georgia. As both Ukraine and Armenia slipped away at the very last moment, the EU needed a success story of its own and that is how the Association Agreement was initiated with Georgia (Moldova also initiated it). Georgia’s new authorities, which succeeded Saakashvili and his team in 2012, were eager to prove that they were “no less pro-Western” than their predecessors. Therefore, they worked intensely on the Association Agreement and very soon managed to meet all requirements. Under Saakashvili, Georgia was more focused on NATO and viewed the EU rather sceptically, and talks with the EU over the Association Agreement were advancing slowly. The new Georgian authorities decided to concede to all requirements and drop all demands that Saakashvili’s government made before. They needed some tangible success to show for as Georgian people started to get frustrated with NATO and the EU accession failures. Thanks to Ukraine and Armenia (and in a way thanks to Russia, too) a success story was finally provided.

As for Azerbaijan, it was never seriously interested in the EU. The country was demonstratively rebuilding its armed forces and establishing itself in the region as a leading economic and even military power. Restoration of its territorial integrity (regaining control over Karabagh) and not integrating with the EU was Azerbaijan’s top priority. Like Georgia, Azerbaijan had territories lost, but, unlike Georgia, it did not lose territories to Russia (at least, directly) and its chances for restoring its territorial integrity looked much better, especially given the positive dynamics of development – both population growth and oil windfall.

Ukraine would affect all three South Caucasus countries only after the Maidan events.

**Maidan and Crimea**

To put it mildly, Maidan did not make Russian rulers happy. In a way, for Armenia and Azerbaijan it had to be

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rather unpleasant, too. Their rulers were never comfortable with public protest. In early 2008, Armenians challenged the results of the presidential elections. Tens of thousands rallied in Yerevan and the government appeared doomed, until it resorted to violence and everything ended in killings and arrests. Azerbaijan faced similar (though less) dramatic challenges after the presidential elections of 2004. In general, the fear of the “Orange Virus” has been haunting the post-Soviet authoritarian and hybrid regimes since 2003. On the other hand, Georgia, as a “motherland of orange revolutions,” felt much more self-assured and safe. In fact, it experienced not only rallies and revolutions but also a peaceful transfer of power (2012 parliamentary elections). Georgian democracy was more advanced and, therefore, more immune to the “Orange Virus.”

However, Maidan presented a difficult choice to Georgia, or at least to its new authorities, which were trying to improve relations with Russia. Supporting the discredited Yanukovych was hardly an option but supporting Maidan would annoy the Russians for sure. As a result, the Georgian authorities remained very cautious. On the other hand, Saakashvili and his team-mates both were inspired by Maidan and saw it as an opportunity. They went to Kyiv and openly supported the rally. As the majority of Georgians sympathized with Maidan, the Georgian authorities suffered greatly for sitting on the fence. Ukraine was always viewed as Georgia’s close ally – way before Yushchenko and Saakashvili forged their intensely close ties – so the Georgian government came under criticism. However, it remained committed to its neutral stance. High officials did not support Maidan, and abstained from visiting Kyiv, even after Yanukovych fled his country and Maidan claimed a victory in the name of the Ukrainian people. The Russians were not be trifled with. Georgia learned its lesson in 2008 and was not going to make the same blunder again; now it was Ukraine’s turn to fight Moscow.

The annexation of Crimea in March 2014 actually proved that the Russians could not be messed with. It made the Georgian authorities even more careful and restrained. While condemning the annexation, the Georgian Prime Minister Garibashvili added that his government would remain “pragmatic” and avoid “radicalism.”2 Later, on numerous occasions, Garibashvili made his best to distance the Georgian case (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) from the Ukrainian one and even said that Russia was not “interested in annexing Georgian territories.”3 For that, he was widely criticized at home by the opposition, which was hoping that, thanks to the Crimean events, Georgia would manage to attract the international community’s attention to the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia once again.

The Georgian-Ukrainian relations looked rather sour, especially after the Georgian authorities in February 2015 asked Ukraine to hand over Saakashvili (whom they were prosecuting)4. To no one’s surprise, Kyiv refused. Soon, Saakashvili was appointed governor of Odessa oblast, which did not improve the bilateral relations. The Georgian-Ukrainian ties (on official level) hardly can be expected to intensify.

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Saakashvili’s presence in Odessa is an issue that definitely deserves special attention. If he and his team succeed he may get a second chance in Georgia. If they fail, though, his chances to return to Georgia will become even more obscure. One thing can be stated without a doubt: in Odessa Saakashvili will be even more resolute than he was in Georgia. He has learned his Georgian lessons, although in his own way. Saakashvili believes that he failed to finish what he started in Georgia. He may think that this was his fault, too, because he was too lenient and allowed his opponents to interfere and criticize him; he lacked resolve, and this is why his reforms finally were stalled. This is why in Odessa he will be even more unwavering. This time, there will be no balancing or half-measures. He will do it his way and will try to do it as quickly as possible. In Georgia, he succeeded as a reformer and failed as a democrat. In Odessa, he only has to succeed as a reformer.

Azerbaijan sounded more unambiguous. Its foreign minister Mammadyarov stressed on the territorial integrity principle and reminded everyone of Karabagh (unlike Tbilisi, Baku decided to link its problem to that of Ukraine). In a few days after the annexation, President Aliyev spoke firmly against violating the territorial integrity principle, while not mentioning Ukraine or Crimea specifically. The Armenian President Sargsyan was the most careful as he expressed hopes that the Ukrainian issue would be resolved “respecting each other’s problems.” It goes without saying that Armenia was in no position to criticize Moscow, especially since it demonstrated its determination in Ukraine.

The annexation of Crimea also served as an additional incentive for further intensification of the traditionally close and intimate Azerbaijani-Turkish relations. Namely, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan paid an unplanned visit to Baku in April 2015, which happened to be dedicated, among other things, to the situation in Ukraine. Turkey was not uncomfortable with the consequences of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and it started a dialogue with Armenia (which was not comfortable either with having a much stronger Russia in the region), but the dialogue finally broke down ostensibly because Turkey wanted the Karabagh issue solved before it would establish diplomatic relations with Armenia. Thus, Turkey demonstrated how firmly it was committed to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. As Turkey was alarmed with the consequences of the 2008 war, it definitely would be even more alarmed with the annexation of Crimea (a land with a vast Tatar population that belonged to the Ottoman Empire some two centuries ago). The recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states was a dangerous precedent, and it strengthened Russia’s presence in the South Caucasus. The annexation of Crimea was probably

even more dangerous for both Turkey and Azerbaijan. Even before annexing Crimea, shortly after having persuaded Armenia to join the Customs Union in 2013, Russia deployed additional forces to Gyumri base (Russia’s military base in Armenia). Putin marked this development by declaring that “Russia is not going to leave Caucasus” as if signalling that he meant business not only in Ukraine. According to more or less accurate sources, Gyumri hosts tanks, MIG-29 fighters, advanced anti-aircraft missiles, and helicopters. Now, Russia has three large military bases in the South Caucasus (Gyumri, Abkhazia, South Ossetia) that brings unrest for all regional actors.

**War in Donbas and the South Caucasus**

Despite Russia strengthening its military presence in the South Caucasus, it was still obvious that after it started a war in Donbas, it would have to divert its forces to the Ukrainian theatre. This was “good news” for the South Caucasus and, perhaps, most of all for Georgia. There was a feeling in the country that, after annexing Crimea, Russia would come after Georgia for daring to initiate the Association Agreement with the EU. Probably Moscow could demand that Georgia join the Customs Union like Armenia. Instead, Russia was entangled in Donbas and finally made the EU and the US to respond.

Once again, the Georgian authorities saw it as a big problem that Saakashvili joined the new Ukrainian government as an advisor. This was annoying for two reasons: Saakashvili, whom the Georgian authorities considered (or at least wanted) to be a political corpse was relaunching his political career; in addition, this stunt would, no doubt, irritate Russia. The Georgian government was doing its best to mollify Moscow and actually achieved something in 2013-2014 – Russia reopened its market for the Georgian products, and tension between the two countries eased. The authorities distanced themselves from the former President Saakashvili. The Prime Minister Garibashvili advised the Ukrainians not to “take heed of Saakashvili” and together with his government was criticized domestically again for “losing Ukraine to Saakashvili.”

In response, the Georgian authorities declared they would not let Georgian-Ukrainian relations deteriorate. It was announced several times that Garibashvili intended to visit Kyiv. However, nothing came of it. Soon, Georgian officers started to join the Ukrainian army and fight in Donbas. This became another headache for the Georgian authorities. They tried to distance themselves again from everything but did so rather clumsily. In December 2014, a Georgian officer died in Donbas, and the Ministry of Defence issued a statement, in which it blamed everything on Saakashvili’s “provocations,” and called on everyone not be provoked (that is, not to join the Ukrainian army). This enraged the Georgian society (not only Saakashvili’s

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supporters), and the Ministry top officials even had to apologize. After that, the Georgian authorities became more careful, when it came to participation of the Georgian officers in the Donbas war.

As for Azerbaijan and Armenia, the war in Donbas brought fewer implications for them than for Georgia. Russia’s strengthened presence in the region did not make the Karabagh conflict zone stabler. In fact, in summer 2014, the situation in the conflict zone escalated. However, Russia made it perfectly clear that it meant business and was not going to abandon its only loyal ally (Armenia) in the region. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a harsh statement concerning the situation in Karabagh, urging the sides to show tolerance, abstain from force and take immediate steps for stabilization.16 The situation stabilized soon. Obviously, shootings still happen in the conflict zone from time to time but only at “business as usual” level.

Despite the deteriorated official relations with Ukraine, Georgia continuously supported Kyiv in multilateral organizations, as did Azerbaijan. In contrast, Armenia not just abstained but voted against pro-Ukrainian resolutions on numerous occasions – at the UN General Assembly, the Parliamentarian Assembly of Council of Europe and finally at the OSCE Parliamentarian Assembly. The Armenian officials and lawmakers claimed they did not agree with placing the territorial integrity principle over the right of self-determination.17 Because of its openly pro-Russian stance, Armenia was harshly criticized. One of the prominent European diplomats, the former Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt simply stated that Armenia no longer had “political affinity” with the EU.18

To summarize, politically, Tbilisi and Yerevan seem to have lost because of the Ukrainian conflict. As the Georgian government was too careful and allowed Saakashvili to take the initiative, the Armenian government had to take sides in international organizations and reveal its dependence on Russia. The Armenian authorities, perhaps better than anyone else, realizing the perils of such dependence, have begun to draft a new version of the Association Agreement with the EU, but it still remains to be seen as how far it can advance (or will be allowed to by Russia). The Armenian public opinion was deeply affronted by the Russian pressure that made the country give up its EU ambitions. Anger with Russia climaxed, when a Russian soldier killed an entire Armenian family in Gyumri in January 2015.19 Later, in summer of 2015, tens of thousands protested against intended energy price hikes by a Russia owned company.20 Public protests may serve as a tool for the Armenian government to withstand the Russian pressure.

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Economic Consequences

The sanctions the US and the EU imposed on Russia indirectly but still quite strongly affected the economic situation in the South Caucasus states. None of them joined the sanctions; moreover, all of them tried to benefit from them by increasing their exports to the Russian market. But now it is clear that all three South Caucasus countries are losing rather than winning from the Ukrainian crisis and its consequences.

The main losers Georgia and Armenia strongly depend on remittances from Russia\(^\text{21}\). As the Russian economy was hit badly by the sanctions (as well as by falling oil prices), both countries were hit badly, too. Their currencies tumbled along with the Russian rouble.\(^\text{22}\) Exports to Russia (as well as to Ukraine) dropped sharply. It harmed Armenia (Russia absorbs 23\% of its exports\(^\text{23}\)) and Georgia, too, as it has just renewed its exports to the Russian market. After 2006 (when Russia imposed a trade embargo on Georgia in response to the public arrest of the Russian spies), Georgia somehow managed to find new markets for its products and, first of all, for its wines. Naturally, Ukraine was among the countries that to a certain degree substituted the Russian market. However, as the Ukrainian crisis hit both Ukraine and Russia Georgian wine exports fell sharply.\(^\text{24}\) The Georgian economy clearly is in crisis, and its authorities are doing their best not to lose the Russian market as one of the sources of foreign currency. In August 2015, the news spread that Georgia joined the sanctions against Russia. As Moscow threatened to retaliate in response, the Georgian authorities hurried to refute the news and announced that they never had such intentions.\(^\text{25}\)

As Russia is slashing its expenditures to balance its accounts, Georgia's two breakaway territories (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) are expected to suffer a lot, as they are almost entirely dependent on the Russian aid. That may result in increased discontent with the Russian rule (especially in Abkhazia, where locals deplore Russia's policies aimed at full subjugation of Abkhazia) but that does not mean that the local population would by default seek to strengthen ties with Tbilisi. Even if it happens, Russia is unlikely to let it happen.

Azerbaijan suffered, first of all, from falling oil prices. However, it is obvious that it was hurt by the economic crisis in Russia, too, despite the fact that it depends significantly less on remittances. In early 2015, Azerbaijan devalued its currency by one third.\(^\text{26}\) The step came as a shock for most Azerbaijani people. No doubt, it will affect Azerbaijan's ambitions to position itself as an undisputed regional leader and claim back Karabagh.

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Much more severe consequences may be expected because of the possible developments in the North Caucasus. Because of the crisis, lots of local population would lose their jobs in major Russian cities. Moreover, this region will be definitely affected by the cuts of Russian expenditures. This may boost Islam radicalism in this traditionally troublesome region, and this time around, it may be more dangerous than ever because of such a phenomenon as the Islamic State. The possible explosion in the North Caucasus will have severe consequences not only for Russia but for the entire South Caucasus, especially for Georgia and Azerbaijan with their direct border with this region.

To sum up the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis for the South Caucasus region, Russia has been distracted from the South Caucasus but still, with its aggressive behaviour hardly any country in the region can relax. No one of them dared to openly criticize Russia but public opinion clearly condemned Russia's actions. The Western sanctions having weakened the Russian economy may distract Russia even further from the South Caucasus but at the same time, they negatively affect the regional economic development. These two factors may eventually serve as an additional incentive for Georgia to capitalize on DCFTA and for Armenia to restart its Association Agreement process. Azerbaijan will seek further intensification of its ties with Turkey, which feels uneasy with the Russian military presence.

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The Ukrainian crisis was unpredictable for many politicians and experts from its very beginning, and it continues to be a complicated issue for analysis and solution management. Eminent politicians and experts are trying their best to come up with various scenarios, including examples of peaceful accords and arrangements such as Finlandization or Bosnization. In this article, the author compares the situation in Ukraine and in Bosnia after 1995, including the Dayton Peace Agreement’s impact on its further development, and what lessons Ukraine can learn from this process and its results.

Ukraine’s Geopolitical Location: Europe–Ukraine–Russia

After the first year of the Ukrainian crisis, it became fashionable to explain the situation through the geopolitical approach and pay special attention to competition between the West and the Russian Federation based on Ukraine’s specific location. Well, it would not be easy to escape a very common understanding: Ukraine is a natural bridge (if not a buffer zone) between the West and the East, Europe and Asia; it is blessed with unique geopolitical conditions. In reality, though, Ukraine’s history was traced by many wars and bloody conflicts. As it is widely known, Ukraine always faced a choice to be closer to one of its neighbours as it was not possible for it to survive without allies. Considering this, everyone, at least briefly acquainted with the Ukrainian history, realises: it is the natural state of things for Ukraine to be in an “in-between” position.

Ukraine grew adjusted to this “in-between” situation, when its neighbours are keeping an eye on Ukraine and firmly following their interests. Hence, the less interests Europe has – the bigger force Russia starts to use to keep Ukraine in its orbit. At the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine confrontation, on March 5, 20141 prominent expert Henry Kissinger famously remarked: “The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Russian history began in what called Kievan Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then.” It was not the best explanation of the Crimean annexation, but an evident chance to refresh the link between the two countries reinforced by Russia’s policy. Taking into account the long, complex history between them, cultural links between Ukrainians and Russians, and economic ties that have continued since the Soviet era, it is entirely natural that Ukraine

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sought stable partnership and constructive relationship with Russia. However, Moscow had concerns about Ukraine's possible integration with the European Union: for many years, when Ukraine was trying to declare and act on its European choice – Russia was clear it considered Ukraine as a part of Russian “natural space”. The reality is that “since the time of Ukraine’s independence, Russia’s fundamental state interest has been to diminish Ukraine’s independence”\(^2\).

It became quite common to examine the Ukrainian issue within the framework of the Russian “patriotic policy” and even to start with “theoretical” statements of Alexander Dugin, the founder of Russia’s Eurasian movement, about an inevitable war between Russia and Ukraine – «to save Russia’s moral authority.»\(^3\) He called on President Vladimir Putin to intervene militarily in Eastern Ukraine at the beginning of the separatist movement in spring 2014; many years earlier; at the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, Putin himself told President George Bush Jr: that “Ukraine is not even a state”, as Time reported in May 2009.\(^4\) Actually, this “frankly speaking” became a part of an unconfirmed legend, coming into higher demand since the onset of the Ukrainian crisis last year. In fact, Putin very transparently threatened that Russia would begin tearing away Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, should Ukraine join NATO (as, he believes, a significant share of the Ukrainian territory was received as a gift from Russia).

Additional steps made by both Ukraine and the EU towards the Association Agreement provoked the next severe reaction in the Russian leadership: how it could let Ukraine shift if it is considered a natural sphere of Russian interests, nothing else. More than that, the crisis and today’s dangers are created by Russia’s political aims, its military actions, and its increasingly febrile view of the world order. From the outset of the Ukrainian crisis, the West reacted primarily with economic sanctions anticipating that they would induce Russia to modify its actions. In reality, sanctions do constrain its capacity, but do not constrain its behaviour.

It looks as Europeans have underestimated the real threats from the Russian side because they did not learn historical lessons – as per Russia’s intention to keep Ukraine. However, some experts caught the idea about this relationship pretty well: “Russia still traces its Orthodox inheritance to Kievan Rus, the loose confederation of Slavic principalities that fell to the Mongols in the thirteenth century. Dominated by the Lithuanians and the Poles from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, and overrun by Cossacks in the seventeenth, most of the area was integrated into the emerging Russian Empire,” – University of London Prof. Orlando Figes pointed out.\(^5\) He continues that since that time (the 18th – beginning of the 19th century) it was “natural” to recognise Ukraine as a part (which is really important, demographic and economic resources-wise) of any “empire project”, no matter whether it was the Russian monarchy or the Soviet Union, as Russia built its national identity on the idea of Slavic unity, of which Ukraine was a fundamental and inseparable part.

It would be a grave mistake to say that the crisis, which started at the end of 2013, was caused by the “European misunderstanding” of the Ukrainian position. Another problem is a common

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\(^2\) Sherr J. Ukraine, Russia, Europe // National Security and Defense. Razumkov Center. – №4-5, 2012. – p.73.
\(^4\) Time, May 2009 // http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1900838,00.html).
inclination in Ukraine to overestimate its geopolitical importance. Many in the Ukrainian elite appear to hold the view that Ukraine’s geopolitical importance to Europe is crucial and Ukraine matters so much in a geopolitical competition between the West and Russia that it the West has very clear obligations to support Ukraine in every way and to dissuade the Kremlin from pursuing Russia’s age-old imperialist designs. For example, the former Ukrainian Prime-Minister Yulia Tymoshenko emphasized that “The United States and the rest of the West can have influence. Putin, like Russian leaders before him, is sensitive to outside criticism".6

Possible Scenarios for Ukraine

Finlandization. To overestimate is no better than to underestimate, and Ukraine is already paying a high price for its mistakes and wrong assessments. Nevertheless, the issue is what should be done to solve a severe crisis and how the West could really help? Or, maybe, which tested scenarios of international crisis management can be used in the Ukrainian situation as well? “Finlandization” was one of the first suggestions made by Zbigniew Brzezinsky (and repeated by many other experts): “The U.S. and European allies have room for compromise with Russia over Ukraine if Russian President Vladimir Putin doesn’t act “impulsively” to seize more territory. The position of Finland, which also has a long border with Russia, offers a possible model.”7 Throughout the Cold War, Finland’s foreign policy was based on official neutrality: so, a peaceful solution may be possible if Ukraine seeks closer relations with Europe but without a NATO membership. The case is that a truly independent and territorially undivided Ukraine pursues policies towards Russia similar to those effectively practiced by Finland, with wide-ranging economic relations with both Russia and the EU. Theoretically, the Finnish model can be ideal for Ukraine, the EU, and Russia. “Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them” – this way Henry Kissinger also tried to clarify this point of view.8 His concern is how to pacify Russia and not to disappoint Ukraine once again, leaving it in its natural in-between position.

Bosnization. Another crisis solution and suggestion for Ukraine’s future, which became popular recently, is the so-called “Bosnization”, with regard to the issues of ethnicity and language, nationalism and separatism. However, we should admit that this is not a scenario – this is a serious challenge.

In fact, some parallels could be made between the Bosnian war (1992-1995) and the situation in Eastern Ukraine, in particular, a challenge to define the conflict: is it a civil war or a foreign aggression? The latter definition involves estimating the impact from abroad as cross-border

7 Brzezinski Sees Finlandization of Ukraine as Deal Maker // http://www.wf.com/cms/s/0/e055408c-9b6b-11e3-a93e-00144feab7de.html#axzz3jL9A83f8x.
terrorism sponsored by “big brothers”, namely, Serbia then and Russian Federation now. Obviously, without that “support” from Belgrade it would have been impossible for Bosnian Serbs to take control over the biggest part of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the first stage of the 1992-1995 war. The same is true about Russia’s sponsored and trained separatists in the self-proclaimed quasi-republics in Eastern Ukraine, which received a “full package of service” from Moscow to control parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

One more thing in common is Western support (at least, deep concerns expressed) and international diplomacy involvement, up to the accords in Dayton and Minsk. Taking all these parallels into consideration, it is possible to suggest to Ukraine a plan of “Bosnization.” Though, in our opinion, Ukraine does not need a new Dayton agreement, and not because we already have Minsk-1 and Minsk-2, but mostly due to two reasons: Ukraine is not Bosnia and Dayton seems to be not as successful as many believe.

The conflict analysis provides us with a clear understanding that Ukraine’s “division line” is primarily about mentality and not religion or ethnicity as it was in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Actually, before 1992 there was no such “division line” in BiH either. Orthodox Serbs, Muslim Bosnians, and even Catholic Croats dispersed through the entire territory enjoyed peaceful coexistence with many mixed families and no significant enclaves. Only after the 1995 crisis management, when two entities were established (one was the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the other, the Republika Srpska), the country was indeed divided. After 3 years of war, many victims and refugees pushed to change the place to be with their communities. A factor of religion played a crucial role in the Bosnian war 1992-1995; at least, it was used by those, who brought this scenario to life. On the other hand, it was crisis management initiatives, which drew and exacerbated these division lines. Therefore, in Ukraine, peace solutions should avoid this temptation; the priority should be to ensure integrity and nation’s unity.

In Ukraine, the situation is rather different as both parts of the conflict are mostly Orthodox Christians. To quote Orlando Figes, “...the country is divided between those who look to Europe for their values and ideals – mainly young Ukrainian speakers in the west and central regions – and those older Russian speakers in the industrial eastern regions and Crimea who prefer to retain the old connections with Russia.” In fact, the conflict gave rise to an absolutely different effect (comparing to the Bosnian experience): the Ukrainian national sentiment and civil society have been strengthened by the war, and the national idea finally got its place in the country development. In BiH the effect was just opposite – fragmentation, identification by religion and ethnicity, not citizenship (as it was before, in “Tito’s time”). Not to forget the fact that Ukraine is a unitary state and any “federalization” idea looks unnatural.

Another essential issue is that military force played a crucial role in stopping the violence in Bosnia, while diplomatic management initially proposed by Europe was not so impressive. After almost 3.5 years of ineffective diplomatic efforts by the European Union and the United Nations, the United States finally decided to take the lead and in 1995 sent eminent diplomat Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary of State,  

to “start a new era in Balkan Diplomacy” – to end the war in Bosnia. Holbrooke and his team mediated between the three sides: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to reverse what Holbrooke earlier had characterized as the «greatest collective failure of the West since the 1930s.” As the key guest at the 20th anniversary of Srebrenica tragedy in 2015, former US President Bill Clinton pointed out that his biggest belief was that the desired peace was set up in Dayton forever and no one in the Western Balkans would dare question it. For the first time since November 1995 – when the Dayton accord ended the three and a half years of a bloody ethnic strife – it seemed to be “a brilliant example of Western diplomacy” at least, many Western experts believed it could be so after months of severe conflict.

**Dayton Agreement Failure**

People in BiH, while appreciating this effort for stabilisation, had their doubts from the very beginning. They became more sceptic after 10 years and almost came to despair after 20 years. Usually, debates on ‘Dayton’ can be divided into three phases: implementing Dayton; changing Dayton; and moving beyond Dayton.

Immediately after the Dayton agreement was signed, dozens of governments, regional organisations, and NGOs descended on Sarajevo and got deeply involved in stitching Bosnia back together. Thirty-six countries (including Ukraine), led by the United States and backed by NATO, sent a total of 60,000 troops to enforce the treaty. Although the peacekeeping force had their mandate for only one year, it was extended in the form of the robust NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which maintained a major security presence in BiH for over a decade.

It was a strong belief, that under the right conditions the international community could successfully rebuild conflict-ridden countries. The country was flooded with attention and over USD 14 billion in international aid, making it a test field for what was arguably the most extensive and innovative democratisation experiment in history. By the end of 1996, 17 different foreign governments, 18 UN agencies, 27 intergovernmental organizations, and about 200 nongovernmental organisations were involved in reconstruction efforts. “On a per capita basis, the reconstruction of Bosnia – with less than four million citizens – made the post-World War 2 rebuilding of Germany and Japan look modest.” The accord created social and economic conditions for life to return to normal, at least on the surface. Prof. Florian Bieber from the European Centre for Minority Issues, Belgrade, pointed out: “Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Dayton Peace Agreement has been surprisingly flexible and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina have evolved significantly over the past decade in both implementing the agreement and moving beyond the agreement in key aspects.”

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Unfortunately, after one more decade enthusiasm subsided as there were no visible results, and the key word 'Dayton' is now suggestive of everything that appears not to be well in Bosnia and Herzegovina: complicated institutions, high unemployment, dependency on external aid and intervention, and the predominance of ethnic politics. Decentralization and power sharing as two twin principles of democracy were proposed for political system reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement divided Bosnia into two semi-independent entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina inhabited mainly by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (Serb Republic). Every entity was allowed to have its own government, taxation, educational policy, police forces, etc.

As successful as Dayton was at ending the violence, it also sowed the seeds of instability by creating a decentralized political system, which undermined the state's authority. In the past years, the ethnic nationalist rhetoric from leaders of the country’s three constituent ethnic groups has intensified, and the economy decreased.\textsuperscript{16} With the total of 160 ministries on the state and entities' levels in the country of only 4 million citizens, it seems difficult to provide effective reconstruction and stable development. The biggest obstacle to the country's reform path right now, as the US deputy ambassador in BiH Nicholas Hill believes, is in Republika Srpska, whose president Milorad Dodik has for years played an unfathomable role.\textsuperscript{17} Famous as promoter of the idea of Great Serbia and Putin's friend, a man with big ambitions, the RS president wants to preserve his power. As to the Russian Federation's role, the U.S. and the EU interests in Bosnia coexist with Russia's rising commercial and diplomatic involvement in the Balkans, which Dodik has actively exploited to stabilize his political position within the RS and to strengthen the RS’s hand in Bosnian politics.\textsuperscript{18} In particular, Dodik used Russia’s invasion to Georgia in August of 2008 and its diplomatic opposition to the United States’ and the EU's position on Kosovo as a rallying cry for his increased obstructionism to strengthening Bosnia's central institutions.

After 20 years of intense international efforts to stabilize and rebuild BiH, the country still stands on the brink of collapse from time to time. Bosnians are not talking about a potential war but they worry about rising social divisions along religion and ethnicity, as well as corruption, unemployment, and economic stagnation. Also, the EU and NATO integration processes are slow; after big aspirations and big expenses, the image of the country is nothing like a “success story”. Moreover, the West itself is busy with many other problems, from financial crises to diplomatic challenges – in Iran, Syria etc., and it is tempted to declare Bosnia a “mission accomplished”. Overall, the situation is often described by Bosnian people as "We waste your money and you waste our time". To implement Dayton seems to be easier than go beyond Dayton, and to draw an ethnic division is anyway easier than to go ahead and to create a truly multinational state.

\textsuperscript{16} Hill N. Deputy Ambassador Of Sad In Bih N. Hill: Moving Beyond Narrow-Minded Politics Onasa: Sarajevo, July 8 (ONASA).
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} McMahon Patrice C. and Western J. The Death of Dayton. How to Stop Bosnia From Falling Apart // Foreign Affairs. September/October 2009.
Lessons for Ukraine

The main conclusion is that Dayton’s priority was to end the violence, but the accord included compromises that encouraged Bosnia’s fragmentation. This fragmentation became the biggest obstacle, and the situation looks disappointing, where no one knows how it could be resolved. Therefore, the first lesson for Ukraine is about how to avoid division lines, combat the separatist movement, and preserve its unitary state. Any “special status” for any region, and decentralization could be accepted only as distribution of power, not in the sense of fragmentation. Otherwise, it would be a way to nowhere, as it happened in Bosnia, where the state itself became dysfunctional.

Another lesson lies in understanding the outside (Western) assistance as a crucial but not obligatorily required condition to change the situation. The international community could really help Ukraine to survive and its financial, economic, military, and diplomatic support would be of great importance. At the same time, without real reconstruction inside the country and strong intention of different political forces to be united, the process of development and real crisis management could be blocked.

In Bosnia, weak and disjointed domestic institutions were also undermined by a series of international missteps, when deep pockets and good intentions came along with little historical knowledge and erroneous plans. It could happen in Ukraine, too, as not all Western experts really understand the situation or possess reliable knowledge about its historic background.

As for the West itself, this issue goes beyond Ukraine. Russia has torn up the rulebook that maintained peace, stability and security in Europe for almost 70 years, and it has now used force to change borders. If the West does not push back, it could face challenges, even armed conflicts, from Russia elsewhere that will require far more costly responses. Talking about the West, we have in mind not only Europe, but also the USA. Actually, to return to the story in Bosnia, until the US and NATO engaged in diplomatic and military management, nothing could stop the war in Bosnia. The conflict’s first months resulted in Europe’s failure to mediate the situation. So, the US’ strong commitment to provide solutions is necessary for Ukraine as well, otherwise we may face the same situation.

To date, the United States and the European Union have responded to Russia’s aggression with economic sanctions, which have been inflicting serious damage on the Russian economy but have yet to achieve their political goal: steering Moscow toward a genuine negotiated settlement. The United States has also provided military non-lethal aid assistance to Kyiv. Respected Brookings Institution experts Steven Pifer (former US Ambassador to Ukraine) and Strobe Talbot (former Deputy Secretary of State) argue that Washington needs to do more to get Russia to change its course. That means giving the Ukrainian military sufficient means to make further aggression so costly that Putin and the Russian army are deterred from escalating the fight. “President Putin may hope to achieve glory through restoring, through intimidation and

19 Russia and Ukraine Sanctions, Department of the Treasury // US Department of State http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/.
force, Russian dominion over its neighbours. But a peaceful world requires opposing this through decisive action.\textsuperscript{20} The same opinion is expressed by James Sherr, who believes that Western assistance is “unsystematic, uncoordinated and unevenly matches to Ukraine’s need.”\textsuperscript{21} To support Ukraine, he said, the West must go beyond sanctions. This assistance should focus on enhancing Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. Providing critical military assistance to Ukraine is necessary, as weakness has only repeatedly provoked Vladimir Putin into a dramatic escalation of the conflict.

As to diplomatic efforts, they definitely should be continued, but in case of Ukraine, Minsk should not play the role of another Dayton. While the Dayton Peace Agreement is a model to emulate because it ended the violence, at the same time, it leaves much in place to preserve corruption, ethnicity in public policy, ineffective economic management, etc. Diplomats engaged in peacemaking in Bosnia, Ukraine, and elsewhere must learn to weigh the long-term implications of the deals they make and ensure that both peace agreements and post-conflict implementation strategies are flexible and open to adaptation as situations change.

No doubt, Ukraine needs support of the West to manage the crisis, to preserve its independence and integrity. At the same time, we should not overestimate possible Western assistance once again. Moreover, to get it in full scope, we have to prove our intention to reconstruct the economy and conduct real reforms in our civil sphere. The new team’s biggest challenge will include confronting the corruption; it will require introducing a significant number of new cadres into the upper and middle levels of the Ukrainian government. This is obvious: without visual results of reforms, it could be risky to follow the Bosnian way, and neither Minsk agreement, nor any other “Dayton management” will serve well in that case. Failure to modify an ineffective economic system and governance invite even more danger for Ukraine’s sovereignty.

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\textsuperscript{20} Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do. By S. Talbot, S. Pfyfer // http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2015/02/ukraine-independence-russian-aggression.
