EU-Ukraine Relations: 
The search for a new European security system
This issue of the quarterly International Review offers a series of articles with analysis written by a group of international experts about recent initiatives taken for the development of a new European security system. It is published as part of a joint project “Monitoring EU-Ukraine relations” initiated by the Regional Office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine and Belarus together with the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

The need for implementation of this project was predetermined by the need to review Ukraine-EU relations, as well as the need to create a new model of Ukrainian integration strategy within the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).

This review of Ukrainian integration strategy requires new approaches in order to introduce European standards in various spheres of public life and to bring Ukraine closer to EU membership requirements. One of such approaches is related to the formation of strategic understanding among the political elite with regard to the European vector of Ukraine’s development. Another area for implementation of European integration aspirations of Ukraine is securing broad public awareness regarding the status and prospects of Ukraine’s integration into the EU. One more important task is to raise awareness and understanding of the importance of Ukraine’s European integration by Ukrainian businesses, include them into Ukraine’s strategic thinking, and into the process of adapting Ukraine to the European market and business culture.

Regional aspects of integration tend to be an important segment of implementation of Ukraine’s EU integration objectives, which requires the regions to be regularly informed about major events in the European Union and the EU-Ukraine relations.

To achieve these objectives the above project monitors and analyzes the EU-Ukraine relations, publishes monitoring results, and mails out findings of monitoring directly to regional government bodies, foreign diplomatic missions and NGOs.

The ideas expressed in the publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foreign Policy Institute and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
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THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: TRENDS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

Modern architecture of European security has passed a long way of development, reflecting the realities of different historical types of international relations systems. Like any "live" system it is still experiencing its evolution under the influence of external and internal factors of the modern international system.

Key trends in building the European security architecture.

Traditionally, various mechanisms of European security and defence have been patronizing the issues of all European security and this rule is still the same for Europe now. Historically, despite the evident dialectical relationship between the defence and security, the concepts of their building in Europe were based on rather divergent sources. Thus, their development was parallel, but often it was competitive and mutually exclusive in nature. Therefore, there are two key trends in building the architecture of European security.

The first trend is split (separated) Europe in search of security. For centuries in Europe there was a significant number of countries (regardless of their formation types — slave-owning, feudal, capitalist) and quasi states. Each of them, based on the principles of the neo-realism doctrine had a set of interests which were often conflicting to the interests of other neighbouring European countries. Political fragmentation was traditional for European continent: Europe was the arena of fierce fighting of states and nations. Deepening divisions and exacerbation of the differences between European countries pushed them to seek a peaceful coexistence. Thus, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that concluded the Thirty Years War, marked the establishment of the first international security system. For the first time in practice, there was the shift from non-systematic bilateral and multilateral relations to the system more or less regulated by international agreements. Later on, system of international agreements of 1814-1815, related to fighting against and victory over Napoleonian France, became a foundation
for Vienna system of international relations, which was a modified version of common security introduced by the Peace of Westphalia.

The end of the First World War intensified the desire of the Europeans to maintain the security *status quo* on the continent through the establishment of the international peacekeeping mechanism. The legal basis for such system was the package of Versailles and Washington agreements between the victors and defeated countries in the First World War. The League of Nations, set up in 1920, became the institutional dimension of common European security, and its main aim was to keep peace in all Europe by consolidating the results of the First World War.

Security agreements (Dunkirk pact of 1947 and the Treaty of Brussels, 1948) between the European countries after the Second World War which preceded Washington Agreement establishing NATO in 1949, can well be regarded as the efforts of creating the system of common European security.

*The second trend is manifestations of common defence.* When there was a danger of aggression escalation from the side of non-European countries not sharing the Europe's civilization values, the states of the continent managed to demonstrate some examples of common European defence policy in practice.

The basis for modern European security architecture was laid at the beginning of the 90's of the twentieth century, when «cold» confrontation was replaced by unstable equilibrium of post-bipolar world with its new challenges, threats and competitive environment. The new system of international relations, which started its establishment in the 90's of the last century and still exists with a few modifications today, was characterised, on the one hand, by elimination of the threat of large-scale Soviet military aggression in Europe, and on the other — by emergence of new potential crisis as a result of fundamental changes in nature of threats in the former Soviet camp.

**New challenges and threats to European security**

New challenges and threats to European security made the Europeans take a fresh look at their security issues and re-evaluate the role of traditional security institutions. Thus, throughout the long history of the European integration processes, in the early 90’s of the last century, the security factors started to play the role of the most powerful incentive and benchmark for their subsequent evolution. Systemic nature of threats the author connects with the general dynamics of development of the international relations system. Together with the disappearance of block antagonism
and collapse of bipolar system, there was invalidated the major international stabilizing factor — the balance of power between the poles of the system, which had been working effectively throughout the period of the Cold War. For half century harsh political and military balance between the superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union, was ensuring relative stability of international relations at that time. After disappearance of bipolar control and counterbalance system a certain phenomenon of anarchy, named also by political scientists early in the 90’s as the “vacuum of power”, or “security vacuum”, emerged in the world. The perturbation of this global system of international politics had an immediate effect on European continent. Under these new conditions, the European countries had to deal with distinctly new and complex tasks, in relation to finding their place, ensuring self-defense from external and internal threats in terms of unpredictable and uncontrollable international processes.

In addition, there was a deemed “dire necessity” of reconsidering the role of traditional international security institutions and efficient filling the “power vacuum” in Central and Eastern Europe. Relations with the United States were also significantly modified.

On the whole, European-American relations merit special attention as they contain one of the systematic threats. Actually, this threat has two fundamentally opposing dimensions. From one side, it is associated with the leveling effect of the European community on world affairs, on condition that there was only one global superpower, which was particularly acutely during 90’s and during former U.S President George W. Bush’s first term in Office. Indeed, after the collapse of the USSR, the United States became the only superpower in the world. As H. Kissinger aptly notes “…the end of the Cold War gave rise to the temptation to remake the world according to the American sample”.\footnote{H. Kissinger. Diplomacy.- Ladomyr, 1999.-p.733} Unwillingness of the Americans to adhere to “multilateralism”, and dictates of international law and the United Nations is characterized by conduct and decisions made by the U.S. The desire of the Europeans at that time to develop their own security mechanisms within the new security architecture was based primarily on the discrepancy between the significant achievements on the path of creating powerful economic community on the continent and undeniable dominance of the U.S. in all issues related to armed defense of European integration heritage. From the other side, the weakening of the US global leadership due to a number of mistakes of Bush Administration foreign policy, including global war on terrorism and the consequences of world financial crisis, which we observe now, makes the recognition of the role and place of Euro Atlantic security dimension and calls into question the emergence of new
influential players in modern European security architecture. Obviously, candidate number one, to play such a role is Russia, but its place and influence in European security is highly debatable issue, which the author will touch on later.

Moreover, the modern security architecture is characterised by the globalisation of world processes, which lead to weakening the role of borders towards interpersonal, information and economic interactions in the world. In addition to positive impact of these processes on the world economy development and the overall progress of the mankind, transparency of borders also opens the way to the free flow of various threats. There have been the threats to spread conflict potential on the European continent. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the threat of spreading civil conflicts, having had occurred in close proximity to the EU borders, became more than real. Ethnic and religious minorities, compactly residing on the territory of the European Union could potentially become focus of consolidation of the warring parties with further conflict conversion on the territory of the EU. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Kosovo in particular, played a special role in this aspect and. Thus, the stability of the European community was endangered by the conflict potential of the civil war, which took place close to the EU borders.

The Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008 was no less convincing evidence of a powerful conflict situation in Europe. Its importance, from the point of view of modern European security architecture formation, hasn’t been thoroughly evaluated. However, the above mentioned conflict was the first in post-bipolar world which showed the presence of deep unresolved conflict between key players in European politics, thinking in the categories of “sphere of influence” and “balance of powers” typical to 20th or even 19th century, and also the threat of potential escalation of regional conflicts, in which the interests of great powers are involved, to sub-regional or even global conflicts. Moreover, the fact that in August last year there was a clash of regular armies of sovereign states, puts on agenda of the European security architects in a new way the notion of “hard security”, which was slightly forgotten in the 90’s.

One of the current threats to Europe, is the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in close proximity to the continent and the sprouting of it’s threat in incidents in European cities. In practicality, after the collapse of the USSR, the terrorism became the foremost threat not only for the U.S. but also for its allied countries in Western Europe. Its influence became prominent in the 90’s when al-Qaeda set up a network of so-called “humanitarian organizations” in the Balkans. It's also known that the militants participating in operations in the former Yugoslavia, had been schooled in Taliban
training camps in Afghanistan.\(^2\) In addition to danger of terrorist acts, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism near the European borders could become a powerful factor of destabilization of the Muslims, compactly residing in European countries and could put some of them to the brink of civil conflict.

Indirect and derivative threats are no less acute for the modern European security architecture. A significant place among the mentioned threats belongs to so-called “soft threats”\(^3\). To this group the author includes negative accompanying results of implementation of the mentioned types of threats.

A significant threat to Europe is also posed by the uncontrolled influx of refugees and illegal migrants from the areas of instability bringing to the EU social problems like unskilled labor glut, increasing grant categories of the population, complex crime situation, spread of infectious diseases, manifestations of hostility to religious and ethnic grounds minorities.

Financial crisis became the new factor of indirect threats. On the one hand, it united the Europeans in finding the ways of tackling the crisis, on the other hand, it demonstrated the depths of the differences between the “poor” and “rich” residents of the European home and readiness of certain players to make political concessions to potential violators of peace on the continent in exchange for material dividends. Natural and made-man threats constitute a separate block. Based upon the fact that the consequences of natural and man-made calamities and disasters are transboundary in nature, the elaboration of common approaches to their solutions by the European countries and creation of an appropriate material and technological base is dictated by the requirements of time and fits into the logic of European integration processes.

**Common European Security and Defences Policy (CESDP) and institutional approaches of Russian President D. Medvedev towards building new European security architecture.**

Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) became the European response to the threats that appeared on “the joint borders of competence” of UN, OSCE and NATO. Having passed the stage of its formation which occurred between the signing of Maastricht in 1991 and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, currently it undergoes the phase of its development related to building the institutional framework, creating the

\(^3\)Semeniuk O. Responding to “Soft threats”. Common European Security and Defense Policy – is it the future of European security?// Politics and Time.-2004.-#2.-p.65
decisions implementation mechanisms, as well as first successful attempts of conducting military operations. Comparative analysis of CESDP and the mentioned structures indicates the hybrid nature of this mechanism. It reveals the attempts to combine security functions of the OSCE with defense functions of NATO, not duplicating the latter. CESDP became the constituent part of Common foreign and security policy of the EU aimed at protection of European values and European community security from new challenges, internal and external threats, beyond the competence of existing European international security systems and collective defense, by harmonious combination of military and non-military means[4]. For the Europeans, creation of the CESDP became the logical result of the 21st century security architecture development, which would comprise all the security dimensions. In this aspect, the evolution of already existing mechanisms – change of their quantitative and improvement of the qualitative characteristics, but not the further institution building, became the natural trend of security architecture development. It is not surprising that President Dmitry Medvedev’s appeal to launch a new Treaty on Security in Europe during his visit to Germany in June 2008 didn’t cause any significant interest or enthusiasm in Western Europe. Equally sceptical was the perception of the “detailed” version of that initiative submitted by the Russian leader at Evian World Policy Conference in October 2008, which was heated, however, by the emotions in connection with the events in Georgia.

Europeans have been invited to continue the building of continental security architecture by institutional means. Thus, the key argument of the Russian side was the allegation about the inefficiency of the mechanisms created at the time of the Cold War in modern conditions. OSCE was selected to be the starting point as it was “ineffective”, and in fact “inconvenient” organization for Moscow, as it was during the OSCE summit in Stambul 1999 when the rest of the participating countries subjected to devastating criticism of the policy of Russian Federation in Chechnya and since then it has been the mouthpiece of international criticism for violating human rights in Russia.

Theoretically, Helsinki - 2, as new Russian project was called, was a reformulated list of previous UN principles of good neighbourliness and peaceful coexistence of European nations, backed by a legally binding mechanism based on a wide range of participants. Prima facie, this is just another official international legal form of providing security dialogue for its participants. From scientific point of view, the Treaty on European Security, in the format proposed by Moscow, at this stage cannot

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4Semeniuk O. Common Policy of the European Union on Security and Defence in conditions of its expansion: Dissertation of the candidate of Political Studies: 23.00.04.- K.,2007.-p.84
be defined or classified as the security ensuring mechanism. Only very controversial principles and the idea of their legal obligations have been formulated at the moment, but there is neither clear vision of the mechanisms of their realization, nor the means of countering their violation.

Therefore, in the author’s opinion, it is currently impossible to talk seriously about the place or the role of the Treaty on European Security in European security architecture. However, the author believes the Treaty on European Security should be considered from another angle – as the signal of “Russian” factor actualization, which will have certain impact on the continent’s security system evolution. The above mentioned factor was a bit neglected in the 90’s by the Western countries in the process of the EU and NATO enlargement. Low degree of Russia engagement in the European architecture development, from one side, encouraged the development of the latter exclusively on EU and Transatlantic basis, and from the other side, it promoted the development of its “loser” complex in Russian society along with the desires of revenge.

Putin’s idea of “restoring Russia as a powerful state” is secured by advantageous environment on global gas markets and politically, by consolidating the power and formation of rigid vertical, which got its expression in audacious and often antagonistic Russian foreign policy towards the West. Declaring its position, rather unsubstantiated, in matters of principle for the Europeans and their American allies, Russia was creating its own sham and asymmetrical analogue to European security architecture. Thus, Russia’s response to “ineffective” OSCE was equally “ineffective” Commonwealth of Independent States; the EU got its antipode in the shape of Eurasian Economic Commonwealth, and the “aggressive block” of NATO got Russian-Chinese creature in the form of Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Organizations of the treaty on collective security with a number of former Soviet republics. The latter now positions itself as the potential NATO’s competitor5.

Against this background, the draft of an comprehensive agreement proposed by Russia, which is declared to be the foundation of European security architecture with the participation of all countries, looks inappropriate, at least at first glance. It seems that by that proposal Moscow abandons its previous strategy of maximum leveling influence of Western security and defense structures in Europe. A set of the proposed principles of the Treaty on European Security seems to be good intentions, especially, reaffirming the UN ones: inadmissibility of the use force or threat, commitment to abiding by international law, respect for territorial integrity of states, as

5 UN will ” equalize in rights ” CSTO and NATO.- Internet.- http://obozrevatel.com/news/2009/10/14/326807.htm
well as basic arms control parameters, no state or organization can’t have exclusive rights to maintaining peace and stability in Europe.

However, only detailed study of the declared principles enables understanding of the Russian proposal. From the point of view of understanding Moscow’s intentions the principles which reveal the interaction of the Treaty on European Security, other security elements of European architecture are taken into consideration:

• no ensuring one’s own security at the expense of others;
• no allowing acts by military alliances and coalitions that undermine the unity of the common Euro-Atlantic security space;
• no development of military alliances that would threaten the security of other parties to the treaty.

Obviously, these implicit formulations contain the desire to limit the US influence on the continent, make the United States and its European allies finally abandon the plans to deploy elements of missile defense in Europe, as well, which is fundamentally important, to impede the process of NATO expansion to the East. It should be noted that these provisions perfectly fit into the overall strategy of restoring Russia’s status as a great power claiming to impact the continent.

Thus, against this background the Treaty on European Security is not the draft of European security architecture as a response to new challenges – Russian proposals de facto do not bear any novelty. Draft Treaty objectively makes the continent return to the “balance of power and interests” of the 20th century.

No allowing expansion of military and political alliances (read – NATO) would bring back into the political practice of security order in Europe old categories of “spheres of influence” and “dividing lines”. The latter will naturally call into question an important principle of the indivisibility of international security of 21st century. The treaty calls for the strengthening the “status quo” in European security architecture, which would obviously be an inappropriate step for it, as described on termination of development of the latter in conditions of high dynamism of modern political and economic processes in the world, evolution of challenges and threats.

The idea of “status quo” according to the Treaty on European Security raises the issue of conflict potential on the continent in an absolutely new way. Today there is a number of “frozen” conflicts in Europe, which often affect the interests of not only small states, but regional and global leaders. In such circumstances it is considered to be quite problematic to involve such countries as Armenia and Azerbaijan with their unresolved issue of Nagorny Karabakh independence, Georgia with its two quasi
countries as a result of war with Russia in summer 2008, Serbia which painfully reacted
on Kosovo independence, Moldova considering Transdnistria its own territory, into the
Treaty on European Security. Not having mutual consent of all the parties of European
security architecture building without exceptions, it won’t be possible to talk either about
indivisibility of security on European continent or about the treaty mechanism in general,
proposed by Moscow.

The proposal of Russia presents in new light the issue of the role and place of
existing security and defence structures in Europe. The mechanism of Treaty on
European Security can potentially stimulate competition between European security and
defence structures, force to make their reformatting and redistribution of competencies,
causing their overall weakening. Besides, the actual prohibition of their expansion calls
into question peaceful and stable co-existence of the states not included in those or
other security structures. The reality of XXI century demonstrates the inability of any
state whatsoever to fully protect itself today from new challenges and threats with the
help of their national means. In this regard, countries not included in NATO nor CSTO
are under the risk of sharing the fate of so called “border” and “buffer” states. The
latter are at the turn of the geopolitical and cultural expansions, facing the threat of
becoming sort of “pawns” in the relationship of external forces, or speaking political
terminology, traditionally used in the Cold War studies, - places to blow off steam.
Unfortunately, Ukraine also belongs to such states\(^6\).

Russia’s interests and the future of European security architecture.

Clearly, the “double” content of Russia’s proposals is well understood by Euro
Atlantic allies. Therefore, based on the above considerations, it won’t be too bold
to assume that the idea of the Treaty on European security won’t find serious fans and
also among them. Moreover, not only the U.S., but most European states defend the
idea of European security architecture building on the basis of already existing
institutional mechanisms – through deepening and expanding their development and
adaptation to the realities of modern challenges and threats.

In such circumstances Russian Federation can hardly claim a central role or role
of one of key leaders in the development of this architecture as well as being on equal

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terms with the West in the process of building European security architecture. However, Russia’s accomplishment in restoring its great-power status, primarily due to commodity revenues, will push the Europeans to seek new modalities of interaction in the framework of existing mechanisms, at international level as well. The biggest hope of the West is associated with the course declared by U.S. President B. Obama Administration to reset U.S.-Russian relations and the prospect of security cooperation between Russia and the EU.

At a time when "reset" is now regarded by Moscow only as the policy concessions from Washington, such as decision of the latter to suspend construction of missile defence system in Poland and Czech Republic. Russia has an objective interest in cooperation with the European Union, in particular through the CESDP on the ground, inter alia, of the following considerations:

1. Cooperation with the EU in defence and security should enhance the role and political weight of Russia in European security system to ensure its presence in solving current security issues in Europe, such as crisis situations in close proximity to the EU, disasters and other "soft" threats. This approach fits well in the foreign policy strategy of Russia towards the revival of Russia as a great power, the restoring of its influence on the surrounding areas, the growth of its role in the international politics.

2. Involvement of the Russian Federation in European affairs will automatically serve, according to the Kremlin leadership, the levelling of the U.S. influence on European affairs. In other words, Russia considers cooperation in the context of CESDP in terms of compensation of U.S. military and political ambitions on the continent. The position of a number of Western European countries and Russia coincide in this.

3. Despite the clear signal from the Europeans that CESDP is no way a competitive mechanism with respect to NATO, it is the weakening of political weight of the Alliance in European affairs, through the development of CESDP defence component is considered by Moscow as an important element and a direct result of cooperation with the EU in this field.

4. It’s necessary for Russia to participate in common European defence and security policy right now, because it is at the stage of its formation, to avoid the CESDP to be formed as a mechanism of anti-Russia policy in the regions of special interest, such as Eastern Europe, Balkans, Caucasus.
5. Obviously, Russia expects tangible achievements through participation in CESDP. In this context we are talking about providing the EU countries on chargeable basis with military facilities for operations by Rapid Reaction Force.

6. Some scholars note the importance of interaction in the context of CESDP for Russia in terms of so-called instrumentality. Back in 1999 Russia's President Boris Yeltsin hoped to link the EU development in security dimension with the enhancement of the OSCE role.

After the Kosovo crisis, Moscow began to treat this common policy as a filler in vacuum of security in Europe. As it is considered, wider and deeper EU which has strong ties with Russia will be able to provide interrelated and balanced strengthening of Russia and EU positions and the EU in the international community of the XXI century.

In its turn, developing CESDP the EU states, obviously, are not trying to drag the responsibility for security in all Europe to its competence or promote Moscow plans to restore its influence on the continent. Despite various statements by the official Brussels, the European Union is ready to build CESDP primarily for its own security and stability, but not with an aim to build so-called "Wider Europe" as Russia would like.

What will happen to the European security architecture of the 21st century? Based on the above suggestions, it can be assumed that the future European security architecture should be connected with the traditional "dualism" and the interaction of security and defence structures: improving existing institutions - the UN, which will have "moral leadership in this context, NATO as a key continental defence Alliance and the OSCE as pan-European security system. Further intensification of the role of the European Union is expected to be the result of the deepening of the European integration processes. Based on the fact that economic union of such geographical size, population of more than 400 million people and GDP of more than 8500 billion dollars can not progress without effective providing of internal security and defence7.

In this regard, CESDP seems promising – as a mechanism that, unlike traditional supranational or national security-defence institutions (UN, NATO, OSCE, intelligence services and armed forces of individual States), can cover all security levels simultaneously - from base to top, as well as work on the "joints" of power of such institutions. Thus, European security architecture is getting its final institutional framework covering all areas of modern challenges and threats.

7Perepelytsya H.M. Conflicts in post communist Europe.- K.,2003.-p.13
TREATY ON EUROPEAN SECURITY: RUSSIA'S INVITATION TO BUILD A CONSENSUS

Despite the constant scepticism of most experts and diplomats, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s proposal on the feasibility of a pan-European summit and the treaty on European security, submitted in Berlin on June 5, 2008 is today the subject of extensive discussion. A year ago it did not seem obvious.

The discussion that took place within Helsinki meeting of Council of foreign ministers of the Organization for security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE Council of Foreign Ministers) in December 2008 initiated a new dialogue on European security architecture. In 2009 it continued in late June at an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OSCE on the Greek island of Corfu, organized this year by Greece as the acting head of the Organization. This informal meeting started the process of "Corfu" - a series of weekly meetings at the site of the OSCE in Vienna, during which there is the discussion of issues and most importantly - a procedure to further discussion of Medvedev's initiative.

Moscow formally distinguishes between “the process of Corfu” and preparation for the Treaty on European Security (TES). It bases on a discussion of the feasibility of the idea of the Treaty, not only in the framework of the OSCE. Into this discussion it offers to involve other European organizations dealing with security - NATO, the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Organization of Collective Security Treaty (CST). To this end, the Russian Federation, in particular, proposed to organize a meeting of heads of secretariats of these organizations.

Although the idea of such a meeting seems unattractive to most of its potential members (excluding CST), the process of TES discussion, as they say, is underway. At least it will continue next year too. However, despite the dialogue that has started, the idea of TES still remains an idea that has not yet been embodied in the specific Russian proposals.
In November and December 2008 at Russia - EU summit, and before the Helsinki meeting of Foreign Ministers (Council of Foreign Ministers) of the OSCE, Russia shared its first observations concerning the TES. However, they essentially reiterated the principles set out in other OSCE documents relating to the traditional (military or "hard") security. The Russian side explained: the “added value” of TES is not about asserting new principles of inter-governmental relations in the sphere of military security, but in reconfirming political commitment of states in legally binding form and agree on their common interpretation in order to avoid “double standards” in the future.

In June 2009 at the annual conference of the OSCE reviewing the problems in the sphere of security, and then - at the meeting of ministers in Corfu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov specified some proposals of the end of 2008. Moscow, however had not submitted a draft treaty which would have given a clearer idea of how it saw the desired result of current debate.

Therefore, in October 1, 2009 during the Russian-French consultations Lavrov made the statement that Russian side would prepare and submit a draft of the TES. It is expected, however, that this document will see the light not earlier than in 2010, only after the Athens meeting of the OSCE Council of Ministers.

In turn, during the dialogue that had begun, many countries and especially - the West, marked quite clearly what result of current discussions would be undesirable for them.

Only OSCE is considered as the major and natural platform for dialogue on European security. They do not want to limit the scope of possible agreements to only military security issues, based on a comprehensive understanding of security within the OSCE. They also do not consider it appropriate to form new institutions of European security, offering to go through the improvement of existing ones.

The vast majority of the OSCE participants sees no need to sign an international treaty, referring to the inevitable problems associated with its ratification, and offer to go through concretization, where it is necessary and appropriate, within the political commitments in the framework of the OSCE.

In other words, the current debate on European security architecture and the Russian proposal on TES has not clarified understanding of the main question - why does Moscow need the new Treaty on European security? The talks on this subject are

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8Challenges on hard security in Euro Atlantic scope. The role of the OSCE in creating stable and effective security system. Speech given by S.V.Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the opening of OSCE Annual Security Review Conference, Vienna, 23 June 2009
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/ADED9C34EE795D2BC32575DE003DECD1
mostly at an informal level in the course of numerous meetings of the "second track" with politicians, diplomats and experts.

It seems that Russian and international foreign experts and politicians are right, coming from the fact that the problem boils down to Moscow’s dissatisfaction with contemporary European security system where there is no decent place for Russia.

If this conclusion is correct, then discussion about a new European security architecture should focus less on the idea of the Treaty but more on the issue of what decisions will allow Moscow to feel like a full party to the new European security system, not infringing at the same time the interests of other European countries. If it’s possible to agree on this issue, perhaps it will be no need to conclude new comprehensive agreement.

It is not unlikely that it will be enough to agree with NATO on the parameters of the new agreement limiting conventional armed forces in Europe, on non-placement of significant armed groups of foreign governments near the Russian border on a regular basis, and on non-spreading of military infrastructure to enhance defensive capacity.

To create with the European Union (EU) and transit countries a mechanism to ensure security of energy supplies, and within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) - to coordinate measures that would allow the Organization promptly intervene in conflict situations, preventing their escalation and not waiting until the organization forms consensus on the measures that are appropriate to be taken in certain situation.

However, in all this - much easier said than done. And the problem discussed is much deeper than any topics listed above. What choice will the Russian Federation ultimately make in defining its place in the European security system and what Russian choice will be accepted by other European countries? Today, both questions remain open.

**European security architecture**

Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the contours of multilateral international cooperation, which is being formed on the territory of Europe, has been quite clearly defined.

The main regional organizations are the OSCE, which brings together 56 countries in Europe, North America, Central Asia, the Council of Europe, which consists of 47
European countries, including Turkey, the EU (27 countries) and NATO (28 countries in Europe and North America). The UN and organizations of sub-regional cooperation, including the CIS, Eurasian Economic Community, CST play a certain role here. 

The dynamics of European security architecture in the past two decades and especially - in the last decade was characterized by the following persistent processes that have not exhausted their potential:

1. **Enlargement of the Western European and Transatlantic institutions - the Council of Europe, the EU and NATO, which gradually acquire pan-European reach.**

   Over the past twenty years the number of members of the Council of Europe has been doubled. Among the OSCE members only countries of North America (having the observer status in the Council), Central Asia and Belarus have not been included.

   Since 1995 the number of EU member states has more than doubled. Despite the complexities of internal adaptation of the EU after the entry of twelve new countries into it in 2004 and in 2007, in the foreseeable future the EU can welcome to membership former Yugoslavia, Albania, and possibly Turkey. In the long term, the EU can unite more than 35 European countries.

   The number of NATO members in 1999 increased from 16 to 28. In the medium term, the Alliance can be joined by all the countries of South Eastern Europe with the exception of Serbia, which has not set itself this goal.

   In the foreseeable future to review the EU and NATO can unite 38 or more states. Upon completion of the process of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures in South-Eastern Europe, only CIS countries, Switzerland and European mini-states remain outside of these structures.

   However, absence of Switzerland and European mini-states in the EU is conditional, since they are directly or indirectly associated with the European Union, via the European Economic Area or bilateral agreements.

   However, the conclusion made in Moscow that the trend towards further expansion of Western European and Euro-Atlantic structures of multilateralism has not been exhausted yet, is subject to doubt.

   It seems that Moscow bases its conclusion on fact that the process of "extension" has expired or will expire in the nearest future. For this reason, it considers not only the numerical ratio of members and non-members of “western club” will remain relatively stable in Europe, but the problem lies balancing relations in the sphere of security.
between the countries and organizations that are in Euro-Atlantic structures and those - which do not belong to them.

Thus, V.I. Voronkov writes: "NATO has already admitted those who have been allowed. Other countries can not rely on the admission to NATO or do not want. It is more difficult with the EU - all the new criteria and obstacles are being elaborated for the candidates. The EU, especially in times of crisis, is unable to accept new members without harming itself, Iceland and Croatia may be the only exceptions. This means that a large number of countries in the Euro-Atlantic area will be outside the NATO and the EU in the coming years or even decades". 

2. Enhancing the EU and NATO cooperation with the CIS countries.

The EU and NATO are developing cooperation with almost all other members of the OSCE and non-European countries. The EU proposes European CIS countries and South Caucasus states the prospect of association and closer integration, beginning with an agreement on free trade, in exchange for the harmonization of standards of the political system, economic regulation and technical standards. The EU supports direct political dialogue with Central Asia aimed at expanding economic, energy and financial cooperation and promotion the principles of respect for human rights, cooperation in countering new challenges and threats to security. The EU is the major trading partner for most countries of the CIS.

3. Interaction of European regional organizations.

In 1990’s Russia put forward an initiative to discuss the idea of transforming the OSCE into an umbrella organization of the European security and creating the "executive committee" with powers similar to UN Security Council. The proposal was not supported, and the European organizations interaction developed on the "network" basis - through their political leadership, the Secretariat and field missions.

In the course of conflicts regulation in former Yugoslavia another practice for the regional organizations interaction was formed. The UN playing the leading political role, NATO took over security issues, the OSCE took over the establishment of democratic institutions (including the Justice and Home Affairs), holding elections, upholding rule of law and human rights. The EU took over the key role in restoring the economy.

Recently, the EU is more often replacing NATO in security issues in South Eastern Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the long run, perhaps - Kosovo) and the OSCE - in the activity upholding the rule of law. At the same time, there were agreed the arms reduction and trust building measures in Bosnia under the auspices of the OSCE and in countries of former Yugoslavia. These agreements have contributed substantially (in 3-5 times) to the reduction of armed forces in the region.

4. Expanding the potential for interchangeability in the activity of European regional organizations.

Today the EU is expanding activities in the field of security. Not being a collective defence organization, it is participating in the regulation of crisis in and outside the European Union, in counteracting new challenges and threats, in relations with partners more attention is devoted to the rule of law and human rights and supervising elections.

Reducing its activity in Europe, NATO is getting involved in non-European crises regulation. In relationship with partners, the Alliance is mostly focused on issues of rule of law and democratic control over the security sector.

All this promotes the potential of interchangeability of European regional organizations. In South-Eastern Europe the termination of OSCE and NATO activity was compensated by the expansion of similar activity of the EU. Until recently, a parallel trend could not see its development in Russia. But after the war in Georgia in 2008 there has been a tendency of the EU to get directly involved in the CIS crisis management.

5. Further fragmentation of "post-Soviet" space, stagnation, if not degradation of the institutions of multilateral cooperation of Newly Independent States with Russia.

Thus, the "backbone" structures of the new united Europe are the EU, NATO and the Council of Europe. The states that recently joined the European Union and North Atlantic Alliance, have no reason to doubt their choice. On the contrary, a significant number of countries remaining behind the EU and NATO would like in a reasonable time to become members of these organizations. It refers to many CIS countries which would gladly change their membership in the Commonwealth for the EU membership and (or) NATO, if they had such an opportunity.

The EU and NATO in this regard, see the institutional structure of European security that has been established today as the one that meets their fundamental
interests and do not see the need to change it. At the same time they are ready to discuss the question of its improvement, increasing its efficiency, and most importantly – starting closer cooperation with Russia in dealing with European and non-European security problems.

**Russia in European security architecture**

The discontent of the Russian political elite is caused by the tendencies that define the development of European security architecture. After all, not being the EU or NATO member, Moscow cannot directly influence the decision making process in these organizations. Simultaneously it faces the partial marginalization of the OSCE, where Russia, relying on the principle of consensus, has veto power and the gradual degradation of the post-Soviet structures of multilateral cooperation, and above all - the CIS, where Moscow hoped for the role of "first among equals."

**Calling into question the need for new European security architecture is reflecting the dissatisfaction of the Russian policymakers with the architecture that has been formed in Europe during the past two decades, and especially - the extension of "Western" organizations and the progressive curtailment of Russia's zone of "privileged interests", first in Central and Eastern Europe, and now in the CIS.** Moscow's objections against NATO expansion, which have already become common, desperate opposition to plans of Ukraine and Georgia to enter NATO, and in recent years - increasing criticism of "Eastern Partnership" Policy of the European Union, in which Moscow is suspected to have desire to expand its own "sphere of influence" confirm the conclusion that **Moscow would hope at least to stop the further expansion of "western" organizations eastwards.**

The question on the need to agree new rules of the game in Europe, raised by the Russian leadership, does not give the answer of what role in modern Europe would be worthy for Moscow. The "elements" of the Treaty on European security articulated by the Russian side do not give the answer to this question either.

Theoretically, Russia could choose one of the three options regarding the system of multilateral European cooperation, which continues to form:

• try to break (revise) and replace it by another, more comfortable for the Russian leadership (in other words - less "Western");

• to get integrated into the system of multilateral cooperation in Europe, which has been established, and thus get the opportunity to influence its further development;
• Neither breaking nor integrating into modern European system, to find ways of building it in such a way that it would allow to see the interests of the Russian political elite more fulfilled than now.

Apparently, Moscow has not made its final choice. But its advantages are obvious. It would be good to believe that Russian politics has enough common sense not to set a task to break the system of multilateral international cooperation, which has been established in Europe. Fulfilment of this task would foresee not only to restrain but abandon the tendency to expand the "Western" institutions in Europe. But the prospect for integration into “western” European security system which rests, first of all, on the EU and NATO annoys Russian political elites as well.

**Having neither power for conducting revisionist policy, nor enough will for integration into European system which is being formed now, Moscow seeks to stop further expansion of the “West” and get involved into building the European system by the means of cooperation with the EU and NATO hence prevent from further erosion the sphere of its “privileged interests” primarily in the CIS.**

Refinement and formation of modern system of European security may occur in four ways. Although not necessarily on the basis of new comprehensive agreement, which would have placed all the dots over the “i”s. Most probably it may and will occur as a result of specific solutions of specific problems which will mark the general vector of development.

Four ways (options) of Russia’s participation in the system of European security could be as follows:

• Fixing the current status-quo in Europe, in other words to suspend extension of the “Western” structures (NATO, EU) eastwards and implicit or explicit recognition of CIS as a zone of “privileged interests” of Russia. Fixing the status quo could be accompanied by the intensification of interaction in “triangle” Russia-US-EU in a wide range of international agenda, excluding from this cooperation the issue of Russia and CIS domestic structure, alongside with the problems that occur within the recognised spheres of “privileged interests” of Moscow (i.e. post-Soviet space) and of the West (new member-states of NATO and the EU, South and East Europe). This option can be called “New Yalta” with the difference that in 1945 Western countries recognised the right of the USSR, which was considered as a revisionist state, to have extended sphere of influence in Europe. Today Russia is considered not so much as a revisionist state, but as a state that fails to assert its status quo and tries to resist its further erosion.
• Russia’s integration into the existing system of European security, which means not only building closer partnership and cooperation with NATO and the EU but also deep convergence of domestic political and economic structure of Russia and Western states. In this case the issue of “the eastward expansion of the West” may have lost its urgency because as a result of convergence Russia itself would become part of the West. In institutional aspect (membership or non-membership of Russia in those or other “Western” multilateral organizations, primarily in NATO and the EU) the prospect of Russia’s integration may have all sorts of decisions.

• The confrontation between Russia and the West in Europe, in the course of which Russia would use strong measures, of military nature as well, in conditions of arms race it would assert its rights for the sphere of its “privileged interests”.

• Maintaining modus vivendi in Europe, which suggests that Western powers will not speed up the integration of East European and South-Caucasian states, new independent states in NATO and the EU, and would also not recognise Russia’s exclusive rights in CIS. Maintaining modus vivendi in post-Soviet space would mean the continuation of the 1990s policy and policy of the new millennium. It would be crucial in this case if there were defined the areas of cooperation between Russian and Western countries, where progress is needed in the view of Russia and where the progress is possible – from the point of view of Western countries.

1. **Fixing the status quo in Europe ("New Yalta")**

At first glance, the West exclude such option of the agreement, emphasizing the hopelessness of a return to policies of the 19th and 20th centuries and referring to ratified agreements within the OSCE, which exclude the idea of division of spheres of influence in Europe\(^\text{10}\).

But not all the politicians in the West are far from thinking in terms of "real politics". Many of them in informal speeches and conversations reflect not only on the legitimacy of Moscow’s claims to sphere of special interest or geographical area of expanded security in Europe, but also think about the possibility of concluding a comprehensive agreement with Russia, which would assume guarantees on long-term supply of Russian energy resources to Europe in exchange for recognition of special interests of Moscow in "post-Soviet" territory, as well as closer cooperation in addressing the pressing issues of international security, such as settling the question of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the stabilization of Afghanistan, the Middle East settlement.

\(^{10}\text{Within the OSCE no State, group of states or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.}\)
Signals coming from the West, indirectly reassure Moscow that the prospect of consolidating the status quo in Europe is not completely excluded. Similar signals in Moscow generate feeling that such agreement is possible and that the issue comes down largely to the price that Russia will have to pay for fixing its zone of privileged interests. Depending on the decisions to be taken by Western countries in the nearest future, this feeling can either grow stronger or lead to an illusion. To such “crucial” decisions we can, inter alia, include:

- Relatively fast recovery of the EU, NATO and the U.S. cooperation with Russia after the suspension of negotiations on a new Russia-EU agreement, plenary meetings of Russia- NATO Council and meetings within the "G8" in autumn 2008 after the five-day war in Georgia.
- Pressing the "Reset button" in Moscow-Washington relations after coming into the White House B. Obama Administration, and especially – U.S. refusal to deploy components of global missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic.
- An attempt of similar "reset" in British – Russian relations in autumn 2009.
- If not legal, then de facto recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia government by the West would strengthen the effect of return to normal agenda and would send signal to Moscow that not only Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but possibly, Georgia on some stage may be assigned to the zone of "privileged interests" of Russia.
- Freezing the decision on NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia. Although NATO does not formally abandon its policy of "open doors", a series of statements by Western leaders that Georgia can not hope for NATO membership until the conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be resolved, and Ukraine - until the majority of its population will have expressed against joining the Alliance, and yet as there still remains hypothetical possibility of conflict with Russia in the Crimea, because of Sevastopol or over some other issue, all this strengthen the confidence of Moscow that NATO's further expansion can be stopped. Change of the U.S. current administration position in this regard reinforces such confidence.
- International recognition and guaranteeing the neutral status of the Newly Independent States that are not included in either the CSTO or NATO or the EU.
- The North Atlantic Alliance endorsement of obligation to deploy neither nuclear weapons, nor military infrastructure strengthening in the territory of new member states and not to deploy on a regular basis substantial combat forces in the new member countries. This commitment would be more enhanced if NATO members agreed to further revision of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), as the Rus-
sian government insists. Such a revision would assume rigid restrictions imposed on the NATO countries by the adapted treaty of 1999, while removing the restrictions imposed by the Treaty on Russia on its southern flank.

- Keeping the "low profile" of the OSCE in the former Soviet territory or partial termination of its activities in the area.

- Less ambitious implementation of the program "Eastern Partnership" announced by the EU in 2009, which allows progressive convergence of political and economic systems of East European and South Caucasian states to the EU standards. Closer coordination of plans for "Eastern Partnership" with Russia.

- Maintaining or rather bringing the EU back to the policy "low profile" concerning its participation in the conflict settlement in Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan.

When it comes to the EU, most of the above mentioned solutions are not considered unreal, although each of them would cause serious divisions within the EU.

However, the case is complicated by the fact that the United States to a lesser extent than the Europeans are inclined to conclude an agreement with Russia to the detriment of their partners, including the "post-Soviet" countries. But Washington is also inclined to reach a compromise with Moscow, which will at least allow not to repel it from cooperation with the West. Therefore we can expect that many decisions which will be made by Western countries in the nearest future will strengthen Moscow’s (most probably - wrong) feeling that the West will be able to agree on retaining the status quo in Europe.

This feeling would grow even stronger if Russia agreed with the West (USA, NATO, EU) on "rules" or "code of conduct" in situations of conflict with third countries (that are not NATO or EU members), that is as minimum on neutrality in conflicts with third European countries. In practice, this arrangement may have only one content - non-intervention of NATO and the EU in any conflict between Russia and its neighbours that are not members of these organizations.

Institutionalizing the interaction in the "triangle" Russia-US-EU in principle, does not require any special decisions or new institutions creation. Formal or informal institutes required for such interaction, already exist, but do not function well in terms of discrepancies between Russia and the West. This is the UN Security Council, which could serve the purposes of positions coordination in the triangle, being with present membership or enlarged, when there will be reform of the United Nations. These are the mechanisms of interactions within the “Great Eight” (G-8); contact groups on various international security issues (such as the Middle East Quartet or the Group of Six States
where the policy in the Iranian nuclear dossier is being elaborated with the participation of China).

Such institutions of policy harmonization are more important for Russia than the establishment of an Executive Committee (kind of Security council) of the OSCE. In case of recognition of Russia’s zone of "privileged interests", this body is not necessary. As the triangle would focus its attention primarily on solving the problems which could be associated with the situation outside Europe.

Creating the contact groups with flexible structure will allow when necessary to involve non-European and "non-Western" countries such as China into cooperation, which is in more accordance with the spirit of Russian foreign policy doctrine than interaction limited by the "triangle".

2. Russia's integration into the existing system of European security.

This option, at first glance, doesn’t seem feasible - especially in current conditions of deep mutual distrust between Russia and the West. However, it should not be excluded in the longer term.

The integration of Russia involves the interest of Moscow and the willingness of Western states to fully include the Russian Federation not only in overall economic space but also in Western (Euro-Atlantic) security system. Institutionally simplest, but politically the most difficult way to solve this problem is Russia's entry into NATO and in the future - into the EU.

Russian political elite, focused on the principle of "sovereign democracy" and ensuring sustainability of Russia (albeit illusory) that rejects the idea of convergence, today is not ready for such a decision. Majority of political elites in the West is not ready for it either, although the initiative of D. Medvedev on TES conclusion added new momentum to the issue discussion.

Former German Foreign Minister J. Fischer expressed his opinion in favour of Russia joining NATO in early 2009. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski spoke in the same manner at the end of March 2009. All this testifies that there is discussion on this in NATO and this option of integrating Russia into European security system should not be completely written off. But it should not be regarded as relevant in the short or even medium term.

Since 1990' Russia, the EU and NATO repeatedly attempted to build partnership relations on “non-institutional” or "contractual" basis. This would have to be Russia-NATO cooperation within the framework of special boards created in 1997 and 2002.

aiming to provide the necessary level of consultation, coordination of common positions and joint actions in crisis situations. However, neither the first nor the second NATO-Russia Council could cope with that task. The cooperation of the parties was limited by minor issues and was sacrificed every time when the positions of the parties were fundamentally diverse (NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the war in Georgia in 2008).

The strategic partnership of Russia and the EU was often “tested for strength” - especially in recent years. The experience of cooperation in solving crisis management problems is minimal so far. It is limited only by the participation of Russia in the police operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina earlier this decade, as well as the EU operation in Chad in late 2008 - early 2009. At the same time, the status of the parties, legal framework and mechanisms for their cooperation in crisis situations is only being discussed, and the discrepancies growth in zone of "common neighbourhood" of Russia and the EU complicates the already difficult cooperation establishment in matters of external security.

Considering these reasons, the most optimal direction for Russia's integration into the existing Euro-Atlantic security system may become building the allied relations between them based on the experience of a particular interaction in solving international security problems. Russia and the West can hope for cooperation in such vital issues as:

- Joint efforts to stabilize the situation and the formation of current state structures in Afghanistan;
- Prevent Iran from creating nuclear weapon, which would represent not only a threat but a serious blow to non-proliferation regime;
- Stop the illegal transit of drugs from Afghanistan, which would require putting the U.S-Russia cooperation with the EU countries to a qualitatively new level.

Other, albeit more courteous, and in some cases - symbolic areas of forming partnerships, and in the future - the allied relations between Russia and the West are:

- Increasing cooperation in the fight against modern sea piracy;
- Implementation of naval operations for several years under the auspices of NATO and with participation of Russia to stop the illegal trade in materials and components necessary to build weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (PSI).

The implementation of allied relations with Western countries is impossible without a substantial increase of interoperability of the armed forces, including - mobile and expeditionary forces in Russia and NATO. Solution of this problem would
require a revision of lines, forms and intensity of joint training in the framework of cooperation between Russia and NATO, as well as the implementation of such cooperation between Russia and the EU.

3. The confrontation between Russia and the West and the new arms race.

This version of the European security system development, which involves return to the bipolar scheme of relations in Europe, based on the coalitions balance headed by Russia and the U.S., the military power of parity, enshrined in the relevant agreements on arms control, is not considered urgent due to a number of reasons. Although the rhetoric in recent years sometimes resembles time of the Cold War.

Neither Russia nor Western countries need the arms race in Europe. Today they use their resources in solving other issues - largely outside the Europe. However, in case of renovation of an arms race in Europe, Russia has very slim chances - either in terms of sustainability, or from the technological point of view – to be the winner in this race. Similarly, from political point of view, we can’t rely on the possibility of an effective and cohesive anti-Western military alliance creation – a kind of anti-NATO under the auspices of Russia. Neither CSTO, the majority of members of which see themselves as partners rather than opponents of NATO, nor Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes China, is a proper candidate for that role.

The option of confrontation revival - in all senses is the worst for Russia. Its implementation would lead to exactly the opposite results than those the anti-Western alliance supporters would hope for. It would result not in consolidation of the military alliance of the CIS countries under the aegis of Russia, but in erosion of existing rudiments of such a union. It would accelerate but not impede the desire of many post-Soviet states to be integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, as well as willingness of Western countries to accept them in these structures. Russia's limited resources would be dissipated in the senseless arms race, but not in modernizing the country. The implementation of this option would lead Russia not to the return into European security as one of its key participants, but to isolation and marginalization of Russia.

4. Maintaining the modus vivendi.

This option would mean that in the nearest future they will not dot all the “i”s and cross all the “t”s in issues of Western community border security in Europe (NATO and EU) and in matters related to Russia’s relations with this community. All of the above options of the European security evolution would remain open, and none of them would be completely rejected.
Many of the practical solutions, to be taken in the future, would preserve ambiguity of this situation, as could be interpreted as signs of the status quo strengthening and formation of alliance relations of Russia with the West or maintaining the modus vivendi. Thus, freezing the process of further NATO expansion to the East while maintaining the NATO policy of open door can be interpreted, if desired, as a step toward fixing the status quo, and reluctance to bring the final clarity to issues that divide the West and Russia, until they are solved. The EU refusal from forcing the plans of “Eastern Partnership” may be regarded as a reluctance of Brussels to challenge the current status quo, and as a hope to negotiate with Russia the integration of the latter into the modern system of multilateral cooperation in Europe. Russia's interaction with the United States and NATO in Afghanistan, as well as its cooperation with U.S. and the EU on Iran and the Middle East can, on the one hand, generate illusion of building the alliance or quasi-alliance relations between them and, on the other hand – can be interpreted as part of a compromise that involves fixing the status quo in Europe.

**Perspective**

Our brief review leads to the conclusion that Russia and Western countries today mainly disagree on the issue of fixing the status quo in Europe. If such decision coincided with the interests of the country as the Russian political elite’s perceives them, then majority of Western countries wouldn’t go further in maintaining modus vivendi. In its turn, neither fixing the status quo nor maintaining modus vivendi satisfies the post-Soviet countries which would like to get a guarantee of their future integration into Euro Atlantic structures.

The very logic of the modus vivendi policy does not promise in foreseeable future to clarify Russia’s place and role in European security system. Those and other decisions to be taken by the European countries in the near future could bring certain hope for maintaining the status quo in Europe, while in opinion of others they could mean not more than fixing the modus vivendi, or moreover, the movement towards the formation of partnerships or even allied relations with Russia, in other words, its integration into the modern system of European security.

This ambiguity does not contribute much to achieving a comprehensive agreement that by its magnitude and historical value would correspond to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Instead, it remains and will remain a source of disappointment and distrust in Russia’s relations with the West.
The West enlargement – a key social process in contemporary Europe

The International situation in Europe, especially in its Central and Eastern parts, is generally determined by one main process. Reference is made to over a 20-year old truly revolutionary by its nature and scale expansion of the West. This process includes dissemination of Western values, EU and NATO enlargement and a great deal of related nuances. The main one is Russia's conservative aspiration to protect its sovereignty the way it is being understood in Kremlin and on Smolenskaya Square, what would, in fact, mean the restoration of its sphere of influence in Europe.

Today, for the first time in almost five hundred years, at least since the 16th century – the era of the Reformation, most of the continent from the Atlantic Ocean and to the Bug has been united into single security, economic and political space. The influence of such powerful institutions as the EU and NATO, which form this space, reaches Russia. This space serves as a nucleus of the dominant entity today, so called global West. Such unprecedented expansion of the West, which has lasted for almost two decades since 1989, not only fundamentally changed, but revolutionised the international situation. Today, almost all European countries of the former Warsaw Pact, or rather the Soviet empire, have joined the EU and NATO, and other former socialist countries have a perspective for membership in future. Baltic states, in particular, former Republics of Soviet Baltic only 20 years ago, joined Western institutions.

In the new era, the influence of NATO and the EU has spread far beyond their borders and areas of responsibility. "The North Atlantic Cooperation and Partnership for Peace (NATO) (established in 1992), Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe, the Council of Europe have formed a common space on the continent."
Expansion of NATO and its area of responsibility in the field of security led to a lengthy debate about a possible global nature and role of NATO, which caused the need for its new strategic concept. Let’s remember that NATO was created primarily to deter the Soviet Union and its development can not be understood outside the relations with Russia. In addition, such historical process as West enlargement could not do without side effects, one of which was the Yugoslav-Balkan crisis, which is not yet fully resolved, but rather frozen and hidden under the carpet. On the one hand, the collapse of Yugoslavia and the following tragic military conflicts mainly resulted from the collapse of real socialism and the victory of the West in the Cold War, on the other hand, the credit for rather fragile peace in the Balkans states should be given to the EU and U.S. Policy.

Secession of the Albanian-populated autonomous province of Kosovo in Serbia in 2008, its self-determination, declaration of Independence and recognition by a majority of NATO state-members is an illustrative example of the crisis and ambiguous consequences of EU and NATO strategic course for enlargement. These events undermined the main principle of the international legal foundation for European security – the inviolability of borders, which has undergone through dramatic changes of the socialism failure in 1989–1992 and the Balkan Crisis in 1992–1999.

Relevant international legal foundation for European security has been formed mainly during the last period of the Cold War (1975-1990). The Helsinki Final Act of 1976, its main document, provided for the inviolability of borders, international cooperation and rule of human rights over sovereignty of States. The Paris Declaration of 1990 on a common European house should also be mentioned. It determined the ultimate goal of common efforts and set the basic rules of the game in the field of military security through the Treaty on the Elimination of intermediate – and shorter-range missiles in 1987 and Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 1990.

Collapse of the socialist camp in 1989 and final breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991 has fundamentally transformed Europe and, therefore, questioned this legal foundation. However, a decade and a half of absolute U.S. dominance in the 1990s and first half of 2000 has extended its existence as an artificial legal construction.

Today this legal foundation for European security has ceased to correspond to the international situation on the continent and, consequently, failed. As noted above, in the situation in Kosovo, in order to implement certain provisions of the Helsinki Act, the others were abolished. It was another mine explosion of variance between the human
rights supremacy, state sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. Moratorium on implementation of the CFE Treaty, declared by the Kremlin in the end of 2007, symbolised a final abolishment of guiding norms for exclusively military affairs in Europe.

**Russian factor in European security.**

Situation is made very difficult due to radically different perceptions of international processes in Washington, Brussels and other European capitals on the one hand, and Moscow – on the other hand. Democratic values and liberal ideology serve as the priorities in the West, what is of the great importance on both sides of the Atlantic, and have dominated in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in the United States since their establishment. The Russian government, inversely, thinks chiefly in terms of Realpolitik, spheres of influence, etc., in other words along the lines of the ideological postulates of the end of 19th century. Thus, the same events and processes are perceived in the U.S., EU and Russia differently and are given dramatically adverse assessment.

It should be borne in mind that Moscow, in exhaustive conformity with a thinking pattern defined by the American classic of political science, J. Kenan, perceives any action taken by the EU and the U.S. within the former Soviet Union as a direct threat to its security and attempts to respond using any tools at its disposal. Such actions seen as absolutely legitimate as far as the Kremlin is concerned, are obviously regarded by the West and especially by the neighbouring with Russia countries, including Ukraine, as a manifestation of imperial ambition and make the situation rapidly complicated through deepening mutual distrust.

In its turn, it is useless even try to explain to Moscow that the intentions, as of Ukraine for example, to join NATO and the EU are not directed against Russia as it is perceived from the point of view of values, and in a very specific way, while the reasons would be of a rational thinking in terms of finding the balancing of interests. This specificity is explained by tough historical experience and peculiarities of the political regime in Russia nowadays. However, this issue requires a separate consideration. Lets note that such a perception of the international relations is an integral part of the complex idea that defines Russian credo today and is determined by the following:

*Firstly,* the Russian ideological texts are characterised by the high-noted attention to the "roots", primordial approach for the nation (it has always been there and
will always be, rather than it arises out of time), essentialism (a phenomenon has an unchanging 'essence'). The contemporary Russian ideologues tend to ignore the relativity of being and to appeal to the timeless Absolute. At the same time, irrational rather than rational thinking patterns are proclaimed or covertly used, as well as everlasting urge for miracles, appeal to mysterious forces uncontrolled by a man.

Secondly, according to the dominant viewpoints in contemporary Russia, society is clearly divided into those who rule and those who execute: passionarity and sub-passionarity of people (trans.: according to passionary theory by L. Gumiliov), elites and the populace, creative minority and passive majority. Full control of both the history and individuals by a certain group of puppet masters is proclaimed. Far and by, one concept, distinctive for adornian type of authoritarian person, prevails: life difficulties and defeat are interpreted by external interventions rather than by one's shortcomings. Russian social consciousness remains dominantly necessarian.

Thirdly, the Manichean perception of the world as the arena for eternal struggle between good and evil, whose essence has been defined once and forever, prevails in given construction. Given forces function both openly and in an occulted ways what creates space for various conspiracy interpretations.

Fourth, disguised, and often outright xenophobia and defensive national chauvinism. Ideology of besieged fortress. Russia is all around surrounded by numerous enemies longing for one thing – to bring it to ruins, to play a nasty trick on it. This is primarily referred to criminal West.

Fifthly, inherent to modern Russian ideology is the heartthrob for power and nurturing the cult of violence and war, preference of power, disdain for the negotiations as a way of solving social problems, rudeness, which often turns into outspoken boorishness, even in everyday life. Any game is perceived as a zero-sum game, the winner wins exactly what the other party loses.

Sixth, the disposition to tragically fatal perception of the world. Contemporary Russian ideologues urge to fight for the death, rather than for the victory. The world has almost reached the time of its final battle. It is a Latter–day times.

The point at issue is about conservative revolutionary nature of the ideas that shape modern Medvedev/Putin's Russia and its foreign policy. As a matter of fact, in our opinion, Moscow, and it explicitly and openly declared that, as no one else in modern Europe is in no way interested in changes, but in returning to the past, or at least, in keeping the status quo. Strange as it may seem, the Russian–Georgian war in August 2008 was a key indication of this, when the Russian Federation tactic aimed to
preserve the situation formed in the region during 1990-2008 and its legal consolidation. Tbilisi operation, the other way around, was of a revolutionary character, as it aimed to restore the sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the way the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic used to be within the USSR, but which in fact has never been renewed by modern independent Georgia.

In the meantime, while being aware of the collapse of the Helsinki system, Russia takes a very logical step, as from its standpoint, and offers Western Treaty on Collective Security and faces the lack of understanding by the United States and EU on the smaller scale: NATO already exists as the system of collective security, what else is needed? Furthermore, one can easily see the attempt to destroy the North Atlantic Alliance.

Attitude of the EU countries, especially France and Germany, has become more complicated. Although, prior to the Russian–Georgian war in August 2008, they considered Russia’s proposals in the propaganda context, their position has changed after the above mentioned event. France and Germany are ready to discuss the security issues with Russia, but in broad terms they suggest OSCE + format, what in its turn is not accepted by Moscow.

Even more repudiation and reluctance to the idea of the Collective Security Treaty in Europe meets in the states that have not yet joined NATO, and are not willing to join the Organisation of Collective Security Treaty (the CSTO, the Tashkent Treaty). From the perspective of these capitals such a treaty is aimed not only to try to destroy NATO, which is unlikely, but to secure division of potentially united Europe into full-bodied Western, Russian and Eastern Europe. It’s worth mentioning that any agreement may only formulate a decision, however it is not a decision itself. And such a decision, we believe, has already been taken.

It looks like the Kremlin’s desire to keep the status quo in Europe was somehow perceived by the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama. In fact, much-spoken-about-in-the-last-six-months restart of US-Russian relations should not be regarded as a withdrawal, which has been often mentioned lately. It is rather an attempt to consolidate and digest of what has been achieved by redirecting world attention from Europe to the issues in the Greater Middle East, and Asia in general. Moreover, even a worst-case scenario of Russia’s situation¹² for the U.S. (and its probability should not be

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¹²Restoring direct control of the Kremlin in Kiev and other former Soviet capitals, forming the basis of new imperial power, the agreement with key EU countries as for problem-solving at the U.S. expense and an offensive tin regards to the interests of Washington
overestimated) would threaten life interests of Washington only in 10–15 years perspective, while the eventual nuclear Iran, or fundamentalist Pakistan constitute direct and immediate danger today or tomorrow.

One should not forget that the USA and the Russian Federation are now divided by fundamental problems, that is to say the nonidentical values of rulings groups and societies on the whole, in many ways dissimilar political regimes and institutes, far from common vision of the future world on the whole and their countries in particular and therefore different approaches and attention to such important issues as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, Energy preservation in Europe etc.

Taking into account an importance of the issue, a size and scale rates of the players as well as internal fragility of the countries that currently do not belong to either NATO or CST, one can predict growing instability in these European countries to the point of their total transformation into failed states type of countries followed by progressing decay, accompanied by the bloody civil war.

Grey zone - a security vacuum territory.

In between 2004 and 2008 Ukraine has lost its relatively easy chance to join NATO.
There are many reasons to it, chiefly of internal nature. The main one is due to a lack of common consensus by the elites and public in Ukraine regarding its security strategy, including the choice of alliances.

Another equally important reason is political competitiveness in Ukraine during the last 9 years, at least since the end of 2009\(^3\), has obtained visible destructive forms and has created real threat to national security. Weakening of the state was also caused by lack of determined political will of its leadership, multi-polarity of the executive power set up by a compromising Constitutional Reform in December 2004, and also by political factor as an employment criteria to administrative positions in state institutions which resulted in to drastic decrease of civil servants professionalism. Ineffectiveness of government policy has also led to the high–level corruption in public administration. There are also other significant issues.

There are also powerful external factors with their growing influence from year to year. The policy of the Russian Federation, of course, plays a leading role. Generally speaking, at the end of 2009 it can be argued that Russia has succeeded to create the

\(^{3}\text{Complex of events, related to disappearance of journalist Heorhij Gongadze, 'cassette scandal' and public movement “Ukraine without Kuchma”}\)
opportunities which would collectively grant it the right for veto on the accession of European countries, at least Ukraine and Georgia, into the North Atlantic Alliance.

Thus, Ukraine, unfortunately, falls into a grey zone between NATO and the CSTO. At this stage it includes Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan to a smaller extend that tends to both Europe and Central Asia. Belarus and Armenia while in the process of emancipation from Russian influence may also potentially join this zone.

This grey zone is characterized by at least two types of asymmetry. First of all, it is the very structure of the zone. It primarily consists mostly of small countries with a population of 3 – 10 million people. Ukraine is three times bigger by its population, not to mention the size of the territory and economics in comparison with other three countries together. This is the first level of internal asymmetry. Grey zone is geographically divided into two major parts. Baltic–Black Sea part includes Ukraine and Moldova, and potentially Belarus and the Black Sea–Caspian part includes Georgia, Azerbaijan and potentially Armenia. These parts differ in size and other specific features.

Secondly, another type of asymmetry can be seen in very different levels of interest in gray area by major global and European players on overall. While Russia's key objective of foreign policy strategy is predominant influence in Kyiv and other capitals in this area, what is more or less directly stressed in Concept of Foreign Policy 2008. For the United States, by contrast, such influence is important, however not a primary task at this stage.

Meanwhile the EU, especially its leading countries Germany and France, primarily care about security dimension, namely predictability and absence of dangerous conflict escalations which specifically would not threaten energy supplies to the EU, gas in particular. It is worth mentioning that such predictability and peace may well be achieved through recognition of Ukraine and other countries as part of Russia's zone of privileged interests, and therefore Moscow's predominant influence on their important political and economic decisions–making. Let’s remember that the Kremlin policy regarding Europe, in particular, is aimed at such a solution. How successful it will be raises another topic for discussion. Another issue for consideration would be the fact that through the restoration of power on the post–Soviet territory Russian Federation would obtain potential and vital opportunities for implementation of tough policy towards Europe.

Role of the values in the policy of these countries and the EU is left out in the background. Meantime, upcoming radical changes in the EU related to the ratification
completion of the Lisbon Treaty will certainly lead to reconsideration of such European foreign policy. By the way, it is curious that the potential borders of the grey zone almost coincide with the borders of EU programme "Eastern Partnership". The level of random facilitation in this coincidence is a rhetorical question. In any case, this program shows potential interest of the EU in gray area countries.

Key peculiarity of the grey zone in security is, as the matter–of–fact, the lack of proper regulations of competition in it and for it. Yes indeed, the Helsinki Accords and other basic European security regulations are in force, however in these international circumstances their effectiveness is rather low, as noted above. Thus, the grey zone is to be talked about as security vacuum in Europe. Moreover, as one can see, the size of the zone is quite small, however the reward is too big. Let’s remember that what is meant by it is renewal of the Eurasian empire.

**Defining the rules of the game – the main objective in security agenda.**

In these circumstances a comprehensive definition of international game rules, their legal registration and strict adherence to it becomes crucially important for Ukraine and other countries in the grey zone. The package of such rules could include, *firstly*, the recognition of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders in Eastern Europe by all countries concerned and non–use of force (in NATO’s area such requirements have already been implemented for about 60 years).

*Secondly*, declaration of the democratic values rule on the whole territory of the grey zone (which is not in any way a ritual, but rather meaningful thing to do since it would allow to preserve the integrity of values on the European territory and common pro–European trend of social development), acceptance of free competitiveness of ideologies and viewpoints regarding states territory and free access to information in particular.

*Thirdly*, non-interference in internal affairs of democratic states that adhere to its practice of fundamental principles of their constitutions and legislation, including external support to subversive organizations and movements as well as implementation of relevant propaganda. It concerns mainly an implementation of Convention on the radio services in favour of peace and conveyance of its principles onto other electronic media, especially television.
Fourthly, the principle of transparency in key markets, including electricity–power market (Energy Charter could become a part of the package or any document on its development). This could also include consideration regarding the creating of a consortium for the development of Ukraine's gas transportation system.

Fifthly, the package could also provide the principles and immediate steps to resolve the territorial problems of the grey zone countries, each holding on to their understanding of solution. Talking about the implementation mechanisms it is worth mentioning unfulfilled Ukraine's initiatives in 2005 regarding the Transnistrian conflict settlement.

Sixth, a consideration should be given to an absolute prohibition regarding establishment and prolongation of foreign military bases on the grey zone territory as well as possible demilitarization of certain territories in the region. Among such areas the Black Sea requires a special attention. The prohibition on military activity in its basin would significantly contribute to strengthening of trust and cooperation among the states in the region.

Seventh, another topic for discussion is joint actions of European states, including those in the grey zone, against unconventional threats and challenges such as cross–border organized crime, illegal migration, drug trafficking, cyberterrorism and so on.

Eighth, an important place in such agreements could be given to joint projects of the U.S., EU, Russia, Ukraine, including the ones in military–technical sphere.

Ninth, to summarise it should be mentioned that the point at issues is about certain re–edition of Helsinki Final Act, but this time not for the whole of Europe which does not need it, but for the states between the EU and NATO/CSTO, transformation of this territory and its states into the field of honest competitiveness for various forces grounded in democratic values recognized by all countries concerned.

Such guarantees could be enshrined by a legally binding document signed by the states of the OSCE, the EU as a separate entity and China. Such an agreement would provide a valid consultation mechanism on the security issues between the grey zone and the Guaranteeing Powers.

Obviously, that the preparation of such a package would take a complicated and multi–round negotiation process which could be initiated organising in Ukraine an international conference of the experts in the filed of international security, experienced state, public and political figures on December 5th 2009 which it the 15th anniversary of the Budapest Memorandum.
In addition to an international conference one of the first steps towards an implementation of this idea could be a development of a permanent consultation mechanism between Ukraine and the Guaranteeing Powers of its security - the U.S., the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, China and France on the basis of the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. Having said so, it does not mean a withdrawal from a Ukraine's strategic course towards European and Euro–Atlantic integration, which has been tested with time, but rather its specific method of implementation in new circumstances.
The end of the Cold War was a historical chance for the European nations to create a secure and united continent. The idea of a “Wider Europe” in the 1990s seemed close to reality. The Helsinki process, which started in the 1970s, laid the foundation for such a Europe, grounded in common values, European identity, indivisibility of security, inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, absence of dividing lines and spheres of influence. In order to build such a foundation for a “Wider Europe”, a special institution, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), was established, which afterwards grew into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The OSCE successfully managed to overcome the confrontation between East and West, which eventually resulted in the end of the Cold War. The OSCE proved to be effective in establishing trust between two ideologically hostile parts of Europe–democratic West and communist East. Mainly, due to the OSCE initiative the military machine with enormous weapon potential – a material basis of the Cold War was successfully dismantled. The OSCE managed to introduce the methods of military trust between countries from the opposing politico–military blocks. After the end of the Cold War the OSCE faced huge new tasks namely: the development of common European security system and Wider Europe which were grounded in shared democratic values.

Thus, the Paris Charter for Europe adopted at the summit in Paris served as the main plan for development of this system. It included the set of shared values which European countries should adhere to in their relations, while there was no confrontation and divisions of spheres of influence between the blocks. This system had to be based on the principle of ‘indivisibility of security’ and dependence of one country's security from the safety of others. Thus, the OSCE managed quite successfully the consequences of the Cold War and prepared the ground for the building of new Europe.

International consequences of “Wider Europe” security project fiasco.
However, the implementation of the "Wider Europe" project appeared to be very different from the initial plan. As it turned out building of this new Europe, both on the West and East edges of large European continent was impossible. The introduction of democratic values in post–Soviet and post–communist countries was stifled by authoritarian consciousness, deep social stratification and the dominant post–communist elites.

As a result of such economic and political transformations the states in this region sank in deep economic downturn and social chaos. Profound disintegrating processes and ethnic conflicts broke out in some of these countries. Post–communist countries found themselves in a security vacuum. Russia suffered from particularly destructive processes in this period. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty was perceived by it as a huge geopolitical defeat. Russians developed a complex of 'loss of country greatness' which reached the edge of breakdown under the influence of these deep–rooted and radical transformational processes. This complex is, in fact, a complex of 'state status' loss, which turned out to be the main value for the Russians, unlike the Western Europe with the democracy as its fundamental value. On the background of a great sense of 'status loss' the Russians started perceiving democracy as alien and hostile to their values. Thus, Russian society felt the need to restore 'country greatness' and authoritarianism. Russia and Europe were once again divided. Fundamental European values of democracy, which had to serve as a foundation for Wider Europe, have not taken root in Russia and in the majority of former Soviet countries. Thus, the project to develop a "Wider Europe" failed.

These circumstances, building a united Europe started through dissemination of Western European values in Central and Eastern Europe in the form of NATO and the EU enlargement, as well as through involving of post-communist countries in joint programs in security, humanitarian and economic development. With regard to the security, a NATO programme “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) appeared to be the most successful. Through this program, the North Atlantic alliance has managed to build a system of partnerships between European countries in the filed of security. In addition, the program has prepared an appropriate ground for Central and Eastern European countries to join NATO. Therefore, NATO acted as the main integrator of the efforts to build a common security system in Europe in the '90s and 2000. NATO enlargement to the East has formed the necessary security and political framework for EU enlargement. The latter served as a model of political and economic integration for Western and Central–Eastern Europe.
So, after the last twenty years of post–bipolar period a new united Europe with shared values, common economic, political and security space came into existence. The other Eastern part of this continent stayed outside this united Europe.

Thus a security vacuum was formed in Europe, which revealed itself as internal instability of the countries located in this part of the continent, through the threats, instability and conflicts. On the other hand, Russia got a chance to establish its dominance in East Europe and to claim it to be its ‘zone of privilege interests’ due to such a division of the European continent into the areas of security and uncertainties, stability and instability. This perspective allowed Moscow to take revenge and to restore its statehood on the former Soviet Union territory and to include it into Eurasia (Russian) civilizational space with authoritarian values.

Therefore, instead of Wider Europe on the European continent the bipolar system of European security on the regional level was formed, being incarnated on the one hand by NATO and the EU, on the other – SCTO and the CIS under the Russian leadership. This trend has intensified while the American leadership got weaker and international relations have undergone transformations from unipolar into multi–polar system.

**European bipolar system of regional security in terms of multi–polarity.**

Ebbing of U.S. role in the world is the main characteristic of such transformation. More and more the U.S. experience a lack of its foreign policy resources in order to implement their global geopolitical interests. The U.S. is losing their allies in the international arena. The Iraq war did not bring the desired success for the United States. Moreover, it destroys international image of this country as a world leader and sole superpower, eroding its economic, military and socio–political potential. In this sense, the war in Iraq destroys U.S. leadership the same way the war in Afghanistan destroyed the Soviet Union as a superpower.

On the other hand, through the easing of U.S. global leadership one can observe the emerging of new centres of power such as China, Russia and the EU. The development of these powers has been accompanied by an increase in their geopolitical ambitions, leading to increased regional confrontation between them. The emergence of these regional centres of power is also a challenge to U.S. global dominance and their unipolar world order. As a result, such global tendency is accompanied by deterioration of the international security climate. Weakening of
transatlantic ties and increasing geopolitical ambitions of the EU is a serious challenge for European security in general and the national security of Ukraine in particular. Weakening of transatlantic ties leads to disability of the North Atlantic Alliance to provide the highest level of security and defence in Europe. This will also undermine the EU security as it has no defence structure and needed resources, and therefore is unable to protect its members. Thus, due to the development of such negative trends in relations between the U.S. and EU, Ukraine will lose the chance join both the EU and NATO.

The emergence of new centres of power will certainly lead to a dramatic struggle between them for spheres of influence, as well as the renewal of old conflicts. This struggle will end with the distribution of spheres of influence in Europe.

Following such international developments, the regional security will undergo great destruction. Threats and challenges to international security in a multipolar world will shift from global to regional level. In fact, the security climate in Europe formed in the post–bipolar period after the Cold War has already suffered from a very substantial erosion.

Military or severe threats will become again the most relevant issue in regional security. This will lead to the restoration of military rivalry and an arms race on the regional level.

Thus, the tendency to multi–polarity causes formation of bipolar regional security system in Europe. What role can European security institutions play in such a bipolar system and what kind of relations can develop between its two parts?

NATO and the EU will belong to European part of it. The existence of NATO allows the U.S. to maintain a presence in Europe. And therefore, U.S. posses considerable resources and strategic advantages over the Eastern, the Eurasian part of the system presented by Russia with its satellites combined in such structures as the CSTO and the CIS.

Russia is interested in such a bipolar system because it allows it to restore itself on this territory outside the united Europe as a great power and one of the world power–centre. Obviously, Russia will seek to renew such a bipolar system of European regional security. What is important for Russia in development of such a system?

First of all, to keep a status quo as one of the two main power–centres in Europe.

Secondly, to hold the right to exclusive possession of the part of Europe not covered by NATO and the EU. In its turn, Russia is ready to recognise relatively similar rights of NATO and the EU in regards to their members, and not to interfere in the
processes occurring inside these organisations in the area of their geo–strategic responsibility.

Thirdly, to achieve a certain balance of power in relations with the opposite part of the system, which would be characterised by strategic parity in order to shift the relations with the West from the asymmetric into symmetric relations plane. The vast majority of Russian President D.Medvedev's points regarding the signing the Treaty on European security was actually dedicated to achieving these goals. In addition to reciting the principles of international security enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, D.Medvedev emphasized the following principles of the future treaty: “not to ensure own security at the expense of others; not to allow actions within military unions that will weaken the unity of shared security space; focus should be placed on military–political issues, because the so-called “hard security” plays a crucial role today; common “rules of the game” for all multilateral institutions, including the European Union, NATO, OSCE, CSTO, CIS; an effective interaction between Russia, NATO and the United States could become the main structure of political unity in Euro–Atlantics”

In fact, it is all about the establishment of common rules of the game for Russia, CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the one side, and the United States, NATO and the EU on the other side. Besides, these rules should be enshrined by a legally binding document. According to the above–quoted abstract this means that countries can not join, for example, the North Atlantic Alliance without Russia’s consent, because such accession could be regarded as a threat to its national security. This means that NATO can not expand, because such an extension may weaken the unity of a common security space. Besides, key issues of European security regarding many European countries are now suggested to be addressed on the level of triumvirate NATO/Russia/United States. This proposal disguises Russia's attempts to raise its international status and to have a decisive influence on all the security processes in Europe as well as to play a key role in problem–solving of European security.

Another intention seen in D.Medvedev's initiative is an effort to put the CSTO and NATO on one level in new the European security system of and to establish equal partnership between them. Thus, through the realisation of this intention Russia gains the opportunity, on the one hand, to balance relations with the West and to achieve institutional parity and, on the other hand, to deeper integrate and mobilise post–Soviet countries around itself. In this case, Russia is entitled to form its part of the bipolar system according to symmetric conditions uniting former Soviet states in the Russian

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1D.Medvedev's speech at Helsinki University, and answers to questions from audience on 20.04.2009. / http://www.ruvek.ru/?page=news&grpID=13&newsID=847
camp, grounded not in the European democratic but Eurasian authoritarian values. Countries which happen to join this camp are denied any opportunity to integrate into the European community.

Moreover, in reaching the rules, which would include non-intervention of NATO and the EU in conflicts with third countries other than their members, Russia gets carte blanche to resolve military conflicts in the post soviet countries, which conduct policy that diverges with Russian interests. In this case, for example, democratic regimes in Georgia and Ukraine would immediately be confronted with the threat of Russian military occupation as happened with Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).

Another important question: ‘what kind of relations would develop between the two parts in the conditions of such regional bipolarity? No doubt that neither the West nor Russia is willing to restore military confrontation. However, the West wants to build relations with Russia grounded in shared values, while Russia wants to build equal relations with the West based on their interests. Obviously, the consensus between the two sides of the bipolarity will depend on whether Europe, especially the EU, is ready to exchange values for the interests of certain leading EU countries, as well as on what is Russia's ultimate goal of its policy in Europe: European security or sphere of influence. It is obvious that today the EU is not ready to barter away democratic values for the selfish interests of some EU countries, and Russia is not ready to change its 'spheres of influence' thinking. In such a situation, reproduction of 'Helsinki+' process, which is also a part of President of Russia D. Medvedev's initiatives, can only be viewed with a high level of conditionality.

What will Russia seek to gain from the 'Helsinki+' process?
1. Respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders in the light of new subjects of international law, including Kosovo as well as Abkhazia and North Ossetia.
2. Adherence to fundamental principles of arms control that would enable NATO and the CSTO to achieve military parity, confidence, moderation and reasonable sufficiency in military development.¹⁵
3. Setting common "rules" in a legally binding document to ensure common security guarantees. Provide the OSCE with decision legally binding status.¹⁶

What is the West interested in regards to 'Helsinki+' process?

¹⁵Medvedev presented to Europe a project proposal on Collective Security Treaty. 08.10.2008 17:55 /http://www.grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.142433.html
¹⁶The same source of info
1. Implementation of Helsinki 'third basket'—shaping new Europe based on democratic values.
2. The principle of openness, partnership, cooperation and free competitiveness among systems, organizations and countries.

Zbigniew Brzezinski in “Foreign Affairs” magazine has written about forming bipolarity in Europe on such principles, suggesting to sign 'an official pact' between NATO and the CSTO. According to his estimation, Moscow has recently shown interest in achieving such an agreement, however NATO, by contrast, showed no inclination to such 'an official pact' as it would mean "military and political symmetry between the two organizations". Brzezinski justifies the importance of signing this Covenant provided there is a provision in it giving the right for non-member countries of either NATO or CSTO to join in any of these organisations.¹⁷

Of course, due to the implementation of these principles the West would have multiple strategic superiority over Russia, that would result in the European Community and Euro–Atlantic system of shared security to be joined by Western Independent States, and in Russia's loss of sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. Thus, Russia may end up as the USSR did as a result the Helsinki process. History might repeat itself. It is no mere chance that the official representative of Russia to NATO Rogozin D. hastened to call Brzezinski's proposal 'nicely wrapped candy' used to remove Russia's objections against the involvement of new NATO members.¹⁸

Obviously, with such different priorities and principles regarding development of new European security, a compromise between the two sides is unlikely. However, it is clear that the only type of relations between the two sides can be built on the principle of relations of peaceful coexistence of two systems with different political structures and different ideological values.

Signing the Treaty between NATO and CSTO on non-aggression and renunciation of the information and propaganda war aimed at discrediting the parties would be an important step in strengthening the stability of relations between the two sides of bipolar system and European security in overall. In this respect, Z. Brzezinski's idea of “Official pact” is grounded in rational thinking. Another important set of questions in regards to the development of such regional bipolarity in Europe is about the future role of NATO, EU, OSCE and the future awaiting for Ukraine in such a European security system.

NATO. It is obvious that with the predominance of hard threats and regional bipolarity, NATO will remain, as in the Cold War, the main pillar of European collective security and defence. In comparison with the unipolar world, when NATO had to respond to global threats, and thus, to assume the functions of the global security structure. In a multipolar world it will be forced to return to the traditional regional responsibility enabling NATO to respond to specific global challenges. However, despite returning to the traditional functions and objectives in such a system of regional bipolarity, NATO will face a new challenge. Tentatively it can be called - a dilemma between global strategy of cooperative security and regional strategy of holding Russia back. Without the implementation of such functions bipolar system of European security will be fragile, unstable and inefficient. Obviously, to fulfil such functions, NATO will be forced to resort to limit their missions, particularly in Afghanistan and to direct its resources into the key and most promising areas.

EU. EU will serve as the second pillar in given system and play the role of second riddle in ensuring security to the European Community. The EU will focus their efforts in the security area on neutralizing the soft threats to European security in close correlation with NATO and cooperation with Russia. Such distribution of duties will enable the EU to save on military expenditure and concentrate its resources on the economic and political modernisation within European community.

OSCE. The role of this organization will be reduced to a mediator between the two sides of bipolar security system and a common regime of arms control.

Ukraine. In a bipolar system of regional security, Ukraine will remain in the grey or “buffer zone”, which is characterized by internal and external instability, an adverse and sometimes dangerous foreign environment. Unable to integrate into the European system, and not wishing to join the Russian bloc, Ukraine will formally remain non-aligned country with a large deficit of its own national security. The perspective of neutrality for the countries in the grey zone, foreseen by D. Medvedev's initiatives, seems unlikely for Ukraine. With the lack of its adequate defense resource base, Russian military presence, powerful external influences and the split of Ukrainian society and political elites, such guarantees of neutrality may be fictitious and only seen as obstacles to NATO.

However, such a fictitious neutrality or non-membership status will not save Ukraine from external interference by Russia into internal affairs in order to re-structure the political system of the country into the Russian system. Thus, in such regional bipolar system, Ukraine has very little chances to maintain its independence and state
sovereignty. However, such bipolar regional security system in Europe would not last long.

**Scenarios of European security system development.**

If even during the Cold War bipolar system lasted for nearly 40 years, it is clear that regional bipolar system will last less than half. Instability and transience of the system will be stipulated by the dynamics of its basic components and by the change of power balance between them. That is why it would be appropriate to regard this regional bipolar system as a transition to homogeneous or heterogeneous system. Depending on the change of the balance of power, one can expect two possible scenarios.

**The first scenario**, where Russia succeeds in developing its geopolitical offensive in Europe and achieves its geopolitical interests for establishing dominance on the European continent. This script can be called a "scenario of the European concert". This phenomenon was typical for European policy in the 18th, 19th and first half of the 20th century, when the development of international relations in Europe was determined by five major powers, including Russia. Other European and non-European states were looked on as policy objects of those leading European countries. Commonality of interests of these states was stipulated by external threats to European security.

However, within Europe the relations between those leading countries were built on the principle of maintaining the balance. Responsibility for maintaining internal European balance relied on large countries, which concluded various interim military-political alliances between themselves. Due to its participation in maintaining a balance, Russia played a key role in solving many problems of European security. Russia is longing to re-gain this role today. Medvedev's initiatives include stories about multi-polarity, multi-ateralism, the mechanism of between Russia/ NATO/EU interaction – a key element of security etc.\(^{19}\)

The security system built on the principles of "European concert" would be the most acceptable for the geopolitical ambitions of Russia and for its transformation into truly influential world power.

The main terms and conditions of Russian in order to build such a European security system are:


2. Liquidation of NATO as a military and political organization.

Russia started building such a system in Europe when Vladimir Putin came to power. The reduction of U.S. influence due to Russia's efforts was supported by such EU countries as Germany and France through their resistance to U.S. policy, stirring up widespread anti-American hysteria both in Russia and abroad; intentions to unite anti-American alliance with countries like China, Iran, as well as India; displacement of the U.S. economic, political and military presence in Central Asia and the former Soviet Union territory. The most successful of Russia's strikes related to U.S. interests can be considered Russia's victory in the war with Georgia, its severe approach to relations with the countries seeking to develop close ties with the United States, Kyrgyzstan's decision under Russian pressure to close U.S. military base in Manas, Russia signing an agreement with Tajikistan on the RF Ministry of Defence military taking control over Hyssar airport including the space observation station.

By displacing the U.S. presence in the former Soviet Union and decreasing Washington's influence in Europe, Russia is trying to build an equal relationship with the U.S. based on a power balance as equals in geopolitical power. Putin believes that terms and conditions for such parity relations with the U.S. would be as follows: the U.S. dispense with deployment in Europe, Ukraine's refusal to join NATO, the acceptance by the U.S. and EU of their mistake supporting 'colors' revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia.

Obviously, for Ukraine such Russian claim in relations to the United States means to give up on the idea of NATO membership, as well as strategic partnership relations between Ukraine and the United States. As for Ukraine in this context of relations with the U.S., Russia's policy is aimed at isolating Ukraine and convincing the U.S. to stop supporting the sovereignty of Ukraine and its democratic development.

The second Russia's strategic offensive towards the West was directed against NATO. Supported by Germany and France, Russia managed to block granting Membership Action Plan to Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucharest summit in April and at the summit of NATO Foreign Ministers in December 2008. Having restored their control over the Caucasus after the Russian-Georgian war, creating a military base in Tajikistan and the CSTO military group in Central Asia, Russia has put at risk the logistical support

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20 Putin is happy that Obama is in no mood for Ukraine. // TCH. ua. 2009, January, 26th, 12:37.
corridor for NATO's mission in Afghanistan. Thus, Russia has got an opportunity to push against the Alliance's weakest point bringing it to the edge of defeat in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to the representative of the Russian Federation to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, in the context of the current official position (Moscow – author) U.S. presence in Afghanistan only contributes to instability in the region.

Russia's third geo–strategic offensive was launched towards the EU. Russia's growing geopolitical ambitions, energy resources, demonstration of military force, occupation of Georgia during the war there in 2008 as well as the intention to deploy missiles in Kaliningrad region against Europe was its main striking force while attacking the European Union. Russian President D.Medvedev has repeatedly demonstrated the willingness to restore Cold War relations with Europe. However, major European powers, especially Germany, France and Italy are not interested in confrontation with Russia. Neither are they interested in military confrontation between Russia and the United States, which could destroy the entire security of Europe (the foundation for the European Union). Therefore, the EU fears renewal of Cold War relations even more than Russia.

On the other hand, the integration concept used by the EU to integrate Russia into Wider Europe has totally collapse. Therefore, the EU no longer requires democratic values from Russia and is ready to recognize Russia's right to determine the fate of post–Soviet countries. Russia's strategy aimed at splitting the European Union has succeeded. Following this strategy Russia prefers bilateral relations with the leading EU countries such as Italy, Germany and France ignoring the interests of other EU countries. Thus, Russian policy towards the EU causes inconsistency of the European countries' policy towards Russia.

Lack of common consolidated position towards Russia makes the EU weak and unable to resist the Russian geopolitical offensive. The manifestation of inconsistencies and uncertainties of EU policy toward Russia is seen through two fundamentally different approaches. According to one of them, Russia is a threat that must be gently restrained. Mainly countries of Central - Eastern European - new EU members - stick to this approach. Meantime the old EU members – Western European countries – regard Russia as a potential partner, willing to integrate it in the European system. Some are

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developing strategic partnerships with Russia, while others are trying to openly oppose its geopolitical offensive in Europe.

However, Russia has lacked adequate resources and international influence in order to implement such a plan of the European security system development. Russia's war against Georgia, the impact of the global financial crisis and the gas conflict, which involved the EU as well as the election of Barack Obama as New U.S. president have consolidated Europe to some extent and made it share the United States attitude. President Dmitry Medvedev could already sense such changes of the West' position during the meeting in Evian in 2008, when French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that "any agreement on security from "Vancouver to Vladivostok" should be based primarily on NATO and invited the Russian President for closer cooperation with already existing institutions and mechanisms such as the Council of Russia-NATO, European Security and Defence Policy of the EU²³.

So, Medvedev's first initiatives aimed to exclude NATO from a new European security system, the new version, as he noted in his interview for the program "News on Saturday," on May 15th, 2009: "New agreement on security in Europe, which Russia has an intention to sign, should not be directed against NATO²⁴.

Thus, now new version of Medvedev's initiative actually seeks to build regional bipolar security system in Europe. However, Russia is again facing the problem of balancing geopolitical ambitions and interests with available resources. Asymmetry of the latter in comparison with the West remains impressive.

The second scenario of the system of European security will be realistic in the case of a substantial reduction of Russia's positions and a change in the balance of power in favor of the West. In this case, the formation of homogeneity of European security will continue. This will be manifested through continuing NATO and the EU enlargement to the East and joining of independent states into the Western system; through erosion of an authoritarian regime in Russia and other former Soviet states. According to this scenario, Russia will be forced to integrate into the European security system based on the principles of cooperative security, convergence of economic and political system of Russia and the European Community.

²⁴Medvedev: Agreement on security in Europe should not be directed against NATO. http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/05/15/640726.ht
The changing notion of Security

The perspectives on “Security” have changed fundamentally in the just 20 years since the fall of the Berlin wall. During the 20th century, and especially during the Cold War the tradition focus on the “State Security” had been central, putting the emphasis on military threats and thus national defence structures with the aim to defend against the armed attacks of adversary states. Therefore security concepts included different layers of national defence, including in the last order also weapons of mass destruction as the ultima ratio.

The end of the Cold War brought a series of ethno-political conflicts (especially in the Balkans and the Post-Soviet space), the spread of international terrorism and the growing danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Security policy changed on the one hand into crisis management, and on the other into internal security deliberations dealing with internationally generated threats. Thus the state-centric perspective remained, but the “wider security concept” added economic, environmental as well as internal security threats to the purely military issues. Through this amendment of the security concept, the concept of state security still prevailed, the responses to this different new threats were policies of the nation-states enhanced through international cooperation. A recent example is the policy of “Global Zero”, meaning the disarmament of all nuclear weapons world-wide. In the new security environment, nuclear weapons are not longer perceived as a means to secure states, but the combination of unsecured nuclear weapons and nuclear material with the aim of terrorist groups to obtain these, nuclear weapons are viewed as threats. The widening of the security concept has begun to change the understanding of this weapons technology characteristic for the 20th century.

However, the states-centric perspective is more and more at odds with the actual security policy of the international community. Especially the different mission of crisis management in the Balkans, East Timor or in Africa could not be legitimated any more with the need to defend the state against threats coming from abroad. The famous
saying by the former German Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, that Germany was to be defended at the Hindu Kush, had been one line of argument to link crisis management and state-building efforts to the state-centric concept of security. But additionally, conflicts and crises all over the world proved, that states would become security threats for their own population or supporters of non-state actors aiming at the destabilization of the international community. The case of Serbia’s policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is but one example for the first problem, whereas Afghanistan harboring Al-Qaida illustrates the latter.

Thus the notion of security changes slowly, as it can be observed in the academic discourses, the different documents of international organizations and NGO’s and also in the national security strategies of different states. The focus of the 21st century deliberation on security turns more and more to the security of people, although the debate on a new concept of security is still ongoing. The term “Human Security”, with all its different implications and interpretations, expresses this new perspective. It aims at concentrating on the “freedom from want and freedom from fear” of people in the context of the so-called “new wars”, which are characterized by political and criminal aggression by regular as well as irregular forces. It thus turns the focus from the norm of “state sovereignty” to the principle of “human rights”. The responses in the context of Human Security are coordinated responses by many actors in the field, states, NGO’s and international organizations. However, the main response is to empower the affected people, as to allow them to develop their capacities to become part of the decision-making process.

Human security means thus protecting vital freedoms of people. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It focuses on building systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. The concepts combines and connects different types of freedoms – freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf. To do this, it offers two general strategies:

1. Protection and Empowerment.

1.1. Protection shields people from dangers. It requires concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities. The protection aspect is at the centre of the deliberations towards a European Human Security Approach to crisis management.8

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7 This section relies mainly on the Report of the Commission on Human Security.
1.2. Empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making. Protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing, and both are required in most situations.

Human security complements state security by being people-centered and addressing insecurities that have not been considered as state security threats. By looking at “downside risks”, it broadens the human development focus beyond “growth with equity”. Respecting human rights are at the core of protecting human security.

One of the expressions of this new security perspective is the legal concept of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), which has been adopted by the UN in 2006 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674). R2P aims at the responsibility of states to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The resolution commits the Security Council to protect civilians in conflicts. The R2P concept is thus the first legal expression of the new security concepts at a global level. It aims at the high end of the Human Security Concept, meaning the protection of people during conflicts. But by codifying the responsibilities of states, and in the end the responsibility of the international community, for the security of people, it marks a first shift towards a possibly more human-oriented security concept of the 21st century.

Introduction

The European Union is a relatively young actor in the field of security policy. During the Cold War, the European had either delegated their security policy to NATO, their system of collective defence together with the US, or were part of the Warsaw pact, the communist adversary of NATO. The European Union, although one of its main raisons d’être is peace, had been focussing on economic integration, which evolved successfully. Only after the Cold war, when Yugoslavia disintegrated in violent wars just before the door of the then European Community, the necessity of a foreign and security policy became clear. But it took another eight years, until the EU gave itself the European Security and Defence Policy, around which most of the current security debates in Europe centre.

The European Union has evolved into a security actor in less than ten years. Since the St. Malo summit in 1998 the EU has established the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) and conducted 23 missions worldwide. Within these years the EU has built an impressive set of institutions in Brussels, including the High Representative, the EU Military Staff and the Civilian Planning and Conduct capability, and others. The Treaty of Lisbon, which finally has been approved by all 27 member states and enters into force on 1 December 2009, will integrate the High Representative into the European Commission and thus enhance the chances of more coherent external action of the EU. It will also introduce the European External Action Service, which will be the backbone of European foreign policy. By these measures, European security policy can be embedded in a more coherent set of foreign policy.

But the analysis of the institutional evolution in Brussels is a one-sided view on European Foreign and Security Policy in the last years. The real outcome of the institutional setting cannot be neglected and an analysis of the actual achievements of Europe in this policy field is rather gloomy. Therefore this article will take a double approach: It will give an overview on the achievements of ESDP in the last ten years, showing on the one hand how the EU has built a foreign and security policy apparatus in Brussels, as well as generated a set of strategic documents, providing a basis for European foreign and security policy. On the other hand, it will focus on the outcome of the EU's security policy and the actual standing of the EU on its way towards being a global actor in security policy. The changing security environment for Europe will be discussed roughly after this assessment of the EU, as to give an overview on the actual debate on the new security challenges and to allow an assessment of what the EU should concentrate on in the coming years to become a real global actor. The article will close with an outlook at the EU's perspectives in this respect after Lisbon and some recommendations especially for the EU's policy towards Russia.

**Overview and achievements over ten years (1999–2009)**

The period beginning with the Franco-British summit in St Malo and the European Council of Cologne (1998–99) has seen major achievements in the establishment of a European security and defence policy, with the necessary civilian and military tools. This included also building up several new institutions to manage these new instruments of the EU. The current institutional framework includes:

2. *firstly*, the General Secretary of the European Council/High Representative (HR), entrusted with implementing the policy of the Member
States; with the Lisbon Treaty in force, the High Representative Lady Catherine Ashton\(^9\) will also be Vice-president of the Commission heading the portfolio of External Relations, including for example such important aspects of the EU's foreign policy as the European Neighbourhood Policy.\(^{10}\)

3. the Political and Security Committee (PSC), at the Ambassadors’ level, main interlocutor of the High Representative for ESDP. The PSC has a key role in shaping the day-to-day CFSP/ESDP decisions taken by the Council, including the strategic direction of operations;

4. the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military authority of the EU; composed by the chiefs of staff of Member States, it functions as military advisor of the High Representative;

5. the European Defence Agency (EDA), set up to work to get defence budgets spent rightly and promote cooperation from the research lab to the front line (Witney 2008).

Such a complex foreign policy apparatus was unthinkable back in the 1990s, let alone during the days of the old Political Cooperation (which produced CFSP).

Secondly, on the strategic level, there has also been impressive development since the inception of ESDP at the 1999 Cologne Summit. The adoption of the European Security Strategy 2003 stands first on the list, as a milestone towards a shared security culture, aimed at addressing the EU’s potential role in the world and the challenges it faces. On just 16 pages the ESS outlines the threats and challenges for the EU in the field of security. It drafts the way the EU should deal with these challenges and vaguely defines the aim of the European security policy: “A secure Europe in a better world.”\(^{11}\) The ESS provides the basis for a “distinctive European approach to security”\(^{12}\), which can best be described in the following: »Europeans rely on a clever mixture of political negotiations, military protection and basic practical help for everyday integration« (Steinmeier 2007: 29).

\(^9\) The former Commissioner of Trade Catherine Ashton has been nominated by the European Council at November 19 as the new High Representative. By the time this paper was finished (a few days later), she had not yet been approved by the European Parliament, although the signal by leaders of the parliamentarian groups were positive.

\(^{10}\) Very briefly, the General Direction of the Council for external affairs (DGE) is composed by the administrative services acting on ESDP; the DG8 is the direction for Defence affairs, the DG9 the one for civilian direction of crises. The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is composed of military personnel detached by Member States to the General Secretariat of the Council. The EUMS responds to the Military Committee and ensures the functions of early warning, situation awareness and strategic planning for ESDP missions. A civilian military cell also helps the EUMS within its missions.


\(^{12}\) The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy
The ESS has been further spelled out by different substrategies of the EU, which deal with Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction respectively. The European Security Strategy has been revised during the French Presidency in the second semester of 2008. The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy further develops the Strategy and includes changes at the level of threats and challenges to the European Union.

Thirdly, EU governments have established benchmarks for making this policy real beyond the mere building of institutions, such as the Helsinki Headline Goals for the military and civilian capacity building. The EU countries do have with these Headline Goals a ‘road map’ of sorts for ESDP capabilities, which, if duly implemented, would enhance Europe’s credibility, by adding the means for implementation to the ambitious strategies. It spells out the requirements member states must fulfil at the civilian and military level to meet the aims set at the European level. Twenty six member states (Denmark is not part of this aspect of European integration and has opted out) increasingly use the European Defence Agency’s criteria in their planning in the field of military procurement and the built-up of civilian capabilities. There is, indeed, greater cooperation and a certain *interlocking of defence systems* in Europe, which is a notable achievement, bearing in mind sensitivities related to state sovereignty.

Finally, the Union has launched a number of missions, most of them of a civilian character. It has also set in motion five military missions so far, sometimes with the help of NATO’s machinery (such as the ongoing EUFOR Althea, in Bosnia), sometimes independently (as with Artemis in 2003, RDC). All of them have largely been of a crisis management and state-building nature. ESDP missions have made the EU a crisis management actor. Moreover, the European Union and its states reacted quickly to crises in which the United States, for various reasons, was unable to play a military role, such as Georgia and Lebanon. Especially the case of Georgia shows the potential of the EU in certain crisis scenarios. The quick reaction by the French presidency in cooperation with the HR, led to a truce between Georgia and Russia, monitored by an ESDP mission, deployed within weeks.

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The achievements can be seen mainly in the institutional framework and on the strategic level. Additionally, the fact that the EU had been able to conduct missions abroad can also be counted as a success of the Union, always taking into account the inability of the Europeans to effectively deal with the crises in former Yugoslavia, which shook the basis of European security during the 90s. The role of the US, also through NATO, had been indispensable in stabilising this region, whilst the EU provided mostly for economic and financial support. Some member states also had military capabilities deployed, as part of their NATO membership. The so-called “hour of Europe” at the beginning of the 90s had been revealing the sad fact, that the EU was non existent in foreign and security policy. This experience generated the political will at the member states’ level and let to the decisions to include the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Treaty of Maastricht 1993 and later the inception of the European Security and Defence Policy 1999.

**Shortcomings**

CFSP and especially ESDP, as of 2009, exist but, as repeatedly underlined by many policy papers, suffer from several, related shortcomings. The shortcomings can be discussed in the following areas:

*Common Foreign and Security Policy*

The Common Foreign and Security Policy is fundamentally coined by the coexistence of a European foreign policy and 27 different member states' foreign policies. The field of external relations has been preserved by most states as an important part of the national sovereignty, which has led to the fact that the European Union can act effectively in cases, where member states do not have specific national interests. Otherwise the “EU” is sending rather mixed messages to its international partners, who not always understand the subtleties of the European Union and the parallel foreign policies of the member states.

This leads, sadly so, to a EU foreign policy in the shadow, dealing with minor issues, or problems, where member states do not have the respective instruments at hand or the EU offers certain advantages compared with a national or NATO-approach. Three examples illustrate this argument:

- *Transatlantic relations:* The relations with the United States can be regarded as the primary reason for European divisions in foreign policy. The best-known example is the Iraq war, where the populations in Europe as well as most political parties agreed in
their assessment of the endeavour in the Gulf. All of them regarded the war against the Saddam Hussein regime as based on vague, or even false, reasons. The connection with international terrorism of Al-Qaida was also regarded with, post factum reasonable, doubts. Nonetheless, 15 governments of the European Union of today\textsuperscript{15} decided to take part in the American coalition of the willing, offering some substantial deployments to Iraq and overtaking important responsibilities in the stabilisation efforts (esp. Poland and the UK). Others were taking part with minor commitments (e.g. Slovakia, Lithuania, and Portugal with not more than 130 troops respectively). They even declared their support for the US in the famous “Letter of eight” just a few days after the Greek presidency of the EU had managed to draft a common declaration of the member states on the Iraq issue.\textsuperscript{16} The EU had been made publicly irrelevant. The eight governments argued that they held true to the alliance with the United States and were therefore supporting them. The letter of the eight was shortly afterwards followed by the so called Vilnius letter, signed by some current member states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and accession countries (Albania, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

This example illustrates bluntly, that for most European countries the US was and is still the most important ally, even before their European partners. A recent study by Nick Witney and Jeremy Shapiro reveals that Europeans still believe that they can gain extra benefits through bilateral relations with the EU, as opposed to a common approach of the EU to Washington. They even found out, that 15 out of 27 member states, perceive their relationship with the US as “special”.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore the potential of the European Union to deal effectively with issues where the US is deeply involved, is very limited due to the reluctance of the Member States to support a EU approach, which could be perceived as opposed to the US. The debate on the Missile Defence System in Poland and the Czech Republic is a more actual example for this distorted relationship. Although it would have presumably affected most of the members of the EU, there was no real debate, let alone a position, on this issue in Brussels. An effective policy towards the Middle East is another example of such an area, where the EU is hampered by this caveat of the member states.

\textbf{Relations with Russia:} What applies to the US, also fits for Russia. The relations with Moscow could therefore judged to be the second reason for European divisions on

\textsuperscript{15} The European Union was then consisted of 15 member states, but the accession of the eight states of Middle-Eastern Europe as well as Cyprus and Malta was already decided upon for January 1, 2004.

\textsuperscript{16} Annex IV of the EU Presidency Conclusions:

\textsuperscript{17} These 15 member states do not coincide with the 15 states that have taken part in the Iraq war.
foreign policy issues. The EU’s relations with Russia have a similar conflict potential to those with the USA. One reason for this is the extremely varying perceptions of Russia among the member states: on the one hand, countries such as Germany, Italy and Greece cultivate good relations with Moscow and would like to intensify cooperation between the EU and Russia, while on the other the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe in particular still regard Russia as the main threat to their security (Edwards 2006: 159).

The replacement of the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was delayed because negotiations on a »Strategic Partnership« between Russia and the EU were long blocked by Poland. At the EU–Russia summit in Khanty-Mansiysk in 2008 both sides agreed to resume negotiations on the Strategic Partnership. It will cover the economy, freedom, internal and external security and justice, as well as science, education and culture (Buhbe 2007: 10). Another reason for problematic relations is Russia’s partly erratic foreign policy which on the one hand supports European efforts to solve international conflicts – as in the case of the Iranian nuclear programme – but on the other hand seeks aggressively to demonstrate its new self-confidence against the interests of Europe or of individual European countries. This was discernible particularly in the negotiations on the status of Kosovo and Moscow’s reaction to the declaration of independence, but it also finds expression in the firm stance towards the American plan for a Missile Defence System together with Poland and the Czech Republic. The policy of maximising its influence, reminiscent of the nineteenth century, was exemplified by the crisis in Georgia (cf. Kagan 2008). Future conflicts between the EU and Russia will also concern dealings with post-Soviet states. The turning off of the gas supply to Ukraine and Belarus in order to secure higher prices, the trade boycott against Georgia and Moscow’s unwillingness to cooperate with initiatives within the framework of European Neighbourhood Policy showed this clearly even in the run up to the Georgian crisis.

Although there is growing awareness that the EU should deal collectively with Russia, as to strengthen its position towards Moscow in such issues as energy security, crisis management or the alleged Russian sphere of interest in the former Soviet space it has proved to be rather difficult for the European member states to agree on a common policy. The Russian policy towards the EU even aggravates this problem, as they deal mostly with the bigger members, leaving smaller states, especially in Middle-Eastern Europe aside. The proposal on a European Security Architecture, made by President Medvedev in June 2008, offers the opportunity to focus more on the security
part of EU-Russia relations and thus strengthen the foreign policy profile of the Union.

- **EU-Africa-Strategy**: Such a profile of the EU can be perceived in the EU-Africa Strategy that has been drafted by the EU Commission together with partners from the EU Council and the African Union. It has been adopted at the EU-Africa Summit in 2007 in Lisbon. The EU-Africa Strategy describes in a comprehensive manner the challenges for EU and AU in Africa, the aims, they pursue with the common strategy and the different means that will be applied to achieve them. It presents a rather thorough picture of what the EU strives for in this region, and how the different instruments at hand will be coordinated. This strategy had been promoted by the then Commissioner for Development Cooperation, Louis Michel, who had been supported actively by some EU governments, while most of the others, were happy to have the EU drafting such a strategy to unite the different efforts in place and coordinate European aid in an effective manner. The existing national interests e.g. by Belgium, the UK or Sweden, were not too strong and could therefore be included quite easily.

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

ESDP also suffers from certain shortcoming:

- ESDP is coined by a fundamental strategic confusion or division on the level of the member states. It remains unclear, why the European Union intervenes in certain scenarios and does not in others. The engagement in Chad, but not in Sudan is but one example of this. The confusion leads to Member States governments half-hearted support to ESDP missions also due to deep scepticism within the European populations towards these engagements. Operation Artemis in Congo, trumpeted as a success by the EU, was criticised in other quarters for its limited scope, in terms of both space and time, making it insufficient to deal with the challenges on the ground. The Balkans on the other hand show the spectre of the EU's abilities to stabilise conflict prone countries or regions, although this is a special case, because the EU uses here the membership perspective as an important incentive for these states to adhere to democracy, human rights and rule of law. And even now, the EU engagement on the Balkans is characterized by incoherence, a lack of coordination of the different EU policies and EU bodies on the ground (Kramer/Dzihic 2009), as well as a fundamental difference on some overarching foreign policy issues, as e.g. the question of the independence of Kosovo, which has been recognised by most of the European member
states, whereas others five states do not regard it as an independent state (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain).

This short assessment reveals, that mostly the reason for European engagement is self-reflective. Reasons for interventions are either the aim to mark the EU as an able global actor or national interest of Member States played though the European level. The outcome on the ground or in the respective regions is regarded as a secondary issue.

- **Capabilities Deployment.** Adequate and timely contributions in terms of troops, resources and civilian staff is indeed one of the ongoing problems of ESDP, as the examples of EUFOR Chad and EUPOL Afghanistan have shown. Especially the latter example has been criticized harshly for its many flaws and especially the inability of the member states to deploy capabilities.\(^{18}\) This has injured the EU’s credibility on the ground.

- **Insufficient progress in the development of capabilities**, both for the civilian and the military pillar. The Helsinki Headline Goals notwithstanding, the EU is still far from able to muster the famous 60,000 combat-ready troops to implement Petersberg tasks: as of 2009, St Malo remains more an aspiration than a reality. However, the EU member states achieved the medium term goal to realise the EU Battle Groups. Since January 2007, 15 of these small military forces of 1500 combat troops have reached full operational capacity. They rotate actively; two of them are thus deployable within 5-10 days.

- Despite the revision of the Headline Goals in order to fulfil the capabilities shortfalls at the 2010 horizon, and the reaffirmation by the French EU Presidency in the second semester of 2008 that the EU should reaffirm this level of ambition, it already seems clear that capabilities shortfalls in 2010 will be similar to the ones noted in 2003. E.g. the EU still has not enough capacities in the crucial strategic areas of airlift and helicopters. However, Member States need to have deployable civilian and military capabilities to meet their shared security needs. But, Europe’s mass armies are still largely unsuitable for that purpose; not only that, but EU countries deploy only a tiny fraction of their total forces for ESDP missions (an estimated 0.3 per cent).

- For the civilian dimension of the EU, a similar problem can be observed. Most importantly, quantity, quality and availability of national civilian contingents to be deployed in civilian ESDP missions remain problematic, especially if one applies the

newly formulated objectives with regard to the scope of ESDP missions. Despite progress in some Member States, there remains considerable room for improvement with regard to setting up national training facilities, as well as establishing and keeping up to date databases of available personnel. The Secretariat has identified particular shortfalls in certain police and rule-of-law categories.\(^{19}\) One must be very clear that the ongoing problems with supplying pre-committed personnel to civilian ESDP mission’s hampers the very approach to crisis management and peace-building the EU aspires to uphold. Institutional reforms, as important as they are, cannot replace the political will, first, to reach a strategic consensus and, second, to make available the necessary personnel. This applies, in particular, to larger civilian ESDP missions, such as EUPOL and EULEX; very small missions, especially, do not represent a real challenge for Member States and cannot be the principal benchmarks for the overall success of ESDP’s civilian dimension.

- Against the background of the current financial and economic crisis, the ability and preparedness of European governments to put more funds in their security capabilities to be deployed within the framework of the EU, will be limited.

- **Weak institutional setting.** The EU has seen its security ambitions skyrocketing without a strong institutional basis and framework for sound decision-making. The system of decentralised inter-state cooperation which now defines ESDP might have been not unreasonable for testing the first stage, but it is now undoubtedly a hurdle if the Union is to move to a more ambitious and effective stage for ESDP. In particular:

  - The so-called **convoy approach** embodied in the unanimity rule is a problem; this will be even more the case in view of the tendency of certain countries to block progress at all EU levels, even if a clear majority is in favour of action.

  - **The current system for the planning and direction of EU missions** ‘is disjointed, unstable and plainly transitional’, (Witney 2008) as reflected by the lack of an EU command and control system through an EU Operational Headquarters (EU-OHQ), or the division between civilian and military planning (against the very comprehensive civil-military approach advocated by the EU).

  - **The lack of funding for ESDP operations** – ESDP is supposed to be part of CFSP, yet it remains excluded from common funding, even if the number of EU missions has gone up. ESDP as a policy cannot dispense with a budget, but its essence remains the principle of ‘costs lie where they fall’, minor advances such as the Althea mechanism notwithstanding. It is no surprise that, in practice, few states are

inclined to commit resources for missions, particularly in a context of financial crisis.

- The lack of a watchdog authority, supervising performance and compliance with objectives. New catalogues and voluntary benchmarks are provided, without completely meeting those agreed in the first place. Though the EDA sees its role enhanced under Lisbon, the current system does not provide incentives for Member States to meet their commitments.

The Security Environment of the European Union

During the ten years of building ESDP, the security environment of the EU has further changed. Since the end of the Cold War, security threats for the members of the EU stem not anymore from armies of other states threatening to wage a war against them. The probabilities for an interstate war in Europe have decreased, although the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 has reminded us, that this remains a threat at the margins of Europe. However, threats and risks for the EU origin mostly from non-state actors and failing or failed states. As the Balkan wars have shown, civil wars close to Europe with massive human rights violations cause regional instability, as well as the spread of organised crime and migration. In relation with the emergence of non-state–actors in the field of international relations – terrorist groups, organised criminal groups, as well as civil-society NGO’s and many more – the picture of security policy has become more and more complicated. There are no clear cleavages any more, threats and risks have become blurry and difficult to challenge.

Europe has been affected by these new security risks in manifold matters. The new wars (M. Kaldor) in the Balkans have had a major impact on Europe, through the spread of organised crime due to state failure in the region. The EU and its member states are part of the Afghanistan mission, where the fight against terrorism and insurgency in combination with a state-building effort, illustrates the challenges for the toolkit dealing with this kind of crises. Europe has also been target of Islamic terrorism, causing many victims in the attacks in Madrid 2004 and London 2005.

This changing environment is reflected in the European Security Strategy, where WMD proliferation, terrorism, state failure, regional conflicts and organised crime are named as key threats for the Union. Therefore the toolkit of European security policy has been and is still being adapted to these threats, combining civil and military instruments.
Perspectives of a European foreign and security policy after Lisbon

The Lisbon Treaty, which enters these days into force, will help to overcome some of the institutional shortcomings of European Foreign Policy. Its provisions of Permanent Structured Cooperation as well as Enhanced Cooperation allow for the willing and able member states to proceed within the framework of the Union, by forming pioneer groups to build certain capabilities. But the Lisbon Treaty can not overcome the crucial problem of the European Foreign and Security Policy: political will of the member states to support the European Union with capabilities but also with political capital. As long as the national governments pursue their idiosyncratic foreign policies, the EU will remain a second-rank foreign policy actor. This would lead in the longer term to the diminishment of European influence on global issues, as the member states of the EU become lose more and more of their abilities to shape effectively international relations. This includes also the bigger member states, who – in comparison with China, Russia, India or Brazil - will loose clout. The relations with Russia can serve as an illustration for the chances and risks for a European foreign policy:

The proposal of a European Security Architecture brought forward by the Russian president Medvedev is an interesting approach towards a common effort to enhance security in the broader Euroatlantic region – from Vancouver to Vladivostok. However, Europe needs to find a common approach to this proposal, reflecting its foreign policy priorities as well as the interests of the Union and its member states. Thus, a process leading to such a Common Position is necessary, where the differing views of the members can be discussed. The aim of the EU to establish “effective multilateralism” must be reflected also in the European response to Medvedev. Europe should therefore link this debate to the current revision of the NATO Strategci Concept, which will define aims and means of the Alliance in the next years. Europe should also consult closely with the states mostly affected by such a European Security Architecture: the countries between Europe and Russia. These former Soviet states are in the Russian sphere of interests and Europe needs to represent their perspectives and to emphasise the fact that in a functioning European Security Architecture there cannot be any spheres of interests. The negotiations this proposal should therefore be more in the sense of Helsinki 1974 than of Yalta or Potsdam during and after World War II.

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