THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT IN GREATER KAMPALA

MOVERS, SPOILERS AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

Tom Goodfellow & Paul Isolo Mukwaya
March 2021
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FOREWORD

For many citizens of Greater Kampala the journey to work has become a daily nightmare. Roads are continuously clogged, taxi routes have been concocted haphazardly, buses are rarely to be seen, and there is your love-hate relationship with boda bodas: you love them when they miraculously take you on the back seat through the messiest of congestions to still get to work in time; you hate them when you are using any other form of transport.

That is because, like other African cities, (Greater) Kampala has been ill designed for the onslaught of rapid urbanization. Its colonial structures, its geographic features and its uneven growth have in the past stifled many reform projects. This study is the humble attempt to pinpoint the reasons for those failures by looking at the movers and spoilers in the technical, institutional and political struggle to improve urban mobility.

Grand masterplans and super-imposed blueprints abound, Kampala and its surrounding populous districts are still operating within an inadequate and poorly managed system of urban transport. So far, most of the reforms to introduce ambitious schemes for Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) have ended in some drawer because they left out the grown structures of the informal transport sector. And most efforts to improve the informal transit service were equally unsuccessful since they did neither understand the various interests nor the underlying system behind the seeming “mess” of this largely informal sector. Again, this is what this study is trying to do by describing those interests and the dynamics of their interplay.

The results of this study will provide the stakeholders and FES with a better understanding of the transport sector in Greater Kampala to ultimately match the regulatory ambitions of political institutions with the needs and livelihoods of informal sector workers. We compliment the authors Tom Goodfellow at Sheffield University and Paul Isolo Mukwaya at Makerere University for delivering such a succinct and useful analysis of a field so difficult to research and study.

FES has commissioned “The Political Economy of Public Transport in Greater Kampala” as part of our regional “Just City” program which looks at urbanization dynamics in half a dozen African cities. The objective of the program is to promote urban social justice and equal distribution of opportunities for social mobility in sustainable cities.

The management of this urbanization, which will have the majority of Africans living in cities by 2040, will be a decisive factor in shaping the future of the continent. And successful strategies for urban mobility improvement will be one precondition for Kampala and other African cities to become habitable, justly and efficiently administered urban environments driving the economic and social progress of the continent.

Rolf Paasch
Resident Representative
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Uganda
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<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>ATGWU</td>
<td>Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union</td>
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<td>BRT</td>
<td>Bus Rapid Transit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
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<td>CIG</td>
<td>Cities and Infrastructure for Growth</td>
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<td>CONSENT</td>
<td>Consumer Education Trust</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
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<td>GKMA</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
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<td>UTRADA</td>
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STUDY TEAM AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was co-authored by Tom Goodfellow and Paul Isolo Mukwaya, and was supported by additional research from Enock Jumba and Moses Musiitwa. We are also grateful to FES-Uganda for funding the study and assisting us in establishing contact with a number of key stakeholders, as well as to John Mark Mwanika of ATGWU for his specialist input and comments. We are also very grateful for all the respondents who generously gave up their time to be interviewed for this study. All errors are of course our own.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction
Kampala and surrounding municipalities are struggling under the strain of gridlocked traffic, rising traffic fatalities, and recurrent political conflicts over the future direction of urban public transport. This has led to a growing transport and mobility crisis within the city and its expansive metropolitan area, worsened by the fact that there is no functional metropolitan governance arrangement to manage the transport system at the scale required. In the context of current efforts to develop a governance framework for the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area (GKMA), this report offers an analysis of the interacting challenges relevant to the reform of public transport in the GKMA.

The report brings together the perspectives of a wide range of stakeholders to document the main ‘movers’ in the contemporary urban public transport scene in the GKMA, and highlights fifteen specific challenges, framed as ‘spoilers’ to the progress of effective and inclusive transport reform. It situates this analysis against the historical evolution of public transport in Kampala from colonial times to the present day. This helps to contextualise the political economy analysis in the report, tracing how vested interests and the relationships between key stakeholders have evolved over time.

Historical background
Although parts of Kampala predate colonialism, much of the city is colonial in origin and transport planning in the city owes much to colonial legacies. Since it evolved as a ‘dual city’ in which the colonially planned area and the existing Buganda Kingdom capital (kibuga) were treated separately, urban planning and transport infrastructure were highly uneven. Despite this, passenger transport in the form of taxis had emerged by the 1920s. Buses were introduced in the 1930s, and new laws were passed to limit competition from taxis. However, taxis continued to proliferate in areas where it was difficult for bus services to operate. By the time of Independence in the 1960s, vehicle ownership was rapidly increasing and the city had expanded beyond its municipal boundaries. Buses continued to be prioritised, with the Uganda Transport Company (UTC) holding a monopoly over bus service provision.

During the turmoil of Idi Amin’s rule and the civil war of the 1980s, UTC services largely collapsed and private operators entered the market, along with small scale ‘paratransit’ in the form of minibus taxis (often also just referred to as ‘taxis’). After the commencement of the NRM era, the liberalisation of the sector, alongside rapid urban growth, turbo-charged these trends and particularly the role of taxis. These largely operated in a regulatory vacuum, though from the mid-1980s they were organised through a powerful association, the Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA). Many attempts to revive large buses in Kampala in the 1990s and 2000s failed, in part due to competition and resistance from the taxi sector and UTODA. Meanwhile, the motorcycle-taxi (boda-boda) sector started to grow in significance from the 1990s and 2000s. This was partly a response to the increased road traffic, since boda-bodas offer unparalleled agility in heavy traffic, and growing numbers of male urban youth turned to boda-boda service provision as a livelihood. Although Kampala City Council (KCC) made efforts to impose greater regulation on both taxis and boda-bodas, weak capacity and political interference rendered these efforts futile.
As a consequence of these developments and the resulting congestion, recent efforts have focused on attempts to re-introduce large buses and limit the presence of taxis and boda-bodas on specific routes. The replacement of KCC with the better-resourced Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) in 2011, which was also more politically aligned to central government, was intended to increase the capacity to manage transport in the city. However, new political conflicts arose and the transport challenges by this time also extended far beyond the city’s boundaries, necessitating increased attention on the wider metropolitan area if transport reforms are to have any impact.

‘Movers’ in public transport
Key ‘movers’ in the sector can be broken into five major categories: government agencies, private companies, taxi and boda-boda associations, international development partners, and NGOs and think tanks, including those supported by academia. Key national government agencies include the Ministry of Works and Transport, the Ministry of Kampala Capital City and Metropolitan Affairs, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, the Ministry of Local Government, and the National Planning Authority, as well as a range of other agencies with limited, specific roles to play. More locally, the KCCA is by far the most significant actor, but the role of the surrounding Wakiso District and its several constituent municipalities is also very important. Alongside these various government players are important institutional processes and associated documents, including National Development Plans, the National Transport Master Plan and the Multi-Modal Urban Transport Master Plan for Kampala.

In the private sector there are a small number of bus companies, the most significant within Kampala being Pioneer Easy Bus and Awakula Ennume (which evolved out of UTODA), as well as the planned Tondeka Metro Bus scheme. Pioneer was the first company since the UTC days to try and introduce large numbers of buses, but encountered numerous difficulties and its fleet rapidly shrank. Tondeka promises a major transformation of bus transport, but the scheme is widely viewed with scepticism despite apparently having political backing. Also of growing significance are several small eco-bus projects, and ride-hailing companies in the boda-boda sector (most notably SafeBoda).

By far the most significant forms of public transport in the GKMA are minibus-taxis and boda-bodas, and the associations through which they are organised constitute further key ‘players’. Many (though certainly not all) of these associations are now affiliated with ATGWU. Both taxis and boda-bodas operate through a highly organised system of stages, with stage-level committees and Savings and Credit Co-operatives (SACCOs) playing a key role. In the taxi sector, UTODA dominated the scene until 2012, after which a range of new organisations emerged, the most significant being KOTSA and UTRADA. The boda-boda sector never formed an organisation equivalent to UTODA and has always been more fragmented, though for a period of time a highly-politicised organisation called Boda Boda 2010 achieved a relatively high level of membership and control (often violently enforced). Today, the most significant association is KAMBE, which is affiliated with ATGWU.

The other two categories of ‘movers’ are international donors, and NGOs, think tanks and academia. Particularly significant donors include the World Bank, AfDB, the European Union, JICA, AFD and DFID/FCDO. Initiatives currently being supported by these partners include the planned BRT network (first proposed in 2010, with a World Bank feasibility study following in 2013), an expansion of the railway
system (a priority for the EU), and strategic efforts to integrate paratransit (taxis and boda-bodas) into plans for BRT and other mass transit. Various political, financial and technical obstacles have delayed some donor initiatives. The attempt to integrate existing paratransit into future plans is particularly important if any major transport reforms are to be inclusive and sustainable.

Transport reform ‘spoilers’

We identify fifteen ‘spoilers’ which threaten current reform efforts. The above players are implicated in different ways in these challenges and will have to work together in concert to overcome them if major transport reforms are to succeed. These include:

- **Inter-ministerial/agency disputes**, particularly between ministries competing to host any new GKMA Authority, and between KCCA and certain ministries such as MoWT

- **Inter-jurisdictional disputes**, particularly between KCCA and the (much weaker) surrounding districts and municipalities, including in relation to unresolved questions of revenue sharing

- **Limited support from the Presidency and Ministry of Finance** is thought to be central to the stalling of plans for BRT and a general failure to get large initiatives off the ground

- **An absence of identifiable ‘champions’** within key ministries and the political sphere more broadly, reflecting the lack of commitment from the executive and its knock-on effects

- **Delays in establishing the GKMA Authority and Metropolitan Area Transport Authority** due in part to the disputes above, and to other technical/legal issues impeding metropolitan governance

- **Uncoordinated planning and institutional silos**, generated both by donors’ ‘pet projects’ and a lack of coordination among government agencies, some of which prioritise different modes of transport rather than integrated approaches to transport needs

- **Financial and budgetary challenges** including questions of revenue generation/sharing and donor reluctance to disburse funds until institutional and political issues are addressed

- **Opportunism and lack of experience in the private sector**, evident particularly in the experience of Pioneer Easy Bus and some of the proposals of the Tondeka scheme

- **Failure to adequately incorporate the informal sector into transport plans** - a critical ongoing issue, given the huge numbers of people who might be displaced from paratransit, though there are now important moves to address this (supported by French aid)

- **The debate on the value and constitution of an ‘apex body’ in the paratransit sector**, an issue that could be very important for ensuring that drivers are adequately represented

- **Fragmentation and politicisation of informal sector organisations**: different organisations continue to proliferate, and the potential for political interference and conflict is high

- **Land acquisition and resettlement plans for BRT**: the cost of land acquisition for BRT and fair processes of expropriation are an important concern, especially given the prevalence of private land ownership in the GKMA and complex patterns of ownership and land use rights
· **Creating a fair and effective process for route allocation**, which will be essential if new planned bus services are to be profitable and paratransit to be effectively incorporated

· **Regulatory capture and conflicts of interest**, whereby regulators’ roles are compromised, are potential obstacles to an effective and fair system of routes and rights of way

· **COVID-19-related challenges and associated lockdown measures**, which have highlighted the devastating effect on livelihoods when transport operations are shut down or restricted.

**Conclusions and recommendations**

Three clusters of key challenges need addressing for transport reforms in the GKMA to be effective, transformative and sustainable. The first concerns securing sustained commitment from the highest levels of government, so that committed stakeholders can pursue a consistent path over time without severe political disruption. A second cluster of issues relates to inter-governmental co-ordination: the relative roles of MKMA, MoWT and KCCA need to be further clarified. So, too, do the relationships between KCCA and the surrounding districts and municipalities, particularly concerning questions of revenue sharing. A third key set of issues relates to the inclusion of existing transport workers and to the nature of multi-stakeholder engagement- including what role an ‘apex body’ might be assigned in the urban public transport sector, and how this should be organised.

To address these concerns, we recommend that the question of which government agency leads on metropolitan transport is urgently clarified; that a model for transport revenue sharing between municipalities be developed as a matter of priority, through inclusive stakeholder dialogue; that concerned stakeholders work in concert with the media to raise the profile of public transport reform agendas; that the boda-boda sector be brought into current multi-stakeholder dialogues as soon as possible; that any efforts to build an ‘apex body’ are constructed from the ground up; and that environmental sustainability, safety and gender equity concerns are thoroughly incorporated into reform agendas.
People, cars, Pioneer buses and boda-bodas all wait together in a traffic jam on Jinja Road in Kampala.
1.0 INTRODUCTION

Background to the study
This study was commissioned by FES-Uganda as part of their series of political economy studies of key sectors in Uganda. It also aims to contribute to their ongoing work in generating a more supportive environment for public transport workers in Uganda, and specifically in the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area (GKMA). The subject of this study speaks to government agendas concerning urban transport reform, to the interests of key stakeholders within the transport sector and to the concerns of the general public in the GKMA. KCCA’s own social media campaign demonstrated that traffic and congestion is by far the most significant issue that city-dwellers are concerned with when it comes to everyday urban problems.

Each day 24,000 person-hours are believed to be lost by commuters in Kampala due to traffic jams (World Bank, 2017). Thousands of lives are also lost each year on the roads of the GKMA, with the role of motorcycles in road traffic accidents steadily increasing and a steep increase observed in the proportion of road accident patients present in hospital casualty ward populations (Vaca et al 2020). Despite several decades of reform efforts and many attempts to modernise the urban public transport sector, a series of major (and often recurring) obstacles has impeded this agenda. It is by now clear that the challenges to a sustainable and inclusive transformation of the sector are formidable—however, improving public transport in the city is not an agenda that can be abandoned or marginalised.

The transport landscape in Kampala is not the product of a grand masterplan or a design framework, but of thousands of decisions made by individuals, organisations and government agencies over many decades, right back to the colonial era. Motorisation advanced at a breath-taking pace in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as households acquired automobiles, minibuses came to dominate public transport and motorcycles proliferated exponentially. The result is that Kampala City and the surrounding municipalities are struggling under the strain of grid-locked traffic saturation. This has led to a growing sense of transport and mobility crisis within the city and, increasingly, its expansive metropolitan area, worsened by the fact there is no functional metropolitan governance arrangement to manage the transport system at the scale required.

While a large number of very useful studies and reports have been produced in recent years by NGOs, academics and donor-funded consultants, these mostly address specific issues around transport planning, policy review, working conditions, or the nature of unionisation in transport and related sectors. There remains a need for a study that documents the overall range of interacting challenges affecting current efforts to introduce reforms to public transport—particularly in terms of plans to introduce forms of mass transit—and brings together the perspectives of a wide range of different stakeholders. This is even more important given the unfinished project of establishing a metropolitan governance authority for the GKMA, and the new range of challenges that have unfolded in 2020. This report aims to address this gap by examining the political economy of urban public transport in the GKMA and highlighting a series of specific ongoing challenges, framed here as ‘spoilers’ to the progress of effective and inclusive transport reform.

1 Interview, 19 November 2020.
Study methodology

The overarching aim of this study is to identify the various actors, institutions and organisations that constitute the main ‘movers’ and ‘spoilers’ in the urban public transport sector in the GKMA, and to analyse their inter-relationships and the motivations, incentives and constraints affecting them. It offers an analysis of the organisational mechanisms and strategies adopted by key actors and agencies, the impacts of these on the functioning of the urban public transport sector, and prospects for reform.

The study pursued two primary methods: a) a review of documentary sources including relevant academic literature, grey literature and media sources; and b) semi-structured interviews with individuals and groups of key stakeholders. The academic literature review was limited to key texts on the public transport system in Uganda (particularly Kampala) and its evolution over time. The review of grey literature focused on i) key government planning and policy documents and ii) NGO, international donor and consultancy reports on the urban public transport sector. This was complemented by analysis of media coverage of key developments in the sector.

For the interviews, we conducted 32 semi-structured interviews encompassing members of the taxi\(^2\) and motorcycle-taxi (boda-boda) sector and their representative organisations, major bus companies, civil society organisations and think tanks, local authority officials, bureaucrats from key national government ministries, politicians, international donor representatives, consulting firms involved in transport studies and reform initiatives, and academic researchers. Most interviews were conducted individually, though some of the interviews with taxi and boda-boda drivers took the form of focus group discussions. The majority of interviews were conducted online, though some involved face-to-face discussions, subject to local guidelines in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Interviews ranged in length from around 20 minutes to 3 hours, with the average length being around 45-60 minutes.

This study broadly adopts a political economy approach to the analysis of urban public transport in the GKMA. Broadly speaking, this means interrogating the relationship between political and economic processes in a given context, and the institutions that support a particular distribution of power and resources. To conduct a Political Economy Analysis (PEA) of a specific sector involves paying attention to how reform efforts and agendas create winners and losers, and the ways in which existing vested interests generate obstacles to reform either through active mobilisation or more passive forms of resisting change. This involves both situating the economic sector in question firmly in its historical context, in order to trace how vested interests and political conflicts have arisen historically, and mapping the key stakeholders and how their relationships to one another have evolved over time.

Conducting a PEA requires attention to be paid to the formal institutional and organisational structures in the sector in question, but also to the informal relationships that shape the way governance of the sector evolves in reality, and the processes of bargaining, negotiation, conflict and collusion that often frustrate reform efforts. PEA has become an increasingly mainstream approach among international development agencies and their governmental and non-governmental partners over the past two decades, in their pursuit of more effective and sustainable reform strategies.

\(^2\) Please note that in this report the term ‘taxi’ always refers to minibus taxis (sometimes also known by the Kenyan term ‘matatu’), unless otherwise specified.
However, it is important that donors and other international actors- which bring their own interests, incentives and constraints- are themselves made subject to PEA, and this forms part of the approach adopted here. The intention of PEA is to help in identifying which policy strategies are most likely to actually succeed in addressing persistent challenges, and to provide a basis for considering any perverse or unintended outcomes that might arise from reforms due to the ways in which they interact with the political economic context. For more information on the use of PEA to support policy reform, see Fritz et al. (2009); Duncan and Williams (2012); ESID (2014).
The Old Taxi Park of the 1970s in Kampala City.
2.0 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT IN THE GKMA

Although parts of Kampala were the site of the capital (kibuga) of the Buganda Kingdom long before colonialism, much of the city is colonial in origin and the history of planning for transportation in Kampala owes much to colonial legacies. We can cluster the evolution of the city’s transportation system into three distinct phases: i) the phase of colonial-era town and country planning, particularly from 1903- 1962; ii) the phase of structure and master planning from Independence to the 1980s, including the collapse of public transport from the early 1970s; and iii) the period of deregulation, rapid increase in motorisation and marginalisation of planning from the 1990s to date.

2.1 Town & Country Planning in the Colonial Era

When Uganda became a British Protectorate in 1894, it had only rudimentary systems of transport (Jorgensen 1981). In the pre-colonial period, people used to move very long distances on foot. There were no established and distributed roads although Buganda, where Kampala City is situated, had a more developed road network than the rest of Uganda. The extent to which planning systems addressed transport development paths in the city can be understood with reference to the urban planning schemes that characterised early planning efforts in Uganda.

The Uganda Township Ordinance 1903

The 1903 Uganda Township Ordinance provided the first legal framework for directing orderly urban growth and empowered the Governor to declare any place in the protectorate to be a township, to define the boundaries of towns, to make rules and to levy rates (Southall and Gutkind, 1957 and UN-Habitat, 2007). Kampala was gazetted as a Township in 1906, administered and financed by the Protectorate Government (Southall and Gutkind, 1957). The diameter of the city at that time did not exceed a distance that could be traversed by foot, and street patterns and road dimensions were mainly appropriate for pedestrian movements, as well as for the rickshaws used by colonial administrators. Because of the small urban area, African residential areas were also within walking distance of the main centre of Kampala. The first motor car was introduced to Uganda in 1908 (Pirie, 2011), and soon there was ‘a respectable mileage’ of roads for wheeled transport, including cycling (Pirie, 2011; Hattersley 1968). However, due to the ‘dualism’ of Kampala- with part of the city colonially planned but much of it left to the Buganda Kingdom authorities- infrastructure was very uneven. Weeks (1962) reports that upon reaching the Kibuga, pavements ended, street lighting ceased and roads were dusty during the dry weather.

Transport and early colonial urban planning schemes

In 1912 a town planning committee was established by the colonial government to prepare the first modern urban planning scheme for Kampala, an area of 56.7 square kilometres with a population of about 2,850 people. This scheme did not last, however, as unplanned growth rapidly outpaced it (Muwonge, 1977). A further plan in 1919 continued to focus exclusively on the European and Asian communities,
ignoring the growing number of urban Africans and entrenching ethnic spatial segregation (Southall and Gutkind, 1957; Muwonge, 1977 and Okpala, 2009). Meanwhile, Kampala grew to the extent where it was no longer optimal to travel everywhere on foot. As Ugandans became integrated into the cash economy, the demand for vehicles increased and by 1919, lorries and small cars were already being used, which in turn stimulated the emergence of the taxi business. The population in the south formed a viable market for passenger transporters and as a result African participation in the taxi business grew steadily (Osborne, 1937 and Nsereko, 1994).

By 1929, Kampala had expanded rapidly and with such minimal planning that it necessitated a more comprehensive town plan, which was developed in 1930. This introduced separate land use by zoning areas into residential, commercial and industrial zones for the first time. Although the plan was again overtaken by rapid population and economic growth (Kiggundu, 2012), it was significant in that it led to the creation of the Transport Licensing Board (TLB) in 1936, with powers to control and advise the government on how best to improve passenger transport in Uganda. On the advice of the TLB, the colonial government adopted a conventional passenger transport system based on buses.

In order to ensure that bus transport was profitable the operation of small vehicles for public transportation was made illegal (Nsereko, 1994) but this created a number of problems. First, the buses were given a large area to service, leading to gaps in supply. Furthermore, the TLB set high standards for the buses that could be used and, apart from being expensive, they could only be acquired from Britain (Morland, 1953). Meanwhile, zoning ordinances further relegated Africans to the housing estates of Naguru, Nakawa and later Kiswa (Ssebana, 2004), or to areas at the edge of town or in the neighbouring Kibuga Township (Gutschow, 2009), which increased the distances that had to be travelled. Nsereko (1994) reports that by 1930 many Africans were acquiring vehicles from Asians through hire purchase and their participation in the transport industry grew steadily.

The colonial government then attempted to organise the whole transport industry, including eliminating unregulated competition, controlling entry, determining route coverage, producing timetables and clear fare structures, and determining minimum standards of vehicle design and construction. The Road Accidents Committee Report of 1936 proposed the reduction of the number of passenger service vehicles operating on the main routes, and suggested that the country’s requirements could be adequately met by a small number of buses run on organised lines (Road Accidents Committee Report, Entebbe, In: Nsereko, 1994).

**Transport and late colonial urban planning schemes**

An urban expansion scheme was developed in 1947 by Ernst May, originally only for the Kololo-Naguru area and the Nakawa settlement for itinerant labour, but with a view to planning for a far larger area of Greater Kampala (Munger, 1951). By conceptually organising the city and its extension into nine separate, mixed-use communities, May drew on Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City concept as well as zoning techniques advocated by Le Corbusier (Gutschow, 2009). Kololo was set aside for European and Asian inhabitants and Naguru strictly for Africans (Gutschow, 2009). This plan had several important transport implications, not least that the proposed decentralisation of activities and creation of satellite cities created new travel demands. Very few Africans lived within the municipal area, houses were scattered and even the roads that connected these areas were too narrow to allow effective
bus services (Nsereko, 1994). This allowed for the proliferation of the taxi business which was more capable of effectively operating on such roads.

A major re-planning of Kampala was undertaken from 1949, resulting in the 1951 Town and Country Planning Act (sometimes referred to as the Kampala Outline Scheme). The Act established procedures for making plans and laid out the necessary content of planning schemes, as well as defining the duties and powers of various organs of government in urban planning matters. It was inherited by the Ugandan government at Independence and amended in 1964, continuing to exert influence on postcolonial planning. The Outline Scheme covered only 28 square kilometres (17.5 miles) of the old Kampala planning area, and designated the city for a population of 100,000 (Lindsay, 1955 and Omolo-Okalebo, 2011). Because the city continued to be racially segregated, a great majority of the working population commuted each weekday along primary roads to places of employment in or near the city centre (Munger 1951). At this time most Africans still travelled primarily by bicycle or on foot.

Bus transport continued to be accorded priority, and to limit the functioning of taxis, the Traffic and Road Safety Act (1951) made it illegal for small vehicles to make repeated trips on the same road with more than three people in a car. Nevertheless, by 1962 motorisation had increased substantially among Africans as more people acquired vehicles. In recognition of this, the government promoted cleaner, wider streets and more dispersed development in the city. Meanwhile, the growing but informally-settled population of the Kibuga district encircled the eastern side of Kampala outside of the 1951 Kampala Planning Area. This upset the balance of the systems of transportation.

The ongoing conflict between private taxi operators and bus companies generated debate as to whether the taxi business should be legalised. The 1951 Traffic and Road Safety Act further maintained a bias towards bus transport, allowing the Uganda Transport Company to operate as a franchise in several areas in Kampala. However, it also legalised the operations of taxis but imposed restrictions on their operational radius. The Act introduced classes ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ in the licensing system, which determined the radius of the city centre within which different transport providers were licensed to operate (Nsereko, 1994).

2.2 Planning from the 1960s-1980s and the collapse of urban public transport


The UN Kampala-Mengo Regional Planning Mission (1964-66)
Following political independence, some planning provisions embodied in the 1951 Planning Scheme were adapted. The Kampala-Mengo Urban Planning Mission was concerned more with the regional setting of Kampala within Uganda. Issues of urban land use were raised in the context of projecting future patterns, rather than describing the present (Omolo-Okalebo, 2010). It was felt that there was
a need to initiate regional planning for the Greater Kampala area: to stretch westwards about halfway to Mityana, northwards about 35 miles (56 kilometres), eastwards to include Lugazi, and southwards to Lake Victoria.

The planning mission’s recommendations for transport included advocating for an open-ended expansion of the present CBD, segregation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and a radical traffic plan to cater for all forms of transport to avoid the acute traffic congestion which was predicted to arise by the end of the decade (Litherland, 1966; Hather 1974). By 1967, the total vehicle population of Uganda was over 40,000 and the vehicle population was increasing at an average rate of 8 percent per annum. To conserve foreign exchange, the Uganda government restricted import licenses for vehicles. Uganda Motors Limited was established to import and sell all types of motor vehicles, though private traders or dealers were also allowed to import with the permission of the company (GATT, 1975). Meanwhile, the plan was to continue providing passenger transport by bus for many years ahead, with the intention that train services would later become feasible (Omolo-Okalebo, 2011).

**The UN Physical Planning Mission 1967**

In 1967 the UN Physical Planning Mission was recruited with the objective of extending the work of the 1964/66 UN Mission. It focused particularly on future growth, employment, land use requirements and the need for a master plan for Kampala. The mission recognised that the city had begun to spread outside of its boundaries with rapid residential development in suburban areas. Towards the end of 1968, Kampala City Council prepared a Transport Plan for the Kampala Area up to the year 2000, to accommodate the new areas. This extended over 24 hills with an area coverage of approximately 195 sq. Km. It was anticipated that by 2000 there would be 1.3 million people with 140,000 motor vehicles in the country. This plan was the first example of a comprehensive transport strategy for Kampala City to be implemented through predicting traffic levels and by identifying congestion points on the road network.

**The 1972 Development and Structure Plan**

The 1972 plan was prepared to comprehensively respond to cumulative planning and transport challenges. Kampala was divided up into five geographical zones: Central, Western, Southern, Northern and Eastern. Each zone was divided into districts and each district into sectors, linked to particular kinds of land use (Ssebana, 2004 and Kiggundu, 2012). It was envisaged that this would ensure that people living in one area could acquire the majority of their requirements within their zone. In terms of transport, the plan proposed that express buses would operate on primary distributors, with some routes operating non-stop during peak hours and more frequent stops during off-peak hours. For shorter journeys, local buses would be provided with stops every 400-800 meters. These would operate mainly on local distributor roads. Specially-reserved bus lanes would be provided at the busiest points, especially in and around the city centre.

The 1972 plan recognised that most activities largely concentrated in the CBD, from which the main roads radiated. That spatial arrangement was seen as being incapable of accommodating rapid growth, so the aim was to work towards a suitable grid street pattern to generate more transit and dispersed development as well as to provide good accessibility to all parts of the city. A key aim of the structure plan was to foster dispersed development and avoid continued congestion of the city centre. In reality, few of the plan’s proposals were implemented, due in large part to the political turmoil in Uganda in the 1970s and 1980s.
At this time, the exclusive franchise for bus services in Kampala was held by the Uganda Transport Company (UTC), which was nationalised in 1972. Its only competition came from shared taxis based on saloon or estate cars. The significance of the bus sector at that time is reflected in the fact that at its peak, the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers’ Union (ATGWU) had as many as 48,000 members, mostly formally employed in the transport sector. Following its nationalisation, and as a result of the period of social, economic and political upheavals in the country, the UTC both contracted and focused more closely on its long-distance services. As such, the market for urban transport services in Kampala became open to private sector operators, mostly using small minibuses, though a few Kenyan-sourced midi-buses were also deployed (World Bank, 2005). One of the most drastic changes in Kampala’s life after the economic disruptions of 1972 and afterwards was the death of the bus as the basic means of public transport. As the economic malaise started to bite, UTC’s fleet started dwindling as spare parts could not be procured in time. Overloading started, adherence to timetables slipped and as the UTC to become dysfunctional, enterprising Ugandans stepped in to fill the gap (Buwembo, 2019).

By 1983, the UTC was still operational and had a fleet of about 145 buses, but with an availability rate of only about 30% (World Bank, 1983). In addition, a number of private bus companies (160 in 1979) were licensed to operate specific routes. Carriers were required to apply to the TLB for permission to operate on a specific route. The applications were publicly announced and hearings were held. Carriers already providing service on the route in question could oppose the application, and Board decided whether or not public convenience dictated that a new carrier should be allowed to operate (World Bank, 1983). Some of these carriers competed directly with the UTC but with much higher tariffs, and due to shortages of spare parts and high vehicle operating costs, many went out of business. No significant allocations were made for equipment replacement, and consequently public transport service and availability deteriorated substantially (World Bank, 1983). There was therefore a serious shortage of public passenger transport in Uganda and in Kampala, with passengers often having to wait over one hour for a bus (Ibid).

As the buses collapsed, individual entrepreneurs started trying out minibuses on city routes to meet demand. The commuter ‘taxis’ had always been small station wagons, including the Peugeot 404. Volkswagen Kombis were tried out, as were old Land Rovers. Then Mercedes Benz 25-seater minibuses dominated from the mid-1970s. These were possibly the last brand-new PSV equipment on the city roads before the era of reconditioned Japanese vehicles set in during the second half of the 1970s. Used Nissan and Toyota Commuter taxis then became the basic means of public transport in Kampala, right up to the present day (Buwembo 2019).

In part due to the roiling political turmoil of the era, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a relaxation of traffic regulation, parking and land use controls, which eroded the aims of the 1972 Structure Plan. Transport supply worsened further when in 1974 the Amin government banned the importation of vehicles by individuals, in order to better manage the use of scarce fuel products (Voice of Uganda, 1976; In: Nsereko, 1994). In response to the transport supply shortage, in 1981 the Uganda Railways Corporation commissioned railway wagons which it used to run a very limited suburban passenger service in Kampala City on the main line serving areas such as Katwe, Kibuye, Ndeeba, Kabusu, Nateete and Mukono. This was nicknamed ‘kayoola’ (mixed and non-discriminatory). It seems doubtful that this service was ever profitable and it was ended in 1989 (Nserek, 1994).
2.3 Liberalisation and weakened planning since the 1990s

The NRM’s rise to power in 1986 following the civil war of the early 1980s, heralded a period of increasing liberalisation. Beginning particularly in the 1990s, liberalisation proceeded apace in the transport sector. This, twinned with the very rapid rates of urbanisation and urban growth, made it extremely challenging for urban planning to keep pace with development. A new Structure Plan was developed in 1994, but there was limited capacity for its implementation, particularly given the substantial public sector retrenchment which occurred from 1992 onwards (Ssonko 2008). There were also various donor-sponsored programmes to improve the transport system, which had limited effect. To some extent planning has received an injection of resources and commitment since the institution of KCCA in 2011. In this section we briefly review these historical developments since the 1990s.

Liberalisation and high motorisation

Active liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of the public transport sector was being actively encouraged by the World Bank by the early 1990s, following the experience in the developed world (Gómez-Ibáñez & Meyer, 1993), and many countries including Uganda enthusiastically adopted this approach (Benmaamar et al., 2002). This further fuelled processes that were already under way following the demise of the UTC (Kumar and Barrett, 2008), with private sector participation encouraged on the basis that the government would continue to maintain and establish operational standards through its regulatory systems. However, a particular public transport issue which had emerged in the latter half of the 1980s was the rapid and unregulated growth of the taxi industry, with operators in often violent competition with each other. According to Kumar and Barrett (2008), the shift to minibuses did not result from a conscious decision to deregulate public transportation but was an indigenous response to the growing demand and commercial opportunity available in the public transport sector. However, this growing number of taxis were operating largely in a regulatory vacuum, with their supply and organisation left to route associations or syndicates.

From 1986 onwards, and particularly from the 1990s, the main organisational face of the taxi sector was the Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA). As its name suggests, this association was in theory supposed to represent the interests of both owners (‘operators’) and drivers of taxis, though this ultimately proved to be a fundamental conflict of interest (Goodfellow 2017). The NRM realised the importance of the taxi sector from an early stage, both economically and strategically, with one observer noting that the government ‘were using it as a channel in spreading their political tentacles’ (quoted in Goodfellow 2017: 1573). From the 1990s UTODA became increasingly associated with the ruling party and also consolidated its position as the organisational face of the sector (Benmaamar et al. 2002). Indeed, compared to many other African countries, there was virtually no other significant organisation in the taxi sector: by the 2000s UTODA was among the most extreme examples of a monopolistic transport association in the whole of Africa (Kumar & Barrett, 2008). By the 2000s, Kampala also had one of the most under-regulated public transport sectors in Africa, with no clear system for allocating routes and no legal restrictions on the entry of vehicles into the market (Trans-Africa, 2008). Moreover, many attempts to revive large buses in Kampala in the 1990s and 2000s failed partly due to competition and harassment from the minibus sector and the power it consolidated under UTODA (Kumar and Barrett, 2008; Goodfellow 2017).
Vehicle imports into the country were also liberalised in 1993 (Rhode, 2006), contributing to rapid increase in vehicle traffic. Although the size and growth rate of the motor vehicle fleet in Uganda is uncertain due to inconsistencies in official statistics, the data collected by the Uganda Revenue Authority indicates that the 44,510 recorded vehicles in 1971 increased by a factor of 12.4 to 552,653 vehicles by 2009 (UBOS, 2009). The importation of used vehicles has been the principal means of supplying the vehicle market in Uganda (Howe, 2001). Imported vehicles arrive in complete form and are sold, serviced and repaired within Uganda.

The fastest growing vehicle category is motorcycles, with motorcycle taxis (boda-bodas) constituting a central feature of the Kampala transport landscape. It has been argued elsewhere by Kisaalita and Sentongo-Kibalama, (2007), Kumar and Barrett, (2008) and Asedri (2010) that their growth is a response to: a) the ease of entry into the motorcycle transport business; b) increasing travel demands; c) lack of an effective public transport system; d) poor state of roads and broken surfaces; e) their ease of manoeuvrability even in congested traffic conditions; and f) a spontaneous entrepreneurial response to the increased availability of bicycles and motorcycles. Olupot (2012) argues that the arrival of boda-bodas on the transport scene was motivated by the near absence of any sort of urban planning or effective regulatory regime. The growth of boda-bodas has also been further stimulated by political interventions that prevented the city council from effectively regulating and taxing them over a period of several decades (Goodfellow and Titeca 2012; Goodfellow 2015).

Meanwhile the commuter railway system, which offered passenger and cargo transport to areas surrounding Kampala, ceased operations in the 1980s. Subsequent efforts by the Government of Uganda to revitalise the railway system have faced major procurement problems, though since 2015 there has been some success in reviving one small commuter service. Despite this small step towards reviving rail services, road transport and particularly paratransit has continued to dominate the transport system, both in the city and across the whole country. In the context of the surging growth and liberalisation of paratransit, the government introduced a new plan in 1994.

**The 1994 Kampala Urban Study and Structure Plan**

Efforts to replace the languishing 1972 plan resulted in the 1994 Kampala Urban Study and Structure Plan. This revised the approach to zoning and called for less segregation of land use and economic classes than the earlier plans. The primary objective was to encourage rather than discourage the kind of mixed use which had arisen over the past 15-20 years, albeit on an ad hoc basis (Koojo, 2004). The upgrading and maintenance of the existing primary and secondary road structure was seen as being of key importance over the plan’s period of ten years. One of the major components of upgrading existing primary roads was enhanced public transport, bicycle and pedestrian traffic routes and furniture (Omolo-Okalebo, 2011). The Structure plan included the developmental upgrade and expansion of commercial areas including Nakulabye, Ggaba and Kabalagala, intended to relieve traffic congestion in the CBD and produce alternative transportation modes (Ssebana, 2004).

However, the 1994 Structure plan emerged at the same time that liberalisation and heightened levels of motorisation were unfolding, as discussed above. Consequently, the 1994 Structure Plan soon became out of step with reality and needed re-appraisal and renewal. While it was intended to last for just 10 years, a lack of financial resources and institutional capacity caused the Plan’s remit to be...
extended up to 2010 (Lwasa, 2005; Kiggundu & Mukiibi, 2011). Little evaluation was undertaken to establish how much of development on the ground corresponded to the plan (Lwasa, 2005), though it is widely acknowledged that it made very little impact, including with respect to integrating land and transportation planning (Kiggundu and Mukiibi, 2011). Kampala City Council increasingly lost control over the transport planning process; ceding power to the private sector, most of whom shared a very different outlook and set of values.

Attempts to improve urban transport since the 2000s

From the 2000s onwards there were also some attempts to improve transport and traffic flow, including the World Bank financed Kampala Urban Transport Improvement Programme (KUTIP) from 2003. Under the KUTIP, KCC worked closely with the central government to define strategies for issues such as improving traffic flow and enhancing intersections in Kampala. Some of the small scale projects such as signalisation and junction improvement were implemented, but broader KCC plans such as the replacement of 14-seater taxis by larger 60-seater buses on specific corridors, and incorporation of city centre bus lanes with specified stops at strategic locations, proved much more difficult. The plan to decongest the city also aimed to reduce the number of boda-boda stages operating in the city centre from 300 to 83, with clearly demarcated areas and signs (Nakaayi, 2007).

In 2009 the Ministry of Works and Transport (MoWT) also published their National Transport Master Plan (NTMP) for the period 2008-2023, which contained within it a Transport Master Plan for the GKMA based on the principles of Transit-Oriented Development. This was one of the first efforts to articulate the boundaries of the GKMA and specify the authorities that would administer it, namely: Kampala City Council; Entebbe Municipal Council; Mukono Town Council; Kira Town Council (except for Kimwanyi Parish); Wakiso Town Council; Mukono District (part thereof) and Wakiso District (part thereof) (MoWT 2009). The GKMA element of the National Transport Master Plan identified specific constraints to transport planning in the GKMA including inadequate coordination between stakeholders, deviation from planned activities, inadequate and irregular resources, and lack of personnel, capacity, transparency and accountability in the sector.

The proposals for transport in the GKMA contained in the 2009 NTMP identify the high demand corridors in Kampala and its associated feeder routes. On these the plan proposes to 1) develop a strategy and investment plan for the introduction of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT); 2) start on the improvement of key road junctions; and 3) schedule routes for taxis and designate stopping areas to ease congestion in the CBD (MoWT, 2009). Route options for BRT were identified, upon which the 2010 pre-feasibility study for BRT were based (see Section 6.2). The NTMP also proposed the establishment of a Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (MATA) for Kampala, to act as a ‘single-purpose urban transport authority on behalf of seven local authorities’ (MoWT 2009: 78), with delegated authority to enforce regulatory provisions for licensing, economic regulation and environmental issues, and to perform transport-related legal services.

Despite these ambitious plans, by the late 2000s informal paratransit’s domination in the greater Kampala area was extreme, with taxis being by far the most important means of transport in terms of passenger capacity, estimated at 300,000 seats standby capacity compared to 90,000 for motorcycles and about 50,000 for buses (MoWT 2009). In terms of absolute numbers of vehicles,
however, 50% of the almost half a million motorised vehicles in the country by 2008 were motorcycles (MoWT 2012). By this time there was also widespread awareness that the planning process had not been able to keep pace with the state and direction of public transport, or of urban growth generally. Heightened political conflict between the national government and Kampala City Council (KCC) over the state of the city’s roads and transport system fed into the passing of the KCCA Act in 2010, and the institution of the new Kampala Capital City Authority in 2011. The creation of KCCA was seen by many as a highly political move to regain control of the capital city, which had been dominated by the opposition under KCC (Gore and Muwanga 2014).

The increasing numbers of vehicles and the resulting level of congestion have necessitated a revision of policies and action plans towards transport planning in the city. The last decade has witnessed a growing awareness of environmental issues, and an increased recognition that a large proportion of the city’s residential and commercial activities have spread beyond the formal boundaries of Kampala City. The Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area is increasingly seen as one whole, in which people move freely between the surrounding areas and the city itself in search of jobs and services. This has been reflected in efforts to further revise and elaborate the National Transport Master Plan and Greater Kampala Metropolitan Transport Plan, discussed below.
Kiira Motors’ Kayoola Electric Bus.
3.0 ‘MOVERS’ IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT I: GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

This section outlines the key government stakeholders and their roles in relation to current transport reform initiatives within the GKMA.

3.1 The key national ministries and agencies

Ministry of Works and Transport (MoWT)

The MoWT is responsible for the development of the National Transport Master Plan, which was published in 2009 and supplemented by various implementation strategies (see Section 3.3). Among other things, the MoWT is also responsible for licensing on all transport routes not only national but, since May 2020, also for routes within the KCCA area. This change amounted to an expansion of the MoWT’s licensing mandate and was instituted to streamline licensing processes in the context of ongoing infighting among different associations and unions. 3

The Transport Licensing Board (TLB) is no longer officially in place due to the 2020 Amendment of the Traffic and Road Safety Act (1998), which brought the TLB together with the National Road Safety Council into the new Department of Transport Regulation and Safety, within the MoWT. However the technical team of the TLB is still in place. 4

The regulators are currently attempting to license providers- whether individuals or organisations- on specific routes. The idea is to encourage providers to apply for a license based on a route they are already operating on, and the relevant authority within MoWT (which was previously the TLB) will decide whether to approve based on how ‘full’ the route currently is.

This, however, was an interim plan that was only supposed to be in place until December 2020, after which there is to be a new system in which groups of taxi operators come together as Savings and Credit Co-operatives (SACCOs, discussed further in Section 5.2) and are granted routes on that basis. There is likely to be some kind of competition involved in this procedure, though as of November 2020 the details of this were not yet clear. 5

The Department of Transport Regulation and Safety is also planning to undertake passenger volume studies on different routes to support this. For taxis, the intention is that each taxi operator will be licensed to operate on one specific route for a year at a time, reversing a previous Presidential directive which stated that taxi operators could choose their own routes. 6

Ministry of Kampala Capital City and Metropolitan Affairs (MKMA)

Although this Ministry has existed since around the time of the creation of KCCA, under its first minister (Frank Tumwebaze) the ministry had a particularly low profile from 2012- 2016 and did not

3 This was a significant shift, because prior to this point KCCA was doing the licensing for intra-city routes. Interview, 2 November 2020.
5 Interview, 2 November 2020;
6 Interview, 17 November 2020
much engage in the politics and governance of the city, which was left to KCCA. However, after the 2016 election and Beti Kamya’s appointment to the post of Minister, relations between KCCA and the Ministry became more strained. As the Ministry became more of a powerful player, concerns were also raised by municipalities outside of Kampala caused by a widespread belief (reflected in some public comments) that Kamya did not really care much about the priorities of these municipalities. These set in train a period of increased tension and poor relations between the MKMA and the municipalities around Kampala.

MKMA also increasingly came into conflict with KCCA in the period 2016-2018, as the fallout from the poor NRM election result within Kampala in 2016 led to recriminations and differences in approach between Beti Kamya and then-Director Jennifer Musisi. Musisi resigned in October 2018 and a cabinet reshuffle in 2019 saw Betty Amongi brought in as Minister for Kampala and Metropolitan Affairs. This, along with a renewed commitment to GKMA development over the past couple of years, has improved relations between MKMA and KCCA, which are now very positive.

Despite its growing significance, for most of the period since 2016 the MKMA has operated as more or less just a shell, with only a small handful of staff. However, the ministry’s role is set to become much more important over the next few years. Though not yet officially approved, in December 2020 the Ministry of Finance agreed to give MKMA a vote in relation to government funding, which could lead to it being able to recruit the staff it needs. Within a few years it could emerge as one of the strongest players in relation to transport development within the GKMA.

**National Planning Authority (NPA)**

The NPA has produced a series of five-year National Development Plans, the third of which was published in 2020. These have incorporated elements of the National Transport Master Plan and successive changes to it. It has been closely involved in discussions around the GKMA, and as of 2020 has outline 18 priority development programmes that the GKMA planning is supposed to align with.

**Ministry of Local Government (MoLG)**

The MoLG is particularly important in relation to the governance of the Districts and Municipalities which are beyond the territory of KCCA but which are within the GKMA, since these are all legally accountable to the MoLG. For this reason, MoLG was one of the contenders for hosting the GKMA authority, and it has continued to be central to discussions around GKMA development and associated transport projects.

**Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD)**

As the ministry responsible for land as well as urban development, MLHUD has also been central to discussions around GKMA development. Around 2018 it was assumed by many stakeholders that MLHUD would be the natural and most sensible ministry in which to situate the GKMA authority. This was not the case however, and the role of MLHUD has become somewhat overshadowed in the last few years by the increased significance of MKMA with regard to GKMA development.

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7 Interview, 28 October 2020. Interview, 2 November 2020.

8 Interview, 10 December 2020.
Other key agencies

Other important players in discussions around GKMA and associated transport projects include the Uganda Police Force (specifically the Road Traffic Division, which enforces traffic rules and regulations), and the Uganda Revenue Authority, which, through its online payment portal for taxi operations, could play an important role as regards to revenue sharing formulas in future routing systems for taxi operations. The Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) will also play an important role in repairing and widening roads, in addition to building new ones. Other ministries with a role to play include the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (responsible for the regulation of labour sector and the enforcement of labour laws and regulation of trade unions), the Ministry of Trade (particularly with regard to private sector participation in transport provision) and the Ministry of ICT (with regard to plans to digitise timetables and develop online systems for managing transport).

3.2 Local governments

Kampala Capital City Authority

KCCA is by far the most important local government actor, though it is difficult to even think of it in terms of local government since it has one of the highest profiles of all government agencies nationally, and receives a substantial amount of central government resources. The new Executive Director, Dorothy Kisaka, is a lawyer and corporate executive who, before her appointment to the KCCA leadership position in June 2020, was a Senior Presidential Advisor deployed as the Deputy Head of the Delivery Unit in the Office of the Prime Minister. Her deputy David Luyimbazi previously worked in the MoWT on urban transportation issues and has a good working relationship with the CIG team (see Section 6.1), assisting particularly with their work on inland water transport. In relation to plans for BRT, KCCA is responsible for route allocation, although MoWT is responsible for licensing on these routes. KCCA is also responsible for developing the Greater Kampala Economic Development Strategy, in which transport and connectivity will play a key role.

Surrounding municipalities

Several surrounding municipalities are now part of the area considered as the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area (GKMA), which is bound together economically and has an estimated combined population of five million people. The GKMA hosts about 10% of the country’s population and spans a number of urban councils. In the GKMA, about two million people live and work in the core and a further two million commute into the city core to work during the day and then return to surrounding municipalities in the evening. It is this commuting pattern that has strong implications for transportation. While the city of Kampala is itself managed by KCCA with a national government ministry under the KCCA Act 2010, the surrounding urban councils are governed under the Local Government Act of 2005 and coordinated by the Ministry of Local Government. By 2020 these included Makindye-Sabagabo Municipality, Entebbe Municipality, Katabi Town Council, Kyengera Town Council, Nansana Municipality, Kira Municipality, Kasangati Town Council, and Mukono Municipality.
3.3 Key documents in transport planning

National Development Plans

A series of major planning documents have been published and officially adopted by the government over the past decade. Elements of the National Transport Master Plan have been integrated into the first (2010-2015) and second (2015-2020) National Development Plans. These have implications for transport. Specifically, core projects in the first NDP included: improving transport infrastructure, connectivity, and safety for the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area; restoring existing railways; establishing standard rail gauge from Malaba on the Kenyan boarder to Kampala; and improving the water transport system in Lake Victoria (NPA 2010). The second NDP added a focus on developing an adequate, reliable and efficient multi-modal transport network in the country and developing an adequate and improved air transport system (NPA 2015).

A third National Development Plan (NDP III) was published in June 2020. This incorporated several important KCCA priorities, including developing multimodal transport infrastructure to enhance interoperability among the key transport modes contained within the overall NDP III strategy. More specifically, NDP III incorporates a focus on KCCA concerns including: re-registration of all motor cycles in the GKMA; identifying and gazetting boda-boda stages and exclusion zones in the GKMA; gazetting of specific stages for buses, taxis and town cabs; re-routing and restriction of movement of Passenger Service Vehicles (PSV) and heavy goods vehicles within the GKMA; construction of the non-motorised transport corridor, repair of walkways and cycle lanes; managing traffic flow in the CBD through one-way routes; review and update of street parking management; and numerous other initiatives relating to roads, flyovers and links between non-motorised transport and the railway system (NPA, 2020: 281-282).

Revision of the National Transport Master Plan

After the adoption of the NTMP in 2009, two further transport plans have been published. First the 2012 Strategic Plan, an internal Strategic Plan published by MoWT in February 2012 (MoWT 2012a). This was followed by the 2015 Strategic Implementation Plan for 2015-2023 (MoWT 2015), which altered the priorities of the NTMP including by proposing a shift in investment from road to rail projects, by capping the national roads development budget to 70% of the 2019/20 total in order to encourage non-road transport modes. A Non-Motorised Transport Policy was also adopted in 2012 (MoWT 2012b). A mid-term review of the NTMP was undertaken in 2018 by a group of consultancy firms, and following this a new version of the NTMP is currently in progress, supported by the consulting firm COWI. The NTMP included a Greater Kampala Transport Master Plan within it, though this has been superseded to some extent by the Multi-Modal Urban Transport Master Plan for the GKMA.

Multi-Modal Urban Transport Master Plan (MMUTMP)

The Multi-Modal Urban Transport Master Plan (MMUTMP) is a major study financed by the World Bank under phase II of its Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Programme (KIIDP), resulting in a 500-page report published in 2018. It explores different possible scenarios projected forward as far as 2040, based on different potential investments into mass rapid transit and non-motorised transport, and compares these with a ‘base’ scenario based on the situation in 2016 and a ‘reference’ scenario based on existing land use patterns and commitments. These are assessed against criteria of sustainability, mobility, accessibility, safety, environmental impacts and economic efficiency.
The MMUTMP has strong buy-in from KCCA, and a number of major donors including DFID as well as the World Bank. However, although it is supposed to cover the whole metropolitan area, it has been strongly associated with KCCA, which can cause issues in terms of the ‘buy in’ of surrounding municipalities, discussed further below. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that the MMUTMP is complex and thinking about integrated multi-modal systems highly challenging, to the extent that KCCA officials themselves admit there are only one or two people who understand the complexity.9 Also, despite the widely acknowledged good quality of the MMUTMP in terms of its analysis of existing dynamics and different possible scenarios, it does not offer a clear road map of how to proceed.

9 Interview, 18 November 2020.
A graveyard of broken-down Pioneer buses in the outer periphery of the Namboole Stadium parking lot in Bweyogerere Kampala.
4.0 ‘MOVERS’ II: THE PRIVATE SECTOR

4.1 Bus companies

In theory, anyone can operate a bus company in Uganda. In practice however, competition with taxis, as well as outright intimidation (particularly during the time when UTODA dominated the taxi sector) has made it very difficult for bus companies to succeed. While some current companies are more organised than others, there is no existing framework for organising or allocating routes beyond the licensing processes noted in relation to MoWT activities above. Many are also requesting dedicated lanes, but the MoWT is not yet willing to offer this until there is a clear framework for engagement with bus companies in place.10

Nationally, bus owners and operators are organised through the Uganda Bus Owners and Operators Association, which is comprised of over 200 members involved in bus operations of varying sizes. A new concern for some bus owners is that on October 9 2020 the President announced an import substitution strategy, in which he proposed to reduce the import of buses to support the manufacturing of buses in Uganda (Osiba 2020). Although it remains unclear whether or how this might unfold in practice, it caused alarm in the bus sector given that the buses currently being assembled at a plant in Namanve are poorer value for money than the typical imported buses.11

There are a number of bus companies that operate routes between Kampala and other parts of Uganda, including Global Coaches (80 buses), Link (60 buses), Gateway (50 buses), Eastern Route (50 buses) and some other slightly smaller companies. Within Kampala, Pioneer Easy Bus Limited are thought to operate around 50 buses, with Awakula Ennume operating 22-25.12 There are also some smaller companies. The precise numbers of buses being operated by each of the companies operating within Kampala can be difficult to determine, both because at any given moment a substantial proportion of the fleet are out of action due to disrepair, and because bus companies are often unwilling to reveal numbers for reasons relating to taxation and regulation.13 Below we outline some of the most significant bus companies operating in Kampala in recent years, as well as the proposed Tondeka Metro bus scheme.

Pioneer Easy Bus Limited

An agreement was signed between the former City Council, KCC, and Pioneer Easy Bus Limited (PEBL) in 2010. PEBL started bus operations in the city on March 12th 2012, shortly after UTODA taxi operators went on strike protesting a UGX 120,000 monthly fees charged by Kampala Capital City Authority (Bwambale, 2012; Ogwang, 2013). A concession agreement with KCCA was structured as a Public Private Partnership (PPP) requiring the city authority to install bus lanes and bus stops, to allow PEBL exclusive routes, and to offer a government guarantee on financing, though this did not take place (Ogwang, 2013).

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10 Interview, 2 November 2020.
11 Interview, 7 November 2020; interview, 9 November 2020.
12 Interview, 17 November 2020. The exact number of buses operating for these companies with Kampala varies slightly by source.
13 Interview, 7 November 2020.
The company agreed to provide 522 buses on the western and eastern route zones and 98 of these buses were introduced within the first four months of signing the contract. The company, in return for a payment to KCCA of UGX 300,000 per bus per month, would have exclusive operation of buses with a capacity of 60 passengers and above on the designated routes. Other operators along the concession routes would be allowed to operate mini-buses of 20 passengers. The concessions would be for a year, extendable to a full term of five years if there was satisfactory performance in the first year. PEBL operates on four routes, covering a distance of 54km, and transports an estimated 20,000 passengers each day (COWI 2020: 228).

PEBL has however been affected by numerous difficulties and controversies, including the persistent breakdown of old buses without procurement of new ones; delayed salaries and consequent employee strikes; unpaid debt for spare parts; high commercial interest rates on its loan leading to increased debt; impounding of buses by the Uganda Revenue Authority due to failure to pay UGX 8 billion in tax arrears (Sempebwa, 2013); and petitioning by Mukono and Kira municipalities to suspend PEBL due to loss of revenues and lack of a revenue sharing arrangement (Ogwang, 2013). There was also significant controversy over the PEBL contract, which was perceived to have been awarded based on political connections and without following proper procurement processes.

**Awakula Ennume**

After KCCA intervened in 2013 to end the longstanding dominance of the minibus-taxi sector by UTODA (see Section 5.1), a number of former UTODA taxi drivers decided to establish their own bus company, named Awakula Ennume Transport Cooperative Society. Their decision to launch bus services at this time was partly a response to the events surrounding PEBL, which as noted above was based on a very different model and which had been facilitated through political connections and expensive commercial loans. As PEBL buses were grounded, this created an opportunity for the former UTODA leaders. 'Awakula Ennume- Tewakula Emu' refers to a Luganda proverb that means ‘there cannot be one bull in a kraal’ (Observer, 16 June 2013), with the implication being that bus provision in Kampala should not be the preserve of only one ‘bull’- i.e. Pioneer, the dominant bus company at the time- but should accommodate more ‘bulls’. Their Awakula Ennume model was very much about taxi-drivers coming together to produce bus services from the bottom up.

They were given a license to operate by the TLB and began with just eight buses in June 2013, though they imported 30 and had plans to launch around 240 in total by February 2014, supplied by Tata and with the aim of pushing 14-seater taxis out of the CBD. According to some accounts, Ashok Leyland, saw great potential in the company and were planning to help it expand in order to deliver on its aim for over 200 buses. However, this did not materialise because Awakula Ennume could not secure a credit guarantee from the Ministry of Finance, partly because the Ministry was sceptical after the Pioneer experience and partly due to ongoing animosity and prejudice towards the informal sector background of Awakula Ennume. In reality, by 2019-20 there were still only an estimated 20-25 buses in operation, and they have struggled to remain competitive given the ongoing dominance of taxis in the city.

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**Tondeka**

Tondeka Metro Bus Service is a locally registered special purpose vehicle that was due to launch in 2020, promising to serve Kampala and the GKMA and to transform its transport system. The scheme has been spearheaded by Fred Ssenoga, a former Managing Director of PEBL, who is proposing a big push that will eventually see 2000 large capacity commuter buses deployed in the greater Kampala Metropolitan Area. The project is backed by Ashok Leyland (a subsidiary of the Hinduja group), the world’s third biggest bus manufacturers, who have pledged to offer a turnkey solution involving the provision of 980 buses in the first instance. The scheme is intended to be completely cashless and a proposed transport infrastructure project will deliver five bus terminals, five depots and several park and ride facilities along the major arteries of Tondeka’s operational radius (Muhereza, 2020). Tondeka was initially supposed to start operations in September 2020.

Tondeka won significant political backing, with the President reportedly asking the Ministry of Finance to fast-track it for funding. It also appears to have the backing of the Ministry of Works and Transport, which further claimed that a number of the main taxi organisations have also said they are willing to work with the company if it can incorporate them in some way (Kyeyune, 2019; Mugisha 2019; Wakabi, 2019). It does seem that Tondeka has managed to persuade certain taxi association leaders of its benefits, on the understanding that they will be key stakeholders.  

Tondeka attempted to build on the work that Awakula Ennume has done to get a government guarantee in order to underwrite a loan (from Exim Bank of India) for their buses. The proposed loan is UGX 600 billion, and would be delivered through the Uganda Development Corporation. The idea that the government should underwrite a private venture in this way was dismissed by some government figures, although apparently had not been written off as a possibility. However, despite the apparent political backing for the project, government approval for this loan has not materialised, and by the end of 2020 Tondeka still appeared to lack the finance to import buses and start operations.

There has also been a growing chorus of concern about the uncompetitive nature of the procurement process, the scale of the loan, the proposed monopoly nature of the project, and the project’s overall viability and profitability. Kampala’s Lord Mayor, Erias Lukwago, has been particularly vocal in opposition, as are many surrounding municipalities which are concerned about how they would benefit from revenues, especially given the lost revenues from taxi parks and stages. There are also very significant questions about how existing paratransit operators would be affected. Tondeka has claimed that it that it would create 10,000- 20,000 jobs for former workers from the taxi sector, though it is unclear how this figure was reached (Cardno 2020c: 26).

Tondeka was widely viewed with suspicion among government officials, donor agencies and opposition politicians. One stakeholder described Tondeka as ‘trying to put their foot into the muddy water thinking it would get some mileage when BRT comes’. Part of the problem however is that the announcement of the Tondeka scheme ‘stopped the BRT plans in their tracks’, because it appeared to draw a lot of the energy at the level of the Presidency and MoWT away from BRT and towards this specific proposal.

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15 Interview, 5 December 2020.
16 Interview, 10 December 2020.
17 Interview, 10 December 2020.
18 Interview, 3 November 2020.
Interestingly, taxi associations have not been so concerned about Tondeka, quite possibly because— in the words of one observer— their experience of past bus projects leads them to believe ‘it will die a quiet death.’

While the people behind Tondeka clearly have longstanding knowledge and experience of the transport sector, their specific proposals have been widely viewed with scepticism.

A report produced under the DFID-funded Cities and Infrastructure for Growth programme concludes that ‘there are more questions than answers’ about this scheme currently. (Cardno 2020c: 24). Among other issues raised were that the project ownership remains unclear, particularly in terms of the proposed shareholding between the UDC and the project company, the role of Ashok Leyland, the extent of local content, regulatory and procurement issues, and the financing arrangements. The report also argues that Tondeka’s claim that it could decongest the city is ‘not substantiated and not plausible’, because such decongestion would require substantial modal shift from car to bus travel and also segregation of bus operations, which is not likely in the near future. It also suggests that Tondeka’s proposals overestimate passenger demand, with only around two thirds of the proposed 980 buses actually being required to meet likely demand in the early years of operation (Cardno 2020c: 79).

**Other bus companies**

The African Development Bank is currently tendering for a provider for an eco-bus project. This aims to provide electric buses of 80-100 seat capacity on a circular route in the city centre buses, pushing aiming to push others out of this area. As yet, this scheme has not been coordinated with questions of informal paratransit, and a number of question marks remain about its feasibility.

If these do emerge this will be largest bus fleet in the city by some margin, as well as being environmentally sustainable.

Another, local initiative- Kiira Motors Corporation- also aims to produce electric buses. According to media sources, two electric buses have so far been produced and the construction of the vehicle assembly plant in Jinja is on-going (New Vision, 9 October 2020).

**4.2 Ride-hailing companies**

The private sector has begun to penetrate into the boda-boda market in the form of ride-hailing companies modelled similarly to Uber. The most significant is SafeBoda, which was established in 2014 with around 50 drivers. The company now incorporates an estimated 5% of all boda-boda drivers in Kampala, and a much larger share (potentially 90-95%) of all ‘online’ drivers.

The vast majority of boda-boda drivers thus continue to operate ‘offline’. SafeBoda’s growth has nevertheless been very impressive, particularly since securing new sources of investment in 2018. Since January of that year their numbers have grown by a factor of one hundred, from around 1000 rides a day to almost 100,000 by late 2020. The number of drivers has risen to around 20,000, though not all of these are actually operating. Their aim is to achieve around a 20% share of all boda-bodas operating in the city.

19 Interview, 6 November 2020.
20 Interview, 28 October 2020; interview, 6 November 2020.
22 Interview, 30 November 2020. Different figures are available and hard to verify; see Spooner et al (2020) for estimates of figures in a number of ride hailing companies.
23 Interview, 30 November 2020.
A number of other ride-hailing companies operate in the city, including Uber Boda and Bolt (formerly Taxify). These have much smaller numbers of drivers, with some thought to be losing drivers in significant numbers to SafeBoda (Spooner et al. 2020). This is likely to be partly because SafeBoda is much more locally-driven and has developed a number of context-specific strategies and additions to its app, including the ‘pairing’ function, as well as offering better prospects for drivers. Ride-hailing companies do face substantial obstacles, however, particularly given their dependence on the purchase of mobile phone data, which has been rendered more expensive by the government’s ‘social media tax’ which effectively reduces the amount of data mobile phone users have to spare.

### 4.3 Asset financing companies

One of the highest profile companies that provides finance to drivers to acquire boda-bodas and repay their loan over time is Tugende, which has been in operation since 2012. Although this provides a valued service in terms of a clear framework for repayment, a system of training and support activities for drivers, some observers have also noted that the repayments are high (Spooner et al 2020). Another company offering similar services is Watu Credit, a Kenyan firm that works with SafeBoda.
Drivers of motorcycle taxis, known locally as boda-bodas, wait at a junction beside the Clock Tower in downtown Kampala.
5. ‘MOVERS’ III: TAXI AND BODA-BODA ASSOCIATIONS

Taxis (minibus-taxis/matatus) and boda-bodas remain by far the most significant forms of public transport in the GKMA. According to MoWT, the annual compound growth of minibuses is 23.8% pa, with a fleet that increased from 27,600 minibuses and just 900 buses in 2005 to 289,000 minibuses and 3,000 buses in 2019 (COWI 2020: 221). Both taxis and boda-bodas are organised into a number of associations, some now affiliated to ATGWU, though the picture is very fragmented and constantly changing. It is worth noting that a relatively new addition to the paratransit scene in Kampala are three-wheeled motorcycles (tuk-tuks), which offer potential advantages over boda-bodas in terms of shelter from rain and dust, as well as faster transport than taxis because they fill with passengers more quickly. Though they vastly outnumber boda-bodas in other cities in the region, they were initially prohibited for passenger transport by the Minister of Kampala. This was overturned through a Presidential intervention in 2017, but at present this sub-sector remains small and there are few signs of collective organisation.

5.1 Taxi associations

For a long time, the commuter taxi industry could be considered as the most self-regulated industry; organised and supervised under ‘stages’ or more accurately, routes, they have very strict operating codes and procedures. The manning of the vehicle is agreed upon with the owner who puts it in the fleet with the driver and conductor closely supervised by the stage management. The fares chargeable are standardised even as they vary according to time of day, the density of traffic and even the weather (Buwembo, 2019).

As noted in Section 2.3, for a period of several decades the taxi sector was dominated by a single association in the form of UTODA. Given the conflict of interest embodied in this organisation, which purported to represent both drivers and owners, by the mid-2000s a group of drivers had come together under the banner of the Drivers and Conductors Central Association (DACCA) to try and challenge UTODA’s lack of representation. This association gained little traction however, until the establishment of KCCA led to the termination of UTODA’s authority to manage taxi services in 2012. After this there was increased fragmentation as breakaway groups formed, including the KCCA-approved TAPSCOM and UTRADA, with the latter in particular involving key personnel from UTODA. UTRADA failed to achieve the same level of dominance as UTODA had, though, particularly now that it was stripped of its role in managing revenue collection and taxi parks in Kampala. Meanwhile members of TAPSCOM and DACCA came together to rebrand themselves as the Kampala Operational Taxi Stages Association (KOTSA), which is now thought to be the largest taxi association in the city and is affiliated to ATGWU (Spooner and Mwanika 2017).

There are now six main taxi associations recognised by government: UTRADA, KOTSA, CTODA, Independent Association and Inter-Taxi Parks Association, as well as UTODA itself, which has been mostly focused on operating inter-city buses since 2012 but has apparently experienced a resurgence.
in relation to taxi operations in Kampala following the 2020 lockdown. The reasons for this are unclear, but in the context of growing fragmentation of the sector and efforts by KCCA to register all public transport providers in the city, UTODA has re-registered as an association operating within the city.  

However KOTSA and UTRADA are believed to be the most significant groups as of late 2020. UTRADA is the most obviously politicised, given its origins in the UTODA leadership and a period in which it allied itself with the highly-politicised Boda Boda 2010 (discussed in Section 5.2). Estimates of membership of several of these associations are provided in Spooner et al (2020).

CTODA (the Commercial Taxi Owners and Transporters Development Association) is another association that evolved out of UTODA. As of 2020 they reportedly had around 300 members, employing over 3500 people. Others that were mentioned included smaller organisations such as COTRADA, which some respondents said did not have many ‘real’ taxi drivers and existed really only in name despite having been registered some years ago. Several stakeholders noted that there is a sense of growing infighting among these groups and increased insecurity in the sector (for example in relation to fee payments enforced by certain associations at taxi stages). However, the recent successes in engaging a number of them in consultative fora (see Section 6.2) may be helping to address this, particularly with the increasingly positive tone from December 2020.

In recent years, the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers’ Union (ATGWU), one of Uganda’s oldest unions, dating back to 1938, has resurfaced as a significant umbrella organisation with a commitment to supporting informal public transport sector associations. This came after a difficult period of around six years during which ATGWU- which previously engaged only with formal sector workers- reoriented itself towards the informal transport sector. Early efforts to engage with the informal sector had been rendered difficult partly due to the failure to engage UTODA, which would only come under the umbrella of ATGWU if it were able to appoint the General Secretary. Given that ATGWU’s constitution states that the General Secretary needs to be democratically elected, they were not willing to agree to UTODA’s demands.

Given the constant churn among associations, some sources felt that ATGWU was not representative enough of what is actually happening on the ground and so was not able to fully represent the opinions of taxi drivers. Some taxi association members felt that they were well represented but neither their associations nor ATGWU have sufficient power to influence the government. Instead, the people who end up meeting government claiming to represent drivers are those who are politically connected. One driver noted that:

24 Interview, 1 December 2020.
25 Interview, 4 November 2020; See also Spooner et al (2020).
26 Interview, 27 October 2020.
27 Interview, 12 November.
28 Focus group discussions, 2-3 November 2020.
29 One source reported that members of KOTSA sometimes carry pangas and knives to meetings. Interview, 14 November 2020.
30 Interview, 1 December 2020.
31 Interview, 27 October 2020.
‘The so-called representatives of taxi operators that ministers meet are unknown to us as taxi operators. These people have no work, waiting to meet the president, ministers or government officials is their only business. They can afford to sit for the whole day if that’s what it takes, on the other hand we have a lot of coordination work here to do so we don’t have such time to waste.’

Drivers also maintained that the entire taxi system was highly organised, and the system of stage and park management was well respected by drivers, with leaders selected on the basis of competence (for details on the functioning of this system, see Spooner et al, 2020). They voiced concerns about government proposals to introduce new forms of democratic election, which could stimulate chaos, and argued that functional elected structures are already in place. External advisors also noted that it would be very ‘dangerous’ for government to initiate changes that were too disruptive to the existing stage system, which has evolved over decades.

5.2 Boda-boda associations

According to a recent United Nations report, the number of boda-bodas operating in the GKMA region has increased by 58.7 percent annually since 2007. By 2014 there were about 405,124 boda-bodas, up from 15,979 in 2007 (cited in COWI 2020:227), with 63,000 officially registered in Kampala but also a large number unregistered (Spoon et al 2020: 48). KCCA was said to have registered around 120,000 by 2020, though this was thought to be below the actual number operating in the city.

Reliable figures are difficult to come by, both due to the number of unregistered drivers and the difficulty in distinguishing between owners of motorcycles and those who use them commercially. The ways in which the boda-boda sector functions is explored in detail in Spooner et al (2020).

The boda-boda sector has always been much more fragmented than the taxi sector, with various organisations claiming to be the main umbrella organisation in the 2000s but none achieving very widespread dominance. This changed to some extent with the appearance of Boda Boda 2010. Although it reportedly originated as a bottom-up organisation set up by drivers intended to help with emergency response, Boda Boda 2010 rapidly became a highly politicised entity under the leadership of Abdallah Kitatta, an NRM stalwart who was strongly connected to the then Inspector General of Police (IGP) Kale Kayihura. It introduced a number of new systems within the motorcycle-taxi sector that were violently enforced, and became increasingly associated with surveillance and political factionalism before Kitatta was arrested for possession of firearms in 2018.
Since the decline of Boda Boda 2010, the most significant boda-boda association has been the Kampala Metropolitan Boda Boda Entrepreneurs (KAMBE). KAMBE started in 2014 with 654 members and two branches, expanding rapidly to incorporate five branches around the country, several outside the GKMA. By 2017 they reportedly represented 38,000 drivers, and through their affiliation to ATGWU from 2015 benefited from some increased bargaining power and reduced police harassment, as well as increased opportunities for women in the sector (Spooner and Mwanika 2017). In 2020, their membership had risen to 48,000 (Spooner et al 2020). They have recently been working towards the creation of an online application system and are working to deliver a number of different online services, including a ride-hailing app. In addition, they claim to be offering interest-free loans to members and helping members to access government youth livelihood funds to purchase boda-bodas.38

KAMBE has also been registered as a SACCO since 2015 (Spooner et al 2020: 52). Many drivers operate outside of organisations like KAMBE, however, and some are coming together to form their own SACCOs, a central part of current government policy in relation to paratransit. These SACCOs provide important sources of credit and family support (see Box 1)39. It is also apparent that while the rise of KAMBE and the opportunity for associations to affiliate to ATGWU generated new opportunities for collective organisation (Spooner and Mwanika 2017), new organisations continue to pop up and the dominant trend remains one of fragmentation.

38 Interview, 23 November 2020.
39 Focus group discussion, 23 November 2020.
Box 1: SACCOs

Savings and Credit Co-Operatives, often just called SACCOs, are an increasingly dominant form of co-operative in Uganda as well as in Kenya and several other African contexts (Develtere et al, 2008). Unlike other forms of co-operative such as producers’ co-operatives, consumers’ co-operatives or housing co-operatives, their role is generally limited to holding savings and providing credit to members. They serve as a form of financing for small and micro-enterprises, and in the context of sectors such as public transport are seen as a means for enabling the collective acquisition of resources and vehicles through a model of equitable partnership and shared ownership, as well as providing a collective safety net for drivers.

The role of SACCOs has grown in the context of the liberalisation of African economies and increased interest in small and micro-enterprise development, including in urban areas. SACCOs are increasingly seen across Africa as a successful and effective way of mobilising collective resources which avoid the pitfalls of dependency by relying on their own financial resources and are able to service large numbers of depositors with a diverse range of loans. They have the capacity to provide finance to people who would otherwise be excluded from financial markets, including women and various disadvantaged groups. Like all co-operatives, in different national contexts SACCOs vary in the extent to which they are centralised through co-operative unions, federations and apex organisations.

While there is significant organisational fragmentation, there is clearly a common interest in enhancing safety and security within the sector, supporting proper systems of registration and training, and distinguishing ‘genuine’ operators in the boda-boda business from people using boda-bodas to commit crimes.40 Boda-boda drivers are also keen to emphasise their distance from politics, especially since the experience of Boda Boda 2010, an organisation which became highly and overtly politicised, causing substantial disruption and violent conflict within the sector (see Muwanga et al 2020).

40 Interview, 23 November 2020; focus group discussion, 23 November.
People in parts of Namuwongo live in the railways reserve land and they sell their merchandise along the existing railway track.
6.0 ‘MOVERS’ IV: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

6.1 Major development partners in the public transport space

The World Bank

The World Bank has long been a significant player in supporting transport infrastructure in Kampala, including through its Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Programmes (KIIDP 1 and KIIDP 2). The World Bank also financed the feasibility study for BRT in the GKMA, published in 2013. Its current $175 million programme in the city is supporting the rehabilitation of city-wide infrastructure and institutional support to planning, property registration and revenue collection. While their existing and previous programmes focused on Kampala, they now have approval to focus on the whole GKMA including 14 authorities bordering KCCA.

Although the WB has a strong association with plans for BRT, having funded the feasibility study and having also financed the BRT system in neighbouring Dar es Salaam, it is clear that there are conditions that would need to be met before it will release funds for BRT in the GKMA.41 This is discussed further in Section 6.2.

African Development Bank

The AfDB have mainly focused on roads in terms of their co-operation in relation to transport, and have a new five year (2020-24) $228m road rehabilitation programme. Linked to this, they have also said they will provide $12m to finance the provision of 124 electric eco-buses (COWI 2020: 233). They are currently tendering for this, and for the consultancy services to support the implementation of bus transit services in Kampala City. These eco-buses would be designed to serve a specific circular route in the inner city, as discussed in Section 4.1.

The European Union

The EU has engaged in major transport infrastructure investments in the GKMA in the recent past, for example by providing €47.5 million for construction of the Kampala Northern Bypass, as part of a collaboration for the urban road sector in the GKMA. More recently, the European Union has been playing a particularly important role in current efforts to upgrade the existing metre-gauge railway. EU representatives believe that for around €200 million the railway could be rehabilitated sufficiently to carry around 300,000 passengers daily. It is also potentially interested in extending this to fund rail transport between Mukono and Kampala, and has conducted a study on this, though at this stage there is no firm commitment. This is part of a broader interest in rail transport, and they are already in the process of funding the Tororo-Gulu railway, which would offer a direct trade route between the north of the country and the Kenyan border.42

41 Interview, 26 November 2020.
42 Interview, 19 November 2020.
Japan (JICA)

JICA is seen as a major international partner in the transport sector in Uganda, particularly with regard to infrastructure. It has been involved in many road projects in the GKMA, and a review of the National Transport Master Plan in 2010. JICA has a strategic focus on economic infrastructure, partly focused on energy and partly on transport infrastructure. Among their key objectives in the latter work is the reduction of traffic congestion in the GKMA, including through flyovers. They have also been working with KCCA with the objective of signalising major junctions and removing roundabouts in places with heavy traffic flow.

The UK (DFID/FCDO)

DFID (now reorganised as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office or FCDO) has been a key player in the urban sector in recent years, ramping up its support for infrastructure (including transport infrastructure) through its Cities and Infrastructure for Growth (CIG) programme, which was launched in June 2018 and is implemented by Cardno International Development. The three thematic focus areas of CIG are urban governance, energy, and infrastructure within the GKMA, focused to a great extent on decongesting the metropolitan region. Amongst other work, the programme has produced reports on existing land use and strategic land use planning options for the proposed BRT route (Cardno 2020a; 2020b), a BRT Service Plan (Cardno 2020c), and an Inland Water Transport situational analysis (Cardno 2020d). CIG has also involved some work on e-mobility with WRI and the Shell Foundation, focused on the boda-boda sector. The CIG team has a good working relationship with KCCA, which has facilitated significant engagement on both sides with the Kampala Multi-Modal Transport Plan and re-energised the process of attempting to form the GKMA authority.

France (AFD)

For some time AFD has been notable in its emphasis on incorporating existing paratransit into the picture, rather than attempting any kind of ‘blank slate’ approach or rapid phasing out of taxis and boda-bodas. In 2019-20 AFD has funded a new programme of work led by the consulting firm Transitec, which is focused explicitly on existing modes of transport and how these could be included in programmes to modernise public transport in the GKMA. This has resulted in the production of a series of reports on paratransit and existing street use, the prospects for accommodating paratransit alongside BRT, and the governance of transport in the GKMA. It has also led to the establishment of a series of consultative fora, incorporating a range of stakeholders in the sector and convened in partnership with urban planning specialists from Makerere University. Thus far, the main role of AFD in the GKMA transport sector has been at the level of producing these studies and supporting this consultative work.
6.2 The status of key donor-sponsored reform initiatives

BRT

BRT was first seriously proposed in Kampala in 2010, with a pre-feasibility study undertaken by Integrated Transport Planning Ltd (ITP), a UK-based firm. Following this, a 2013 World Bank feasibility study came up with a number of different potential routes and primary costings. In fact, the World Bank team who supported the BRT system in Dar es Salaam, which opened in 2016, were originally planning to implement it in Kampala, before the project shifted to Dar es Salaam—partly because institutional conflicts in Kampala were generating so many delays.43

In the time that has elapsed since the 2013 study, the situation in the city has continued to evolve, to the extent that the study is now considered to be out of date in several key respects, making the prospect of implementation even more challenging. Despite concerns in recent years that BRT had slid quite far down the agenda, there were signs by late 2020 that the energy around BRT was being revived, with the Ministry of Finance reportedly issuing a letter to the World Bank to request funds for BRT as part of its 2021-25 planning. The idea appears to be to following quite closely the phased implementation adopted in Dar es Salaam. However, several stakeholders now emphasise the need to view BRT in terms of its integration into a broader, multi-modal transport plan that can potentially link up with the railway as well as incorporating paratransit around its edges. This more integrated approach is consistent with the Greater Kampala Multi-modal Transport Plan and is supported by a number of donors.

From a MoWT perspective, the aim is to develop the infrastructure and procure bus service providers concurrently. They propose that the first phase, which is just 25km, would involve just one single bus company, amounting to a pilot phase. The amount currently being requested from the World Bank is in the region of $400m to $500m, but MoWT sources believe that the first phase could be achieved for significantly less—potentially under $300m. This is because for the first phase there would be relatively minimal land acquisition required along the corridors if existing street parking areas are utilised and traffic islands removed.44

It is also important to note that while BRT could help to ease congestion—subject to the necessary land acquisition, infrastructure investment, licensing and procurement issues being resolved—it is not the answer to all public transport problems. The experience of Dar es Salaam shows that fares can creep up to the point where they are unaffordable to the poorest, exacerbating mobility inequalities. There has also been inadequate attention paid to the estimated 20-30,000 workers displaced from transport work by the shift to BRT (Rizzo 2017) in Dar es Salaam. There is also significant concern among current bus operators about whether they will be able to get involved in BRT.45 While various donor agencies are supportive of BRT in principle, having funded a wide range of studies related to it, it is clear that the government needs to address a number of institutional issues and demonstrate clearer commitment before any funds will be forthcoming. These are examined in Section 8.

43 Interview, 19 November 2020; interview, 10 December 2020.
44 Interview, 2 November 2020.
45 Interview, 7 November 2020.
Railways

In 2015 Uganda Railways Corporation (URC), KCCA and Rift Valley Railways (RVR) started running a commuter train service between the city centre and Namanve, 14 kilometres east of central Kampala, as a joint venture on a pilot basis. The train runs through Kampala’s busiest route alongside Jinja road, operating five refurbished coaches with a maximum capacity of 1,000 passengers (Athmani, 2016). In October 2017 the government terminated RVR’s 25-year concession which had been signed in 2006, citing operational inefficiencies, and management of the railway reverted to Uganda Railways Corporation (URC). URC relaunched the daily round trip for commuters in February 2018 (Oirere, 2018).

In this context, upgrading the existing metre-gauge railway has become a priority for the EU in its development cooperation with Uganda. This could potentially complement the BRT, serving an East-West route while BRT could focus on the North-South axis. Commuter trains are currently running, but only twice a day. The plan is to bring in more engines and carriages as well as to construct more stations along the routes.46

46 Interview, 19 November 2020; Interview, 10 November 2020.
Integrating paratransit

Various donors and government agencies have recently committed to supporting much wider consultation with existing paratransit operators. This shift comes partly in response to increased recognition of the lack of input from the informal paratransit sector in previous approaches to national and metropolitan transport planning. The AFD-funded consultative fora that are currently underway aim to close the gap between government and taxi providers, with the intention of creating a shared vision and generating an atmosphere of partnership. The key ministries/agencies in charge of managing the integration of paratransit will be MoWT and KCCA, though the consultative fora have also involved the Ministry of Local Government, UNRA and the relevant municipalities, as well as the traffic police, and of course the main government-recognised taxi associations listed above. As this is already a substantial group of stakeholders with complex relationships, boda-bodas have not yet been brought into the discussion, though there is an intention to bring them in at a later stage.

According to stakeholders present at the first forum (January 2020), it was tense, with neither side wanting to talk, but by the second forum in August 2020 the mood was better. The third one was really positive, and was followed up by a week-long study tour to Cape Town in December 2020. This involved staff from KCCA, members of several of the main taxi associations, and staff from MoWT, as well as the facilitators from Transitec and Makerere University. This process of stakeholder consultation is different from anything that has ever happened in relation to public transport in Kampala— all previous attempts to reform paratransit and manage the relationship between paratransit and buses have been very top-down- and marks an important step forward.

47 Interview, 1 December 2020.
A view of the chaotic New Taxi Park situated in the very heart of downtown Kampala
A cyclist uses a new KCCA bicycle lane, part of a small network recently installed in some areas of Kampala.
In addition to the various actors outlined above, there has been significant work by a number of NGOs and think tanks to initiate stakeholder dialogues and generate forums for ongoing discussion about the need for inclusive public transport reforms. These organisations have also engaged in meaningful research into the changing dynamics in the sector. These activities have often been supported by academics, particularly from the College of Engineering, Design, Art and Technology (CEDAT) and the Economic Policy Research Centre, both at Makerere University. Among the organisations engaging in research and advocacy in this area is FES-Uganda, sometimes also in partnership with other international organisations such as the Global Labour Institute (see Spooner and Mwanika 2017; Spooner et al 2020).

Many key NGOs and think tanks are collectively represented through the Civil Society Coalition on Transport in Uganda (CISCOT), a loose coalition of around 25 member organisations with an interest in the transport sector. Membership is open to all non-governmental organisations and CSOs at district and national level with an interest in the sector, from umbrella unions such as ATGWU and organisations representing vehicle owners or drivers, to specialist organisations working on issues such as helping victims of traffic accidents, promoting bicycles, occupational health, and passengers’ rights. CISCOT is part of the National Transport Sector Planning Committee and participates in annual Joint Transport Sector Reviews. Through these events CISCOT has continued to push for legal reforms and improved implementation of existing legal instruments relating to issues such as road safety, workers’ rights and multimodal transport planning. CISCOT has struggled to make an impact on public transport reforms in practice, but in the context of the current multi-stakeholder engagement there may be a growing window of opportunity for influence.
People, vehicles and boda-bodas wait in a traffic jam on a street in downtown Kampala.
8.0 ‘SPOILERS’ IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORM

8.1 Inter-ministerial/agency disputes

If planned transport reforms are to succeed, a large number of government agencies must work effectively in concert. This is true of proposals about streamlining route allocation, promoting larger buses through SACCOs, and providing clear bus stops and route information for users—even without the more ambitious proposals to bring in BRT, LRT, cable cars or a metro. The government agencies that need to be involved include all of the Districts and Municipalities within the GKMA, the MLHUD, MoWT, MoLG, KCCA, UNRA as well as the ministries of Trade and ICT. There are signs that this can happen, and work on mapping out routes has been quite co-operative thus far.48 There are however many tensions in inter-agency relations that continue to cause problems, particularly in relation to the GKMA development and questions of revenue collection and sharing.

One major dispute, which significantly delayed the establishment of the GKMA Authority, related to the question of which ministry the Authority should be based in. Hosting the GKMA was considered to be a significant prize, with power and resources to follow for whichever ministry prevailed in this struggle. A number of ministries and authorities claimed that they would be the most rational place in which to host it. Among those competing were KCCA, the Ministry of Lands, Housing & Urban Development, the Ministry of Local Government, National Planning Authority and the Ministry of Kampala Capital City and Metropolitan Affairs.

Discussions around this were quite advanced by June 2018, and around this time even though the original proposal to Cabinet was for it to be hosted in MKMA, many stakeholders thought it more sensible and likely to be hosted by the MLHUD, which had greater capacity. By 2020 it was clear that it would be hosted in MKMA after all, and this generated significant resentment on the part of MLHUD. Adding a further layer to this is the fact that the Minister of Kampala and Metropolitan Affairs switched places with the Minister of Lands in December 2019 with Beti Kamya moving from the former to the latter position and Betty Amongi moving in the opposite direction. In this sense, the political capital in terms of GKMA development has shifted with Amongi towards MKMA in recent months. Her appointment also seems to coincide with increased resourcing of MKMA.

There was also a lengthy dispute between KCCA and MoWT over the ‘ownership’ of metropolitan transport, with the intention initially being that the Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (MATA) would sit within MoWT. KCCA argued that it made more sense for them to build on their existing transport directorate. With the creation of MKMA in 2016 and its increasing prominence as the leading ministry for GKMA governance (including transport), the role of MoWT in metropolitan transport is likely be further weakened. In general, the increasing resourcing and remit of MKMA involves it taking on a number of responsibilities that currently sit with other ministries, which may generate further tensions in the years to come.

48 Interview, 17 November 2020.
The confusion generated by all these disputes is leading to a wariness among donors about the messages they get from government. One donor representative noted that they seem to get different signals from different parts of government, and this reduces donor confidence in the government’s capacity to manage large transport investments. Meanwhile, the institutional wrangles are clearly a source of frustration to workers in the existing paratransit sector. Although they recognised the significance of MoWT and KCCA, beyond this there was a lack of clarity on institutional structures. When asked which ministry was most relevant overall, one taxi driver noted that ‘They are all the same. They work together to come up with their guidelines to oppress us and kick us out of work.’ Boda-boda drivers also expressed confusion regarding which government agency is ultimately responsible for the sector.

8.2 Inter-jurisdictional disputes

In addition to the above disputes about where to host the GKMA and the different roles each ministry should play, there are ongoing disputes between the different municipalities and districts within the GKMA region, particularly between KCCA and the surrounding municipalities. These disputes can be thought of as legal/technical on the one hand, and political/territorial on the other (though the two are related). An estimated two million people come into Kampala from surrounding districts every day, particularly from Wakiso- over 50 percent of the people working in Kampala live in Wakiso (World Bank, 2017). For any new bus services to stop at the boundaries of Kampala clearly makes no sense. Currently, the disparities between KCCA and surrounding municipalities in terms of infrastructure as well as political authority and technical capacity are huge, with 57% of roads within Kampala being paved as compared to just 16% in Kira Municipality, 11% in Mukono Municipality and 15% in Wakiso District as a whole (COWI 2020).

On the technical side, the vast disparity in resources between KCCA and the surrounding areas means that these municipalities will always be concerned about KCCA dominating the discussions, but the clearly much higher capacity of KCCA means that it is the obvious place for most strategising and technical planning to take place. Yet there are also legal issues to overcome here because the 2010 KCCA Act established Kampala with a level of legal autonomy that other municipalities do not have, since they are governed under the Local Governments Act and accountable to MoLG. This created institutional design challenges for the GKMA and Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (MATA). These problems further increased with the creation of MKMA, because while this ministry is now responsible for metropolitan governance, the municipalities are still legally accountable to MoLG.

In addition to these technical and legal issues there are political/territorial challenges associated with the imbalance of power and authority between Kampala and its surrounding districts. There are concerns that if KCCA dominates the discussion, the needs of the surrounding districts would not be adequately taken into account. One stakeholder referred to this as the KCCA ‘big brother syndrome’.

49 Focus group discussion, 3 November 2020.
50 Focus group discussion, 23 November 2020.
51 Interview, 10 December 2020.
52 Interview, 28 October 2020.
This imbalance was in theory addressed with the creation of MKMA, which is explicitly tasked with metropolitan affairs. However, given its present lack of actual staff and capacity, MKMA has tended to depend on KCCA’s capacity, which simply recreates the ‘big brother syndrome’.53

In the words of another stakeholder involved in the GKMA discussions, ‘the politics of this area always transcends our technical capacities’.54 A political solution to the relationship between different jurisdictional authorities with highly imbalanced power relations has yet to be found. One of the major points of contention is around revenue sharing between KCCA and the municipalities. Under the existing system, in which most public transport is provided by paratransit, fees are collected at taxi parks and stages and filter back to the municipality. With the introduction of large numbers of buses these fees would no longer apply, and the ways in which revenues from bus transport should be shared among different territorial jurisdictions remains unresolved.55

8.3 Limited support from the Presidency and Ministry of Finance

Over the past two decades, there has been a long history of presidential interventions that have undermined attempts by Kampala City Council, and subsequently KCCA, to tax and regulate the informal transport sector (Goodfellow and Titeca 2012; Muwanga et al 2020). These forms of top-down intervention are also widely seen as impeding efforts to move projects such as BRT forward, seen as they are alongside a general inertia and lack of support from the top which has made it very difficult to get transformative transport projects off the ground. There is a pervasive sense that despite the energy around the idea of BRT from 2010-2013 when the pre-feasibility and feasibility studies were undertaken, BRT has since been de-prioritised to the point that some observers even thought that the idea was ‘dead’.56

For several observers, a key cause delaying the progression of BRT plans had been the Ministry of Finance’s failure to write the letter to the World Bank actually requesting funds for this ($500m for the first phase). MoF is the only Ministry with the authority to formally make this request. The fact that it took a very long time to make an official request for funding for BRT reflects, in the view of some stakeholders, the ongoing pressure exerted by a powerful ‘mafia with strong political connections’ that continues to control the transport system, despite the decline of UTODA.57 The long delay on the part of the MoF in approving the application for World Bank funding for BRT was a source of great frustration to actors in other relevant ministries. One such stakeholder noted that ‘they simply aren’t engaging. We’ve lost a lot of time, a lot of opportunities’.58 For some people it was inexplicable that funding for BRT had not been officially requested even 7 years after the World Bank-funded feasibility study.

53 Interview, 10 December 2020.
54 Interview, 2 November 2020
55 Interview, 10 December 2020.
56 Interview, 17 November 2020.
57 Interview, 3 November 2020.
58 Interview, 2 November 2020.
Despite this, as noted above there was some renewed optimism by November 2020 that BRT was coming back onto the agenda because the MoF finally issued the letter to the World Bank (though the World Bank still has major reservations, mainly relating to issues discussed in Sections 8.12 and 8.13 below). This might indicate a shift in the President’s thinking, though the ongoing push from donors may also have helped. Generally, however, it seems clear that The President ‘is not very passionate about public transport’ and ‘other things make more sense to him’ in terms of prioritising infrastructure and other development programmes.\(^{59}\) For many observers, this really is the key challenge, noting that ‘If we have the political backing, everything will fall in place’, regardless of whether current players in the sector support the changes.\(^{60}\) In other words, there is a sense that many other political and economic challenges could be overcome with a strong indication of support from the top.

### 8.4 An absence of identifiable ‘champions’

Related to this is the broader sense of an absence of ‘champions’ at the ministerial level for the modernisation of public transport. MoWT is committed to the agenda but ‘they don’t have the push that you might want’,\(^{61}\) while the MoF has been very slow to act and MKMA still suffers from a major lack of capacity and staff. Ministers and bureaucrats are also frequently reshuffled—just as they start to develop an enhanced interest and understanding in public transport they are moved on. Several observers noted that without a clear push from the Presidency, the agenda would never really gain momentum, and despite the speculation noted above in relation to BRT, clear Presidential support has yet to materialise. As some technical staff noted, politicians are generally not conversant in public transport issues and are unexcited to hear about them. Even those who might potentially be passionate supporters of urban transport reform often tend to ‘go with the flow, believing that there is no point in devoting too much energy to it without [the President’s] support.’\(^{62}\) It is also notable that despite the presence of a Parliamentary Committee on Physical Infrastructure, Parliament has had a very limited role within the process of debating and scrutinising proposed public transport plans—a reflection of its limited role in Uganda’s political dispensation more generally.

There was also a sense that the difficulty in finding ministerial level champions created a sort of vicious circle. As one technical expert noted in relation to BRT and related reforms, ‘Maybe it’s a failure on our side as we’ve not marketed the project well, but that’s because we don’t have a good champion.’\(^{63}\) Many of the projects that do get prioritised are those in which senior ministers and officials find a way to benefit personally, and without this kind of ‘sugar coating’ the only way to find champions within government would be if there was significant external pressure. On this basis it was noted that raising the profile of the value of enhanced public transport in the media would be extremely helpful, because the media holds a lot of sway in Uganda and especially Kampala. It should also be noted that certain issues relating to urban transportation do seem to have been politically prioritised— for example, road upgrades within Kampala, including better linkages to industrial zones etc, are actually mentioned in the NRM manifesto. This makes it more likely they will be delivered.

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59 Interview, 2 November 2020.
60 Interview, 17 November 2020.
61 Interview, 3 November 2020.
62 Interview, 3 November 2020.
63 Interview, 2 November 2020.
It is also important to note the potential role of organised users of public transport, since consumer voices are key in building necessary pressure from below to demand for better public transportation. They have already started to exert their voice through consumers’ organisations such as CONSENT.

### 8.5 Delays to GKMA and MATA development

The idea of a GKMA is mentioned in the KCCA Act (2010) as a goal to work towards, and again in the National Development Plan, but has proved very difficult to actually realise. This has been a crucial obstacle to progress because, in the words of one transport specialist, ‘you can’t get a functional metropolitan transport system without a metropolitan transport authority- this is absolutely fundamental’.

Discussion around metropolitan governance in the GKMA have been going on for a long time, becoming particularly intense since around 2018. However it was around this time that President Museveni announced that the proliferation of quasi-governmental agencies was proving to be costly and inefficient, and on this basis he issued a moratorium on the creation of any such new agencies or authorities, as well as demanding the consolidation of some existing ones. This threw the GKMA and transport authority plans into disarray.

This was particularly problematic because a number of important donors, including DFID and the World Bank, said that they would only be prepared to issue funds for various urban projects (including the third phase of the Bank’s major urban institutional and infrastructure support programme, KIIDP) if the question of metropolitan governance was resolved. This further exacerbated the tensions described above, because it was clear that whichever ministry won the struggle to host the GKMA would be the recipient of major international resources. In the words of one observer, ‘suddenly there was a pie- and you know what happens when there is a pie.’ These ongoing conflicts over ‘ownership’ of GKMA generated further delays.

Following these delays, however, it was clear by 2020 that the GMKA would be hosted within the Ministry of Kampala Capital City and Metropolitan Affairs (MKMA) and would be able to go ahead within that ministry, despite the ban on new authorities. MKMA was selected despite being widely considered the weakest of the possible host organisations. The decision caused some concern among external stakeholders who were worried about the capacity of this new ministry, which until very recently was often described as being just a shell, staffed by as few as two people in the Prime Minister’s Office. However, the Ministry is now said to be expanding, with more staff and its own premises, making it better placed to host the Authority. The flow of knowledge between the Ministry and KCCA is also has improved considerably over the last couple of years, with key personnel moving frequently between the two.

A further question relates to the Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (MATA) that was advocated in the National Transport Master Plan (NTMP), and whether or not this will actually materialise.

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64 Interview, 6 November 2020.
65 Various interviews with key stakeholders.
66 Interview, 28 October 2020.
The MoWT was pushing hard for this Authority to be developed, but there was a conflict with KCCA around 2014, with the city authority arguing that under the 2010 KCCA Act the mandate to organise transport within the city sat with them, not MoWT. KCCA officials thus maintained that to create MATA within MoWT would amount to an unnecessary duplication of effort. This challenge over executive ‘ownership’ of metropolitan transport (and, relatedly, of BRT) has not yet been fully resolved. Despite MATA being deemed vital in the National Transport Master Plan, the mid-term review of the NTMP noted that by 2018 ‘there appears to be no progress towards enacting a law for its establishment’ (MoWT 2018: A-79). The prohibition of new authorities mentioned above also created problems for MATA. By 2020, some stakeholders thought that the idea of MATA was effectively ‘dead’ now that metropolitan governance was shifting more clearly to the MKMA67 - but this leaves the question of ultimate responsibility of transport at the metropolitan level unresolved.

8.6 Uncoordinated planning and institutional silos

The many actors and interests involved have tended to reproduce problems of uncoordinated planning and institutional silos, particularly given the conflicts noted above. People working within the system who are committed to transport reform and who have the authority to approve projects have a tendency to try many different things at once, in the hope that something will work, but this reproduces and exacerbates problems of coordination.68 The tendency to think about one mode of transport at a time, rather than a more area/route-based approach that takes into account the integration of different modes of transport in specific nodes, further perpetuates this fragmentation.

Institutional silos and donors’ pet projects often exacerbate this problem. For example, The EU is keen to push upgrading the metre-gauge railway, there is a strong BRT lobby from the World Bank (specifically the team who supported the BRT in Dar es Salaam), a strong light rail lobby within the Ministry of Works and Transport (linked to previous work on the SGR), and KCCA has been particularly keen on pushing cable cars. Even MoWT itself is said to be characterised by significant silos. In many cases, the people lobbying for these transport modes are not thinking much about the integration that will inevitably have to be central to any effective approach in Kampala. There is a tendency to see other transport modes as being in direct competition to those that a particular actor is lobbying for. Given that specific revenue flows tend to follow specific transport modes, the politics of this are very challenging.69

Issues of poor coordination, blockages and lack of cooperation between ministries aren’t always resolved as quickly as could be hoped for, for reasons to do with bureaucratic protocol. Actors within a given government department often do not feel that they can criticise other agencies and ministries, or people within their own ministry - even when it is clear what blockages and/or delays are being caused by.

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67 Interview, 10 December 2020.
68 Interview, 19 November 2020.
69 Various interviews, October-November 2020.
8.7 Financial and budgetary challenges

In many respects, financing is one of the less-significant challenges, given the substantial number of international donors apparently willing to provide resources for public transport infrastructure. As one donor representative noted, ‘the finance is the easiest’.70 The issue however is whether certain terms attached to the financing can be met, in particular with regard to the institutional arrangements noted above and the absence of clear plans on how to manage routes and incorporate the existing paratransit sector, as discussed below. While willing to provide finance in principle, donors are increasingly wary about disbursing funds for transport infrastructure in the GKMA beyond various feasibility studies and technical assistance, due to the evident institutional challenges at the metropolitan scale. Some local government stakeholders also express concern about the longterm sustainability of dependence on donor funding for transport initiatives, highlighting the importance of innovative funding solutions to enable budgeting for transport over time.71

8.8 Opportunism and lack of experience in the private sector

Opportunities for training and capacity building in bus provision have been very limited; some people have travelled to neighbouring countries to learn but the majority simply learn on the job.72 The experience of Pioneer Easy Bus Ltd has been a cautionary one, given the numerous problems it has faced, as discussed above in Section 4.1. According to one former PEBL representative, ‘the company degenerated so fast because it was not run on business principle... Company meetings could easily degenerate into physical abuse.’73 The following quote illustrates the severity of the poor management of the PEBL and its consequences:

‘The managers of PEBL should have no one else to blame for the management crises that they experience, especially when they collect money and keep it in their pockets and the drawers of managers and owners. Even with a fleet of about 100, only 40 were operational. The company doesn't have a workshop to service or repair their fleet. That is how a serious bus company manning city transport operates. And by the way, those buses don't even have parts to replace worn out ones, and that explains the many buses rotting away outside Namboole Stadium, let alone the absence of comprehensive insurance which puts the company into serious court cases. Further, PEBL used to bank with Cairo Bank, but after several cases of compensation and the company failing to pay, court attached the accounts which further sunk the already bedridden company.’74

There is some concern that Tondeka may recreate some of these challenges, but on a much larger scale. In addition to the various problems with Tondeka outlined above, the relationship between Tondeka Metro and the planned BRT remains unclear.

70 Interview, 16 November 2020.
71 Interview, 4 November 2020.
72 Interview, 7 November 2020.
73 Interview, 5 November 2020.
74 Interview, 5 November 2020.
According to one report, Tondeka is seen as being a likely precursor of the future BRT system, but this may run into problems due to the lack of clarity regarding ultimate ownership of the project. Since Tondeka is structured as a private sector-led initiative, and BRT infrastructure would have to be implemented by government, conversion of Tondeka into a government BRT initiative ‘would likely have legal and cost challenges’ (Cardno 2020c: 26).

### 8.9 Failure to adequately incorporate the informal sector into transport plans

The question of how to incorporate existing providers in the paratransit sector is one of the most difficult and urgent challenges which must be grappled with if proposals to bring in a large scale bus systems are to succeed. As noted in Section 2, the way in which the sector evolved historically created incentives for lots of people to invest in paratransit, with this sector growing exponentially over several decades. This means that there is a huge challenge in terms of getting buy-in from these existing players and helping to find an ‘exit route’ for them within any proposed new system.\(^{75}\) This may involve creating opportunities for existing investors in buses and taxies to come together to purchase and operate buses, via SACCOs. There is a ‘huge army’ of workers in the sector; the question of how to compensate those displaced, to help them to purchase assets and to provide any necessary retraining is arguably an even greater conundrum than issues of institutional coordination, infrastructure finance and the securing of rights of way.\(^{76}\) In the boda-boda sector, for example, a recent study estimated that over 50,000 riders would be affected by the implementation of current BRT plans (Spooner and Mwanika 2020: 48).

This is not just a matter of employing former paratransit workers within any new bus system: there also needs to be recognition of the role that both taxis and boda-bodas could continue to play in Kampala. Even with all the finance, regulations and infrastructure in place, buses are highly unlikely to be able fully cope with transport demands in the spatial and topographical context of Kampala.\(^{77}\) Until a possible exit route is found, people will continue to invest in taxis and boda-bodas, making the transition even more challenging. There is also a ‘chain of benefits’ in terms of the people who depend on these industries, and this needs to be fully taken into account. Touts have already officially been banned in the recent revision to the Traffic and Road Safety Act, and it remains to be seen how enforceable this is given the large numbers of people involved. As well as reflecting concerns about crime, the rationale for prohibiting touts was to allow more income to flow to the operators of taxi services without increasing fares, thus helping them to accumulate capital to invest in larger vehicles.\(^{78}\) Representatives from the taxi sector made clear the extent of these concerns, and the degree to which they would not hesitate to ‘wage war’ on buses if their livelihoods were not taken into account, particularly based on their past experiences:

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75 Interview, 17 November 2020.
76 Interview, 10 December 2020.
77 Interview, 17 November 2020; interview, 30 November 2020
78 Interview, 17 November 2020.
‘UTODA used to take a lot of our money without showing us accountability but we have been able to survive on the little money that we save. Now, we don’t want to hear of any court cases, we will wage war on the buses. Nobody can clap and ululate when somebody is taking away our job. The introduction of buses can be compared to a situation where one tells you to leave your job.’

These concerns were shared by a local opposition politician, who noted that:

‘The commuter taxi system has withstood the test of time, it is resilient, and considering any new public transport reforms, people in the taxi business should be considered. Taxis won’t be eliminated by competition or natural processes….We can’t afford to simply eliminate young men from employment for the sake of introducing a ‘modern’ transport system.’

This question of how to incorporate existing forms of paratransit has been the subject of recent work funded by AFD. AFD brought in the consultancy firm Transitec which, in partnership with academics from Makerere University, organised a series of consultative fora to bring key stakeholders together with a view to engaging them in more productive discussions about the relationship between taxis and buses in the city. Some stakeholders worry that too much attention has been paid to incorporating existing workers into BRT specifically, and this is distracting from a more holistic focus on a multi-modal ‘whole transport system’ approach. It was also emphasised by many that the ‘last mile’ problem is substantial in the context of unplanned settlements that are not easily accessible to conventional forms of public transport. The need for paratransit as part of an integrated system will therefore continue.

On the positive side, some transport experts believe that the ownership model of taxis in Kampala (documented in Spooner et al., 2020) is actually a sound basis for improvement in the sector, because there are lots of owners operating on the ground with 25+ years’ experience. This contrasts with the domination of ‘absentee’ owners in some countries such as Ghana. The experience of South Africa is also instructive here, given the relative success in bringing former taxi workers into BRT systems in several South African cities. One of the things that happened in South Africa was that a capital remittance was provided on the basis of trading in old minibus-taxis, with people being provided on this basis with an interest in the BRT system. Although there is now increased discussion, these kinds of issues were not previously factored into proposed shifts to mass transit in Kampala/GKMA. To learn from the South African experience, key Ugandan stakeholders went on a week-long study tour of South African cities in December 2020.

79 Interview, 14 November 2020.
80 Interview, 14 November 2020.
81 Interview, 19 November 2020.
82 Interview, 6 November 2020.
83 Interview, 10 December 2020.
8.10 The debate on the value and constitution of an ‘apex body’

A number of key stakeholders in the ongoing consultation on incorporating paratransit are very keen to work towards the realisation of an overarching ‘apex body’ in the taxi sector. One stated that ‘if an apex body can be established I think we’ll have a better system’, because currently the taxi drivers ‘don’t have one voice’. The desire for a collective voice is also clear among both taxi and boda-boda drivers.

Working with one or a small number of associations is also easier from a governance perspective than attempting to maintain a dialogue with a larger number of fragmented organisations. The development of an apex body would build on the history of co-operative organisation in many African countries including Uganda, whereby primary co-operatives came together into unions and federations, with an apex organisation at the very top that was often imposed by the colonial or post-colonial state (Wanyama et al. 2009).

While there are efforts currently ongoing to deepen discussions between the taxi sector, government agencies, and international donors, these efforts do not presently include the boda-boda sector. The exclusion of the large number of transport providers from these discussions around a potential apex body has been justified on the grounds of not wanting to introduce too much complexity too quickly, but also poses potential risks as it may be difficult to effectively accommodate their interests later on. The creation of an apex body also poses other risks, because the degree to which it represents drivers can easily become diluted over time, as happened in the case of UTODA. The South African experience also offers cautionary lessons in terms of the value of such an apex body, given the increased association of this agency (SANTACO) with politicisation and extortionate fees, though of course this is a very different national and urban context. It has sometimes been the case in Uganda’s own history, as in many other African countries, that apex bodies have acted as an instrument of the state to exert political control over co-operative organisation. This tendency to centralise co-operatives was undermined by several decades of liberalisation (Wanyama et al. 2009), but might be reproduced through current efforts, and the benefits of this remain disputed among stakeholders.

8.11 Fragmentation and politicisation of informal sector organisation

People in the taxi industry themselves acknowledge that they have a major problem of being disunited, as well as a lack of resources and money, and they want to overcome these problems. Several stakeholders noted that new associations pop up all the time. These organisations also very easily become politicised.

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84 Interview, 1 December 2020; others??
85 Focus group discussion, 23 November.
86 Interview, 6 November 2020.
87 Various interviews and correspondence, November-December 2020.
The setting up of leadership elections within taxi associations leads to further politicisation, because people competing for association leadership often use allegiance to particular political parties in order to gain support and resources. This politicisation is apparently getting worse, given the level of fragmentation in the sector. Often leadership candidates will accuse rivals of being supporters of opposition parties, to sow division and confusion. It is recognised that different members of taxi organisations support different political parties, but on the whole there is no open campaigning in taxi parks and stages. Because explicitly discussing political affiliation is something of a taboo, much of the current politicisation involves secrecy and the casting of aspersions on potential opponents.

Worsening this is the fact that when politicians seek to engage people in the sector, which is common during election times, some drivers maintain that the ‘wrong people’ are the ones invited, creating political dynamics from the top down that generate further conflict in the sector. Finding a balance between achieving greater political support for public transport reform issues on one hand, and politicising the sector further by fuelling factional splits and inter-associational conflicts on the other, is an ongoing challenge. Fragmentation and politicisation also exacerbates challenges of safety and insecurity in the sector, which in turn poses particular challenges for the entry of women into this sector. Working in transport is both considered highly unsafe and stigmatised for women at present, which further perpetuates gender inequalities, in addition to the fact that public transport involves particular dangers to women as users.

### 8.12 Land acquisition and resettlement plans for BRT

One of the reasons given for the stalling of earlier moves to initiate BRT in 2013/14 is that the government failed to develop a clear plan for compensation and resettlement. Land acquisition is notoriously expensive and difficult in the GKMA. Donors are currently attempting to give the government a clear message that they can assemble an appropriate financial package for BRT but will only do so if the project is likely to be able to go ahead without issues of land access stalling procedures, and with plans for resettlement of displaced populations being clarified. For some major donors, questions of land acquisition and right of way are the central issue that needs to be addressed before funding can be disbursed.

A government source also pointed out that donors generally don’t provide funds for land acquisition, so these funds have to be sourced from within, which feeds into the issues raised above about ministerial support, since there is a dependence on MoF approval for projects involving substantial land acquisition to go ahead. As donor representatives stress however, it is not just a case of finding the funds for land acquisition, but also how you actually get them to the relevant landholders in a fair and equitable way— a problem exacerbated by absentee landlords and multiple claimants to plots under the complex

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88 Interview, 2 November 2020.
89 Focus group discussions, 2-3 November 2020.
90 Focus group discussions, 2-3 November 2020.
91 For a discussion of this in relation to the Kampala-Entebbe Expressway, see Goodfellow and Huang (2020).
92 Interview, 26 November 2020.
93 Interview, 2 November 2020.
mailo system. Even though current BRT plans reportedly acquire quite minimal land acquisition due to being on major arterial routes, the initial BRT feasibility study costed land acquisition at around $20 million and this may have doubled since.94

8.13 Creating a fair and effective process for route allocation

The need to develop a fair, effective and robust system of route allocation is one of the most immediately pressing challenges. Given that one of the main short- to medium-term strategies of the government is to enable existing paratransit operators to come together in SACCOs to claim a space on specific routes, including through buying larger buses, it is vital that they provide assurance that any such investment can be recouped by removing or reducing competition on their routes. Making operations profitable and efficient will also eventually require dedicated lanes and stages to ensure faster operation, and to allow buses to be competitive relative to smaller forms of paratransit which are likely to continue operating.

There are concerns about one single company, such as Tondeka, coming in and dominating the scene, without adequate opportunities for other groups of existing paratransit operators to come together as SACCOs and run their own bus operations. There are also problems with the statutory instruments that provide for bus operation in Kampala, according to one opposition figure, particularly in terms of the way it facilitates a monopoly on bus provision. This person also noted problems such as the law saying no person should be allowed onto formal buses with luggage. This is inconsistent with the idea that paratransit commuter vehicles should stop at the edges of the city and then transfer people to buses, since many people coming into the city carry luggage.95

According to one source involved in discussions with taxi operators, about 85% of them were actually happy with a route-based system once they heard more about it− at first they were suspicious, but now they feel included. Much of the resistance to route-based approaches in the past has been due to a lack of information and consultation.96 More generally however, it is clear that any actual process of route allocation is likely to be fraught with difficulty and will require significant consultation in order to have a chance of success. As one group of drivers noted, ‘the most recent route charts greatly affected our work because they didn’t invite us to consultation. We don’t follow them because they are unrealistic and if we are to follow them, we will not have customers taking taxis.’97

In the context of the abolition of touts, which is intended to facilitate low fares and greater capital accumulation by operators, there is also an intention to introduce digital technologies to provide users with all the relevant information about routes.98

94 Interview, 26 November 2020.
95 Interview, 14 November 2020.
96 Interview, 1 December 2020
97 Focus group discussion, 3 November 2020.
98 Interview, 17 November 2020
This is however likely to be very difficult to effect at a technical level, given that routes are likely to be allocated in a piecemeal and ongoing way and the potential for digital technologies to be inaccurate or ineffective seems high, at least in the short term.

### 8.14 Regulatory capture and conflicts of interest

Some representatives of the bus sector noted that individuals working for regulatory and contracting institutions including MoWT, KCCA and local authorities outside the city, are also investors and/or bus owners. This creates a lack of fairness in route allocation, as well as creating monopolies in some areas. These concerns were echoed by a number of stakeholders in the taxi sector.

This sense of a strong distrust in government regulatory institutions is likely to create further difficulties in terms of compliance to regulatory structures in the future. More generally, conflicts of interest in the sector are clearly a key issue, including with respect to the ownership structures of companies such as Pioneer and the proposed Tondeka scheme.

### 8.15 COVID-19-related challenges

The COVID-19 crisis and its associated lockdown measures have illustrated the severity of problems facing the public transport sector, the extent of livelihoods depending on it and the challenges that face anybody attempting to radically alter contemporary arrangements. During the period of lockdown, KCCA and the new Minister for Kampala and Metropolitan Affairs Betty Amongi made a concerted attempt to ‘reset’ the sector, using the four-month public transport suspension to introduce strict new rules and routes, including an entirely boda-boda free zone in the CBD. KCCA also undertook a huge taxi and boda-boda registration exercise and attempted to use this as the basis for a new route-based licensing system.

As of mid-November 2020, transport services were said to be operating at 30% capacity.

In the view of some observers, the severity and suddenness of this approach was ill-advised, recreating the lack of consultation associated with past efforts. The attempt to ‘re-set’ public transport was also widely considered to have failed. Despite a great deal of press during the summer about the boda-boda exclusion zone, subsequently delayed until November, few sources believe this is workable. More generally, aggressive moves towards the removal of boda-bodas from parts of the city are thought to be out of step with the needs of Kampala’s residents and also with more general trends towards ‘micro-mobility’ in global transport policy. The effects of COVID-19 also have important health and safety consequences, with drivers being asked not to wear helmets or provide them for riders.

99 Interview, 7 November 2020.
100 Interview, 4 November; interview, 9 November.
101 Interview, 17 December 2020.
102 Interview, 6 November 2020.
103 Interview, 28 October 2020.
104 Interview, 30 November 2020.
which reverses many years of work on getting drivers to wear helmets, given the scale of often fatal motorcycle accidents in the city.\textsuperscript{105}

The question of an exit route for the tens of thousands of boda-boda drivers likely to be affected by any exclusion zone, as well as taxi owners and drivers affected by measures relating to COVID-19, is thus thrown into an even starker light by the events of 2020. The ways in which this was managed may however make negotiations harder, if public transport workers believe they cannot trust KCCA and other relevant government agencies. There is a sense that the experience during the lockdown period has resulted in heightened anger and mistrust among boda-boda drivers, making them less inclined to have faith in government interventions that appear to be in their favour.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{105} Interview, 30 November 2020.

\textsuperscript{106} Interview, 6 November 2020.
A traffic police officer makes signals to drivers at a busy junction as he manages the flow of traffic on one of the arterial roads leading to the centre of Kampala.
9.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Conclusions

This report has set out the history of the evolution of the urban public transport sector in the GKMA and the key players on the contemporary urban public transport scene. This complex composition and constellation of interests in the sector has resulted in a number of significant ongoing challenges, which have been set out here in the form of fifteen distinct ‘spoilers’. These have the potential to obstruct inclusive and sustainable reforms, and need to be carefully considered in ongoing attempts to transform public transport in the GKMA. This conclusion underlines some of the most significant cross-cutting challenges before presenting a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis of the current public transport context, as well an analysis of key challenges through the PESTEL (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental and Legal) framework. It then makes some recommendations.

One of the most important issues concerns how to generate sustained commitment from the Presidency, and related to this the Ministry of Finance, so that a range of committed stakeholders (including donors with substantial resources on offer) can pursue a consistent path over time without severe political disruption. In particular, sustained commitment on issues such as developing a fair system of regulation and route allocation that is not politically undermined, streamlining processes of land acquisition, and enhanced transparency in procurement processes, are likely to be central. Enhanced commitment and consistency in relation to these issues has the potential to open up a wide range of financing opportunities. Such heightened commitment is likely to require the identification of clear ‘champions’ within key ministries, as well as continuous work to promote understanding of the importance and value of transport reforms, including through the media.

However, while this buy-in from the top is clearly extremely important, there is also the risk that waiting for the President to demonstrate commitment could delay important processes or gradually drain the commitment of other key actors. The more that people believe change can only happen with a major Presidential intervention, the less those people have the energy to try and push for change themselves. While Presidential support is of course hugely important, it depends on building momentum at other levels of government. There is also a danger in believing that this support will solve all problems, because there are many other technical, socioeconomic and regulatory challenges too, all of which could undermine Presidential commitment even if it has been achieved. In this sense working steadily to build support for this agenda at the very top must go hand in hand with lots of other strategic work to address challenges lower down the chain.

A second key cluster of issues relates to inter-governmental co-ordination, as discussed in points 8.1 and 8.2 above. In particular, the relative roles of MKMA, MoWT and KCCA need to be further clarified, and so too do the relationships between KCCA and the surrounding districts and municipalities, particularly concerning questions of revenue sharing. While the relationships among key ministries appear to be becoming somewhat clearer with the rising significance of MKMA, there is still a lack of a clear political solution as to how to involve the various municipalities who all have a strong stake in what happens in the GKMA but who have very constrained capacity, especially when compared to KCCA. With
the resolution of some of these issues of governmental co-ordination, any issues concerning donor co-ordination and donor silos are likely also to improve, since donors tend to respond to ministerial agendas. Enhanced inter-governmental coordination is also likely to improve the prospects at the level of integration of the transport systems themselves. There are signs of increased commitment to a more integrated and multi-modal approach to urban public transport than in the past, including with regards to the role of BRT. Rather than being seen as a ‘be-all and end-all’, as has sometimes been the case, expectations of BRT are becoming more realistic, and the need for it to connect with a range of other modalities of public transport in a context such as Kampala is increasingly acknowledged.

A third key set of issues relates to the nature of multi-stakeholder engagement, which parties should be involved in these projects going forward, and what role the state should play in creating and organising an apex body in the urban public transport sector. The work currently taking place to bring stakeholders together and develop a shared understanding of challenges in the sector, and the need to integrate paratransit, is unprecedented in Kampala. Despite a difficult start, discussions have improved with each successive multi-stakeholder workshop, and this could provide an important shift in mentality with regard to the future role of paratransit in the modernisation of transport in the city. However, the question of when and how (rather than if) to include the boda-boda sector in these processes is crucial. There are also dangers in imposing a top-down form of apex organisation on the sector, particularly if this leads to large components within the sector feeling that they are not truly represented. If the structures of organisation are seen to either replicate a UTODA-like organisation, highly politicised and lacking channels for drivers’ voices, or emulating some of the top down attempts by KCCA to reorganise the sector, this could generate sustained resistance and possibly disruptive political interventions. It is also unclear whether the apex body will be national or limited to the GKMA, and what the relationship between high-level bodies at different geographical scales would be.

### 9.2 SWOT and PESTEL analysis

The following two tables summarise the key findings and challenges in the form of SWOT and PESTEL analyses.
## SWOT analysis

### STRENGTHS
- Relations between KCCA and MKMA have improved, with an increased sense of a shared agenda for reform
- The ownership profile and depth of experience in the taxi sector provides a good basis for reform
- The existing rail network provides a sound basis for scaling up commuter trains
- Limited land acquisition is required for the first proposed pilot phase of BRT
- Current consultation processes bringing together paratransit operators with government agencies are reportedly going well

### WEAKNESSES
- Inter-ministerial tensions and disputes over metropolitan governance and metropolitan transport planning are not fully resolved
- Limited Presidential commitment
- Arrangements between KCCA and surrounding municipalities unresolved, including in relation to revenue sharing
- Tondeka Metro has not yet found finance and has important unresolved issues over ownership, strategy and de facto monopoly
- Both the taxi sector and boda-boda sector remain organisationally very fragmented
- The costs of land acquisition and inadequate procedures for compensation and resettlement remain an impediment to transport investments
- The fate of MATA or an equivalent metropolitan transport planning agency remains unclear

### OPPORTUNITIES
- A substantial number of donors show continued willingness to finance major transport infrastructure
- Increased resourcing of MKMA enhances its capacity to lead on metropolitan governance
- Signs that the consultative fora supported by French development assistance are significantly enhancing dialogue among stakeholders
- Despite criticism of measures during the lockdown, the COVID-19 pandemic has generated heightened energy for transport reform
- The extent of congestion increases the incentives for a sustained commitment to non-motorised transport
- There is an increased willingness to learn from other countries, including through the experience of integrating paratransit in South Africa

### THREATS
- Individual ministries and donors tend to champion specific modes of transport, which can perpetuate silos and impede integrated planning
- Lack of a clear exit route for paratransit workers could lead to political instability
- Risk of deeper politicisation of informal transport associations is high, and could undermine efforts to develop a unified voice for transport workers
- The effort to build an ‘apex body’ to represent the whole taxi sector could lead to renewed exploitation and a lack of genuine representation
- Exclusion of boda-bodas from current multi-stakeholder dialogues
- Incentives for private sector actors to invest in buses and other forms of transport are undermined by lack of clear rights of way
- Attempts to implement an effective system of route allocation risk being undermined by regulatory capture and attempts to maintain political support in the city
Building on the above SWOT analysis, we can further break down the nature of the challenges facing reform efforts in the sector through a PESTEL analysis, which classifies factors in relation to political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal threats.

**PESTEL analysis**

| **POLITICAL**                                                                                                                                  | **ECONOMIC**                                                                                           |
|IODGOLP | Limited political buy-in from Presidency and other key ministries                                                                                     |
|IODGOLP | Inter-ministerial conflicts over spheres of authority or favoured transport modes                                                                     |
|IODGOLP | Resistance to mass transit among key stakeholders benefitting from existing system                                                                    |
|IODGOLP | Renewed efforts by politicians to build support among paratransit workers by stalling transport reforms                                               |
|IODGOLP | Politicisation and factionalism in the paratransit sector impede development of a collective agenda                                                   |
|IODGOLP | Lack of profitability of bus companies due to ongoing competition from paratransit on the same routes                                               |
|IODGOLP | Cost of land acquisition and resettlement                                                                                                            |
|IODGOLP | Lack of training and business skills in the bus sector                                                                                              |
|IODGOLP | Efforts towards import substitution could raise the cost of acquiring vehicles                                                                   |

<p>| <strong>SOCIAL</strong>                                                                                                                                          | <strong>TECHNOLOGICAL</strong>                                                                                           |
|IODGOLP | Enormous challenge of alternative livelihoods for workers displaced from paratransit                                                              |
|IODGOLP | Rising insecurity in the paratransit sector                                                                                                       |
|IODGOLP | Lack of gender equity among both drivers and in terms of livelihoods in the sector                                                               |
|IODGOLP | Difficulties in ensuring access to mass transit in the context of hills, swamps and large unplanned settlements |
|IODGOLP | Ageing vehicles and lack of spare parts for new vehicular forms such as tuk-tuks and electric vehicles                                             |
|IODGOLP | Social media tax reducing uptake of app-based innovations                                                                                         |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENVIRONMENTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worsening environmental pollution due to increased congestion, urban heat island effects and ageing vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impact of COVID-19 and other public health crises</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>LEGAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Different legal status of KCCA relative to municipalities leads to different lines of accountability within GKMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent and unrealistic legislation regarding use of buses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal status of Tondeka remains unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal framework does not adequately militate against monopolies</td>
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9.3 Recommendations

Based on the analysis provided here, this report makes a number of key recommendations.

• The question of which government agency will ultimately lead on matters of metropolitan transport governance needs to be clarified, as does the question of the Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (or an equivalent organisation) and its legal and administrative relationships to MoWT, MKMA and KCCA. Without much clearer structures not just for metropolitan governance but specifically for metropolitan transport governance, past conflicts and obstructions are likely to be reproduced and donors will be reluctant to disburse funds for large-scale mass transit.

• There is an urgent need to develop a model for revenue sharing from bus transport and any other planned forms of mass transit between municipalities, due to the loss of municipal revenues from existing taxi parks. This will require a dialogue about inter-jurisdictional roles and responsibilities which involves serious engagement with the concerns of districts and municipalities around KCCA.

• Pockets of commitment to inclusive, multi-modal transport reform that currently exist within government agencies and civil society need to be linked together, both in building a coherent vision and in generating a media profile to popularise this vision. This is likely to be an important strategy in finding high profile ‘champions’ and securing greater commitment from the Presidency and key ministers.

• While there may be sound reasons for beginning the discussion on generating an overarching apex body without representatives of the boda-boda sector, there is an urgent need to begin serious discussions with a range of boda-boda representatives about their potential future roles in the city. These discussions should then be brought together with the broader stakeholder dialogue as soon as it is feasible to do so. The risks of integration taking place without the accommodation of boda-boda drivers are likely to be substantial. Any achievements of multi-stakeholder discussion that have taken place without them might be undermined by interventions from the President or other political actors in favour of boda-boda drivers, which could seriously disorganise the achievements of current stakeholder dialogues.

• More generally, for an apex body to be successful in this political context it is imperative that it is built from the bottom up, involving a wide range of members of existing SACCOs and unions from stage bodies upwards. Determining what exactly the key constituencies are within the complex transport context discussed in this report is an important step, before the question of who legitimately represents these constituencies can be adequately addressed.

• The growing recognition on the need to provide new forms of mass transit while also accommodating certain forms of paratransit provides an opportunity to make public transit in the city more environmentally sustainable, improve public safety, and enhance gender equity both at the level of employment opportunities and passenger experience. These concerns should be part of the discussions as much as possible.
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MOVERS, SPOILERS, AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM


