Alan Boswell

Do local peace deals work? Evidence from South Sudan’s civil war
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Imprint

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KEY FINDINGS

Across five case studies, criteria for successful local peace agreements include …

• Be inclusive of main conflict actors, including the top leaders.
• Be a supplement, not substitute or alternative, to a national peace process.
• Involve credible united civil society mediation with political backing.
• Put emphasis on strong processes during mediation and monitoring mechanisms after.
• Offer structural solutions to structural problems.

However, the ‘pockets of stability’ strategy has clear limitations, especially in areas affected by conflict between national armed actors, and may under certain circumstances pose risks of exacerbating conflict.
INTRODUCTION

In December 2013, violent conflict broke out in South Sudan, the continent’s youngest country which had gained independence only two years earlier. Originally triggered by a political conflict in the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) elite, ethnic divisions soon became a defining feature of the new civil war. To date, the conflict has resulted in close to 400,000 excess deaths,¹ nearly two and a half million South Sudanese refugees in the region² and nearly two million internally displaced persons.³

The first attempted peace accord, the Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), signed in August 2015 and mediated by the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), collapsed when renewed fighting broke out in the capital Juba in July 2016. This led to the further proliferation of armed groups and political fragmentation. The Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), signed in September 2018⁴, has significantly reduced fighting on the ground. Yet the success of the peace process remains in doubt, as implementation has faced repeated delays, and several armed actors have rejected the agreement. As of October 2019, the parties had yet to form the unity power-sharing government envisaged in the agreement.

From the beginning, local dynamics, too, shaped the agendas of armed actors. The link between local and national conflict dynamics is usually complex. For example, the creation of new administrative boundaries further politicized and exacerbated traditional boundary conflicts. Local conflict revolving around cattle grazing is often linked to elites in Juba. The design of the regional peace process poorly reflects these local-national conflict links. In fact, attempts at conflict resolution at the national level may also fuel new violence, such as through ‘cantonment’ policies incentivizing more armed mobilisation by local actors.

The localised conflict dynamics and the difficulties in reaching a national political settlement frequently raise the question of whether and how conflicts can be resolved or mitigated at the local level. Historically, people-to-people processes, particularly the 1999 Wunlit conference, played a critical role in reducing fighting among South Sudanese. In the current conflict, too, non-state actors have forged intra- and inter-communal peace agreements at the local level. The results of such local peace initiatives in the ongoing South Sudan war vary considerably. Systematic analysis of these local peace initiatives – varying widely in context, scope, inclusiveness, and so forth – has also been wanting.

This paper maps five cases of recent local level peace deals in South Sudan between 2014 and 2018 to identify key criteria that strengthen the prospects of successful implementation and sustainability of local peace agreements. Critically, there are no generic formulas to achieve effective sustainable local peace deals. What works is highly contingent on the specific local context. Nonetheless, the set of criteria identified in this paper offers a useful guide for external actors who engage in peace-making efforts at the grassroots.

² UNHCR, South Sudan data, September 30, 2018.
⁴ For a full text signed copy, see JMEC: IGAD–HLRF Agreements: Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, September 2018.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in South Sudan convened a Regional Experts’ Reflection Group on South Sudan in June 2018. The experts, some of them involved as mediators in past local peace initiatives, developed a number of criteria that are necessary (but not sufficient) for effective and sustainable peace processes at local level.

Ample time and space are critical for strong processes

Extensive quiet and informal diplomacy, facilitated by mediators and/or informal influencers, is required to build trust between parties. This requires sufficient time and space to allow engaging especially spoilers shielded from the public eye and its expectations. Informal processes are critical in trust-building. External actors must display courage to engage in flexible and open-ended processes rather than pre-determined, limited projects.

Broad participation, including by “godfathers” and spoilers

Peace-makers and spoilers - including ‘godfathers’ and violent youth –, alike must participate in local agreements to make them sustainable. Active agency is important rather than mere representation. Formal and informal authority often overlaps and both must be involved. The capacity, deep understanding and (moral) authority of mediators are instructive for trust-building and changing of the narrative. Churches and leaders of faith, followed by local elders, are regarded as informal influencers unrivalled in capacity to engage ‘godfathers’ in quiet diplomacy.

Guarantors to hold the peace

Guarantors must have credibility, capacity and legitimacy. They may include a variety of different actors with different capacities, such as control over immaterial and material resources that enables them to offer incentives and impose sanctions. Guarantors may include institutions of authority or specifically set up follow-up mechanisms, as well as external actors, be they states, INGOs or NGOs.

Strong feedback from local to national and national to local

Effective feedback mechanisms are required to link the local, national and regional level, empower communities to hold their leaders accountable and create local ownership of current peace processes. The failure to explain proceedings and agreements resultant from ongoing national and regional processes leaves space for misunderstandings, mobilization and incitement. At the same time, community voices must be heard by national leaders.

Rituals and restitution

People-to-people peace processes must address both the emotional and material needs of the communities in conflict through symbolic and material means in order to be sustainable. Both rituals and restitution contribute to a changing of the narrative from conflict to harmony by addressing psycho-social needs and delivering tangible justice and material benefits from peace agreements.

To further this inquiry, this paper takes as a case study local peace deals in South Sudan from the period of 2014 to 2018. This period
corresponded with South Sudan’s civil war and a national peace process primarily based in Addis Ababa, hosted by the regional IGAD bloc of countries. This paper does not look at strictly inter-communal conflicts isolated from rebellion against the government. The paper only examines local peace efforts in the context of South Sudan’s current national war. One peace deal, in Pibor, was negotiated prior to the outbreak of the war but remains of interest given its implementation and challenges in the course of the civil war.
CASE STUDIES

This study comprises five recent case studies of local peace agreements signed between 2013 and 2018 in different parts of the country. The five case studies also differ greatly with regard to the actors involved, the nature and scope of the agreements, and implementation of the respective provisions. Given the small number of cases and the wide variation across numerous variables, the validity of the findings remains limited. Ultimately, the criteria for successful mediation and implementation of peace agreements at local level are highly context-specific. Nonetheless, this comparative study offers valuable insights and points to important questions external actors must consider before getting involved in local peace making. The full texts of the peace agreements are included at the end of this paper. The case studies are updated on events up to November 2018.

Pibor: Church mediation with unaligned militia

Relative success.

Background: Nearly half of all violent deaths and displacements in South Sudan in 2009, the year of the worst violence since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, occurred in the Jonglei region that witnessed a series of inter-tribal clashes, including between the Murle and the Lou Nuer. David Yau Yau, an ethnic Murle local official in Pibor county, was one of several candidates who contested and lost in the 2010 parliamentary elections to seek and receive arms from Khartoum for rebellion against the government. Following mediation by the South Sudan Council of Churches, Yau Yau accepted government amnesty in 2011 and integrated his troops into the SPLA. This peace was short lived: In April 2012, the rebellion re-emerged when Yau Yau defected to Khartoum. By 2013 the Yau Yau-led insurgency among the Murle – now known as the Cobra faction of the Khartoum-aligned South Sudan Democratic Movement / Army (SSDM/A) – had gained significant strength and support in the context of Murle opposition to the SPLA civilian disarmament exercise.5 However, several other conflict dynamics were at play, including long-standing competition over water resources and cattle between different ethnic groups and contests between local political leaders, which were aggravated by an influx of small arms in the region.

Mediation: Several attempts at government-initiated attempts at mediation failed. The Murle objected to mediation by South Sudan Council of Churches Archbishop Daniel Deng, of the Murle’s rival neighbors, the Dinka Bor. The government also hired a British defense contractor to negotiate directly with Yau Yau, which also failed, as did outreach attempts by local Murle elites and interlocutors close to the Juba government. Finally, a mediation team of three nationally respected church officials not from the Jonglei area (all three were Equatorians) succeeded in bringing Yau Yau to the table, establishing trust, and holding the peace talks together even as South Sudan fell into civil war in December 2013. In fact, the emergence of a national level rebellion, the SPLM-IO, likely strengthened the government’s commitment to this local peace deal. The peace process involved wider support, and was brought into the IGAD-led process in Addis Ababa in January 2014.

Results: A Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed between the Government of South Sudan and the SSDM/A – Cobra faction in January 2014 in Addis Ababa, and followed by a comprehensive peace deal in May 2014. The core plank of the peace agreement was the devolution of significant local power through the creation of the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA), which effectively gave the Murle a self-governing administrative unit with state-like powers. The agreement further provided for increased political representation of Murle at national level and a special government development fund for the GPAA. (However, the relevance of the GPAA was greatly diminished by the creation of 28 states by presidential decree in October 2015, in place of the formerly ten states spread over three historic provinces.) Lead mediator Bishop Paride Taban personally lobbied government in 2015 to prevent Yau Yau’s forces from being deployed en masse against the SPLA-IO.

Takeaways: The mediation of the Pibor conflict began prior to the outbreak of South Sudan’s civil war. The Pibor case is instructive in part because it was the last major local peace deal of its kind due to the eruption of national conflict. The government made major concessions towards the national power structure, namely the devolution of significant powers. This clearly underlined the sustained success of the accord. When local civil society and elites failed to bridge the gap between the parties, national church officials succeeded in establishing credibility with both sides. The mediation was lengthy and engaged at the senior levels on both sides. Juba negotiated directly with the insurgents in recognition of the national roots of the conflict. South Sudan’s sudden descent into wider civil war likely had a counterintuitive stabilizing effect on the peace process. The raging war with the SPLA-IO strongly incentivized the government to prevent a wider, united insurgency.

Key Variables:
- Strong sustained lengthy process.
- Inclusive, including the top commanders.
- Structural solutions involving devolution of power.
- Strong support and troubleshooting afterwards.
- Strong incentive for government to contain local insurgency to prevent wider united insurgency.

Yambio: Church mediation with unaligned militia

Limited success.

Background: In August 2015, South Sudan President Salva Kiir sacked and detained the Governor of Western Equatoria state, Joseph Bangasi Bakosoro. Two armed groups with Bakosoro’s patronage subsequently declared a rebellion against the government: one, the “Arrow Boys”, a previously existent loose network of community defence forces in Western Equatoria, declared their allegiance to the main rebel group, the SPLA-IO. The other, the newly formed South Sudan National Liberation Movement (SSNLM), declared an independent rebellion. Sporadic clashes with government forces broke out from the end of 2015 and into 2016.  

6 See also ‘Real but fragile: The Greater Pibor Administrative Area’, Small Arms Survey, October 2015
7 For more background, see ‘Spreading Fallout: The collapse of the ARCSS and new conflict along the Equatorias-DRC border’, Small Arms Survey, May 2017; Schomerus, Mareike, ‘Non-state security providers and political formation in South Sudan: the case of Western Equatoria’s Arrow Boys’, ODI, April 2016..
Mediation: Peace talks with both groups were mediated by an “interfaith” group of cross-denominational church leaders in Yambio, the Western Equatoria capital. Despite the church leaders’ efforts, however, the local SPLA-IO leadership refused to negotiate formally with the state government on the grounds that such negotiations needed to take place through SPLA-IO at a national level. The SSNLM, unaligned to SPLA-IO, did respond to church-led overtures, leading to direct talks with the state government. The state government in Yambio and the National Security Service pushed the SSNLM peace deal, but it received opposition in Juba, especially from the SPLA under then-SPLA chief of staff Paul Malong. Surprise SPLA offensives on the SSNLM positions killed the SSNLM leader and marred and delayed the peace process.

Results: A peace deal was signed in 2016 between the SSNLM and the state government, backed by Juba. The agreement made explicit reference to ARCSS and was presented as complementary to the national process, and provided for legislative action of Gbudue and Maridi states to initiate a reconciliation process. At the core of the deal though was the integration of SSNLM troops into national security services.

Informal dialogue proceeded with the local SPLA-IO, resulting in periods of effective truce and real positive gains for human security and freedom of movement. However, the success of the accord was also limited, primarily on two counts. First, this did not end the local insecurity since the SPLA-IO units, a larger force than the SSNLM, continued to insist peace must be negotiated at a national level. Heavy levels of insecurity in 2018 highlight this point. Secondly, the SSNLM peace deal produced a significant pocket of risk prior to the integration of the SSNLM force. Local elites used the SSNLM peace deal for “post-peace mobilization”, as a force of no more than a few hundred claimed 3000 members and soon swelled to over a thousand. This post-peace mobilization served three clear purposes: i) for the governor, to justify the peace deal against Juba opposition, ii) for local elites, to increase the number of locals capturing gains of the process, iii) for those mobilized, to capture the gains from this process.

Takeaways: Overall, the SSNLM peace deal shows the value of church-led mediation. However, it also shows the limits of local peace talks in the context of the national civil war. Post-peace mobilization temporarily increased militarization in order to bring peace. This created a risk for greater instability, amid fears the now-larger SSNLM would defect again. Further, the sharp rise in insecurity due to SPLA-IO insurgency in 2018 shows the gains of this approach was limited to the non-SPLA-IO group. Since most armed opposition factions are now part of the national peace process, the SSNLM itself was a contingent outlier in the current war, rendering its local resolution of limited relevance to other areas.

Key variables:
• Limited inclusivity. All parties were engaged, but the largest of the rebel factions did not participate in the accord.
• The peace therefore served to supplement, not substitute for, the national peace process by resolving conflict with the rebel group not aligned to SPLA-IO.
• The peace deal was pushed through by a strong, credible united civil society in the form of a cross-denominational local interfaith group.
• Strong sustained peace processes, and very strong monitoring and support by the mediators after the signing of the accord.
Lakes-Unity: Chief-to-chief peace

Possible limited success.

Background: When war broke out in late 2013, the border between the southern Unity state, dominated by ethnic Nuer, and Lakes state, inhabited mainly by ethnic Dinka, formed a natural front line in the ethnicized national conflict at local level. The national-level conflict disrupted longstanding traditional kinship, trade, and neighborly ties for the bordering communities, specifically the Nyuon Nuer in Unity’s Panyijar and the Dinka of Amongpiny and Dinka of Yirol East, and exacerbated pre-existent violent inter-communal conflict over cattle raids, grazing rights and water points. In addition to the formal SPLA-IO and SPLA fighters, both communities had their own informal community militias, known as the “gojam” in Nuer and the “galweng” for the Dinka.8

Mediation: The mediation and process, formally initiated in 2015, was complex. Since the national level armed parties on both sides were still at war, the administrators, most importantly the county commissioners and governors, could not officially declare peace with each other. The first thaw in the relations was on the initiative of the Amongpiny commissioner, a South Sudan government official, who approached the Panyijar commissioner, an SPLA-IO rebel official. This created space for a chiefs-to-chiefs led process, mediated and supported by a national NGO, Assistance Mission for Africa. The talks between chiefs produced provisions for the freedom of movement for civilians and commitments not to raid each other. This in turn created confidence for a local truce to be negotiated and extended to the Panyijar-Yirol border.

Results: A peace proclamation was signed between the paramount chiefs of Ganyiel, Amongpiny, and Yirol in 2018. The commissioners, representing warring parties, lent political support to the process but did not sign. The mediation has reported a limited, community-to-community success, although the impact of the recent accord is difficult to verify due to lack of visibility on the ground. The impact of the agreement was limited by design. It stipulated renewed community to community relations but did not address the official armed parties to the war, the SPLA-IO and the SPLA. The local peace therefore produces some positive but very frail gains. Additionally, the commissioners on both sides navigated difficult, shifting internal politics within their own warring parties.

Takeaways: Traditional mediation between neighboring communities achieved some critical local human security gains. However, since these did not and could not include the national armed parties to the war, the process was fraught and politically contested. Gains were limited and could prove frail.

Key variables:

- Strong process, clear mechanisms taking recourse to traditional structures and practices.
- Supplement, not substitute, national peace process. Stayed within its limits.
- Traditional leaders and civil society took lead roles.
- Did not bypass the official local political figures in the SPLA and SPLA-IO, thus trying to prevent emergence of immediate and clear spoilers.

8 For more background, see ‘Peace is the name of our cattle camp: Local responses to conflict in Eastern Lakes state’, Rift Valley Institute, September 2018; ‘Community peace resolutions agreed between Paynjar, Yirol and Amongpiny’, PAX Protection of Civilians, May 2018.
Mundri & Wondoroba: Church-mediated failure

‘Good faith’ failure.

Background: In late 2015, violence escalated against the government in the Mundri and Wonduruba areas west of Juba in Central and Western Equatoria. In both places, insurgencies began in 2014 and then erupted into larger scale violence following the August 2015 national peace accord in Addis Ababa. The Mundri rebellion was led by Wesley Welebe, and the Wonduruba rebellion was led by John Kenyi Loburon, both of whom had joined the SPLA-IO. In both clashes, attacks on the SPLA by insurgents led to heavy retaliatory abuses by the SPLA against the civilian population, including extensive destruction and looting, resulting in the flight of civilians into the bush.9

Mediation: Following their success in brokering peace with Yau Yau’s group in Pibor in early 2014, the same three bishops sought to mediate the conflicts in both Wonduruba and Mundri in late 2015. However, this latter mediation differed substantially from the Pibor mediation effort. Rather than negotiate between Juba and the insurgent leaders, in both cases they mediated between local SPLA commanders and “community” representatives. The mediation was conducted quickly, with little time spent on the ground by the bishops, and never received any official blessing from the Juba government or the SPLA-IO leadership. Local clergy were also involved in the mediation but did not play the leading role.

Results: The Wondoroba and Mundri peace agreements signed after only two days of meetings set out a series of pledges of good will on behalf of the community and the SPLA but apart from the establishment of committees of inquiry did not provide for mechanisms for implementation and monitoring. As a result, the “peace deals” quickly fell apart. Civilians heeded calls to return to the towns, despite the absence of a ceasefire between the opposing belligerents. In both cases, renewed clashes sparked additional reprisals against civilians by the SPLA, further alienating the community and plausibly strengthening the insurgencies.

Takeaways: The mediation failed to acknowledge or end the SPLA-IO rebellion, resulting in the quick collapse of the accords. The peace deals were uninclusive, vague, and did not address structural issues. Rather than a sustained peace process, the church mediators opted for a brief visit.

Key variables:
• Not inclusive: Did not include the principle actors on either side of the conflict.
• Did not supplement but rather sought to bypass the two warring parties.
• Short and shallow mediation process without broad civil society engagement.

Yei: Co-optation of rebel defectors

‘Bad faith’ failure.

Background: South Sudan’s southern Central Equatoria “Yei state” descended into heavy ethnic political violence in 2016 following the collapse of a national peace deal in July 2016 and the escape of SPLM-IO leader Riek Machar through the Equatoria region into the DR Congo, with government forces in hot pursuit. Local groups mobilized heavily into the SPLA-IO.

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9 For more background, see Small Arms Survey, ‘Conflict in Western Equatoria’, July 2016. See also UNMISS, ‘Peace agreement signed in Mundri West’, May 2015.
The state government relied on primarily ethnic Dinka SPLA soldiers, which committed widespread atrocities and torched numerous villages, depopulating and alienating the community, hundreds of thousands of whom fled to Uganda and Congo as refugees.10

Mediation: In early 2017, a Yei charismatic bishop, backed by American evangelicals, the Yei government, and Juba’s National Security Service (NSS) began talks in Kampala with a faction of SPLA-IO self-proclaimed local commanders led by Hilary Yakani, a former political operative, civil society, and NGO worker. By Yakani’s own private admissions, he had arrived in the Yei battleground area just months earlier, the end of 2016. SPLA-IO officially denies Yakani’s role as an officer, but privately acknowledged Yakani played a role in non-military functions. Yakani publicly described himself, falsely, as overall commander of the SPLA-IO forces in Yei state.

Results: A “peace deal” was signed in Kampala in April 2017 after four days of consultations.11 The “peace deal” committed the parties to a continuous grassroots process for conflict resolution, provided for presidential amnesty to those engaging in dialogue, encouraged the voluntary return of those who fled to Uganda and DR Congo, and so forth. At its core though was the formation of a Joint Military Committee that would oversee the assembly and training of SPLM-IO fighters for the formation of a pro-government militia.

However, Yakani was only able to bring back a handful of defectors from the thousands he claimed to command. This prompted a heavy “post-peace” recruitment process by Yakani and the Yei state government to create a pro-government local militia. The local bishop who had been instrumental in the peace talks opened up a training camp in Morobo for Yakani’s force. Some who escaped say the trainees were held involuntarily. Ugandan border and security officials have accused Yakani’s group of recruiting refugees inside Uganda to join the group, with accusations of forced abduction and threats against refugees. Several Yei civil society leaders claim that a group of youth was deceptively recruited in Yei and also involuntarily sent to the Morobo training. The bishop received financial backing for the implementation for the peace deal from a small group of American evangelical organizations. Numerous allegations have been leveled from Yei civil society and SPLA-IO officials that the Bishop used the resources for nefarious purposes. An interfaith council in Yei, which includes the Catholic and the ECS, have denounced Bishop Elias’s activity and distanced itself fully from his peace process, which the government continues to strongly support.

Takeaways: The Yei process is an extreme example of a “bad faith” local peace initiative. The local peace process thinly covered for a politicized attempt to splinter the opposition and mobilize a new pro-government militia.

Key variables:
- The peace deal did not include the rebel leadership but a defecting rebel official who overstated his credentials.
- The peace deal was not supported by the Yei civil society. The bishop was denounced by fellow clergymen.
- The peace process attempted to undermine and replace the national peace

10 For more background, see ‘Spreading Fallout: The collapse of the ARCSS and new conflict along the Equatorias-DRC border’, Small Arms Survey, May 2017.
process without buy-in from the local SPLA-IO.

- The mediation and implementation appears to be primarily a ruse designed to attract and maintain external private funding from well-wishers.
- The Yei peace process has not led to any tangible structural concessions.
CONCLUDING NOTES AND TAKEAWAYS

The ‘pockets of stability’ strategy has had a strong allure for donors and diplomats when national and regional level processes are stalling or lacking credibility. However, if these alternative peacebuilding efforts are not well thought through, they can indeed exacerbate conflicts – particularly if the external actors are perceived to be lacking impartiality.

What makes local peace deals work?

This paper identifies five key variables in the five case studies examined of recent local peace processes in South Sudan.

- Inclusive of main conflict actors.
- Success as supplement but not substitute or alternative to national peace process.
- Civil Society mediation with political backing and strong, active monitoring and engagement.
- Strong processes and follow-up.
- Structural solutions to structural problems.

The five key variables identified by the paper as relevant to the success or failure of local peace deals – inclusivity, complementarity, civil society participation, strong processes and structural solutions – heavily overlap with the ones identified by the FES Reflection Group on South Sudan.

Crucially, these criteria appear critical but not sufficient to make local peace deals work. A key take-away is that local peace deals are not substitutes for a national process. Two of the three (relatively) successful cases involved (rare) non-aligned opposition groups not linked to a national rebel group such as the SPLA-IO. The third successful case represented neighboring communities across the SPLA-IO and SPLA front line, but did not claim to strike peace between the warring parties themselves, and was thus limited as a result. Among the cases examined, no local peace deal has succeeded in ending a localized conflict with the SPLA-IO. In sum, local peace deals in the context of a national conflict must acknowledge and seek to incorporate the national conflict while still providing direct benefits to communities.

Of the two substantial failures, one involved a matter of ‘good faith’ but shallow mediation attempt which quickly collapsed. The other failure can be classified as a ‘bad faith’ effort to be avoided.

It is noteworthy that the one clear successful local peace deal – Pibor – included a substantive structural solution, the creation of a new administrative unit and the devolution of powers. Importantly, in Pibor, the government had strong military incentives to pursue a settlement and make concessions in the form of structural solutions in order to prevent the emergence of a wider, united armed uprising.

This study pointed to the difficulties of forging local peace in areas contested by national armed groups. At the same time, if external actors in consequence shift their attention to areas not (or less overtly) affected by national conflict dynamics, this may nurture perceptions that external actors favor communities in government-held territory – and by extension display a bias towards government.
Formulas for failure

The case studies also highlight “red flags” to watch out for:

“Uninclusive”
Successful peace deals either include the main actors to the conflict or else are naturally constrained to a more limited scope. Local peace processes have not found success in ending localized rebellions connected to the national conflict. Specifically, local peace processes have not found success in ending localized SPLA-IO rebellions outside the national peace process, though not due to a lack of trying.

“Post-peace” mobilization
The integration provisions of peace deals often create a sudden inflation in the size of the non-state armed group. If the peace deal is unstable, this can pose risks of further militarization. Further, this can take a less benign form, as local elites instrumentalize local peace process for the goal of blessing the creation of a new local militia.

“Easy wins”
The Mundri and Wonduruba examples show the dangers of attempting quick peace deals without investing in the process and political capital necessary to create space for inclusive dialogue and resolving the conflict between the warring parties. Some community members believe these peace processes effected more harm than good.

Divided civil society
Local peace deals should at least achieve a base level of local civil society support. The Yei example is an extreme case that highlights the pitfalls of pursuing a deal not backed by the local civil society.

‘Bad faith’
Local peace deals are frequently wielded as a divide-and-rule strategy rather than a good faith effort at conflict resolution. These types of deals aim to further splinter forces or siphon off from the “bottom” rather than the “top” through a war of attrition. This strategy poses a number of issues:

i. a reliance on partial cooptation and attrition rather than addressing root causes;
ii. partisan mediators;
iii. splinter groups, potentially rendering the conflict more long-term, fractious, and intractable.
APPENDIX

Pibor peace agreement with David Yau Yau and the Murle community

AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN JONGLEI STATE

BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

AND

THE SOUTH SUDAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT/SOUTH SUDAN DEFENCE ARMY (SSDM/SSDA-COBRAD FACTION)

ADDIS ABABA ETHIOPIA
MAY, 2014
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I

PRE AMBLE

The Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Defense Army Cobra Faction met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia between April 30 to May 9 2014 under the auspices of the Church Leadership Mediation Initiative (CLMI) on Jonglei peace dialogue chaired by Bishop Paride Taban:

DETERMINED to achieve peace and promote unity amongst the different ethnic communities in the region including the Dinka, Nuer, Murle, Anyuak, Kekhipo and Jie being multicultural, multi-lingual and multi-religious;

COMMITTED to abandon the culture of revenge including inhuman activities such as child abduction, murder, rape and torture;

MINDFUL of the fact that the country is in need of a peaceful and durable solution to the conflict that made the SSDM/A, Cobra Faction resort to armed option;

AWARE of the current engagement in negotiations to find solutions to the conflicts taking place in the Country generally in order to reach a comprehensive peace deal;

CONSCIOUS of the need to end the problem of internal displacement amongst the population; and

NOW THEREFORE, the parties agree to abide by the terms of this agreement and respect its implementation to the letter and spirit;
2 GUIDING PRINCIPLES

2.1 The Republic of South Sudan is governed on the basis of a decentralized democratic system and is an all-embracing homeland for its people generally;

2.2 In particular, the Jonglei state is an equal homeland for the Anyuak, the Dinka, the Jie, the Kechipo, the Murie and the Nuer respectively. It is therefore a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-religious state where such diversities shall co-exist.

2.3 Administrative setup in the current Counties of Pibor and Pochalla in Jonglei state shall be re-examined with view to restructuring their current administrative units for effective service delivery to their people and this shall be done in wider consultations with the ethnic groups that inhabit and constitute the Counties.

2.4 The proposed state creation by the SSDM/A Cobra Faction in the lands of Greater Pibor shall be done within the constitutional framework including the ongoing constitution making process in the Republic. This is to observe the Transitional Constitution of 2011 that derives its authority from the will of the people of South Sudan. In their effort to study and consider the said state creation proposal, the parties shall followad adhere to the procedural mechanisms provided in the Constitution.

2.5 A firm commitment to lasting solutions to the existing root causes of the Jonglei conflict for a sustainable peace founded on justice, equality, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2.6 Reconciliation process in Jonglei state shall be inclusive, and accountability modalities shall be devised in a consultative manner.

2.7 In the implementation of this agreement, the parties shall promote positive communication to enhance confidence building.
ESTABLISHMENT OF GREATER PIBOR ADMINISTRATIVE AREA (GPAA)

3.1. There shall be established an Administrative Area to be known as Greater Pibor Administrative Area hereinafter abbreviated as (GPAA) within the Republic of South Sudan based on the principle of decentralisation of government in the country.

3.2. For the purposes of administrative and managerial convenience, the boundaries of the Greater Pibor Administrative Area shall comprise the current boundaries of Pibor and Pochalla Counties within Jonglei state and shall be maintained as it was on January 1, 1956.

3.3. The GPAA shall be established by the President of the Republic in accordance with this agreement and the constitution. Upon approval of this agreement by the Council of States, the President shall sign the same into Law which shall be known as law of Greater Pibor Administrative Area.

3.4. The Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) shall be governed by a Chief Administrator whose status will be equal to that of a state governor.

3.5. During the current constitution making process up to the promulgation of the same, the GPAA shall be annexed under the Presidency.

3.6. The area shall have provisional seal, flag and emblem until the new constitution determines the status of GPAA.
4 ESTABLISHMENT OF COUNTIES IN THE GREATER PIBOR ADMINISTRATIVE AREA

4.1. The Greater Pibor shall be sub-divided into six (6) counties after thorough consultations with Payams or Bomas with view to upgrading them into full county administrations, provided always that county creation criterion set forth in the South Sudan Local Government Act is adhered to.

4.2. The consultations mentioned in (4.1.) above shall be done by the SSDM Cobra Faction in collaboration with a Technical Committee made up of members from GPAA communities selected by the Chief Administrator and appointed by the President.

4.3. The Technical Committee shall assess and report on the viability of the area, the need for six (6) county administrations as a prerequisite for a viable large Administrative Area.

4.4. The technical committee shall provide the office of the President with a comprehensive report including the map of the administrative area within a period not exceeding thirty (30) working days from its formation, upon which the President shall issue counties’ creation and establishment orders which shall be in accordance with the Law of Greater Pibor Administrative Area.

5 GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES OF THE GPAA SHALL HAVE THE FOLLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES

5.1. The Chief Administrator shall be a nominee of SSDM Cobra Faction, appointed and removed by the President and answerable to him.

5.2. The Chief Administrator shall have two (2) deputies who shall be appointed and removed by the President on recommendation of the Chief Administrator (CA). One deputy shall be in charge of Administration and Finance including relevant departments thereto and another deputy shall be in charge of services and its related departments.
5.3. There shall be a head of legal Administration for the GPAA who shall be the chief law officer deployed by the Ministry of Justice. The powers of the head of legal Administration shall be as per the National Constitution and Ministry of Justice Act.

5.4. Upon appointment of the Chief Administrator he or she shall appoint County Commissioners to the newly established counties that constitute the GPAA and whose terms of office shall be regulated by the Law of GPAA.

5.5. After establishment of proper administration in the area, subsequent appointment of the county commissioners shall be in accordance with the South Sudan Local Government Act 2009.

6

GREATER PIBOR AREA COUNCIL (GPAC)

6.1. For the time being, the GPAC shall be appointed by the President on nomination by and recommendation of the SSDM Cobra Faction to represent their local areas whose number shall not exceed 36 members out of which (25%) percent shall be women.

6.2. The GPAC shall enact local legislations on development, governance and administrative matters in the area. Compatibility of such legislations shall be approved by the Ministry of Justice.

6.3. Sittings of the GPAC shall be presided over by a Chairperson of the GPAC elected from amongst them.

6.4. The GPAC may recommend to the Chief Administrator the removal of a County Commissioner by a two third (2/3) votes of all the members present in a sitting convened for this purpose.
7

THE JUDICIARY

7.1. High Courts of the Area

7.1.1 There shall be High Courts in the GPAA counties which shall be presided over by 1 class Judges appointed and deployed by the Chief Justice.

7.1.2 In the application of statutory laws, the county and high court judges may apply customary laws as they deem necessary.

7.2. Traditional Authority

7.2.1 The institution, status and role of Traditional Authority, according to customary law, are recognised in the Constitution and the Local Government Act 2009 and shall be respected.

7.2.2 Chiefs and Traditional Authorities shall litigate in local disputes or matters that the legal values do not exceed their legally specified competences in the South Sudan Civil Procedure Act as well as legal competences and limitations specified in other legal instruments of the country.

8

ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND (SDF)

8.1. The President shall establish a Special Development Fund (SDF) within the Presidency, to be managed by a management Team headed by a Coordinator appointed by the President in consultation with the Chief Administrator.

8.2. The Office of the President shall undertake the responsibility of mobilising necessary resources for the Special fund which shall be used for the provision of services, local road networks and infrastructure generally to bridge the gap of underdevelopment in the area.

8.3. For the general administrative running cost of the GPAA and counties, the sources of funds shall principally be drawn from the general budget of the National Government.
8.4. Funds from development partners, private donations from NGOs and well-wishers, who wish to implement projects in the GPAA, are encouraged to do so in a coordinated and transparent manner with the office of the President.

8.5. Accountability and oversight to safeguard proper use of public and private funds that may be allocated to ensure the implementation of the development projects and governance in the area shall be done and audited by the National Audit Chamber.

9

ESTABLISHMENT OF CERTAIN AREA EXECUTIVE BODIES

9.1. The law of Greater Pibor Administrative Area shall provide for establishment of adhoc committees to carry out specialized functions or tasks as may be deemed necessary. These committees shall include the following:

9.1.1. Civil service,
9.1.2. Traditional Authority,
9.1.3. Repatriation, Relief, Resettlement and Rehabilitation,
9.1.4. Peace and Reconciliation and,
9.1.5. Investigation on violation of human rights including child abduction

10

SOURCES OF REVENUE FOR THE GREATER PIBOR ADMINISTRATIVE AREA

10.1. The (GPAC) shall legislate for raising revenue or collecting taxes from the following sources:

10.1.1. Area land and property tax and royalties
10.1.2. Service charges for Areas’ Administrative services
10.1.3. Personal income tax at Area level
10.1.4. Stamp duties
10.1.5. Agricultural production taxes
10.1.6. Excise duties and
10.1.7. Any other tax as may be determined by law
11 SOURCES OF REVENUE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT/COUNTY AUTHORITIES

11.1 The local Government taxes, fees and charges shall be determined by each local Government council. They may impose:
   11.1.1 Property rates
   11.1.2 Rents
   11.1.3 Entertainment taxes
   11.1.4 Stamp duties
   11.1.5 Personal graduated tax
   11.1.6 Royalties
   11.1.7 Cess
   11.1.8 Fees on registration and licensing

12 ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES, STANDARDS AND FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The Administration of GPAA shall comply with the established and generally accepted accounting procedures, standards and fiscal accountability to ensure that public funds are allocated and expended according to the budget of the respective level of government.

13 INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIP

Institutional relationships with other entities or states, interstate trade and commerce including liabilities and assets, shall be maintained through the Presidency as provided in (3.4) of this agreement.
14

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

14.1. Re-commitment to the Cessation of Hostilities and Permanent Ceasefire

The parties re-commit themselves to fully respect and observe the cessation of hostility agreement signed between the parties on the 30th of January 2014 and further re-affirm their commitment to the ceasefire unilaterally announced by the government and endorsed by the SSDM/A Cobra Faction in January 2014.

14.2 Integration of the SSDA Cobra Faction

2.1. General Principles

2.1.1. The parties agree that the forces of the former SSDA Cobra Faction shall be peacefully integrated into the ranks of the national army, South Sudan police service and other organized forces.

2.1.2. The parties further agree that the number and the force ranks of the former SSDA Cobra Faction at all levels that will be integrated are subject, where necessary, to the general policy of the country’s army structure and all other law enforcement organs.

2.2. Establishment of a Peaceful Integration Mechanism

To effect clause 2.1.2. above, the parties agree that:

1) A mechanism be established by the leaders of the two parties to this agreement; which shall be known as a Joint Military Technical Committee (JMTC) comprising an equal number to integrate the SSDA Cobra Faction forces into the National Army, National Security and Intelligence Services, South Sudan Police Services, Wildlife and any other organized force.

2) The JMTC shall consist of members of SSDA Cobra Faction, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior.

3) The Church Leaders Mediation Initiative (CLMI), members of the SPLA, the SSDA Cobra Faction and UNMISS shall be the overall body lead by the CLMI to monitor and supervise the integration process and solve any potential conflict that may arise or occur in relation to the implementation of this agreement.
4) Should a conflict arise within the so established mechanism, then the leaders of the parties to this agreement shall provide necessary political guidance in resolving such matter.

14.3 Functions and terms of reference of the JMTC shall include:

3.1. The screening, integration, training, organization and deployment of the former SSDA Cobra Faction into the National Army and Organized Forces shall be conducted within Greater Pibor Administration Area. Upon conclusion and completion of the agreed numbers including the military ranks, this security arrangement agreement shall be an integral part of the Greater Pibor Administrative Area agreement.

3.2. The deployment of the former SSDA Cobra Faction into the South Sudan Police Service and other Organized Forces shall be done in accordance with the internal regulations and laws that govern these institutions mindful of the six counties that constitute GPAA.

3.3. The JMTC shall, upon its formation, jointly develop its elaborate terms of reference which shall facilitate a smooth integration process and this shall be done and shared with the CLMI and the leadership of the two parties to this agreement.

3.4. Integration process of the former SSDA Cobra faction into the national organs as specified in clause 14.3 above shall commence upon appointment of the Chief Administrator of the GPAA.

14.4 Special Considerations

After the screening and identification of the disabled and child soldiers from the former SSDA Cobra Faction, these shall be entitled for services due to a disabled and child soldiers from the relevant offices of the National Army, and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan.
FAIR REPRESENTATION IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

The President may appoint from SSDM and other citizens of GPAA for the following positions as an affirmative action, mindful of the need for competence. These include: presidential advisors, ministers, deputy ministers, chairpersons and members of specialized institutions and commissions, ambassadors and diplomats in the foreign service, officials in public services and members of National Legislature as per the constitution.

AMENDMENT

This Agreement shall not be amended, modified or altered unless by mutual agreement between the two parties and this shall be done in writing.

COMING INTO FORCE

This agreement shall come into force upon approval by the Council of States by a simple majority in a period not exceeding four weeks from date of its signing.
In witness of the above, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army Cobra Faction have agreed and signed this agreement on the 9th of May in the year 2014 AD, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Signed
Hon. Canon Clement Janda
Head of Government Delegation

Signed
Li. Gen. Khalid Boutros
Head of SSDM/A Cobra Faction

Witnessed by the Church Leadership Mediation Initiative (CLMI)

Signed
Bishop Emeritus Paride Taban Kenyi
Chairperson of the CLMI

Signed
Bishop Paul P. Benjamin Yugusuk
Spokesperson of the CLMI

Signed
Bishop Arkanjelo Wani Lemi
Member of the CLMI

Signed
Professor Hizkiyas Assefa
Moderator
### Annex: Implementation Matrix

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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>President</td>
<td>45 days from signing</td>
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<td>Juba, GPAA</td>
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<td>Presidential decree</td>
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<tr>
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<td>President</td>
<td>45 days from signing</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>7 members; (one for each county plus the chair)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>President</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Chief Administrator</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of the Greater Pibor Area Council (GPAC)</td>
<td>President</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nomination of the GPAC members</td>
<td>SSDM</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Appointment of the GPAC members</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Within 21 working days of the establishment of the GPAC</td>
<td>36 members</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishment of the Special Development Fund (SDF)</td>
<td>President</td>
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<td>Various sources, including the President</td>
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<td>Article 8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishment of the (fund) management team</td>
<td>President</td>
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<td>Coordinator and 6 board members</td>
<td>GRSS</td>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>Article 8, as per the agreement</td>
<td>Article 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishment of the Joint Military Technical Committee (JMTC)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>JMTC and DDR</td>
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<tr>
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AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT

IN THE GBOUND AND MARIDI STATES (FORMER WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE)

BETWEEN THE

GOVERNMENT OF

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN (RSS)

AND

THE SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY

(SSNLM/A)

IN THE GBOUND AND MARIDI STATES (FORMER WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE)

YAMBIO

2ND APRIL, 2016
1. PREFACE

The government of the Republic of South Sudan and the South Sudan National Liberation movement met in Yambio the State capital of the former Western Equatoria State, between November 16th and January 12, 2016 under the auspices of the Faith Based Council for Peace (FBCP) on the Western Equatoria state peace dialogue chaired by Bishop Barani Eduardo Hiiboro Kussala:

**DETERMINED** to achieve and promote unity amongst the different ethnic communities in the state including the Azande, Avokaya, Baka, Balanda, Bongo, Jur Bel, Moru, Mundu, and other tribes residing in the State being multicultural, multi-lingual and multi-religious;

**COMMITTED** to the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and to abandon the culture of revenge including inhuman acts like torture, rampant killing of the innocent and respect for human dignity;

**MINDFUL** of the fact that South Sudan is in need of a peaceful and durable solution to the issues that made the SSNLM/A resort to the option of violence;

**AWARE** of the need to support the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan for a just and sustainable Peace throughout the country;

**ACKNOWLEDGING** the preliminary Peace Agreement and the need to promote inclusive and democratic society founded on the rule of law;

**FURTHERMORE** **AWARE** of the need for harmony, stability, reconciliation and national healing;

**CONSCIOUS** of the need to end the suffering of the communities and the problem of displacement amongst the population; and

**NOW THEREFORE**, the parties agree to abide by the terms of this Comprehensive Peace Deal (CPD) and respect its implementation to the letter and spirit:
2. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

2.1. The Republic of South Sudan is governed on the basis of a decentralized democratic system and is an all-embracing homeland for her people;

2.2. In particular the Gbudue and Maridi states is equal homeland for the Azande, Avokaya, Baka, Balanda, Bongo, Jur, Maru, Mundu and other tribes respectively, it is therefore a multi-ethnic, multicultural, multilingual and multi-religious State where such diversities shall co-exist peacefully and shall not be interrupted by the administrative divisions of the area into the newly created states of Gbudue, Maridi.

2.3. A firm commitment to a lasting solution to the existing root causes of the conflict in the Gbudue and Maridi states for a sustainable peace founded on justice, equality, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2.4. Reconciliation process in the Gbudue and Maridi States shall be inclusive and shall be held in a consultative manner involving the parties and others. The process shall be established by Legislation promulgated by the legislative assemblies of both Gbudue and Maridi States. Such legislation shall outline the mechanisms and methods of the reconciliation process.

2.5. In the implementation of this agreement, the parties shall promote positive communication to enhance confidence building.

3. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

3.1. Recommitment to the cessation of hostilities and permanent Ceasefire

The parties recommit themselves to fully respect and observe the cessation of hostility agreement signed between the parties on 29th April 2016 and now further re-affirm their commitment to the general amnesty announced by the president on several occasions since 2014.

3.2. Integration of the SSNLM/A

3.2.1. General Principles

The parties agree that the forces of the former SSNLM/A shall be peacefully integrated into the ranks of the national army, South Sudan Police Service and other organized forces.

3.2.2. The parties further agree that the number and the force ranks of the former SSNLM/A at all levels that will be integrated are subject, where necessary, to the general policy of the country's army structure and all other law enforcement organs.

3.2.3. The parties shall agree on cantonment/assembling area which shall be identified by the SSNLM/A within Gbudue State.
3.2.4. The government shall provide for the needs of the SSNLM/A in the cantonment after signing of the agreement.

3.2.3. Establishment of a committee for peaceful Integration

To effect clause 3.2 above, the parties agree that:

I. Within sixty days (60) of signing of this Agreement, an Integration Committee consisting of eight members shall be established by the leaders of the two parties to this agreement; which shall be known as a Joint Military Technical Committee (JMTC) comprising equal number to integrate SSNLM/A forces into the national army, and other organized forces based on their qualifications and capabilities and the rules and regulations governing these institutions and in accordance with the Security Sector Reforms stipulated in the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.

II. The JMTC shall consist of members of the SSNLM/A, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and the National Security Service. A nine member Peace Monitoring Committee (PMC) consisting of two representative from the Faith Based Council for Peace (FBCP), one each from SPLA, SSNLM/A, NSS, National Police Service, UNMISS, women group civil society and traditional leaders shall monitor and supervise the implementation of this Agreement including but not limited to the integration process and shall resolve any potential dispute that may arise or occur in relation to the implementation of this agreement.

III. Should the PMC fail to resolve any dispute that may arise in the process of implementing this Agreement, then the faith based council shall provide necessary political guidance in resolving such matter.

3.3. The Functions and terms of reference of the JMTC shall include:

3.3.1. The screening, training, integration, organization and deployment of the former SSNLM/A into the national army and organized forces shall be concluded within Gbudue State. Upon conclusion and completion of the agreed numbers including the ranks, this security arrangement shall be an integral part of this agreement.

3.3.2. The deployment of former SSNLM/A into the South Sudan Police Service and other organized forces shall be done in accordance with the internal regulations that govern these institutions mindful of the different ethnicity that constitute former Western Equatoria State.

3.3.3. The JMTC shall, upon its formation, jointly develop its elaborate terms of reference which shall facilitate a smooth integration process and this shall be done and shared with FBCP and the leadership of the two parties to this agreement.
3.3.4. The integration process of the former SSNLM/A into the national organs as specified in clause 3.3 above shall commence within twenty-one (21) days after the formation of the JMTC

4.1. Special Considerations
After the screening exercise and identification of disabled and school age soldiers from the former SSNLM/A, they shall be entitled for the service suitable to a disabled, school age soldier and people with special needs from the relevant offices of the National army and the Government of Gbudue and Maridi States.

4.2. Special consideration for creating rehabilitation centers for taking care of conflict affected communities in Gbudue and Maridi states shall benefit from rehabilitation facilities to be established under agreement for the resolution of the conflict of South Sudan

4.3. The list of grievances and demands of SSNLM/A stated in November 16th 2015 Preliminary agreement have been acknowledged and will be duly and mutually addressed by the Government of South Sudan such as:

4.4. Members of the SSNLM/A who may not be integrated into the military and other organized forces may be absorbed into appropriate government institutions or trained and supported to pursue self-employment based on their qualifications.

5. COMING INTO FORCE
In witness of the above, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the South Sudan National Liberation Movement/Army have agreed and signed this agreement on the 2nd of April, 2016 AD, in Yambio, the former Western Equatoria. State Headquarters

Signatures of Parties, Chairperson of the Faith Base group, other Stakeholders, Civil Society Organization, and Witnesses to this Agreement.

1. THE PARTIES

Hon. Tut Gatluak Manimi
Presidential Advisor
For the Government
Republic of South Sudan (RSS)

Commander Mbereke John Faustino
Leader
For South Sudan National Liberation Movement (SSNLM)
2. FOR THE FAITH BASED MEDIATION

Barani Eduardo Hiiboro Kussala
Bishop and Chairperson of Faith Based Council

3. WITNESSES TO THIS AGREEMENT

UNMISS Representative
South Sudan
Headquarter

4. STAKEHOLDERS:

Chief Wilson Peni Rikito
Paramount Chief
Representative of Traditional Authority

Simple John Bakeaki
Youth Representative
Civil Society Organization

Christine Joseph Ngbaazande
Representative of Women Group-WES
### Annex 1: Timeframe

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<td>3.3.4</td>
<td>Sharing of ToR with parties and PMC</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>21 Days</td>
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<td>06</td>
<td>3.3.4</td>
<td>Beginning of integration process</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>21 Days</td>
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<td>07</td>
<td>3.2.3</td>
<td>Establishment of cantonment</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>60 Days</td>
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Lakes-Unity peace agreement

JOINT PEACE COMMITTEE MEETING RESOLUTION (PAYINJIAR, YIROL AND RUMBEK-AMONGPINY)

UNDER THE THEME COMMUNITY SUSTAINABLE PEACE

Held in Ganyiel on 14th to 18th May, 2018

Introduction

This brief publication provides the basic document of the Joint peace committee meeting Resolution (Payinjiar, Yirol and Rumbek-Amongpiny) 14th - 18th May, 2018. The purpose of this publication is to immediately make the core document available to

- The Dinka of Yirol, Amongpiny and Nuer of Payinjiar communities who have established the Ganyiel Resolutions and will be responsible to implement them.
- The broader grassroots communities who are eager to read the results of the meeting in Ganyiel and will be able to expand this peace to other areas of their locations.
- The international and local partners and peace organizations in South Sudan who have assisted in this people to people peace process and will now have key roles in the implementation of the resolution.
- The South Sudanese churches under South Sudan Council Of Churches (SSCC), and
- The international community with special focus on the partners (PAX + AID and Development Botswana) who have contributed to this process and those who will need to assist in the implementation.

Background

The Yirol, Amongpiny and Payinjiar Joint peace committee meeting is a major step in a much larger process. It is designed to bring reconciliations to people of these three locations who are in conflict with one another. As the process grows and expands it carries the potential to transform the dynamics of this conflict.

The Agreement

Chiefs, Church representatives, Elders, women and youth leaders from Payinjiar, Yirol and Amongpiny have met in the Joint Peace Committee meeting in Ganyiel under the auspice of AMA. The meeting has established Resolutions, and declared that border grazing lands and fishing ground that was abandoned due to inter-communal insecurity or conflict, shall be available immediately as shared resources between community of Payinjiar and Yirol and shall be settled and utilized peacefully and harmoniously.

We declare and adopt the following.

[Signatures]
• There was a call for a next general conference to be conducted either in Amongpayin or Yirol with the aim of bringing to an end all the hostile acts between the communities.
• It was agreed that there was a need for sensitization and mobilization of communities of four locations of Yirol, Payinjir, Rumbek North (Maper) and Amongpayin against cattle raiding, robbery, border conflict and river Nile attack.
• The peace committees must carry out the peace advocacy in all four locations.
• It was agreed that there was an immediate need to form a regional body that will monitor peace along the borders and on the river Nile.
• The participants resolved also that, the rules to govern this peace shall be developed, and any body or group of people from either sides shall be accountable for any border crime(s).
• It was agreed that there was a need for a blood compensation and compensation of other properties that were damaged or destroyed as a result of action of other community such as cattle raided should be returned.
• Exchange visits and freedom of movement is affirmed and inter-communal trade, development and services are encouraged.
• Youth Monthly forum should be extended to payam levels this is to encourage the community in grass root to understand the importance of peace.
• There should be in the future another conference involving magicians or spear masters to agree on their roles in peace building.
• There was a call for IDPs support, especially those coming from Central Unity State and Maper County.
• It was agreed that there should be practices of inter-communal art and culture to promote peace among the communities.
• There was a call for facilitation of peace committees with communication equipment for conflict early warning.
• There was also a call for development partners to dig boreholes that are strategically located along roads to support free movement of people to support peace activities.
• There was also a call for support of livestock health.

Signed on behalf of Payinjir, Yirol and Amongpayin this 16th Day of May, 2018 in Ganyiel

1. Paramount Chief Gordon Chiinyen Mayom, Payinjir Community

2. Paramount Chief Andrew Madut Bupi, Yirol Community

3. Mr. Duong Keu Chath, Youth Representative Amongpayin
Mundri peace agreement

Agreement

Between:

The Community of Greater Mundri and SPLA Division 6, Brigade 16, Mundri Battalion

On:

The Resolution of Mundri Conflict

15th November 2015

Mundri Town
Western Equatoria State
Preamble

We, the representatives of the community of Greater Mundri and the representatives of the SPLA Division 6, Brigade 16, Mundri Battalion have consulted between the civil population and the army and have deliberated on various issues regarding Greater Mundri conflict, from Wednesday 11th to Sunday 15th November 2015, do hereby make the following resolutions and recommendations:

Resolutions

1. That we appreciated the church leaders mediation team led by Bishop Paul Yuguusuk for mediating between the representatives of the community of Greater Mundri and the representatives of the SPLA Division 6, Brigade 16, Mundri Battalion in order to resolve the Greater Mundri conflict.
2. That we apologized to the community of Greater Mundri and to the SPLA Division 6, Brigade 16, Mundri Battalion on the conflict.
3. That the community of Greater Mundri and the army will respect themselves and the other law enforcement agencies as required by the interim constitution of the Republic of South Sudan.
4. That the youth and the army will refrain from any hostilities.
5. That the community will be able to feel free to come back and continue with socioeconomic development.
6. That SPLA soldiers who have caused atrocities in Mundri will be disciplined by their command.
7. That the local administration of Greater Mundri will keenly discuss with the leadership of the youth in resolving their conflict.
8. That we make a commitment to resolve this conflict once and for all.
9. That we shall henceforth be at peace with one another and respect each other.
10. That the army and the other law enforcement agencies will respect the community in accordance with the interim constitution of the Republic of South Sudan.
11. That the youth shall commit themselves not to cause any attacks and shall report to the county authorities about their peaceful processes at least once every month for the next three months.

12. That the SPLA leadership in Mundri should investigate on the specific soldiers that had caused atrocities and take disciplinary measures against them, and even remove them from among the good soldiers.

13. That the County Commissioner will form a committee to investigate the magnitude and extend of loss of lives and the looted properties, including government institutions, NGOs, hospitals, etc. and will report to the national authority for appropriate actions, including compensation.

**Recommendations**

1. That the two parties requested for humanitarian support to enable to settle the IDPs.

2. That the agreement shall be disseminated to the community through media and civic awareness.

3. That the church leaders’ mediation team shall monitor the implementation of the agreement and shall meet and consolidate with the parties to the agreement.

4. That the two parties agreed that the church should recommend to existing non-governmental organizations and other institutions and agencies to provide bursary for the pupils and students whose parents cannot now pay their school fees as a result of the Mundri conflict.

**Signed on Sunday 15th November 2015 by:**

[Signatures]

Mr. James Biro David  
Representative of Greater Mundri Civil Community  

Major. Toby Majak Thomas  
Representative of SPLA  
Division 6, Brigade 16, Mundri Battalion  

Bishop Paul Yugusuk  
Diocesan Bishop of Lomega  
Lead Mediator
Bishop Bismark M. Avokaya
Diocesan Bishop of Mundri
Witness

Bishop Matthew Taban Peter
Diocesan Bishop of Wonduruba
Witness

Hon. Hullen Ablatere Hakim
Deputy Governor of WES
Witness

Major Gen. Johnson Juma Okot
SPLA Division VI Commander
Witness
Wonduruba peace agreement

AGREEMENT BETWEEN WOUNDURUBA COMMUNITY AND SPLA, COMMANDO UNIT ON THE RESOLUTION OF WOUNDURUBA CONFLICT

Preamble

We the delegates representing Wonduruba community and the SPLA Commando Unit, having deliberated on the conflict in Wonduruba, Mangkaro, Menkele, Katigiri and Tuliang and address all our differences during a peace and Reconciliation dialogue mediated by Church Leaders Mediation Initiative led by Bishop Paul Yugusuk from Tuesday 1st to Wednesday 2nd of December 2015 at Wonduruba do hereby agree on the following resolutions;

Resolutions No. 1

That the Wonduruba community and the SPLA Commando unit have forgiven themselves on the conflict in Wonduruba, Mangkaro, Mengele, Katigiri and Tuliang

Resolutions No. 2

That the community of Wonduruba and SPLA Commando Unit will live in harmony respecting one another as citizen with different responsibilities in accordance to the interim constitution of the Republic of South Sudan

Resolutions No. 3

That the SPLA shall adhere to the SPLA act and the consultation in all their activities as shall protect the community without any harassment or intimidation in accordance to the interim constitution of the Republic of South Sudan

Resolutions No. 4

That the SPLA and the community leaders shall hence forth build trust between the community and the SPLA and shall put in place all necessary confidence building measures to enable returnees to settle peacefully
Resolutions No. 5

That the Central Equatoria State Government shall immediately send local Government administration and organized forces to Wonduruba to resume their duties

Resolutions No. 6

That the leadership of SPLA guarantees that the local administration and other organized forces that they will not be intimidated when they return and resume their duties

Resolutions No. 7

That the local civil administration and the SPLA and other organized forces shall strengthen their unity and commitment as members of security committee

Resolutions No. 8

That the leadership of the SPLA shall take appropriate disciplinary measures on officers and NCO's who will commit crime in the community

Resolution No. 9

That any community member commit any crime shall be deal with in accordance with laws of the Republic of South Sudan

Resolutions No. 10

That the Wonduruba Payam administrative area coordinator shall established a committee to investigate loss of live, looted shops, houses, hospitals, Government and non- Governmental institutions etc as a result of the conflict and consequently submit a report to the Governor of Central Equatoria State for appropriate action

Resolutions No. 11

That the Church leaders mediation Initiative and the Government of Central Equatoria State will request for the humanitarian assistance from NGO's and well whishes to enable resettle the IDPs from Lainya, Yei, Ganji, Ku'da and other displaced camps
Resolutions No. 12

That the agreement shall be disseminated to the community and SPLA commando unit through media and civic awareness.

Resolutions No. 13

That the Church Leaders Mediation Initiative is requested to dialogue with opposition in Wonduruba area for possible peace and reconciliation initiative.

Resolutions No. 14

That the Church Leaders Mediation Initiative monitoring team shall monitor the implementation of the agreement and shall meet and consolidate with parties to the agreement.

Resolution No. 15

That we commit ourselves to adhere to the agreement and shall not violate it whatsoever.

Signed on Thursday 2nd December 2015 by:

Engineer Juma Stephen Lugga
Representative of Wonduruba Community

Colonel Juma Sanango Kher Alla
Representative of SPLA Commando Unit,

Bishop Paul Yugusuk
Lead Mediator
Church Leaders Mediation Initiative
Hon. Augustino Kiri Gwolo
Commissioner of Lainya County &
Representative of the Government
of Central Equatoria State
Witness

Major General Johnson Juma Okot
SPLA Division VI Commander
Witness

Rt. Rev. Matthew Taban Peter
Diocesan Bishop of Wounduruba
Witness

Rt. Rev. Bismark Manday Avokaya
Diocesan Bishop of Mundri
Witness
Yei peace agreement

PHASE II

GRASSROOTS AGREEMENT TO PROMOTE NATIONAL DIALOGUE IN YEI RIVER STATE AND SOUTH SUDAN

ATTENDED BY: COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MOROBO, MUGWO AND YEI RIVER REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF YEI RIVER STATE And

THE SPLA – IO YEI RIVER STATE

Mediated and funded by the Evangelical Presbyterian Church lead by Bishop Elias Taban and their partner His Voice Global USA under the leadership of Dr. Vernon Burger

Signed in Kampala, Uganda on April 30th 2017
Phase II Grassroots Peace Agreement

PHASE II

GRASSROOTS AGREEMENT TO

PROMOTE NATIONAL DIALOGUE IN YEI

RIVER STATE AND SOUTH SUDAN

ATTENDED BY: COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS OF MOROBO, MUGWO

AND YEI RIVER REPRESENTING THE

GOVERNMENT OF YEI RIVER STATE

And

THE SPLA-IO YEI RIVER STATE

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Mediated and funded by the Evangelical Presbyterian Church lead by Bishop Elias Taban and their partner His Voice Global USA under the leadership of Dr. Vernon Burger

Signed in Kampala, Uganda on April 30th 2017
SUMMARY

The phase II grass-root initiative to promote the National Dialogue in Yei River State and South Sudan kicked off in Kampala, Uganda on April 25th - April 29, 2017 and was attended by County Commissioners of Yei River State who represented their respective Counties and the Government of Yei River State, SPLA – IO of Yei River State, represented by senior officers of Division 2B Brigade 1 and 4 representing greater Morobo and Yei, elders from Koboko - Uganda, representative of Yei Community Forum for Dialogue and Peace (YCFDP), representatives from South Sudan embassy in Kampala as well as the national security director for Yei River State – all were invited by Evangelical Presbyterian Church (EPC) under the leadership of Bishop Elias Taban and their partner His Voice Global USA under the leadership of Dr. Vernon Burger. The Church mandate is divine 2Cor 5:18-20.

On April 25, 2017, the Most Rev. Bishop Elias Taban and the Church mediating team spent the day with the sons of Yei who took up arms against the Government of Yei River State (referred to as the armed opposition group) who signed the Phase I document as well as the SPLA – IO Yei River State who joined the Phase II dialogue (referred to as SPLA – IO Yei River State). The two opposition groups or parties of Yei River State in their capacities as senior commanders jointly referred to as parties to this agreement have agreed to be one and known by the name SPLA – IO Yei River State after a day of Prayer and in consideration of the peaceful way to end the currently conflict in Yei River State.

The four (4) days meeting was officially opened by the Most Rev. Bishop Elias Taban with Prayers as follows:
Sukuru Yesu song 92 Arabic, followed by a Biblical Reading taken from 2Cor Chapter 5:18-21 and this was preceded with prayers. Rev. Mama Anngrace
Phase II Grassroots Peace Agreement

Asha Taban also prayed followed by a Biblical Reading taken from 2Cor 10:3-6 that was shared by the Most Rev. Bishop Elias Taban and at the end concluded by prayers and Sukuru Yesu English 105 (what a friend we have in Jesus).

The warring parties discussed common ground to resolve the current crises, security issues, ensuring quality of life and dignity of life and shared demands that when enacted on would create a favorable environment for socio-economic, political and cultural development in Yei River State and South Sudan at large. The warring parties also expressed commitment to achieve lasting peace in Yei River State and accepted the immediate need to end the uncalled for war.

Position of the SPLA – IO Yei River State – presented by SPLA – IO Yei River State

Background:

The Republic of South Sudan is at war with itself. The causes of the war are plain known to all the actors but the lack of will to resolve the conflict has continued to impose untold suffering on the civilians both within the government controlled areas and in areas under opposition control.

Yei River State is deeply immersed into the same conflict with adverse effects on the living conditions of the civilian population. The increasing cases of insecurity manifested by exchange of bullets between the SPLM/A in Government and SPLM/A IO has led to death of innocent civilians and mass displacement of settled communities, the reported cases of arbitrary arrests and detention without trials, disappearance of potential young people, targeting killings along roads, looting and destruction of civilian property including burning of houses are enough to raise our consciousness as it has
set an environment not conducive for social, economic and political development.

Security situation in the state has and continue to worsen since the spread of the conflict in July 2016. A number of incidents happened that led to death of innocent unarmed civilians coupled with high level of rumor, misinformation and hate speech which caused fear, mistrust, hopelessness and mass outflow of civilians in desperation from the areas to seek refuge in neighboring Uganda and DR Congo. As it is evident, towns are almost deserted with the latest being Kajo-Keji which continues to witness mass exodus of civilians, education of children interrupted, health service broken down, business affected as well as financial institutions and humanitarian work highly affected putting the lives of thousands of those left in more danger.

We underscore all efforts made by a range of stakeholders in continuously calling for cessation of hostility and starting of dialogue between the two warring parties, and ensuring that justice and accountability is served to victims, however, with all these voices of goodwill, the situation continues to become deplorable.

It is important to note that the living conditions of those who flee the violence to the refugee camps are heart paining. The people displaced have left behind good houses, enough plantations, and other property. There is therefore nothing more appealing now than ensuring the internally displaced and those in refugee camps to return home and once again enjoy peace and security in totality.

We recognize that for this to be possible, parties must be allowed to openly express their view points, present their concerns/position and a common ground for compromise is sought through an open and inclusive process of
dialogue that can lead to immediate cessation of hostilities and signing of successive agreements on agreed points. This must be done in a neutral ground.

**General Goal:**

To restore peace and security, ensure quality and dignity of life and creating a favorable environment for socio-economic, political and cultural development in Yei River State and South Sudan.

**Specific Goals:**

1. To silence the guns through an immediate process that can lead to cessation of hostilities.
2. To provide a space for parties to engage in a political process of dialogue that will lead to signing of sustainable agreement.
3. To ensure immediate and safe return of internally displaced person and refuges to their original areas.
4. To reduce hate speech/propaganda and misinformation of communities including on social media
5. To close the widening gap of relationship among civilians and between communities and government by creating dialogue and activities that facilitate socio-political interaction and harmony.

**Grievances of SPLA – IO Yei River State**

1. Country-wide insecurity which is a sign of total breakdown of security sector
2. Ongoing uncalled for targeted killings of our brothers/sisters/mothers and fathers  
3. Failure of the Judicial system leading to rise in cases of land grabbing and malpractice

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Phase II Grassroots Agreement to Promote Nation Dialogue in Yei River State and South Sudan
Phase II Grassroots Peace Agreement

4. Deliberate promotion of hate speech, tribalism, nepotism, partisan politics and lack of space for political opposition by the government

5. Continuous appointment of unpopular politicians in our region leading to a calculated misguidance, hence a failure to govern the populace

6. Unbalanced representation in key government areas like; Central Bank, National security, Military Intelligence, Foreign missions, Oil sector, Immigration, et al

7. Unfair treatment of our sons and daughters in the regular forces who are either deployed in far areas and not given an opportunity to visit their homes

8. Neglecting of our sons and daughters who joined the liberation movement as early as 1987 to date serving without equal promotion as their colleagues in other regions

9. Diversion of important projects to other regions for example the development of Nimule – Juba road instead of Juba – Yei Kaya road; yet people of greater Yei contributed immensely during the liberation struggle

10. Weak economic policies resulting to the breakdown of the country’s economy

11. Poor Development policies to improve Education, Agriculture and Health sector which are key for a third world Country to pickup

12. Lack of will by the government to form a national army instead the government is contributing greatly in the creation of militias loyal to them

Demand of SPLA – IO Yei River State:

1. Immediate stoppage of Mathiang Anyor and their relocation from Yei River State
2. Prioritization for protection of our citizens in the region
Phase II Grassroots Peace Agreement

3. Set up of a viable and balanced military representation between the SPLA - IG and the SPLA - IO Yei River State
4. Creation of a balanced and popular shared government between the current government in Yei River State/GRSS and the SPLA - IO in Yei River State
5. Speedy set up and funding of repatriation of our citizens from the refugee camps and the internally displaced to their original settlements
6. Equal representation in key government sector to promote unity of purpose in the Republic of South Sudan
7. Set up of a committee for reconciliation and compensation of victims in Yei River State
8. Set up of a court to try cases of alleged crimes to punish wrong doers and stop future perpetrators of crimes
9. Promotion of development programs which favors the citizens of the Republic of South Sudan
10. Return of grabbed land to its rightful owners through a legal procedure without prejudice

Position of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan

I. The President of the Republic of South Sudan approved and ordered the grassroots effort to proceed with the Peace process based on the declaration of the National Dialogue.

H.E. the President also Declared Amnesty to armed groups who have accepted dialogue; recognized the phase I agreement and approved phase II to be rolled out.

II. The Presidential Order included the establishment of a "Joint Military Committee", comprising of 3 - 4 SPLA Officers from the Government side and equal number from the armed groups.
Phase II Grassroots Peace Agreement

III. The Joint Military Committee will be a Coordination Mechanism composed of SPLA, National Security and the armed groups or rebels to operationalize the initiative.

Terms of reference of the Joint Coordination Mechanism

i. Discuss, agree and co-manage affairs of the proposed assembly area, security in the assembly area, re-organization of forces and any other security related matter to ensure the smooth implementation of the agreement.

ii. Arrangement for facilitation in the Assembly area in terms of Shelter, Food and Medicine

iii. Continue to negotiate phase II military issues before assembly, during assembly and in the lead up to the integration of forces

iv. Report regularly to the State Administration, which will in turn report to the office of H.E. the President of the Republic, on progress, challenges and solutions thereof pertaining to the implementation of the agreement.

National Government Recommendations for Phase II Implementation of the grassroots initiative as per the six (6) pointers of Yei River State Government

1. On Assembly area,

Kendilla Primary School was agreed upon in phase I and has been blessed by the National Government to be the Assembly site because it has the advantage of being 5 miles on the Kajo-Keji Road and its proximity to the government approved cantonment area as well as proximity to areas that are not part of the phase I agreement.

Note: Assembly areas are typically for registration and determination of parade. Thus under normal circumstance, the longevity of accommodation
should not exceed 2-4 weeks before the assembled force move to the
cantonment area(s). However, under the current unpredictable conditions of
operation, and particularly with the cantonment areas not yet established to
date under the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
(ARCSS), the assembled force may remain put for at least three (3) months.
It is therefore advisable to use the three (3) months as the basis of phase II
implementation of the grassroots initiative to promote the National Dialogue
in Yei River State.

2. On security of Assembly area

It has been acknowledged that the need for the security of the assembled
forces emanates from (a) the threat from anti-peace elements from within
the same force and this is a real challenge (b) fear of indiscipline or
disgruntled SPLA, National Security or other organized government forces.
All of these challenges will be contained by the Government orders since the
government supports and owns the peace initiative. Therefore, the following
options are suggested:

i. Option - 1: The armed groups in Yei River State can take care of their
own security, if possible, and if they have the confidence to do so.

ii. Option -2: The SPLA, which has combat mandate, can be assigned to
provide security in collaboration with the assembled forces. National
monitors can be appointed to monitor, evaluate and ensure the security
report of the assembled forces and regularly report to the leadership of
the State Government.

Note: Incase the SPLA is over stretched, either the National
Security (NS) cover the gap or alternatively, a combined force
constituted from the SPLA, National Security, other organized
forces and the armed groups can provide security for the
assembly area.
iii. Whether Option 1 or Option 2, a small “Joint Military Committee” is to be constituted comprising of representatives of the armed group, the SPLA and National Security as a coordination mechanism to deal with the day-to-day matters resolve challenges peacefully and create an environment for trust and confidence building.

Note: In the assembly areas, only the Army and National Security have a role to play. It is only during integration that the Army, National Security, Police, Prisons, Wildlife and Fire brigade shall be represented to manage selection and deployment into their respective fields.

3. On the Provision of food, shelter and healthcare:

The Government agreed that the advance provision of shelter, Food and Healthcare materials to the assembly area is the most important undertaking that will encourage those who have taken up arms against the government to report, and entice others not covered by the agreement to accept a peaceful solution to their concerns. This is very important because experience shows that assembly of rebels for reorganization and training have always failed due to facilitation.

Note: Under the current challenging economic conditions, the following recommendations have been made:

a. In the short term, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management is directed to provide emergency start up supply to expedite phase II implementation. The Under-Secretary of the Ministry responded positively and indicated that it was possible to make a provision from the bilateral donations available in the store. Additionally, the Ministry of Health has been directed to allocate Healthcare facilities for this program.

b. The government calls upon Bishop Elias to mobilize resources to assist in this program, as appropriate for the short, medium and in
the long term. And where necessary, as the Bishop will advice, the government can make recommendation of such appeal(s).

4. On Immediate withdrawal of forces deployed along the road

The Government noted that the deployment of the Army along the road was for the provision of security and protection of the civil population going about doing their normal livelihood activities from hostile anti-peace elements. It is therefore not feasible to immediately withdraw the army from the roads till such time when the factors that led to their deployment are eradicated. Even then it will be necessary to withdraw them gradually as security returns to the area in order to deter anti-peace elements and assure the civil population of their security.

The leaders of the communities of Yei River State; including the Church, the Youth, the Women, Elders and the intellectuals assisted the State Government and made the initiative successful. So, there is complete acceptance of the peace initiative by all stakeholders, namely: the government of both National and State levels, those who have taken up arms against the government and the entire community. Therefore, there should be no fear or doubt about the potential negative intention by either party to the agreement.

5. On Re-organization of the forces in the assembly areas

Expert advice based on the Anya-nya Movement and the SPLA post-CPA, 2005, suggest that re-organization of any armed group into various military units must be accompanied by morale orientation and proper military training to inculcate professionalism and discipline.

Therefore, the SPLA is called upon to provide internal training which inter-alia will produce trust and confidence amongst the trainers and the trainees. Subsequently once integrated into the SPLA it will be much easier to build a national army of a united, peaceful and professional nature and character.
Phase II Grassroots Peace Agreement

6. Recognition and facilitation of the grassroots participants by the ministry of foreign affairs during negotiations in the Neighboring countries

Since the leadership of the armed groups and some of the key elements that brokered the grassroots peace initiative reside in Uganda, it is deemed appropriate that the leadership of Uganda, both political and military, be kept abreast. In this regard, the Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan in Kampala is directed and authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation to officially notify the Government of Uganda on the operationalization of phase II and any other matter related to the agreement.

The warring parties exhausted all common ground to resolve the current crises in Yei River State and South Sudan, recalled the bitter struggle of the people of South Sudan in their pursuit of freedom, justice, peace, and prosperity and the SPLA – IO stood out and demanded that immediate positive response and action by the National Government is required in the following areas if lasting peace is to be achieved:

Demand of SPLA – IO Yei River State:

1. Immediate stoppage of Mathiang Anyor army and their relocation from Yei River State  
2. Prioritization for protection of our citizens in the region  
3. Set up of a viable and balanced military representation between the SPLA – IG and the SPLA – IO Yei River State  
4. Creation of a balanced and popular shared government between the current government in Yei River State/GRSS and the SPLA – IO in Yei River State  
5. Speedy set up and funding of repatriation of our citizens from the refugee camps and the internally displaced to their original settlements
6. Equal representation in key government sector to promote unity of
purpose in the Republic of South Sudan
7. Set up of a committee for reconciliation and compensation of victims in
Yei River State
8. Set up of a court to try cases of alleged crimes to punish wrong doers
and stop future perpetrators of crimes
9. Promotion of development programs which favors the citizens of the
Republic of South Sudan
10. Return of grabbed land to its rightful owners through a legal
procedure without prejudice

Reaction to the ten (10) points demands:
South Sudan diplomat who attended the meeting was deeply concerned with
the tragic loss of lives, destruction of properties, forced displacement of
people from villages and homes in the towns and the unprecedented
migration of our people to refugee camps in the neighboring countries due to
the ongoing fighting in Yei River State as was expressed by the SPLA – IO
Yei River State. The Diplomat further commented that he was proud and
happy to call the SPLA – IO Yei River State brothers and sisters from South
Sudan for having expressed their grievances and concluded that we have
enough of war; it is time to sit down as brothers and sisters and resolve
difference.

Mugwo County Commissioner is determined to maintain the resolve for a
peaceful resolution to the conflict and asked the SPLA – IO Yei River State
for compromise and cooperation in the joint effort to end the conflict in Yei
River State and South Sudan.
Phase II Grassroots Peace Agreement

Morobo Commissioner urged the SPLA – IO to be mindful of the unity of our communities and that we need to live in peace and harmony as people of one nation bound by a common history and destiny. The Commissioner however, lamented the very fact that it has been very difficult to approach the SPLA – IO Yei River State and this has resulted to loss of lives and properties.

Elder George Ambe of Koboko, Uganda is thankful to Bishop Elias Taban for the hard work of making the dialogue attractive. The elder further called on the warring parties to put the interest of the suffering people first on the agenda.

The Most Rev. Bishop Elias Taban who is the lead mediator to the grassroots effort concluded the reaction to the ten (10) points as follows: “the ten points will be immediately forwarded to the person who has the prerogative to answer them and that is the President of the Republic. In the meantime, emphasis should be placed for the warring parties to do the needful and that is to bring this uncalled for conflict and the humanitarian crisis it caused, affecting the citizens, particular the vulnerable people to an end.

The warring party’s agreement to end the conflict in Yei River State:

The undersigned mediators of Evangelical Presbyterian Church, the County Commissioners of Yei River State who represented their respective Counties and the Government of Yei River State, SPLA – IO Yei River State, represented by senior officers of Division 2B Brigade 1 and 4 representing greater Morobo and Yei, elders from Koboko - Uganda, representative of Yei Community Forum for Dialogue and Peace (YCFDP), representatives from South Sudan embassy in Kampala as well as the national security director for Yei River State met in Kampala Uganda, from 25th April to 29th April 2017 at the invitation of Evangelical Presbyterian Church.
Phase II Grassroots Peace Agreement

The participants extended their special thanks to the Government and the people of Uganda for their hospitality and cooperation with the Government of South Sudan and for the good wishes for the people of south Sudan to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict. The participants, further expressed deep appreciation for the support of the grassroots effort by the Governor of Yei River State and the Blessing of the grassroots effort by the President of the Republic H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit.

The warring parties discussed all grievances presented and considered all options and unanimously concluded that the warring parties agree to end the use of force as a means of settling differences and firmly promote the culture of dialogue and peace through commitment to the following:

1. Adoption of the Presidential approval and order for the grassroots effort to proceed with the Peace process based on the declaration of the National Dialogue.

2. Committed to the Presidential Amnesty to armed groups who have accepted dialogue; recognized the phase I grassroots agreement and the approved phase II to be rolled out.

3. Adoption of the Presidential Order for the formation of a “Joint Military Committee”, comprising of 3 – 4 SPLA Officers from the Government side and equal number from the armed groups.

4. Agreed to open all roads leading to Yei Town and out of Yei Town to enable movement of people and their properties.

5. Resolve to set timetable for the formation of Joint Military Committee to be effected by 30th May 2017.

6. The warring parties thanked EPC Peace Desk and their partners and urged them to continue to play the mediation role of preaching peace to the nation.

Phase II Grassroots Agreement to Promote Nation Dialogue in Yei River State and South Sudan
1. **RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPLM/A IO YEI RIVER STATE**

SPLM/A IO Yei River State commits to secession of hostilities and the declaration of National Dialogue by the President of the Republic of South Sudan

a) Stop its forces from engaging the Government in combat  
b) Organize and manage its forces pending future absorption into the national organized forces  
c) Manage its forces in all ranks and will have power to conduct screening and allocation during the process of integration into the organized forces  
d) Provide protection to the civilians in areas under our control  
e) Mobilize the civilians who have taken refuge in Uganda and Congo for their return to the country  
f) Provide free movement of civilians  
g) Determine 4 pre-assembly areas in addition to the approved assembly area of Kendilla  
h) Commits to exchange security details with the government

2. **RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT:**

a) To remove the Mathiang Anyor forces from Umbasi, Kergulu, Go'do, Morobo, Kaya and Yei Town and replace with other National Army  
b) Provide basic needs like food, shelter, medical care  
c) Provide a standby force for emergency response  
d) Maintain communication with the armed opposition forces  
e) Provide incentives to the forces while in assembly areas
Phase II Grassroots Peace Agreement

f) coordinate its movement outside territories of their control with the opposition forces

g) Provide space for free movement of civilians between areas occupied by the government and opposition forces

h) Provide logistics and communication gadgets to the opposition forces

i) Avail necessary resources for trainings of the opposition forces

j) allow full access of Humanitarian corridors

k) Respect the declared National Dialogue by the President

3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHURCHES, PARTICULARLY EPC AND PARTNERS

a) The EPC and Partners to monitor the implementation of the security arrangement

b) EPC and the Partners should report any breach of the agreement and mediate any dispute

c) EPC and the partners will maintain their mediation role during the process of implementation of the security arrangement

d) EPC and the partners will facilitate and finalize the comprehensive agreement after approval of the document of demands presented to the presidency

e) EPC and Partners should lobby for international support for smooth implementation of the agreement

f) EPC and Partners will lobby for humanitarian services like trauma and healing counseling and other necessary trainings for the armed opposition forces

g) EPC and partners to provide support of basic needs (food, shelter, medical and others)
SIGNATURES OF THE PARTIES TO THE GRASSROOTS PEACE AGREEMENT

Church Mediation Team

Most Rev. Bishop Elias Taban, leader of the Mediation Team

Rev. Angrace Asha Taban

Rev. Michael Alias

Elder Victor Luncri

Commissioners of Yei River State

Hon. Denis Lasuba Paul, Yei River County

Hon. Richard Remo Soru, Morobo County

Hon. Natalino Lasuba, Commissioner, County

Elders from Uganda

Ambe George Wilson – Elder Koboko, Uganda

Muzamil Amule, Elder Koboko Uganda

SPLA – IO, YEI RIVER STATE

Brig Gen. Hillary Edson T. Yakani SPLA – IO YRS

Brig Gen. Yuma Sebastian, SPLA – IO YRS

Col. John Data Taban, SPLA – IO YRS

Representative of Yei Community Forum for Dialogue and Peace

Hon. Jacob Aligo Lo – Ladu, YCFDP Founder
Phase II Grassroots Peace Agreement

National Security Representative
Major James Alor Majok

Representative of the Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan in Uganda
Emmanuel Padé, 1st Secretary
Philip Maluui Akol, 1st Technical Secretary
Joseph Ochera, Technical Attaché

Signed in Kampala, Uganda on April 30th 2017
About the FES Africa Peace and Security Series

The lack of security is one of the key impediments to development and democracy in Africa. The existence of protracted violent conflicts as well as a lack of accountability of the security sector in many countries are challenging cooperation in the field of security policy. The emerging African Peace and Security Architecture provides the institutional framework to promote peace and security.

As a political foundation committed to the values of social democracy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) aims at strengthening the interface between democracy and security policy. FES therefore facilitates political dialogue on security threats and their national, regional and continental responses. The FES Africa Peace and Security Series aims to contribute to this dialogue by making relevant analysis widely accessible. The series is being published by the FES Africa Security Policy Network.

About the publication

The link between local and national conflict dynamics is usually complex. From the beginning of the outbreak of violent conflict in South Sudan, local dynamics, too, shaped the agendas of armed actors. However, the design of the regional peace process poorly reflects these local-national conflict links. This raises the question of whether and how conflicts can be resolved or mitigated at the local level. Historically, people-to-people processes played a critical role in reducing fighting among South Sudanese. In the current conflict, too, non-state actors have forged intra- and inter-communal peace agreements at the local level. The results of such local peace initiatives in the ongoing South Sudan war vary considerably. This paper maps five cases of recent local level peace deals in South Sudan between 2014 and 2018 to identify key criteria that strengthen the prospects of successful implementation and sustainability of local peace agreements.