Political Handbook & NGO Calendar 2004
Dear Partners, Friends & Interested Readers,

In order to meet the interests and needs expressed by most of our partners and friends for dissemination of different information via our Political Handbook & NGO Calendar, we decided to publish the 2004 edition.

This time we enlarged the calendar part for those who may wish to use it more effectively. The idea is to concentrate the Handbook on core themes. For this year we decided to present specific articles on the “Cotonou-Agreement”, the agreed co-operation between African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and the European Union (EU). We want to concentrate our activities in order to accompany the process of the Cotonou Agreement. We are convinced that the Cotonou Agreement will be one of the important themes of the near future, and that, will shape the economic relationship of developing countries and the European counterparts. It is also in this process that will be decided the development direction of your country within the whole region.

In this matter the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Tanzania has the following objectives:
1. To provide our partners with readable and relevant information about the Cotonou Agreement and its processes.
2. To raise awareness and encourage our partners for broader participation in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement in Tanzania and in the East African Region.
3. To enhance the capacities of selected partners so as to ensure their involvement and effective participation in the Cotonou Agreement negotiations and policy processes at national and regional levels.

The Cotonou Agreement recognizes the complementary role of the civil society, the private sector, the trade unions etc. (defined as the Non-State Actors) in the development process, and that they are to be involved more systematically in the dialogue, decision-making, evaluation and monitoring. This is a new challenge for the FES.

For those readers who are actively engaged in the development of civil society the Political Handbook and NGO Calendar 2004 provides you with tools to assist you in your work.
And for those who need updated statistic information about the country you will find them here.

Finally I would like to thank our many contributors for their work, with special thanks to Angela Ishengoma for the product-coordination, Marianne Schreiber-Einloft for the tireless revision, and Petra Sutila for the design and layout.

Me & all staff of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Tanzania wish you and your family a healthy, prosperous, successful and peaceful year 2004.

Reinhold Einloft
Resident Director
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<td>Monday 11</td>
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Monday 25

Tuesday 26

Wednesday 27

Thursday 28

Friday 29

Saturday 30

Sunday 31
Monday 1

Tuesday 2

Wednesday 3

Thursday 4

Friday 5

Saturday 6

Sunday 7
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**NOVEMBER 2004**

**WEEK 46  8TH - 14TH NOVEMBER 2004**
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<td>Saturday 25</td>
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<td>Sunday 26</td>
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<td>Day</td>
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</table>

**DECEMBER 2004 - JANUARY 2005**

**WEEK 53 27TH DECEMBER 2004 - 2ND JANUARY 2005**
1. OVERVIEW

**SOME BASIC FACTS & FIGURES**

*Compiled by Mr Aloisi Tobias, University of Dar es Salaam, November 2003*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geography 1</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total area</strong></td>
<td>945,087 sq. km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land area</strong></td>
<td>886,037 sq. km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Water area</strong></td>
<td>59,050 sq. km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(This includes the islands of Mafia, Pemba and Zanzibar)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total land boundaries</strong></td>
<td>3,861 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coastline</strong></td>
<td>1,424 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest point: Kilimanjaro</strong></td>
<td>5,895 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural resources</strong></td>
<td>hydropower, tin, phosphates, iron ore, coal, diamonds, gemstones, gold, natural gas, nickel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land use</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arable land</strong></td>
<td>4.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Permanent crops</strong></td>
<td>1.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Permanent pastures</strong></td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forests and woodland</strong></td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>18% (1993 estimates)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Irrigated Land</strong></td>
<td>1,550 km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong> ² (estimated)</td>
<td>30.5 mil.</td>
<td>32.9 mil.</td>
<td>33.7 mil.</td>
<td>35.92 mil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population growth rate %</strong></td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population density (people per sq.km)</strong></td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic groups ³</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainland - native African 99% (of which 95% are Bantu consisting of more than 130 tribes), other 1% (consisting of Asian, European and Arab) Zanzibar - Arab, native African, mixed Arab and native African</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religions</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainland - Christian 45%, Muslim 35%, indigenous beliefs 20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar - more than 99% Muslim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources**

1 CIA-The World Factbook - Tanzania: downloaded September, 2003
2 Population statistics: World Development Indicators database, 2002
3 Information on ethnic groups and religion: CIA - The World Factbook
An indicator is a measure that can be used to reflect progress, stagnation or deterioration in a particular phenomenon or situation such as literacy, the economy, health and poverty. For example, a change in the literacy rate from 5% to 7% over a five year period reflects an improvement in literacy in that period.

Indicators are also used to compare a given situation, for example poverty, between one individual and another, between one household and another, between one community and another or one country with another.

The economic and social welfare of an individual, household or community can be measured using economic and social welfare indicators.

**ECONOMIC INDICATORS**

There are a number of standardized indicators in this area that can give a picture of a country’s economic situation. These indicators are most useful when (1) they are compared with those of other countries in the region; (2) they are put into a time perspective (e.g. the 1960 Gross National Income compared with that of 1980); and (3) when internal variations are taken into consideration (e.g. how the project area compares to the nation as a whole).

**Gross National Income (GNI)** in previous years was referred to as Gross National Product (GNP) per capita is the main criterion for the country classification. It does not in itself constitute or measure welfare or success in development. It does not distinguish between the aims and ultimate uses of a given product, nor does it say whether it merely offsets some natural or other obstacles to welfare. GNI measures the total domestic and foreign value added claimed by residents. It comprises Gross Domestic Product (GDP) plus net factor income from abroad, which is the income residents receive from abroad for factor services (labour and capital), less similar payments made to domestic non-residents who contributed to the domestic economy.

**Gross Domestic Product (GDP)** is the total output of goods and services for final use produced in an economy by both residents and non-residents regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of “fabricated” assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. GDP per capita is obtained by dividing GDP by the population. The figures for GDP are US $ value converted from domestic currencies using a single-year official exchange rate.

**Unemployment** is one of the key indicators of the economy. Unemployment is generally defined as males and females in the economically active age group who are not in paid employment in cash or kind of self-employed on a continuous basis, but who are available and have taken specific measures to seek paid employment or self-employment. The rate is derived from the economically active population. The employed include regular employees, working proprietors, active business partners and unpaid family workers but exclude homemakers.

Income distribution is the proportion of the consumption that the population with the lowest consumption (lowest 20 percent) spends.

This indicator can also be used to measure the pattern of the standard of living.

**The nation’s debt situation** is an estimate of the nation’s public and private sector long-term foreign debt expressed as a percentage of
the GNP; an assessment of the nation’s ability to pay it back and how it affects the government’s capacity to provide services to its people.

**Rate of inflation** is defined as the percentage annual increase in a general price level commonly measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or some comparable price index. Inflation affects people’s livelihood. Price increases of food and non-food essential items means harder lives for people.

**Social Indicators**

The following represent commonly used indicators for social development. In general they are used in the same way as the economic indicators.

**Infant mortality rate (IMR)** is the probability of dying between birth and exactly one year of age expressed per 1,000 live births for a given year. It is a very sensitive indicator, which is influenced by maternal care, health services provided and infant care. The “under 5 mortality rate” is the probability of dying between birth and exactly five years of age expressed per 1,000 live births. It is influenced by the livelihood status of the family.

**Life expectancy** is the average number of years newborn children can expect to live taking into account the mortality risks prevailing for the cross-section of the population at the time of birth.

**Literacy** is defined as the percentage of women and men aged 15 and above who can read and write. “Adult illiteracy” is defined as the proportion of the population over the age of 15 years who cannot, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.

**Primary school gross enrolment ratio** is the total number of children enrolled in primary school, e.g. Std. I-VII (whether or not they belong in the relevant age group for that level), expressed as a percentage of the total number of children in the relevant age group for primary school, e.g. 7-13 years old. However, it should always be remembered that the overall net enrolment rate is, in most cases, much lower due to pupils dropping out of school.

The Ministry of Education has issued a directive that “the primary pupil-teacher ratio” must be 45:1. The primary pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in a school divided by the number of teachers in the education system.

Sources:

2) World Development Report 2002
### 1. Poverty and Social Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2002</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Sub Sahara Africa</th>
<th>Low Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population, mid-year (millions)</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>2,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita (Atlas method, US$)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI (Atlas method, US$ billions)</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>1,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual growth, 1996-02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (%)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force (%)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most recent estimate (latest year available, 1996-02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty (% of population below national poverty line)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (% of total population)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child malnutrition (% of children under 5)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access to an improved water source (% of population)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy (% of population age 15+)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross primary enrollment (% of school-age population)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>87</td>
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### 2. Key Economic and Long-Term Trends

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<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>87</td>
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3. STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

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<tr>
<td>(% of GDP)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private consumption</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General government</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumption</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of goods and services</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private consumption</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumption</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-32.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic investment</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of goods and services</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: 2002 Data are preliminary estimates
### 4. PRICES AND GOVERNMENT FINANCE

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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic prices</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% change)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer prices</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit GDP deflator</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government finance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% of GDP, includes current grants)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current revenue</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current budget balance</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall surplus/deficit</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRADE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(US$ millions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total exports (fob)</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>98</td>
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<td>Manufactures</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>56</td>
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<td>Total imports (cif)</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>1,889</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>169</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel and energy</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td>Capital goods</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>755</td>
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<td>Export price index (1995=100)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>156</td>
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<td>Import price index (1995=100)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>Terms of trade (1995=100)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>148</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BALANCE of PAYMENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(US$ millions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exports of goods and services</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>1,569</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports of goods and services</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>2,232</td>
<td>2,224</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resource balance</td>
<td>-556</td>
<td>-1,337</td>
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<td>-656</td>
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<td>Net income</td>
<td>-85</td>
<td>-187</td>
<td>-85</td>
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<td>Net current transfers</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>-19</td>
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<td>Current account balance</td>
<td>-523</td>
<td>-714</td>
<td>-738</td>
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<td>Financing items (net)</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changes in net reserves</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-102</td>
<td>-171</td>
<td>-347</td>
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<td><strong>Memo:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves including gold (US$ millions)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conversion rate (DEC, local/US$)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>297.7</td>
<td>876.4</td>
<td>966.6</td>
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### 5. EXTERNAL DEBT AND RESOURCE FLOWS

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<tr>
<td>Total debt outstanding and disbursed</td>
<td>6,202</td>
<td>6,675</td>
<td>6,679</td>
<td>7,238</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1,618</td>
<td>2,588</td>
<td>2,869</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total debt service</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Composition of net resource flows</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official grants</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>927</td>
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<tr>
<td>Official creditors</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>179</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private creditors</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>-21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>224</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portfolio equity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>224</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>World Bank program</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Commitments</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disbursements</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal repayments</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net flows</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>140</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest payments</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net transfers</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>123</td>
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### NOTES
# 6. ICT INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICT infrastructure &amp; access</th>
<th>TANZANIA</th>
<th>SUBSAHARAN AFRICA</th>
<th>LOW INCOME</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone mainlines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per 1,000 people</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In largest city (per 1,000 people)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waiting list (thousands)</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,295</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revenue per line ($)</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>1,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of local call ($ per 3 minutes)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile phones (per 1,000 people)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>International telecommunications</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing traffic (minutes per subscriber)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>245</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost of call to U.S. ($ per 3 minutes)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>5.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daily newspapers (per 1,000 people)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios (per 1,000 people)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television sets (per 1,000 people)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers &amp; the Internet</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal computers</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per 1,000 people</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installed in education (thousands)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users (thousands)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>5,799.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monthly off peak access charges</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>35.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service provider charge ($)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone usage charge ($)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Notes: Figures in italics refer to an earlier year.


Development Data Group, World Bank

The United Republic of Tanzania was formed in April 1964 by the union of Tanganyika and the state of Zanzibar, comprising the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. Tanganyika had been successively a German colony, a British administered League of Nations’ Mandate, a United Nations’ Trust Territory under British administration, and finally independent since 1961 within the Commonwealth of Nations. Zanzibar was a British colony until 1963.

Africans in Tanganyika, as was the case in other parts of Africa, never reconciled themselves to colonial domination. From the very beginning, they rose and fought the colonial invaders. The most outstanding resistance was shown by the Sambaa led by Kimweri against the Germans; by the Hehe under Mkwawa who fought a long and bitter war against the Germans; and during the Maji Maji War under the leadership of Kinjeketile, Mputa and Kibasila. Due to the lack of unity among these early nationalists and fighters for freedom, and due to the superior fighting power of the colonial invaders, all of these early liberation struggles ended up in total failure and great loss of life.

The later struggle for national freedom in Tanganyika was not marked by sharp confrontation and bloodshed as was the case in neighbouring Kenya or other African colonies like Mozambique, Angola or Zimbabwe. There were two main reasons for this relatively peaceful struggle. One was that there was only a small body of white settlers in Tanganyika, numbering about 20,000 in the 1950s, and as few of them were of British origin, there were not very strong British political and economic interests in Tanganyika. The other reason was that in 1946, after the Second World War, Tanganyika became a United Nations’ Trusteeship Territory. As such it could scarcely be allowed to fall under settler control.

As in the majority of African colonies, nationalism developed in Tanganyika after 1945. In fact the first signs of national awareness were already evident shortly after the First World War when, both on the mainland and on Zanzibar, African associations were formed. On the mainland the African Association (AA) was formed in 1929 as a discussion group among educated persons. This association became the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) in 1948. In 1934 a similar African Association was formed in Zanzibar.

After the Second World War members of the Tanganyika African Association moved with the tide of nationalism and, in 1953, under the able and skilful chairmanship of Julius Nyerere, the TAA was reorganized as a political party, leading directly to the formation of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954, while in Zanzibar the African Association was reorganized into the Afro-Shiraz Party in 1957.

The formation of TANU in 1954 marked the beginning of the independence struggle in earnest. After seven years of intense political struggle Tanganyika won her freedom under the auspices of the TANU, strengthened by the cooperation of the trade unions and agricultural co-operatives.

Two years later, in December 1963, the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba also became independent, but under a government without wide support. This was a government dominated by the Sultan of Zanzibar and a minority of land-owning
local Arabs. Two months after independence in January 1964, the Sultan’s government was overthrown and power passed to non-Arab Afro-Shiraz Party.

The leaderships of the newly independent Tanganyika and Zanzibar replaced parliament with the party as the centre of power and in 1965 a change in the constitution made the country a one-party democratic state.

Tanganyika had inherited an economy torn and dilapidated by many years of colonialism. There was a very low level of literacy, a poor infrastructure and a high rate of disease and poverty. In response to this, in 1967, the new leadership made the then famous Arusha Declaration on Socialism and Self-reliance as the country’s development blueprint. The cornerstone was Ujamaa, a policy of “villagisation” whereby the rural population was grouped into village communities to cultivate land together and be provided with essential services. The object was that they should be self-sufficient in basic needs.

This project did not survive. It collapsed along with socialism elsewhere in the world. Central planning proved itself unable to mobilise the country’s economic forces and there were too many management errors, not to mention cases of embezzlement. However, although the economic performance of the period was far from satisfactory, standards of living did improve. Access to education and health services was extended and national unity was consolidated. This last aspect is seen as President Nyerere’s most significant achievement.

Given the failure of Ujamaa and self-reliance, President Nyerere’s successor, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, made an about turn and in 1985 he negotiated an adjustment programme with the Bretton Woods institutions. Since 1986 the country has been involved in a series of adjustment programmes following on from the first agreement with the IMF. Tanzania had effectively no choice and was forced to implement drastic measures in an attempt to create an environment favourable to investment in all the economic sectors. The 1990s have seen an acceleration of the reforms with considerable effort going into the key programme of decentralisation.

In the early 1990s the ruling party CCM sensed that the democratic movement was gaining ground across Africa. It had grasped the nettle of economic liberalisation and now also managed to swim with the tide of democratisation. A multi-party system was introduced in July 1992 and the first multiparty elections were run in 1995. Benjamin William Mkapa became President of the United Republic of Tanzania, while Dr. Salim Amour became President of Zanzibar.

A difficult political situation arose after the 1995 elections. The main opposition party CUF disputed the results and boycotted the House of Representatives. It claimed that victory had been snatched out of the hands of its leader, Seif Shariff Hamad, and appealed to world opinion to denounce the poll and introduce sanctions against CCM.

In 1997 the Commonwealth secretariat came in as mediator and, after protracted negotiations, an accord was made but never implemented. The situation remained tense up to 2000 when the second multiparty elections were held. Again CCM won both in the mainland and in Zanzibar with Mr Mkapa as President of the Union and Mr Aman Karume as President of Zanzibar. The post 1995 election scenario was repeated after the results of the 2000 elections. However, this time, CCM and CUF wasted no time and entered into negotiations, reaching an accord in September 2001. The implementation of the accord started towards the end of 2001.

The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (SMZ) has passed a motion on the accord in the House of Representatives. SMZ is also
effecting the 8th amendment of her constitution in order to provide for the implementation of the accord.

The President of the Union, Hon. B. W. Mkapa, has appointed Hon. Hamad Rashid Mohamed of Civic United Front (CUF) an MP in the Union Parliament. The Union President has also formed a commission headed by Brig. Hashim Mbita (Rtd) to inquire into the clash between the police and demonstrators which occurred in the islands of Unguja and Pemba on 26 - 27 January 2001.

The number of fully registered political parties increased from 13 in 2000 to 15 in 2002. Two parties, namely PPP and MSHIKAMANO, have obtained temporary registration. During the same period two parties have been de-registered, namely TPP and PONA.

In the first By-Elections held in May 18, 2003 in Pemba after the 2000 general elections and the CCM-CUF Mwafaka of 2001, the ruling CCM lost heavily to the Zanzibar main opposition party – CUF.

CUF won all the eleven House of Representatives seats it had contested as well as all the 17 seats it contested for the Union Parliament. Three other opposition parties – the National Convention for Construction and Reforms (NCCR – Mageuzi) the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) and TADEA fielded candidates in constituencies where the CUF candidates were barred by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission.

The ruling party CCM won in all the six constituencies where the CUF was barred to field candidates. But it also lost the strategic Mkanyageni constituency, home to the Vice President Dr Ali Mohamed Shein. The constituency had fallen vacant following the appointment of Dr. Ali Mohamed Shein as Vice President after the death of the late Vice President Dr. Omar Ali Juma.

Following the landslide victory of the Kenyan opposition under the umbrella of NARC in 2002, a series of consultations among Tanzanian political opposition parties were held with the objective of forming a coalition along the lines of the Kenyan NARC. However these consultations which lasted for almost a year were more often mired in wrangles among and within the parties. However, after last minute withdrawal by some of them, eight opposition parties signed a unity pledge on August 30, 2003. The parties which signed include UDP, UMD, NCCR-Mageuzi, FORD, NLD, TADEA and PPT-Maendeleo. Four parties did not sign the document – these were CUF, CHAUDEMA, CHAUSTA and TLP.

In 2002 the National Assembly (Parliament) passed the Anti-terrorism Act, amid an outcry that it would discriminate against Muslims. This Act became operational since June 15, 2003. Under the new law, terrorism suspects could be repatriated to countries where they are alleged to have committed the crime.

On August 2, 2003 President Benjamin Mkapa inaugurated the Rufiji Bridge worth shs. 30 billion. It is hoped that the bridge will act as a catalyst to development in the southern corridor of the country as well as speed up the development and unity among member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). But the bridge will particularly ease communication and transport problems experienced by the people of Mtwarra, Lindi, Coast and Dar es Salaam. Four countries – Uganda, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe witnessed its inauguration.

The 23rd Summit of heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 25 – 26. At the end of the meeting the (SADC) countries issued a 52 point communique in which among others, they reaffirmed their support for Zimbabwe. President Benjamin Mkapa became the new Chairperson of the organization for the coming
year. This was the first time for Tanzania to host a SADC conference since its inception in the late 1980s.

The Vice President Dr. Ali Mohamed Shein launched on August 27, 2003 the National Trade Policy and small and Medium Enterprises Policy. These two constitute a milestone on the road towards stimulating the development of a robust private sector in the country. On 1st September, 2003 Finland resumed economic aid to Zanzibar five years after the Isles government was denied aid not only by Finland but also other donor countries due to a political crisis and human rights issues brought about by the disputed 1995 elections in the Isles. Finland said that the political situation in Zanzibar now allows donor countries to resume long-term development cooperation with the Isles.
2. THE ACP-EU PARTNERSHIP

THE COTONOU AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW

The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement or in short, the Cotonou Agreement is a comprehensive trade and aid agreement concluded between the EU and 77 African- Caribbean-Pacific countries. It was concluded for a twenty-year period (2000-2020) and signed in June 2002 in Cotonou, Benin. Furthermore the agreement is a financial protocol, divided into 5 year periods with the financial means provided under the corresponding European Development Fund (EDF). EDF9 for the period 2002-2007 contains 13,5 billion Euro to which may be added some 10 billion Euro unused funds from previous EDFs.

1. ACP-EU Relations in a Historical Perspective

The Cotonou agreement may be called the fourth phase of development cooperation between ACP-countries and the EU. European Development policy, in its beginning was largely shaped by the colonial history of the European community’s member countries with France pressing for special relations with their former colonies. The first two agreements focussed on French speaking Africa (Yaounde I 1963–69 and Yaounde II 1969–75). The second phase took off with the United Kingdom (UK) joining the EU in 1973 and request similar privileges. The community reacted with a more balanced geographical spread. Lome I (1975–80) included 47 ACP countries, a figure which rose to 77 under the latest agreement on development cooperation. While the development strategy was reformulated every five years and new elements were introduced like Stabex and Sysmin, Lome I – II remained primarily programmes on economic cooperation.

Lome III and IV may be seen as third phase of ACP-EU relations, as they took momentum in a radically changing economic and political environment. The ‘neo-liberal age’ of the 1980ies and the end of the bipolar world of the east-west-confrontation changed the framework of EU-ACP-relations in several ways:

- Trade preferences to ACP countries eroded irreversibly due to progressive lowering of EU-tariffs under GATT/WTO as well as EU preferential agreements to other areas;
- Political pressure increased to make Lomé-agreements compatible with WTO-rules;
- The focus of EU-aid shifted from ACP-countries to Central & Eastern Europe (CEE). While still increasing slightly in absolute figures, in relative terms, ACP-share in EU-aid fell from 61% in 1990 to 30% in 1998
- Lome IV, for the first time, introduced ‘political conditionalities’ and linked some aid to structural adjustment and the observance of human rights.

When Lomé IV expired the environment for the European development aid had changed dramatically and had to be reformulated against the backdrop of:

- the future enlargement of the EU to Eastern Europe
- the decreased geo-strate-
When it comes to ACP-states in comparison to the Mediterranean and Latin American states

- the WTO trade regime, which demands most favored nation treatment, thereby contradicting the Lomé rules (Occasionally experienced in the banana dispute between USA and the European Union)
- the worsening of economic and social conditions in many parts of Africa and resulting frustration of European Union. Despite preferential access the ACP-share in EU markets had fallen from 6.7% (1976) to 3% (1998)

Within the EU claims occurred to completely abandon the Lomé regime while statements of ACP-Governments mostly expressed the need to continue with the Lomé regime. In the end, a compromise was found, which, at the same time, is a continuation of Lomé as well as a departure from it.

2. The Cotonou Agreement: Some Principles and Objectives

The EU-ACP relations as outlined in the Cotonou-agreement can – for the purpose of this study – be subdivided into three major areas:

1. a political dialogue between ACP - countries and the EU,
2. the development of a new trade regime, called Economic Partnership Agreements, and the
3. development aid cooperation.

All three areas are open to the participation of Non-State actors.

(a) Political Dialogue between ACP and EU

The Cotonou-agreement identifies three joint ACP-EU institutions that engage in political dialogue and the management of cooperation. There is the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, which on the ACP-side includes one member of the Government of each ACP-member country and on the EU-side the Council of the EU and representatives from the European commission.

The ACP-EU-Committee of Ambassadors monitors the implementation of the Cotonou agreement and plays the role of advisor to the Council of Ministers. The joint Parliamentary Assembly has plenary sessions twice a year, can break into regional and sub-regional meetings and recommends to the Council of Ministers on any duties it feels fit.

The joint ACP-EU institutions shall engage in dialogue on human rights, democracy, rule of law, migration, arms trade, peace and security and so on. It is thus established, that issues of political democracy and peace & security become integral part of development cooperation.

A distinction is made between fundamental and essential elements. Essential elements, the violation of which may lead to aid suspension, includes Human rights, democracy and the rule of law, while fundamental elements, which constitute no ground for aid suspension focus on good governance, including the participation of new actors.

There is no doubt, that the political dialogue is framed into the conflicting principles of sovereignty vs. suspension of aid and that the differentiation between ‘essential elements’ and ‘fundamental elements’ leaves much space for interpretation.

So far the mechanism has been used in the case of Zimbabwe where the formulation of the CSP and NIP was blocked by the EU due to the political development in this country.

(b) Towards regional integration and a new trade regime compatible with WTO-rules

The Cotonou-agreement lays out a time-table towards establishing a new trade regime.

- Until 31. Dec. 2007, all current ACP tariff preferences shall be maintained;
- As from 2008 onwards, LDC of the ACP-group may continue to receive non-reciprocal trade preferences while non-LDCs shall have concluded so-called Economic Partnership Agree-
ments (EPA) with the EU, which allow for reciprocal preferences (EU-ACP-free trade agreements) and are WTO-compatible;
• The EPAs shall promote regional integration and thus, shall be concluded with regions instead of national economies;
• EU-ACP-negotiations in effect started in 2002. It was agreed, that the first year will be used to agree on basic principles for EPAs while end of 2003, negotiations on regional EPA should take off and be concluded latest till 2007.

(c) Development aid cooperation – national and regional

While Lome IV had 10 different instruments, cooperation under Cotonou is rationalised and based on 2 instruments: Firstly, grants are given though a country support strategy (CSS), which covers all grants and runs for a period of five years. Secondly, investments are operated under a special investment facility.

Programming of development aid can be for regional or national projects. In both cases, the sequence of programming involves three steps:
• Country or Regional Support Strategy (CSS, RSS)

Based on a country or region situation analysis, development strategies are outlined to which the EU responds by identifying its sector focus and bringing development activities of other donors like Worldbank or bilateral EU member countries programmes into a coherent plan.

• National or Regional Indicative Programme (NIP, RIP)

Based on a country or regional support strategy, a national or regional indicative programme is drawn up for five years, listing individual concrete proposals for funding.

• Review

The indicative programme will have an annual review, to check on operation and implementation, and a midterm review and an end-term review to give a performance test.

3. Participation of Non-State Actors (NSAs)

One of the most radical innovations of the Cotonou-agreement is the introduction of a new participatory approach. For the first time, the ACP and the EU legally commit themselves to involve new actors. Article 2 of the Agreement defines participation as a fundamental principle of the cooperation between the EU and the ACP-countries. The principle of participative development is promoted to involve a wide range of actors.

“Article 2:
Fundamental Principles
[...] Participation: apart from central government as the main partner, the partnership shall be open to different kinds of other actors in order to encourage the integration of all sections of society, including the private sector and civil society organisations, into the mainstream of political, economic and social life; [...]”

Article 6 defines the actors of cooperation. On the State side, local, national and regional Government bodies are listed. On the Non-State side, the agreement mentions the private sector, economic and social partners, including trade unions and “civil society in all its forms according to national characteristics”. From here-on, the later group is many times referred to as Non-State Actors.

There are additional selection criteria to cut down Non-State Actors “in all its forms” to a more manageable manner. The Cotonou agreement mentions three such qualifying criteria:

“Article 6.2
Recognition by the parties of non-governmental actors shall depend on the extent to which they address the needs of the population, on their specific competencies and whether they are organized and managed democratically and transparently”
There is no single chapter in the Cotonou agreement containing in a comprehensive manner the ‘participatory rights’ of the new actors. Article four outlines the general approach but information is spread through many parts of the document and due to the changing context, the meaning sometimes changes as well. There appears to be three areas, where Central Governments should allow participation of new actors:

(a) Policy formulation and drawing-up programmes: The rights are limited to information and consultation while voting and final decision-making is left to State actors. The areas of information and consultation include the political dialogue, the economic partnership agreements as well as the aid programme under CSS/NIP and RSS/RIP;

(b) Project implementation: Two issues are of major importance. The private sector should be strongly involved in terms of consulting as well as taking contracts; and NGOs and socio-economic interest groups may receive financial resources for capacity building to improve their participation;

(c) Programme review and evaluation: While the monitoring of programme implementation and reviewing the outcome is made a major point in quality management, no clear provision is provided as to how non-State actors should get involved in what kind of review procedure.

For the purpose of our study, two more points should be mentioned here:

• The participation of new actors is not treated as an essential element but as a fundamental element the violation of which constitutes no ground for aid suspension. If a national Government however, does exclude non-State actors from participation, the EU has the possibility to sanction bad governance by taking note of it through the review process and reducing its funding in the aftermath. Whether the EU will use a sanction line or not is not regulated and appears to depend on the individual case.

The defence line of an ‘erring State’ can even be seen as being cared for in the agreement where it states in Article four, that non-State actors shall be involved “where appropriate”. This passage can be interpreted as providing the legal argument for limiting participation.

The agreement is silent on any institutional provisions how the involvement of non-State actors should be organized. There is no mentioning of a formalized process like the establishment of consultation committees or minimum requirements for procedures. It is left to State actors, to set up a mechanism for consulting non-State actors. We can assume, that the definitions of Article six, dealing with the selection of participants, can be applied in the same manner. The relevant passage is: “way to the selection of procedures”.

NOTES
Recognising the Differences

In developing future trade relations with the EU the members of the East African Community face a fundamental dilemma as a result of the very different trade options open to least developed and non-least developed ACP countries.

Uganda and Tanzania as least developed countries have a recognized right under WTO rules to non-reciprocal trade preferences. The EU has recognized this right through its “Everything But Arms(EBA)” initiative, which granted full duty, special levy and quota free access to the EU for all products “originating” in least developed countries, except arms, munitions and, on a transitional basis, sugar, rice and bananas.

Since this GSP based initiative applies equally to all least developed countries and does not discriminate between countries at the same level of development, unlike the Cotonou Agreement trade provisions, it is not subject to challenge in the WTO. As a consequence Uganda and Tanzania will in future enjoy complete duty, quota and special duty free access to the EU market for all products which meet the rules of origin for least developed country products.

Kenya finds itself in a somewhat different position for as a non-least developed country, the alternative to the current Cotonou Agreement trade preferences which Kenya enjoys is the standard GSP treatment. This trade regime would lead to a re-imposition of standard, yet reduced import duties and special duties on a range of products for which Kenya currently enjoys duty and special levy free access.1 Significantly, these product areas (most notably cut flowers and horticultural products) are sectors into which Kenya has been diversifying in recent years to reduce its dependence on traditional export commodities (coffee and tea) prices for which are showing a strong downward trend.

Kenya thus finds itself in a position where it needs to find a new basis for its future trade relations with the EU beyond the lifetime of the current Cotonou Agreement trade provisions which expire at the end of 2007. This is why Kenya is currently taking such a keen interest in the economic partnership agreement negotiations which were launched between the EU and the ACP in September 2002 and which are intended to establish WTO compatible free trade area arrangements over a transitional period from 2008 to 2020.

If Kenya is unable to negotiate a new preferential basis for its trade relations with the EU, which preserves and enhances existing trade preferences, then it will revert back to standard GSP treatment. This would result in the re-imposition of GSP import duties across a range of products which are of growing importance to Kenya’s export trade with the EU. The product area most likely to be affected are cut flowers, although certain temperate horticultural products could also be affected by a re-imposition of duties.2

However there is one area where Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya will be similarly affected by the introduction of reciprocity in their trade relations with the EU, that is in terms of its impact on
## EXPORTS TO THE EU 2000

(MILLION EURO AND % OF TOTAL EXPORTS TO EU)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Uganda M EURO %</th>
<th>Tanzania M EURO %</th>
<th>Kenya M EURO %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0307 fresh fish</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0303 frozen fish</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0304 fish fillets</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>112.9</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0306 crustaceans</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0307 molluscs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0607 live plants</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0608 cut flowers</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0708 leg Vegetables</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>151.3</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1009 vegetables</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0801 dates, avos pineap.</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0901 coffee</td>
<td>136.7</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0902 tea</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>141.8</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1604 prepared fish</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710 sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801 cocoa beans</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 pres veg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 fruit &amp; nuts</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 fruits juices</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2101 coffee extracts</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2401 tobacco</td>
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<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
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<td>2523 cement</td>
<td>9.2</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2529 feldspar</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4101 raw hides</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4106 goat &amp; kid leather</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5201 cotton</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5705 cotton yarn</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5301 sisal</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7010 flaks etc.</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7102 diamonds</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7103 precious stones</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7108 gold</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7112 scrap prec. Metal</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8105 cobalt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Tariff Losses</th>
<th>Total Revenue Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Government revenues. Each East African country has a high dependence on customs duties as a source of government revenue and for each East Africa country the EU is a major source of imports.

The official study on the impact of regional economic partnership agreements in East Africa found that likely government revenue losses would be equivalent to 12% of total government revenue in Kenya, 16% of total government revenues in Uganda and 20% of total government revenue in Tanzania.

Structuring tariff offers in order to reduce or defer revenue losses and mobilizing effective assistance in support of processes of fiscal restructuring with thus be important areas to be addressed for all East African countries in the forthcoming negotiations.

**EPAS and Least Developed Countries**

Currently despite the right which least developed countries like Uganda and Tanzania enjoy to non reciprocal trade preferences, the European Commission in its approach to economic partnership agreements in expecting least developed ACP countries to give up this right. In the East African context, Uganda and Tanzania would be expected to give up this right to non-reciprocal trade preferences in favour of the regional negotiation of a reciprocal preferential economic partnership agreement (EPA) with the EU. This would involve all East Africa Community countries making concrete commitments on the progressive elimination, over a 10 to 12 years period, of import duties on substantially all trade with the EU and the conclusion of agreements on a range of trade related areas and with regard to trade in services.

Least developed Uganda and Tanzania would be expected to enter into and fulfill all the same reciprocal obligations as non-least developed Kenya. How difficult these obligations would prove to be on Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya respectively will depend on:

- the extent to which the elimination of duties on imports from the EU would lead to increased competition for local producers supplying East African markets;
- the extent to which the elimination of duties on imports from the EU would lead to increased competition in areas where local producers could develop production for a larger integrated East African market;
- the impact the elimination of customs duties on imports from the EU will have on government revenues from customs duties and total government revenues.

In the EU's view these temporary adjustment costs need to be weighed against the benefits which East African producers would gain from participating in a larger economic area centered on the EU. However, while the benefits to Kenya of retaining and enhancing existing preferential access to the EU market are apparent, it is unclear what additional benefits least developed countries will in reality (as opposed to theoretically), gain from joining in the with regionally negotiated economic partnership agreements.

**The Market Access Issue for LDCs**

Least developed countries such as Uganda and Tanzania already enjoy full duty, levy and quota free access to the EU market for all originating products through the EBA could generate additional market access benefits for Ugandan and Tanzanian producers, since there is nothing extra in terms of removing market access restrictions which an EPA could bring Tanzania and Uganda.

For Uganda and Tanzania the market access issues faced related to the establishment and implementation of issues linked to rules of origin under the EBA initiative. This includes the rules of origin to be applied, the cumulation arrangements allowed, the provisions made for derogations from the rules of origin and the administrative arrangements established for the implementation of the EBA initiative in favour of least developed countries.

In this context the follow-
ing issues will need to be addressed:

The establishment of rules of origin for least developed country exports, which take account of the production constraints faced in most LDCs and that are designed to enable individual LDCs to take advantage of the nominal duty free access granted under the EU’s GSP scheme for LDCs.

• the derogation procedures to be followed under the EBA by least developed countries seeking to establish or extend new industries;
• the cumulation provisions to be applied to LDCs that form an integral part of regional integration initiatives involving non-least developed ACP countries.
• the administrative arrangements to be established to allow duty free access for products to which strict sanitary standards are applied.

However, all these issues will need to be addressed in the context of the elaboration of the EBA initiative in favour of least developed countries and not in the context of the EPA negotiations.

**Getting to Grips with Supply Side Issues**

The European Commission maintains that EPAs will allow a more comprehensive approach to be adopted to addressing the supply side constraints which inhibit competitive production in ACP countries. However, the European Commission is also insisting that this more comprehensive approach to addressing supply side constraints will be financed using existing European Development Fund (EDF) resources and instruments and will not involve the allocation of any additional funds or the creation of any new aid instruments.

Footnotes:

1. An important priority for Kenya is to identify precisely the tariff and trade treatment which would be applied to its current and emerging exports under the standard GSP regime, in order to determine the likely impact of a re-imposition of duties on current and emerging exports to the EU.

2. How important this development would be for Kenyan exporters can only be determine by a detailed review of: the duties and special duties charged on current and likely future exports under the EU’s standards GSP scheme; the likely impact of a new WTO agreement on the duties charged; the impact of the process of reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy on market prices for cut flowers and temperate agricultural products.
**DIRECT FINANCE FOR TANZANIA’S BUDGET**

Macro-economic reforms as a pre-requisite

Continued macro-economic reforms are a basic foundation of the Tanzanian Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP). Among the reforms initiated since 1995, most noteworthy has been the success of the macro-economic stabilization program. This program was implemented with great commitment. As a result, GDP growth average 4% in 1996-2000, inflation declined from 30% to 6% and substantial foreign exchange reserve were built up. The big domestic and foreign debt stocks partly inherited from the past, making Tanzania one of the world’s most indebted countries, have been tackled with donor assistance. HIPC will result in a net reduction of 45% in Tanzania’s foreign debt, hitherto amounting to 7.6 billion US$.

**Donors’ support to macro-economic reforms**

A large number of donors have been involved in support to macro reforms, through balance of payments aid sector-specific interventions, mainly under co-financing arrangements.

The second 8th EDF macro-economic support operation of 76M Euro, to be disbursed in FY 2001/02 and 2002/03, has been conceived as a contribution to the poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) facility in which Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, plus two non-EU partners participate. The main purpose of PRBS is to contribute to achieving Poverty Reduction Strategy objectives through general budget support. The joint mechanism reduces cost for the Government of absorbing external assistance and allows for joint monitoring of expenditure plans, budget execution and financial management reforms.

**Budget support will represent 34% of the 9th EDF overall envelope for Tanzania**

Government will allocate significant funds to priority sectors identified in its Poverty Reduction Strategy, with the objectives to reduce income poverty, improve quality of life and social well being of the poor whilst maintaining macro-economic stability. The EC will support the Government in its effort to combat poverty by contributing to the general budget, together with a number of other donors. Donor support to the budget will then permit substantially higher levels of allocations to priority sectors. It is expected that donors will finance about 55% of the priority recurrent expenditure or 30% of the overall budget. The instrument for channeling funds will be the Poverty Reduction Budget Support Facility (PRBS) put in place in 2000 to accommodate external budget aid to the general budget.

**Transparency and effectiveness in funds’ management must be guaranteed**

The Cotonou Agreement allows for general budgetary aid as long as public expenditure management is transparent, accountable and effective. The prerequisite for any budget support, therefore, would be that Tanzania ascertains the necessary standards in the management of such funds. A set of joint performance indicators, applicable by all donors involved, will allow monitoring progress in these key areas. Disbursement of yearly tranches of EC support will depend on the achievement of satisfactory results. A package accompanying measure aimed at strengthening capacity in accounting, procurement and internal auditing through technical...
assistance and training, as well as for improving the production of macro-economic and financial statistics will be designed and supported by the EC.

**Support to Road Sector is Maintained Road sector reform process**

In 1998 and 1999, institutional reforms were made in the road sub-sector. Following the establishment of the road Fund in August 1999 and the Road Agency Tan Roads in 2000, the European Commission and the Tanzanian Government signed Financing Agreements for road projects totaling over Euro 160 million. In 2001, discussion continued between Government of Tanzania and the road donors on the implementation of the reform. This included a sector coordination meeting in June 2001 and the Consultative Group Meeting in September 2001. The European Commission plays a coordinating role for donors involved in the road sector. The main issues under discussion are:

- The consolidation of the road sector reform process
- The redefinition of the role of the Ministry of Works and the implementation of the transition towards this new role
- The adequacy of road maintenance funding
- Continued support for further capacity building of Tanroads

**Current EU financed projects under 7th and 8th EDF.**

Following the agreement on the road sector reform in 1999, the European Commission approved three major road projects in 2000 and 2001 to be funded by the 8th EDF:

- Mwanza border – Tinde & Nzega – Isaka road (Euro 85 million) was approved in March 2000.
- Mwanza Region Transport Programme (Euro 35 million) in March 2000
- Backlog Maintenance Project (Euro 42 million) in March 2001

Two other major road projects funded by the 7th EDF were under implementation in the roads sector during 2001:

- RUSIRM project (23.8 million)
- Wazo Hill – Bagamoyo Road (EDF Euro 2 million, Italy Euro 13 million for works).

**Road sector perspective under 9th EDF**

Roads remain the biggest sector under 9th EDF programme. The overall aim is to support the Tanzanian Government’s National Transport Policy and improve access to local, regional and international markets and services. There are four components in the support strategy:

- Support for the road sector policy reform programme and strategy implementation
- Finance for backlog, periodic and routine maintenance to bring the network to a maintainable condition
- Continued support for the development of the high priority truck road network
- Active donor coordination

**BASIC EDUCATION TO REMAIN TOP PRIORITY EU support to Tanzania Development Strategy**

Considerable progress has been made in developing an Education Sector Development Strategy (ESDS) since the beginning of 2001 under the leadership of the Prime Minister’s Office. In June 2001, the Minister of Education and Culture approved the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) as the first component of ESDP to become operational. Concurrently, Government-donor dialogue on the political and technical level quickly improved. As a consequence, the idea of supporting the District Based Support to Primary Education programme was dropped in favor of support to PEDP. Moreover, EDF funds remaining unspent under the Interim Textbook Programme, which came to an end in 2001, will be reallocated to support PEDP.

**Urgent needs**

PEDP first of all aims at absorbing the increase in pri-
mary enrolment resulting from the abolition of primary school fees earlier this year. Enrolment in standard I is expected to increase from 800,000 to 1,500,000 pupils. This requires an estimated 14,000 new classrooms and 7,000 new teachers during 2002, as well as textbooks and other educational material. At the same time, PEDP includes strategies to improve the quality of education in order to reduce drop-out rates, and strategies to improve regional, social and gender equality in the education system.

**Pooled funding**

EU support to the PEDP will be provided through a pooled funding arrangement. Government and donors have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding which lays down the procedures for the management of the pooled fund. The Financing Proposal for an amount of Euro 25 million from EDF 8 will be presented to the EDF Committee in September 2002.

**Renewed support under 9th EDF**

Under the 9th EDF, it is intended to allocate 15% of the funds towards the Primary Education Development Programme.

**AGRICULTURE NOT FORGOTTEN**

**Sector Development Programme**

In 2001, the EU and selected other donors assisted the Tanzanian Government in the preparation of its Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) as an instrument for stimulating growth and reducing poverty. Due to diversity of the agricultural sector, many actors are involved in the Development of this sector: public institutions, private stakeholders, civil society and Development partners. The success of the ASDS will depend on the ability of each sector to effectively play their role and the establishment of effective institutional coordination mechanisms.

**EC involvement**

Since the beginning of the 1990’s an amount of Euro 51 million from STABEX resources has been allocated to the coffee sub sector. These STABEX transfers have been used, on the one hand, to support macro-economic reforms through the provision of the foreign coffee sector (improvement of coffee quality, multiplication and distribution of plants) and, on the other hand, to support the preparation and implementation of reform (coffee research and extension, etc). STABEX Resources have also been allocated to the tea sector for an amount of Euro 3.0 million and to the cotton sector for Euro 2.2 million.

**Future support**

The EU and the Ministry of Finance are finalizing a new agreement of support to the agricultural sector. A total amount of 40 million will be allocated. The priorities for the use of those funds will be improving productivity, quality and profitability of smallholder coffee production; reducing marketing costs and access to services, through the improvement of rural feeder roads; and supporting the government’s Agricultural Sector Development Programme to stimulate agriculture growth.
THE PROCESS
Following the signing of the Cotonou Agreement on 23 June 2000 Guidelines for the programming of the 9th EDF were issued by the European Commission and the Secretariat of the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) Group of States organized a three-day Regional Seminar in Mauritius in September 2000. The purpose of the seminar was to bring together the national and regional authorities, as well as the Heads of Delegation with the objective of familiarizing all parties with the background and content of the Partnership Agreement. In this context it is noteworthy that Civil Society and Private Sector representatives from Tanzania were invited and actively participated in the seminar.

In January 2001 the Head of Delegation of the European Commission in Tanzania, together with the Permanent Secretary Finance, who is the National Authorizing Officer (NAO) of the European Development Fund (EDF) jointly launched the Cotonou Agreement in a ceremony which, in the words of the NAO: “participants were carefully selected to enable dissemination of information on the Cotonou Agreement to the Tanzanian Community, drawing participation from the press, the private sector, civil society, the NGO-community, as well as institutions for research and higher learning…”.

The objective of the launching was “to promote awareness and participation of all stakeholders in programming for the resources availed to Tanzania under the Agreement”.

The programming for the 9th EDF now started in earnest, taking its cue from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which had been completed, in the preceding month. The PRSP itself had been prepared in a highly participatory manner and had involved legislators and representatives of civil society, the private sector, research institutions and the poor themselves.

On the Tanzania side programming involved the elaboration of a Policy Framework document and subsequently an outline strategy and sharing it with a wide range of stakeholders: civil society, the private sector and research institutions, culminating in a stakeholder workshop in March 2001.

On the EU side this was accomplished by undertaking an appraisal of the Government medium-term strategy and a thorough analysis of constraints, capacities, prospects and needs, together with a dialogue within the donor community, and in particular with EU member states. This culminated in a response strategy.

The process really came together when discussions took place on the response strategy and the preparation of Sector Indicative Work Programmes to underpin the Strategy was undertaken in very close collaboration between the two parties. The resulting Country Support Strategy Paper (CSP) was signed on 8th March 2002.

THE CONTENTS AND STATUS OF THE TANZANIA COUNTRY STRATEGY AND INDICATIVE PROGRAMME
The CSP contains two parts. Part A is the Country Strategy, which comprises the EC and Tanzania Cooperation
and Development Objectives, the Country Analysis, and Assessment of Past and Ongoing Cooperation and the Response Strategy. Part B is devoted to the Indicative Programme, and this will be the focus of this part of the presentation.

**9th EDF Indicative Programme**

**The Resources**
The resources available under the Indicative programme amount to a total of 355 million Euros (360 billion Tanzania Shilling). This is split over two ‘envelopes’:

- The A’ Envelope of 290 million Euros is to cover long-term development operations with the CSP. The indicative allocation of this envelope on a sector base is as follows:
  - Transport infrastructure (roads) 116 ME
  - Basic education 43.5ME
  - Macro support 98.6ME
  - Other programmes
  - (Governance, Non-State actors, reserve) 31.9ME

- A second envelope, the so-called B’ Envelope of 65 million Euros, is available to cover unforeseen needs including emergency assistance, contributions to debt relief and mitigation of the adverse effects of export earnings instability.

Outside the Indicative programme Tanzania also has access to the 9th EDF Investment facility managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB), as well as EC Budget Lines, which could be used to finance specific operations.

**Focal Sectors**

**Transport infrastructure**
The purpose of EC’s support to the road sector is improved access to services and to markets at local, regional and international level.

The support is focused on three major areas of intervention:

- i. rehabilitation of priority roads;
- ii. support to road maintenance; and
- iii. institutional support to improve the management of the road sector.

Discussions with Government and with the Donor on the contents of the programme for the sector has reached a point were identification and formulation can take off soon.

From the experience under previous EDF programmes, the area that lends itself well to involvement of Non-State actors is backlog maintenance of non-paved roads, as executed under the ongoing Ruvuma and southern Iringa Road Maintenance Programme (RUSIRRM). This project, which effectively started in 2000, has involved the local communities in maintenance activities, as well as providing information sessions to local stakeholders/road-users in the area. The project was reviewed in 2002 and stakeholder workshops, again involving the road users in both regions, were organized and effective feedback on such issues as community involvement in maintenance, road safety and the spread of HIV/AIDS was obtained and taken into account in the second phase of the project.

**Basic Education**
EC support to this PRSP priority sector is focused on improving gender-balanced and equitable access to better quality basic education. The indicative allocation of 43.5 million Euros will be provided in the form of sector-specific budget aid for the implementation of the Education Sector Development Programme, to be implemented in a decentralized approach and with the support of a group of donors.

The Government will transfer funds to local school level in the form of Capitation and Investment Grants. The local School Development Committees will be playing an increasing role in the management of their schools in conjunction with the headteachers.

**Macro Support**
With an indicative allocation of 98.6 million Euros, the EC will support the national Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) by contributing to the general budget through untied macro support. This and other external support will permit increased levels of allocation to PRS priority...
sectors within the budget. The Government has already set up a consultation mechanism to ensure the participation of a broad range of actors to accompany the support in connection with the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) and HIPC initiative and the EC contribution is placed in this context.

**NON-FOCAL AREAS**

**Good Governance**

In addition to promoting good governance in all areas of co-operation at both macro and sector-specific levels, the CSP stresses the strengthening of capacity for service delivery at local level and the encouragement of a culture of participatory management where local societies can gain influence in decision-making and access to development opportunities. An indicative amount of 29 million Euros has been reserved for this Governance Programme.

Three areas of intervention have been identified:

- A Capacity Building programme for Participatory Development;
- Support to the ongoing Local Government Reform Programme; and
- Support for the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy.

Non-State Actors will be particularly involved in the realization of the programme for Capacity Building for Participatory Development, as implementing partners, as facilitators, and, as beneficiaries of training as well as ‘owners’ of community-based development interventions. An indicative amount of 17.4 million Euros has been set aside for this, and the CSP states in this context that Non-State Actors will be the beneficiaries to the tune of a maximum of 2% of total available funds.

**CONCLUSION**

By adopting the 9th EDF Country Support Strategy, based on the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement, and building upon the experiences with participatory approaches gained in the preparation of the PRSP, the scene has been set for taking the participation of Non-State actors, including civil society a step forward.

Depending on the specifics of the sectors concerned, such participation may take place at strategy, programmes or project level. Participation could be as implementing partners, as facilitators or as beneficiaries, or in the evaluation of strategy and programmes. Provisions exist in the CSP for the building of capacity for Non-State actors, for effective participation.

The issue has been raised of eligibility of Non-State actors to take part in Tanzania-EC cooperation. The criteria for eligibility will have to be defined, but they will most certainly include the extent to which they address the needs of the population, on their specific competencies and whether they are organized and managed democratically and transparently.

We look forward to the discussions and the group work, which is planned and express the hope that this will contribute in giving shape and substance to the effective participation of Non-State Actors in the development process in general and in the implementation of the 9th EDF Strategy and Indicative Programme in particular.
This brief on “Debates Around Future ACP-EU Trade Relations” provides an overview of some of the debates that have taken place on the issues faced in future ACP-EU trade relations. It looks at:

- the commitments which the EU has made on future market access for ACP exports;
- the debates around the issue of addressing supply side constraints;
- the debates around the issue of the external effects of the common agricultural policy;
- the debates around the issue of the fiscal implications for ACP states of moves towards free trade with the EU.

What Commitments On Future Market Access For ACP Exports Have Been Made?

Three major concerns with regard to future access for ACP exports to the EU market are emerging:

- a review and relaxation of the rules of origin;
- the need for a substantive improvement in real market access opportunities for ACP exporters in areas of immediate benefit (the elimination of residual market access restrictions on 40% of agricultural tariff lines where the EU retains in place restrictions);
- consultations on how genuine EU health concerns (human, animal and plant) can be addressed without creating new barriers to ACP exports.

ACP representatives are calling for a clear commitment from the EU on all these market access issues at the outset of the negotiations. This is seen as important since it will provide the basis for ACP countries to attract investment in those areas of growth, which are currently being held back by the application of residual market access restrictions.

How Is The Issue Of Supply Side Constraints To Be Addressed?

It is recognized in the ACP that in order to be able to take advantage of trade preferences a country needs to be able to produce competitively and get products to the market at a reasonable cost. As the experience under the Lome Convention has demonstrated many ACP countries face major problems in producing and supplying goods competitively within an increasingly liberalized trading environment. How these problems can be addressed prior to the introduction of free trade with the EU is seen as a critical issue for the future. It is however felt to be an area which to date has been underdeveloped within the European Commission’s approach to the development of future ACP-EU trade relations.

Against this background the ACP-EU joint Parliamentary Assembly has called for:

- a systematic review of the successes and failure of existing programmes intended to address supply side constraints, with a view to ascertaining the effectiveness of various types of interventions under different circumstances;
- a review of existing institutional arrangements for
extending assistance to addressing supply side constraints, so as to determine which institutional delivery mechanisms have proved most effective;
• the establishment of co-ordinated and integrated country specific programmes of assistance to address supply side constraints, which reach beyond the current instruments and approaches, applied under existing ACP-EU co-operation arrangements.

More specifically calls have been made for the issue of how to address supply side constraints to be fully and comprehensively addresses in the development of future ACP-EU trade relations.

These concerns are reflected in the ACP guidelines for negotiations that specifically call for: “the provision of additional resources, with rapid and flexible disbursement procedures”, with a view to addressing supply side constraints, promoting trade, strengthening product specific export corridors, and attracting foreign investment. This forms part of a detailed consideration within the ACP guidelines of what needs to be done if the Commission’s proposed Economic Partnership Agreements are to contribute to the sustainable poverty focused development of ACP economies.

From the European Commission perspective if supply side issues are to be addressed it will be necessary for ACP governments to: “fully integrate EPAs within their development strategies”, particularly in allocating resources under national and regional indicative programmes.

Against this background the European Commission has highlighted how the transitional period up to 2008 should be used: “for building capacity in the public and private sector of the ACP countries with a view to enhancing their ability to define and implement appropriate regional and multilateral trade strategies and policies”, including measures to: “enhance competitiveness, to strengthen regional organisations and to support regional trade integration, where appropriate with assistance to budgetary adjustment and fiscal reform, as well as to upgrade infrastructure and to improve investment.”

How Is the Issue Of The External Effects Of the CAP To Be Addressed?
It is clear that with a process of reform of the Common Agricultural Policy underway, designed to enhance the price competitiveness of EU agricultural and value added food product industries on both EU markets and international markets (including of course those markets also served by ACP producers), this will have an impact on the market conditions facing ACP producers of similar or competing products. This is a particularly important issue given that 36% of ACP exports to the EU are agricultural products and agriculture in most ACP countries constitutes the social and economic backbone of the economy.

The effects of CAP reform are already being felt in terms of a decline in the value of certain ACP agricultural product exports to the EU. Southern Africa beef exports between 1996 and 2002 have seen average price declines in £ of between 28% and 30% depending on the cuts of beef being exported.

In its 2000 Communication on the EU sugar regime the European Commission estimated the likely earnings losses to ACP exporters of an extension of CAP reform to the sugar sector. On the basis of a 25% reduction in the EU sugar price it projected annual income losses to ACP sugar exporters of some Euro 250 million.

On the export side lower EU cereal prices have seen a rapid expansion of EU value added cereal based product exports to the ACP group.

Clearly from an ACP perspective, dialogue with the EU on these issues within the context of the forthcoming trade negotiations would appear to be essential for a wide cross section of ACP countries since it strikes at the heart of the structural development of agricultural dependent ACP economies. This was recognized in Article 12 of the ACP negotiating guidelines.
How Is The Issue Of The Fiscal Implications Of Moves Towards Free Trade With The EU To Be Addressed?

In many ACP countries import duties constitute an important source of government revenue. Partly this is because import duties are relatively easy and cheap to collect. In many ACP countries, particularly in Africa, duties on imports from the EU constitute a major part of total customs revenues. Against this background in a number of ACP countries there is concern over the implications for government revenues of moves towards free trade with the EU.

An analysis of the provisions of the EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement reveals that revenue losses for neighbouring Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland will range from 5.3% of total government revenue (Botswana) to 13.9% of total government revenue (Swaziland). 1 In the case of Namibia these estimated revenue losses would be equivalent to two and half times the current Namibian government budget deficit.

While it needs to be recognized that in an era of trade liberalization there is a need for developing countries to reduce their dependence on trade taxes, studies in Namibia also suggest that this process of fiscal restructuring is likely to be a difficult task. The process of fiscal restructuring required as a result of multilateral trade liberalization is likely to be intensified by the conclusion of reciprocal preferential trade arrangements with the EU, in those instances where the EU is the major trading partner.

The ACP guideline explicitly highlights the importance of addressing the fiscal consequences of moves towards free trade with the EU. These guidelines for negotiations go further calling for additional resources to be provided outside of the EDF in order to deal with this issue and other adjustment related problems.

The EU mandate for its part refers to making available “where appropriate… assistance to budgetary adjustment and fiscal reform”. ■

Footnote
Past Treatment and Emerging Issues
Traditionally under successive Lomé Conventions and now under the Cotonou Agreement ACP countries have enjoyed duty free access to the EU market for virtually all their exports. This duty free access however has been qualified in three significant respects:
- through the establishment of rules of origin;
- through the application of the safeguard provisions and associated consultative procedures;
- through the application of qualified duty and quota free access for products falling under the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP).

In an era of increasingly globalised patterns of production and input sourcing the limitations on duty free access arising from restrictive rules of origin are likely to become an increasingly serious problem for ACP countries. This is particularly the case in the clothing and textile sector, where with the emergence of combination fabrics, ACP cotton producers find it increasingly difficult to produce clothing acceptable on the EU market without losing the duty free access traditionally granted them by the EU. This is an issue which the ACP collectively will need to take up and address.

Perhaps of more serious concern in terms of future ACP-EU trade relations is the likely impact of CAP reform on the value of current trade preferences and any future new preferences which might be extended to the ACP in the agricultural sector.

The Impact of CAP Reform on the Value of ACP Preferences
The process of CAP reform launched in 1992 marks a fundamental shift in EU support to its agricultural sector. Prior to 1992 the policy focus was on price support in order to encourage production and ensure European food security. Since 1992 a shift in policy has been underway involving a movement away from price support towards increased levels of direct aid to EU farmers. This is allowing EU farm gate prices to fall without adversely affecting farm incomes.

In the cereals sector, where this process is most advanced, basic prices fell between 50% and 55% between 1992 and 2002. Direct aid payments to farmers increased correspondingly and cereals production increased 16%, with the EU now expecting a record wheat harvest in 2003. This has increased EU consumption of domestically produced animal feed and reduced the demand for imported animal feed.

In areas more directly relevant to ACP exporters, the extension of this process of reform in the EU beef sector after 2000 saw the £ denominated value of Namibian beef exports fall between 28% and 30% depending on the beef cut being exported. In the sugar sector where reform has been consistently been deferred since 1992, it has been estimated by the European Commission that a 25% reduction in the EU sugar price would result in income losses to ACP sugar exporters of around Euro 250 million per annum. Planned reforms in the rice sector involving price reductions and increased levels of direct aid payments to EU rice farmers...
is likely to lead to a 50% reduction in the EU rice price within 4 years, greatly reducing the attractiveness of the EU market to ACP rice exporters (including Guyana, Surinam and least developed countries considering investing in rice production to exploit the new “Everything But Arms” trade preferences extended by the EU in the rice sector).

During the recent CAP mid term review discussions the Commission has made clear its long term intention to shift from product support to producer support through the introduction of a “single decoupled income payment per farm”.

Under this scheme a single payment will be made to each farm, based on the level of aid the farmer used to get. However this new payment will not be linked to the production of any specific product. Since this aid will not be linked to the production of any specific crop, the whole scheme will be more WTO compatible, since it the EU’s view such aid is non-trade distorting. In order to be eligible for the payment EU farmers will however have to meet certain EU environmental, animal welfare, food quality standards. Nominally EU farmers would be getting the de-coupled direct aid payment for complying with these standards (so called cross compliance) rather than for producing any particular product.

In the first phase this scheme will cover all products currently subject to reform, with the dairy, sugar, olive oil and certain fruit and vegetable regimes being incorporated into the scheme at a later date.

Ultimately however all products subject to the CAP will fall under this decoupled system of payments per farm. While nominally this scheme is designed to allow EU farmers to respond to market signals, these basic market signals will be distorted by the levels of direct aid payments established (nominally provided to recompense farmers for wider public services they provide with regard to environmental protection, food safety, animal welfare, stewardship of the countryside and rural development). In the EU cereals sector it is clear that the shift over to direct aid payments has shifted farmers supply side responses, so that at any given price level they produce substantially more than they would in the absence of direct aid payments. The level of direct aid payments in the cereals sector with which other regimes are being harmonised has led to a 16% increase in EU cereals production despite an average of between a 50% and 55% decline in cereals prices since 1992.

Overall, from an ACP perspective, the move over to a single system of farm payments de-coupled from the production of any individual product is likely to exert a downward pressure on EU market prices for all products currently falling under the CAP. This would occur since if existing high prices were retained in any one sector more farmers would move over to the production of that commodity in order to reap the benefits, with increased supply exerting a downward pressure on prices which under the new system would be allowed to find their own level (since a farm income safety net would be provided by the system of direct aid payments).

This will have important implications for a wide range of ACP non-traditional exports, (particularly fruit, vegetable and horticultural products falling under Declaration XXII of the Cotonou Agreement) which have been developed in the past 10 years.

These developments will greatly reduce the value of trade preferences extended to ACP countries in the agricultural sector under any future economic partnership agreements.

This situation is likely to be compounded by the increased costs ACP exporters will need to carry in order to comply with increasingly strict EU hygiene standards. The very real danger is that ACP exporters could find their profit margins squeezed between the declining value of preferential
access and the increasing costs of supplying the EU market. In some sector this is already occurring, with Swaziland discontinuing exports of lower quality cuts of beef to the EU market in the face of the rapid decline in UK prices of these beef cuts since 1999.

Implications for Negotiating Future Access

In this context ACP governments will need to carefully identify their “offensive” interests in the forthcoming trade negotiations with the EU. Each ACP government will need to identify:

a) those products where trade barriers still exist and where it has a current production interest;

b) those products where trade barriers still exist and where it could profitable develop a production and export interest;

c) the likely impact of CAP reform on market prices for those products where they have a current or potential production and export interest;

d) those products where detailed discussions on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) issues will need to be taken up in order to ensure that measures to protect EU human, animal and plant health are not designed and implemented in ways which become new barriers to trade for ACP exporters.

This will allow ACP countries and regions to clearly identify their offensive negotiating priorities and assess the relative costs and benefits to be gained from the conclusion of an economic partnership agreement with the EU. It will furthermore enable them to identify those EU member states which are most likely to exert pressure on the European Commission to maintain barriers to ACP market access.

This can then inform ACP strategies for dealing with the EU as a whole (and not simply the European Commission which has clear instructions from the Council on what it can and cannot do in the negotiations with ACP countries) in the conduct of the forthcoming economic partnership agreement negotiations. While the European Commission will play the pivotal role in the negotiations with the ACP, all the major decisions taken will be the result of pressures exerted by EU member states through the Agricultural Ministries, via the Agricultural Commissioner and via the Trade Ministers through the Article 133 Committee.

If the ACP ignore this reality in their conduct of the ongoing trade negotiations with the EU they will find themselves giving ground in the trade negotiations, without securing any corresponding benefits.

Footnotes

1. EU Agricultural Commissioner Fischer acknowledged that only 1/3 of the price reductions on the EU beef market between 1999 and 2002 were related to the crisis of confidence following the BSE and FMD crisis and that 2/3 of the price reduction were the result of the reductions in the intervention price arising from the process of CAP reform.


THE REAL FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS

It needs to be recognised that over the next six years of negotiations with the EU the focus will not be on the introduction of free trade but rather on:

a) the products which should be excluded from moves towards free trade;

b) the products which should be subjected to special arrangements under moves towards free trade;

c) the products which should be offered protection from unfair competition through safeguard measures;

d) the products which should only be subjected to tariff reductions and eventual free trade at the end of the transition period (“back-loading”);

e) administrative questions such as the rules of origin to be applied in an increasingly globalised world.

If the focus was exclusively on the introduction of free trade then negotiations could be completed in 6 weeks rather than 6 years. The key issues at stake relate to the treatment of “sensitive” sectors and products, where the simple introduction of free trade would lead to socially, economically and politically unacceptable adjustment costs.

In the context of trade negotiations the EU fully takes this reality into account.

THE EU’S APPROACH TO AGRICULTURE

For the EU the most sensitive sector is the agricultural sector. In its trade negotiations with the ACP member, South Africa, this led to a situation where the final agree-

WILL DOHA PROMISES BE KEPT IN CANCUN?

Source: Financial Times, Wednesday, September 3-9, 2003
ment introduced free trade for only 61% of South Africa’s current agricultural exports to the EU (with many of these products being “back-loaded”). Special arrangements involving the establishment of tariff rate quotas were created for a further 13% of South Africa’s agricultural exports, while fully 26% of South Africa’s current agricultural exports were entirely excluded from moves towards free trade with the EU. A range of products where South Africa has existing production but where current EU import duties have prevented any trade taking place (e.g. sugar) were also excluded from moves towards free trade. Scope was left in the agreement for re-visiting the tariff treatment to be accorded these products.

From an EU perspective however this needs to be seen against the background of the process of reform of the common agricultural policy. A process which de facto amounts to a long term (20-30 year) sectoral adjustment and restructuring programme (conducted with the benefit of large scale public aid programmes - since 1992 when the reform process began the EU agricultural budget has increased around 50%)².

THE CHALLENGE FOR THE ACP
The questions arise:
• what steps are ACP countries taking to identify those sectors of their economies and those products where moves towards free trade with the EU could entail high adjustment costs?
• what steps are being taken to identify the most appropriate options for the treatment of these “sensitive” products, given the human and institutional capacity constraints faced in ACP countries?³

The first step in answering these two questions is to define what a sensitive product is. This will need to be done by each individual ACP government in all sovereignty, but it would facilitate the establishment of common regional and pan-ACP positions if some common criteria were used in identifying “sensitive” sectors. Such criteria could include:
• the importance of the sector or product to employment;
• the importance of the sector or product to rural incomes;
• the importance of the sector or product to women producers and the poor;
• the importance of the product to the structural development of the sector;
• the extent of trade distortion arising from public aid programmes for competing products in OECD countries.

WHY EU AGRICULTURE IS SEEN AS DIFFERENT

“Farming is not an industry that can be abandoned to the tender mercies of market capitalism, and this for one very simple reason: in the agricultural sector the drive to maximise output and minimise costs has consequences that are unacceptable to our communities.... If farming had to go by the principle of the international division of labour, if, in other words, we let the consumer choose the product of the most efficient producer on a globalised market, five million of Europe’s six million farmers would go to the wall. That is not acceptable and it is not what our European civilisation is about”.

would arise from the introduction of free trade with the EU, ACP governments and subsequently regions, will have to determine the most appropriate treatment to be accorded such products.

**DEALING WITH SENSITIVE PRODUCTS**

Under the kind of free trade areas the EU is concluding there are only a limited number of options open for the treatment of such products. This can be summarised in a single matrix, which deals with the “sensitive” products, associated downstream products and competing products.

Establishing national positions on specific product chains in the context of such a matrix would facilitate the establishment of sectoral positions at a regional and pan-ACP level. This could greatly strengthen the hand of ACP negotiators in their dealings with the EU. It would allow attention to be focussed on the most important areas where tariff negotiations will have an impact and facilitate the discussion of the particular arrangements required in “sensitive” areas requiring special arrangements.

There is already a body of experience in the ACP on the establishment of special arrangements for “sensitive” products. For example, in Southern Africa the SADC Sugar Protocol and within the Southern African Customs Union the controls and regulations on trade in cereal products.

The adoption of such an approach to the detailed preparation of negotiating positions could greatly facilitate the achievement of ACP negotiating objectives. This is particularly the case in those areas where arrangements can be built on existing EU practices. A case in point in this regard is the existing Cotonou Agreement safeguard provisions.

**DEVELOPING THE SAFEGUARD PROVISIONS**

The safeguard clause which the EU uses under the Cotonou Agreement to protect against sudden upsurges in ACP exports which could disrupt EU markets has a number of interesting features. The first interesting feature is the scope of the safeguard provisions. The Cotonou safeguard clause allows the EU to take appropriate measures against ACP exports where imports into the EU:

- cause or threaten to cause serious injury to EU producers;

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<th>CEREALS PRODUCT CHAIN</th>
<th>MEAT PRODUCT CHAIN</th>
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<td><strong>Treatment/ “Back Special Exclusions Safeguards Product Loading” Arrang.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Treatment/ “Back Special Exclusions Safeguards Product Loading” Arrang.</strong></td>
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<td>Maize</td>
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threaten serious disturbances in any sector;
• threatens to create difficulties which could lead to an economic deterioration in a region of the EU.

Considerable emphasis is placed on preventing disruption of markets by allowing action, when imports “threaten” to create “injury”, “difficulties” or “disturbances”. Action can be taken in a pre-emptive way because these provisions also include arrangements for regular consultations and statistical surveillance in areas where the safeguard clause may be invoked. The aim of these provisions is to limit the actual use of safeguard measures by allowing preventive action to be taken where close monitoring of trends in “sensitive” sectors detects a problem which could arise. This preventive action has, where invoked, involved voluntary export restraint in the sensitive areas concerned, so as to avoid the actual formal invocation of safeguard measures. These provisions have a strong relevance to ACP agricultural based economies in the context of a process of CAP reform designed to enhance the price competitiveness of EU food and drink exports (against the background of increased levels of EU public sector aid to the EU agricultural and food processing sector) and moves towards free trade with the EU. While ACP markets in themselves are not important to EU exporters, even small increases in EU exports of agricultural and value added food product exports to Africa, stimulated by the

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<th>EU CEREAL BASED VALUE ADDED FOOD PRODUCT EXPORTS TO THE ACP</th>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>Cereals (CN 10)</td>
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<td>Products of Milling (CN 11)</td>
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<td>Preparations (CN 19)</td>
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Source: “Agricultural Situation in the Community” Tables 3.6.12, 1999.

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<th>EVOLUTION OF EU CHICKEN EXPORTS TO THE DRC (0207 MEAT AND EDIBLE OFFAL OF FOWLS) (Selected Years)</th>
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<td>Value ’000 ECU/EURO</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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The process of reform can have profound implications for local agricultural producers. Already in the mid 1990s, following the first round of cereals sector reform EU exports of value added cereal based products to the ACP have increased dramatically (see table).

Similarly EU poultry exports to ACP countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have seen a massive increase as lower EU cereal prices have reduced feed costs and fuelled a 150% expansion of EU poultry exports. In 2000 poultry meat was the single largest EU export to the DRC, 3 times larger than the second most important export. This increase has had a devastating effect on local small-scale chicken production.

Such developments can only be compounded by moves towards free trade with the EU in the agricultural sector. Establishing monitoring and surveillance arrangements in sensitive sectors mirroring those used by the EU could prevent these kinds of disruptions arising under future trade arrangements with the EU. The EU could scarcely object to the inclusion of such safeguard measures in future economic partnership agreements, since they would largely be based on the provisions the EU currently benefits from under the Cotonou Agreement.

Footnotes


2. Figures used are extracted from Extracted for “The Agricultural Situation in the European Union” Annual Reports, table 3.4.4.

3. There have been instances of governments establishing highly sophisticated tariff schedules to achieve various objectives but these have proved ineffective because the human and institutional capacity to effectively administer this sophisticated policy was not in place.
The Cotonou Agreement is a complex convention and its provisions involve new opportunities as well as new risks for the stakeholders especially in the African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) countries. Much will depend on the proactive influence the ACP countries will be able to exert on the implementation of the Agreement. Thus, for many of the new actors in the ACP countries effective participation in the Cotonou partnership is a matter of support and access to topical and concise information in view of the multitude of key issues involved in the cooperation and the impacts forthcoming (trade) negotiations have on their region or single country.

FES as a longstanding partner of those actors in developing countries whose activities contribute to a participatory transition to democracy, has put the Cotonou Agreement on its agenda and offers support to their local partners through a wide range of complementary activities.

In this context our website is conceived to build a source of Cotonou information for all practitioners, interested stakeholders, students etc. inside and outside of Tanzania who are looking for readable and basic information on the ACP-EU partnership and its provisions in general as well as its implementation in Tanzania in particular. Towards this end our website gives a brief introduction to the Cotonou Agreement, highlights the challenges and constraints the new provisions in the Agreement pose to the Tanzanian stakeholders, introduces to the FES Cotonou-strategy and the respective FES activities in Tanzania and the East African region and guides to further sources of reference.

**WHAT IS THE ACP-EU COOPERATION ABOUT? SOME BASICS**

The cooperation between the EU and the ACP group of states, of which Tanzania is a member, has a longstanding tradition. Within the last 25 years, under the previous Lomé I-IV conventions, a set of shared principles, assuring the equality of the partners, dialogue, contractually agreed rights and obligations and the joint administration of the cooperation, shaped the profile of the ACP-EU partnership, which developed into a comprehensive agreement based on a trade and aid pillar. The trade cooperation is characterised until 2007 by non-reciprocal trade benefits for ACP states including unlimited entry to the EU market for 99% of industrial and other goods. The aid component provides predictable aid flows over a five year period, in areas such as economic, social and human development or regional integration.

Even though the new Cotonou Agreement, signed in June 2000 and replacing the Lomé Convention, preserves the Lomé principles and its two pillars, it adapts to a new geopolitical situation as well as the challenges of globalisation and poverty alleviation. Thus, three major changes mark a break with the past:

1. **Cotonou rests on a strengthened political foundation.** A broader political dialogue offers the chance to discuss political issues outside the development cooperation.

2. **The trade cooperation will undergo a far-reaching transformation.** Planned is the establishment of Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) envisaging the ACP states to establish World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible Free Trade Areas (FTAs) on the basis of existing regional frameworks, such as Southern African Development Community (SADC) or East African Community (EAC).

3. The agreement extends its partnership to Non-State Actors (NSAs). For the first time in its history it recognizes the complementary role civil society, private sector, trade unions etc. play in the development process. In Future NSAs are to be involved more systematically in inter-governmental dialogue, decision-making, evaluation and monitoring processes.

**Special Challenge for Tanzanian Key-Players**

The provisions of the Cotonou Agreement, particularly the new trade regime and the extension of the partnership to NSAs, pose a great challenge to the Cotonou partners in Tanzania.

The envisaged trade liberalisation under the EPA concept, which in deviation to the present EU-ACP trade regime aims at opening the ACP markets for all imports from the EU free of duty, involves serious implications for the Tanzanian economy. The loss of an important revenue source caused by the elimination of all tariffs on imports and the increased competition for local producers jeopardising jobs in this sector, contribute to national problems and challenges at the same time. Given a situation of a prevailing fragmentation of responsibilities in trade matters between different Tanzanian line ministries and a missing link between trade strategies and national development goals, there is even risk that the implementation of EPAs in Tanzania might fail to complement the national pro-poor development agenda.

At present furthermore the integration of the Non-State Actors in the inter-governmental cooperation meets its limits. On the one hand, the Tanzanian government seems to be taking an advantage of the Cotonou Agreement which leaves it open for ACP governments to decide on the new provisions, and whom to involve. FES is encouraging the NSAs to organise themselves and be pro-active in a number of ways rather than wait for the government to invite them to participate in the processes. Experience has shown that Tanzanian NSAs received recognition by the government and were involved in the processes of the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy. Although the EU-Tanzania invited some representatives of NSAs based in Dar es Salaam to participate in this year’s Annual Review of the Tanzania-EU Cooperation 2002, there is an expressed need for more NSAs to participate and contribute to the process. On the other hand the ability of the Tanzanian NSAs to act is limited. Many NSAs (especially those based in rural areas) still operate in very difficult conditions. To play, as expected now, a political part in form of an influential third force in the policy fora of the Cotonou cooperation, the sector has to be supported/empowered/guided, through information dissemination, network formation, as well as capacity building on issues related to trade, lobbying-skills, and negotiation.

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**FES - TANZANIA OBJECTIVE**

In the light of the above statements it is the objective of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Tanzania

1. to provide local partners with readable and relevant Information about the Cotonou Agreement and its processes
2. to rise awareness among local partners to encourage broad participation in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement in Tanzania and the East African Region
3. to enhance the capacities of selected partners to ensure their involvement and effective participation in the negotiation- and policy processes related to the implementation of the Agreement at national and regional level
ACTIVITIES
By and large FES activities have various alignments.
• They are conceived to inform our partners about the course, contents, risks and chances of the processes related to the implementation of Cotonou.

Against the background of the forthcoming launching of phase II of the EPA negotiations in September 2003, the FES programme focus of the year 2003 shifted to the Cotonou trade component and the economic and social impacts the conclusion of an EPA can have on Tanzania and the integration process in East Africa.

Therefore workshops at national level complement FES activities with regional scope. Thus, we are able to reach a broad audience, ranging from civil society organisations, government institutions and line ministries to the members of parliament in Tanzania and within the institutional framework of the EAC.

To name a few: In our workshops participate representatives from the relevant trade unions and their umbrella organisation (Teachers Trade Union-TTU, Researchers Academicians and Allied Workers Union-RAAWU, Trade Unions’ Congress of Tanzania, TUCTA), women organizations (Tanzania Gender Networking Programme-TGNP, Tanzania Media Women Association-TAMWA), the Media (Financial Times) informal sector (VIBINDO), Tanzanian umbrella organisations (Tanzania Association of NGOs-TANGO, Tanzania Council for Social Development-TACOSODE), the private sector (the Savings and Credit Union League of Tanzania-SCULT), the President’s Office Planning and Privatisation (POPP), the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT), the National Parliament, the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA). We cooperate inter alia with the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) and the East African Business Council (EABC), The EU-Delegation, and the Embassies. We would like to include more actors from the private sector like the Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO).

OUR ACTIVITIES IN DETAIL
In March 2002 FES Tanzania established an FES-activity-coordinating forum, the • Cotonou Think-Tank
The group encompasses 3 permanent members and is open to various guests. In 2002 the Think-Tank met with representatives from the European Development Fund (EDF)-Support Unit to the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the EU-Delegation and the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) and discussed the realistic options for NSAs participation in the programmes and policy processes related to the implementation of the Tanzanian Country Support Strategy. (Think Tank Profile available)

The Think-Tank meetings also gave the input for a • Path-finding Workshop on Emerging Opportunities for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Participation in the ACP-EU Development Cooperation, held on 29th of January 2003. It was jointly organized by ESRF and FES, who shared the view that the lack of awareness and information was one of the major hurdles for Tanzanian NSAs to participate in dialogue on the Cotonou Agreement. The workshop brought together key actors of the urban NSAs sector with representatives of the EU and MoF. (Workshop Report available).

A second chain of events dealt with EPAs and their impacts on Tanzania and the regional integration process in the Eastern African region.

In September 2002 FES in cooperation with the Faculty of Commerce and Management/ University of Dar es Salaam conducted a two days • Strategic Trade Policy Training Retreat, involving civil servants from the Presidential Office Planning and Privatisation and line min-
istries dealing with trade. It was the objective of the Training to familiarize the participants with essentials of the forthcoming ACP-EU trade negotiations and sensitize for coordination of stakeholders with complementary competences and skills.

- “EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration in East Africa - Options for Tanzania” is the title of a study carried out by a research team of the German Development Institute (GDI), which has been visiting Tanzania in March and April 2003. The team received support from ESRF and FES. The group concluded its field study in Tanzania with two workshops. The first workshop
  - “Getting Ready for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)” was jointly organized by GDI and ESRF and took place on 28th of April 2003. The group presented its preliminary findings to key stakeholders from NSAs, Government departments, and the Donor community (as well as the FES), enlightening on the processes and difficulties faced by Tanzania with regard to the trade liberalisation and the establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements. (all preliminary papers available).
  - The second workshop was a follow-up to the above, elaborating on
  - Economic Partnership Agreements and Poverty Alleviation. It was organized by GDI and FES on 30th of April 2003. The objectives of the workshop were twofold:
  1. To bring together a small group of experts to exchange and enhance understanding
on the inter-linkages of trade matters and poverty alleviation goals.

2. To stimulate a discussion on how EPAs can effectively contribute to poverty alleviation and the action needed to further this goal.

01.07.-02.07.2003 FES/Tanzania held two workshops on
- “Networking at national, regional and ACP level. How can NSAs benefit from it?” and on “EPAs, the link to the WTO and the impacts on East African Countries” to which an expert from Brussels, Mr. Paul Goodison of the European Research Office, was invited.

The workshops lead to the establishment of the
- Cotonou Steering Committee, which took responsibility to operate as a reference point on Cotonou issues and the creation of a non-formal organised Cotonou Information and Communication network of relevant Tanzanian NSAs.

At present, it holds weekly meetings and is charged with specific tasks of identification, mobilisation, motivation, information, and organisation of other Non State Actors (NSAs) relevant in the Cotonou cooperation. Integrated in the committees’ work are some of Tanzanian participants of the FES EU-ACP consultants training.

- FES EU-ACP consultants training. The training was designed by FES/Kenya in cooperation with ECONEWS. It brings together NSAs from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia, prepares the participants in three training modules to assist in the interpretation and implementation of the agreement in the Eastern African region. Module 1 took place in Kenya, whereas Module 2 of the programme was conducted in Tanzania 27th to 29th of August 2003.
- At the end of the Module 2 training of Cotonou Consultants, a workshop on “Experience Exchange with NSAs from other East African countries (namely Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia) on Networking” took place on the 30th of August 2003.
- The “Launching of the Tanzania NSAs Steering Committee”, took place on the 30th of September 2003 in Dar-es-Salaam. The Committee decided to meet bimonthly to plan for further activities.

The following papers can be ordered:
- Think Tank Profile
- Report of the Path-finding Workshop on Emerging Opportunities for CSOs Participation in the ACP-EU Development Cooperation, Daressalam.
- FES Cotonou Info for Non-State Actors
- German Development Institute, February 2003. The EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration in East Africa. Options For Tanzania, Bonn.

Please contact: info@fes.or.tz

EXPECTED ATNCTIONS

- The January 2003 workshop was seen as a key-opener for the NSAs to meet with the EU-delegation, and requested continued discussions as the issues related to the implementation of the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement are new to the majority of the Tanzanians. Therefore awareness raising and dissemination of Cotonou information is a constant in FES activities and support additional FES measures in Tanzania.
- At the same time, FES provides more concise capac-
ity building. Support is required at national as well as at regional level. In September 2003 the regional groupings, whatever form they may have (SADC, EAC, etc.), are expected to negotiate the details and modalities of the envisaged EPAs with the EU. At the moment in Tanzania the responsibilities for trade matters are with the Ministry of Industries and Trade (under the Tanzania Trade and Poverty Programme-TTPP) in close collaboration with Economic and Social Research Foundation-ESRF. The country still has to put much effort in identifying a national EPA strategy, which will be based on broad ownership, be pro-poor oriented and help to preserve Tanzania’s interests even if it has to negotiate EPAs in a regional grouping bigger than the EAC.

The EAC is confronted with comparable problems. Its partner states decided in an extra-ordinary Summit of Heads of State in Kampala, 11. April 2002, to negotiate EPAs as a bloc. So far the implementation of the initiative lacks an pro-active engagement and the establishment of a negotiation structure as most of the relevant stakeholders in the Tanzanian-EU trade and aid cooperation.

1) to assist a steering committee to identify relevant stakeholders in the Tanzanian-EU trade and aid cooperation

2) to provide specific information on EPA and the Cotonou development component

3) to improve the participants capacity to exchange and cooperate in a network

4) to enable the group to establish links to national Government Institutions (National Authorising Officer-NAO, line Ministries etc.) and regional NSAs networks (e.g. ECONEWS, MWENGO)

5) to increase the networks capacity to negotiate trade issues in the respective inter-governmental fora and participate in the Cotonou policy processes, such as the mid-term review of the Country support Strategy.

Further Information on Cotonou and the specific FES-engagement refer to:

FES-Headquarter:
## Action Plan for Cotonou-NSAs Steering Committee

### Mission:
To have a strong joint, non partisan force of NSAs adequately participating in the Cotonou process

### Short Term Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity Levels</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Knowledge base</td>
<td>Present NSAs to stakeholders</td>
<td>Collect and disseminate information on:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collect and disseminate information on:</td>
<td>- Market access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- EU-ACP Dev't</td>
<td>- Patterns of trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- EU-URT Dev't</td>
<td>- Trade documents</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- NSAs areas of intervention</td>
<td>- Controversial elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Implementation level</td>
<td>Identification of NSAs</td>
<td>Develop a questionnaire or contact of NSAs and summary of their areas of interest and intervention in the Cotonou process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Link with Gov't &amp; EU</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Link with NSAs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>Establish criterion to monitor steering committee work and NSAs</td>
<td>Develop Monitoring tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Networking</td>
<td>How to network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partners to network with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experiences of previous networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Implementation level</td>
<td>Creation of thematic areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange experiences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>Assess effectiveness of the network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Capacity Building</td>
<td>Undertake a SWOT analysis of the steering committee on Cotonou issues</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide NSAs with readable information</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undertake Civil Society training on important Cotonou issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Implementation level</td>
<td>Train on negotiation skills and techniques</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share experiences learnt from other countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>Monitor efficacy of the training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Expected Outcome of the Action Plan:**
From the action plan, the steering committee should be able to:
• Identify or establish information gaps
• Identify or establish information points
• Collect information
• Assess the information
• Interpret the collected information
• Take positions from the results of the collected and interpreted information
• Discharge the information
• NSAs participate adequately in the Country Review in 2004

**Possible Observable Indicators**

**• Collection and Dissemination of information**
- Ability of the steering committee/NSAs to undertake self-assessment
- Ability of the information generated to close the information gaps of the Steering Committee and interested NSAs
- Improved confidence amongst steering committee and NSAs
- Ability of established contacts to co-operate and provide required information
- Ability of a permanent information flow loop to be established btn NSAs-SC and information points
- Ability of information collected to provide concrete implications of the Cotonou process on Tanzania’s policy issues like trade, market access, local prices, farm gate prices for local products, future supply curves of local products (especially agricultural produce)
- Ability of information to generate more interest amongst major stakeholders
- Ability of the steering committee to simplify the available information

**• Networking**
- Holding of local workshop on the Cotonou process
- Holding of regional workshop on the Cotonou process
- Ability to establish a network amongst the local actors
- Ability to establish a network amongst the regional actors
- Regular information flow on the developments of Cotonou issues
- Extent to which local and regional contacts provide new information/insights about the Cotonou process

**• Co-operation from EU and Gov’t**
The willingness of the EU and Government to support the steering committee and NSAs will be measured by;
- Regular attendance or response to invitations, inquiries or requests by the Steering Committee
- Ability to provide information, resources, persons and guidance to the steering committee

**• Self Organisation of the Steering Committee**
Success of the Action Plan will depend on the willingness of the steering committee to remain committed and dedicated to achieving the underlined long-term vision of the action plan. This will be measured by:
- Regular attendance of the meetings
- Regular and active participation during the meetings
- Completion of tasks assigned by the steering committee.

**• Assumptions**
- NSAs will be interested in participating in the Cotonou process
- The EU and Gov’t will remain interested in engaging the NSAs in the Cotonou process
- The NSAs will mandate the steering committee to engage on its behalf with other actors
- The resources will be available
3. FACTS & FIGURES

INTERNET AND E-MAIL

The Internet
This is a computer network that joins other networks together e.g. those of academic and government institutions, schools, libraries and corporations, making them seem to be just one network to the user, who sits in front of her/his computer at home, in the office or at an “internet café”. The Internet provides access to information stored in different computers all over the world and it also provides the opportunity to engage in discussions and to share ideas and research with people connected to the network.

To access the Internet you need a computer with the adequate software, a telephone-line and a modem (modem = contraction of modulator/demodulator) to link your computer with the telephone. You also need to subscribe to an “internet provider”, (see our list of major internet providers in Tanzania).

World Wide Web (www)
Through the Internet, you can access the WWW. This is the name given to the apparently seamless “web” of many geographically separate sources of information. The mass of data available is overwhelming. There is no guarantee that it is accurate, up-to-date or even meant to be helpful. Anyone with access to the internet can publish his/her own material and make it accessible on the web. Internet users must therefore approach websites with a very critical mind.

A web is distinguished by the prefix http:// in its address, which you should write on top of the page of your “browser” software (e.g. Netscape, Internet Explorer). Each website has a unique address, known as URL. The FES Tanzania address is http://tanzania.fes-international.de

Take care when writing web addresses for they are sensitive to punctuation and spaces (there are no spaces in electronic addresses), and are normally written in lower case.

Search engines and websites
When you are looking for information you might already know the website to look in and its address. If you do not know where to look, then you will have to use a search engine. A search engine helps you find information. To access the search engine you write http://www. and the name of the search engine, e.g. www.google.com OR www.altavista.com OR www.yahoo.com. These addresses open the websites of Google, Altavista and Yahoo. When you access a search engine, you will have to type some key words in the space provided. The search will be based on those words you chose as the most important ones. Here is the secret: what sort of key words should you use, and how to combine them?

1. Be specific
The more specific your search is, the more likely you will find what you want. For example if you want to know how many international treaties Tanzania has signed, you should write “Tanzania international treaties signatories” or you even write “how many international treaties Tanzania has signed?” You’ll be surprised at how often this works!

2. Use the symbol + to add
If you want to be sure that the pages you will find contain not only one or another word you typed, but all of them, you should use the symbol +. For instance, you want to find pages where there are references to President Mkapa together with references to Mwalimu Nyerere. You should then type: +Mkapa+Nyerere. You can
narrow down your search by adding more specific words.

3. Use the symbol – to subtract
If you want all the pages related to those key words but not the ones referring to a specific subject, you can use the symbol –. Using the above example, you want references to President Mkapa and Nyerere, but do not want references to Ujamaa, you can type: +Mkapa+Nyerere-Ujamaa.

4. Use quotation marks to keep expressions together
If you want to find references to a special combination of words, you will have to write those words in quotation marks. For example, if you type+President+Mkapa, you’ll get sites that make references to those words together or separated. But if you write “President Mkapa”, you’ll get only the references where both of the words appear in that same order.

5. Combining all of it
Try to use the different signs to be specific. For example: +“President Mkapa” +“Mwalimu Nyerere” + development - “international cooperation”

Here are the names of a few search engines:
• Google (www.google.com)
• Altavista (www.altavista.com)
• Yahoo
• Lycos
• WebCrawler
• HotBot
• Fast
• InfoSeek
• Dogpile
• MSN
• LookSmart.

You can also enter a search engine and search for specific search engines, for example, +“search engines” +Africa.

Some of the specific search engines for Africa are:
• Mosaique.com
• ClickAfrica.com
• Orientation Tanzania
• Woyaa.com
• Ananzi.com
• Zebra.co.za
• Siftthru.com
• Searchenginewatch.com
• Fishhoo.com.

E-mail
This refers to electronic mail as opposed to airmail or surface mail (today popularly known as “snail mail”). You can send messages to anyone with an Internet account, and it can include not only text, but also pictures and spreadsheets. Incoming messages are stored in your mail-box on your internet provider until you access it. E-mail is delivered very fast, in a matter of seconds or a few hours. This depends amongst other things on the amount of data being transferred and the quality of telephone lines and that of your modem. The cost of sending e-mail depends on the amount of data and therefore the length of time it takes to send it from your computer to the local server. It is relatively cheap: sending e-mail to the other side of the globe is not more expensive than sending one to a computer next door.

To send and receive e-mails you will need a dedicated program, such as Outlook Express, Microsoft Outlook, Eudora, Pegasus and others. You will have your own electronic address and will send your message to another address. If you have a connection to an internet provider you will receive an address which is composed of two parts: your-login-name + the symbol @ + the name of the internet provider. FES Tanzania’s electronic address is info@fes.or.tz

Chatting and conferencing
The Internet provides the possibility of communicating directly with others “on-line”. In other words the people chatting or holding a conference are at their computers and are on the Internet at the same time.
RADIO BROADCASTING IN TANZANIA

Source: Tanzania Broadcasting Commission, September 2003

RADIO TANZANIA DAR ES SALAAM RTD (National Service)
Director of Broadcasting
P. O. Box 9191, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022 2860760-5, Fax: 022 2865577
Owner: Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
Location: Nyerere Road/Mandela Road
Date of license issue: 1st January 1994
Frequencies: Base Station (Dar es Salaam)
FM Frequencies 90.0 MHZ, 92.3 MHZ
MW Frequencies 531 KHZ, 657 KHZ, 837 KHZ, 1035 KHZ
SW Frequencies (IN KHZ) 9785, 5050, 5985, 6105, 7165, 7280, 9550, 9685, 9750, 15435.
Dodoma Booster St. 87.7 MHZ, 603 KHZ
Mbeya Booster St. 92.3 MHZ, 621 KHZ
Mwanza Booster St. 89.2 MHZ, 88.5 MHZ, 720 KHZ
Arusha Booster St. 91.6 MHZ, 1215 KHZ
Nachingwea Booster St. 684 KHZ
Lindi Booster St. 107.1 MHZ, 93.5 MHZ
Masasi Booster St. 92.3 MHZ, 105.9 MHZ
Songea Booster St. 98.7 MHZ, 990 KHZ
Kigoma Booster St. 88.4 MHZ, 711 KHZ

RADIO ONE
P. O. Box 4374, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022- 2775914, 022-2775916
Fax: 022-27759715
Website: www.ippmedia.com
Owner: IPP Media Ltd.
Location: Plot No. 130 Mikocheni Industrial Area, Dar es Salaam
Date of license issue: 3 February 1994
Frequencies:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) 89.5 MHZ
Arusha Booster St. 99.3 MHZ
Mwanza Booster St. 102.9 MHZ
Dodoma Booster St. 100.8 MHZ
Moshi Booster St. 1323 KHZ

RADIO EAST AFRICAN FM
P. O. Box 4374,Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2775914, 022- 2775916
Fax: 022-2775915, 022-2119373
Owner: IPP Media Ltd.
Location: Plot No. 130 Mikocheni Industrial Area, Dar es Salaam
Date of license issue: 2 January 2000
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam ) 87.8 MHZ

RADIO FREE AFRICA (RFA)
P. O. Box 1732, Mwanza
Tel: 028-2503262, Fax: 028-2500713,2561890
Email: rfa@africaonline.co.tz
Website: www.rfa.co.tz
Owner: Diallo Investment Co. Ltd
Nyalla Investment Co. Ltd
Location: CPLC Building, Ilemela-Mwanza/Posta Rd.
Date of license issue: 6 September 1996
Frequencies:
Base St. Mwanza 89.9 MHZ, 1377 KHZ
Arusha Booster St. 89.0 MHZ
Shinyanga Booster St. sq 88.2 MHZ
Dar es Salaam Booster St. 98.6 MHZ
Mbeya Booster St. 88.8 MHZ

RADIO SAUTI YA INJILI
P. O. Box 777, Moshi
Tel: 027-252772
Owner: Tanzania Evangelical Lutheran Church
Location: Moshi (Off Arusha Road)
Date of license issue: 29 January 1996
Frequencies:
Base St. (Moshi) 92.2 MHZ
Moshi Booster St. 97.2 MHZ
Arusha Booster St. 96.2 MHZ
Same Booster St. 104 MHZ
Kibaya (Simanjiro/Manyara) 102.9 MHZ
RADIO KIWIZERA
Ngara Field Office
P. O. Box 154, Ngara
Tel: 028-2223679, Fax: 028-2222507
Owner: Jesuits Refugee Service Diocese of Rulenge - UNHCR
Location: Ngara
Date of license issue: 28 December 1995
Frequencies:
Base St. (Ngara) 93.6 MHZ
Kibondo Booster St. 97.9 MHZ

CLOUDS ENTERTAINMENT
RADIO FM
P. O. Box 32513, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2123919, Fax: 022-2123919
Email: cloudsfm@clouds.com
Owner: Clouds Entertainment Ltd.
Location: NIC House, Dar es Salaam
Date of license issue: 12 December 1998
Frequencies:
Base St.(Dar es Salaam) 88.4 MHZ
Arusha Booster St. 98.4 MHZ
Mwanza Booster St. 99.4 MHZ

RADIO TUMAINI
P. O. Box 9916, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2117307, Fax: 022-2112594
Email: tumaini@cats-net.com
Owner: Catholic Archdiocese Dar es Salaam
Location: 1 Bridge Street, Dar es Salaam
Date of license issue: 3 January 1994
Frequencies:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) 96.3 MHZ
Kibaha Booster St. 91.6 MHZ

RADIO UHURU FM
P. O. Box 9221, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2182234, Telex: 41239
Email: uhuru@intafrica.com
Owner: Uhuru Publication Ltd
Location: Lumumba Street Plot No.70
Date of license issue: 2 February 2000
Frequencies:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) 95.2 MHZ
Arusha Booster St. 99.7 MHZ
Mwanza Booster St. 92.9 MHZ

RADIO 5 ARUSHA
P. O. Box 11843, Arusha
Tel: 027-2506447, Fax: 027-2504201
Owner: Didas D. Kavishe
Location: CCM Building
Date of license issue: 26 November 1999
Frequency:
Base St.(Arusha) 105.7 MHZ

CHEMICHEMI RADIO
SUMBAWANGA
P. O. Box 34, Sumbawanga
Tel: 025-722765, 025-72178
Fax: 025-70637, 025-72641
Owner: Catholic Archdiocese, Sumbawanga
Location: Plot No. 506 Block N
Date of license issue: 29 November 1999
Frequency:
Base St. (Sumbawanga) 92.2 MHZ

RADIO MARIA
P. O. Box 152, Songea
Tel: 025-2602348/2525, Fax: 025-2602593
Email: songea-archdiocese@cats.net.com
Owner: Catholic Archdiocese - Songea
Location: St. Joseph Building - Songea
Date of license issue: 3 May 1996
Frequency: FM 89.1 MHZ

PRT – RADIO TANZANIA
Director of Broadcasting
P. O. Box 9191, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2860760-5, Fax: 022-2865577
Owner: Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
Location: Nyerere Road/Mandela Road
Date of license Issue: 1st January 1994
Frequency:
Base St.(Dar es Salaam) 94.6 MHZ

RADIO KISS FM
P. O. Box 1732, Mwanza
Tel: 028-2503263
Fax: 028-2500713, 028-2561890
Email: rfa@africaonline.co.tz
Website: www.rfa.co.tz
Owner: Diallo Investment Co. Ltd
Nyalla Investment Co. Ltd
RADIO SKY FM
P. O. Box 4374, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2775914, 022-2775916
Fax: 022-2775915, 022-2119373
Website: www.ippmedia.com
Owner: IPP Media Ltd.
Location: Plot No 130 Mikocheni Light Industrial Area
Date of License Issue: 2nd January 2000
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) 102.5 MHZ

RADIO CHOICE FM
P. O. Box 32513, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2123919,Fax: 022-2123919
Email: cloudsmr@clouds.com
Owner: Clouds Entertainment Ltd.
Location: NIC House, Dar es Salaam
Date of License Issue: 7th March 2002
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) 102.5 MHZ

RADIO TUMAINI INTERNATIONAL
P. O. Box 9916, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2227307
Owner: Catholic Archdiocese Dar es Salaam
Location: 1 Bridge Street, Dar es Salaam
Date of license issue: 19th March 2001
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) 105.8 MHZ

MAGIC FM RADIO
Cable Vision Network
P. O. Box 8983, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2180406, 022-2185240
Owner: Africa Media Group
Location: Jamhuri/Zaramo Street
Date of license issue: 10th December 2001
Frequency:
Base Station  92.9 MHZ

RADIO UKWELI
Diocese of Morogoro
P. O. Box 640, Morogoro
Tel: 023-3340, 023-4828, Fax: 023-3341
Owner: Catholic Archdiocese Morogoro
Location: Bishop House, Morogoro
Date of license issue: 4th August 2000
Frequency:
Base St. (Morogoro) 92.6 MHZ

ABOOD RADIO
P. O. Box 127, Morogoro
Tel: 023-2603529, 2603877
Fax: 023-2603039
Email: abood@raha.com
Owner: Abood Company Ltd
Location: Msamvu Industrial Area Block C
Date of license issue: 19th September 2001
Frequency:
Base St. (Morogoro)  89.7 MHZ

RADIO FARAJA
P. O. Box 47, Shinyanga
Tel: 028-2872068, 2763033
Fax: 028-2763040
Email: balin@africaonline.co.tz
Owner: Catholic Diocese of Shinyanga
Location: Ngokolo Area (Cathedral Plot Area-Shinyanga)
Date of license issue: 12th June 2001
Frequency:
Base Station (Shinyanga) 92.3 MHZ

THE QURAN VOICE RADIO (QVR)
Katibu Mkuu
Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania
P. O. Box 21422, Dar es Salaam
Owner: BAKWATA
Location: Samora Avenue
Date of license issue:
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) 102.0 MHZ

WAPO RADIO
P. O. Box 76837, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-850221, Fax: 022-2850221
Owner: The Word and Pentecostal Organization (WAPO)
Date of license issue: 31st May 2002
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) 98.0 MHZ

ORKONEREI FM RADIO
P. O. Box 12785 (TERRAT), Arusha
Tel: 0744-287636, Fax: 027-28965
Owner: The Registered Trustees of Orkonerei
Integrated Pastoralist Survival Programme
Location: Terrat Village, Simanjiro, Manyara
Date of license issue: 26th August 2002
Frequency:
Base St. (Manyara) 94.8 MHZ

SUNRISE FM RADIO
P. O. Box 14321, Arusha
Tel: 027-2548415, 0741-350792
Fax: 027-2548415
Owner: Haji Suwedi, Mary R. Laizer
Location: Block EE Nairobi Road
Date of license issue: 29th November 2002
Frequency:
Base St. (Arusha) 94.4 MHZ

RADIO MWANGAZA
P. O. Box 3086, Dodoma
Tel: 026-2304671, Fax: 026-2300482
Email: vicariatesecret@hotmail.com
Owner: Society of the Precious Blood
Location: Kisasa ‘B’ Centre, 1 Block ‘A’
Date of license issue: 24th January 2003
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) 100.5 MHZ

BUSINESS TIMES RADIO FM
P. O. Box 71439, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2118381
Owner: Business Times
Location: Lugoba Street, Plot No. 64
Date of license issue: 15th March 2002
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) 100.5 MHZ

RADIO SAUT FM STEREO
St. Augustine University (Nyegezi)
P. O. Box 307, Mwanza
Tel: 028-2550272, 255275, 2550560
Fax: 028-2500575
Email: saut-nyegezi@sukumanet.com
Owner: St. Augustine University
Location: St. Augustine University, Nyegezi
Street
Date of license issue: 21st September 2001
Frequency:
Base St. (Nyegezi) 96.1 MHZ

TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN TANZANIA
Source: Tanzania Broadcasting Commission, September 2003

TELEVISHENI YA TAIFA (TVT)
P. O. Box 31519, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2700011, 2700062, 2700464
Fax: 022-2700468
Email: tvt-dg@africaonline.co.tz
Owner: Government of the United
Republic of Tanzania
Location: Kijitonyama, Off Bagamoyo Road
Date of license issue: 10 March 2000
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) Channel 5 (VHF)

COASTAL TELEVISION NETWORK
(CTN)
P. O. Box 8983, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2185240, Fax: 022-2185354
Email: ctn@cats.net.com
Owner: Africa Media Group
Location: Jamhuri/Zaramo Street
Date of license issue: 14 February 1994
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) Channel 7 (VHF)
DAR ES SALAAM TELEVISION (DTV)
P. O. Box 21122, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2116341/6, Fax: 022-2113112
Email: dtv@raha.com
Owner: Africa Media Group
Location: Jamhuri/Zaramo Street
Date of license issue: 20 May 1994
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) Channel 40 (UHF)

INDEPENDENT TELEVISION (ITV)
P. O. Box 4374, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2775914, 2775916, 2773980
Fax: 022-2775915
Email: itv@ipp.co.tz
Owner: IPP Media
Location: Mikocheni Industrial Area
Date of license issue: 17th January 1994
Frequencies:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) Channel 11 (VHF)
Arusha Booster St. Channel 6 (VHF)
Moshi Booster St. Channel 9 (VHF)
Dodoma Booster St. Channel 11 (VHF)
Mwanza Booster St. Channel 10 (VHF)

STAR TELEVISION
P. O. Box 1732, Mwanza
Tel: 028-2503262, 028-2560561
Fax: 028-2500713, 028-2561890
Owner: Diallo Investment Co. Ltd
Nyalla Investment Co. Ltd
Location: CPLC Building - Ilemela
Date of license issue: 19 June 2000
Frequencies:
Base St. (Mwanza) Channel 31 (UHF)
D'Salaam Booster St. Channel 42 (UHF)
Arusha Booster St. Channel 34 (UHF)
Mbeya Booster St. Channel 58 (UHF)

TELEVISHENI BURUDANI
P. O. Box 1528, Arusha
Tel: 027-2500400, Fax: 027-2500400
Email: tvb@habari.co.tz
Owner: Didas Kavishe/ Anthony Glass
Location: Kijenge, Arusha
Date of license issue: 5 March 1999
Frequencies:
MMDS – Group X
(Channels 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22)

C2C TELEVISION
P. O. Box 8983, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2185240, Fax: 022-2185354
Email: ctn@cats.net.com
Owner: Africa Media Group
Location: Jamhuri/Zaramo Street
Date of license issue: 24th August 1999
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam): Channel 28 (UHF)

CHANNEL TEN TELEVISION
P. O. Box 21122, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2116341/6, Fax: 022-2113112
Email: dtv@raha.com
Owner: Africa Media Group
Location: Jamhuri/Zaramo Street
Date of license issue: 11th January 2002
Frequencies:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) Channel 58 (UHF)
Dodoma Booster St. Channel 57 (UHF)
Arusha Booster St. Channel 42 (UHF)
Mwanza Booster St. Channel 54 (UHF)
Tanga Booster St. Channel 63 (UHF)

DAR ES SALAAM TELEVISION PAYTV
P. O. Box 21122, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2116341/6, Fax: 022-2113112
Email: dtv@raha.com
Owner: Africa Media Group
Location: Jamhuri/Zaramo Street
Date of license issue: 11th January 2000
Frequencies:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) Channel 53 (UHF)
M-Net Channel
Channel 56 (UHF) Super Sport Channel
Channel 64 (UHF) Movie Magic Channel

INDEPENDENT TELEVISION 2 (ITV 2)/C5
P. O. Box 4374, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2775914, 2775916, 2773980
Fax: 022-2775915
Email: itv@ipp.co.tz
Owner: IPP Media
CABLE TELEVISION NETWORKS IN TANZANIA

Source: Tanzania Broadcasting Commission, September 2003

ABOOD TELEVISION
P. O. Box 127, Morogoro
Tel: 023-2603231, 023-2603529
Owner: Aziz M. Abood
Location: Msamvu - Morogoro
Date of License Issue: 17th October 1998
Frequencies:
Base St. (Morogoro) Channel 34 (UHF)

SOKOINE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE TELEVISION (SUATV)
P. O. Box 3000, Morogoro
Tel: 023-2603511/4, 2603236
Fax: 023-2604652
Email: msolla@suanet.ac.tz
Owner: SUA
Location: SUA Administrative Block
Date of License Issue: 21st April 1995
Frequency:
Base St. (Morogoro) Channel 6 (VHF)

CABLE ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK (CEN)
P. O. Box 4454, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2153454/6, Fax: 022-2113148

TELEVISION BURUDANI (DAR ES SALAAM)
P. O. Box 1528, Arusha
Tel: 027-2502431, Fax: 027-2502310
Email: tvb@habari.co.tz
Owner: Didas Kavishe/Anthony Glass
Location: Hall 1, University Hill, D’ Salaam
Date of License Issue: 5th March 1999
Frequency:
MMDS-Group X (Ch. 1/4/7/10/13/16/19/22)

AGAPE TELEVISION (ATV)
P. O. Box 70029, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2150798, Fax: 022-2780217
Email: wam@maf.org
Owner: World Agape Ministries
Location: Mbezi Industrial Area
Date of License Issue: 11th February 2002
Frequency:
Base St. (Dar es Salaam) Channel 36 (UHF)

CABLE TELEVISION NETWORK (CTV)
P.O. Box 3774, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2116594, 2116611
Fax: 022-2112119
Email: bsr@cats-net.com
Owner: Hitesh Tanna (Director)
Bhasker Rughan & Harold Mgome
Location: Sewa Street, Dar es Salaam
Date of License Issue: 13 June 1995

STAR CABLE TELEVISION LTD.
P.O. Box 1468, Dar es Salaam
Tel: 022-2151768, 0742-781837
Owner: Jahagir Hassan Dalvi (Director)
Karim A. Ladha
Location: Mfaume Road, Upanga West
Date of License Issue: 15 December 1995
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Contact Details</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Date of License Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BHARAT VIDEO CENTRE</td>
<td>P.O. Box 2768, Mwanza</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel.: 028-242475, 242200</td>
<td>Bharat Unadkati (Director)</td>
<td>18 July 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWANZA SATELLITE CABLE TELEVISION</td>
<td>P.O. Box 647, Mwanza</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel: 028-42550, 2502187 Fax: 028-2500713</td>
<td>Rizwani Kanji (Director)</td>
<td>8 February 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYOUB CABLE TELEVISION</td>
<td>P.O. Box 333, Shinyanga</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel.: 028-2762013</td>
<td>Ayoub Aziz (Director)</td>
<td>24 August 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABORA CABLE TELEVISION</td>
<td>P.O. Box 506, Tabora</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel: 026-2855</td>
<td>Shashikant M. Patel (Director)</td>
<td>23 January 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPACE SATELLITE CABLE TELEVISION</td>
<td>P.O. Box 946, Musoma</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel: 028-2550675, 2255480</td>
<td>Geoffrey Kajanja (Director)</td>
<td>27 July 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILLAN VIDEO CENTRE</td>
<td>P.O. Box 10367, Arusha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel: 027-2506471</td>
<td>Sudha Millan (Director)</td>
<td>29 January 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL ENTERTAINMENT CABLE TELEVISION NETWORK (IECTN)</td>
<td>P.O. Box 757, Moshi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel: 027-2752307, 2752478</td>
<td>Shobhag D. Shah</td>
<td>15 July 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAHMAN SATELLITE CABLE TELEVISION</td>
<td>P.O. Box 52444, Tanga</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel: 027-242 911, Fax: 027-247041</td>
<td>Ally H. Said/Ahmed H. Said</td>
<td>11 May 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHANDHO CABLE NETWORK</td>
<td>P.O. Box 161, Mbeya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel: 025-24479, 4329, 3453 Fax: 025-24079</td>
<td>Karim Dharsi (Director)</td>
<td>3 January 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARUSHA CABLE TELEVISION (ACTV)</td>
<td>P.O. Box 7043, Arusha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel: 027-2506937, 2502284 Fax: 027-2502284</td>
<td>Abdi Abdulrasul (Director)</td>
<td>13 June 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABLE TELEVISION NETWORK (CTN)</td>
<td>P.O. Box 88, Tanga</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel: 022-2116594, 2116611 Fax: 022- 2112119</td>
<td>Hitesh Tanna, B.S. Rughan &amp; H. Mgome</td>
<td>1 June 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABLE TELEVISION NETWORK (CTV), TAN</td>
<td>P.O. Box 3774, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel: 022-2116594, 2116611 Fax: 022- 2112119</td>
<td>Email: <a href="mailto:bsr@cats-net.com">bsr@cats-net.com</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Owners: Hitesh Tanna (Director)  
Bhyasker Rughan & Harold Mgome  
Location: Taifa Road  
Date of License Issue:  

GHANA CABLE TELEVISION  
P.O. Box 10213, Mwanza  
Tel: 028-2561016, Fax: 028-2507705  
Owners: Patrick Pius/Youseff Kassim  
Location: Karume Street, Mwanza  
Date of License Issue:  

TELEVISION OPERATORS  
Source: Tanzania Broadcasting Commission, September 2003  

NJOMBE DISTRICT COUNCIL TV (NDC TV)  
P. O. Box 547, Njombe  
Tel: 026-2782111, 2782202  
Fax: 026-2782062  
Owner: Njombe District Council  
Location: Njombe District Council Compound  
Frequency: UHF Channel 34 (Njombe)  

SONGEA TOWN COUNCIL TV  
P. O. Box 14, Songea  
Tel: 025-2602970, Fax: 025-2602970  
Owner: Songea Town Council  
Location: Songea Town Council Compound  
Frequency: UHF Channel 22 (Songea)  

SONGEA TELEVISION SERVICES  
P. O. Box 95, Songea  
Tel: 025-22884, 025-22778  
Owner: Daudi Kinyunyu  
Location: Songea Town  
Frequency: UHF Channel 53 (Songea)  

MASASI DISTRICT COUNCIL  
P. O. Box 60, Masasi  
Tel: 2510031, 2510013, 2510045  
Owner: Masasi District Council  
Location: Masasi District Council, Head Office  
Frequency: UHF Channel 47 (Masasi)  

MBOZI DISTRICT COUNCIL TV  
P. O. Box 3, Mbozi  
Tel: 44 (through telephone operator)  
Owner: Mbozi District Council  
Location: Boma Street, No. 14 – Vwawa  

WIN CABLE TELEVISION  
P. O. Box 7177, Dar es Salaam  
Tel: 022-2120683, 0741-278999  
Fax: 022- 2113688  
Owner: Nilesh Nanubhai Patel  
Location: Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road, Plot No. 2290/8/12  
Date of License Issue: 27th February 2002  

MBOZI COFFEE CURING COMPANY TV  
P. O. Box 291, Mbozi  
Tel: 025-2504412, Fax: 025-2504434  
Owner: Mbozi Coffee Curing Co. Ltd  
Location: Mlowo Village, Plot No. 1
(Tunduma Highway)
**Frequency:** UHF Channel 22 (Mbozi)

**TUNDURU DISTRICT COUNCIL TV**
P. O. Box 275, Tunduru
Tel: 065-602812/4, Fax: 065-602808
**Owner:** Tunduru District Council
**Location:** District Council Block – Tunduru
**Frequency:** UHF Channel 30 (Tunduru)

**SUMBAWANGA TOWN COUNCIL**
P. O. Box 187, Sumbawanga
Tel: 025-2802163, Fax: 025-2802380
**Owner:** Sumbawanga Town Council
**Location:** Regional Commissioner’s Block, Nyerere Road.
**Frequency:** UHF Channel 30

**IRAMBA DISTRICT COUNCIL TV**
P. O. Box 115, Kiomboi
Tel: 026-2502253, Fax: 026-2502253
**Owner:** District Executive Director
**Location:** Mandela Road Kiomboi
**Frequency:** UHF Channel 50

**ASHANTI GOLDFIELD TV**
P. O. Box 532, Geita, Mwanza
Dar es Salaam Office
P. O. Box 75803
Dar es Salaam
Geita - Tel: 028-252020, 2520545-6, 2520318
Fax: 028-2520212
DSM – Tel: 022-260054, 2600507, 2600521, 2600170, Fax: 022-2602889
**Owner:** Geita Gold Project
**Location:** Geita Gold Project Village
**Frequency:** MMDS

**C.G. TV TRANSMISSION CENTRE**
P. O. Box 2207, Tabora
Tel: 026-2604893
**Owner:** Director, C.G. Traders Ltd
**Location:** Kaze Hill, Plot No 282
**Frequency:** UHF Channel 34

**IRINGA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL TV**
P. O. Box 162, Iringa
Tel: 026-2700202, 2700470
Fax: 026-2702203
**Owner:** Municipal Director, Iringa
**Location:** Uhuru Avenue, Iringa
**Frequency:** VHF Channel 6

**MUSOMA TOWN COUNCIL TV**
P. O. Box 194, Musoma
Tel: 028-2622208, 2622550
Fax: 028-2620550
**Owner:** Town Director, Musoma
**Location:** Town Council Compound
**Frequency:** VHF Channel 6

**INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT (IDM) MZUMBE**
P. O. Box 1, Morogoro
Tel: 023-2604274, 2604253
**Owner:** IDM Mzumbe
**Location:** IDM Compound
**Frequency:** VHF Channel 16

**MBEYA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL**
P. O. Box 149, Mbeya
Tel: 026-2502563, 2502372
Fax: 026-2504390
**Owner:** Mbeya Municipal Council
**Location:** Mbeya Municipal Office are
**Frequency:** UHF Channel 50

**NOTES**
# Information on Trade Unions in Tanzania 2003

Source: Compiled by Mrs. D.M. Uiso, Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions in Tanzania, September 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNION</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
<th>LEADERSHIP</th>
<th>MEMBERSHIP</th>
<th>STATUS AS OF 31 AUGUST 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA UNION OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS' UNION (TUICO)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 5680&lt;br&gt; D'Salaam&lt;br&gt; Tel: 2151/30/1, 28669/10/60&lt;br&gt; Ilia Shariif Shamba</td>
<td>Chairperson&lt;br&gt; Mr. Evans Ayoub&lt;br&gt; Secretary General&lt;br&gt; Mr. B.Y. Nkakalisi&lt;br&gt; Asst. General Secretary&lt;br&gt; Ms. Jane Mbeza&lt;br&gt; Mr. Hassan Chambayu&lt;br&gt; Mr. Lamimu Saleh</td>
<td>36,326</td>
<td>REGISTERED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT WORKERS’ UNION (TAALGOU)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 609/7&lt;br&gt; D'Salaam&lt;br&gt; Tel: 2121380&lt;br&gt; 2185/333&lt;br&gt; Lindi/UW1 SL</td>
<td>Chairperson&lt;br&gt; Mr. L.M. Musila&lt;br&gt; General Secretary&lt;br&gt; Mr. J.S. Matanga&lt;br&gt; Asst. General Secretary&lt;br&gt; Mr. Kimee</td>
<td>37,301</td>
<td>REGISTERED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA TEACHERS’ UNION (GTU)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 2196&lt;br&gt; D'Salaam&lt;br&gt; Tel: 2182/12&lt;br&gt; Fax: 2182/12&lt;br&gt; Kivukoni Rd.</td>
<td>Chairperson&lt;br&gt; Mrs. M. Silla&lt;br&gt; General Secretary&lt;br&gt; Mr. Yahya Mshinwa&lt;br&gt; Asst. General Secretary&lt;br&gt; Mr. Kimee</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>REGISTERED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESEARCHERS ACADEMICIANS, AND ALLIED WORKERS’ UNION (RAAWU)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 22532&lt;br&gt; D'Salaam&lt;br&gt; Tel: 21381/1&lt;br&gt; Lindi/UW1 SL</td>
<td>Chairperson&lt;br&gt; Mr. N.O. Musali&lt;br&gt; General Secretary&lt;br&gt; Mrs. A. Mwana</td>
<td>9,633</td>
<td>REGISTERED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA SEAMEN’S UNION (TASU)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 7534&lt;br&gt; D'Salaam&lt;br&gt; Tel: 21803/6&lt;br&gt; Cell: 0/11 32/152&lt;br&gt; Lindi/UW1 Street</td>
<td>Chairperson&lt;br&gt; Mr. Nassoro Mtupu&lt;br&gt; General Secretary&lt;br&gt; Michul Chukoma&lt;br&gt; Asst. General Secretary&lt;br&gt; G.R. Kibonde</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>REGISTERED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA FISILING AND ALLIED WORKERS’ UNION (WAMELUFA) (VAMENDA)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 4134&lt;br&gt; Dar es Salaam&lt;br&gt; Tel: 21333/25&lt;br&gt; Cell: 0/11 311030&lt;br&gt; Lumumba&lt;br&gt; Mkungurizi Street</td>
<td>Chairperson&lt;br&gt; S. J. Sheffu&lt;br&gt; General Secretary&lt;br&gt; M. Cholobi&lt;br&gt; Asst. Vice Chairperson&lt;br&gt; A. L. Mkisi&lt;br&gt; Asst. General Secretary&lt;br&gt; Mr. Bwana H. Nuru</td>
<td>255/58</td>
<td>REGISTERED</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONSERVATION HOTEL DOMESTIC AND ALLIED WORKERS’ UNION (CHODAWU)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 15519&lt;br&gt; D'Salaam&lt;br&gt; Tel: 21105/9&lt;br&gt; 21108/23&lt;br&gt; Lindi/UW1 SL</td>
<td>Chairperson&lt;br&gt; Mr. M.C. Castor&lt;br&gt; General Secretary&lt;br&gt; Mr. S.S. Wamba&lt;br&gt; Asst. General&lt;br&gt; Mr. Mansur</td>
<td>19,733</td>
<td>REGISTERED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Address</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Deputy General Secretary</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>TANZANIA RAILWAY WORKERS' UNION (RAWU)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 18158 D'Salaam Tel: 2118111 Cell: 0744-662800 Fax: 2118554 Lindi/UIWT St.</td>
<td>Mr. J.J. Mkogolo</td>
<td>G.N. Machungo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORT WORKERS' UNION (COTWU)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 13920 D'Salaam Tel: 211815/15 211821/1 Cell: 0744-763185 Fax: 2111170 Lindi/UIWT St.</td>
<td>Mr. M.H. Misanga</td>
<td>C.M. Samang'ombe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA UNION OF GOVERNMENT AND HFAIT TH EMPLOYEES' UNION (TUGHEF)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 1669 D'Salaam Tel: 2118152 2118771 Cell: 0744-763206 Lindi/UIWT St.</td>
<td>Mr. J.M. Mjema</td>
<td>Mr. A.K. Msibwa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA PLANTATION AND AGRICULTURAL WORKERS' UNION (TPAWU)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 77470 D'Salaam Tel: 21829667 21848849 Cell: 0741-132211 Agric/Sikuku St.</td>
<td>Mr. K.N. Kabengwe</td>
<td>Mr. P.N. Mioso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA MINES AND CONSTRUCTION WORKERS' UNION (TAMICO)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 77136 D'Salaam Tel: 2119000 2110570 2115574 Cell: 0741-616732 Lindi/UIWT St.</td>
<td>Mr. Mioso</td>
<td>Mr. M.K. Msibwa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRIAL AND GENERAL WORKERS' UNION TANZANIA (IGWUTA)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 77174 D'Salaam Tel: 0744-370503 Samwisi St No. 49 Tandika</td>
<td>Mr. S.A. Wanyancha</td>
<td>Mr. S.K. Msibwa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Name</td>
<td>Address</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Total No. of Members for 12 member unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA SOCIAL INDUSTRIAL WORKERS’ UNION (TASIYU)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 7151 D’Salam Tel: 2555005 Cell: 011 617/51 Umunyabu Mkanzino St</td>
<td>Mr. S.K. Kikule</td>
<td>Mr. T. M. Kasilati</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA UNION OF JOURNALISTS (TUJ)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 3372 Dares Salaam Tel: 2328416 Cell: 011 667/6 Lindi/UWT St</td>
<td>Mr. J. Kwayu</td>
<td>Mr. Godfrey Kamberi</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCK WORKERS UNION OF TANZANIA (DOWUTA)</td>
<td>P.O. Box 242 Dares Salaam Tel: 2182325 Cell: 011 818239 Kanikaoo Area Malia/Sikukuu St House No. 10</td>
<td>Mr. Seleman Melele</td>
<td>Mr. B. Karume</td>
<td>1,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF TANZANIA (TUCTA)</td>
<td>P.O. BOX 15359 D’Salam Tel: 2130036 Fax: 2130036/19 Lindi/UWI Street</td>
<td>Ms. Margaret Silla</td>
<td>Mr. N.K. Ngulla</td>
<td>ALL REGISTERED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES
# INFORMATION ON TRADE UNIONS IN ZANZIBAR

Source: Compiled by Talib O. Mbwana, General Secretary Zanzibar Local Government Workers' Unions (ZALGWU), September 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNION</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
<th>LEADERSHIP</th>
<th>MEMBERSHIP</th>
<th>STATUS AS OF FEB 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORT WORKERS' UNION OF ZANZIBAR (COTWU ZNZ)</td>
<td>P. O. Box 2311, Zanzibar Tel: 2230210 Kikwajuni</td>
<td>Chairperson Omar Ali Mnjombe General Secretary Moh’d Ali Salum Ass. General Secretary Armour Mussa Makarne</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESEARCHERS, ACADEMICIANS &amp; ALLIED WORKERS' UNION (RAAWU ZNZ)</td>
<td>P. O. Box 579, Zanzibar Tel: 2232552</td>
<td>Chairperson Daud Mkaka General Secretary Mwalumbu Khunzo</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANZANIA SEAMEN UNION (TASU ZNZ)</td>
<td>P. O. Box 667, Zanzibar Tel: 2230319 Fax: 2230319</td>
<td>Chairperson Sweddi A. Swoddi General Secretary Abdulrahman Hassan Chanda</td>
<td>3800</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANZANIA UNION FOR INDUSTRIES &amp; COMMERCE (TUICO-ZNZ)</td>
<td>P. O. Box 2865, Zanzibar Tel: 2230800</td>
<td>Chairperson Shab Moh’d I lamad General Secretary : Rhili I i Ali</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>Registered</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANZIBAR TEACHERS UNION (ZATU)</td>
<td>P. O. Box 667, Zanzibar Tel: 2232496</td>
<td>Chairperson Rabia Nassor Majdi Vice Chairperson I lamid Rajab uma General Secretary Mussa Omar Tafurwa</td>
<td>1900</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANZIBAR LOCAL GOVERNMENT WORKERS (ZALGWU)</td>
<td>P. O. Box 667, Zanzibar Tel: 2232496</td>
<td>Chairperson hamis Mkidadi Ali Vice Chairperson Shooce I lamad Mattar General Secretary Talib Omar Mbwana</td>
<td>1418</td>
<td>Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANZIBAR PLANTATION &amp; AGRICULTURAL WORKERS' UNION (ZP&amp;AWU)</td>
<td>P. O. Box 667, Zanzibar Tel: 2232496</td>
<td>Chairperson Gulam Khramis Uss General Secretary I i I Yussuf</td>
<td>416</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANZIBAR UNION FOR PUBLIC &amp; HAI TH FMPI OYFFS (ZUPHF)</td>
<td>P. O. Box 147, Zanzibar Tel: 2231943</td>
<td>Chairperson Zahnun Mo’h Nassor Vice Chairperson Iddi Omar Iddi General Secretary Jina I Iassan Siima</td>
<td>1533</td>
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Federation Under the Trade Union Act No. 4, 2001

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNION</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
<th>LEADERSHIP</th>
<th>MEMBERSHIP</th>
<th>STATUS AS AT DEC 2000</th>
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<tr>
<td>Zanzibar Trade Unions Congress (ZATUC)</td>
<td>P. O. Box 667, Zanzibar</td>
<td>Chairperson: Zahran Moh’d Nassor</td>
<td>12133</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tel: 2232196</td>
<td>Vice Chairperson: Suleiman Omar Ali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fax: 2232196</td>
<td>General Secretary: Makame Lauri Makame</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Organogram of the Labour Movement in Tanzania

Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) 1955-1964

National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) 1964-1979

Jumuiya Ya Wafanyakazi Wa Tanzania (JUWATA) 1979-1991

Multiparty Democracy

Organization of Tanzania Trade Unions (OTTU) 1991-1998

TANZANIA FEDERATION OF LABOUR (TFL)

TAYACT. NO. 10 OF 1998

TANGANYIKA FEDERATION OF LABOUR (TFL) 1955-1964

NATIONAL UNION OF TANGANYIKA WORKERS (NUTA) 1964-1979

JUMUIYA YA WAFANYAKAZI WA TANZANIA (JUWATA) 1979-1991

MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY

ORGANIZATION OF TANZANIA TRADE UNIONS (OTTU) 1991-1998

TU ACT. NO. 10 OF 1998

TANZANIA FEDERATION OF LABOUR (TFL)

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF TANZANIA - TUCTA 18.05.2001

AFFILIATES
WAMEUTA, IGWUTA, TASIWU, DOWUTA

AFFILIATES
TASU, RAAWU, TAMICO, TUICO, TPAWU, CWT, TAL-GWU, TRAWU, TUGHE, COTWU-T, TUIJ, CHODAWU

TUCTA AFFILIATES

- TASU - TANZANIA SEAMEN'S UNION
- TUICO - TANZANIA UNION OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
- TPAWU - TANZANIA PLANTATION AND AGRICULTURAL WORKERS’ UNION
- TTU - TANZANIA TEACHERS’ UNION
- RAAWU - RESEARCHERS, ACADEMICIANS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION
- TUGHE - TANZANIA UNION OF GOVERNMENT AND HEALTH EMPLOYEES
- COTWU - TANZANIA COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
- TAMICO - TANZANIA MINES AND CONSTRUCTION WORKERS UNION
- TRAWU - TANZANIA RAILWAYS WORKERS UNION
- CHODAWU - CONSERVATION, HOTEL, DOMESTIC AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION
- TALGWU - TANZANIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT WORKERS UNION
- TUIJ - TANZANIA UNION OF JOURNALISTS

TFL AFFILIATES

- IGWUTA - INDUSTRIAL AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION TANZANIA
- TASIWU - TANZANIA SOCIAL INDUSTRIAL WORKERS’ UNION
- WAMEUTA - TANZANIA FISHING AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION
- DOWUTA - DOCK WORKERS UNION TANZANIA
TANZANIAN CABINET AND PERMANENT SECRETARIES

Source: Tanzania Information Services, as of September 2003

THE PRESIDENT’S OFFICE
P.O. Box 9120, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 2116900, 2116898/9
President H.E. Benjamin William Mkapa
Chief Secretary Marten Lumbanga
Tel. 2116679
Minister of State (Good Governance)
Hon. Wilson Masilingi, (MP)
Tel. 2114240
Permanent Secretary, State House
Abel Mwaisumo
Tel. 2110932

VICE PRESIDENT’S OFFICE
P.O. Box 9120, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 2110614, Fax 2110614
The Vice President Hon. Dr Ali M. Shein
Tel. 2116919
Minister of State (Poverty Alleviation)
Hon. Edga D. Maokola-Majogo, (MP)
Tel. 2112849, 116964
Minister of State (Environment)
Hon. A. Ntangazwa, (MP)
Permanent Secretary Raphael Mollel
Tel. 2116995

CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT
P.O. Box 2483, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 2118531/4
Minister of State (Civil Service)
Hon. Mary Nagu, (MP)
Tel. 2116999, Fax. 113084
Permanent Secretary
J. Rugumynamheto
Tel. 2130122

PLANNING AND PRIVATISATION
P.O. Box 9242, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 2112681/4, Tlx. 2141516
Minister of State Hon. Dr A. Kigoda, (MP)
Tel. 2112746
Permanent Secretary Dr. Enos Bukuku
Tel. 2116728
Deputy Permanent Secretary Omar Bendera
Tel. 2110411

REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION & LOCAL GOVERNMENT
P.O. Box 1923, Dodoma
Tel. 2321848
Minister of State Hon. Brig. Gen. Hassan Ngwilizi, (MP)
Dodoma, Tel. 2321603
Dar es Salaam, Tel. 2124326
Deputy Minister Hon. M.K.P. Pinda, (MP)
Dodoma, Tel. 2321606
Dar es Salaam, Tel. 2120120
Permanent Secretary D.M.S. Mmari
Dodoma, Tel. 2321607
Dar es Salaam, Tel. 2128105
Deputy Permanent Secretary Damian Foka
Tel. 2128105, Dar es Salaam

PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE
P.O. Box 3021, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 2117249/55
Prime Minister Hon. F. T. Sumaye, (MP)
Tel. 2112847, 2117264
Minister of State (Policy Issues & Chief Whip) Hon. William Lukuvi, (MP)
Tel. 2110365
Minister of State (Information and Political Affairs) Mohamed S. Khatib, (MP)
Tel. 2112849
Permanent Secretary Rose Lugembe
Tel. 2135076, Fax 2112850
Deputy Permanent Secretary Eliseta Kwayu
Tel. 2113713
Deputy Minister Hon. Prof. P. Mbawala (MP)
Permanent Secretary Wilfred Ngira
Tel. 2862064

NATURAL RESOURCES & TOURISM
P.O. Box 9352
Dar es Salaam, Tel. 2114373
Minister Hon. Zakia H. Meghji, (MP)
Tel. 2116681
Permanent Secretary Salmon Odunga
Tel. 2116682

WORKS
P.O. Box 9423, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 2111553
Minister Hon. John P. Magufuli (MP)
Tel. 2116663
Deputy Minister Hon. Mwenegoha Hamza Abdallah, (MP)
Tel. 2117116
Permanent Secretary John Kijazi
Tel. 2110263

ENERGY & MINERALS
P.O. Box 2000
Tel. 2126557, 2124170, Tlx. 2137138
Minister Hon. Daniel N. Yona, (MP)
Tel. 2112791
Deputy Minister Hon. Dr. I. Msabaha, (MP)
Tel. 2110426
Permanent Secretary Patrick Rutabanzibwa
Tel. 2112793

HEALTH
P.O. Box 9123, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 2120261/4
Minister Hon. Anna Abdallah, (MP)
Tel. 2124019, Fax. 2138060
Deputy Minister Hon. Dr. Hussein A. Mwinyi, (MP)
Tel. 2112883
Permanent Secretary Mariam Mwaffisi
Tel. 2116684

HOME AFFAIRS
P.O. Box 9223, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 2112034/9, Tlx. 2412034
Minister Hon. Ramadhani O. Mapuri, (MP)
Tel. 2117108
Deputy Minister Hon. Capt. J. Chiligati (MP)
Tel. 2113753
Permanent Secretary Benard Mchomvu
Tel. 2119050

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, WOMEN & CHILDREN
P.O. Box 3448, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 213256, 2127159
Minister Hon. Dr. Asha-Rose Migiro, (MP)
Tel. 2132057
Deputy Minister Hon. Shamim Khan, (MP)
Permanent Secretary Mary Mushi
Tel. 2115074

LANDS AND HUMAN SETTLEMENT DEVELOPMENT
P.O. Box 9132, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 2121241/9
Minister Hon. Gideon A. Cheyo, (MP)
Tel. 2113164
Deputy Minister Hon. Tatu Ntimizi, (MP)
Tel. 2116517
Permanent Secretary Salome Sijaona
Tel. 2113165

COOPERATIVES AND MARKETING
P.O. Box 9192, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 2862480/1
P.O. Box 201, Dodoma
Minister Hon. C. George Kahama (MP)
Tel. 2862066, Dar es Salaam
026-2322148, Dodoma
Deputy Minister Hon. H. Chibulunje (MP)
Tel. 026-2322149
Permanent Secretary Ladislaus Komba
Tel. 026-2322153
WATER & LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT
P.O. Box 426, Dodoma
Tel. 026-2322619/620/621
Minister Hon. Edward Lowassa, (MP)
Tel. 026-2322600
Deputy Minister Hon. Anthony Diallo, (MP)
Tel. 026-2322601
Permanent Secretary Bakari Mahiza
Tel. 026-2322602
Deputy Permanent Secretary
Dr. Charles W. Nyamrunda

JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS
P.O. Box 9050, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 2111895
Minister Hon. Bakari Mwapachu (MP)
Tel. 2113234
Attorney General Andrew Chenge
Tel. 2113236
Permanent Secretary Johnson Mwanyika
Tel. 2113243

NOTES
### Summary List of Fully Registered Political Parties in Tanzania

*Source: Registrar of Political Parties in Tanzania, October 2003*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Political Party</th>
<th>Certificate of Full Registration Number and Date of Issue</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Secretary General</th>
<th>Location/Address of Head Office and Telephone Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)</td>
<td>001/92 of 17/7/92</td>
<td>HE. Benjamin W. Mkapa</td>
<td>Phillip Mangula</td>
<td>KIU Street, Tel: 2322727 DSM, P.O. Box 50 Dodoma, Tel: 2185245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic United Front (CUF)</td>
<td>002/93 of 21/1/93</td>
<td>Prof. Ibrah Imali Lipumba</td>
<td>Sii Shari Hamad</td>
<td>Mlindiini Street 1, P.O. Box 3637, Zanzibar, Tel: 022-771-146, Fax: 022-771-146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chama Cha Demokrasia Na Maendeleo (Chadema)</td>
<td>003/93 of 21/1/93</td>
<td>Bob N. Makani</td>
<td>Dr. Amani W. Kanyijou</td>
<td>UPFA Street, Kinondoni, P.O. Box 31191 DSM, Tel: 2668886, 21823-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD)</td>
<td>004/93 of 21/1/93</td>
<td>Salim M. Ali</td>
<td>Heshan Y. Hussein</td>
<td>KAGRA Street 11, House No. 84 Magombeni, P.O. Box 2985 DSM, Tel: 2181, 0744-478103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCT-Mageuzi)</td>
<td>005/93 of 31/3/93</td>
<td>Jami S. Mbata</td>
<td>Mwaisi J. S. Polysta</td>
<td>necklace Street 11, No. 7, P.O. Box 72474 DSM, Tel: 0744-276467/860536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National League for Demokrasia (NLND)</td>
<td>006/93 of 21/1/93</td>
<td>Dr. Immanui J. E. Makabi</td>
<td>Kim Kian M. Matumia</td>
<td>SIRA PO Box 1017/73, P.O. Box 352 DSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Peoples’ Democratic Party (UPDP)</td>
<td>00000012 of 41/2/93</td>
<td>Fahn M. Nasser Dodutwa</td>
<td>Abdalrahman Nasso Nasso Ally</td>
<td>SHARIF MUSSA STREET, P.O. Box 3121, Zanzibar, Tel: 0744, 753075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Reconstructions Alliance (NRA)</td>
<td>009 of 2/2/93</td>
<td>Rashid Mputa</td>
<td>Masoud Ali</td>
<td>Bububu Street Tandika, P.O. Box 1000 DSM, Tel: 0744-496724, 0744-863905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Democratic Alliance Party (TADEA)</td>
<td>010/93 of 30/7/93</td>
<td>John M. Lifa Chipaka</td>
<td>Chitema D. Luba</td>
<td>BUKURU NI MAALI, P.O. Box 402 DSM, Tel: 0744-613723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)</td>
<td>012/93 of 24/11/93</td>
<td>Augustin L. Mweza</td>
<td>Harald Jarpu</td>
<td>ARGENTINA, MANZEE (MD), P.O. Box 7271 DSM, Tel: 2443237, 0744-557644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Party (UDP)</td>
<td>013/93 of 34/3/94</td>
<td>John M. Momosi Cheyo</td>
<td>Ag. T. Dyaz</td>
<td>Mii Mii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Makini ( MAKINI)</td>
<td>014/01 of 15/11/01</td>
<td>Godfrey Hicheka</td>
<td>Dominick Lyamchay</td>
<td>KBOUBUBU PO Box 750 DSM, Tel: 0744, 295670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chama Cha Haki Na Ustawi (Chausta)</td>
<td>015/01 of 15/11/01</td>
<td>James K. Mauai Al A.</td>
<td>Joseph D. Mkomagru</td>
<td>Drive Inn Oyster Bay, P.O. Box 5450 DSM, Tel: 0744-424266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORO)</td>
<td>016/01 of 18/11/07</td>
<td>Ramji M. Mzee</td>
<td>Ag. T. Immanui Patuka</td>
<td>KATUKO KIBAMBI WATI STREET No. 3 P.O. Box 15857 DSM, Tel: 0744-408878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party of Tanzania (PPT-Maendeleo)</td>
<td>4/3/2003</td>
<td>Peter Kuga Mziray</td>
<td>Ahmed Hamad</td>
<td>KAWAWA ROAD MORISCO, Plot 11 P.O. Box 31932 DSM, Tel: 0744-300302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>00000057 of 16/07/07</td>
<td>Rev. C. Mtwili</td>
<td>Ali Tanga Nyaawwa</td>
<td>MCHIKISHI CHAALI P.O. Box 6100 DSM, Tel: 0744-686363</td>
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# PEMBA BY-ELECTIONS IN 17 CONSTITUENCIES
## 18TH OF MAY 2003


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total Valid Votes</th>
<th>Candidate Valid Votes</th>
<th>% of Valid Votes</th>
<th>% of all votes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chakechake</td>
<td>Chonga</td>
<td>Kessim M. Nassor</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>2,881</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Salim S. Kamis</td>
<td>NCCR-M</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Yakoub M. Juma</td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zanzani</td>
<td>Herina S. Hamad</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>6523</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juma A. Salim</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>5705</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ali Ali Abderi</td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdalla N. Abdalla</td>
<td>TADDA</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chakechake</td>
<td>Ali M. Ali</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>79.5%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Abdulla S. Abdulla</td>
<td>NCCR-M</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Idris S. Said</td>
<td>TLP</td>
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<td>5.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
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<td>Kessim A. Hamad</td>
<td>TADDA</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mkoani</td>
<td>Chambani</td>
<td>Juma S. Hassan</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>5189</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Abass I. Mruuru</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>1510</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Omar K. Ngwezi</td>
<td>NCCR-M</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Rashid A. Salim</td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
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Source: Caricatures & Cartoons, E.A. 1st Exhibition by G. Mwampembwa, Kenya 1999
4. USEFUL TOOLS

HOLDING A WORKSHOP, SEMINAR OR CONFERENCE

Planning and Budgeting
1. Develop the idea
   Identify:
   • The main objectives
   • The target group
   • The intended outcome
   Write the outline.

2. Develop the program
   Decide:
   • Which topics
   • The time frame
   • The organisational style (conference, lectures, working groups)
   • How much time is needed for the various elements, not forgetting recreation
   • Who will act as resource persons
   • Whether or not to seek media coverage of the event

Try to involve participants in developing the program.

3. Calculate the budget
   • Preparatory meetings
   • Hall charges
   • Catering
   • Refreshments during sessions
   • Accommodation
   • Travel
   • Stationery
   • Secretariat/organising team
   • Reception (if necessary)

4. Income and expenditure
   Record all income - donations, participants’ fees etc.
   Record all expenditure, remembering to keep receipts for each item

Organising
1. A checklist
   • Book the venue & accommodation
   • Hold preparatory meetings
   • Prepare PR (public relations) activities if relevant
   • Make agreements with resource persons
   • Prepare the invitations
     - State the objectives clearly
     - Give information about the program, venue, dates, resource persons and participants
     - If participants have to do homework beforehand, make this clear
     - Explain financial and other conditions clearly
   • Make the necessary travel arrangements
   • Hold a joint session with all resource persons
   • Prepare the necessary materials, forms, documents
     - Stationery
     - Registration forms
     - Claims forms for allowances
     - Printed program
     - Papers and teaching materials
     - Workshop documentation

2. Terms of reference for resource persons
   • Discuss subject, objectives and duration of their input
   • Explain how these fit in to the overall objectives and program for the workshop
   • Discuss the desired method of presentation
   • Give information about the venue and the facilities/equipment provided for the workshop
   • Request a written paper and or hand-outs if they are considered necessary
   • State the terms of payment for the persons services

Try to hold preparatory meetings with resource persons.

Implementing
1. Arrival
   Organisers should be in place well before the participants
   • Check the venue and the technical facilities needed
   • Give resource persons a final briefing
   • Prepare for the registration of participants
   • Display the program and other documents, if relevant

2. Registration

3. Welcome
   Explain:
   • Subject of the meeting
   • Who are the organisers and sponsors
• Objectives
• Logic and timing of program
• Methodological approach
• Expected outcome

4. Holding the sessions
• Handle transport claims etc. during tea breaks only

5. Departure
Collect all that is necessary before people leave
• Signed registration forms/list of participants
• Signed allowance claims
• Original detailed invoices and receipts for venue, food, drinks, accommodation, travel, stationery etc.

6. After the event
As soon as possible take care of
• Accounting
• Report writing
• Any other follow-ups needed

8 TIPS ON HOW TO SUCCESSFULLY CHAIR A CONFERENCE

1
It is the conference chairperson's responsibility to see that the atmosphere during the discussion is always friendly, communicative and fair.

2
The conference chairperson introduces the topic in an objective and informative way. He/she formulates the discussion goals for each item on the agenda. During a discussion, he/she must not initially express his/her own opinion or assessment as this would bias the discussion.

3
The chairperson speaks as little as possible in order to give maximum time to the conference participants. Conference chairmanship principally entails raising questions and giving the word to different speakers.
Questions from the chairperson should always be designed to stimulate dialogue and consequently should never be answered by the chairperson himself/herself.

Preference should be given to open questions (W-questions: who, why, where, when, etc.) and information questions. Closed questions (which can only be answered with a “yes” or “no”) can be fatal to a discussion.

Should a discussion peter out it is up to the chairperson to get it moving again by means of (open) questions, thought-provoking remarks and a summary of the proceedings so far.

The chairperson should make interim summaries to emphasize the thread of the discussion. At the close, the chairperson gives a general summary and his/her evaluation as to which of the goals formulated at the outset have or have not been achieved.

At the end of the conference, it is also up to the chairperson to formulate and delegate tasks to individual participants. Nobody ought to leave the conference without precisely knowing:

a. what has been achieved in today’s discussion,

b. what is my specific assignment until the next conference/meeting,

c. where and when is the next conference/meeting?


HOLDING EFFECTIVE INTERNAL MEETINGS AND PLANNING SESSIONS

Starting the meeting
1. Who is chairing the meeting? (It is best to have agreed on this in advance.)

2. Who is going to write the minutes?

3. If the agenda has not been prepared in advance, then the chairman, (you), should collect the issues that need to be discussed from the participants. They should be written up on a board or a flipchart, so that everyone can see them.

Remember the issues that might have cropped up at the previous meeting.

4. In collaboration with the participants decide how much time it will take to discuss each issue. Confirm at what time the meeting has to close. Ask if anyone has to leave early.

5. Then ask participants which issues they wish to concentrate on at the meeting and which ones can be postponed (if necessary). After that ask which issue should be dealt with first, second, third and so on. This should not take more than five minutes!

During the meeting
1. Follow the agreed agenda, discussing the issues in turn. The chairperson or moderator must see to it that the agreed time frame is adhered to. If this proves difficult, then the group must be asked to decide whether to continue the discussion of the issue in ques-
tion and therefore extend the meeting, or whether to stop the discussion and continue it at an agreed time.

2. Never move on to the next issue before making a decision on the one being discussed.

Closing the meeting
1. Quickly repeat the decisions that have been made.

2. Decide when and how the minutes will be distributed.

3. Decide who will chair the next meeting.

4. Close the meeting at the agreed time.

Should be short, clear and promising.

Those who really know what they want can usually do with 2-3 objectives. Be as concrete as possible.

Who takes interest in this project? Who shall be involved? Who profits from the project and how?

Detailed list of expected expenditures (personnel material, travel, etc.).

Do you foresee any prohibitive difficulties or problems?

Any workshops about maintenance and organisation of the project?

✓ Practical advice
  • use white, clean sheets of A4 - paper
  • present your project in a typewritten version if possible
  • write on one side of the paper
  • make sure you have a clear structure
  • attach a covering letter

Explain briefly aims, general objectives, former projects!

Convince the reader of the need for this project! Explain the idea of the project and how you want to fulfill the objectives, describe the impact!

Do you need to contact other persons to fulfill your objectives? Specify their capacities or know-how!

Be precise about the venue, duration methodology!

Which further impact does it have?

By whom? List names.
QUALITIES OF A MODERATOR

THE MODERATOR

Moderation technique can best be used in groups of up to 15 participants. How to be a good moderator is not something to be learned quickly and easily, but is a matter of guided experiences, self reflection and continuous learning. A moderator’s tasks are to:

• help the group to know and appreciate their own knowledge and strengths
• help the discussion process to be coherent and result-oriented
• be expert at guidance as far as the “how” of the discussion process is concerned, and not the “what”
• visualise and thus document the steps of the discussion process and its immediate results
• ask the right questions and break deadlocks

THE IDEAL MODERATOR IS A PERSON WHO IS...

• regarded as neutral by all participants
• therefore an outsider to the discussion group and
• able to use visualisation techniques, such as pinboards, flipcharts and blackboards

HOW TO PREPARE A MODERATION

• The issue, the main objective, and the quality of the intended results have to be very clear
• Be aware of the participants’ composition, background, knowledge, interests and potential conflicts
• Determine the duration of the process, the facilities available and their limitations
• Identify clear-cut objectives and goals for every session, what methods to use and the amount of time needed
• Make sure that sufficient visualisation materials are available.

NOTES
The Moderation Method

The typical steps in moderating a discussion

1. OPENING
   - Warm-up with participants (explain your role, make them know each other).
   - Discuss and agree on time-frame and organisational matters.
   - Collect the expectations of participants.
   - Discuss and agree on expectations that shall/can be objectives for the workshop.
   - Agree on methodology.
   - How will minutes be taken?

2. COLLECT ISSUES/SUBJECTS
   - Phrase the guiding question carefully and in a very focused manner and visualise it!
   - Collect all answers/ideas of participants, without discussing them first!
   - Visualise answers/ideas as they come.
   - Group them into clusters and give a name/title to each cluster.

3. SELECT ISSUES/SUBJECTS
   - Phrase a guiding question carefully and write it down visibly.
   - Allow participants to prioritise clusters according to their individual preferences.
   - The agenda will then be determined by the number of “votes” per cluster, going through as many clusters as time or workshop-concept allows.
   - In doing this, every participant gets the same number of “votes” which he can use on the clusters as he wishes. (One way of doing this is to hand out little markers of some sort to every participant so that they can all jot down their preferences at the same time.) If possible avoid “voting” by raised hands.

4. WORK ON THE ISSUE AND FIND A WAY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM
   - Find a method of how to discuss or “solve” the prioritised subject/s.
   - The method has to depend on the kind of issue at hand and the intended results.

5. PLAN ACTION/DETERMINE THE FOLLOW-UPS
   - Visualise the activities regarded necessary by the group.
   - Write down who will be in charge and by when different tasks need to be done.

6. CLOSING
   - Find out, whether participants’ expectations have been fulfilled,
   - Whether they are satisfied with the process and the result.

Always come up with a result!
Always pin down which task is assigned to whom!
Always ascertain if you have addressed the needs and expectations of the participants!
THE STRUCTURE OF YOUR SPEECH

The aim of a discursive is to convince the listeners of the correctness of the speaker’s opinion on the subject in question. Such speeches should not last longer than 30 minutes.

How do you most effectively structure such a speech?
✓ AUDIENCE RELATED
OPENING REMARKS
(max. 3 minutes)
- Begin with a provocative proposition, a rhetorical question, a current event, etc.
✓ PREVIEW THE MAIN POINTS OF YOUR SPEECH
(max. 1 minute)
✓ MAIN BODY
(max. 20 minutes)
- Discuss the current situation/the facts/the problem.
- Discuss a variety of possible solutions.
- Discuss the pros and cons of these solutions.
✓ SUBJECT-RELATED
CONCLUSION
(max. 4 minutes)
- Summarise the main argument in a maximum of three points.
✓ AUDIENCE RELATED
CONCLUSION
(max. 1 minute)
- Close your speech by, for instance, thanking the audience for their attention.

ARGUMENTATION TECHNIQUES

Good argumentation techniques are always beneficial. Your chances to win others over are higher if you can:
- present effective arguments and
- refute your opponent’s arguments.

PRACTICAL TIPS
- Try to understand the position of your counterpart first, then react to it.
- If your counterpart’s argumentation is weak, repeat your own good arguments.
- If you are interrupted, insist on the right to finish what you were saying.
- Anticipate your counterpart’s arguments by including them in your own argumentation.
- Use the persuasive power of examples. Ask your counterpart to provide concrete examples of how to apply his theories.
- Expose generalisation and inaccuracies.
- Stick to the facts of the issue.
- If somebody evades the issue, return to the subject.

Source: C. Schulte, 1997, Talking Politics (and being understood):
Kampala, Fountain Publishers

Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere during an interview with the German magazine “Der Überblick” in Hamburg in April 1999.
HOW TO USE BLACKBOARDS AND FLIPCHARTS

Blackboard
Useful in gatherings of up to 25 people.
+ It is easy to write information & easy to correct it.
- Information is wiped off, it disappears and it is hard for participants to retrieve.
TIP If the chalk squeaks - this always makes participants uncomfortable - break the chalk and continue writing using the broken end.

Flipchart
Useful in gatherings of up to 35 people.
+ Sheets can be prepared in advance.
  Information can be displayed for a long period by removing sheets from the flipchart and posting them on the wall.
TIP Useful for a wide range of information e.g. displaying the day’s agenda, important overviews, central statements, flowcharts, participants’ contributions.

General rules
• Do not write down too much: concentrate on key issues only.
• Give the audience time to copy the contents of the presentation OR give it to them as a handout afterwards. If you intend to distribute a handout, tell the participants so. Otherwise it is likely that they will spend time making unnecessary notes.
• Do not talk with your back turned to participants (e.g. while writing on the blackboard or flipchart).
• Do not stand in front of your presentation - the participants will get irritated at not being able to read what is written.
THE CHECK LIST FOR GOOD IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIVITIES

1. Important: plan step by step. What should be done first?

2. Consider all improbabilities, and plan alternatives.

3. Fix deadlines for you and for your partner.

4. Follow-up the results before the deadline.

5. Keep an eye on the indicators to be achieved.

6. Hire assistants, delegate, mobilize people.

7. For seminars & workshops, check everything in advance on loco.

8. Take care of the documentation (dates of receipts, use of materials, tasks of people involved ...)

9. Support partners in the learning process. Sell the idea “on-the-job learning”.

10. Take care of the financial settlement and reporting as soon as possible.

11. Evaluate with the partners the achievement of objectives and indicators. Write recommendations. File documents. Release important papers. Inform other related institutions.

12. Write a reminder for following-up the results sometime later. Document it.

13. Keep your colleagues informed and updated.

Source: Workshop Report
Management Skills for Decision-Makers - August 1999

TIME MANAGEMENT - SELF MANAGEMENT

Most people bristle at the idea of becoming a slave to time: “The Swiss have clocks, but we have time”, said a wise old man in Bhutan. A certain degree of time and self-management is nonetheless necessary if you wish to be effective and to achieve your goals.

Many people rely on their memory as their management tool, but most find that at some point their memory lets them down. “Sorry, I forgot” is not an uncommon statement. This is not necessarily a catastrophe, but in some instances forgetting can have unfortunate consequences. You might lose an important contract, you might lose your job, you might even lose your husband/wife-to-be!

RULE 1: Write things down - use a diary and a calendar, (e.g. the FES diary/calendar).
- Keep a “things to do” list.
- Enter all your appointments and deadlines, putting in a reminder maybe a week before the deadline falls.
- Review your appointments and deadlines regularly, informing those implicated in good time if you want to change them.
- Plan your week: Make the “things to do” list, get an overview over your appointments and deadlines.
- Plan your day.
- At the end of each day and at the end of each week make a review. Did you do all that you had planned to do? Did you meet your deadlines? Did you attend the scheduled meetings? Were you late? Why?

RULE 2: Be realistic about what you can manage to do
- Do not get overloaded: you have to be realistic about what you can overcome in the given amount of time.
- Prioritise: decide what are the most important issues.
- Say no, if the task is beyond what you are capable of doing.
- Remember to make time for your private life - family, friends, hobbies and your own relaxation. This is where you renew your energy.
TWELVE STEPS TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTION

By Dr M. O. Maundi, Centre for Foreign Relations

1. Understanding the conflict
   • its type
   • its sources
   • its intensity
   • its impact

2. Identifying the parties to the conflict
   • whether bilateral or multilateral conflict

3. Identifying the issues involved

4. Determining the method of resolution
   • Conflict prevention: Preventive diplomacy
   • Conflict resolution: Negotiation
     - Direct negotiation between the conflicting parties.
     - Assisted negotiation: Use of a third party.
       Mediation/Facilitation
       Conciliation
       Good offices
       Arbitration

5. Determining the mechanism of resolution
   • The actors/agents
     - States
     - NGOs
     - Individuals: Eminent personalities
     - Inter-governmental organizations

6. Determining the venue and dates for negotiation

7. Negotiating rules of procedure

8. Setting the agenda

9. Launching the substantive negotiations

10. Reaching a compromise agreement

11. Implementing the negotiated settlement

12. Guaranteeing and monitoring the implementation of the agreement
WHAT IS PUBLIC RELATIONS?

Public Relations (PR) is about relations between an organization - be it a business enterprise, a political party or an NGO - and the public. Such relations exist, whether we want them to or not. It is therefore wise to consider what image you wish the public to have of your organization and to work consciously on the promotion of that image.

An organization manifests itself to the public in many ways. It can be through its propagated political aims, the behaviour of its representatives and members, its public statements and activities, the atmosphere at its public meetings and press conferences, its transparency and its accountability.

The traditional “tools” of a public relations officer are:
- press conferences
- publications
- leaflets
- posters
- press releases
- public events

These tools must be used carefully. A public meeting held without being well prepared or a badly designed and written publication may do more harm than good!

PREPARING AND RUNNING A PRESS CONFERENCE

A press conference is an event to which members of the press are invited for a briefing by the host organisation or personality. The briefing is followed by an opportunity for the journalists to ask questions.

Often press conferences are held when the subject matter is intricate and further questions from journalists are expected and desired. If the information/news to be given at the press conference is not sufficiently interesting, relevant or “meaty” for the invited media’s readers/viewers, then it is likely that the journalists will not show up.

Preparation
- Are the objectives clear and is the topic well defined?
- Which media are to be invited?
  Remember, TV & radio may have special needs.
- Is the time/date well chosen and convenient for journalists?
  Does it allow them to meet their deadlines?
  Does it coincide with other important events?
- Who will chair the conference?
- Who will act as the organisation’s spokesperson/s?
- Is the opening statement well prepared?
- Are the major arguments well supported in the written handouts?
- Check the venue: make sure that there are enough chairs, tables and lights.
- Have handouts ready, e.g. press release. You might prepare a press folder that includes the most important statements, a report and background material.

Invitation
- The headline must clearly indicate the host organisation, the name of the person responsible
and how to contact him/her.
• State the subject matter clearly. (Who did/does what, when, where, why and how.)
• Provide information about the speakers.
• Provide details about the venue, time and date.
• Send out/deliver the invitation at least a week in advance.
• Send out a reminder one or two days before the event.

Running it
• Ask journalists to note their names and which media institution they represent on a prepared list. This is useful information for making follow-ups.
• Make the written handouts available for journalists when they arrive.
• The chairperson opens the conference and introduces the speakers and subject.
• The key presenter makes his/her statement clearly and concisely, and relates them to the handouts.
• The chairperson moderates the question and answer session.
• Answers must be brief, clear and concise. It is good to give practical examples to illustrate the message you want to give.
• Speakers must remain relaxed, friendly and forthcoming even when provoked.

A PRESS RELEASE

This is one of the most useful mediums through which an organization can make itself and its views known to the public. The contents might be:
• Statements on pertaining issues.
• Reports on activities or events you have organized.
• Announcements of forthcoming events.
• Reactions to statements made by others.

PROS AND CONS
Issuing a press release is a relatively cheap way of creating awareness about one’s stand. However, badly written press releases and those dealing with unimportant issues will annoy the recipients and may create negative feelings towards your organization.

HOW TO WRITE IT
• The headline must state clearly the name of the organization issuing the release and the subject matter.
• State the most important themes first.
• Make clear why you are issuing the press release at this particular point in time.
• The journalist must be able to pick out relevant information easily and quickly.
• Use a typewriter or word processor, double-space and use only one side of the page.
• Give information about how to contact the person responsible: name, address, telephone, e-mail address.
The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,1 or FES, was founded in 1925 as a political legacy of Germany’s first democratically elected President, Friedrich Ebert, who died in that year. Ebert, a Social Democrat of humble origins, had risen to hold the highest office in his country despite considerable opposition from his political adversaries. He assumed the burden of the presidency in a country which was crisis ridden following its defeat in World War I. His own personal experience led him to propose the establishment of a foundation with a threefold aim:

• to further a democratic, pluralistic political culture by means of political education for all classes of society.
• to facilitate access to higher education for gifted young people by providing scholarships.
• to contribute to international understanding and co-operation in order to avert a fresh outbreak of war and violent conflicts wherever possible.

Today, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is a political non-profit making, public-interest institution committed to the principles and basic values of social democracy in its educational and policy-oriented work.

Development Co-operation

In the Foundation’s offices in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania approximately 80 German staff and 600 local nationals are involved in projects in the fields of economic and social development, social-political education and information, the media and communication and in providing advisory services.

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung sees its activities in the developing countries as a contribution to:

• the improvement of political and social framework conditions
• the democratisation of social structure
• the empowerment of women and the promotion of gender
• the strengthening of free trade unions
• the improvement of communication and media structures
• regional and international media co-operation
• regional co-operation between states and interest groups
• the resolution of the North-South conflict

This calendar is intended to provide not only an individual tool for purposes of time planning but also a day-to-day handbook for quick reference on issues that may be of interest to people in NGOs and to other politically active Tanzanians.

1 Stiftung is the German word for “foundation”