African Security Governance

Emerging Issues
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African Security Governance

Emerging Issues

Edited by Gavin Cawthra
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# Acronyms

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>APRM</td>
<td>Africa Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>ARPCT</td>
<td>Alliance for Peace and Counter-Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDF</td>
<td>Botswana Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDA</td>
<td>Citizen Entrepreneurial Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEMA</td>
<td>Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Crime Intelligence Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISSA</td>
<td>Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Convention for a Democratic South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>community-orientated policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIS</td>
<td>Department of Intelligence and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DISS</td>
<td>Danish Institute for International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>Defence Staff Committee</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</td>
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<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Frontline States</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>highly enriched uranium</td>
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African Security Governance

HOCs  Heads of Civilian Services
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
ICP  International Cooperating Partners
INF  Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
ISDSC  Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
JSCD  Joint Standing Committee on Defence
KLA/UCK  Kosovo Liberation Army
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army
MIRV  multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle
MMD  Movement for Multi-party Democracy
MOD  Ministry of Defence
NAM  Non-Aligned Movement
NCACC  National Conventional Arms Control Committee
NDF  Namibia Defence Force
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NIA  National Intelligence Agency
NIS  National Intelligence Service
NNP  New National Party
NPT  Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSHR  National Society for Human Rights
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
ONUB  United Nations Operation in Burundi
OPDSC  Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
P5  Permanent Five
PAFMECA  Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa
PAFMECSA  Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa
PBMR  Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor
PCLU  Priority Crimes Litigation Unit
PLAN  People’s Liberation Army of Namibia
PMC  private military company
PNW  Prevention of Nuclear War
PSC  private security company
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>peace support operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTBT</td>
<td>Partial Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFMA</td>
<td>Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>RISDP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADCBRIG</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordinating Conference</td>
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<td>SADSEM</td>
<td>Southern African Defence and Security Management</td>
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<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
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<td>SAPSD</td>
<td>South African Protection Support Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARPCCO</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASS</td>
<td>South African Secret Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan for the OPDSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWATF</td>
<td>South West Africa Territorial Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBVC</td>
<td>Transkei–Bophuthatswana–Venda–Ciskei</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Transitional Executive Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDF</td>
<td>Zambia Defence Force</td>
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Notes on Contributors

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Gavin Cawthra is professor of defence and security management at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management (P&DM) at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. He is the former director of the Centre for Defence and Security Management which co-ordinates a Southern African network of institutions carrying out education, research and policy development on security sector reform – the Southern African Defence and Security Management network (SADSEM). He holds degrees from the University of Natal and a PhD from the University of London. He has edited or co-edited five anthologies, and is the author of four books and many other publications.

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Introduction

Gavin Cawthra

This book could have been called Southern African Security Governance: Emerging Issues, since it largely deals with southern African case studies, and with issues pertinent to security governance in southern Africa. However, we decided that because many of the issues in southern Africa are relevant for the continent as a whole, and that many references were made to the whole of Africa, it was appropriate to go with the wider title. The book certainly doesn’t claim to be comprehensive for Africa, either in scope or in theme, but focuses on some selected emerging issues relevant to security governance on the continent.

These issues include policing transformation, intelligence transformation, challenges of nuclear proliferation, regional security, peace diplomacy, the relationship between development and security, and new challenges in governance of the military.

This book is the product of a rather lengthy process within the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) Network, a grouping of ten tertiary institutions involved in common programmes to build capacity for the effective democratic management and governance of security in the region. It also involved cooperation with the Danish Institute for International Studies (DISS) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES).

The process was initiated by an International Roundtable on African Perspectives on Global Security Agendas, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, with the support of the FES, and hosted by the Centre for Defence and Security Management at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg in November 2005. This workshop, attended by delegates from different regions of Africa as well as international participants, identified a broad range of emerging security agendas with which Africans need to engage.
While it wasn’t possible to follow up on all these issues, many of them were taken up in a subsequent seminar held in Windhoek, Namibia, in March 2006, when researchers from the SADSEM Network and their counterparts at DISS met in terms of a Danida-funded cooperation agreement, to share and critique some of their work in progress and reflect on some of the themes identified at the earlier workshop. This in turn led to the codification of a number of key themes and papers, which the researchers continued to develop, and an outline and set of principles for the organisation of this book was agreed.

About a year later, in Johannesburg, the researchers met again with their draft papers, which were presented for peer review at a seminar sponsored by the FES. They were then revised on the basis of the review comments, edited and finally updated.

The papers deal generically with African security governance, in some cases in relation to thematic or sectoral issues, in others within states and in a few cases at the sub-regional level.

Possible frameworks for analysis are established by Dietrich Jung and Bjørn Møller, who identify some of the key conceptual concerns that underpin much of the book and which are reflected in many of the subsequent chapters. Jung takes as his point of departure historical sociology, and uses this as a lens through which to interrogate some of the key issues in security theory, including the relationship between human and state security, the widening of security and the global security regime. He argues that state-building processes in Africa (and elsewhere in the developing world) are rather different to those that took place in Europe and are characterised by tensions between states and societies. Societal and historical realities are too often ignored as the international community and the West in particular seek to impose military security through a new ‘civilising mission’ (what others have called ‘liberal imperialism’).

Møller more directly interrogates new concepts of security, the assumptions behind security sector reform, and the nature of the security sector itself in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. He argues – like Jung – that these Western concepts might not suit Africa, where the security sector is constituted and acts in very different ways. He goes on to examine the complexity of the security sector in the global South, including private and non-statutory. He concludes that it might be impossible, or at least unwise, to attempt to incorporate the whole of the security sector into the formal state, and that regulation of non-statutory forces might be a better route.
Introduction

Together these two introductory chapters establish a conceptual framework for the rest of the book, in which the key issue is the nature of the state and its relationship to broader social actors in the field of security; in other words, security governance.

The following chapters examine some key issues in African security governance; again, these are not meant to be comprehensive, nor are they necessarily the most important themes. An effort is made to cover the wider security sector, beyond the usual research preoccupation with the defence sector. Elrena van der Spuy deals with the transformation of safety and security, while Sandra Africa deals with the transformation of intelligence. In all cases, the South African experience of security sector reform is taken as a point of departure to examine the wider implications for Africa.

Van der Spuy locates police reform in the context of wider security sector reform and security governance, and argues that police reform is a ‘dependent variable’ as ‘much hinges on the growth of a political culture that rejects violence in politics’ and on positive economic growth, as well as an international climate ‘in which the virtues of democracy and the rule of law’ are upheld, even if nominally so. This returns us to the wider themes of state and society and their role in security.

Africa similarly locates intelligence transformation in wider security and societal contexts, but expresses reservations about whether the South African experience can be replicated or generalised – again stressing the importance of historical and social contexts. She puts some faith, however, in the emergence of an Africa-wide intelligence cooperation organisation, which she feels could become a vehicle for spreading good governance practices within the African intelligence community.

The final chapter in this thematic section deals with the under-researched issue of the implications of nuclear weapons for Africa. Actually, Gavin Cawthra and Bjørn Møller go beyond this, looking also at the impact of uranium mining and civil nuclear power. They conclude that important issues arise with regard to South Africa’s continuing efforts to expand its domestic civil nuclear infrastructure, which in turn has an influence on its nuclear diplomacy, but that there is no threat at all of nuclear weapons proliferation on the continent since South Africa has terminated its weapons programmes and a continental non-proliferation regime is in place. The important thing, however, is to work not only towards non-proliferation but also for disarmament by the current nuclear powers.
The final section of this book contains five case studies, based on research into the Southern African Development Community (SADC), South Africa’s role in Burundi, and issues related to security governance in Botswana, Zambia and Namibia, but again in most cases looking at the wider implications for the continent.

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk examines the efforts of SADC to establish a security governance regime, through a range of committees, structures, pacts and treaties. Although progress has been made, he cautions that SADC is not yet – and perhaps is unlikely to become – a ‘security community’, in particular because of divergent national interests, especially between smaller countries and a dominant South Africa.

Using South Africa’s deployment with the African Union and later United Nations missions in Burundi, Thomas Mandrup assesses the extent to which the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is capable of contributing to African peace support operations, and hence to the emerging challenges in South Africa of peace diplomacy. He concludes that its capacities are limited and that policy frameworks are inadequate (or at least are not actioned) but that despite this the SANDF was able to fulfil its mandate and make an effective contribution to security governance.

Mpho Molomo tackles the complex and challenging issue of the relationship between security and development, one of the conceptual issues lying at the heart of the security governance problematic, through focusing on the Botswana case of a self-declared ‘developmental democracy’. As in the other case studies, he explores the implications of this for the wider region. He concludes that the conceptual convergence between security, economic development and human development has been matched in practice in Botswana although the results have been mixed at best. He is more pessimistic about the prospects for this approach at a regional level, given the lack of macro-economic stability and harmonisation and the persistence of national self-interested behaviour.

Finally, two chapters focus on the governance of the defence function (and on civil–military relations) in Namibia and Zambia respectively. Both Vincent Mwange and Godfrey Haantobolo are fairly upbeat about the way democratic control has been established, although they point to serious deficiencies, especially with regard to the limited participation of civil society and the inefficiencies in parliamentary oversight. Nor can it be assumed that the liberal-democratic model of defence governance is
set in stone: certainly in Zambia different forms of control existed under different political regimes.

In conclusion, this book has situated a number of thematic, sectoral and national studies in the context of a wider understanding of security – both human security and state security – and in the context of a broad understanding of the security sector, incorporating state as well as non-state actors. These discussions have been grounded in an understanding of security sector reform as being context-specific, relational and situated within regional and global imperatives. It will hopefully contribute to the exploration of some of the emerging issues and challenges, and be of use to scholars and practitioners alike.

Dietrich Jung

Since the end of the Cold War, a heterogeneous group of actors – states, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations – increasingly has pursued and promoted interventionist policies under labels such as post-conflict state and peace-building. The terror attacks of 11 September 2001, and the subsequently proclaimed ‘war on terror’, gave a further boost to this interventionist tendency in international politics. From this crucial point onward, the Bush administration, which once assumed office on a rather non-interventionist foreign policy agenda, began participating in this new trend and even added the goal of regime change to it. Linking international security, state-building, and development, a number of scholars and pundits have engaged in justifying this new United States foreign policy agenda that Mark Berger labelled ‘democratic imperialism’ (Berger 2006: 7).

Indeed, it seems as if a new mission civilisatrice has captured world politics, although possibly in a more benevolent fashion than its colonial predecessors (Paris 2002). In their declaration of the ‘Partnership for Progress and a Common Future’, the G8 leaders, for instance, confirmed this new civilising mission with regard to the ‘Broader Middle East’ at their summit on Sea Island on 7 June 2004; and in a speech at the American University in Cairo, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice conceded that the US has been following an unsuccessful foreign policy that pursued stability at the expense of democracy in the Middle East. This change in foreign policy attitudes is equally visible when we look toward the African scene, where not only states but also international donors increasingly have linked their development policies to the promotion of democracy. In conceptual terms, this new emphasis on policies of democratic reform instead of the mere state-centric balance of power suggests a shift from
classical security policies, focusing on threats to state security from external actors, to foreign policy approaches that are informed by the broader security agenda of the 1990s and its elusive policy result of human security.

It is my assertion that conceptual innovations in the field of security studies have made an inroad into the thinking of foreign policy circles, as well as into the agendas of international and transnational organisations. At least in rhetoric, global politics increasingly seems to be informed by an expanded and more diversified conceptualisation of security, epitomised in the concept of human security, which has acquired the position of a leading buzzword of international and transnational political activism. In particular in Afghanistan and Iraq, but to a certain extent also in cases such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone or Sudan, we can observe the ways in which different notions of security can be combined in justifying the application of military force in the name of democracy-building and human development.

Yet these attempts at ‘coercive democratisation’ also show the flaws of this new mission civilisatrice. For a majority of observers, Afghanistan and Iraq are well on their way to becoming examples of failed Western foreign policies. Indeed, apart from electoral processes that took place under rather dubious conditions, the political structures in Afghanistan and Iraq do not resemble anything close to those in a democratic state. In both countries, the incumbent governments have no control over their territories or their peoples. The nascent political institutions and their representatives are protected by foreign troops, and many state functions have been taken care of by largely non-transparent collectives of foreign, international, national and non-governmental organisations. While in both countries violence is widespread, military security and human security are largely absent. Does this failure indicate a mismatch of concepts and policies?

In order to answer this question, I will look at the conceptual interrelatedness of human and military security. I will critically review some basic conceptualisations of so-called critical security studies against the background of concepts from historical sociology, with particular respect to the works of Max Weber and Norbert Elias. However, since the end of my research activities at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, I have been gradually withdrawing from the field of security studies. Therefore, I do not claim that this chapter is informed by the most recent studies in the field. Rather, I take some of the conceptual transformations of the 1990s as my point of departure and analyse them; then, within the
framework of the political sociology of Weber and Elias, I conclude with a discussion of some aspects of current policies of interventionism in light of these previous conceptual reflections and pose the question: how can we formulate meaningful state-building policies for post-conflict societies? Given the time lapse that characterises the trickling down of scholarly transformations to the level of foreign policy formulation, this approach seems to me appropriate. Moreover, current policy debates often suffer from a lack of historical depth. In this context, it makes sense to return to the classics of sociology as the right course of action.

Security: Transformation of a Concept

In the past decades, security has become a contested concept. From a theoretical perspective, the military-focused and state-centred reading of classical security studies has been put on the defence. The expansion of the research agenda by new security sectors (political, economic, environmental, social, cultural) and new security referents (societies, non-state actors, individuals), as well as the constructivist turn in social sciences, are challenging the ‘realism’ of the strategic gaze that has dominated the field for so long. If we define security as ‘survival in the face of existential threats’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 27), it is no longer the survival of the state alone, but also various combinations of security sectors and referents such as the economic well-being of societies, the functioning of their political institutions or the integrity of the cultural identities of minorities that seem to be at stake. The narrow and ‘simple-minded’ concept of security, almost exclusively based on the interests of state actors, has gradually given way to conceptualisations that take into account the contradictions and interdependencies among the various social actors and structural elements involved in security policies (cf. Buzan 1991: 1–12).

In addition, security studies have been affected by the so-called cultural turn in the social sciences and therewith by the application of theories of discourse and social practices. Buzan et al., for instance, define security as a self-referential practice, ‘because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue’ (1998: 24). This discursive social practice of ‘securitisation’, a ‘speech act’, constructs objects of security, elevating them above every-day politics and presenting an issue as an existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 23–26). The concept of securitisation goes beyond naturalistic approaches and extends the theoretical apparatus of classical
security studies with a constructivist element. Both the ontology and the epistemology of security studies, i.e. objects and observers, attain an intersubjective and historically constructed character.

To a certain extent, however, this conceptual widening and the appearance of so-called critical security studies, which have driven constructivist thinking to the edges of ‘postmodern’ relativism, was also triggered by historical events. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the course of history suggested a revision in approaching matters of security. In empirical terms, the new security agenda reflects two major tendencies in world politics which are both interrelated and contradictory. The first concerns a drastic change regarding the forms of organised violence in international politics. The classical form of military conflict, wars between states, has increasingly disappeared, giving way to a mixture of civil war, ethnic strife, organised crime, and (trans)national terrorism. These contemporary forms of armed conflict made the postcolonial states of the former Third World, and in particular a number of African states, the predominant theatre of war. These transformations of collective violence have been echoed in the ongoing debate about so-called new wars.

The works of Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld (1991) and British scholar Mary Kaldor (1999) are prominent examples of these debates. Beginning with an article in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Robert Kaplan (1994) has spread the idea of the advent of irrational and anarchical forms of collective violence from a more journalistic point of view, his subsequent book *The Coming Anarchy* (2000) being translated into over a dozen languages (Berger 2006: 12).

The American-led war on terror has further corroborated this image of new wars that in the 1990s gradually took hold of the public discourse on war. Moreover, the war on terror, in which traditionally organised state security forces combat an almost phantasmagorical enemy whose militant networks stretch from the urban centres of Western states to the remote mountains of Afghanistan and the dusty streets of Mogadishu, indicates that the zones of war and peace might not be as detached as some scholars had assumed. Although characterised by an inflated and all too alarming rhetoric (cf. Jung 2005), the discussion about new wars shows that the political, economic and legal structures of the international system might contain the classical form of interstate war, but at the same time facilitate intra-state war and the global spread of anomic forms of violence.

The second tendency is generally associated with the processes of NATO enlargement and European integration. Contrary to the bleak
picture of the new war discourse, these developments in the centre suggest the emergence of a highly developed community of democracies to which the classical rules of power politics and military security no longer apply. In the European Union (EU) context, security is built on internal affinities, as well as shared norms and values, rather than on external threats. As a security community, the EU’s internal security discourse largely builds on matters of non-military security and most of its security concerns have been pushed towards security referents other than state-to-state relations (Wæver 1998a: 104). This identity of the EU as a ‘security community’ indicates a remarkable departure from the classical meaning of security according to which states challenge each other’s sovereignty with military means. Moreover, the EU has not only acted as a magnet, pulling parts of its periphery toward its centre, but has also exercised a disciplinary function upon countries that have not yet qualified as candidates for EU membership (cf. Wæver 1998b). From this perspective, European integration became a central empirical reference for some of the previously mentioned conceptual innovations in security studies.

In light of these transformations, the theoretical debate about security is inseparably knitted together with historical developments. The following recourse to two classical authors of historical sociology might give some hints about the way in which the historical experience of European state formation has engendered a particular conceptual framework for the social sciences with which we can comprehend the intrinsic logic of the widening of the security debate. It goes without saying that this chapter does not claim to present the theoretical potential of historical sociology with regard to security studies in a comprehensive way. Rather, it aims to give a theoretical perspective that could inform future research in both directions, that is, both more theoretically minded and more policy-oriented security studies.

**Historical Sociology and the Issue of Security**

In the ongoing theoretical debate between proponents of classical and those of critical approaches to security studies, there is a tendency to view the relationship between the two approaches with the logic of a zero-sum game. Yet the discovery of a broader range of security sectors, referents, and actors must not imply that the traditional state-centred approaches are completely outmoded. Rather, they should be seen in
perspective. Historical sociology can provide this perspective within the framework of the evolution of global modernity. In the light of classical theories of modernity such as those of Marx, Weber and Elias, as well as the more recent works of Tilly, Giddens, Habermas or the system theory of Luhmann, the increasing differentiation of sectors, referents and objects of security can be conceptualised as part of a process of socio-cultural evolution. At the heart of this process is the formation of the modern state with its monopolies of physical force and taxation, as well as its attempt to control the means of symbolic reproduction of nationally defined societies.

The understanding of the state in the fields of international relations and security studies has its roots in Max Weber’s classical definition. With reference to the violent history of European state-building, Weber defined the central feature of modern statehood as ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber 1991: 78). In Weber’s words, the war-prone formation of state monopolies of physical force was a long-lasting process of ‘political expropriation’ in which all political communities other than the state were gradually deprived of the means of coercion (Weber 1991: 83).

However, the establishment of state monopolies of physical force should not be conceptualised in mere power relations through which power holders carry out their will despite resistance from the subordinated. In order to establish consolidated states, the factual monopoly of the use of physical force has to be considered legitimate by both rulers and ruled. Stable systems of political authority do not only rest on a monopoly of coercion; this state monopoly also has to be anchored in the cultural order of society. A political order needs legitimacy; it has to be embedded in a mutually accepted symbolic structure.

Long-lasting political institutions require a stable set of rules that in normative and cognitive ways regulate the social conduct of rulers and ruled. In referring to the inner justification of systems of domination, Weber precisely distinguished political authority from mere power relations by the category of legitimacy. His concept of legitimacy is intended to give an answer to the question of when and why people obey (Weber 1991: 78). However, in stressing the normative and symbolic aspects of legitimacy, Weber did not deny the importance of material interests in the maintenance of authority structures. Weber actually distinguished between two types of domination: domination by virtue of authority and domination by virtue of a constellation of interests. Consequently, he viewed state security and economic security as intrinsic parts of modern...
legitimacy structures. Yet in empirical systems of domination, this analytical
distinction between the two ideal types is blurred and the borderline
between compliance owing to material benefits or to obeyed authority is

In the 1930s, Norbert Elias conceptualised the experiences of European
state formation as a ‘civilizing process’. In doing so, he applied a double
perspective:

The civilizing process, seen from the aspects of standards of conduct
and drive control, is the same trend which, when seen from the
point of view of human relationships, appears as the process of
advancing integration, increased differentiation of social functions
and interdependence, and the formation of ever-larger units of
integration on whose fortunes and movements the individual
depends, whether he knows it or not (Elias 1994: 332).

In his theory of the civilising process, Norbert Elias put together the
macro-sociological aspects of state formation and the micro-sociological
consequences of this process, which he located in a peculiar moulding of
the humane drive economy – the way in which socio-cultural evolution
has shaped human behaviour. Combining Weber with Freud he defined
the immanent link between the macro and micro levels as the conversion
of outer constraints into self-restraints, and concluded that the formation
of modern states has been reflected in increasingly differentiated patterns
of self-control on the side of the individual (Elias 1994: 443–56). The
pacifying institutional setting of modern statehood was accomplished by
a particular normative restriction of the public behaviour of individuals.

In this sense state security and individual security are inseparably
knitted together. State institutions, their legitimacy, and societal norms
of individual conduct develop in close dependency upon each other.
Elias perceived state formation as the mutual penetration of macro- and
micro-sociological developments, as well as of material and symbolic
structures. From this perspective the identities of states, societies and
individuals are the result of the same complex process of modern state
formation. Interestingly, however, this civilising process is not confined
to the territorial demarcations of the nation state alone. Elias viewed it
as a global development, leading to a highly differentiated social control
of physical force and to a more and more refined formation of individual
consciousness and social conduct that contains in principle a tendency to
transcend the social and political limitations of its territorially demarcated space of origin (Elias 1994: 164). His theory anticipated the transnational extension of social spaces, the trends to territorial and cultural de-bordering, and therewith the intrinsic contradictions of modern state formation, so prominent in the contemporary globalisation debate (cf. Scholte 2000).

In historical terms, however, the civilising process has not been ‘civilised’ at all. On the contrary, Elias traced the origin of both the internal pacification of society and the autonomy of the modern individual back to an unrestricted and violent elimination contest in which any individual or small group struggled among many others for resources not yet monopolised (Elias 1994: 351). In mainly abstracting from the history of France, Elias differentiated between two distinct phases in the emergence of the modern state monopoly of physical force. In the first phase, a factual monopoly of physical force is established. An increasing number of people lose direct access to the means of force, which progressively become centralised in the hands of a few and thus placed outside open competition. In the second phase, this relatively private control over the monopoly of physical force tends to become public, that is, it moves from the hands of state-makers into a political setting of legal institutions and appointed rulers under the control of the public (Elias 1994: 345–55).

While the first phase of the monopoly process is associated with absolutist and authoritarian forms of rule, the second phase deposes coercive state-makers and establishes structures of political authority which, according to Weber, are based on legal or rational legitimacy: the belief ‘in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands’ (Weber 1968a: 215). Thus, state formation comprises not only the establishment of the monopoly of physical force, but also the transition of the normative and institutional order on which this monopoly rests.

Without explicitly addressing the question of political legitimacy, Charles Tilly described these two phases of state formation as a long-lasting negotiation process between state-makers and the emerging capitalist bourgeoisie in which ‘the pursuit of war and military capacity, after having created national states as a sort of by-product, led to a civilisation of government and domestic politics’ (Tilly 1990: 206). In terms of security, this negotiation process, together with the competitive external nature of European state-building, permitted a strong identification of the security interests of states and their citizens (cf. Krause 1996). However, in order to
lead to both stable modern state structures and lasting bonds of political legitimacy, this synchronisation of the security interest of state and society had to materialise in a specific normative order. State formation, therefore, simultaneously appears as legalisation, as the evolution and differentiation of specific bodies of law.

In a similar way to Elias, Jürgen Habermas viewed this legalisation of state–society relations from the vantage point of the crucial linkage between the macro and micro levels. The social fabric of state and individual developed, in Habermas’s reading, in the expansion and increasing density of written formal law, framing the specific societal space in which civil society could emerge. With respect to European state formation, he identified four particular steps of juridification. In the first step, we can observe the establishment and consolidation of the monopolies of physical force and of taxation in the absolutist state. This process seems to be synonymous with Elias’s first phase of monopoly formation.

The second phase of Elias’s model begins, in Habermas’s conceptualisation, with the appearance of constitutional monarchies. They break with the power monopoly of the absolutist state by legally anchoring state power in political institutions and civil law. Then, the bourgeois revolutions initiated the eventual nationalisation of the state monopolies, bringing about the democratic nation state. Finally, the formation of the welfare state tamed the autonomous dynamics that spring from the accumulative logic of the economic system (Habermas 1986: 356–363). From this juridical angle, the synchronisation of security interests is synonymous to the legal establishment of different security referents such as state, society (i.e. public but not state-related civil society actors), and individuals. Moreover, the penetration of society by various bodies of law contributed to the formal separation of different security sectors such as military, social and economic security. Consequently, we can trace the evolution of both the modern democratic state and the diversified concept of security in the historical particularities of European state formation.

Conclusions

Through the lenses of historical sociology, internal societal pacification, the evolution of democratic institutions, and the internalised mechanisms of normative control of modern individuals are interdependent facets of
state formation. The evolution of differentiated but interdependent sectors of military, political, economic and societal security has taken place in the course of the historical formation of the modern state and its monopoly of physical force. Therefore ‘traditionalists’ are right that the expansion of the security agenda should not lose contact with the core question of security studies: the social control of physical force and therewith the institution of the modern state. The security of the state and the security of other referents are not mutually exclusive but the result of a complex interplay. Yet this sociological framework is a heuristic instrument. The concepts of historical sociology are ideal types. They do not represent historical reality, nor do they deliver us a normative blueprint for successful state-building. Rather, they might help us to organise analytically the historically uneven and fragmented evolution of global modernity currently articulated under the buzzword ‘globalisation’.

In comparison with the historical context of European state formation, particularly of postcolonial states, however, contemporary state-making takes place in a very different setting in which state–society dynamics are not necessarily engulfed in domestic pacification and therewith transformed into political consolidation. As reflected in the current debates in international relations and security studies, the very same mechanisms behind globalisation produce, in the developed world, phenomena like the evolution of supranational institutions, that is, the extension of social and political spaces beyond national borders, as exemplified in European integration, while in developing countries they prevent the establishment of consolidated state structures and contribute to the spread of internal warfare and anomic violence.

The interface between the developed and the developing worlds becomes particularly transparent when zooming in on individual political leaders. Jean-Francois Médar, for instance, analysed many African statesmen as ‘political entrepreneurs’. In accumulating economic, political and social resources, these political big men act in a system of personalised power in the name of the state. They represent both the patriarchal chief of an extended network of personal ties and the head of a formally institutionalised system of political authority. The contradiction of the position of these African state-builders is apparent in three strategies of social action that are necessary for their political survival. In order to extract resources from international and transnational donors, currently these African statesmen have to pretend that they are acting according to global standards of so-called good governance. As political entrepreneurs,
however, they follow a strategy of personal enrichment in accumulating external and internal resources within the ranks of their families. Additionally, the reciprocal normative expectations of Africa’s traditional society demand from them the redistribution of these resources within a system of clients (Médar 1992).

Caught in a complex network of international, transnational, regional, local and personal ties, African state-builders must act according to a hybrid normative setting.

In stark contrast to the previously analysed experiences of European state-building, based on the simultaneous formation of external and internal sovereignty under the condition of violent state competition, most of the postcolonial state elites in Africa acquired independence in the form of ‘negative sovereignty’ (Jackson 1990: 202). According to this concept, the political economy of postcolonial states largely rests on the guarantees given by the political and legal framework of the international system and the influx of resources via international aid. The conflict-prone processes of state- and nation-building are confined to take place within internationally guaranteed borders. Born into an existing ‘society of states’, the postcolonial states in Africa show rather different dynamics from the European example and African politics is characterised by ongoing tension between states and societies.

A similar synchronisation of the security interests of states, societies and individuals as in the European example seems to be rather unlikely. While state authorities have invoked Westphalian norms such as sovereignty, non-intervention and self-determination, the emerging national civil societies have turned their attention toward the institutional framework of a global civil society. In terms of security, the postcolonial political elites claim their rights according to the classical security agenda, while their societies and individuals articulate their grievances in the terms of human security. Thus, questions about democratic governance, economic participation, and the protection of individual rights are articulated through transnational and international institutions rather than negotiated between state and society.

This situation is mirrored in current peacemaking and peace-building exercises such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Republic of the Sudan. There, a multiplicity of domestic and foreign actors takes care of different societal functions. Simultaneously, they are engaged in tasks such as coercive internal pacification, building viable state institutions, providing essential services,
and rebuilding the economy. Yet the political authority structures of these cases hardly remind us of modern states. Rather, they represent forms of ‘controlled anarchy’ (Schlichte 2003) in which we can observe a complex interplay of often conflicting interests and competencies. In light of the ideal types of historical sociology, this ‘controlled anarchy’ resembles a situation that Ernst Bloch once described as the ‘contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous’ (Bloch 1935): the paradoxical coexistence of empirical phenomena which in conceptual terms are separated along a temporal axis of socio-cultural evolution. In this sense, there is indeed a visible mismatch between the chronological order of concepts and the observable reality of historical developments.

Turning to the policy side of this mismatch, things get further complicated. From an analytical point of view, the solution could be to synchronise empirical reality with our conceptual model. This is what the title of a recent article by Francis Fukuyama suggests. In ‘Stateness First’ he argues that it is pointless to engage in democracy promotion where the basic institutional prerequisites of a modern state, a consolidated monopoly of physical force, have not yet been established (Fukuyama 2005). He has been seconded by Stephen Krasner, who suggests that new institutions for failing states be introduced under the label of ‘sharing sovereignty’. From this perspective, the existence of zones of peace and zones of war justifies the representatives of the former to establish protectorates over the latter in order to reduce international threats and improve the prospects for individuals who suffer under postcolonial state failure (Krasner 2004: 86).

In light of the ideal types of historical sociology, these new protectorates turn the European experience upside down. In providing military security from outside, the various forms of societal and individual security should be established while the state monopoly of force, and therewith indigenous state structures, remain suspended. Elias’s second phase of state formation precedes the first. To be sure, history is contingent and Elias’s abstraction from European experiences cannot principally exclude the possibility of successful state-building by ‘democracy first’. Francis Fukuyama’s proposal of ‘stateness first’ only takes the sequential logic of this abstraction as a given.

Generally speaking, there are no one-size-fits-all solutions to the fundamental questions of contemporary state-building in Africa and other parts of the world. The historical lessons and abstract concepts from European state formation might offer policy-makers a macro-structural
framework for defining state-building policies. Concrete interventionist policies, however, have to take into account the local conditions on the ground. It is the particular micro structure of a country and the path dependency of its institution-building process which in the end should be decisive in framing these policies. Unfortunately, too many state-building policies have been focusing on the analytical tool kit, rather than on the societal and historical realities.

Endnotes

1 Regarding the history and recent developments of these two cases, see Bellin (2004–05); Dodge (2003, 2005, 2006); Doronsoro (2005); Papagianni (2005); Rubin (1995, 2006); Synnott (2005).

2 For the broad field of critical security studies, see, for instance, the books of Katzenstein (1996); Krause (1999); Krause & Williams (1997); Lipschutz (1995); McSweeny (1999).

3 The work of Robert Jervis (1970, 1976), however, shows that the classical, state-centred approaches with their reliance on a narrow concept of power were already being challenged under the conditions of the Cold War.

4 For statistically based accounts of contemporary war development, see Eriksson et al. (2003); Gantzel & Schwinghammer (2000); Gleditsch et al. (2002).

5 For an attempt to develop a concept of world society that is largely based on the works of these sociologists, see Jung (2001, 2004).

6 In particular the historical experience of some processes of state formation in West Europe and Scandinavia.
The Security Sector: Leviathan or Hydra?

Bjørn Møller

‘Security sector reform’ has become a prominent buzzword within the international donor community, including the United Nations, the World Bank and an array of national donors, where it is usually viewed as an integral part of so-called ‘post-conflict peace-building’ (Bryden & Hänggi 2004; OECD DAC 2007; Schnabel & Ehrhart 2005).

As both are to a large extent donor-driven – and as the donor community is clearly dominated by the West – it should come as no surprise that there are hidden agendas involved, for example in the form of ‘implicit teleologies’ intended to transform ‘backward’ or ‘primitive’ countries in Africa and the rest of the Third World into mirror images of the West (Paris 1997, 2002; Richmond 2004). Post-conflict peace-building (also known as state-building or nation-building) is intended to establish ‘modern states’ with Weberian ‘monopolies on the legitimate use of force’ (Weber 1958: 78) within their respective territories, and the accompanying security sector reforms aim to establish civilian supremacy and democratic civil–military relations as well as rein in all irregular forces (Cawthra & Luckham 2003; Vankovska 2001).

For all their indisputable merits, these Western paradigms may not really be suitable for Africa, where (what we might call) the security sectors are much more diverse than in Europe or North America and especially so in weak, post-conflict or failing states. This is the topic of the present chapter in which, as an introduction, the evolving meaning of ‘security’ will be addressed, followed by an analysis of the providers of this security, that is, the security sector – both its statutory elements and their non-statutory (and often highly irregular) counterparts, which are especially prevalent in Africa. It concludes with some considerations concerning the implications of this diversity for security sector reform.
New Concepts of Security

How to conceptualise the security sector obviously depends on what is understood by the security which its various components are in charge of providing.

The concept of security has all along been ‘essentially contested’ (Gallie 1962) but, until quite recently, surprisingly under-researched and under-theorised. One of the few international relations scholars who bothered to come up with a definition was Arnold Wolfers, who suggested the following: ‘Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked’ (Wolfers 1962: 150). Such a definition leaves open questions such as whose and which values might be threatened by whom or what and by which means. This does not so much speak against the definition as such, but rather calls for a further subdivision into different forms of security.

Notwithstanding the lack of definitions, ‘security’ within the field of international relations came to refer almost exclusively to the absence of threats to the state – its unchallenged sovereignty and territorial integrity. International relations realists also tended to focus almost exclusively on military threats from other states. This international relations concept was usually, albeit misleadingly, referred to as ‘national security’. The term is misleading because it is often not the security of the state as an institution which is protected, but rather that of the incumbent regime, and because there is in most cases a significant difference between state and nation, at least in the European terminology – the latter referring to a community and the former to a bundle of political institutions.

For the last decade and a half or so, however, this traditional and narrow conception has been challenged in various ways, as summarised in table 1.

This typology takes as its point of departure the identification of various ‘referent objects’ for security, that is, those institutions or entities whose values may be challenged, but also distinguishing between different kinds of values and the various potential threats to them. The main revisions to the traditional and narrow conceptualisation are the following.

• As far as national security is concerned, the almost exclusive preoccupation with military threats has been abandoned in recognition of several other ‘sectors’ (for example that of the economy) from which it might be challenged (Buzan 1991). Moreover, the preoccupation with
external threats to national security has been abandoned by pointing to threats to a state’s security from within its own boundaries, particularly as far as weak states in Africa and the rest of the Third World are concerned (Ayoob 1995; Job 1992).

• The exclusive preoccupation with the state as the referent point and the resultant neglect of stateless communities such as nations or ethnic groups has been challenged with the suggested addition of a concept of ‘societal security’, referring to the unchallenged cohesion and identity of human collectives, a referent object which may also encompass national or other minorities within states (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver et al. 1993. For a critique see McSweeney 1999).

• It has also been argued that the focus should be shifted towards what is after all the final yardstick – human beings. Their individual survival and well-being is what is usually termed ‘human security’ (Commission on Human Security 2003; King & Murray 2001; McDonald 2002; Newman 2001; Paris 2001; Thomas 2001; Tow & Trood 2000). This reorientation also points to a whole array of new security threats, for example emanating from economic conditions such as poverty or dependency (hence the term ‘food security’) or from environmental developments such as pollution, resource depletion, global warming, etc. (Ney 1999; Thomas 1992; World Commission on Environment and Development 1987).

• Even though there is thus an environmental dimension to human security (usually labelled ‘environmental security’), this term might more appropriately be used to refer to the security of the environment as such, for example the globe as a sustainable biosphere or the

Table 1: Concepts of Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Referent object</th>
<th>Value at risk</th>
<th>Sources of threat</th>
<th>Form of threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National security</td>
<td>The state (regime)</td>
<td>Sovereignty, territorial</td>
<td>Other states (sub-state actors)</td>
<td>Military attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal security</td>
<td>Nations societal groups</td>
<td>National unity, identity</td>
<td>States, migrants cultures</td>
<td>Genocide, ethnic cleansing, discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human security</td>
<td>Individuals, humankind</td>
<td>Survival, quality of life</td>
<td>The state globalisation</td>
<td>Crime, under-development, terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental security</td>
<td>Ecosystem, species, planet</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Humankind</td>
<td>Pollution, warming, destruction of habitats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2009/11/05   10:04 AM
survival of various endangered species (Eckersley 1992). However, environmental factors may also impact on national security, as recently acknowledged by the Pentagon, which realised the linkages between climate change, the environment and security, as evidenced by a report published by an independent institute, but with a military advisory consisting of high-ranking US generals and admirals (CNA Corporation 2007).

The concept of human security especially seems to be gaining ground quite rapidly, not least in Africa, placing the spotlight on new, or at least previously overlooked, security challenges such as poverty, crime, human rights violations, disease, etc. For all its merits, however, this conceptualisation risks making the concept of security all-encompassing and thereby analytically useless.

Opinion is thus far from unanimous about how to define and delimit ‘security’, and it becomes even less clear if one adopts a constructivist approach along the lines of Ole Wæver’s concept of ‘securitisation’. Thus conceived, to refer to something as a security issue is to engage in a so-called ‘speech act’ – a term borrowed from JL Austin (1962) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1963) – which is to be identified via discourse analysis. A ‘securitisation move’ is identified as such by referring to an issue as being of existential importance as well as urgent, hence as warranting a resort to ‘extraordinary measures’. Whilst acknowledging that, in principle, anything might be securitised, and that what should count as ‘extraordinary’ may differ from country to country as well as change over time, the success of such an attempt at securitisation may be determined by assessing whether such measures have been taken and generally accepted.

The Security Sector

All of the above has obvious implications for how and by whom security should be provided. Whereas the traditional and narrow concept pointed towards a correspondingly narrow concept of the security sector, largely comprising the armed forces and the intelligence agencies, more expansive concepts will bring into play a wide range of other actors, both national and international, as will be apparent from table 2.

We might, of course, define the security sector as comprising all the actors and agencies providing some form of security to either the state, human collectives or individuals, or the environment. This would,
however, make the term almost all-encompassing and thus unwieldy and less analytically useful. We shall therefore adopt an intermediate approach, limiting the term to the formal security agencies designated as such along with their counterparts in the non-public sphere – the armed forces (mainly in charge of national security) and the agencies responsible for the law-and-order elements of human security, that is, the police, the judiciary and the penal system.

Virtually every formal or statutory security agency has a fairly close counterpart or functional equivalent in the informal sector (see table 3). The latter tends to be very large, especially in Third World and/or post-conflict countries, as is the case of the economy, with which the informal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Security</th>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Providers of security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National security</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Military attack Armed forces Intelligence agencies UN Allies UN alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanded</td>
<td>Economic threats</td>
<td>State Treasury Customs services WB, IMF, WTO Development agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Police Judiciary</td>
<td>Interpol UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal security</td>
<td>Genocide Ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>Armed forces Self-defence groups Intervention forces Peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>Lawyers Human rights NGOs</td>
<td>UN, NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human security</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Police Militias Courts ICC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
<td>Doctors Hospitals</td>
<td>WHO UNAIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Private companies Charities</td>
<td>Donors Diasporas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental security</td>
<td>S. from the environment</td>
<td>Natural disasters Global warming Rescue agencies Planning agencies UN States NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. of the environment</td>
<td>Global warming Poaching</td>
<td>Planning agencies Game wardens UN NGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

security sector is in fact often intimately linked – hence the concept of ‘war economies’ (Ballentine & Sherman 2003; Berdal & Malone 2000; Jean & Rufin 1996; Keen 1998).

**Table 3: Statutory and Non-statutory Security Agencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal/Statutory</th>
<th>Informal/Non-statutory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces (regular and home guard/ territorial defence)</td>
<td>Rebel/guerilla groups Pro-government militias Self-defence groups Private military companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police (regular and gendarmerie)</td>
<td>Vigilante groups Neighbourhood watch groups Court militias Private security companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence (external and internal)</td>
<td>Network of informants ‘The grapevine’/ ‘Radio Trottoire’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary (courts, judges, lawyers)</td>
<td>Informal courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penal system (prisons)</td>
<td>Executioners Avengers Collectors of compensations</td>
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Not only are security functions thus spread widely across agencies, but it must also be acknowledged that all these agencies are multifunctional, that is, they perform several functions, some of which may have nothing whatsoever to do with security in any sense of the term. This is illustrated in table 4, where a ‘security function’ is only counted as such if it is either intended for, or actually serves, the security of the principals of the agents in question, that is, representatives of the above ‘referent objects’ of security.

Quite a few security agencies provide security for their clients or principals by simultaneously generating insecurity for others. Whether to count them as security providers or not thus depends on one’s vantage point. This is a good example of the intricate workings of the well-known security dilemma. Even though this has mainly been associated with relations among states in the international domain (Buzan 1991: 294–327; Collins 1997; Herz 1950; Jervis 1978), it is also applicable to relations between groups and institutions in the intra-state domain (Posen 1993; Roe 1999; Walter & Snyder 1999) or even to interpersonal relations, for example in stateless environments such as the state of nature described by Thomas Hobbes (1968: 183–188, 223–228).
Table 4: Security, Insecurity and Non-security Agencies and Functions (examples)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public/Statutory status</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Security (for whom)</th>
<th>Insecurity (for whom)</th>
<th>Non-security (for whom)</th>
<th>Introverted functions</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>At home</td>
<td>National defence (own state)</td>
<td>Deterrence/defeat (other states)</td>
<td>Rescue missions (own citizens)</td>
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<td>Counter-insurgency (own regime)</td>
<td>Oppression (rebels/opponents)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Abroad</td>
<td>Alliance contributions (other states/own state)</td>
<td>Containment/deferrence (other states)</td>
<td>Peacekeeping (other states) Humanitarian intervention (other people) Revenue creation (own defence ministry)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-emptive attack (own state)</td>
<td>Aggression (other states)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Law and order (own society)</td>
<td>Apprehension (criminals)</td>
<td>Traffic control (own society)</td>
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<td>Riot control (own regime)</td>
<td>Oppression (opponents)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Counter-terrorism (own state/society)</td>
<td>Apprehension (actual/suspected terrorists)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>National defence (own state)</td>
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<td>Counter-terrorism (own state/society)</td>
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<td>Internal</td>
<td>Rule of law (own society)</td>
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<td>Counter-terrorism (own state/society)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>Rule of law (own society)</td>
<td>Litigation (other citizens)</td>
<td>Arbitration (citizens, companies)</td>
<td>Jobs, bribes, prestige</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Penal system</td>
<td>Rule of law (own society)</td>
<td>Punishment (criminals, terrorists)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jobs, bribes</td>
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<td>Public/Statutory status</td>
<td>Security (for whom)</td>
<td>Introverted functions</td>
<td>Non-security (for whom)</td>
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<td>At home</td>
<td>Looting, smuggling</td>
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<td>Abroad</td>
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<td>Agency</td>
<td>Rebel groups/guerillas</td>
<td>Protection (own community)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pro-government militias</td>
<td>Defence (government)</td>
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<td>Self-defence forces</td>
<td>Protection (own community)</td>
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<td>Neighbourhood watch group</td>
<td>Protection (private companies)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vigilante groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>Apprehension/punishment (criminals)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Court militias</td>
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<td>Law and order (own community)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Private security companies</td>
<td>Protection private lives and property</td>
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<td>Private military companies</td>
<td>Protection (government)</td>
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<td>APPROPRIATION-PUNISHMENT (CRIMINALS)</td>
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<th>Security (for whom)</th>
<th>Introverted functions</th>
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<td>At home</td>
<td>Looting, smuggling</td>
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<td>Abroad</td>
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<td>Rebel groups/guerillas</td>
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<td>Pro-government militias</td>
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<td>Self-defence forces</td>
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<td>Neighbourhood watch group</td>
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<td>Court militias</td>
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<th>Introverted functions</th>
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<td>APPROPRIATION-PUNISHMENT (CRIMINALS)</td>
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Moreover, all of the agencies have secondary functions which may well be useful to society but have little to do with security – and all of them represent job opportunities (and often other benefits) for their staff – they have introverted functions. According to the ‘bureaucratic politics’ paradigm, one cannot safely assume that the security functions will always be the ones determining the actual behaviour of such agencies, as all agencies are selfish in the sense of promoting their own corporate interests (Allison 1971; Halperin et al. 2006), even when the rules of the game dictate that they couch their demands and policies in security terms. The various security agencies of the state (‘statutory’ in the sense of being regulated by law) perform a panoply of functions:

- The armed forces are not only involved in national defence against other states, but also (especially in Africa and the rest of the Third World) in counter-insurgency warfare against domestic rebels and in various constabulary tasks, in addition to which they sometimes interfere in politics, for example via military coups. Besides this, they also serve the national interest in ways which are only very marginally related to security. Third World countries typically provide ‘blue helmets’ for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions (for details see Møller 2005), whereas Western countries occasionally provide troops for humanitarian interventions – both missions are about ‘saving strangers’ rather than about the national security of the respective countries themselves (Seybolt 2007; Wheeler 2000). Moreover, to the extent that such missions take place under the auspices of the UN, the expenses will be reimbursed (often on quite favourable terms), implying that peace support operations (PSOs) may contribute to national and especially defence budgets. In the past, most countries only participated in such PSOs as a secondary task, but considering the lack of military threats to the West, the armed forces of most Western countries are now primarily preoccupied with functions that have little to do with national security.

- The police are mainly in charge of upholding law and order as a public good (Desai 2003; Rumabut & Bittner 1979), but are often also involved in protecting the incumbent regime against political opponents – something which will, at most, enhance the security of the regime, sometimes at the expense of the population at large. This was, for instance, the case in apartheid South Africa (Cawthra 1993; Shaw 2002). In addition to this, the police in many Third World (and other) countries perform a wide range of non-security functions, just
as they all too often engage in income-generating activities by setting up roadblocks in the middle of nowhere and accepting bribes from citizens in transit (Ellis 1999).

- The same may be the case of the judiciary, which is furthermore available for settling disputes among citizens.
- Intelligence services (often formally parts of the military and/or the police) perform their activities both in the interest of the society as such and of the state, but sometimes they serve to protect mainly the regime in power, as was the case of the KGB, the Stasi and several other intelligence services, including many in Africa.

One might also have included as parts of this statutory segment of the security sector the various agencies and companies providing the weaponry for the provision of the various forms of security – arms producers and arms trade agencies, which are often closely intertwined with the actors and agencies using the weapons, that is, the armed forces. Indeed, the concept of the military–industrial complex is based on the assumption of an almost symbiotic relationship between arms producers and the military (Kaldor 1981; Pursell 1972. For a critique see Sarkesian 1972). This may also explain why arms production is usually either state-owned or at least more tightly controlled by the state than other industries, as is the trade in armaments – which is indeed often seen as an important security instrument, as when opponents are subjected to arms embargoes or (state or non-state) allies are provided with weaponry (Anthony 1991; Brzoska & Pearson 1994; Pierre 1982).

Non-statutory Security Providers

Most of the functions listed in the previous section are not merely performed by public (statutory) agents and agencies, but also by private actors. These various private agencies and actors could thus be seen as functional equivalents of the statutory agencies, and might be labelled components of the non-statutory segment of the security sector. Just with the case of their public counterparts, however, their functions are usually also quite ambivalent, perhaps even more so than in the formal sector in the sense that they are producers of both security and insecurity, in addition to which they perform a wide variety of non-security and introverted functions. Indeed, we may even find some of them labelled as terrorists.
Rebel groups, mainly of a guerrilla nature, constitute security threats to the regimes against whom they are rebelling – indeed, this is their very raison d’être – but they may simultaneously protect the communities they view themselves as representing. Even though the secessionist urge may be receding in Africa (Englebert 2007) it certainly has not disappeared yet, and secessionist rebels always aim for state power in their prospective secessionist polity. This requires them to be on good (or at least acceptable) terms with the population, who also serve as their support structure during the struggle. This was, for instance, the case of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in its protracted war of secession, during which it temporarily functioned almost like a state in ‘liberated territories’ (Iyob 1995; Pool 2001). From a strict legalistic point of view, the same remains the case for the various armed forces of Somaliland which de facto seceded from Somalia at the beginning of the Somali civil war and have remained separate ever since, yet without international de jure recognition (Kibble 2001).

As far as guerrillas operating (partly) in or from neighbouring countries are concerned, they may even serve as proxies in what might otherwise have been a real war between states. Sudan thus supported, until quite recently (and may even continue supporting), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda, whereas Uganda supported the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of southern Sudan. The LRA was thereby arguably enhancing Sudan’s security by means of insecurity for Uganda, and the SPLA enhancing Uganda’s security at the expense of Sudan (Prunier 2004).

Rebel militias or guerrillas sometimes also contribute to upholding law and order in their local communities, operating under the command of ‘traditional authorities’ such as village or tribal elders. Whereas some such militias and their commanding warlords constitute part of the security problem – preying on the civilian population in a gangster-like fashion – in other cases they seem to be part of the solution, at least temporarily, by filling the gaps left by an incompetent government, as argued by William Reno (2007) and others (Graduate Institute of International Studies Geneva 2006: 247–271; Holmquist 2005; Jackson 2003).

Several rebel groups also engage in income-generating activities, albeit usually of a criminal nature, as was the case with the diamond extraction and trade by UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) and the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) in Angola and Sierra Leone respectively (Boeck 2001; Campbell 2004; Global
Witness 1998; Malaquis 2001; Zack-Williams 1999), or the involvement in Peru and Columbia, respectively, of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) in the drug business (Bibes 2001; Palmer 1992; Kay 1999; Thoumi 2002), to which the Taliban also seems to have reverted after having lost its hold on government (Felbab-Brown 2006; Goodhand 2005).

As argued by Paul Collier and his associates, the presence in a country of such extractable and lootable resources is a pretty good predictor of armed conflict (Collier et al. 2005. For a critique see Korf 2006), even though others such as Paul Richards (2005) have maintained that political grievances are usually more important for mobilisation of rebels than simple greed, just as security concerns may drive people to arm themselves and/or join an armed group. In an environment characterised by pervasive violence and an abundance of weapons, it is simply safer to be armed oneself. Whatever may have driven rebels to take up arms in the first place, the violent environment may often change incentives and motivations, as several actors thrive in a ‘war economy’, as convincingly argued by David Keen (1998, 2005) and others, which may explain why they often act as ‘spoilers’ in connection with a peace process (Newman & Richmond 2006; Stedman 1997).

Sometimes governments collaborate with informal militias resembling rebel guerrillas, not only using these as auxiliaries in support functions, but also in combat roles, that is, in support of state or regime security at the expense of either rebels or civilians, or both. In both cases the benefits to the government are considerable, as this is a very cheap form of counter-insurgency warfare (as the militias usually ‘live off the land’) and because of the opportunities they offer in terms of ‘plausible deniability’. As the government does not directly command or control the militias, it may be difficult to hold it accountable for the atrocities they commit. This is not a strategy that only ‘uncivilised’ and ‘rogue’ Third World states resort to – the US has also on more than one occasion made similar use of militias and warlords of very dubious repute, for example with its support for the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK/KLA) in Kosovo during the 1999 attack on Yugoslavia, and the support for the so-called Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (Andres et al. 2005; Peake 2003). Most recently, the US has (at least according to some accounts) attempted something similar by means of a loose alliance of warlords in Somalia, the so-called Alliance for Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), which was provided with support via the private military company Select Armor and intended to help defeat
terrorists presumed to be hiding in Somalia (Anon 2006; International Crisis Group 2006).

In many cases of protracted rebellions or civil wars, self-defence groups are formed by the civilian population, sometimes supported by the government. This was, for instance, the case of the so-called Kamajores in Sierra Leone during the civil war, who were recruited among the ‘traditional hunters’ and tended to remain under the command of the village or tribal authorities. According to most observers they generally behaved quite well, protecting the villagers against the RUF, the forces of the short-lived military junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, and occasionally government forces behaving as predators. They thus served both the human security needs of the civilian population and the national security of the state (Gberie 2005: 14–15, 83–86, 93–94, 108–109; Keen 2005: 90–91, 151–158, 197–212, 276–280; Muna 1997; Zack-Williams 1997). In other cases, however, the self-defence groups are of a more dubious nature, as was the case of the Popular Defence Force (usually labelled mujahidiin) raised by the government of Khartoum during the civil war against the SPLA (De Waal & Salam 2004; International Crisis Group 2002: 144–147; Johnson 2003: 81–83, 131–135) or indeed those groups raised by the British colonial rulers during the Mau-Mau uprising of the 1950s in Kenya (Anderson 2005: 86–87, 124–125, 209–212, 240–243).

Old-fashioned mercenaries or modern private military companies (PMCs) may also help provide national security as well as human security for a population (Brooks 2000; Coker 1999; Edmonds 1999; Mandel 2002; Møller 2005; Shearer 1998, 1999; Singer 2003). While mercenaries have previously been used by rebels and occasionally by one state against another, not least in Africa (Musah & Fayemi 2000), in recent years they have also been used by the states themselves to boost their national security, for example in Angola and Sierra Leone (Bergner 2004: 117–131; Cleary 1999; Douglas 1999 Hirsch 2001: 37–50). Even more recently, PMCs have been used extensively, for example in Iraq, for a wide range of missions – ostensibly thereby furthering US national security (Björk & Jones 2005; Singer 2004; Spearin 2003). Besides combat and support functions, PMCs have also been hired by the US for training the security forces of friendly nations, in what constitutes an integral part of security sector reform, as has been the case in Croatia, Bosnia and Liberia (Ebo 2005: 24–25; International Crisis Group 2004: 20–21 Mandel 2002: 113–114).

PMCs are corporate entities resembling other private enterprises by often being involved in many different commercial activities besides
soldiering. Their primary function is to generate income for their personnel and shareholders, either in the form of services-for-cash contracts or in the form of concessions for the exploitation of natural resources. Hence, they generally offer their services to whoever is willing and able to pay for them, which in the past have often been economic actors of very dubious repute such as diamond smugglers or drug cartels. However, there seems to be a growing desire for respectability among at least the major PMCs, probably because they prefer the large, solvent and reliable customers such as governments or international organisations to the less reliable ones such as warlords, rebel movements and crime syndicates. Several of the major PMCs thus conduct lobby activities, both jointly and individually, in favour of legalisation-cum-regulation. A number of PMCs which are members of the International Peace Operations Association thus recently adopted a code of conduct, including the following principles:

Members believe that private firms should be required to be more accountable, transparent and candid about their motivations than similar military organizations operated by states ... In all their operations, signatories will strictly adhere to all relevant international laws and protocols on human rights. They will take every practicable measure to minimize the loss of life and destruction of property ... Signatories pledge to support official investigations into allegations of contractual and human rights violations. Signatories pledge to work only for legitimate, recognized governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations ... Signatories strongly endorse the establishment of inclusive advisory and coordination councils as soon as practically possible ... Signatories that may become involved in combat situations will have appropriate ‘Rules of Engagement’ established with their clients before deployment ... (www.ipoaonline.org/code.htm).

However, neither more dubious (and generally smaller) PMCs nor old-fashioned mercenaries have disappeared completely from the scene. During the wars in Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia, thousands of ‘volunteers’ thus participated, only some of whom seem to have enrolled out of sympathy for the common cause. The rest might be more appropriately labelled mercenaries, who have either been recruited from among the general population (for example, most of the ‘Afghan Arabs’
who have subsequently turned up in various terrorist activities) (Bruce 1995; Burke 2004: 56–86; Cooley 1999; Kepel 2002: 217–221; Rashid 2001: 128–140; Williams 2003) or from the ranks of existing armed forces in deep economic trouble, such as those of the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia.

There are also substitutes for the statutory police forces, tasked with law and order functions. For the wealthier parts of the population as well as for expatriates from private companies, international organisations or NGOs in countries with inadequate police protection, the favoured option is the use of private security companies (PSCs). In many respects they resemble PMCs, also overlapping with them (Mills & Stremlau 1999; Johnston 1999; Waard 1999). Just like PMCs, PSCs offer their services for money, which means that their primary purpose is income generation for the owners and staff – which may occasionally be enhanced by collaborating with criminals, as seems to be a rather common practice in countries such as South Africa (Irish 1999). Nevertheless, most PSCs clearly provide some security to most of their clients most of the time, lest they lose their clientele. Hence, in many countries (and not merely in the Third World) the security business is thriving and its number of employees exceeds that of the statutory police forces.

Neighbourhood watch groups usually spring up among ordinary citizens in neighbourhoods which are not patrolled properly (or at all) by the police and where the inhabitants cannot afford the services of PSCs, for example South African townships (Baker 2002; 2007). In most cases this is a matter of patrolling a neighbourhood in order to deter burglars and robbers with a minimum of force and often without weapons other than clubs and sticks. They are thus arguably providing security by defence, in the terminology of Glenn Snyder (1961: 14–16).

Vigilante groups come closer to ‘security by deterrence’, by seeking to deter wrongdoers with the threat of retribution. Even this may provide some security for communities under certain circumstances. Such vigilante groups come in many different shapes. Particularly notorious were the Nigerian Bakassi Boys who began with very good relations with their local communities and even the local and regional authorities, who were quite happy to collaborate with them. Gradually, however, they became increasingly brutalised and corrupt, thus becoming part of the security problem for the local population (Harnischfeger 2003; Meagher 2007). One may even argue (with Ken Menkhaus and others) that the clan organisation of a country such as Somalia, with its ancient customs of diya-paying groups¹, might serve to uphold law and order, albeit in a

Court militias seem to be a fairly recent phenomenon, manifested in the creation of (shari’a) court militias in Somalia. They even straddled Montesquieu’s principled divide between the executive and the judiciary by performing functions which are usually the prerogative of the executive, but under the command of the (informal) judiciary. Indeed, the courts had, by the summer of 2006, assumed de facto government powers, driving out from most of the country both the ARPCT and the supporters of the internationally recognised, but completely impotent, Transitional Federal Government, regarded by many as a mere ‘pawn’ for Ethiopia (International Crisis Group 2005, 2006). It seemed that the courts and their militias were in fact enhancing security in this stateless environment, where there had been no functioning public authorities since the beginning of the 1990s. That the businessmen of Mogadishu were prepared to surrender most of their weaponry certainly testified to an improved security situation in the capital. However, the fact that some of the leading members of these courts were suspected (by the US) of being aligned with Al Qaeda muddled the situation.

Finally, we have non-statutory counterparts of the arms production and arms trade agencies, for example the informal network of blacksmiths in West Africa (not least Ghana) providing the various rebels and militias with guns and other small arms (Aning 2005; Graduate Institute of International Studies Geneva 2006: 255–258), and the clandestine trade in weaponry, sometimes linked to other forms of illicit smuggling, such as in drugs (Kinsella 2006; Lumpe 2000; Naylor 2004).

**Conclusion**

Quite a number of formal and informal agencies are thus involved in providing security, either for the state or for local or broader communities, thus arguably forming part of the security sector. Most of them, on the other hand, also constitute security threats to others, reflecting the fact that security is relational as well as context-dependent – one side’s security
providers being the other’s security threats. The public–private divide is blurred, to say the least, the state and other public authorities collaborating with private actors and agencies in their provision of security, or even deliberately outsourcing large parts of this function. It is not even the case that the state is predominantly associated with order and security and private actors primarily with insecurity, as in many places the state is a source of insecurity for (at least some of) its citizens.

Security is thus arguably becoming increasingly privatised, which does not bode well for the state as an institution. To the extent that the state has ever enjoyed a Weberian ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of force’, this may be eroding – and where it has never really enjoyed any such monopoly the prospects of ever establishing one may become increasingly remote. Rather than a Hobbesian Leviathan providing order and helping society in moving from the proverbial state of nature, where the bellum omnium contra omnes means that ‘life is solitary, nasty, brutish and short’, we may be dealing with a multi-headed Hydra (Graves 1960, vol. 2: 107–110).

The question remains whether to aim for a security sector reform that would transform the Hydra into a Leviathan – by chopping off the ‘superfluous’ heads as seems to be the inclination of the ‘epistemic community’ (Haas 1992) engaged in post-conflict peace-building and security sector reform. In many cases, however – not least in Africa – this would leave several lacunae in ‘security coverage’, as the reach of the statutory security agencies would not extend far beyond the national capital, leaving the rest of the country in question effectively without any protection. Rather than dismantling the non-statutory security providers, it may thus be preferable to seek to ‘rein them in’, for example by providing them with official stamps of approval and establishing appropriate companion institutions to ensure some democratic accountability.

Endnote

1 Lineage groups collectively obliged to pay compensation, e.g. in the form of ‘blood money’.
2 Baron de Montesquieu in his Spirit of the Laws (1758) praised Great Britain for its subdivision of powers into those of the executive (the King), the legislature and the courts.
3 On the multi-headed Lernaean Hydra, see Hesiod: Theogony, lines 306–332 at http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_text_hesiod_theogony_4.htm. See also Graves (1960, vol. 2: 107–110). As far as the Biblical serpent Leviathan is concerned, the Old Testament is actually equivocal about the number of heads; Job 41 uses the singular, whereas Psalms 74:13–14 speaks of several heads and Isaiah 27:1 only mentions the serpent’s body.
Two decades ago one would have had to search hard for evidence of any real debate on the police in Africa. Much has changed in the intervening years. As the Cold War came to an end, regional contestations in Namibia, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa made way for relative peace, with some unhappy exceptions. Political transitions towards democracy have been accompanied by elaborate state-building efforts. These efforts also trickled down to the institutions of the security sector, including the rather ramshackle and authoritarian police forces that were characteristic of states from Cape to Cairo. As international influences of various degrees of benignity applied increasing pressure, and citizen outrage was allowed an outlet, the modernising project of police reform was spawned, and has given birth to a veritable cottage industry.

The industry boasts a diverse membership. It cuts across academic, police practitioner and policy communities. It has brought representatives of the state and ‘civil society’ together and put local delegates in direct contact with international counterparts. In recent years, many conferences on the subject have been convened, workshops held, papers delivered on a range of topics, resolutions tabled and press releases issued. Currently there seems to be no shortage of conversations about the future of the public police in Africa.

An eavesdropper on these conversations would probably detect both a measure of clarity and a fair amount of confusion. There is clarity about the ailments besetting the police in Africa and the vision to which they should aspire. African public police agencies are under-resourced and under-trained. In terms of structure and function they bear the indelible stamp of militarisation and politicisation. Both their colonial roots and the politics of the post-independence period did little to change this state


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of affairs, except insofar as conflict further undermined their efficacy as ‘neutral’ tools of the public will. The resilience of these features in the post-colonial period suggests their instrumentality to the interests of incumbent regimes (Hills 2007).

There is also some clarity as regards the desirable future of African policing if the prevailing rhetoric is to be taken at face value. Every conference, every workshop, proclaims that public police agencies in Africa need to embrace the core principles of ‘good governance’ associated with democratic rule. A reflection of this consensus about the desirability of accountable and effective police agencies responsive to the safety concerns of their citizenry is to be found in policy debates emanating from both transnational development think tanks and domestic human rights constituencies. Programmatic interventions pursued by development agencies (the UN, EU, the UK’s Department for International Development, to name the most significant players) have offered technical and financial resources in pursuit of ‘democratic policing’. Practical handbooks have also made some attempt to engage with the details of good policing-in-action (Bruce & Neild 2005).

It may be that on closer scrutiny the policy mantras on police reform more often than not take for granted the existence of a political edifice based on the rule of law and acquiescence to human rights. In most new African democracies, however, the political substructure has fragile roots. Looking beyond the policy pronouncements, clarity and consensus begin to break down when the conversations about police reform leave the normative realm of the desirable and start to grapple with what is feasible. It is at this delicate point that the need for the historical contextualisation of policing and a structural analysis of the prospects for democratic state formation begin to overshadow the visions. Debates on police reform in Africa have yet to engage with the challenge of such structural enquiries. So, in short, whilst the vagaries of police and policing in Africa have been flogged to death, an alternative practical discourse on public police reform has yet to gain momentum. In the interim, the spectre of ‘bad’ policing continues to haunt the continent.2

It is this discrepancy between what is, and what ought to be, which constitutes the most critical of challenges with which the transformation of safety and security agencies in Africa need to contend. This chapter makes no claim to rise to this formidable challenge. Rather, some attempt is made first to provide a brief description of salient aspects of police reform in the southern African region and, second, to identify some of the challenges
with which the academic field of African police studies needs to engage. With regards to the latter: given the evident enormity of the topic, this brief discussion considers only a select number of issues with data drawn mostly from five South African Development Community (SADC) states from which at least minimal information is forthcoming. In the light of the developments considered here, the conclusion to be arrived at is that the transformation of safety and security in southern Africa reflects both advances toward, and retreats from, the vision of accountable and efficient police (Hills 2006; Whitaker 2007). The future of police reform in SADC, as elsewhere on the continent, depends on the construction of a pragmatic synthesis concerning the basis of those very counter-tendencies.

Key Features of Police Reform: Varying National Parameters

A look at police reform in some countries in SADC (South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania) reveals some common features. Such general features can be misleading when one gets down to particular cases, where national differences may be tenacious.

In each of the countries considered here the political pathways to democracy have differed, with the consequent effect that the very quality of democracy varies across the countries. For example, of the five countries considered in this report, South Africa and Botswana may be considered ‘liberal democracies’; Namibia an ‘electoral democracy’; Mozambique and Tanzania ‘ambiguous hybrids’; and Angola a ‘liberalised autocracy’ (Bratton 2004: 6). A difference in the quality of life is further augmented by considerable variance in land mass, population figures, and the size of the public police. With regard to the latter, the difficulties in arriving at reliable figures of Africa’s public police agencies are well known. Official figures, unreliable in some cases, suggest that the ratio of police officials to population varies between 1:1 382 in Angola, 1:1 298 in Tanzania, 1:1 089 in Mozambique, 1:897 in Lesotho, and 1:365 and 1:270 in South Africa and Botswana respectively.3

The Politics and Economics of Police Reform

Police reform is always a deeply political endeavour. In post-conflict settings, the scope of police reform is qualitatively different from what
is usually understood by the term in conventional northern debates on the topic. In the context of regime transitions that take place amidst or in the aftermath of violent conflict, the depth and breadth of the reformist endeavour required to reform police agencies (in the image of their democratic and service-orientated Western counterparts) is usually underestimated. In this regard, the concept of fundamental police reconstruction probably serves better to capture the potential scale of the reformist enterprise. This goal of fundamental change is one that seems particularly demanding in situations where governments themselves have very limited capacity. Any analysis of police reform in southern Africa suggests that reformers face a task that is as complex and intractable as that which confronts ‘development’ practitioners as a whole.

The examples discussed here demonstrate that the reforms envisaged involved changes in structure (from centralised to decentralised institutional arrangements); function (from an emphasis on defending regime security to the protection of citizen security) (Ziegler & Neild 2002); and in the basis of legitimacy (from regime-based legitimacy to legitimacy based on popular consent and participatory modes of democracy) (Mawby 1990).

Institutional change of the police in Africa is multilayered. It includes reconstruction of the material base of the police organisation and human resource capacity. A reconstruction of the basic police infrastructure may involve rebuilding police stations; supplying paper, pens and uniforms; putting communication systems in place; providing vehicles and petrol; and/or developing more specialist infrastructure involving forensic laboratories and so forth. All post-conflict police agencies require investment in the processes of recruitment, selection and training of police personnel. The human resource development needs are great at all levels of the organisation: from foot patrollers to middle-level managers and executive officers. Overall, the needs tend to outstrip by far the resources available. But this problem in turn demands a prioritisation of needs in the light of what is feasible. This task assumes that there is a police leadership with the capacity to undertake such strategic planning which, more often than not, is not readily forthcoming.

Beyond development of infrastructure and human resources lies a further critical area of development. Equally important, and difficult, is the forging of a new institutional culture for policing in which the basic democratic values of the rule of law, equality before the law, and accountability to democratically elected institutions are protected.
Training police officers in the ethos of human rights, for example, is a standard feature of reform endeavours, as a review of interventions in a number of SADC states makes very clear. Again, the difficulties of translating abstract ideas into operational practice are mostly underestimated. Beyond the realm of basic democratic values, other reform principles have also made their presence felt. Such principles are shaped by neo-liberal models of governance as pursued by that powerful coterie of developmental institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Since the early 1990s new public management ideas have been routinely applied in the course of state reconstruction in Africa. This has resulted in an emphasis on ‘fiscal discipline’, ‘value for money’ and efficient ‘service delivery’ to the ‘clientele’ of state bureaucracies, including of course the security sector and thus the police. A review of reforms in, for example, the South African police, suggests that managerial forms of accountability have made considerable inroads.

Police reform is a resource-hungry enterprise. The costs involved in police restructuring on the scale required in even relatively better-off SADC countries exceed by far the capacity of national economies – the only partial exceptions to this general rule being South Africa and Botswana. The scale of such efforts and the costs associated with them stand in contrast to the piecemeal and ad hoc nature of interventions in police reform which dominate in many national locations. The scale and cost of the British role in the reform of the Sierra Leone police, for example, and the EU-led intervention in security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), are enviable examples of more ambitious long-term engagements.

Police reform competes with a litany of other equally pressing domestic priorities. It is into this breach that the development community steps. A dependency on the West for funding the reform effort creates its own problems. Dependence on external resources does not sit comfortably with notions of national ownership of reform agendas. Short-term interventions aimed at stabilising crisis situations, providing emergency relief, undertaking the most basic of reforms within the police organisation and building specific capacity with a view to policing elections, continue to be dominant features of foreign assistance in the security and policing field in many post-conflict situations. Although such interventions are important in their own right, they do not address the need for longer-term developmental assistance.
Most of the five SADC case studies illustrate the gap between police capacity and cultural disposition, and the ideal situation. In short, the generalised state of despair and disrepute exuded by post-conflict police agencies hardly comes close to matching the expansive demands for modernisation of the police machine, the professionalisation of existing police personnel, and the democratisation of both the formal rules and the attitudes and practices of the informal police culture. It must be said that dismally little is known about the sub-cultural dynamics of African police institutions caught in the throes of political and organisational change. On this score Monique Marks’s (2005) ethnographic work on the transformation of public order policing in South Africa is a useful example.

**Actors and Agencies in Police Reform**

In the South African case, a range of constituencies were involved in the process of police reform. Domestically, police reform drew on inputs from political parties across the political spectrum, key NGOs, research-based institutions, the corporate sector, and different units and groups within the police agency itself. External agencies included representatives of observer missions and the development community, policy consultants and foreign police advisors. Few of the other countries in the region have had at their disposal the sheer range of internal (or external) actors involved in deliberations on police reform.

Donors have played, and continue to play, an extremely significant role in shaping police reform in most of the countries in Africa. One of the key lessons from the South African experience was that domestic capacity (both in government and in civil society) for engagement with issues relating to police reform is critical to its success. In many a post-conflict context, such capacities are in short supply. Each of the case studies in Southern Africa illustrates (although to varying degrees) the extent to which external agencies, such as donors, play a critical role in the design and implementation of policing policy.

However, opportunities seem to be opening up for African regional networks such as the SADC (and its West and East African counterparts) to play an increasingly important role in policy formulation and capacity building of security sector institutions. Networks in civil society, such as the African Security Sector Network, and regional networks like the Southern African Defensive and Security Management, are potentially as important as those between government agencies such as the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO).
Established in 1995, SARPCCO has emerged as a mechanism of cooperation between police in the SADC region. Over the past ten years, SARPCCO has defined the agenda for regional policing with particular emphasis on organised crime (focusing in the initial phase on the illegal trade in stolen vehicles, drugs, weapons and, money laundering). To create legal space for cross-border operations and joint crime prevention initiatives, the Legal Sub-Committee has focused its attention on the harmonisation of legislation (particularly around corruption, organised crime and money laundering), while the Training Sub-Committee has pursued various training initiatives – often in collaboration with other research networks and training facilities.

Beyond narrow law enforcement capacity in the policing of organised crime, SARPCCO may also hold potential as a conduit for ideas and practices associated with ‘good policing’. Amnesty International’s call upon chiefs of police in the region in 1998 to incorporate human rights training more forcefully in police training suggests that SARPCCO has been recognised as a regional player of some importance. Beyond a rhetorical commitment to democratic values (equal treatment, due process and human rights), which are enshrined in the constitution of SARPCCO and, more importantly, in the recently adopted Code of Conduct for Police Officials in the region, various training interventions have also attempted to sensitise police to the needs of particular groups. In doing so, regional police discussions may begin to engage with broader social justice considerations. Regional courses offered under the auspices of SARPCCO and with the assistance of research and training institutions (such as the Institute for Security Studies, SaferAfrica, and the Centre for Conflict Resolution) have, for example, included training on the policing of violence against women and children.4

Much more recently, training for peacekeeping has been added to the list of training needs with the decision to build African peacekeeping capacity.5 Recent developments within SARPCCO also suggest that a more extensive engagement with gender issues may be in the offing.6 In the larger scheme of security things, the destiny of SARPCCO, as a mechanism for shaping regional security debates and practices, remains tied to the fortunes of political structures situated higher up the SADC chain, such as the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and its various strategic plans (Schoeman 2002).
Key Policy Frameworks

Reform of police in post-conflict settings is usually embedded in wider policies, with their attendant needs for resources. One such policy consists of the implementation of peace accords and so-called DDR programmes – disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants.

Peace agreements provide road maps for transitions from war to peace. The extent to which reform of the security agencies is inserted into peace agreements varies. A comparison of, for example, the South African peace accord (1991), the General Peace Agreement signed in Rome (Mozambique, 1992), the Bicesse Peace Accord and the Lusaka Protocol (two agreements negotiated in the 1990s when peace in Angola seemed in sight), illustrate wide variance in the detail of provisions and stipulated time frames.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

In post-conflict contexts, police reform is, as a matter of course, tied to much broader policy frameworks – particularly policy relating to DDR. Again, the extent to which police agencies stand peripheral or central to DDR processes varies. The difficulties encountered in adhering to the policy objectives of DDR are many (see, for example, Vines [1998] on the difficulties of disarmament in Mozambique). The lack of employment for large numbers of ex-combatants creates its own dynamic for job creation. State bureaucracies are often the only source for sheltered employment. The Namibian police, for example, became a significant employer of ex-combatants, regardless of whether the insertion of the ex-combatants fitted the professionalisation objectives of police reform (Rauch & Van der Spuy 2006: 98–100).

Justice and Security Sector Reform

More recently, police reform has become tied programmatically to wider reform of the criminal justice system and/or the security sector. The policy frameworks associated with security sector reform or justice sector reform currently in vogue in transnational think tanks espouse the virtues of embedding police reform in wider and more ambitious sector-wide programmes. Such policy frameworks currently provide common terms of reference across the donor community and might, in the long term, aid coordination of reform efforts within countries and between external players. However, rhetoric and promise concerning sector-wide security reforms continue to outstrip practice and actual delivery on the ground.
Transforming Safety and Security in Southern Africa

(Peake & Marenin 2008). Sector-wide approaches can slow and inhibit creative reform within police institutions.

The earlier cases of police reform in SADC – notably Namibia in the late 1980s, and South Africa in the early 1990s – were not conducted as part of sector-wide approaches, which have tended to be a post-2000 phenomenon, in respect of the criminal justice sector at least. These two southern African cases illustrate the potential for police reforms to be speedier and perhaps more radical when police institutions are the sole focus, rather than being slowed down or diluted by sector-wide pace and acceptability. In these two cases, donor assistance to police reforms was facilitated by having to negotiate with only one ministry and one state institution (the police), rather than with a wide range of government representatives from the criminal justice or security sectors.

The extent to which the fortunes of police reform are intimately tied to the capacity of the broader criminal justice system is aptly illustrated in the case of Mozambique (Rauch & Van der Spuy 2006: 92–3). Deficits in infrastructure, budgets and the absence of skilled staff are common ailments across the departments of the criminal justice system (Afrimap 2006). Within the justice sector antiquated facilities, a critical shortage of trained court staff, an overload and backlog of cases, a lack of jurisprudence and weak financial management are amongst the range of factors contributing to the malaise. Behind such debilitating constraints also lurk the more political issues relating to the independence and accountability of judges and lawyers. Deplorable conditions within prisons add yet another dimension to the reform agenda of the criminal justice system. The resolution of this range of issues, of course, depends on the possibility of entrenching the rule of law in Mozambique (and elsewhere for that matter) in order to create the kind of political context within which the bare essentials of democratic policing can flourish.

Crime Control and Prevention

The dynamics of the transition to peace and early democracy usually provoke new realities that challenge police capacity. The national capacity to shape the agenda of police reform and translate policy into operational reality varies from one case to the next. At the national level, two ingredients are critical: political will at the centre, and civil society capacity at the extremities. The re-eruption of old conflicts, the emergence of new patterns of conflict, so often a by-product of democratic reforms (Cawthra & Luckham 2003), and the rise in crime more generally, a common feature
of transitional societies, create social contexts within which the difficulties of sustaining reform efforts multiply. The rise in crime, together with the emergence of new forms of organised crime and the increase in public insecurity to which they give rise complicate democratic reform efforts. In such contexts (as the comparative record stretching across Africa and within SADC suggests) more punitive and militarised responses to criminality are evoked, which may threaten reform endeavours relating to civil liberties and human rights of criminal suspects.

Looking beyond South Africa, both the philosophy and the practice of crime prevention remain woefully underdeveloped in the region (Klipin & Harrison 2003). This is the case for a number of reasons. Avant-garde notions associated with the crime ‘preventative role’ of the police do not sit comfortably with paramilitary police institutions which have, until recently, been responsible for the protection of state security. The switch toward preventative ‘problem-solving’ strategies requires a radical redefinition of the raison d’être of the police. The reorientation of policing toward crime prevention and service delivery towards victims is further bedevilled by the absence of reliable crime information and limited institutional capacity for strategic analysis. Such lacunae of course complicate reform.

A common problem in the region is the inadequacy of information available to the police as the guardians of peace. The most striking example, of course, is that of crime data. Few of the countries in the SADC region, with the exception of South Africa and Namibia, are able to produce remotely reliable crime statistics, although some agencies such as the Angolan and Mozambican police claim that statistics are collected and collated at headquarters. The capacity to collect, transmit, correlate and analyse statistics of this nature requires massive resources, trained personnel and equipment such as computer systems. If criminality in both its interpersonal predatory and more organised forms is a prevalent feature of African societies, the absence of reliable crime information further limits the prospects of effective policing. The rise and decline in fortunes of South Africa’s National Crime Prevention Strategy – one of the few countries in the region which sports a comprehensive policy framework – provides instructive lessons about the challenges confronting the implementation of such policies in fraught criminal justice environments.

Whilst international victimisation or crime surveys and UN-driven Safer City initiatives are beginning to yield much-needed information, police reform more often than not tends to be pursued in the absence of critical information about the crime environment. Public opinion
surveys, for example, can yield invaluable information about public perceptions ‘from below’ of the quality of governance more generally, and of government’s performance in combating crime more specifically. Whilst significant progress has been made here and there toward generating basic crime data and victim crime surveys, police in southern Africa go about the daily job of policing without the kind of access to crime data which is taken for granted in more developed contexts. This state of affairs may contribute to the kind of internal focus on organisational reforms rather than the external attention to citizen safety which bedevilled the early South African approach to police reform. The compilation of basic and reliable data on crime in Africa, and particularly in its urban centres, thus requires urgent attention.

Cross-cutting Concerns in Police Reform

The relevant studies in this report highlight a number of common concerns in the course of post-conflict police reform, such as those related to the amalgamation of police (or military) forces, the integration of personnel from security formations, civilianisation and demilitarisation of ‘new’ police agencies, the establishment of various devices to improve police accountability and strategies for improving police effectiveness. In most of the police reform initiatives under way at present, there are marked similarities in discourse: concepts such as accountability, partnerships, service to communities, and improved community relations appear universal. It would thus seem that a degree of policy convergence has emerged from recent experiments in police reform in the SADC and wider African region.

Amalgamation and Integration

In post-conflict situations, the integration or inclusion of combatants into existing police agencies from all sides can assist in building the legitimacy of police institutions which were previously led or dominated by one group; and collaboration among former enemies in service of a post-settlement government can be a powerful symbol of national reconciliation and peace-building. Integration of combatants and amalgamation of various police and military organisations are fairly common features of post-conflict police reforms in the countries surveyed by Rauch and Van der Spuy (2006).
In three cases (South Africa, the DRC and Rwanda) pre-existing police organisations were amalgamated into the ‘new’ police agency: in South Africa, eleven racially-based police forces were merged in 1994 to form the new police service. This type of organisational merger is often motivated by the quest for efficiency (particularly cost-efficiency), or to reduce potential armed power bases for opposition groups or particular ethnic communities who may have grievances against the new government in power. The change management capacity required for successful amalgamation is huge, and beyond the means of many of the police forces. In many instances, disparities in organisational culture or in human resource practices remain after the processes of amalgamation are formally complete – legacies which provide fertile ground for potential future divisions within police organisations and conflict between sections of the police and the government.

Integration of former combatants (individuals rather than entire organisations) from opposing sides of the conflict is an altogether different matter. It sometimes forms part of the DDR strategy, but most often is a highly symbolic political gesture signifying the compromises reached in peace negotiations or political settlements. In Angola, for example, some UNITA troops were integrated into the police after the end of the civil war. In South Africa, integration of former liberation movement personnel was limited to a couple of hundred individuals, into a police organisation comprising over 100 000 members.

In South Africa, Mozambique and Namibia, integration of some former combatants was part of the process of taking independent national ownership of the police in a post-settlement or post-independence period. There were, however, important differences between the approaches adopted in these three countries, which are outlined elsewhere (Rauch & Van der Spuy 2006: 159–160).

For example, in South Africa, the exiled liberation movements did not prepare any cadres to work in the police (unlike the defence and intelligence sectors), and after the transition, sent just over a hundred of their cadres to join the police intelligence and VIP protection components. Few of these people subsequently attained positions of influence within the police organisation; the African National Congress government had to rely on other means to exert political control over the police in the early post-transition period, as it did not have the trusted staff to take the reins of the police institution. In Mozambique, FRELIMO sent a battalion of its cadres for police-related training in Tanzania in 1974, in preparation for
independence a year later. After independence, some of the managers in
the Portuguese colonial police agreed to stay on for a year, for a process of
handover and training of the incoming FRELIMO group. In Namibia, the
loss of South African personnel and the pressure from ex-combatants led
to the intake of fairly large numbers of former insurgents into the national
police.

The political imperatives for processes of amalgamation and integration
of formations and individuals into new police structures vary from one
national context to another. How such decisions impact on the vision
of professionalism as understood in democratic police models, however,
remains under-researched.

Demilitarisation and Civilianisation

Most of the countries inherited a colonial policing style, which was by its
very nature militarised, even where the police were traditionally separate
from the military. There was therefore some imperative for demilitarisation
of police style and culture at least.

The introduction of community policing (an issue to which we return
in the next section), which is a fairly universal component of modern
police reforms, constitutes one element of demilitarisation. Some of the
actions which have been taken to achieve this type of demilitarisation
include symbolic changes to the names of ranks and to police symbols
and uniforms. In cases where the police emerged from a particularly close
relationship with the military, or even from direct control by the military,
the imperatives for demilitarisation were slightly different, and included
the development of independent police chains of command, separate from
the military.

In South Africa and Tanzania, there was an additional imperative to
depoliticise the police. This involved removing the police from direct
control or influence by the ruling party, and establishing multiparty or
independent mechanisms of oversight and accountability. Again, this is in
line with the modern discourse of community (or ‘democratic’) policing,
which sees the police as serving the community as a whole, rather than
merely serving the government in power.

Oversight and Accountability

In conversations on police reform, accountability is writ large. All the
police reform initiatives which have been undertaken in the region include
a significant component of oversight and accountability. Again, this is in
line with the modern approaches to democratic policing, which emphasise police accountability to democratically elected structures like parliaments or local governments, but it is often also a direct response to previously unaccountable or abusive police practices. Recent research on accountability arrangements in various regions in Africa has contributed to debates and advocacy that are less abstract as well as more contextual and pragmatic (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2006a, 2006b, 2006c).

Many mechanisms for improved oversight and accountability of the police are evident in the case studies, but they commonly fall into one of the following categories:

- **Democratic political oversight and accountability** – for instance, police reporting systematically to parliament on their plans, budgets and performance.
- **Human rights oversight** – commonly exercised by national human rights commissions or similar bodies, which are specifically interested in monitoring police abuses of power or compliance with human rights instruments.
- **Accountability for misconduct** – which generally takes the form of some sort of specialised body which investigates (or oversees investigations into) police misconduct and public complaints against the police. The creation of some form of specialist oversight body along these lines is an increasingly common feature of police reform in the countries surveyed.
- **Oversight of personnel management practices** inside police organisations is less common, but Nigeria offers an exceptional model in the form of its Police Service Commission, which deals with matters such as promotions and discipline. In South Africa, the police labour unions play an internal role in monitoring personnel management policies and practices, and can make visible unfair management practices.

In most of the countries surveyed, parliamentary oversight of the police is weak, and this is certainly an area where assistance to parliaments would be useful. In general, even where mechanisms of oversight are provided for in legislation, these bodies are under-resourced by governments and therefore unable to make a significant impact. In countries where the police previously routinely engaged in abusive practices (such as torture) or corruption (such as extracting bribes), misconduct tends to continue, posing one of the greatest challenges to the police reform enterprise. The sheer scale of the problem can overwhelm new oversight agencies.
The doctrine of community policing holds persuasive influence over contemporary efforts to transform police agencies in ways which will make them responsive to the safety concerns of citizens, and thus accountable at the local level. Much faith has been placed in the reformist and accountability dividends of community-based police consultative structures. The chequered history of ideas and (uneven) practices associated with community policing in South Africa has been the subject of considerable enquiry. In Mozambican circles too much hope is pinned on emulating South African experiments. When it comes to community policing, police practitioners and other policy entrepreneurs eagerly engage in cross-national lesson-drawing.

As for the efficacy of community-orientated policing (COP) as a reformist strategy, the empirical evidence is scant. Evidence from Kenya suggests that COP may be put to repressive rather than benign use. For Ruteere and Pommerole (2003), COP provides an opportunity to ‘decentralise repression’ rather than to ‘democratise security’. Anthropological enquiries further afield (such as Heald 2005) also point to a stand-off between Western-style community policing initiatives pursued under the auspices of a reforming public police, and indigenous community-based traditions of self-policing in rural Tanzania. Such field observations point to the need for a more critical engagement with the Western export of models of community policing to the underdeveloped reality of Africa (Brogden 2004).

**Political Control of the Police**

In most of the countries surveyed, the police organisation falls under the political direction and supervision of a civilian minister in the Cabinet; most often a ministry of interior or home affairs, or a dedicated ministry for police or safety. In South Africa, different types of political control are exercised by national and provincial governments.

In general, the ministries responsible for police organisations do not appear to have much independent capacity, and tend to rely on the police for information and advice. For this reason, strengthening of civilian ministries is becoming a more regular feature of the programmes of democratic police reform, for instance in South Africa (where the experiment with National and Provincial Secretariats for Safety and Security to support the national and provincial ministers is beginning to falter).
The chief of police is generally appointed by the head of state, and this represents another significant form of political control of the police. In Tanzania and South Africa, the dynamic between appropriate political control and direction of the police, versus inappropriate political interference by the ruling party, is well illustrated. Finding the balance between a politically neutral, professional police organisation, and appropriate accountability to the democratically elected government and the fundamental legal framework of the country remains one of the central challenges for police reform on the continent. The British doctrine of ‘police independence’ is often mooted as the model for resolving this conundrum, but is itself undermined by the legacy of British colonial policing in Africa. Furthermore, efforts to draw neat distinctions between the military and civilian police agencies is compromised by the appointment of military officers as chiefs of police, as is the case in Kenya and more recently in the DRC.

Issues in the Debate on African Police Reform

Generally, some themes recur in both the SADC states considered here and the wider literature on police reform in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the diversity of states from Dakar to Durban, scholars wrestle with issues that at least superficially seem to confront most if not all of the countries in the area where police reform (as one amongst a broader list of issues) is of analytical and practical concern.

Democracy and Development: From Optimism to Pessimism?

In the aftermath of the Cold War the reform and transformation of the police came to be pursued as a crucial component of the larger project of state-(re)building in the image of democracy. At first the latest wave of democratisation created much enthusiasm. Despite such optimism, however, the trajectory of democratisation has turned out to be more uneven and shallow. By the mid-1990s the initial unbridled optimism regarding democracy had given way to straightforward pessimism. In African scholarship a range of phrases were coined to capture the emerging nature of democracy in much of Africa: ‘hollow’ democracies, ‘pseudo-democracies’ (USAID 2002: 39), ‘illiberal’ democracies (Diamond 1996) and ‘virtual democracies’ (Joseph 1998). The implications of this perceived tendency on the trajectories of reform of police agencies in the
direction of accountable and effective institutions are issues of considerable importance. Yet, thus far, discussions on police reform have largely failed to engage with the character of democracy, the prospects for development and thus the structural ‘limitations’ on police liberalisation.

**Politisation of Police in Africa: The Tenacity of Tradition**
If the character of the African state and the nature of political relationships between the elites and their subjects remain largely at odds with Western models of statehood, many questions surround the applicability of the very model of accountable and professional policing hatched in Western policy think tanks and exported via the long lean hand of security sector reform consultants. Hills (2007) appears to have history on her side when she writes that we do not seem to appreciate the nature of the political relationship between elites and police agencies in Africa. In the absence of such an appreciation, strategic interventions will fail to engage with pressing political realities. Police harassment of opposition parties during elections, as in the case of Tanzania, for example, mirrors political realities elsewhere (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2006a: 23).

**Securitising Democracy: Global Imperatives and African Responses**
The implementation of anti-terrorism laws in the Third World under the pressure of the superpower, argues Whitaker (2007: 1017), holds implications ‘for the ongoing processes of democratisation’ through the curtailment of civil liberties and the remilitarisation of policing strategies to defend, once again, state security. Human rights organisations operating in Africa have little difficulty in reporting on the anti-democratic consequences for policing at national level of the global ‘war on terror’. The militarisation of the ethos and practices of policing in both its general and specialist forms is in uncomfortable contrast to the insistence on demilitarisation and civilianisation so characteristic of templates for police reform.

**Access to Safety and Security: Formal versus Informal**
If the above-mentioned problems hinder policing of the urban centres, policing of Africa’s rural hinterland remains even more severely underdeveloped. The problem is largely a function of the lack of capacity of most postcolonial administrations to extend their administrative rule into rural areas. Again, the seeming exceptionality of the South African case stands in contrast to the incapacity of other states to extend their reach.
into the hinterland (although South Africa has similar if less pronounced problems in this regard). This weakness is of course particularly pronounced in Africa’s big states: Nigeria, the DRC and Angola. The agencies of law and order tend to be thin on the ground in many African societies.

Coming to terms with the ‘short outreach’ of police in Africa and the ‘pervasiveness of crime’ (Bratton 2004: 10) means engaging with more existential matters. Of what importance is reform of public police agencies for the prospects of access to safety and security of Africa’s citizenry? If informal mechanisms of security and justice have bred in the vacuum left by the state, how should the project of reform of safety and security be conceptualised? Observations from the field continue to underline the vital importance of non-state social ordering arrangements. Some (in particular Baker [2003, 2004a, 2004b]) argue that in situations where the reach of the public police is either absent or limited (as is the case in Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Mozambique), a forceful incorporation – or accommodation – of informal and formal institutions is critical. This contention is all the more relevant when confronting the evidence of the privatisation of the provision of security to market providers in many African countries. This issue is particularly pertinent in countries such as Angola and the DRC, for example – which possess valuable raw material reserves that constitute potentially lucrative sources for state revenue – where mineral resource extraction is reliant on the provision of security by the market rather than the state (Ferguson 2006).

**Conclusion**

Much has been said about the fragile nature of social order in Africa over the past four decades. Where authority is weak, institutions unstable, and leadership lacking probity, it can hardly be expected that the police will prove an exception. Yet stability, peaceful conditions and an adherence to the rule of law seem to be prerequisites if Africa is to escape from poverty and underdevelopment. In bringing about social order, the positive role of policing agencies, both formal and informal, must surely be one key ingredient. Whether the policing agencies of Africa can perform this role remains an open question. One encouraging sign is that African leaders and the international community are agreed on the urgent task of police rehabilitation, and concrete action is under way on many levels to improve
the provision of public safety. Case study data illustrate the achievement of a fair amount of consensus on this point, at least at the level of public pronouncements and political rhetoric.

The current limited gains for police reform in sub-Saharan African countries offer at least qualified evidence that the process may be a continuous one in coming years in some countries. There are many provisos, however. It should not be forgotten that police reform is a dependent variable in the African context rather than an autonomous factor. Much hinges on the growth of a political culture that rejects violence in politics, even if only as a result of war-weariness and chronic fears of a return to fratricidal conflict amongst the population at large and among the key elites now in or surrounding the corridors of power.

Another context-shaping force is that of the economy. In recent years many African economies have returned to a positive growth path, albeit still vulnerable and propped up by international aid. Economic growth – a complex process involving much more than mere positive fiscal balances – is essential if African publics are to regain a sense of opportunity and progress that marked the 1960s. A further, if rather intangible, factor is the continuation of an international climate in which a consensus on the virtues of democracy and the rule of law retains at least a rhetorical hegemony, and to which African governments find themselves obliged to make a minimal accounting.

It is important that the international community and the most influential donors, in particular, recognise that reform of the police is a long-term project marked by differing stages of consolidation and not the fruits of a once-off short-term intervention. In many ways democracy is an expensive form of government, and it is probably no accident that South Africa and Botswana have maintained reasonably democratic regimes. It must therefore be acknowledged that police reform will continue to require subventions from the richer countries if it is to have any chance at all. It is now recognised that such support, monetary, political and diplomatic, should address not only the policing agency itself, but also the wider criminal justice system, parliament and NGOs. While financial aid that is too widely diffused may serve little purpose, nevertheless the interdependence of the police and society must remain at the forefront of the reformist mentality. In this respect, the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the state police needs to be counterbalanced by the creation or rejuvenation of a lively civil society, where NGOs, academics and the media can safely scrutinise and criticise governmental
and policing performance. Here the international community has an obvious and powerful role to play.

Endnotes

1 This chapter relies in large part on information compiled in the report by Rauch and Van der Spuy (2006). Thanks to Jeffrey Lever for editing this text and Elaine Atkins for assisting with referencing.

2 See in this regard the comments on police in Amnesty International’s (2007) latest report for Africa.


5 According to one source, a minimum of 15 000 African CIVPOL would need to be trained over the next five years to meet the demand (SARPCCO UN Police Pilot Course, SAPS Training College, Paarl SA, 25 November–3 December 2004: p. 4).

6 In May 2007, a two-day women’s conference of SARPCCO took place in Gaborone, Botswana. Issues affecting policewomen in the workplace were discussed. At the meeting the idea that a policewomen’s network be constituted as a sub-committee of SARPCCO was mooted.


8 See, for example, Afrobarometer’s most recent analysis of citizen perceptions of how well governments are responding to crime and corruption in 12 African countries. On this score, survey data reveals both positive and negative trends (Bratton & Cho 2006). Also see Mattes (2006) for a comparative assessment of public views on crime and policing across African countries.
Any assessment of intelligence services is bedevilled by several factors: firstly, the reality that intelligence services are generally shielded by legislation and norms promoting secrecy, making scrutiny of their governance arrangements difficult. Secondly, measuring the performance and value-add of intelligence services is difficult. This has much to do with the fact that intelligence services are expected as their core business to predict future events and trends in the security landscape, making their success indicators difficult to anticipate and plan for. To make matters worse, public commentators cannot readily review their outputs, since the dissemination of their reports is so strictly circumscribed. Members of the public – indeed, anyone who has no direct access to them – are expected to trust their judgement, a condition which tends to unravel uneasily when crises arise and intelligence failures come to the fore (Lustgarten & Leigh 1994; Todd & Bloch 2003).

In spite of these conditions, in policy debates concerning security sector governance, intelligence services are receiving increased attention. This is part of an overall trend of reviewing the security systems of countries and regions more holistically, to cover the broader spectrum of state organs formally involved in the delivery of security. The structures typically subjected to analysis include the armed forces, police, the justice system, the correctional services and the intelligence organs of state, as well as a range of paramilitary or extra-legal forces (Aguero 2005; Lala 2004).

Concerning intelligence services, the following questions have been at issue: whether traditional intelligence services have a meaningful role to play in information-saturated societies; whether they are effective in anticipating threats to national security; and whether their methods are relevant and acceptable, measured against democratic norms and
standards (Born & Tuler 2002). In addition, there is the question of the culture of the intelligence organisations – and whether their predisposition to secrecy undermines democracy, or is a ‘necessary evil’ that must be tolerated in order to sustain democracy (Khanyile 1997). For post-conflict countries, and for developing countries managing scarce budgetary resources in the face of pressing social needs, these questions are pertinent, and policy-makers have a duty to address them judiciously. In addition, there are questions around how to keep the various interest groups in post-conflict societies, including the intelligence components, focused and committed to democratic peace, and how to absorb, demobilise or bring under control the membership of structures that may have had some role in a preceding conflict (Ball & Fayemi 2004).

As a post-conflict country, South Africa has had to grapple with these matters, both in the negotiations between the major political parties that led to the establishment of a post-apartheid government, and in the actual implementation of this agenda. This chapter examines the context in which the post-apartheid civilian intelligence structures came into existence, and comments on whether the governance arrangements, the product of South Africa’s negotiated transition, laid a sufficient foundation for promoting transparency and accountability on the part of the post-apartheid civilian intelligence services, when they formally came into being in January 1995.

**Governing Intelligence in the Period Leading up to the First Democratic Elections**

South Africa’s transformation of the security and intelligence services was one of many consequences of the political transition from white minority rule to a democratic government. The term ‘transition’ has been described by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1991) as the interval between one political regime and another.

Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime, and on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1991: 6).\(^1\)
This chapter takes 1990 as a starting point for the South African transition when, in the context of apartheid imploding, a decision by the South African government to liberalise the political space through the unbanning of previously restricted organisations, presented unique opportunities for reshaping the political landscape (Haysom 1992). In line with the above definition of a transition, the analysis stops at 1995, the year in which the post-apartheid civilian intelligence services were formed. The shortcomings of this delimitation are immediately apparent. The question of how successful the intelligence transformation has been can only be answered with some reference to the role, performance and governance of the intelligence services under a new dispensation. This chapter does not have such a focus; instead, it reviews the emergence of a set of principles of values in the transition period, how these contrasted with and sometimes coincided with those of the apartheid period, and how they were incorporated into the governance model of the post-apartheid intelligence services.

There is another useful reference to the nature of transitions in the analysis of O’Donnell and Schmitter who argue:

It is characteristic of the transition that during it the rules of the political game are not defined. Not only are they in constant flux, but they are usually arduously contested; actors struggle not just to satisfy their immediate interests and/or the interests of those whom they purport to represent, but also to define rules and procedures whose configuration will determine likely winners and losers in the future. Indeed, those emergent rules will largely define which resources can legitimately be expended in the political arena and which actors will be permitted to enter it (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1991: 6).

The intelligence transformation was a complex and difficult process, integrally linked to the broader political transition, which simultaneously impacted upon it. A web of objective and subjective conditions shaped its path as well as its outcome, and only a few of these will be highlighted in this chapter.

What is so compelling about the South African transition is that, in some measure, the white minority government’s own intelligence services were architects of the process. Early contact between leaders of the exiled ANC, the premier liberation movement, and the government was handled
by the National Intelligence Service (NIS), under conditions of strict secrecy. These contacts, of which there were reportedly several from the mid-1980s to 1990, were not formal negotiations between the adversaries, who publicly continued to condemn each other, but a way of feeling out each other on preconditions for entering into negotiations about the political future of South Africa.

After the restrictions on the ANC, the South African Communist Party and other organisations were lifted in 1990, the NIS continued to be a key actor in the process. Its counterpart in the ANC, the Department of Intelligence and Security (DIS), was equally influential in engaging the leadership of the movement around strategies to be pursued. What probably provided both intelligence components with this leverage was their access to critical information, which would have guided political decision-making on a tactical and strategic level. This is not surprising, given the volatility of political and security conditions during the transition. On both sides, for example, there were both ‘hardliners’ and ‘softliners’, and suspicions about each other’s motives and interests.2

Senior ANC leaders say that the ruling government had at first resisted the idea of negotiating a new intelligence dispensation, on the grounds that intelligence issues could not be discussed in open political forums. They offered, it is said, to simply absorb members of the intelligence structures of the liberation movements and the bantustan Transkei–Bophuthatswana–Venda–Ciskei (TBVC) states into the apartheid-era NIS.3

This position was rejected by the ANC, and the political actors went on to negotiate an elaborate intelligence dispensation. Over the period 1990 to 1994, sheer intimacy between the ruling elite and that of the ANC seems to have facilitated this process. As the parties got to know each other, mutual suspicions eroded, and in the course of the negotiations on an almost day-to-day basis, consultation was the norm. This did not prevent strong invective being the order of the day. The head of ANC intelligence in 1992 accused the security apparatus of the ruling government of having had ‘a licence to kill, maim, eavesdrop and much more’ in the name of state security, and said this underlined the need for a fundamental transformation of the intelligence services (Nhlanhla 1992). He further said that, in the context of the transition:

It is totally unacceptable that the intelligence agencies continue to serve the National Party government and its allies, at the expense of other political organisations, through the use of agents and
informers. Under careful monitoring, all such persons and the related practices of phone tapping, letter interception of domestic opponents of the government engaged in lawful political activity should stop (Nhlanhla 1992).

It is interesting but not surprising to note the alignment between the positions of political actors and intelligence heads at the time. For example, Nhlanhla, as a member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, was able to articulate the position of the ANC on the form of the transition, including the formation of an interim government, under which the steps toward democratising the security forces would begin.

The major talks about the content of the South African transition were conducted at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) from 1991 to 1992. Most of the deliberations happened in smaller working groups, which all parliamentary political parties and extra-parliamentary political groups under the leadership of the ANC participated in (Friedman 1993). One of the working groups at CODESA was charged with examining the role of the security forces, with the objective of levelling the playing fields. The discussions about the modalities of reorientating the security forces were to take place, however, under the auspices of a transitional authority, which was formed as a product of the negotiations (Friedman 1993).

In the period leading up to and subsequent to CODESA, active political posturing and discussion within the parties saw them refining their positions. President De Klerk, who enjoyed a high public profile, was at pains to demonstrate that in ideological terms the South African government had turned a corner and was intent on establishing democratic norms. The ANC, too, consolidated its perspective on the transformation of the security sector, both by adopting elements of models obtaining in other liberal democracies, but also recalling the content of its own struggles and internal policies.4

Following CODESA, developments towards elections for a democratically chosen government began to unfold. There had been agreement between the parties that a transitional authority comprising the major political players should be established. The Transitional Executive Council Act of 1993 gave expression to this agreement. Seven sub-councils provided for in the legislation were set up to facilitate co-governance in the run-up to the country’s first elections. These were the sub-councils on Defence, Law and Order, Intelligence, Finance, the Status of
Women, Foreign Affairs, and Regional and Local Government. The role of the sub-councils amounted to a form of multiparty scrutiny over the above-mentioned areas of governance. The function of the Sub-Council on Intelligence, spelt out in the legislation, was to adopt a set of basic principles on intelligence that could also serve as a basis for the creation of a national capability in a new democratic dispensation. It also had to formulate a code of conduct which would be binding on all members of all services during the period of transition and which would serve as a basis for an official code of conduct in a democratic South Africa (Africa 2006).

Under the Transitional Executive Authority (TEC), the intelligence services of the apartheid government were to remain intact, as were those of the TBVC states and the liberation movements. Of course, they continued to serve their principals with information during this critical period, but were bound by political agreement to begin crafting a single intelligence framework for the future. Unavoidably, the leaders of the intelligence structures were drawn into negotiating their common future. One of the agreements in this forum was that the members of existing intelligence entities should be absorbed into new structures. This was to constitute an amalgamation, and would require the dismantling of all recognised intelligence structures pre-dating this process.

The TEC’s Sub-Council on Intelligence entrusted this delicate work of facilitating the talks and preparations for the amalgamation to a forum – the Heads of Civilian Services or HOCS as it was commonly called – comprised of the heads of the various civilian intelligence agencies. The implication of this development was that former foes in the intelligence sphere would begin to collectively define their future.

O’Donnell and Schmitter have commented on the relative power of the conflicted parties in the transitional period, in a manner that reflects the South African experience:

During the transition, to the extent that there are any effective rules and procedures, these tend to be in the hands of authoritarian rulers. Weakly or strongly, depending on the case and the stage of the transition, these rulers retain discretionary power over arrangements and rights which in a stable democracy would be reliably protected by the constitution and various institutions (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1991).
Governing Intelligence in the South African Transition, and Possible Implications for Africa

In spite of the formal cooperation that was introduced by the establishment of the TEC, secret information was a contested area in the political negotiations that preceded the country’s first democratic elections. Both the National Party government and its political adversaries, particularly the ANC, were aware of the powerful leverage of institutions charged with intelligence responsibility, and throughout the period of negotiations kept up their intelligence offensives with a view to understanding the activities and strategies of the other side.

Whilst the ANC may have felt it held the moral high ground, the reins of power were very much in the hands of the ruling government during this period. A wide-ranging Protection of Information Act, and other draconian security legislation such as the Internal Security Act, remained in force. A double-edged sword, security legislation was probably as much directed against the liberation movement, with which government was busy negotiating a new political dispensation, as against the white right wing, who were engaged in violent activities to derail the talks. The volatility of the situation should not be underestimated. There were strong divisions in the apartheid security forces, with a number of members aligned with the extra-parliamentary white right wing. There was real concern that information might be leaked to them from inside the intelligence services, and former members speak of a climate of mutual fear and distrust among the rank and file.

To the extent that the legislative regime forbade undisciplined leakages of critical information to elements bent on wrecking the peace, it worked in favour of the peace. The NIS leadership of the apartheid government insisted that throwing open the files of the apartheid era would have been a recipe for disaster and that many ANC members themselves would have been implicated for informing on their colleagues. They were to use this logic to unilaterally destroy tons of records in the period immediately prior to the country’s first democratic elections, as was later revealed (RSA 1998).

Governing Intelligence in the Period Leading up to the Establishment of the New Intelligence Services

South Africa held its first democratic parliamentary elections on 27 April 1994, with virtually all state institutions intact. Much hard work lay ahead, now that the ANC was the government in power, and it had
the opportunity to drive its policies into place. Immediately after the first democratic elections, the Interim Constitution of 1993 took effect. Chapter 3 of the Constitution took the form of a new feature of South African politics: an entrenched Bill of Rights. This chapter guaranteed to the public a range of fundamental rights, including the right to life, the right to equality before the law, the right to privacy, the right to freedom of expression, association, movement, access to the courts, administrative justice and, most significantly for the purposes of this chapter, the public right of access to information.

In the period following the elections, the intelligence components of the statutory and non-statutory forces began preparations for their integration in earnest. As background to the legislative process, a White Paper on Intelligence was considered and adopted by the new parliament. The White Paper incorporated many of the principles that had been agreed upon in the negotiations between the government and ANC intelligence operatives. These were in sharp contrast to the principles that had governed intelligence under apartheid. The new vision recognised:

- the primary authority of the democratic institutions of society;
- subordination of the intelligence services to the rule of law;
- compliance of the intelligence services with democratic values such as the respect for human rights;
- political neutrality of the intelligence services;
- accountability and parliamentary oversight;
- maintenance of a fair balance between secrecy and transparency;
- separation of intelligence from policy-making; and
- an ethical code of conduct to govern the performance and activities of individual members of the intelligence services (Africa 2006).

The tone of what was agreed to was acceptable to all, reflecting a liberal democratic vision of the role of intelligence services. Legislation reflecting this model was drafted by the new parliament in three bills, namely the Intelligence Services Bill, the National Strategic Intelligence Bill and the Committee of Members of Parliament on and Inspectors of Intelligence Bill, and passed after consideration by Cabinet. The first of the three Acts, the Intelligence Services Act, No. 38 of 1994, made provision for the amalgamation of the former members of the NIS, the DIS, the ANC, the Pan Africanist Security Service of the Pan Africanist Congress, and the former bantustan satellite services that had existed in the TBVC states – the Transkei Intelligence Service, the Venda National Intelligence Service and the Bophuthatswana Intelligence and Security Service – into the
new intelligence structures. This was a significant move for its inclusivity, although it would pose enormous logistical challenges, as well as prove a tough terrain for any of the entities to retain the high ground in the battle of ideas (Africa & Mlombile 2001).

The second bill, which became the National Strategic Intelligence Act, No. 39 of 1994, spelt out the functions or legal mandates of the various components of the intelligence community: the civilian National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South African Secret Service (SASS), as well as the Crime Intelligence Division (CID) of the South African Police Service (SAPS), and Defence Intelligence located within the armed forces. In addition, it made provision for the coordination of intelligence, particularly prescribing that the intelligence structures would provide intelligence to a Coordinator for Intelligence, out of which comprehensive estimates could be compiled. This too was significant, for building coordination entrenched by legislation into the intelligence system was aimed at pre-empting the compartmentalisation, empire-building and rivalry between the agencies that had come to characterise the apartheid period.

The last of the three bills, later to be more elegantly renamed the Intelligence Services Control Act, No. 40 of 1994, made provision for a multiparty parliamentary committee with representatives from both houses of parliament. Significantly, but in keeping with the practice characterising the parliamentary oversight model, the majority of its members were to be drawn from the ranks of the party that held the majority in parliament. The Act also made provision for the appointment of an inspector general who needed to enjoy a 75 per cent endorsement by parliament, and approval and appointment by the president of the republic. The inspector general would be responsible for hearing and investigating complaints about the intelligence services, should they be charged with exceeding their powers. The passage of the intelligence legislation was an important milestone; it represented a period of ‘pacting’, during which the political elites were able to craft an inclusive and accommodative outcome.6

The Constitution of 1996 was later to endorse the creation of intelligence services by national legislation:

National legislation must regulate the objects, powers and functions of the intelligence services, including any intelligence division of the defence force or police service, and must provide for –
a. the co-ordination of all intelligence services; and

b. civilian monitoring of the activities of those services by an Inspector appointed by the President, as head of the national executive, and approved by a resolution adopted by the National Assembly with a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of its members (RSA 1996, section 210).

In anticipation of the new legislation the HOCS had tasked various sub-committees to embark on the process of amalgamating the various intelligence services. Based on the reports and recommendations of these sub-committees, the HOCS formed an Amalgamation Committee to coordinate and implement the establishment of the NIA and SASS. The Committee established a number of so-called ‘Super Working Groups’ consisting of representatives of the statutory and non-statutory intelligence structures.

The Super Working Groups were tasked with implementing the decisions and agreements of the HOCS, focusing on the practicalities that would have to be addressed in the migration to the new intelligence services. These working groups were established on a full-time basis and their reports were processed by the Committee for consideration by the HOCS for decision-making. Some of the issues addressed by the Super Working Groups were practical steps for the establishment of the NIA and SASS; training needs of the planned intelligence services; mechanisms to ensure the appropriate distribution and management of such shared facilities; and the staffing of the new intelligence services (Africa 2006).

The intelligence services were formally established on 1 January 1995, leading to the incorporation of the members and assets of six former disparate entities into two services, the NIA (the new domestic agency) and SASS (the new foreign service). The post-1994 period saw the newly established intelligence services struggling to come to terms with their identities as defenders of the new political order crafted by the country’s democratically elected legislature. The broadened concept of security contained in the Constitution was undermined in reality by continuities in both the discourse and practices of security.

Secrecy, for example, was entrenched in law, as the prerogative of the heads of the intelligence services, if they considered it necessary to protect the identities of members, sources of intelligence, and the methods of work of the intelligence services. On the other hand, the Bill of Rights guaranteed all of those subject to the Constitution the right of access to all
information held by the state and public bodies. Clearly, a balance would have to be struck, and any contradictions in the legal and constitutional framework resolved (Currie & Klaaren 2002). Without a reasonable degree of transparency, the public was obviously going to be at a loss as to what information it might request from the intelligence services. Yet intelligence information – and much other official documentation – continued to be routinely classified as ‘Top Secret’, ‘Secret’, ‘Confidential’ or ‘Restricted’, depending on the perceived degree of harm to national security which disclosure of such information would cause.

The matter had not gone unnoticed in the first post-apartheid legislature, where the White Paper on Intelligence was passed in 1994, several months before the NIA and SASS were established. The White Paper called for a system of classification and declassification of information to be established, but did not elaborate. It was only five years later that a legislative vehicle giving effect to the constitutional right of access to information was adopted, and several more before the legislation was implemented. The public therefore was subject to the discretion of the intelligence services regarding how much information they chose to disclose.

Another concern was the extent to which the intelligence services could legitimately infringe on the rights of others. There was some suspicion among opposition political parties that the ANC, in spite of the agreements that had been reached in the negotiations and notwithstanding the spirit of the law, were wont to use the intelligence services to further their political agenda. The fact that many of the senior appointments were of ANC-aligned members further fuelled this perception, even though it had been an important compromise or ‘pact’ of the negotiated outcome for the intelligence services that a power-sharing arrangement prevailed (O’Brien 1996).

Assessing the broader transformation of the public service provides some insight into the context for change in the intelligence services. As early as June 1995, barely a year after the country’s first democratic elections, and just four months after the establishment of the civilian intelligence services, the Ministry for Public Service and Administration released its Draft White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service. In its introduction, the role of the public service in the new democracy is recognised:
In forging ahead with the process of reconciliation, reconstruction and development, the public service has a major role to play. To fulfil this role effectively, the public service will need to free itself from its apartheid past, and to be transformed into a much more coherent, representative, competent and democratic instrument for executing government policies and meeting the needs of people. The Government’s commitment to this process is demonstrated by the fact that in the RDP [Reconstruction and Development Programme] White Paper, administrative transformation is identified as one of its top five strategic priorities, along with education, health, housing and land claims (RSA 1995).

The Draft White Paper went on to identify the following characteristics of the apartheid era as the major shortcomings that would have to be addressed in the post-apartheid transformation process: lack of representation of all social groups; lack of legitimacy; low capacity for service delivery and development; centralised control and top-down management; lack of accountability and transparency; absence of effective management information and financial control systems; inappropriate use of staff resources; poorly paid and demotivated staff; conflictual labour relations; lack of a professional ethos and work ethic.

The intelligence services, though they had been established under a special Act, were in every other sense, part of the public service. Members received their salaries from the public purse, parliament appropriated a budget for their functions, and they were overseen by a minister accountable to parliament.

The objectives for public sector transformation, as spelt out in the Draft White Paper, reflected that the challenges of political and social reform – or transformation – were not unique to the intelligence services, but general in application. It followed that the intelligence services would not escape scrutiny in terms of these criteria when public bodies – elected or otherwise – assessed their performance in the coming years.

By all accounts, the backgrounds and orientation of the people in the newly constituted intelligence services were highly politicised. In the case of the civilian intelligence services, the NIA and SASS, the amalgamation of six disparate entities from both the statutory and liberation movement environments has posed enormous challenges. Mutual suspicions had to be overcome, and personnel who had been ideologically poles apart, moulded into effective organisations. Under these circumstances, training
and reorientation programmes did not always yield the intended results. Shortly after being elected into office, the new government introduced voluntary severance packages for public servants, offering a way out for those who wished to make a break with the services. Many intelligence officers, some of whom were probably too steeped in the ways of the old order, were among those who chose to cut their ties with the new intelligence services.

In the post-conflict period, crime emerged as a pervasive problem for the intelligence services. Political violence was a feature of the immediate post-apartheid landscape, as was economically related violence such as the ‘taxi wars’, which saw rival groups of taxi owners vying for control over lucrative commuter routes. And from time to time, the CID detected white right-wing groups, as they went about their attempts to destabilise the new government. More seriously, the SAPS, together with the civilian intelligence agencies, had to contend with the problem of urban terror in the Western Cape. Following almost two years of investigations into what appeared to be drug- and gang-related instances of bombing of government installations and public places, several high-profile suspects were arrested, restoring a semblance of normality to the troubled province (Africa 2006).

The establishment through the Intelligence Services Control Act, No. 40 of 1994, of a multiparty parliamentary committee was one of the more dramatic post-apartheid developments. In its earliest stages, the committee was at times supportive and at other times critical of the intelligence services, a healthy sign on the face of it.

Appointed by the president, the committee was in a powerful oversight position. Members were required to undergo a security clearance process, managed by the NIA. The Act gave the committee access to intelligence, information and documents in the possession or under the control of a service, to the extent that such access was necessary for the performance of its functions, and on condition that information and records were handled in accordance with the existing security regulations. The Act, however, drew a line when it came to the names or identities of service members, sources, or methods of intelligence gathering: the services were not obliged to disclose details to the committee. The committee was obliged by law to function within the bounds of secrecy of the intelligence services, and to tread the fine balance of being publicly accountable, satisfying parliament that the services were operating within the framework of the law, whilst ensuring that their own impartiality was not impaired.
Lessons from the South African Experience

It is important to recap what made the South African intelligence reform process unique. The relatively powerful position of the liberation movements during the negotiations for a post-apartheid political dispensation saw the constitutional entrenchment of an important principle: the subjection of the security services, including the intelligence agencies, to civilian authority. The intelligence transformation was the product of a systematic pacting between the political elites. This is not to judge the process negatively, but to view it in perspective. Some of the ideals that came to be expressed and eventually adopted by previously conflicted parties were civilian control over the security and intelligence services; the requirement to act in accordance with the rule of law, including international law; the requirement to train security services in a people-centred ethos; and a requirement to establish multiparty oversight structures over the intelligence services. Moreover, the provisions of the Bill of Rights, which includes the rights of freedom of speech, expression, association and information, have required the intelligence services to conduct themselves with restraint.

Another factor which boded well for intelligence reform in South Africa was that, over time, political consensus emerged between the conflicted parties around the question of how to manage the security and intelligence entities in the new political dispensation. The intelligence components of the political entities involved in negotiations were thereby drawn into discussions and the presentation of options for the recrafting of the intelligence services. In this regard, mature leadership played an important part. Also relevant and of impact was the confidence building that took place over the considerable duration of the transition.

It is hard to resist the framework provided by O’Donnell and Schmitter when assessing the role of the main actors in the initial steps in the transition:

Although we cannot provide hard data to prove it, our personal experience in having lived through several of these moments indicates that the catalyst in this transformation comes first from gestures from exemplary individuals, who begin testing the boundaries of behaviour initially imposed by the incumbent regime. This leads to mutual discovery of common ideals, which acquire enormous political significance just because they are articulated
publicly after such a long period of prohibition, privation and privatization (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1991: 49).

The modalities of change were probably also instrumental in ensuring a relatively smooth and successful transition. During the transition, the intelligence services were placed under the control of a transitional political authority consisting of the then government and the ANC.

This transitional authority was mandated to explore the principles that would govern a new intelligence dispensation and the form it would assume. The fact that consensus was reached on these questions should not be underestimated. In both constituencies, there was extreme disquiet along the way, that the concessions being made in the negotiations process were compromising (Friedman 1993). Also, under the transitional arrangements, the intelligence components were forced to get used to the idea that they would be subject to a single civilian leadership under a new political dispensation, and engage with it.

The policy and legislative framework for the existence of the new intelligence services, the allocation of public funds to their activities, the nature of the balance between the secrecy surrounding intelligence activities and the public’s right to be assured of their responsible and accountable conduct, the value structure impacting on the workings of the intelligence services – including freedom of association and expression, and the public right of access to information – were identified as critical issues for new thinking and practice around national security and the posture of the intelligence services. Parliament captured its policy outlook in the White Paper on Intelligence in 1994, and this laid the basis for the reforms that were shortly to be formalised in law (Levy 2004).

The fact that the South African transition involved the wholesale rewriting of the country’s Constitution was another tremendous opportunity. It was not surprising, however, that in spite of all the efforts at alignment with the democratic objectives of the Constitution, the new intelligence services initially faced suspicion and derision from the public.

**Possible Lessons from the South African Experience for Africa**

The drive towards open and multiparty democracy in Africa over the past decade has seen the governance of the security services placed firmly on the agenda. In many instances, such reform has been a requirement
for donor aid (Hendrickson 1999). Very often, there has also been pressure from below, and political parties, civic organisations and other stakeholders have voiced their rejection of security dispensations that are regime-centred. Whatever the reasons, there has been some movement in several democracies in favour of the establishment of intelligence services that are established through legislation, have mandates distinct from those of the police and military, and are subject to the rule of law and oversight procedures. However, not all intelligence and security reform processes take place under conditions which are as favourably disposed to strong oversight and governance as the South African case. During the Cold War period, the presence of foreign intelligence agencies on African soil was rife, with Western governments securing the cooperation of African ex-colonial entities to further their interests (Ray et al. 1979). In many cases, the intelligence and security services were powerful institutions, significantly able to influence or participate directly in political life. Uppermost in the motivation of foreign powers was the promotion of their countries’ interests, and this narrow deployment of intelligence capacities continued well into the post-colonial period. Under the African Union (AU), reform of the military has been high on the agenda when ending conflicts in Africa. What reform of intelligence services there has been in Africa has not generally featured in public discussion. Yet security and conflict have been at the heart of the issues confronting the continent. It can be assumed that where they exist, the security and intelligence services have been central in attending to these concerns. This is borne out by the establishment of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), following a proposal in May 2004 by the Angolan Foreign Intelligence Service, as a vehicle to create consensus and cooperation between African intelligence services, and to exchange information, particularly in the fight against mercenary activity and terrorism on the continent (www.sudaninform.org, 29 July 2007).

CISSA was formed in August 2004 with the broader objective of encouraging the AU to deal with the intelligence and security challenges of the continent. Since its inauguration, CISSA has sought recognition from and affiliated to the AU’s Peace and Security Council, which has had the task of advising and leading the AU Heads of State on how to address the conflicts in areas such as Darfur, Somalia and the Ivory Coast (www.sudantribune.com, 3 June 2007). The theme for CISSA’s fourth conference, ‘Towards enhanced stability, peace and security in Africa’, is reflective of
the collective security concerns of the AU. To that end, and at least on paper, Africa’s intelligence services are aligned in their intent.

There is no doubt that CISSA is inclusive – 54 countries were represented at the fourth conference in 2007. The structure has established a full-time office in Addis Ababa, the headquarters of the AU, with a Chief Executive Officer coordinating its activities. In addition, CISSA boasts a website, a commendable feature on an African landscape that is otherwise opaque on intelligence matters. But the CISSA resolutions reveal a mechanism that is more concerned with the outcome of peace and security, and how cooperation can advance that goal, than with intelligence governance arrangements in individual countries.

A major project of the AU, with implications for intelligence services, has been the resolution to establish a continental early warning system, with sub-regional nodal points. According to Cawthra (2004), such a goal, whilst laudable, will be difficult to implement, because governments are usually not willing to share information that reveals their weaknesses to other governments, demonstrating the challenges of addressing collective and common security goals. What is not apparent is whether the intelligence structures belonging to CISSA are collectively engaged in achieving certain norms that might serve as benchmarks for governance: these might include limiting the mandates of intelligence services and establishing civil control, and independent oversight. But there are signs that at least some countries are considering these issues, and allowing for extensive public debate around them. In Botswana, the government introduced the Intelligence and Security Bill in 2006, aimed at establishing a civilian intelligence structure. Until now, known intelligence functions have been located in the police and defence force. The bill received widespread attention, with reservations being expressed that, amongst other things, it does not provide for parliamentary oversight. But the decision to place the activities of the intelligence services on a legislative footing must be welcomed as an advance.

The critical question posed by observers is whether reform of intelligence services should be concerned with the security of the regime they serve, or whether it should be centred on the broader goals of national development and national security (Cawthra 2004). The fact that intelligence services conduct their affairs in relative secrecy could well be the factor that strengthens calls for oversight and accountability of these structures. Another matter about which there is very little information is the existence and role of oversight structures in the governance of African
intelligence services. To ensure that the intelligence services are properly overseen, best practice for as many of the following elements as possible should be in place:

- executive control and responsibility (the public should be able to hold a particular member of government to account for the successes or failures of the intelligence services);
- multiparty parliamentary oversight, with the oversight structure having meaningful access to relevant information to play its role effectively;
- an independent inspector general for the intelligence services who can investigate complaints from both within the services, and from the public;
- independent oversight of the finances and effective budgetary management by the intelligence services;
- an active role for civil society in shaping policy about national security and the mandate and role of the intelligence services;
- respect for the public’s right of access to information about the intelligence services (Aguero 2004).

Not many countries in Africa boast parliamentary oversight structures specifically for intelligence services, though more are coming to view parliamentary oversight of defence and security as a central feature of a transformed security sector. In South Africa, the advantage was that the Constitution made provision for and required the establishment of oversight structures. This is not the case in all countries undergoing security sector reform. Placing this matter on CISSA’s agenda may well open the door to fundamental reforms that ensure that intelligence services not only cooperate around common interests, but begin to share common values beyond effectiveness, such as accountability and respect for human rights.

Conclusion

The new South African intelligence services are a far cry from their apartheid-era antecedents. Underlying their establishment are principles that put human security, the rule of law, and accountability foremost. Yet redirecting the services from a repressive agenda to one upholding a democratic dispensation has been a minefield, not without shortcomings in practice. To the extent that the process has been a success, this is probably due to a conscious decision to reflect on the envisaged ideal
situation in law and policy. Defining the country’s security vision and framework in law was an inclusive process, involving political parties and their intelligence components, academics and NGOs. Yet the language – or discourse – of transformation has in some ways been superseded by a degree of continuity in the discourse of national security, where the requirement of secrecy is pronounced even in the post-apartheid era. The consequence of this condition must be the subject of further analysis.

With regard to replicating the South African reform process in the rest of Africa, it must be remembered that the South African intelligence dispensation was born out of particular political conditions. There have been encouraging movements towards reform of intelligence services in other African countries. However, the major vehicle coordinating and encouraging cooperation (CISSA) is more outcomes oriented – it has adopted the AU’s goals of promoting stability, peace and security as its own lodestar – rather than promoting the normative values that should underpin the actions of intelligence organisations. Collectively addressing this matter through the forums of the AU can only partly address the concern. Political will and resolve within the countries desirous of change is the critical ingredient for success.

Endnotes

1 Years later, Cawthra and Luckham (2003) were to vindicate this analysis through their study Governing Insecurity – Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies.

2 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1991) use these concepts to describe those who resist the dismantling of authoritarian rule on the one hand, and those who realise the need for legitimation of the regime for its survival, on the other.

3 The incorporation of the armed guerilla wings of the liberation movements into the county’s armed forces was even more stridently resisted by ‘hardliners’ within the ruling government. Questions raised in parliament were routinely greeted with assurances that the guerrilla armies were unprofessional and politicised, and therefore had no place in a regular force.

4 The ANC’s Freedom Charter, which had been adopted at the well-canvassed Congress of the People in 1955, called for ‘peace and friendship’. Rejecting the isolationist and brutal nature of apartheid, it espoused a South Africa at peace with itself and with its neighbours. These principles formed the core of the philosophical outlook for the post-apartheid security services.
What was more critical to both sides was the political fallout of the negotiations and the extent to which the ‘foot soldiers’ would be held to account against the newly defined standards. This was to be resolved after the establishment of a new government, through the establishment by law of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. One of its tasks was to facilitate the granting of amnesty to persons who had committed abuses, if the motivation had been political. The requirement for being granted amnesty was that full disclosure had to be made.

‘Pacting’ is yet another O’Donnell and Schmitter analytical tool. They explain that ‘a pact can be defined as an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the “vital interests” of those entering into it. … Some of those pacts may eventually become the law of the land, being incorporated into constitutions or statutes, others may be institutionalized as the standing operating procedures of state agencies, political parties, interests associations and the like’ (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1991).
Nuclear Weapons: Implications for Africa

Gavin Cawthra and Bjørn Møller

This chapter examines the rather limited African experience of nuclear weapons, and the implications of global nuclear weapon possession and proliferation – and responses against it – for Africa. Because there is a contingent, but not necessary, relationship between civil nuclear power and nuclear weapons, it also touches on civil nuclear issues in Africa, and the implications of uranium production. Since the only country in Africa to have actually developed both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons is South Africa, much of the focus is on that country – also, South Africa, as a result of its prowess in this field, inevitably leads African diplomacy on nuclear governance issues. Before turning to African implications, however, it is necessary to contextualise these issues in the global framework.

Since the end of the Cold War, a specific discourse has gained almost universal prominence even though it seems to defy plain common sense – that the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states and perhaps non-state actors is the main problem, whereas it has ceased to be a problem at all that the existing nuclear weapon states maintain their much larger and more sophisticated arsenals, which are even being continuously upgraded. A lot of international attention is therefore paid to the nuclear non-proliferation regime inaugurated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whereas other forms of nuclear arms control are being systematically disregarded. On closer analysis, however, the NPT reveals itself as just one piece in a much larger puzzle, or as one element in the endeavour to eliminate or at least limit the risk of nuclear war, preferably without thereby increasing the risk of conventional war.
Preventing Nuclear War: Arms Control

As summarised in figure 1, other elements of nuclear and nuclear-related arms control may be grouped into measures intended to reduce or otherwise modify nuclear arsenals (structural arms control) and constraints on nuclear activities (functional arms control).

From the category of structural arms control, the following deserve mentioning:¹

- Attempts to halt the strategic nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, notably with the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation) treaties of 1972 and 1979 respectively, of which only the former entered into force (Carter 1989; Kaplan 1973; Newhouse 1973; Rice 1988; Talbott 1985).
- Modest attempts to reverse this arms race, e.g. in the form of START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) or (on a regional scale) the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, banning intermediate-range nuclear missiles.²
- A quest for arresting or at least slowing down the technological arms race by proscribing nuclear testing with the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) followed by a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (Carter 1989; Loeb 1993).
• Proscriptions or limitations on non-nuclear arms programmes such as defences against nuclear attack with the potential of leading to or accelerating nuclear arms races, as was the rationale for the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty (Bunn 1993).³
• Control of particular technologies which might make nuclear war more likely, for example the use of MIRVs (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) on strategic nuclear missiles, limited in the START II Treaty and the preceding bilateral ‘de-mirving’ agreement (Lockwood 1993).⁴
• Efforts to stem the geographical spread of nuclear weapons, for example into the seabeds of the world’s oceans, in Antarctica or in outer space (Garthoff 1993; Joyner 1993; Ramberg 1993).

From the category of functional arms control, we might mention the following:
• Efforts to prevent nuclear wars by accident or misunderstanding, e.g. via the establishment of a hotline in 1963 and by means of the PNW (Prevention of Nuclear War) agreement (Stone 1993).⁵
• Proposals for banning either the use or, as a minimum, the first use of nuclear weapons.⁶

All of these measures addressed, albeit with rather meagre results, what would logically appear to be the main problem – the nuclear weapons of the states with the largest and most sophisticated arsenals, directed against each other and at a very high level of readiness.

Proliferation Risks in Africa?

There has never been any great enthusiasm for nuclear weapons in Africa – in fact, various African organisations have passed resolutions against them, for example against French nuclear tests in the Sahara Desert in the early 1960s. Apart from Egypt, Libya and South Africa (see below), the only African countries that have ever expressed an interest in joining the nuclear club have been Nigeria and Gabon – the former only for a very brief period, mainly for peaceful use and partly as a counter to the South African nuclear programme, and the latter with a request from then President Omar Bongo to France for a nuclear power station, which was understandably rejected and has never been repeated (Ogunbadejo 1984).

Even though Africa has substantial uranium deposits and production, what is lacking (besides political will) are both the general technological
Table 5: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility/Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Fuel Element Fabrication Plant</td>
<td>Fuel fabrication</td>
<td>In operation</td>
<td>Pilot plant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inchas Nuclear Fuel Laboratory</td>
<td>Fuel fabrication</td>
<td>Laboratory</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Mounana</td>
<td>Uranium ore processing</td>
<td>Decommissioned</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Jorf Lasfar – Khouribga</td>
<td>Uranium recovery from phosphates</td>
<td>Deferred</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safi – Youssoufia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Rössing</td>
<td>Uranium ore processing</td>
<td>In operation</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Arlit</td>
<td>Uranium ore processing</td>
<td>In operation</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Beva</td>
<td>Fuel fabrication</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pelindaba Fuel Fabrication</td>
<td>Fuel fabrication</td>
<td>In operation</td>
<td>Pilot plant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beisa</td>
<td>Uranium ore processing</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Blyvooruitzicht</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Buffelsfontein</td>
<td></td>
<td>Decommissioned</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Central Processing Plant</td>
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<td>Shut down</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Driefontein</td>
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<td>Decommissioned</td>
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<td></td>
<td>East Rand</td>
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<td>Decommissioned</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Freegold</td>
<td></td>
<td>Decommissioned</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Harmony (Merriespruit)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Decommissioned</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hartebeestfontein</td>
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<td>Shut down</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Palabora</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shut down</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Randfontein (Cooke)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Decommissioned</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stifontein</td>
<td></td>
<td>Decommissioned</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vaal Reefs – 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shut down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vaal Reefs – 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>In operation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West Rand Consolidated</td>
<td></td>
<td>Decommissioned</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shut down</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western Deep Levels</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shut down</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
and industrial foundation and the more specific technologies related to the nuclear fuel cycle, except in the case of South Africa (see table 5).

Not only is Africa thus nuclear-weapons free, but it also strains the imagination to envision any change in this regard. Indeed, Africa has been home to three cases of ‘nuclear reversals’, Egypt, South Africa and Libya, all of which pursued nuclear status or even achieved it, only to subsequently abandon their nuclear ambitions.8

### Egypt

The Egyptian nuclear weapons programme seems never to have been a really high priority (Gregory 1995; Rublee 2006). It was first launched by President Nasser and continued under his successors, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. It initially took the form of a request for ‘off-the-shelf’ nuclear weapons addressed to the Soviet Union and China in 1965 and 1967, respectively. As both requests were turned down, Egypt approached India for a collaboration agreement, which was signed in 1970 but produced very little actual assistance. Ambitious plans for an indigenous nuclear weapons production capability, based on a full nuclear fuel cycle, had to be abandoned by 1981, when Cairo signed the NPT. What actually came out of these endeavours was, first, a very small (2MW) research reactor followed by another reactor with a greater capacity of 22MW, which was still quite insufficient for producing weapons-grade material.

There seems to be no significant risk that Egypt may want to resume its nuclear programme and even less grounds to fear that it might be successful this time. It never seemed particularly serious in the first place, even though it seems to have been provoked by the clandestine Israeli nuclear weapons programme (Walsh 1994). Since that time, a ‘cold peace’ has been signed with Israel, and it is unlikely that this will break down – unless, of course, a complete regime change were to occur, for example

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility/Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valindaba (Laser)</td>
<td>Uranium enrichment</td>
<td>Deferred</td>
<td>Pilot plant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valindaba Y – Plant</td>
<td>Decommissioning</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Valindaba Z – Plant</td>
<td>Decommissioning</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Valindaba (UF6)</td>
<td>Conversion to UF6</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelindaba Zircaloy Tubing</td>
<td>Zircaloy tubing</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Gabes</td>
<td>Uranium recovery from phosphates</td>
<td>Under study</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in the form of an electoral victory for the Muslim Brotherhood who just might decide they want to construct an ‘Islamic bomb’. Even in this (entirely hypothetical and quite unlikely) eventuality, Egypt would be very unlikely to succeed.

Libya
There has been more international concern about Libya’s nuclear weapons programme, mainly because of the rather unpredictable nature of the regime,\(^1\) which was even labelled a ‘rogue state’ by the US, both because of its sponsorship of international terrorism and its proliferation efforts (Klare 1995; Litwak 2000; Tanter 1998; Wright 1981).

Libya’s quest for nuclear weapons seems to have begun almost immediately after the coup which deposed King Idris in 1969.\(^1\) The new leader, Colonel Muammar al-Gadhafi, thus approached first China (1969–71) and then France, India and the USSR in the second half of the 1970s for ‘off-the-shelf’ equipment, but to no avail. He then tried ‘shopping around’ for equipment for indigenous production with rather meagre results, even though he claimed only to be interested in peaceful uses of nuclear energy (for example for sea-water desalination), and in 1975 ratified the NPT which the king had signed in 1968. Eventually the USSR consented to selling Libya a small research reactor which went into operation in 1981.

Because of the tight constraints imposed by the NPT and other of the aforementioned anti-proliferation regime elements, Libya through the 1990s chose to rely mainly on clandestine deliveries of both equipment and technical assistance through the Pakistani AQ Khan network, supplemented by efforts to recruit scientists from other Arab countries. There has even been speculation that Libya’s intervention in neighbouring Chad and its \textit{de facto} occupation of the Aouzou Strip from 1973 to 1994 were partly motivated by the hope to be able to mine uranium (Bowen 2006: 29). The main constraints seem to have been neither a lack of political will nor of money to fund the programme but rather the lack of an indigenous industrial and knowledge base.

The rationale for the quest for nuclear weapons has never been quite clear, as Libya has never really had any serious enemies – except, of course, for the US, which launched an air attack against it in 1986 in retaliation for Libyan support for a terrorist attack against US forces (Blum 1986; Davis 1990; Jenkins 1986; Jentleson 1991; Kaldor & Anderson 1986).\(^1\) Even though this may well have strengthened the Libyan desire for a nuclear
deterrent, it cannot really explain what had begun 15 years earlier. A better explanation may be Israel’s nuclear weapons, even though an Israeli attack on Libya was never really on the cards. Indeed the only thing that might have given Israel a motive for such an attack would be the perception that Libya was about to go nuclear. Gadhafi may, however, have viewed the Libyan bomb-in-the-making as a contribution to pan-Arabism, providing a joint Arabian deterrent against Israel. In 1987 Gadhafi thus proclaimed that:

The Arabs must possess the atomic bomb to defend themselves until their numbers reach one billion, until they learn to desalinate seawater (sic!), and until they liberate Palestine. We undertake not to drop the atomic bomb on anyone around us, but we must possess it. (...) If there is going to be a game using atomic bombs, then it should not be played against the Arab nation. (...) This is an essentially defensive weapon (Bowen 2006: 18–19).

Since the late 1990s, however, Libya has reversed course almost completely in several respects (Bahgat 2004; Mateos 2005; Midem 2006; Zoubir 2002). Its geopolitical and cultural/ideological orientation has shifted from pan-Arabism to pan-Africanism, making it, among other things, one of the main promoters and sponsors of African integration (Huliaras 2001; Sturman 2003; Ronen 2002); and it has exhibited a strong interest in mending its relations with the West, not least the US, first by discontinuing its sponsorship of international terrorism and even paying compensation to the victims of the PanAm-103 terrorist attack, and then by a complete abandonment of its proliferation plans.

The motives for abandoning the nuclear programme may have been partly economic – as the economy had been deteriorating, albeit from a very high level – and partly related to a revised view of the country’s security interests. Rather than seeing nuclear weapons as a likely contribution to national security, the regime came around to regarding them as a threat to the very same security (Bowen 2006: 48). In December 2003, Libya announced its intention to implement full disarmament of its weapons of mass destruction programme (including chemical weapons) under full international supervision – and then proceeded to actually do so to everybody’s complete satisfaction. As of today, Libya thus possesses neither weapons of mass destruction nor missiles with ranges in excess of the 300 kilometres permitted by the Missile Technology Control Regime.
South Africa

As the only African country to have developed nuclear weapons and a full nuclear fuel chain, South Africa deserves special attention. From the outset, South Africa’s nuclear ambitions were supported by the US and other Western countries. It was one of the first countries in the world to produce uranium (as a by-product of gold mining), with assistance from the UK and the US, and nuclear research programmes began in the mid-1950s. In 1957 the South African government signed a 50-year agreement with the US under Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme, and the following year a South African team was invited to witness US nuclear weapons tests. In the 1960s, the US supplied a research reactor and enriched uranium to power it. US supplies of enriched uranium were terminated as a result of the apartheid regime’s refusal to join the NPT in the mid-1970s, but by then the country had embarked on its own enrichment programme, and by 1978 was diverting much of the product to the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. Despite this, by as late as 1981, South Africa was the third largest recipient of US nuclear exports. With French assistance, a nuclear power station was constructed at Koeberg near Cape Town in the 1970s, thus completing the nuclear cycle, except for reprocessing (which only a few countries can do) (Cawthra 1986: 106–107; Fig 2005: 40–43).

The apartheid regime adopted a similar stance to that of the Israelis: while it was obvious to most informed observers that it was developing – or had already developed – nuclear weapons, with the support of its international backers in the West, it did not declare its capabilities. Nevertheless, during the 1970s and 1980s there were a number of events that pointed towards South Africa’s nuclear weapons capabilities, some of which still remain shrouded in secrecy or mystery. In 1974 a nuclear test site was built in the wastes of the Kalahari Desert at Vastrap in the Northern Cape. It was detected by a Soviet surveillance satellite and the US pressured South Africa into dismantling it, apparently without it ever being used. Then in 1979 a US satellite registered a double flash usually associated with a nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic Ocean, where a South African warship was present. The evidence around this remains inconclusive, but at the time the CIA apparently reported to the US National Security Council that the most likely explanation was that a tactical nuclear weapon had been tested jointly by the South Africans and Israelis (Cawthra 1986: 107–109; Fig 2005: 41–50).
In 1990, after the unbanning of the ANC and other resistance organisations, and the onset of negotiations to end apartheid, then President FW de Klerk ordered the dismantling of South Africa’s nuclear weapons capabilities. Three years later, he admitted that six nuclear weapons had been built, with a seventh under construction at the time of the dismantling. Subsequently it was revealed that these were ‘old fashioned’ Hiroshima-type bombs that could have been launched from British Buccaneer naval bombers in the possession of the South African Air Force, or from other South African aircraft (Fig 2005: 45–50). It is possible that preparations were also being made to develop nuclear warheads for missiles, as South Africa had a rapidly expanding missile programme at the time – based on a secret agreement with Israel whereby technology from the Jericho II ballistic missile was transferred to South Africa. Three ballistic missiles were built in South Africa, two of which were tested, and although there is no evidence that they were weaponised, Schmidt argues that the Jericho II programme would have allowed South Africa ‘to give its nuclear weapons twice the reach into Africa as delivery by Buccaneer bomber would allow’ (Schmidt 2007: 8).

Many questions remain unanswered about South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme. The South African History Archive has listed these amongst them:

- Was it the intention from the early 1970s, when South Africa was developing ‘peaceful nuclear explosives’, to develop nuclear weapons?
- Was the programme designed only for gaining diplomatic leverage or did it have a military purpose?
- What exactly were the foreign sources of technology (linkages with Israel are strongly suspected, and the extent of US, West German and French support is not clear)?
- Was a new generation of weapons under development?
- Was foreign pressure put on South Africa to sign the NPT (it stretches credulity to the limit to believe that the US and other major Western powers did not know of the nuclear weapons programme)?
- And finally, was fear of a democratic (i.e. a black) government possessing a nuclear arsenal a significant factor behind the decision to dismantle? (South African History Archive 2003: 5).

In July 1991 South Africa became a signatory to the NPT, dismantled its bombs, and subsequently placed its HEU under international safeguard, dismantled its enrichment and other plants, and opened all its facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to
the organisation’s satisfaction (although its reports were never made public) (Reiss 1995: 7–43). Documentation related to the programme was destroyed, but there remained some questions about the role of some of the scientists, and years later cases were recorded of South Africans smuggling nuclear technology to countries such as Libya.

After the first democratic government came to power in 1994, South Africa entered the world arena as the first country to have voluntarily relinquished its nuclear weapons (even though under a previous regime) and was able to use this to good advantage, playing a central role in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and bridging the gap between the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Permanent Five (P5) UN Security Council members (see below) (Reiss 1995: 7–43). It also drove the process of establishing the Pelindaba Treaty (named after one of South Africa’s main nuclear facilities) that set up a nuclear-weapons-free zone for Africa, including its island states.

**Africa as a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone**

As early as 1964, at the first ordinary session of the Organisation of African Unity, the African states passed a declaration on the denuclearisation of the continent (the Cairo Declaration). It was followed with a Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in 1986, but only in 1996, after the apartheid regime had dismantled its nuclear weapons programme and South Africa had made its transition to democracy, did the African states agree on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, better known as the Treaty of Pelindaba. For its entry into force, 28 ratifications were required, but by the end of 2006 only 22 states had ratified: Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo and Zimbabwe.

The treaty is to a large extent built on the model of the South American Tlatelolco Treaty. By constituting the treaty itself, setting out the rights and obligations of the African members, and additional protocols open for the signatures of others, the nuclear powers and the remaining colonial powers (Spain and France). In the treaty itself, the signatories pledged neither to ‘conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile nor otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device’ (art. 3). They also pledged not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons or the
conduct of nuclear tests on their territories (arts. 4–5). Any signatory would have the right to withdraw ‘if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised its supreme interests’, but only after a twelve-month ‘grace period’. The five official nuclear powers, in turn, were invited to sign and ratify Protocol I, thereby renouncing their ‘right’ to ‘use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device’ against any of the African signatories (art. 1), and with Protocol 2 they were invited to pledge themselves to refrain from nuclear testing in Africa (art. 1), a pledge reiterated in Protocol 3, applying only to France and Spain as the last colonial hold-outs. The only exception appears to be the island of Diego Garcia, to which Mauritius lays claim, but which is recognised as British territory and has been leased to the US for a military base – on which there are almost certainly, at some times at least, nuclear weapons.

Africa as a Uranium Supplier

In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, the UK and the US argued their case for the need to disarm Iraq with reference to an alleged Iraqi purchase of uranium from Niger. Even though this soon turned out to be either a deliberate fraud or at least a complete misunderstanding (see Kerr 2003), such clandestine uranium deliveries to prospective non-African proliferants are, in principle, conceivable, especially where government writs do not run strongly.

Indeed, in July 2006, a UN investigation report submitted to the chair of the UN sanctions committee concluded that there was ‘no doubt’ that a large shipment of smuggled uranium 238, hidden in a consignment of coltan and uncovered by customs officials in Tanzania, had originated from uranium mines near Lubumbashi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Shinkolobwe mines there (which supplied the uranium for the bombs that the US dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) were closed in the early 1960s when the departing Belgians poured concrete down the mineshafts, but they have reportedly been reopened by local illegal miners. The shipment was destined for the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, allegedly for forwarding to Kazakhstan, where the coltan would be smelted, but Western commentators assumed the uranium would stay in Iran (Business Day 07.08.06).

The only significant producers of uranium in Africa are Niger, Namibia and South Africa, of which only the latter has the technological and
industrial potential for a full nuclear fuel cycle – even though only the mining capacity remains along with the actual power plants. Other major uranium producers in the world are Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Russia, the US and Uzbekistan (see figure 2).

- Gabon was a minor producer until the late 1970s, but has ceased mining completely.
- In Niger, two uranium-producing companies have been in operation since 1970 and 1978 with production capacities of 1,500 and 2,300 tonnes of uranium p.a. – and with an actual annual production of around 3,000 tonnes.
- Namibia has one operational uranium mine with a nominal production capacity of 4,000 tonnes p.a.
- South Africa has one operational mine, run by AngloGold Ashanti, with an annual production (as a by-product of gold mining) of around 1,000 tonnes (2002). Its only conversion plant (Valindaba) was shut down in 1998, its two enrichment plants (Valindaba Y and Z) closed in 1990 and 1995 respectively, and its fuel fabrication plant (Beva) in 1996. Two nuclear reactors are in operation at the Koeberg nuclear power plant with an annual electricity production of 12.588 TW-h. However, there are plans to open other sites (see below).

Besides these countries, however, several other African countries might become relevant in the future as indicated by the listing of uranium deposits in table 6.

It has been argued that African uranium mining is set to expand quite dramatically, particularly because of recent price increases which make formerly unprofitable mining ventures financially attractive (Reuters 2007), and new deposits may be discovered. Indeed, in the first months of 2007, the Angolan government announced that it had discovered uranium reserves (Africa Confidential, 48(8), 13.04.07).
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Some analysts have argued that nuclear power may be the solution to the energy shortages in the Third World and Africa (see table 7), but no major steps in this direction have been taken in Africa, nor do any seem likely in the foreseeable future, unless South Africa leads the way – as it may do (see below). It should be noted that along with the discovery of uranium reserves, the Angolan government declared that it was ‘interested in looking at developing nuclear power, despite the country’s large petroleum and hydro-electric potential’, and presented to parliament a draft Law of Atomic Energy related to ‘the production and use of nuclear energy’ (Southscan 21(23), 17.11.06). However, this would be a long way to go for a country with Angola’s low technological and knowledge base in relation to nuclear issues.

Table 7: Per Capita Electricity Use (2003)

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Implications of South Africa’s Expanding Civil Nuclear Programme

While the post-apartheid government has shown no interest in renewing a nuclear weapons capability, it has, especially in the last two or three
years, tilted strongly towards reviving a civil nuclear power programme. Initially this was based around the development of what was touted as ‘revolutionary technology’, the Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR), which was originally developed in Germany and the US but refined in South Africa. Essentially, this is a mini-reactor filled with hundreds of thousands of ‘pebbles’ consisting of graphite and enriched uranium dioxide – the design is meant to be safe and efficient. However, as design costs escalated, technical problems mounted and potential markets outside of South Africa waned, enthusiasm for the project appeared to wane (Fig 2005: 93–111).

Without abandoning the PBMR, the South African government has now embarked on a process of building more conventional nuclear reactors on the Koeberg model. This follows global trends, where countries as diverse as China, Russia, Taiwan and Australia are building reactors for power generation, given rising costs of fossil fuels, concerns about global warming and greater comfort about the safety of nuclear reactors. It is also driven by a chronic shortage of electricity in South Africa, where major cities have faced regular blackouts and considerable pressure has been put on the grid by economic expansion. And the new reactors may also form part of a renewed South African effort to become an important actor in the global nuclear arena, especially in Africa.

In February 2007, after much speculation that six or even thirty reactors might eventually be built, then public enterprises minister Alec Erwin announced that a new nuclear power station would be built ‘in the southern part of the grid’ – almost certainly next to Koeberg which is already licensed for another two reactors (Business Day 13.02.07). As with Koeberg, French companies were at the forefront of the bidding to build the plant. In the longer term, government aimed to meet 30 per cent of the country’s energy requirement through nuclear power, investing almost the equivalent of the government’s total annual revenue, over a period of 18 years (Mail & Guardian 09.11.07).

More surprisingly, again after much speculation, then minerals and energy minister Buyelwa Sonjica announced shortly afterwards that South Africa would re-embark on a uranium enrichment programme ‘before year end’, possibly with French or Russian support. Such a programme would be in line with South Africa’s commitment to develop local beneficiation capacities, would ensure a reliable supply of enriched uranium for the new PBMRs and conventional reactors, and could set South Africa up as an exporter of enriched uranium. This could be extended to reprocessing of
spent fuel (Business Day 21.02.07). This is surprising because few countries find it cost-effective to enrich their own uranium – only ten countries do so, many of them through joint ventures to save costs – while even fewer are capable of reprocessing. It is difficult to envisage how South Africa could find this cost-effective.

One clue may lie in its evident ambitions to spread nuclear technology throughout Africa. In November 2006, the minister of minerals and energy held a two-day meeting with African ‘energy decision-makers’ comprising an executive committee called Powering Africa: The Nuclear Option. She said that Africa possessed significant uranium resources which should be beneficiated (enriched) and used to generate energy, that regional approaches should be adopted to building a nuclear infrastructure and that discussions were taking place with Nigeria to establish a regional nuclear and radiation regulatory forum. Strategic partnerships would be required with countries that had extensive nuclear programmes, and ‘deliberate and calculated planning on behalf of the leaders of the continent’ was needed – South Africa was already developing its own strategy. ‘Africa in particular needs nuclear energy,’ she concluded (Business Day 28.11.06).

In parallel, South African companies have been developing plans to expand uranium mining – South Africa possesses the fourth largest reserves in the world but they are largely under-exploited (see figure 2). A company called Uranium One has started work on a mine near Klerksdorp and a small mining company, Simmer & Jack, has plans to exploit uranium in its slimes dams at Buffelsfontein and Randfontein. South African companies have also indicated an interest in exploiting resources at the Kanyemba deposit in Zimbabwe. The Nuclear Energy Corporation has announced plans to build a new smelter for the future disposal of domestically generated nuclear waste. South Africa also supplies one-quarter of the world’s radioactive medical isotopes, which are exported from OR Tambo international airport (Business Day 23.06.06, 03.03.07).

Clearly, although it has no intention of resuscitating its nuclear weapons programme, South Africa has substantial plans to expand its domestic nuclear capabilities, through the full cycle, and export nuclear technology into Africa. This in part explains some of its foreign policy positions, in particular in relation to Iran’s enrichment programme, which brings us back to the problem of nuclear weapons (from which it is often difficult to separate civil nuclear issues).
Policy Challenges for Africa and South Africa

It may be asked why South Africa is ‘separated’ from the rest of Africa in this section. The answer, of course, is that as the only African country with an internationally-recognised nuclear technological base, and as a former nuclear weapons power which is also represented on the board of the IAEA, South Africa may have somewhat different interests in the nuclear game to other African countries, and certainly will carry more punch, as has been seen in the NPT review processes. Nevertheless, to a large extent, South Africa occupies common policy territory with the rest of Africa, and has sought to promote the positions of the NAM, the African Union and the G-77, sometimes acting as interlocutor between these groups and the P5.

Africa will continue to remain a nuclear-weapons-free zone. With Libya now falling into line, there are no African states contemplating developing or hosting nuclear weapons. The issue of warships from the P5, which may or may not have nuclear weapons on board, however, is a vexed one. For the most part, African countries hosting such ships (for R&R, official visits or peacekeeping purposes) assume that they do not have nuclear weapons on board and since this is neither confirmed nor denied the issue is fudged.

There will be continued emphasis not only on the non-proliferation aspects of the NPT but also on the provisions for disarmament. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, this issue – that the P5 signatories to the NPT are expected to disarm, but have shown little or no inclination to do so – has somehow been allowed to slip off the global radar screen. This was the issue that divided the 1995 NPT review conference, with the NAM countries resisting an indefinite extension of the treaty without regular review and the establishment of ‘yardsticks’ with which to measure disarmament by the P5 (Simpson 1996).

In general within Africa, there is a strong sentiment that any steps taken against states allegedly violating the NPT or developing nuclear weapons outside of the NPT should be done through multilateral institutions such as the IAEA or, where necessary, the UN Security Council. Hence the opposition of most African countries (although not all) to the US invasion of Iraq on the grounds of its possession of weapons of mass destruction, and the reservations of many African countries about Security Council actions against Iran (subsequently vindicated by revelations that UN intelligence believes that Iran is no longer intent on developing nuclear weapons).
With its nuclear technology base, and its ambitions to expand it (including through enrichment), South Africa feels perhaps a stronger concern than other African countries about P5 (especially Western) attempts to prevent Iran from enriching uranium. This may explain in part why it held out until the last moment on the Security Council against such actions. As Rob Adam, head of South Africa’s Nuclear Energy Corporation, put it rather bluntly, the problem is that developed countries seem to want to control the expansion of nuclear activity, and Western powers’ efforts to stop Iran from enrichment demonstrate that (Business Day 04.09.06). Likewise, in August 2006, after meeting with her Iranian counterpart, South Africa’s minister of foreign affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, reiterated ‘the basic and inalienable right of all NPT states to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination’ (ANC Today 6(33), 25.08.06).

There remains considerable concern in Africa – especially in Egypt – about Western tolerance of Israel’s nuclear weapons and the fact that it has not signed the NPT. This again has been a major issue in the review conferences. The fact that some African countries, such as Egypt and countries in the Horn, are essentially more part of the Middle Eastern security complex than African ones, complicates the issue of proliferation. For example, it has been posited that a ‘cascade’ might follow the possible development of nuclear weapons by Iran, with Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia wanting to counter a ‘Shia bomb’ – and where would this leave Egypt over the long term? The prospects of such a cascade do, however, seem quite remote.

India and Pakistan, as developing countries with which many African countries share a policy solidarity, pose particular problems, especially for South Africa with its close ties to India and its membership of the India–Brazil–South Africa alliance. South Africa’s position is clear: despite India’s failure to sign the NPT, and its development of nuclear weapons, President Mbeki indicated that as a member of the Nuclear Supply Group, South Africa would support a bid by India – backed by the US (providing it can be pushed through Congress) – to have access to technology for its nuclear power stations (this is on the very questionable basis that India has ‘separated’ its civil nuclear programme from its military one) (Economist 22.06.06; Business Day 03.10.06).
Conclusion

With the exception of South Africa, African countries have been largely unable to develop nuclear technology infrastructures which would allow them to exploit nuclear power – despite important uranium reserves in some states. With the exception of South Africa and Libya, African countries have been unwilling or unable to attempt to develop nuclear weapons, and only South Africa succeeded in this regard.

With the Pelindaba Treaty in place, it is highly unlikely that any attempt will be made by any African country in the near or middle future to develop or deploy nuclear weapons. Even those African countries that form part of the Middle Eastern security complex are most unlikely to experience nuclear proliferation.

However, an expansion of civil nuclear technology, uranium extraction and possibly beneficiation, and development of nuclear power facilities within South Africa is under way. Whether this process will have much effect on other African countries remains to be seen, although South Africa would certainly like this to happen, and in the current economic climate, uranium extraction is likely to increase on the continent, raising concerns about controls.

South Africa’s intentions to promote civil nuclear power inevitably impact on its nuclear diplomacy and have some effect on its approaches to non-proliferation, but overall it is guided, as are many other African countries, by the strategic imperative of promoting disarmament as well as non-proliferation.

Endnotes

1 The texts of all the following agreements are reprinted in Burns (1993).
2 On START, see Caldwell (1993); Karp (1992); May et al. (1988). On the INF Treaty, see Nolan (1993); Dean (1988).
3 On the negotiations, see for example Garthoff (1985). On the contents of the treaty, see for example Schwartz (1984); Schneiter (1984); Drell et al. (1986).
4 The treaty itself, with accompanying protocols and memorandums of understanding, is appended on pp. 576–589 in Lockwood (1993). The preceding ‘de-mirving’ agreement of 17 June 1992 is excerpted ibid., pp. 575–576. MIRVs were especially crisis-unstable because they allowed one side to ‘take out’ several enemy missiles (and even more warheads) with each missile in a first strike, while at the
same time increasing vulnerability to a hostile first strike that might neutralise several launchers with an even greater number of warheads. Both incentives for and the actual ability to launch a (partially) disarming first strike were thus increased. 

On MIRV, see also Greenwood (1975).


6 On no first use, see Hampson (1993); see also Bundy et al. (1985); Union of Concerned Scientists (1983); Steinbruner & Sigal (1983); Blackaby, et al.; Lee (1988); Lübkemeier (1988). The International Court of Justice has, in an advisory opinion, proscribed the use of nuclear weapons. See Chazournes and Sands (1999).

7 Data from IAEA: *List of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities*, at www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/.

8 On the concept, see Levite (2002).

9 On the Israel-Egypt peace, see Quandt (1993).

10 On the rather bizarre ideology of Muammar al-Gadhafi, see Hajjar (1980); idem (1982); St John (1983); Shepard (1987); Anderson (1986); Ayoub (1992). His *Green Book* is available online at www.qadhafi.org/the_green_book.html. It is also reflected in the official name of the state, which is ‘The Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’.

11 The following is mainly based on Bowen (2006).

12 On the inability to thus deter Libya from new terrorist attacks, see Malvesti (2002); Collins (2004); Jentleson & Whytock (2005).


14 On the relative weight of the various policies to bring about this change, see Collins (2004); Jentleson & Whytock (2005).

15 On the Lockerbie affair, see Beveridge (1992); Anon. (2001); Anon. (2003).

16 IAEA 2005: 43 (Gabon), 60 (Namibia), 62–63 (Niger), and 74–75 (South Africa).

17 Diagram from IAEA (2006). uranium resources in Namibia, Niger and South Africa are thus 6, 5 and 7 per cent respectively.
Security cooperation is not an obvious element of regional economic integration. By this I mean there is no automatic link. A region’s members can progress economically without necessarily trusting each other. Despite this, African leaders assume that countries ought to cooperate in the security arena in order to improve the prospects of economic integration (the pillar upon which the African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development [NEPAD] is built). In our case in southern Africa, few beyond the leadership echelons make such assumptions. It is unclear to many southern Africans whether or how the Southern African Development Community (SADC) provides human security to the people of the region. Instead, the positions of SADC member countries on the key regional challenges (trade, growth and development, security and stability) are driven by national interests rather than regional interests. As realists argue, national interests (a must-have) are hard and measurable; regional cooperation (often a nice-to-have) is hard to measure. Or should we accept a regional consciousness shaped by a shared historical experience – a problematic assumption?

A policy analysis whereby one looks at organisational behaviour through the lens of new institutionalism might enable a deeper understanding of SADC security cooperation. However, as any reflective postmodern audience would know, social theory, especially in the inter-organisational or institutional domain, often obscures more than it reveals. March and Olson once remarked, ‘what we observe in the world is inconsistent with the ways in which contemporary theories ask us to talk’ (quoted by Powell & DiMaggio 1991: 3). With these caveats in place, we can now examine the substantive issues.
New Institutionalism

For a long time, institutions were at the heart of political science and public administration. More recently, researchers have expressed a renewed interest in institutions, but going beyond constitutions, legislatures and executives by focusing on processes, actors, interests, norms and rules (Parsons 1995: 223). This chapter refers to institutions as forms of social organisation, specific or abstract (Williams 1983: 169). Following Lowndes (1996), institutions display the following characteristics:

- **Institution is a middle-level concept.** Institutions are devised by individuals, but in turn constrain their action. They are part of the broad social fabric, but also the medium through which day-to-day decisions and actions are taken.

- **Institutions have formal and informal aspects.** Institutions involve formal rules or laws, but also informal norms and customs – ‘the way things are done’.

- **Institutions have a legitimacy and show stability over time.** Institutions have legitimacy beyond the preferences of individual actors.

However, it must also be said that new institutionalism is not a single or coherent body of theory. The concept is used in many different disciplinary contexts – political studies, economics, and organisational theory (for discussion, see Lowndes 1996; Powell & DiMaggio 1991). I will discuss some of these uses later in the chapter. The valuable point most new institutionalist perspectives make is that institutions are not things but processes.

How is this relevant to SADC and its efforts at security cooperation? This chapter explores two avenues.

It is worth re-emphasising that institutions display three key characteristics: a set of formal and informal rules which structure social action; change and stability, which are stages in an institutional life cycle; and strategic action, which plays an important role in driving change, whilst norm-driven behaviour is key to sustaining institutional rules over time. On the basis of these variables, Lowndes (1996) constructed six short ‘vignettes’ or sketches of institutions, four of which are summarised below.
Another version of the new institutionalism assumes progress through process. Smith (2004), for example, argues that through the process of institutionalisation, relations among states in a cooperative arrangement (such as the European Union, which he examined) progress from narrow instrumental rationality (characterised by intergovernmentalism) to a more collective or social rationality (characterised by legitimate procedures of governance and corresponding changes in their domestic policies). One can distinguish between the following stages or steps in such a process (wisely allowing for overlap and inconsistency), with a view to its applicability to the SADC arena:

**Box 1: Institutional Behaviour: New Institutional Insights**

**The ‘Stable’ Institution**
Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a stable, but not necessarily efficient, framework for human interaction. Technically inefficient institutions persist because they contribute to stability and harmony in interaction and because they are deeply embedded in culture and tradition. It is the tenacity of informal constraints that produces institutional stability. While formal rules (constitutions, contracts, standing orders) can be redrawn overnight, informal rules change slowly – ‘old’ conventions often persist in the face of, and at odds with, new formal codes.

**The ‘Manipulated’ Institution**
Public choice scholars view institutions as obstacles to effective exchange. They predict processes of ‘institutional entropy’ in the political arena. Manipulated by utility-maximising politicians and bureaucrats, institutions degenerate over time; they come to serve the individual, private interests of officials and any conception of the public interest is lost.

**The ‘Disaggregated’ Institution**
The ‘policy community’ or ‘policy network’ approach paints a picture of institutions which are disaggregated, informal, policy-specific and relatively stable over time. Policy is made not by a unified machine but by an assortment of actors linked together in networks. Networks have a limited number of participants who interact frequently, share values and exchange resources. There are low levels of conflict and ‘positive-sum’ power games. However, the specific pattern of network relationships varies in different policy fields, there are also areas in which inter-agency relationships are not institutionalised as networks: such fields are characterised by a lack of stability and continuity.

**The ‘Appropriate’ Institution**
Institutions provide order in political life. They express norms of decision-making and behaviour, providing a ‘logic of appropriateness’. Seemingly neutral procedures and structures embody particular values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs. A calculus of identity and appropriateness is more important to actors than a calculus of political costs and benefits. Rules are sustained by trust, and reflect and embody historical experience. Institutions generally change in an incremental way through responding to environmental signals.
• **Establishment of the policy domain as an inter governmental forum.** The start is often a conscious, public decision amongst a number of actors to organise their cooperation in an issue area. In the case of southern Africa, the Frontline States (FLS) alliance historically played this role, although it must be acknowledged that the FLS itself was a product of the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), later expanded to include the southern African nationalist movements seeking independence (and hence renamed the Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa – PAFMECSA) (Omari 2000).

• **Information sharing.** Once actors have agreed to cooperate, they may then begin a discourse about the means and ends of their cooperation. This can initially be mere discussion about policy coordination (‘cheap talk’) or specific cooperative policy actions (‘results’). As goal-oriented communication intensifies, the demand for greater structure grows and cooperation becomes more likely. Arguably, the Defence Staff Committee (DSC, later renamed the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee [ISDSC]) as a mechanism of the FLS played this role.

• **Norm creation and codification.** Once communication moves beyond ‘cheap talk’, institutionalisation takes on a new dynamic, involving the generation of norms. As officials learn to trust each other and develop a shared understanding of what their cooperation actually involves, it becomes possible for them to establish clearer obligations regarding ends and means of a specific policy domain. Smith (2004) examined various types of norms: informal customs, or the traditions and practices that emerge in day-to-day interactions among officials, norms that are codified into written norms, a further transition of norms to rules as specific rights and obligations applicable to certain situations, and finally the transition from rules into formal laws. Again, arguably, the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) started to play this role from 1980 (Mandaza & Tostensen 1994).

• **Organisations.** Behavioural norms are not the only manifestation of institutionalisation. The establishment of a permanent organisation to administer some policy domain represents an additional degree of institutionalisation. Such formal organisations can change the nature of cooperation. At the very least, organisations can provide some institutional memory concerning previous decisions. At the most, the organisation itself can become an autonomous actor with policy influence. In the case of southern Africa, the establishment of
the SADC in 1992 indicated that the region was moving up a level in terms of institutionalised political and economic cooperation (Le Pere & Tjønneland 2005).

Smith (2004) finally identifies governance as a further evolution of cooperation, where states consider cooperation as a unified whole. This, in his opinion, requires a policy process whereby governance is seen as the authority to make, implement, and enforce rules in a specific domain.

We can display the above process in the following format:

### Box 2: Institutionalisation of Security Cooperation in Southern Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a policy domain as an intergovernmental forum</td>
<td>PAFMECA/PAFMECSA/FLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing</td>
<td>DSC / ISDSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm creation and codification</td>
<td>SADCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations</td>
<td>SADC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This process has seemingly allowed for informal patterns of security cooperation in southern Africa (primarily focused on the struggles against colonialism and apartheid) to be formalised (that is, rules-driven and forward-looking) with the establishment of organisational structures. Whether the restructured SADC of 2001 and its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) and the range of recently adopted policy frameworks in the area of security cooperation (including the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the Mutual Defence Pact and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ [SIPO]) can be seen as approaching the fifth level of institutional cooperation (governance) is a question to be examined.

The other side of the same coin can be stated thus: to what extent are SADC member states willing and able to harmonise national decision-making (structures and practices) in order to enhance the region’s security authority to make, implement and enforce rules? The second question concerns the extent to which SADC displays institutional behaviour of a ‘stable’, ‘appropriate’, ‘manipulated’ or ‘disaggregated’ kind. In a recent seminal analysis of SADC, Oosthuizen (2006: 325) concludes that it
provides an ‘evolving, institutionalised, rules-based forum within which the members meet regularly to discuss and argue about political and security issues’ – a strong vote in favour of seeing SADC as having evolved governance capabilities, or displaying ‘appropriate’ behaviour.

However, participant observation (of discussions – formal and informal – between SADC members and SADC and the donor community) suggests that three alternative scenarios are possible:

1. **United SADC**: A holistic (integrated and comprehensive) approach to trade, economic and security integration, accompanied by a negotiated road map with clear timelines and implementation indicators, therefore approaching governance or appropriateness.

2. **Divided SADC**: A two-level, variable-speed approach to integration: fast-tracking trade and economic integration amongst a core group of countries, with sporadic security cooperation, accompanied by a separate Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the SIPO, therefore displaying organisational or disaggregated behaviour.

3. **Disintegrating SADC**: A radical rethink of the nature of the relationships between countries and societies in southern Africa, therefore suggesting mere information-sharing behaviour and signs of being manipulated.

The chapter now focuses on SADC’s genesis, evolution and current state of implementation of rules in the area of security cooperation in order to further interpret its institutional nature and behaviour.

Formal, interstate cooperation in southern Africa is a relatively new phenomenon. The roots of this practice lie in the region’s complex colonial past, whereby European powers maintained an exploitative presence in the region, primarily for economic purposes. Wars of liberation gave rise to security cooperation (via PAFMECA, PAFMECSA and especially the FLS) and economic cooperation (via SADCC).

Largely in preparation for a liberated South Africa, the region reconfigured its cooperative strategies by establishing SADC in 1992. As it grew in membership (from nine to 15) and objectives (from socio-economic cooperation to integration), SADC’s structure and operations had to be refined. This was initiated in 1999 and concluded in 2001. It also formalised peace and security cooperation by establishing a comprehensive decision-making architecture. In 2003, it adopted an implementation plan, the RISDP.
The Nature of the Integration Project

SADC is first and foremost an arrangement facilitating economic integration in order to ‘improve the quality of life of the peoples of the region’ (SADC 1992). SADC’s genesis reflects this priority. When SADCC was formed in 1980, it adopted the slogan ‘Southern Africa – towards economic liberation’.

The current SADC vision is one of:

… a common future, a future within a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa (SADC 2003: 4).

However, as the academic literature on regionalism and human security makes clear, this is a task not easily achieved, requiring a range of objective and subjective preconditions. Indeed, at the time when the SADC leadership was contemplating the future management of power relations, a throng of policy analysts recommended the need for SADC to adopt the ‘new’, widened definition of security (for an overview of these debates, see Zacharias 2003). The uncritical assumption was that this would lead to ‘the elimination of war’ and sustainable human development – features of a ‘security community’ (Booth & Vale 1995). Much was to be said for being inspired by the mood of the time – the dawn of a new post-Cold War, post-apartheid era – and the caution from some analysts (and policy-makers), namely not to underplay the impact of the violent political history of the region, was discounted.

And indeed, both analysts and policy-makers hoped that a regional grouping such as SADC would evolve into a ‘security community’ on the basis of exhibiting four conditions: active engagement with security and development challenges; a timeline for achieving objectives; an inclusive process, allowing for state and civil society input; and institutionalisation of the process (Schoeman 1998).

However, the model never fully accounted for the long-term impact of the historical experiences of the region, and with the onset of the wave of democratisation in southern Africa some of these fault lines rose to the surface (Matlosa 2003).

Indeed, the eruption of the Great Lakes crisis vaporised the naïve beliefs of many of the theoretical community builders. In 1999, one
assessment was that SADC appeared unable to meet the first three conditions for being classified as a security community (namely active engagement with security and development challenges, a timeline for achieving objectives, and an inclusive process, allowing for state and civil society input) and partially met the fourth condition of institutionalisation (Van Nieuwkerk 1999. See also Isaksen & Tjønneland 2001; Nathan 2004. See Ngoma 2005 for an optimistic view). A few years later Landsberg and Baregu concluded that SADC’s security architecture remained ‘elusive’, operationalisation of the OPDSC was not guaranteed, and the gap between policy and practice needed to be closed.

Several years later, I still argue that the SADC project can progress, but only on the basis of careful phased planning towards meeting the four conditions necessary for its evolution into a security community. And institutional development is still a key requirement. On this issue, Hansohm observed:

The formation of a regional integration arrangement requires that regional institutions be developed to which important facets of national economic and political decision making will be subordinate. Its successful establishment … requires a major transition, which can easily trip participating countries up. This may explain why the conclusion of regional integration arrangements is not matched by the active participation of member states in the integration exercises … (Hansohm 2005: 202).

This chapter argues that the deepening of regional cooperation in the area of peace and security similarly requires institutional governance in the sense that regional institutions be developed ‘to which important facets of national … decision making will be subordinate’ (Hansohm 2005; see also Mulaudzi 2006). Of course, this is not the only way in which countries have to pursue security cooperation: alternative avenues include ‘functional coordination’ (to deal with, say, cross-border theft), or coalition or alliance formation (similar to networking – whereby a number of countries come together for a short period of time to pursue policy objectives in a specific issue area). But the language of the SADC Treaty and the OPDSC Protocol is clearly written with more in mind! Hence the seemingly useful fit between new institutionalism and SADC’s behaviour. The question then becomes, can SADC make the transition to institutional governance as specified above?
Although one can track institutional development (for example the OPDSC Protocol, adopted in 2001), such developments seem not to be matched by the active participation of members, to the extent that one can discern a positive impact of such institutional activity upon regional peace and security. If the SIPO (adopted in 2003) was designed to give effect to the mandate of the OPDSC (as well as provide a measuring tool for the Organ’s impact), then the evidence is not entirely convincing. The sections below will interrogate these impressions in more detail.

Institutional Evolution

Regional cooperation in the 1980s, even if informal and limited, succeeded in realising a number of regional development projects, mainly in the infrastructure and food security sectors (Lambrechts 2001). The activities of the FLS, in its quest to eradicate colonial rule and apartheid in southern Africa, additionally brought about a sense of regional identity and promoted a shared political vision (Omari 2000).

SADCC was transformed into SADC in 1992, reflecting the changing regional – and external – environments. Most importantly, South Africa joined SADC in 1994, as did the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1997. However, a year later a major regional war erupted, involving the DRC and a number of other SADC member states. At the same time an attempted coup destabilised Lesotho. SADC’s unconsolidated security structures (especially the OPDSC, established in 1996 and chaired by President Mugabe of Zimbabwe) played a controversial role in the attempt to resolve these crises (Williams, 2001).

In following the logic of ‘no development without stability’, broad institutional refinement was therefore called for. As Tjønneland (2005) notes, in March 2001 an extraordinary SADC summit approved the proposed recommendations for far-reaching changes in SADC’s institutional framework and the structure for executing its 1992 mandate. These included changes in SADC’s governing structures at the regional and national levels but, most importantly, a plan for the centralisation of the 21 sector-coordinating units and commissions located in 12 of its member countries. These units were brought together in four clusters in a strengthened SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana.

At the Council of Ministers Meeting and Summit in Blantyre in August 2001 these changes in SADC structures were further consolidated.
The SADC Treaty was amended to take into account the institutional changes. In addition the summit signed a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation to underpin the OPDSC, which was placed under the authority of the SADC summit. The Organ has its own set of regional structures and mechanisms for policy formulation and implementation.

The SADC SIPO

The foreword to the printed version of the SIPO (dated August 2004) states that the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation is intended to serve as an instrument for dealing with the region’s political and security challenges, and that the SIPO was formulated to assist with the implementation of the Protocol:

The SIPO is not an end in itself … it is an enabling instrument for the implementation of the SADC developmental agenda (embodied in RISDP). The core objective of the SIPO therefore, is to create a peaceful environment … to realise the region’s socio-economic objectives (SADC 2004).

The SIPO was designed to do three things: provide guidelines for action (strategies and activities); shape the institutional framework for the day-to-day activities of the Organ (including the Protocol and the Mutual Defence Pact); and align the regional peace and security agenda with that of the African Union (AU) (in particular the Standby Force and aspects of good governance).4

There seem to be a variety of reasons for the production of an implementation plan which contains over 130 objectives with no clear hierarchy, and no serious effort to produce a business plan.5 First of all, the manner in which the document evolved is important for understanding its shape. SADC’s preference for consensual policy-making resulted in a number of countries adding their voices to the activities of the working group which was set up to construct the guideline in the first place. The resultant document reflects more accurately the combined national interests of 14 countries instead of a strategic management tool to guide Organ activities. As such, it reminds us of the delicate nature of security perspectives and preferences amongst members of SADC.
Secondly, the management of the Organ’s affairs takes place in the context of a small (and weak) administrative infrastructure and capacity. This has obvious implications for SADC’s ability to prioritise, implement, monitor and evaluate mechanisms and plans relating to its peace and security agenda. The choice to run a ‘minimalist’ Organ Directorate relates to the divergent political outlooks and priorities of its member states, whereby some governments are preoccupied by state (or regime) security issues, while others emphasise human security. As some analysts provocatively argue, the Organ was created to ensure the self-preservation of SADC and its ‘governing elites’ (Makoa 2005; Van Zyl Slabbert 2006). Governments have also adopted different approaches to dealing with internal challenges, reflecting the region’s varied experiences with democratisation (Nathan 2004; Tjønneland 2005).

It would therefore be misleading to expect the SADC Secretariat to be engaged in political decision-making relating to regional peace and security: it exists by design of the member states, in order to carry out political instructions. Put differently, the SADC Treaty and the mandates of the Secretariat and Directorate restrict them to being administrative (or implementation, monitoring and evaluation) units with no political decision-making powers. SADC member countries have not chosen to establish a regional institution with supranational power in the areas of politics, defence and security – critically, a precondition for moving the institution towards a security community. Given these strictures, the relationship between the Secretariat and individual members becomes key, as does leadership. In short, the Organ is not more than the sum of its parts, and given its in-built shortcomings, the parts become key. What is it that the participating member countries want from the SADC security agenda? Although attempted before (Cawthra & Van Nieuwkirk 2004), this question remains difficult to answer without additional research into the national security agendas of SADC member states.

**Status of Implementation**

The rather exhaustive list of objectives, strategies and activities contained in the SIPO document can be summarised to include democracy-building, peacekeeping training, police cooperation – especially regarding cross-border crime, disaster management, conflict management (with the emphasis on conflict resolution), and food security. In the (much) longer
term the organisation plans to promote institution-building, peace enforcement and harmonisation of foreign policies. But where is the current focus?

Some analysts believe the focus to be wrong altogether. For example, Makoa (2005) has serious reservations about the ability of the Organ to act as an integrative, democratic force in the region and points to its ‘inability’ to deal with political crises in Angola, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and the DRC (see also Nathan 2004). This, in his view, demonstrates its lack of credibility and legitimacy (‘protecting governments rather than people’), leading to his call for the Organ to realise its potential by being democratised, that is, opened up to the people, presumably via introducing parliamentary oversight over the institution. This debate, of course, raises questions about the nature of the integration project (scenario two above), which lies beyond the scope of this chapter. It is also necessary to point out that the Organ’s so-called ‘inability’ to deal with political crises seems to be a misreading of the nature of SADC decision-making: it chose to deal with political crises in a certain manner.

If we believe the Organ to be of value in the broader integration process, then we can focus on an analysis of its implementation. Tjønneland (2005) sees three emerging priority areas: small arms, elections management and peace support efforts. On the first issue, he notes that Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation seems to be making more progress than the Organ Secretariat itself (although it must be noted that the former is not formally part of the latter). Regarding peace support operations, he notes progress but also the emergence of various problems: the failure to get the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre based in Harare reactivated, the absence of a mandate for the SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG) deployment, the question of the financing of a deployment mission and, finally, contrary to UN doctrine, the absence of any meaningful civilian involvement in the activities of the Standby Force. Again, it must be noted that the putative SADCBRIG can only be understood from the perspective of the AU’s continental security architecture and plans (Van Nieuwkerk 2003).
Enhancing National Decision-making for Regional Security Governance?

There is no question that SADC, through its Organ and related structures (including the SIPO), has made progress. The Organ Directorate can rightly claim that the region experiences relative peace and security (although not entirely because of the Organ!) and that the focus should be on responding to the human security agenda. From the Organ Directorate’s perspective, these issues have been identified as in need of further operationalisation. Yet in reviewing the status of the SIPO there are also some worrying signals. The first, and most obvious one, relates to the ongoing signals from the Directorate which lead to perceptions of secrecy and unaccountability as far as the Organ and its Directorate are concerned. International Co-operating Partners (ICPs) and civil society members alike register frustration on a regular basis at the lack of engagement with the Organ and its Directorate.

Secondly, although the focus (in the SIPO and the Directorate) seems to be firmly on meeting the region’s human security challenges, there appears to be a fixation with the SADCBRIG. As analysts have pointed out elsewhere, it is a military obsession, whereby the AU request for standby arrangements is interpreted as needing a militarist response, leaving civilian input and participation behind, if not absent from planning altogether.

In order for the SIPO and its managers to move beyond some of this criticism, it is suggested that the proposed SADC–Civil Society Partnerships, as identified by the acting Director of Politics, Defence and Security during the SADC Consultative Conference of 2006, be activated expeditiously. Apart from establishing a much-needed channel of communication, such structured engagements will allow both SADC and civil society to pursue matters in a manner that will benefit the broader integration project. Over and above such confidence-building measures, it will also provide ICPs with an additional channel to engage with the Organ.

On another level, and following from the argument that one ought not to expect the Organ Directorate to lead with political decision-making in the areas of politics, defence and security, it is recommended that individual member countries examine their own approach and commitment to the Organ’s objectives. Which of the three scenarios are attractive to members? Recall that the chapter identified a ‘united’,...
‘divided’ and ‘disintegrating’ SADC. To determine this, some questions can be put to the nation. Does the regional integration project, and the pursuance of peace and stability, resonate with its own broad vision of the future? Does the country get an adequate return on its investment in SADC? Is committing to SADC (in terms of human and physical resources) in the national interest, or should membership of alternative clubs be considered? Critically, how do the regional peace and security policy frameworks integrate with domestic policies? What is the general public’s view of SADC? Is there a regular review of the regional/national interface? As with the AU peer review process, these questions ought not to be answered by government and state managers alone: civil society has a critical role to play.

For those supportive of the vision of a united region, more work needs to be done in preparing for the further prioritisation and implementation of the SIPO, taking into account the specificities of the parts which make up the whole. On this basis the SIPO can then be reformulated to look like the road map it was supposed to be in the first place. The recent (2006) summit in Maseru seems to point the way forward: it has finally accepted a (admittedly ambitious) road map to realise SADC’s vision of deeper regional integration and poverty eradication by specifying stages and timelines: from a Free Trade Area in 2008, to a Customs Union in 2010, to a Common Market in 2015 and a Monetary Union by 2016 (SADC 2006). The 2007 summit with its focus on poverty alleviation has the potential to inspire the region with a strong vision and sense of purpose, and is to be encouraged. The question that lingers, however, is where the SIPO fits into such a revitalised vision.

Conclusion

Earlier in the chapter, I developed three scenarios (probable futures) for SADC. For purposes of concluding the chapter, I repeat them:

• A united SADC follows a holistic (integrated and comprehensive) approach to trade, economic and security integration, accompanied by a negotiated road map with clear timelines and implementation indicators.
• A divided SADC follows a two-level, variable-speed approach to integration: fast-tracking trade and economic integration amongst
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a core group of countries, and with sporadic security cooperation, accompanied by separate RISDP and SIPO implementation plans.

- A disintegrating SADC is characterised by a regression in the nature of the relationships between countries in southern Africa – driven by narrowly defined national interests, unregulated markets, or a combination of both.

How does this relate to our various excursions into the cooperative security literature? For a start, this chapter’s brief affaire with new institutionalism allowed the construction of a view of SADC security cooperation (box one) which suggests a developmental path from informal, ad hoc to formal, rules-based governance. Measured against action in the field, so to speak, the chapter finds that on the one hand the SADC leadership is rhetorically committed to full integration in both the socio-economic and security arenas (and to the eventual merging of the two into one, human security, agenda). Yet, on the other hand the practice reveals the maintenance of a stable (but not efficient) institution, used by members to behave in a disaggregated manner, driven by the overriding demands of national interest and sovereignty. This is not a very encouraging finding.

How dependent is the SADC integration project on the role of South Africa? For many this is critically important, which is why, in some quarters, there is concern about the perceived lack of interest by the South African government in SADC matters (anecdotally, a diplomat recently noted that he found it odd that the hegemon does not occupy a single senior position at the SADC Secretariat). Some analysts argue that the South African government is shifting its interest and energies to an engagement with continental structures such as the AU, NEPAD and the African Development Bank where it perceives the country to have a greater return on its investment (Le Pere & Tjønneland 2005). In SADC, the South African government is promoting market-led integration, which by all accounts is proceeding along the lines of the second scenario developed above. It is seemingly not really interested in the SIPO’s implementation – what incentive does it have for doing so? After all, it increasingly works with the AU and UN on matters relating to peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building.

However, there are at least three powerful reasons for South Africa to take its regional role seriously. South Africa’s freedom was achieved through the sacrifice of many Africans in the region and beyond – a reality that has created shared values and which needs to be recognised and maintained in the interest of future generations. Given its political,
economic and military strengths, it has much to offer the region in terms of advancing the integration and poverty alleviation agenda. Secondly, no state can avoid the challenges of managing cross-border flows of people and goods – whether legal or illegal. SADC already recognises a range of socio-economic, health and environmental issues in need of (at least) functional cooperation. The RISDP and SIPO now need a strong implementation drive. Third, South Africa’s continental and global political and economic ambitions are best based on a solid home foundation. To speak confidently on matters that affect the southern African region, whether at AU or UN platforms, South Africa’s leadership (and the world) needs to know that it has the support of its neighbours – a key lesson in African politics and, increasingly, the world. For these reasons, it dare not relinquish its regional leadership role.

Endnotes

1 Part of this chapter is based on earlier research by the author under the auspices of the Formative Process Research for Integration in Southern Africa (Foprisa) project (www.foprisa.net). Permission was granted for the utilisation of aspects of the earlier research in this chapter.

2 See for example the September 2004 edition of Security Dialogue, in which a special section provided a broad overview of human security debates ten years after the popularisation of the concept by the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

3 One such analyst noted that the nature and character of colonialism as it was practiced in the region, economic interdependence, and the impact of the realist paradigm in the way security was perceived in the region, were important to understand the peculiarity of the SADC security architecture (Macaringue and Magano, 2008).

4 According to SIPO its scope includes the following issues –

In the political sector:

• Protect the people and safeguard the region against domestic instability
• Promote the evolution of common political values and institutions
• Prevent, contain and resolve conflict by peaceful means
• Promote democracy and human rights
• Observe and encourage states to implement the UN and AU Charter
• Develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces
• Enhance regional capacity re: disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance
Develop a common foreign policy approach on issues of mutual concern.

In the defence sector:
- Protect the people and safeguard the region against domestic instability
- Promote regional cooperation on matters related to security and defence
- Consider enforcement action as a matter of last resort
- Consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact to respond to external military threats
- Observe conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament
- Develop peacekeeping capacity
- Enhance regional capacity re: disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance.

In the state security sector (intelligence services):
- Protect the people and safeguard the region against domestic instability
- Promote regional cooperation on matters related to security and defence
- Prevent, contain and resolve conflict by peaceful means
- Consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact to respond to external military threats
- Develop close cooperation between the police and state security services.

In the public security sector (law enforcement agencies):
- Protect the people and safeguard the region against domestic instability
- Promote regional cooperation on matters related to security and defence
- Consider enforcement action as a matter of last resort
- Promote democracy and human rights
- Develop close cooperation between the state security and defence forces
- Observe conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament
- Develop peacekeeping capacity
- Enhance regional capacity re: disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance.

5 A UNDP-funded conference scheduled for senior security sector officials from SADC in December 2004 in Maputo rejected proposals for the urgent implementation of a range of SIPO objectives. By observing proceedings, it became clear that SADC members did not share a common understanding or vision of the Organ or its activities. The formal communiqué, produced by the Organ Directorate, steered clear of revealing these underlying tensions.
As discussed in earlier chapters in this volume (particularly Møller), the role of the armed forces has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold War. The traditional focus has changed from a narrow territorial defence to a broader societal approach, where the armed forces are just one element in dealing with the security threats that modern societies face. In South Africa one of the consequences has been that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) increasingly has been asked to handle what are traditionally defined as secondary tasks, such as domestic policing, border control and, since 1999, international peace support operations (PSOs).

This development is also part of a constant struggle between government departments for resources, and in particular a political struggle concerning the use of sometimes scarce resources, where matters of security, in the absence of direct conventional threat, are not given special priority. From the outset the relationship between defence and development is, as argued by Williams, both an oxymoron and a contingent relationship (Williams 2001: 57f). Investment in defence has traditionally been considered as the use of state resources in an unproductive sector, something that is highly contested, especially in developing economies with limited resources. The South African government’s increasing use of the military tool in its foreign policy conduct should also be understood within this context, as a way of legitimising the spending on defence. The idea is that South Africa is interlinked in geography and destiny with the rest of the African continent, and peace and stability in Africa create the necessary foundations for development and effective governance in South Africa itself. Alden and Le Pere have argued, in relation to this, that:
… South Africa could not remain ‘an island of prosperity in a sea of poverty’ … only through concerted regional development would some of the region’s deep-seated problems … be addressed (Alden & Le Pere 2003: 13).

South Africa’s recent involvement in Burundi is an example of the government’s highly prioritised peace diplomacy strategy. According to the plans, the SANDF should help secure the foundations for peace and stability, and hereby sound governance and development in countries in volatile transitional phases as they emerge from conflict. This is part of an integrated and comprehensive South African civil–military effort. This chapter will describe the change in the SANDF’s tasks since 1994. It will furthermore investigate what priority the political level has given to military deployment in Burundi, and scrutinise how the SANDF conducted itself during the deployment.

The SANDF’s Primary and Secondary Roles

During the defence policy processes in the 1990s – the Defence White Paper and Defence Review – the direction given to the SANDF was that it should plan within a narrow understanding of security and mainly for its primary tasks – protection of the territorial integrity of South Africa and deterrence against potential aggressors. The Defence Review stated clearly that ‘the primary function of the SANDF is defence against external aggression. The other functions are secondary’ (DOD 1998: 29).

The SANDF force planners therefore had to look to these primary tasks in their planning to determine where the priorities lay. However, as argued by Williams (2001), during times of peace, or periods with an absence of full-scale war, defence forces more often than not are expected to undertake secondary tasks, such as PSOs, humanitarian assistance, support to the police, etc. The SANDF is today expected to be able to undertake both primary and secondary tasks, increasingly PSOs. The SANDF has become an increasingly important instrument in the government’s peace diplomacy strategy. Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota argued in his defence budget speech in June 2004 that the SANDF would increasingly support the government’s diplomatic drive in Africa (Lekota 2004), a role that President Mbeki called being the ‘midwives’ of peace (Parliament 2005b). It is unclear, however, to what extent the
SANDF has the capacity and the needed capabilities\textsuperscript{2} to carry out this role of supporting South Africa’s regional diplomatic efforts by acting as a lead nation and therefore meeting the criteria for being a successful mediator and peacemaker.

The SANDF has increasingly been included in a comprehensive South African response to these challenges and therefore needs to be able to undertake its secondary tasks. Domestically, South Africa is faced with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, poverty and crime as the most pressing issues. South Africa is geographically located in what Holsti (1996) defines as a zone of war, and experiences constant pressure on its borders from non-conventional sources such as refugees and illegal immigrants from its neighbours.

The ANC government sees the non-conventional challenges created by failed and fragile states as central security threats for South Africa, along with the closely interlinked issue of migration.

The SANDF and Peace Support Operations

The SANDF found it difficult to choose a path in developing the necessary capabilities for future PSOs, because the government did not initially have much policy in this field. Only in 1999 did the government clearly present its policies on South African participation in PSOs, in the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions. Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stated in an address to the South Africa Institute of International Affairs on 1 November 1999 that:

\begin{quote}
The fact that South Africa now has a policy on peace keeping and has made a practical commitment to start participating in multinational peace missions makes it incumbent on the Government to recognise the role that the Defence Force will play. This puts a new dimension to the Defence Force in terms of South Africa’s international obligations (Dlamini-Zuma 1999).
\end{quote}

One of the pressing issues, which led to the publication of the White Paper was the national and international debates on what could realistically be expected of South Africa in relation to participation in PSOs. In the White Paper it is stated:
Although South Africa acknowledges its global responsibilities, the prioritisation afforded Africa in South African foreign policy makes Africa the prime focus of future engagements. South Africa has an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spill-over effects of conflict in the neighbourhood (Department of Foreign Affairs 1999: 21).

However, South Africa’s recent commitments to African PSOs show that the government has moved beyond the force number of one battalion anticipated in the peace missions White Paper, which has now been declared outdated. By March 2005 South Africa had deployed more than 3 000 SANDF personnel as part of African and UN PSOs (DOD 2005). The SANDF functioned as lead nation during the intervention in Lesotho in 1998, during the operations in Burundi, and has furthermore contributed with relatively large contingents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan. All the major military contributions can be seen as part of a comprehensive South African involvement, where the military tool is used as part of a diplomatic effort.

The day-to-day functions of the SANDF – apart from protecting the state against foreign aggression – have increasingly been to support the government’s diplomatic drive in Africa. The government has furthermore decided to phase out the SANDF’s permanent domestic support for the police. South Africa is politically and militarily involved in both actual African PSOs and in establishing the new African continental and regional collective security regimes. However, even though several seemingly ‘securitising’ moves have been made from central government actors, who present the diplomatic efforts in Africa, and the subsequent military involvement as being of existential importance, this has apparently not led to political commitments beyond what constitutes normal political procedures, such as increased resource allocations for the SANDF and the use of what can be perceived of as extraordinary means (Mandrup 2007; for discussion on securitisation see Jung in this volume). Nevertheless, peace diplomacy has had a high political priority and has involved influential South African political figures.
South African Involvement in the Burundi Peace Process: Political Negotiations

Since 1999 high-profile South African politicians, first President Nelson Mandela, then Deputy President Jacob Zuma, and lately President Thabo Mbeki, have functioned as the chief mediators and facilitators in Burundi on behalf of the international community, the AU and the regional parties. Mandela was able to continue the previous facilitator’s efforts, leading to the Arusha Agreement in 2000. The agreement provided for the setting up of a transitional government, but this was boycotted by two of the four main rebel groups, making implementation difficult. The role of the facilitator was written into the agreement, where it was stated that ‘the facilitator shall continue in his role as moral guarantor, recourse authority and conciliation agent’ (Arusha Agreement 2000).

South Africa’s diplomatic role and involvement was thus written into the agreement, stressing its pivotal role in the process, but also assuring continued South African commitment in the attempt to secure implementation. South Africa’s mediation has since been characterised by a continued effort to bring together the parties and encourage them to accept and implement the agreement. In May 2006, President Mbeki took over the role of mediator before the final round of negotiations with the National Liberation Front (NLF), something that stressed the South African government’s commitment to the process and the prestige tied to its success. The closure of the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) on 31 December 2006 must be seen as a very clear indication of the relative success of the South African mediation initiative, which has been characterised as an attempt to keep close contact with all the parties involved in the conflict.

This also meant maintaining contact with the two remaining rebel movements outside the Arusha Agreement. Horst Bremmer (2000), former head of the Southern African Development Community office in the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), argued that South Africa would even talk to the devil if it thought it would help. Chris Landsberg (2004) points out that the continued contact with all parties to the conflict helped minimise criticism concerning South Africa’s impartiality. Attempts were also made to coordinate matters with the regionally appointed mediator, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, and the other parties involved, such as President Omar Bongo of Gabon and the Tanzanian government.
From a strategic point of view, there was a great deal of prestige tied to the South African involvement in Burundi. Nelson Mandela had been appointed international facilitator for the process and therefore had great responsibility for future developments. President Mbeki chaired the AU and played a central role when, in 2003, the continental body decided to launch an African peace mission into Burundi, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) (Kent & Malan 2003). The South African DFA had a pivotal role in supporting the role of the facilitator, and it also played an important part in hosting some of the later negotiations, leading to the signing of the so-called Pretoria protocols in 2003. When first Deputy President Zuma and later President Mbeki took over the responsibility as facilitators, they did so as the leaders of the South African government. Their failure would therefore also be the failure of South Africa, and potentially have a strong negative impact on South Africa’s reformist ambitions in Africa (Mandrup 2007). The decision to deploy the SANDF must also be understood within this context.

Political Decision-making in South Africa on the Burundi Involvement

The international community was asked, in the Arusha Agreement, to deploy a peacekeeping force to facilitate its implementation, including providing protection for returning political figures. Accordingly, on 29 October 2001, South Africa was formally asked by the UN Security Council under Resolution 1375 to provide VIP protection teams for the returning opposition leaders as part of the implementation of the agreement. The South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) was deployed in November 2001, with the task of providing protection for members of parliament. The SAPSD was not a PSO operation and only had a mandate to provide VIP protection in coordination with the Burundian Army.

In the 1999 White Paper on Peace Missions a detailed description of the ideal decision-making process related to the deployment of the SANDF into international missions and the criteria that should be in place before deploying has been included (Mandrup 2007). However, the White Paper has aged and is, to a large extent, out of touch with the realities on the ground; a revision process of the paper has been initiated. One of the provisions in the paper deals with the necessary decision-making process before the deployment of an operation. It is stipulated in the White Paper
that government needs approval from parliament before the deployment of whole contingents (Department of Foreign Affairs 1999).

In relation to the decision to deploy the first batch of South African troops to Burundi in November 2001 – the VIP protection team – there had been a debate and a ratification process in parliament on the issue of deployment. However, several members of parliament felt left out of the decision-making process during the deployment of the first SAPSD force, as well as later, when in 2003 it expanded into AMIB. The parliamentarians claimed that they had not been informed in advance and only learned about the decision from the media. In the minutes of the meeting of the Defence Portfolio Committee of 15 March 2002, the day before the debate in parliament concerning additional financing, several members of the committee across party lines expressed frustration with the Department of Defence (DOD) and the ministers because they had not received any briefing on the situation in Burundi. It was argued that they had not been able to make a decision the following day because they had not received prior information about the situation (Parliament 2002a). This happened despite the White Paper provisions that public debate and parliamentary ratification should precede deployment. In relation to this, Kent and Malan (2003) quote Rauties Rautenbach from the DOD as stating to the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) that there is normally no budgetary provision for peace missions and it is often wrongly perceived that when the president signs for deployments, money is automatically available.

Several debates in parliament from November 2001 and March 2002 showed that the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), was critical of South African military involvement in Burundi, but did in the end support deployment and the government’s subsequent request for an allocation of additional funding. However, the DA warned that:

In future we will have to determine our role very carefully and strategically. In the meantime our troops are there, where they are to be accommodated, fed and paid allowances and provided with various other support services. We cannot rescind on our commitment but we request that proper estimates and plans be made to ensure that for the future we have the military resources and funds to get involved in these external operations (Parliament 2002b).
Criteria for Deployment

It was not only in the area of decision-making that the government received critique. When deciding to deploy troops to Burundi, the government, and parliament in endorsing it, ignored several of the seven main criteria put forward in the White Paper for South African deployment in peace missions. The seven basic criteria that need to be fulfilled before SANDF forces should be committed to international operations are: a clear international mandate; sufficient means; a domestic mandate and budget; volunteerism; clear entry and exit criteria; regional cooperation; and foreign assistance (Department of Foreign Affairs 1999: 26–27).

Several of these elements were not in place before the deployment of both SAPSD and later AMIB. In other words, the guidelines set out in the White Paper merely had a guidance role and had not been followed, which is normal in political process when circumstances change. However, it creates a problem for the defence force, because it will prepare according to the guidelines provided by government. Disregarding the stated guidelines was apparently not a controversial decision because at the JSCD meeting on 14 November 2001, only the two members from the Democratic Party, now the DA, expressed opposition to the deployment. They argued that it was difficult to understand how the government could authorise an operation with an estimated cost of R500 million with the task of protecting seven (which turned out to be 13 and later 26) Burundian politicians returning from exile. The DA members argued that this money would be better spent on poverty alleviation in South Africa, thereby making a reference to the government’s ‘Achilles heel’ concerning the problems of poverty and unemployment, and chipping into the tense debate in South Africa concerning guns versus butter – the oxymoronic relationship between defence and development mentioned earlier (Parliament 2001). The government response was that the costs of the operation would be covered by donor funding and reimbursements from the international community, something that turned out to be only partly true. Minister Lekota went even further and argued that ‘South Africa must not wait until everybody in the country has had something to eat before committing itself to world peace’ (Parliament 2001).

This stressed the priority given to this operation by the ANC government. It saw the SANDF deployment not only as a vital element in trying to create peace in Burundi, but also as a piece of the larger jigsaw puzzle concerning the creation of a framework for peace and
stability on the continent, and as a test case for South Africa’s future role on the continent. The ANC government saw and still sees South Africa’s destiny as closely intertwined with that of the continent as a whole, and addressing this had a higher priority than living up to principles outlined in the White Paper. At the time the government had broad support in parliament for the operation and also for the need for additional funding for the Burundi mission. Piet Matthee of the New National Party (NNP), for instance, argued that:

We in the New NP also take pleasure in supporting this legislation, and we want to convey the hope that the presence of our military personnel there will be able to play a really effective and positive role in ultimately bringing real and lasting peace to Burundi (Parliament 2002c).

This was followed by similar statements from, for instance, the United Democratic Movement and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP). The DA was again critical of the government’s decision to deploy forces to Burundi in the first place, and argued that before deciding to deploy:

There are three basic questions which should be asked. In the first place, which countries or territorial areas are of vital importance to South Africa? Secondly, which countries have a direct influence on South Africa? Thirdly, which countries are of interest to us?

And proceeded to answer its own questions by stating that:

Surely the countries that are of vital importance and have direct influence on South Africa are the SADC countries. Here we should play a full role to ensure peace and stability and economic growth, but South Africa cannot be responsible for the whole of Africa and all its problems (Parliament 2002c).

The DA’s position focuses on a narrow understanding of what constitutes South Africa’s national interests, and asks government to prioritise its efforts. The DA considered Burundi as not having any direct national interest to South Africa. The NNP argued that this was too narrow a way to understand South Africa’s interests and, eventually, national security.
The prestige and legacy of the former president and thus of South Africa itself was seen as being at stake, and thereby the country’s future role in Africa. The intervention did not take place because Burundi was of any direct importance to South African national security, or because Burundi is an important trading partner. Rather, the success and failure of the peace process was important for the role that South Africa would be able to play in the future. It was important for South Africa’s reputation as a mediator and peacemaker on the continent (Mandrup 2007).

Another important point that was raised during the initial JSCD briefing in November 2001 was the question of the duration of the deployment. The operation was only to last for six months, maybe a year, after which the Burundian army and other African nations would take over (Parliament 2001). However, delays in the peace process and the absence of available forces to replace the South African VIP protection force meant that it was stuck in Burundi and was even expanded in 2003 with the establishment of AMIB. This issue had already been raised by the DA in 2002 when one of its members argued that the SANDF seemed to be stuck in Burundi for at least the rest of the financial year 2002/03 because the promised African replacement had been withdrawn.

The nature of the debate in South Africa’s second-tier parliament, the National Council of the Provinces, concerning the financing of the SAPSD is indicative of the broad consensus that seemed to exist in parliament. First of all, the opposition’s criticisms of the government for deploying the SANDF into an open-ended mission, despite promising the opposite, were very limited. Criticism was initially directed towards Defence Minister Lekota and his deputy for having promised the JSCD in November 2001 that the funding would be covered by the international community. The government then went to parliament four months later to ask for resources to cover the mission.

In March 2002, Deputy Minister of Defence Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge argued in parliament that members did not have to worry about the issue of financing from the international community because promises had been received from a wide range of donors. However, Adv. ZL Madasa of the ACDP argued that members of parliament needed assurances concerning financing, not promises from the minister that everything would be fine (Parliament 2002a). Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel responded that the government had done what it had to do, namely attempting to create peace in Burundi. It did not have time to sit
down and wait for peace to come because by then the Arusha Agreement would have fallen apart (Parliament 2002a). Manuel stated that:

We had to act, and act correctly. I would like to submit to all members of this House that, having considered all the issues at hand, we acted timeously and dealt with the other issues. Similarly, if we had to wait until all of the EU commitments to ‘put their money where their mouth is’, we would not have secured peace in Burundi (Parliament 2002a).

Manuel implied that the deployment of the SANDF was seen as a necessity in securing the diplomatic efforts of the South African mediation, and thereby overruling a whole range of the principles put in place to frame deployments. He thus recognised that the government had a problem since the international funding was not in place. However, at the same time he made it clear that this was less important in the case of the Burundi intervention, because of its critical nature. The deputy minister of finance pointed out that Burundi was part of the Great Lakes region, which was important to South Africa for economic and security reasons (Parliament 2002c). For the ANC government, the success of the Burundian peace process was seen as a test case for South Africa’s future role in Africa. If successful, South Africa could claim to have facilitated, sustained and secured a peace process and a transitional period towards stable civilian government. Defence Minister Lekota argued that the South African participation could be used to create a framework for the stabilisation of the continent as a whole (Parliament 2001). However, if it failed, it would also be seen as a failure for South Africa and a setback for the provision of African solutions to African problems, and thereby also put into question the viability of the ambition of creating African standby brigades. In June 2004 President Mbeki stated in parliament:

Hon members of the National Assembly, let me emphasise the fact that we have sent troops to countries like Burundi and the DRC because we know that we will never develop and be happy forever all by ourselves while wars and poverty are prevalent in our neighbouring states … It helps South Africa to work for peace so that we increase the number of countries we can trade with while developing the economy of our country and of Africa as a whole.
We are prepared to work for peace in Africa so that no Africans live in poverty and fear (Mbeki 2004).

Much more was at stake for the government than the usual playing of foreign-policy ‘games’ because the intervention would be considered a test of whether South Africa had the capacity to act as a regional power in the African setting. The idea of an African Renaissance was, among other things, also tied to the ability to provide credible solutions to the conflicts on the continent. Then Chief of Defence Sipiwe Nyanda argued that ‘we have to put as much muscle as words into the African renaissance … there can be no African renaissance without the military’ (Cornish 2003).

However, the process also shows that because the Burundi deployment did not constitute an existential threat to South Africa, and the decision-making process was conducted within what constitutes ‘normal politics’, it was not a securitised issue. The ANC government gave the deployment political priority, but it still ranked lower than several other political issues, which will be shown in the following section. However, it chose to disregard the criteria produced in the White Paper on Peace Missions and deployed a military force into a mission without a proper mandate, without the needed military and economic resources being in place, without any exit strategy, and without proper international or regional support. More or less all the criteria mentioned in the White Paper were circumvented by the Burundi decision, primarily because participation was of a higher priority.

The Establishment of the African Mission in Burundi

In April 2003, the AU Ambassadors decided to establish AMIB (AU 2004a). The force was to consist of up to 3 500 soldiers and was to be deployed for an initial period of one year. AMIB was placed under South African leadership, which was also expected to contribute the bulk of the force itself (AU 2004b). Ethiopia and Mozambique were the other troop contributors. AMIB has been described as a model for future African Standby Force (ASF) operations, where one regional power takes the lead and creates the frame for the operations. As pointed out by Kent and Malan, this lead role also included the provision of operational support, which was normally provided by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This was due to the fact that this was an AU mission and that
the AU did not have the necessary support structures in place (Kent & Malan 2003). The operation was under African leadership, consisted of African troops, and had the primary objective of preparing for a future UN deployment. Therefore, there were many lessons to be learned for the ASF as regards the attempts to create an effective and capable structure for the future.

From a South African point of view, the deployment of AMIB also served as a test because it was the first time that South Africa (and the SANDF) had had the chance to act as the lead nation in an international PSO. Apart from regular infantry forces, South Africa was to provide a number of specialised functions, such as the headquarter (CHQ) facilities, the specialised protection units for the returning politicians, engineering, helicopter capability, and health services (DOD 2005). AMIB, like ONUB later, had a South African force commander, stressing the central role played by the SANDF. South Africa had been the facilitator for the negotiations and had now been designated to lead the mission until a UN force could take over. The AU mandate stipulated that the lead nation should, within the mandate, provide guidance concerning the planning of operations, the mission structure, command and control, administration and logistics, health care, etc. (AU 2003). However, the South African contribution was hampered as it experienced problems with the serviceability of its main equipment and had problems getting hold of the needed spare parts in time.12

AMIB’s primary task was to oversee the implementation of the 7 October and 2 November 2003 ceasefire agreements and the 16 November 2003 comprehensive ceasefire agreement, which included assisting with disarmament, mobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and contributing to peace and stability in Burundi (Porto 2003). The AMIB force was to support the DDR process by securing the assembly areas and access to them. AMIB was also given the task of creating favourable conditions for the deployment of a UN mission. The South African troops provided as part of the protection team were later incorporated as an integral part of AMIB. The mission was declared fully operational with the deployment of the majority of the other main contingents, the Mozambican and Ethiopian forces, by mid-October 2003.13 By that time, the total strength of the South African contingent was approximately 1 600 SANDF troops, including the SAPSD units.

Eventually, nearly three years after the deployment of the first South African units to Burundi, on 1 June 2004, the AMIB force in Burundi was
‘re-hatted’ and turned into a UN mission under the French acronym ONUB. ONUB operated under a Chapter VII mandate, using all means necessary, and had an authorised strength of 5 650 military personnel (UNSC 2004). The successful completion of the transitional phase meant that the UN could initiate a downscaling of ONUB in September 2005 and eventually close the mission on 31 December 2006 and replace it with the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). The VIP protection force and the SANDF contingent in ONUB were scaled down during the 2005/06 financial year as part of the closure of ONUB.

Deputy President Jacob Zuma had already in December 2003 called for the transfer of AMIB to the UN. This call was followed by a similar request made by the AU’s Peace and Security Council in March 2004 (AU 2004b). Deputy Defence Minister Madlala-Routledge in parliament explained the transfer to the UN in the following way:

The African mission in AMIB, Burundi, has become a United Nations mission whose mandate it is to support Burundi’s efforts to re-establish sustainable peace. This is due to the pioneering role of the SANDF, and later collaboration with Mozambique and Ethiopia, thus creating conditions for the UN to take over (Madlala-Routledge 2004).

However, the reasons for this decision have to be analysed from different angles. From an economic and resources perspective, South Africa was providing the bulk of the AMIB force and was finding it difficult to get its costs reimbursed. The SANDF’s outstanding costs from international deployment passed one billion rand. The SANDF found it difficult to obtain resources of this magnitude within the framework of its own budget, and the political decision-makers were, as illustrated above, unwilling to provide the SANDF with the needed additional funding to cover the costs. The Burundi operation was not of existential importance to South Africa, and the SANDF had to solve the task of using resources already allocated in its ordinary budget, despite broad-based parliamentary support for the operation. The AU received support for its deployment from a number of states and the EU, but not enough to cover the costs of the operation. When ONUB was deployed, the SANDF was faced with the problem that the VIP protection force element was not covered by the new UN mandate and continued as a separate mission with a separate mandate. The bulk of
the South African force therefore operated as an independent operation alongside ONUB, and did not receive reimbursement from the UN.

A serious problem facing the SANDF during its deployment in Burundi was that it had problems sustaining the four-month rotation of the forces deployed. This was, and still is, particularly the case in relation to specialised functions – army engineers, doctors, pilots – where the SANDF has a critical shortage of personnel. The SANDF was – and to a certain extent still is, as part of the post-1994 transformation and general right-sizing of the force – faced with a long series of structural problems. It has problems keeping its main equipment operational and is experiencing a maintenance backlog. This means that the force has to use large resources getting equipment operational before deployment into international operations. When deployed, the force finds it difficult to keep the equipment operational. Specifically in the case of Burundi, the SAPSD force was faced with an insufficient mandate, which limited its ability to operate outside Bujumbura. Air force helicopters that initially formed part of the force were withdrawn in 2003, thus making it difficult for the soldiers to deploy because there was no back-up available (Parliament 2005a).

Conclusion

According to Deputy Minister Madlala-Routledge:

One of the lessons we have learnt in Burundi is that it is not sufficient to bring combatants into a cantonment area to disarm and register them. Beyond that they have to see a future for themselves wherein they can maintain their families and be part of the development and construction of a peaceful society. They have to have somewhere to go and something to do after they lay down their arms. We refer to this as sustainable peacekeeping. Sustainable peacekeeping must be driven by the host government, who must take the lead within a conglomerate of local NGOs and international development organisations. The dynamic interaction between the political and the military processes is therefore ongoing (Madlala-Routledge 2004).
This was how, in 2004, the then deputy minister of defence introduced what she termed ‘sustainable peacekeeping’, which is part of the idea of a comprehensive approach to peacemaking initiatives. South African participation in the peace mission in Burundi has indeed been a learning process for both the government and the SANDF. The government has concluded that the criteria listed in the White Paper on Peace Missions have had to make way for the realities of the world and especially the priorities of the government. According to Lekota, the result was that the SANDF has been a pivotal instrument of stability in Africa, and played a pioneering role in Burundi. As a regional power, South Africa has been forced to bear large parts of the costs of the operation in an attempt to reach its political goals. This is what often characterises the benign power in a regime, where the costs of maintaining the regime’s objectives are borne by the dominant power itself.

This, of course, being part of a process of regime formation and maintenance, helps South Africa obtain certain larger goals, for instance future market access, control over and access to natural resources, and political support at the international level. The deputy minister of finance, Mandisi Mpahlwa, stated this directly when he argued that the Great Lakes region is important to South Africa for two reasons: first, stability in Africa and thus its future markets, and second, the abundance of resources in the region (Parliament 2002b). Peace in Burundi is seen as a piece in the larger jigsaw puzzle of developing South African peace diplomacy in Africa. Politically, the experience in Burundi also provided some important insights for future African military cooperation, for instance the need for a sustainable approach to PSO. As a model for future African–African and African–UN cooperation, the SAPSD, AMIB and ONUB experience was important for a number of reasons.

First, it provided valuable insights into the ability for cooperation between African forces with very different command structures, levels of training and capacities. It showed that the SANDF was, despite resource scarcity, able to function as the lead nation for an African PSO. It provided specialised functions such as engineers, a brigade HQ, logistics, patrol boats on Lake Tanganyika and medical facilities.

Second, however, the SAPSD/AMIB deployment also showed that the critical issue for African-led PSOs in the future is the requisite financing of operations. The intervention in Burundi also showed that South Africa could not rely on promises made by its African partners to, for example, take over responsibility for missions. The initial plan for the SAPSD
to have been replaced by forces from a number of other African states never materialised and left South Africa with the main responsibility. Moreover, South Africa had to cover much of the cost of the operation itself, as it could not expect to receive reimbursement from the AU. This is an important lesson for future initiatives by the ASF, since it will limit its operational capacity severely.17

A third political lesson was that the UN is more concerned with its potential political role during a deployment. This meant that the SANDF was stuck with the UNSC-mandated SAPSD task, including funding, because the UN thought VIP protection during an election year to be too risky an undertaking for ONUB.

The involvement of South Africa in Burundi was also the first time that the policy directives in the South African White Paper on Peace Missions were tested in a real mission. This turned out to be an important process because the criteria for deployment were overruled by other political considerations. It can be argued that, when the Pretoria government decided to deploy forces to Burundi, it broke several of its own criteria for deployment. No comprehensive peace agreement was in place, no external funding had been secured, and no exit strategy had been drawn up. Politically, the government did receive support in parliament, though it also received some criticism for its handling of the situation. In retrospect it is interesting to note that the timelines for the deployment, that is, a maximum of one year and a promise of full international financing, turned out to be incorrect. South Africa initially had to cover a large proportion of the deployment costs itself, thus putting the DOD under severe financial pressure.

The deployment of the military in Burundi shows that government regarded the above-mentioned political factors as more important than the criteria set out in the White Paper. The decision was made not to provide the full required funding to enable the DOD to cover its costs: the DOD had to make do with its regular budget and an additional R500 million provided by parliament. Despite these constraints, the SANDF deployment in Burundi proved to be a relatively efficient tool in supporting the diplomatic efforts of the South African government. The South African integrated involvement seems to have progressed from the initial diplomatic effort, leading to a seemingly successful substantial military commitment, followed by civilian post-conflict commitment in what could be termed phase three of the South African involvement.
From an operational point of view, in all its three phases the SANDF deployment in Burundi was negatively influenced by the overall resource constraints and structural problems that face the SANDF generally (Mandrup 2007). This led the main opposition financial speaker in parliament, Dr PJ Rabie, to state, concerning the Burundi operation, that:

Besides the astronomical costs and the apparent lack of exit criteria, huge logistical problems exist due to long distances, the lack of political planning and risk assessment. Troops on the ground endure inadequate accommodation and medical facilities. It is reported that the low serviceability of vehicles has also become a constraint (Parliament 2003).

The experience of the Burundi deployment has shown that the structural problems facing the SANDF in general have been visible on the ground in Burundi. One problem was the lack of helicopter support for SAPSD personnel after 2004. Another was the lack of serviceability of equipment in all SANDF deployments. A third was the lack of critical function personnel, which has had a direct bearing on the forces deployed, especially medical personnel and engineers (Parliament 2005a). General problems of a lack of discipline within the SANDF were also visible during the deployment, with several incidents of sexual misconduct, corruption and the mismanagement of funds. For instance, South African army uniforms were sold and later found in the possession of the FNL.18 Another indication of disciplinary problems was the fact that the tour of deployment had to be reduced from six months to four, which, according to then Chief of Defence Nyanda, was due to the volatility of the Burundian situation and the lack of facilities in the country, leading to boredom among the personnel deployed (Kent & Malan 2003). This, of course, put an extra strain on the South African army because the frequency of the rotation was increased.

However, despite the shortcomings of the SANDF, it was able to fulfil its mandate, functioning as lead nation for AMIB and ONUB, as well as acting as a foreign policy tool in supporting the government’s diplomatic drive into Africa. The shortcomings of the force have now been recognised by South Africa’s international and African partners. This means that the somewhat mythical status that surrounded the armed forces of the former apartheid regime in Africa has been replaced by a more realistic picture of South Africa’s military capabilities. So far, the South African government
has been able to cite a lack of experience in PSOs as one of the reasons for the shortcomings. However, this claim sounded rather hollow after several years of deployment in Burundi.

**Endnotes**

1. This chapter is based on part of Thomas Mandrup’s PhD thesis (see Mandrup 2007).
2. For further reading on the SANDF’s structural and capacity problems, see Mandrup Jørgensen (2007).
3. A South African extended battalion is in theory approximately 1 000 soldiers. In reality they often only consist of 600–800 soldiers.
5. Since 1994, the SANDF has at all times had between 1 700–3 000 soldiers deployed in domestic operations. For further reading see Mandrup (2007).
6. In ProtocolV, Article 8, section D, the international community was asked to provide security for public figures. The personal protection of the leaders of the opposition especially was an integral part of the Arusha Agreement and a condition for encouraging them to take up their seats in government.
7. The force consisted of a headquarters, a protection unit, a guard and security unit, and a mission support unit. In addition, the SAPSD also had personnel to deal with health issues, military policy, logistics and engineering. The protection unit primarily consisted of Special Forces units and was deployed on a four-month rotational basis. Initially the SAPSD consisted of 680 personnel of different categories, but it was increased to 754 during the financial year 2001/02 due to an increase in the number of VIPs from 13 to 26. This meant that the protection force had to be expanded from 75 to 150 at the first rotation in March 2002.
8. The second tier of the mandate was the training of an ethnically balanced Burundian protection unit to take over the VIP protection tasks. However, this could not be initiated before the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement in November 2002. Continued fighting between the FNL and the national army also made it difficult to initiate the training programme after that date.
9. The South African forces were eventually withdrawn at the end of 2006.
10. A regional power is here understood as, ‘They accept the duty, and are thought by others to have the duty, of modifying their policies in the light of the managerial responsibilities they bear’ (Bull 2002).
President Thabo Mbeki in 1997 advanced the idea of an African Renaissance, based on five fundamental elements: (1) cultural exchange; (2) emancipation of African women; (3) mobilisation of young people; (4) the broadening and deepening of democracy; and (5) the promotion of sustainable development on the African continent. See Vale and Maseko (1998: 274) for further reading.

Interview with SANDF WO I, A. Meier, member of the UN inspection team, in Camp Iveco, 11 November 2004, who had operational experience from the Burundi mission.

However, with the transfer of the mission to the UN, the protection force was once more run as a separate operation outside ONUB.

Under UNSC resolution 1719, BINUB is supposed to oversee the 7 September 2006 South African-brokered ceasefire agreement reached between the new government and the last remaining rebel group, Palipehutu-FNL.

For a more detailed description of these problems see Mandrup (2007), *Africa: Salvation or Despair*.

For a more detailed description of these problems see Mandrup and Thomas (2008).

The recent experiences of the African Mission in Sudan support this tendency.

For further details on disciplinary problems in the SANDF see, for instance, Gibson (2005a, 2005b); SAPA (2004).
The Link between Sustainable Development and Security in Botswana

Mpho G Molomo

Although Africa is well endowed with natural and human resources, it suffers from extreme poverty and deprivation. The scourge of HIV/Aids and other chronic diseases compounds this situation. African countries aspire to build strong states that have significant social depth and are anchored on the virtues of just and equitable societies. However, the painful reality is that most of these states are elitist and divorced from the people and are often characterised by repression and lack of accountability and political legitimacy.

Africa is also the home of endemic state collapse and societal fragmentation resulting in violent armed conflicts, which lead to loss of life and destruction of property and social bonds. The gloomy picture that emerges from the continent exacerbates a sense of hopelessness and despair. This situation has a direct bearing on sustainable economic development and security. However, Botswana presents a more optimistic picture, which nevertheless needs to be qualified. In this regard, this chapter seeks to interrogate the link between security and sustainable economic development in Botswana.

Sustainable economic development and security are historically and socially constructed entities and are mediated through socio-economic factors in society. There is a constant struggle to deepen and strengthen their institutional relevance. The trajectories that define these concepts, some of which are hidden, throw up possibilities for sustainable economic development and more secure forms of human existence.

This chapter has two substantive foci. It begins by providing a socio-economic and political framework for the understanding of security and sustainable economic development within the context of the Botswana state. Needless to add, at independence in 1966, Botswana was among...
The poorest countries in the world and depended heavily on British grants. Unlike some other colonies, it did not inherit an elaborate infrastructure and bureaucracy. A characteristic feature of the British protectorate was that of benign neglect. Inevitably, the newly independent Botswana inherited a fragile, poor and insecure state. Compounding its uncertain economic future, it was surrounded by the hostile white minority regimes of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Moreover, Botswana’s ideology of non-racialism, espoused by Seretse Khama, its first president, was a thorn in the flesh of the South African state, based as it was on white supremacy. Although Botswana was economically dependent on South Africa, it was outspoken at international fora in its condemnation of colonialism and all manifestations of white settler domination, including apartheid. After 1965, when Southern Rhodesia’s Ian Smith declared unilateral independence, relations between Rhodesia and Botswana remained uncertain, always at the brink of breakdown. South Africa was also to unleash a destabilisation campaign that challenged the stability of its neighbours, including Botswana. Based on the difficult circumstances that Botswana had to navigate in creating or establishing its statehood, it is clear that issues of economic survival were intricately tied to its security.

As corollary of the foregoing, it is evident that although the link between sustainable economic development and security is complex and sometimes unclear, this dialectic raises distinct but related issues. This chapter concludes by presenting the case for constructing a credible paradigm that links sustainable economic development to security. It suggests a strong causal link between political institutions, strong macro-economic planning for sustainable economic development, and security. It postulates that poverty and inequality breed social, personal, societal and even state insecurity. This suggests that human and state security are intricately entwined.

**Socio-Economic Framework**

The formation of the Botswana state, as a cohesive entity, has fairly recent origins. It did not exist until three Tswana chiefs (Bathoen, Khama and Sebele), with the advice of missionaries, went to England in 1885 to request British protection against the encroachment of the Germans from German West Africa (now Namibia) and the Dutch (Afrikaners) from South Africa. It was not until 1891 that a pioneer column led by Charles
Warren, on behalf of Queen Elizabeth II, declared Bechuanaland a British protectorate (Stevens 1967: 113–124).

Previously, several Tswana *merafe* (ethnic groups) had existed as separate and autonomous entities. Within these ‘native reserves’ – as land occupied by *merafe* later came to be called – and other outlying areas, there were other non-Tswana ethnic groups, which had migrated and sought refuge among the Tswana. Other groups, such as the Basarwa, were indigenous to the land, but did not have any form of centralised authority. The protectorate was a marriage of convenience; British protection coexisted with the rule of several *merafe*. *Dikgosi* (chiefs) continued to be ultimate sovereigns within their territorial reserves; all they did was to collect taxes for the British in return for protection. As a result of this loose arrangement, little development took place in Bechuanaland; instead, the territory remained a ‘labour reserve’ for South African mines (Parson 1984). At the time, Bechuanaland was perceived as economically unviable, hence there was talk of incorporating it into the Union of South Africa (Spence 1964: 221–247).

The independence Constitution upon which the 1965 elections were premised had the Tswana hegemony built into it; it recognised the paramount status of the *Dikgosi* of the eight Tswana ethnic groups but *Dikgosi* of other non-Tswana ethnic groups were regarded as *dikgosana* (sub-chiefs). Botswana attained its independence as a unitary state, with parliament as the only legislative authority, but there was also the House of Chiefs (*Ntlo ya Dikgosi*), a second chamber without legislative powers. *Dikgosi* from the eight Tswana ethnic groups⁴ were ex-officio members of *Ntlo ya Dikgosi* whereas *dikgosana* from the non-Tswana ethnic groups had to be elected on a rotational basis. Moreover, the administrative districts at the local level coincided with the ethnic reserves, which traditionally were under the jurisdiction of *dikgosi*.⁵ In essence, the ‘political foundation of tribal identity by which the independence constitution was designed’ gives a semblance of ‘social and cultural marginalisation of [ethnic] minorities, and this remains one of the most contested aspects of Botswana’s democracy today’ (Molutsi 2004: 162–163). The implied hierarchy in traditional power has been a source of insecurity for the state of Botswana.

Although Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world at the time of independence in 1966, it is now promoted as one of the few economic success stories in sub-Saharan Africa. Due to the discovery of minerals in the mid-1970s, especially diamonds, its economy grew in leaps
and bounds and it is now classified by the World Bank as a higher middle-income country. It has Africa’s highest credit ratings and a per capita income of about US$7 000. The country has about US$5.4bn in foreign reserves, equivalent to 28 months of imports. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an annual rate of 14.5 per cent between 1966 and 1988, one of the highest growth rates in the world (Gaolathe 2006).

Starting in 1974, government embarked on an aggressive rural development policy with a view to arresting the problem of rural poverty. Government adopted the Accelerated Rural Development Programme, which focused on the creation of rural infrastructure in the form of roads, clinics, dams, etc. (Cliffe & Moorsom 1979: 35–52; Parson 1981, 1983; Tsie, 1996: 599–616). Nevertheless, the biggest constraint was that although infrastructure was created in the rural areas, it was provided in the villages and not on the lands (ploughing fields) and cattle posts (cattle farms), where actual production takes place. At independence, agriculture was considered the mainstay of the rural economy, accounting for 42.5 per cent of GDP, but this figure has since dropped to 3 per cent, a decline which has had a negative impact on rural livelihoods. Subsistence arable farming does not ensure food security owing to semi-arid conditions and erratic rains. Livestock farming, which is susceptible to recurrent drought and outbreak of diseases, makes a minimal contribution to the national wealth and people’s security, given the skewed ownership of cattle, which is concentrated in relatively few hands. The driver of Botswana’s success has largely been diamond revenues.

The exploitation of diamonds presents an interesting paradox in Botswana’s socio-economic development. This trajectory unfolds in two distinctive ways, which at times appear contradictory. First, although there have been attempts by Survival International to label Botswana’s diamonds ‘blood diamonds’, they are linked to sustainable development. The relatively high per capita income, which is among the highest in Africa, is largely attributed to the exploitation of diamonds. Diamonds have played a key role in fostering growth and account for 36 per cent of GDP, 75 per cent of export earnings and over 50 per cent of government revenues (Gaolathe 2006). The heavy dependence on diamond mining, which is capital-intensive, accounts for a skewed and underdeveloped labour market, as the diamond industry absorbs only 5 per cent of the workforce. A characteristic feature of diamond-led development in Botswana is that of jobless growth. Unemployment stands at 17.6 per cent and those most adversely affected by lack of employment facilities
are ‘women, youth and unskilled labourers’ (Molutsi 2004: 172). The situation for the youth is so bad that even university graduates roam the streets unemployed. Arising from this, Botswana continues to face major challenges in maintaining an A rating from the Moody’s Investor Services (Odirile 2007: 14). Nevertheless, there is hope that the beneficiation from diamond polishing and the expected take-off of the Mmamabula Power Station will add value to the economy, leading not only to economic growth but also to more employment and secondary investments.

Attempts to diversify the economy away from minerals into manufacturing, international financial services and tourism through programmes like the Botswana Export Development and Investment Authority, the Financial Assistance Policy, Small Micro and Medium Enterprises, the Local Enterprise Authority, the Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA) and CEDA Young Farmers Fund, to mention only a few, have produced only modest results. Despite all these efforts, financial and business services represent around 10 per cent of GDP, tourism accounts for 11 per cent and manufacturing about 5 per cent (Gaolathe 2007: 10–13). While diamond-led growth has delivered the country from being one of the poorest in the world, it has largely meant massive revenues and security for the state and not the people; a significant percentage of the rural population still wallows in poverty and has unsustainable livelihoods.

Although the World Bank commends Botswana for its impeccable macro-economic planning and high returns from the proceeds of mining, it has cautioned the country against high income inequalities and poverty (Bopa 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d) and this has distorted the long-term development goals of the country. The insecurity arising from unemployment, poverty and inequality in income and opportunities is the greatest security threat that Botswana has had to endure. The paradox that faces the country is similar to that faced in other high middle-income countries such as Brazil, South Africa and Namibia, where a significant number of people live below the poverty datum line. Economic growth in these countries is beset by serious deficiencies and challenges. Botswana, despite the impressive growth rates and huge foreign exchange reserves, is caught in the contradiction where the majority of the people continue to live under high levels of poverty, inequality and unemployment. Projections show that although the percentage of the population living below the poverty datum line is decreasing – from a high of 59 per cent in 1985/86 to 47 per cent in 1993/94 and 36.7 per cent in 2002 – empirical
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evidence shows that poverty is real for many Batswana (Midweek Sun 01.08.07). Poverty is deepest and most entrenched among the Basarwa, who historically have been a marginalised and servile group. It is also severe among the rural poor, who are adversely affected by the failure of the agricultural sector, especially arable farming.

Nevertheless, compared to most developing countries, Botswana has made major strides in achieving its Millennium Development Goals: most Batswana have good clean drinking water, universal free primary school education, good disposal of human waste, and clinics within walking distance. Although there has been a significant rise in life expectancy and a decline in child and maternal mortality, these gains have been eroded by the scourge of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Security Framework

At independence in 1966, Botswana did not have a defence force, and therefore its security was predicated on the goodwill of its neighbours. However, due to the fact that the country was surrounded by white minority-ruled states, it found itself in the crossfire of the liberation struggle. Its open-door policy of accommodating bona fide political refugees provoked a backlash from these states. The intensity of the war of liberation in Rhodesia turned the north-eastern part of Botswana into a war zone. The Selous Scouts – a terrorist unit within the Rhodesian security forces – engaged in flagrant acts of banditry and aggression, violating Botswana’s territorial integrity under the pretext of hot pursuit of freedom fighters. They carried out acts of arson, kidnapping, and the abduction of innocent Batswana civilians (Molomo 2001: 3–22; Molomo & Tsie 1994: 108–150). At the time, Botswana’s defence and security was mainly the responsibility of the Police Mobile Unit. It was not until March 1977 that the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) was created.

Botswana was targeted not only by the Rhodesian forces, but also by the South African Defence Force. Things came to a head after the Soweto uprisings of 16 June 1976, when the tide of African nationalism in South Africa reached monumental proportions. In December 1977, a South African Defence White Paper was promulgated promoting a ‘Total Strategy’ as a security policy of the South African state (Brown 1990: 57). Under this strategy, the South African state was seen to be at war with its own people and the neighbouring Frontline States (FLS). Internally, the South
African state was facing a tide of mass action, aimed at ending minority white rule. At the regional level, it carried out acts of aggression through cross-border raids, which resulted in loss of life and property. These acts of destabilisation targeted strategic installations, slowed down economic growth, and made the region an unsafe place to invest money.

As a result, the Botswana government became preoccupied with state security. Right from the onset it had to fight for its legitimacy as an independent and sovereign state, thus its defence and security policies were predicated on a fragile sense of security. In this regard, it was inevitable that security was conceived of in the Westphalian sense that emphasised territorial integrity. Its democracy, based on non-racialism, had to be nurtured and secured against ‘perceived and real enemies’ in the region (Molutsi 2004: 166). Botswana’s security policy was thus founded on strong tendencies of centralisation and secrecy. As Molutsi (2004: 166) attests:

The centralising tendencies of the state limited the powers of [traditional leaders], trade unions, and non-governmental organisations. These institutions were encouraged and their development was facilitated, yet restrictive legislation was instituted and crafted in such a way to keep them out of politics and to ensure that they remained under the strong hand of the state.

This centralisation of political power has rendered oversight bodies ineffective. The role of parliament is critical: parliament constitutes an important check and balance by performing an oversight function in nurturing sustainable development and security by strengthening the judicial apparatus, codifying laws, and protecting individual rights. Parliament acts as the custodian of the national coffers, through strict budgetary allocation of resources, debate on the floor of House and accounting through the Public Accounts Committee and the Auditor-General.

Security sector governance worldwide is shrouded in secrecy and characterised by a lack of public accountability. But the secrecy that surrounds defence spending, tendering and procurement often leads to corruption. Parliamentary oversight bodies, civil society and the media are often denied information that would enable them to keep the security sector accountable to the people. Public oversight bodies are effective only when they have information to hold the executive accountable.
However, in the absence of an access to information Act, parliament and civil society organisations are often constrained in performing effective oversight. Moreover, oversight bodies need technical knowledge, which they often lack, to make insightful contributions to the defence policy, budgeting and procurement. Effective oversight bodies can strengthen democratic control of the security sector by promoting ‘fiscal transparency’ (UNDP 2002: 91). This includes specialised parliamentary oversight committees, civil society and the media, government and independent audit boards.

In Botswana, parliament’s ability to conduct effective oversight is constrained because of the predominant party system, the dominance of the executive and the culture of secrecy. However, in building democratic governance of the security sector, confidentiality should not be taken as a rule but as an exception that must be qualified at all times. An entrenched culture of secrecy and lack of transparency has a negative effect on oversight and hence democratic governance of the security sector. There is a pervasive view in the developing world that citizens have no role to play in security policy. Yet it is widely documented that popular participation in the governance structures ‘promotes public trust and boosts the morale of security forces’ because it holds them accountable (UNDP, 2002: 92; Molomo 2006: 193–196). Since 2007, the Botswana state has been undergoing a National Security Sector Review with a view to develop a National Security Strategy.

The Nexus between Security and Sustainable Economic Development

Right from the onset we need to unpack the main lines of argument that underlie the debate around the relationship between security and sustainable economic development. The two concepts have a variety of meanings and are used in many distinctive and interactive ways. The concepts of security and sustainable economic development are not just ‘mental constructs’ but are a reflection of ‘lived experiences’ and future possibilities (Henry 2007: 67). The concept of security is often conceived in realist terms to imply state power and state security. In the context of Botswana this conception is realistic in the wake of the Total Strategy. Nevertheless, in the post-Cold War and destabilisation period, we need to conceive of security more broadly to include state as well as human
security. Whilst state security is more concerned with the territoriality and sovereignty of the state, human security is more concerned with the ‘survival and safety of people from both military and non-military sources’ (Du Pisani 2007: 17). The human security paradigm makes a necessary connection between the security of the people and that of the state.

In a more pointed way, human security also makes a link between security and sustainable economic development. Issues that define human development include the absence of hunger, disease, natural disasters and crime. A further distinction needs to be made between human security and human development. Du Pisani, using the UNDP definition, sees human development as the ‘process of widening the range of people’s choices, while human security can be seen as the ability to pursue choices in a safe environment’ (Du Pisani, 2007: 19). As a result, human security needs to be seen as a necessary condition for human development, which would eventually lead to sustainable economic development.

The dominant feature of the post-Cold War period was the linking of security and sustainable economic development, especially in the war against international terrorism. It also needs to be appreciated that many of the numerous security challenges that people face will not be effectively dealt with by guns, but by macro-economic planning and economic inputs that lead to sustainable development and equitable distribution of income and wealth. Invariably, prospects for redress do not require the military but a strong partnership between the state, the private sector and civil society.

**Sustainable Economic Development**

Sustainable economic development is a complex, multifaceted and integrated process that entails the creation of an economic environment that will not only lead to economic growth but also alleviate poverty and secure livelihoods. It entails not only meeting people’s material needs but also harnessing their ingenuity to actualise themselves and live their lives to the fullest. According to the UNDP’s *Human Development Report*, human development is seen as striving to achieve ‘freedom from want and freedom from fear’, and perhaps most directly ‘safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression’ and ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in daily life’ (UNDP 1994: 23). Moreover, sustainable economic development must take place in a positive political environment characterised by good governance and popular participation of people in the political life of a polity. In addition, sustainable development is about creating a stable macro-economic environment that has backward linkages
with the rest of the economy, and is based in a stable political framework. Good governance entails not only judicial oversight of the law and order, but ensures that there are oversight bodies in the political, economic and security sectors.

Sustainable economic development, which is by far the most cherished ideal in sub-Saharan Africa, is supported by the enhancement of human rights, democracy and good governance. Infringements on political rights and civil liberties – coupled with corruption and lack of accountability – must be discouraged, and governments must build a strong culture of democratic free and fair elections. It is common knowledge that corruption undermines economic performance as well as democratic institutions and the rule of law. The absence of the rule of law and widespread corruption not only degenerate the moral fibre of society, but also lead to the misappropriation of scarce resources. Nefarious behaviour disrupts social order and cohesion, and encourages the festering of organised criminal syndicates, which leads to serious crimes like money laundering, human trafficking, and trading in habit-forming drugs. Effective oversight over development and security sectors requires a vibrant civil society to ensure greater control and accountability to the public. It should be noted, however, that Botswana is widely acclaimed as the least corrupt country in Africa (Bopa 2004d).

According to Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, ‘development is instrumental freedoms relating to economic entitlements, political rights, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security’ (Sen 2002: 13). The World Commission on the Environment and Development defined sustainable development as a process that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. Development experts, including the World Bank, are in agreement that no amount of development can take place if the problem of poverty remains rampant in Africa. Deriving from the Millennium Development Goals sustainable development must be based on the creation of an enabling environment that that would ensure a clean and safe environment where people are secure, safe from harm and dehumanizing social ills such poverty, hunger and disease (UNDP 2005).

For development to have a real impact on the people, it has to invoke strategies that will address the structural deficiencies that bring about poverty and inequalities. For its part, the Botswana government has tried to address the problems of poverty and inequitable distribution of the country’s wealth by developing drought relief programmes, social welfare
programmes for the poor and disadvantaged, and free education and health services.

Since the 1990s, there has been a shift away from state security to human security (see UNDP 1994 above) and yet little attention has been given to the interface between gender, security and development: human security cannot be comprehensive until gender relations of domination and subordination are addressed, and probably eliminated (Henry 2007: 65). Gender relations are important when addressing power relations in society because women often shoulder the burden of insecurity and the effects of bad development policies.

Security

Security has traditionally been conceptualised as the protection of the territorial integrity of the state and freedom from external threats. The security sector broadly defined includes armed forces, paramilitary forces, national and local police, intelligence services (military and police), special branches of the police, customs officers, justice and law enforcement institutions (judiciary, the courts, prisons, human rights commissions, ombudsman and customary courts), private security firms, civil oversight bodies such as parliament and parliamentary select committees, civil society organisations, professional advocacy groups, the media and religious organisations. Security organisations must operate within the purview of constitutional and international law, the rule of law and respect for human rights. A professional and disciplined security sector cannot be effective if it is not supported by an independent and well-functioning judiciary and correctional services. Moreover, for the police to maintain law and order, they need a well-functioning judicial system to prosecute those who transgress the law, and prisons to hold convicted criminals. Public security would also be compromised if there was a partial application of the law.

As discussed by Møller and Jung in this volume, security manifests in two basic forms: state security and human security. Although the Botswana state strives hard to meet the Millennium Development Goals that are anchored on human security, the state security paradigm appears to be a dominant one in conceiving security in Botswana. The Act creating the BDF and the developments relating to the debate and passing of the Security and Intelligence Bill in August 2007 appear to be influenced by the Machiavellian premise that a ‘prince [should] fear internal subversion from his subjects and external aggression’ from enemies (Machiavelli
1961: 103). Machiavelli maintained that the best defence lies in being well armed and having good allies, suggesting strong security and intelligence for the sustenance of a viable state. The primacy of strong security and robust intelligence was conceived during the Cold War, where each side of the political divide felt it was under siege and facing an onslaught from adversaries. The Botswana state has engendered a noticeable shift from state security to human security.

**Security and Development**

Since the end of the Cold War and the advent of democratic reforms in the region, countries have been defining their development and security goals in terms of the Millennium Development Goals. In the post-Cold War era, development scholars increasingly question the sustainability of spending money on defence rather than on development (Smaldone, 2006). In the specific case of southern Africa, the end of the Cold War and apartheid led to a more stable and peaceful southern African region. Arising from this, questions have been asked about why Botswana has built a big airbase at Mapharangwane near Molepolole in western Botswana, when the region is moving towards peace. To this question Machiavelli would say, ‘never take things easy during times of peace’ (Machiavelli 1961: 90). Besides, Botswana did not inherit an army or airbase at independence, these facilities were being built right from the beginning.

The World Bank (1989), in its seminal publication *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development*, has been instrumental in pioneering human-centred development. The debate has been carried forward by the UNDP in its *Human Development Report*, which establishes a link between democratic governance and human development, and also between democracy and security. These approaches challenge the realist and neo-realist notions, which are premised on state security. This perspective argues that personal safety and public order are a precondition for human security. The UNDP has been at the forefront of conceptualising and propagating the human security paradigm, and maintains that building a functioning state requires democratic governance of the security sector and processes that maintain law and order (UNDP 2002: 86). The concept of human security has been broadly defined to transcend the parochial approach of the Cold War era that focused exclusively on state security, to include human security. For a long time security was defined outside the legitimate expectations of ordinary people who yearn for more secure and decent livelihoods. Human security, although it does not
negate state security, recognises the primacy of the individual; that the human being must be at the centre of development and security.

Linking development and security is invariably a political issue; it manifests the interplay between national and international concerns. In the case of the UK, the creation of the Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997 and the adoption of Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and Development (DFID 2005) was a clear statement of the British government’s national and foreign policy position. In this document, security is prioritised ‘as a basic entitlement of the poor’ on an equal footing with more traditional concerns such as health and education, (Waddell 2006: 545). The DFID’s Strategy for Security and Development bears testimony to renewed interest in this area. According to the United Nations:

Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop ... Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their governments help poor countries defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations 2004).

The drive towards sustainable development should be aimed at poverty reduction and the maintenance of peace and security. Issues of safety and security are linked to issues of material and social development. In the words of Hilary Benn, it is untenable to have ‘development without security’ because ‘security without development is only temporary’ (in Waddell 2007: 534). It has been widely argued that linking security to development is problematic because it leads to the securitisation of development or the developmentalisation of security. Given the broad nature of human security, which might include such issues as environmental security, there is a danger that we may securitise or militarise issues such as environmental ones that may not require security intervention. If security is used as a loose catch-all word, sooner or later it will become devoid of meaning and substance.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Madrid and London there has been increased media and political interest in issues of security. Perhaps more concretely, it has been recognised that security is something that must be addressed at multiple levels. The concern has also been to link global security with poverty and terrorism,
assumption being that poor and failed states are havens for terrorists. As a result, there is a danger that development aid may be tied to counter-terrorism measures.

Mendelson-Forman talks about the ‘developmentalisation of security’ as a paradigm wherein the military takes over broader roles to include peacekeeping and support to humanitarian activities, through disaster management and, more broadly, under the banner of aid to civil authorities (Mendelson-Forman 2004: 82). According to Galtung, for peace to be sustainable it should not be based on the absence of war, but rather the absence of structures that perpetuate inequalities and insecurity (Galtung 1975). This suggests that there is a close affinity between peace and development, that is, there can be neither peace without development nor development without peace. This approach presents an important dialectic between security and sustainable development, and perhaps more importantly how the two concepts relate to peace.

This seems to me an important research question that captures the power relations that play themselves out in society. What could be aptly described as securitisation of development or developmentalisation of security are post-Cold War constructions that recognise that poverty, inequality and underdevelopment are consequences of conflict and destabilisation. This perspective links public safety to development and contends that the challenges facing developing countries are not only external but are essentially internal conflicts. Human security involves, among other things, the realisation of human dignity, as well as freedom from political repression and persecution, hunger, disease and ignorance. It also recognises that civil society has a role to play in the realisation of human development and security.

Public security, which often plays second fiddle to state security, is an equally important facet of security. It deals with that aspect of law enforcement without which public order, safety and the rule of law cannot be enforced. The BDF has operationalised this paradigm as ‘aid to civil authorities’. It has engaged in supportive roles with the police to curb armed robberies and carjacking, and to carry out surveillance operations in the urban areas of Botswana. In similar vein, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks also gets assistance from the BDF in dealing with armed poaching in the country’s game reserves and national parks. These engagements not only recognise the centrality of the human being to development efforts, but also link sustainable development to security. Tourism, which is anchored on wildlife, flora and fauna and ecological
sites, has been identified as an alternative engine of growth in Botswana.

Although aid to civil authorities has worked well in Botswana, it carries an inherent danger of diluting and clouding the core functions, integrity and professionalism of the security sector. The conflation of police, wildlife and military roles is also seen as a challenge to security. Police training and induction courses need to emphasise the centrality of the public in policing activities and also the notion of ‘policing by consent’, which is at the heart of building public trust in the police.

Often, professionalism and accountability are lost if there is no clear separation between the roles of the military and the police. Best practice has it that the military are custodians of external security, whilst the police are responsible for domestic law and order. Conflation of the roles of the two sectors may lead to excessive use of force in police functions and thereby erode the public trust and confidence in the police. Similarly, the use of the military on soft civilian targets may compromise the effectiveness of the military and preparedness for war. Therefore, there must be a concerted effort to remove the military from core police functions and encourage community policing.

**An Afro-centric Perspective**

Sustainable African economic development must be based on African cultural and linguistic characteristics. Development must not be seen as a purely technicist deliverable devoid of the cultural setting it evolves from. This perspective not only guarantees a democratic approach to development, but also one that is anchored in people’s culture and language. Modern knowledge, as it were, has to build on indigenous or traditional knowledge. As Prah perceptively asked, are we to wait until the day all Batswana speak English in order for ‘development to be a cultural property’ of the people? (Prah 2002: 35). Development must be grounded in African cultures and must reflect the ingenuity and creativity of Africans.

Under the auspices of globalisation, the world is increasingly unifying in social, economic and cultural aspects, but this is a unity of unequal players. Under the framework of globalisation, the link between development and security is challenging. In terms of sustainable economic development, globalisation is characterised by uncertainty. On the one hand, it is seen as a benevolent force that can deliver Africa from the backwaters of starvation, disease, poverty and hunger. It entails free trade and opening up of African economies to world markets and a better future for all. On the other hand, the reality of globalisation is that it has opened
up African economies, especially in the area of manufacturing, to cheap textile imports from places like China and India, but African farmers are still disadvantaged by the subsidies which their counterparts in Europe receive.

In essence, therefore, globalisation (free trade) for Africa has meant stifling the nascent industries and systematically pillaging raw materials in unsustainable ways. The biggest dilemma with globalisation is that it presents an issue of ‘old wine in new bottles’. As a process, globalisation appeared in the era of mercantilism and continued through colonialism and imperialism; it represents the culmination of a grandiose project that has been with us for some time. As Prah concludes, ‘we cannot wish away globalisation, threatening as it is … somehow we must make it work for us, or perhaps more modestly, make it less threatening’ (Prah 2002: 34).

Botswana’s Role in Regional Sustainable Economic Development and Security Cooperation

The project of regional development and security cooperation is a long-standing one. With the discovery of minerals in the 1880s, South Africa became the hub or locus of regional integration and cooperation. This was institutionalised by the formation of the Customs Union in 1910. Due to the fissures that were created by apartheid and white minority rule in southern Africa, in 1974 a formidable regional grouping known as the Front-Line States (FLS) was formed, deriving inspiration and legitimacy from the Lusaka Declaration of 1969. The role of the FLS was to coordinate the liberation of the southern African region, and also to rid the region of all vestiges of white settler domination, including apartheid. After the independence of Angola and Mozambique (1975) and Rhodesia (1980), it became evident that political independence that was not accompanied by economic liberation was hollow. Arising from this realisation, the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) was formed in 1980 with a view to reducing dependence on South Africa, as well as diversifying the sources of foreign funding. In 1992, SADCC was transformed into SADC, which was formalised in a treaty that binds member states.

Regional economic cooperation remains elusive because, despite the formalisation of the SADC treaty, member countries continue to privilege national and not regional projects. This discord is evident not only at
the economic level but also in security cooperation. There appears to be no consonance in the conception of security: while some countries are making strides towards human security others are busy promoting regime security. SADC should envisage itself as a security community but the fault lines become evident, for example, when Botswana’s security challenges are manifested, among other things, by illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe and armed poachers alleged to originate from Namibia. The quiet diplomacy of SADC with respect to Zimbabwe, in the face of declining standards of living and deteriorating human rights conditions, makes a mockery of endeavours for economic and security cooperation in the region, while Swaziland continues to defy with impunity norms of democratic governance upon which economic and security cooperation are premised.

Deepening regional economic and security cooperation requires an effective superstructure that may even have autonomy over states; but SADC is not conceived that way. Despite its restructuring and the centralisation of 21 sectors that were spread out throughout the member states into four directorates at the secretariat in Gaborone, SADC remains weak organisationally and institutionally. Great strides have been made in creating and harmonising regional economic infrastructure but the region continues to pay lip service to governance issues, which underlie the success of economic and security projects. Even with the launch of the regional peacekeeping force, one wonders whether there have ever been national security audits, under the auspices of SADC, to determine the region’s security needs.

All said and done, the prospects of regional developmental and security cooperation remain bleak given the absence of certain basic conditions. At a minimum, regional economic cooperation requires the existence of basic macro-economic stability and the harmonisation of fiscal policies and instruments. While SADC has done a lot to develop infrastructure (roads, ports, telecommunications, etc.), it is unlikely that a common regional identity will emerge when we have in our fold states that are regressing (politically and economically), like Zimbabwe, that need reconstruction from the start, like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and that are yet to embrace democratic norms, like Swaziland.

Nevertheless, Botswana stands to gain from regional integration and cooperation because, through a larger pool of resources and markets, its investment profile would improve. Moreover, regional integration leads to greater harmonisation of macro-economic policies and reduction of
trade barriers and tariffs. It leads to free movement of people, goods and services. As a landlocked country and also because of its small market, Botswana stands to benefit from regional markets. Therefore an aggressive export strategy entailing access to industrialised country markets and the replacement of imported goods with the consumption of locally produced goods is critical for the development of the private sector and sustainable economic growth. It is perhaps through regional integration that globalisation would become less threatening. While the hegemonic threat of South Africa is real, given its aggressive economic tendencies, there is hope that regional benefits could trickle back to other states and their people.

SADC’s commitment to creating regional security cooperation was conceived in 1996 with the establishment of the OPDSC. Article 15 of the OPDSC protocol recognises that it has to work with and be supportive of processes of the AU and the UN Security Council in terms of the maintenance of peace and security. In a nutshell, the specific objectives of the OPDSC are to protect peoples of the region against instability; promote political cooperation and the cultivation of common political values and institutions; harmonise foreign policies of countries in the region; develop a common security agenda with a view to developing collective security and mutual defence pacts; manage and mediate conflict through peaceful means; develop closer cooperation between the police and other security agencies with a view to curbing the proliferation of small arms and cross-border crime; develop and coordinate peacekeeping endeavours; and enhance regional capacity in disaster management (SADC 2001: 17).

Following the Blantyre 2001 summit, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the OPDSC was commissioned to develop a road map that would operationalise the OPDSC in the areas of politics, defence, state security and public security. In line with the AU’s recommendation that SADC should develop a brigade-size Standby Force to enforce peace on the continent, Botswana hosted Exercise Thokgamo in June 2005. This was conducted under the auspices of the French-initiated Reinforcement of African Capabilities in Peacekeeping Programme in southern Africa. The exercise, a significant milestone in the development of the SADC standby brigade, was conceived as a pillar of the pan-African ideal of the African Standby Force of the AU, in line with article 4 of the AU Charter that commits the continent to a common security agenda by 2010.

The AU has adopted the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as its developmental agenda. The primary objectives of NEPAD
are in consonance with the Millennium Development Goals: they seek to eradicate poverty and embark on rapid growth and sustainable development. World trends depict Africa spiralling downwards and being marginalised from world trade and development. NEPAD is about uniting the African continent as an integrated economic and trading bloc with a view to sharpening its competitive urge and transforming it into a robust world-class economy. Moreover, NEPAD recognises that economic and human development, which are vital for Africa, cannot take place in war-torn and conflict-ridden environments. Therefore peace and security are constituent elements of Africa’s sustainable development. NEPAD is also bent on promoting democratic and corporate governance through a voluntary Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Through the APRM, member states can review democratic practices, identify deficiencies, applaud best practices and, where applicable, suggest remedies for the consolidation of democracy.

Conclusion

The conclusions that emerge from this chapter are that there has been a growing convergence between security and sustainable economic development. The conception of development as sustainable human development has broadened the understanding of development from simply economic growth, and the understanding of security beyond the narrow confines of state security. In a more forceful way, there is a convergence internationally that sustainable economic development and security can best be achieved within a framework of democratic governance. As Tony Blair once said, ‘we cannot turn our backs on conflicts and violations of human rights within other countries if we want to be secure’ (Waddell 2006: 543). It is evident that there is an important dialectic between sustainable economic development, security and good governance.

Although there has been a drive in the Western world, especially in Britain and the US since the 9/11 Madrid and London terrorist attacks, to link global security primarily to international terrorism, Africa has persisted in according a high premium to issues of poverty, unemployment and income inequality. There have also been attempts by the West to depict failed states like Somalia and Afghanistan as havens for terrorism. In my view, more work needs to be done to establish this link. However,
The Link between Sustainable Development and Security in Botswana

a link that is well established in Africa is that sustainable economic development has a direct correlation with security. In an opinion poll survey by Afrobarometer (2003, 2005 and 2008), Batswana were asked to identify their most burning security challenges: they were unequivocal in identifying them as HIV/AIDS, unemployment and poverty. It never dawned on them that they could face an external threat. Even when the problem of illegal Zimbabwean immigrants featured as a distant threat, it was more in terms of exacerbating or compounding the unemployment and crime problems. Hence, the conclusion that emerges is that sustainable economic development and security are inexorably linked, at least in Botswana.

Endnotes

1 The government has had to grapple with the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which threatens to erode the development gains that have been made, as well as exacerbating the rising levels of unemployment. The high rates of HIV/AIDS infection present the greatest challenge to sustainable development in Botswana. Government projections based on the Sentinel Surveillance Study for 2005 report a decreased HIV/AIDS prevalence among pregnant women aged 15–49 years from 37.4 per cent in 2003 to 33.4 per cent in 2005. Moreover, HIV/AIDS prevalence among the population aged 15–19 years dropped from 22.8 per cent in 2003 to 17.8 per cent in 2005. The government has introduced campaigns to change sexual practices and make available antiretroviral drugs to support those affected by the virus in order to minimise the rate of mother to child infection and keep those infected productive at work. However, the financial burden of this campaign on an economy that is already burdened by high unemployment rates and deepening poverty is enormous. For more detail see Gaolathe (2006: 13); Joseph Balisi (2002).

2 This nexus has been strengthened by the fact that the shopping list for the developmental agenda includes improving democratic governance, rapid economic growth, reduction of poverty and inequalities, access to universal free primary education, reduction of child and maternal mortality, gender equality, judicial review and security sector reform.

3 Seretse himself got married to a white woman, which was perceived as an insult to the white race.

4 Bakgatla, Bagwato, Bakwena, Bangwaketse, Batawana, Malete, Barolong and Batlokwa.

5 For more detail see Molomo (2007).
6 Unemployment, although high, experienced a downturn from 23.8 per cent in 2002/03 to 17.6 per cent in 2005/06. For detail, see Central Statistics Office (2006: 8).

7 Gender does not refer to biological differences between males and females, but to a set of cultural characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity. Gender analyses power relations between and among men and women. For further detail see Henry (2007).

8 This view is corroborated by former commanders of the BDF. Lt Gen. Merafhe said ‘armies are built during peacetime’, and Lt Gen. Fisher said an army must be vigilant and prepared all the time because ‘we can never predict the character of the future enemy’. Major General Mokgware maintains that security is an indispensable resource that a country cannot afford not to have; he likens it to ‘oxygen’ without which life cannot be sustained. For detail see Molomo (2001: 5–7) and Twiio (2007: 1).

9 The seven areas of human security are: economic, political, food, health, environmental, personal and community.

10 That is, at individual, community and global levels. Addressing it as a community and individual problem, Tony Blair, the erstwhile British Prime Minister, urged British Muslims to ‘expose those within their communities’ who supported ‘terrorist activities’. For detail see Henry (2007: 62).

11 In the words of US President, George Bush, ‘you are either with us or against us’.


13 The FLS disbanded in 1992 and in its wake the OPDSC was formed.

14 By way of registering their uneasiness with Botswana’s military build-up, Namibia in particular opposed its purchase of Leopard Tanks from the Dutch in 1996. However, Botswana has since purchased them from Austria. In addition, it has recently acquired F5 fighter-bombers from the US. The Namibian foreign minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, criticised the purchases as ‘provocative and unnecessary’. For his part, South Africa’s defence minister, Joe Modise, remarked, ‘who is Botswana’s enemy? Why are they buying tanks?’ See Anglin (1996).

Why is it that the study of the Zambian case in the civil control of the military is an important component in the overall understanding of civil–military relations in Africa? In answering this question, Decalo argues that while there is ‘voluminous literature on the sources of civil–military strife in Africa, there is an incredible lack of academic attention to the reverse condition, civil–military stability’ (1991: 67–68). He further points out that:

... the question of how these states have managed to avoid coups may now be far more significant to inquiring academics than their asking why coups erupt. For notwithstanding the continent’s general instability, a number of states have proven remarkably immune to coup epidemic (Decalo 1991: 67).

In looking at the evolution of governance of the military in Zambia, I focus on three distinct periods spanning from 1964. First, the immediate post-independence government that used structural policies guided by the British-tailored Constitution between 1964 and 1972. Second, the introduction of one-party participatory democracy, which lasted from 1973 to December 1990 and saw the use of behavioural controls as the main method of civil control of the military. And third, the end of the Cold War which resulted in the reintroduction of a multiparty democratic system of government that combined structural, behavioural and parliamentary oversight mechanisms as its main methods of governance of the military.

The comparative element of the three periods in the Zambian case is important as it interrogates the nature, character and degree of civil control of the military and how these have been reconfigured by the different political transitions. The purpose of analysing these transitions is to show
which management elements remained constant and which ones changed as a result of regime changes.

**Governance of the Military in the First Republic: 1964–1972**

At independence in 1964, Zambia was made up of 72 ethnic groups with different cultures and origins. Externally, it was surrounded by minority regimes in Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, Angola and South West Africa. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Southern Rhodesia and the outbreak of guerrilla activity in southern Africa affected the economy and the military security of Zambia. Mtshali argues that:

> The dilemma was that on the one hand the [United National Independence Party] UNIP government had committed itself to the Pan-African ideal of the total liberation of the last remaining bastion of colonial and minority rule on the southern tip; on the other hand however, stood the government’s equal commitment to the protection of its citizens and the economy from internal and external harm (Mtshali 1972: 277).

Under these conditions the government changed the nature of defence governance by introducing structural institutional reforms that suited the new democratic dispensation. Under these reforms, the independence Constitution abolished all policies and laws related to racial discrimination. The composition of the executive, parliament and the judiciary was now based on the principle of ‘one person one vote’ under the motto ‘One Zambia, One Nation’. The Republic of Zambia (Modification and Adaptation) (General) Order, 1964, Section 3(b) facilitated the continued civil control of the military after independence. This meant that all powers other than those entrusted to military commanders were vested in the president. Accordingly, Article 33(1) of the Constitution of Zambia prescribed that the president be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The president further appointed elected or nominated members of parliament as heads of the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964).

The enactment of these and other laws authorised the executive to implement new structural policies, which led to the establishment of administrative structures that worked as effective tools in the governance
of the military. Firstly, Cap.131, Section 8 of the Defence Act was enacted. This established the Defence Council, the supreme policy decision-making body for the Ministry of Defence and advisor to the president on all matters related to defence policy, command, promotion, discipline and administration of the defence force. The composition of the Defence Council ensured that the civil control of the military was maintained. It consisted of the vice-president who was the chairman of the full Council. Other members were the minister of defence, minister of works and supply, minister of transport, minister of finance and development, service commanders and other officers co-opted into the Council depending on the issue under consideration. In order for it to function effectively, the Council was divided into three committees, namely, the Appointment and Disciplinary Committee, the Development, Administration and Finance Committee, and the Strategy and Policy Committee.

Secondly, the government established the office of the Command Secretary in the Zambia Defence Force (ZDF). The creation of this structure became an important link between the ZDF, other government ministries, government leadership and parliament. The functions of this office provided effective linkages through which the government leadership exercised powers of civil control. In line with this arrangement, the Office of the Command Secretary became a liaison office through which civil budgetary preparations, controls and audit of military expenditure were directed by the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the Auditor-General (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1963).

The government also introduced legal measures that prevented discrimination against any Zambian eligible for recruitment into the ZDF. This became an important tool that facilitated effective civil control of the military by the government leadership: the Zambian government was aware that one of the main causes of domestic military intervention and mutiny in African countries (such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]) was ethnicity. Therefore, the recruitment process for the ZDF was guided by the motto ‘One Zambia, One Nation’: all eligible young men from the 73 ethnic groups qualified for recruitment at officer cadet level as well as at lower ranks. This measure ensured effective civil control of the military – as no one ethnic group had a dominant position in the military, the possibility of one ethnic group succeeding in organising a successful military coup d’état, as was the case in Nigeria, was remote.

President Kaunda also frequently addressed the military. The most important of his speeches was delivered at a seminar for the army and air
force officers at Kalewa barracks, Ndola, on 21 March 1967. In it he warned against military seizure of political power (cited in Mtshali 1972: 155–156). The Zambian government further sent some of its military officers to communist countries for training, which included an element of political education (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1972).

The government also decided that loyal young commissioned officers were to receive fast promotion to ensure that African advancement was not held back. However, these measures were taken cautiously so as to avoid a military takeover of government. Mtshali looked at why the military had not taken over in Zambia while elsewhere in Africa successful coup d’êats were prevalent. He observed that the main reason was the paucity of Zambian officers in the upper echelons of the military establishment – by 1969 the highest-ranking Zambians in the army were five majors out of a force of 4,489 men. This provided opportunities for promotion as the expatriate officers left. Dissatisfaction because of poor prospects for advancement and poor conditions of service was counted out. In addition, the UNIP government’s deliberate involvement of the armed forces in the formulation, deliberation and implementation of national policies through the party’s National Council discouraged military takeover attempts. This was because, as participants themselves, the military found it difficult to blame the resultant policy exclusively on incompetence of the civilian authorities. These policies, therefore, improved the relationship between the new government, the military and the citizenry. It also gradually changed the people’s view of the military from being an oppressive colonial instrument to one which protected the people against both natural and physical disaster (Mtshali 1972: 166–167).

Ministry of Defence Budget
In the period 1964 to 1969 the Zambian government followed the liberal democratic policy of annually tabling the Ministry of Defence budget before the Zambian parliament for approval. Welch (1976) argues that the budgetary supervision is the most powerful weapon for civilian control over the military establishment. However, the fear that public security could be endangered by minority regimes surrounding Zambia through the publishing of the country’s annual expenditure in both the printed estimates of revenue and the actual government revenue spent as reported in the Financial Report forced the Zambia government to pass the Constitutional (Amendment) Act, No. 6 of 1970, which amended Chapter VII of the Constitution (GRZ 1970: 1).
The amendment ensured that the Auditor-General would audit defence and public security expenditures while the Ministry of Finance’s internal auditors were excluded. Such reports by the Auditor-General could only be seen by the president, who decided either to keep them secret or to publish or distribute them in any other way he thought fit. This amendment made parliament voluntarily abdicate the responsibility of debating the defence and public security expenditure budgets. This was a violation of the principle of separation of powers, checks and balances between the executive, parliament and the judiciary.

The other effect of this decision was that it substantially increased the political influence of the armed forces within the decision-making process. For instance, ‘the offices of Army Commander, Air Commander and Commissioner of Police were now given dual responsibilities of being commanders of these forces and Ministers of State in their respective Ministries. This allowed them direct access to party and government policy on security issues’ (General Masheke: Interview 11/2005). These measures caused a ‘top heavy military bureaucracy within the executive reaches of the Zambia Defence Force. This brought the emergence of a new category of civil servants in uniform’ (Williams 1993: 12).

Governance of the Military Under the One-party State

The introduction of the one-party state system of government in Zambia fundamentally affected the methods of civil control of the military. The second republic consolidated the structural controls by introducing behavioural controls as its main method of control. This was important for the government leadership because the electoral system the one-party state put in place could not easily remove the regime in power since the political process was controlled by the fusion of party and government.

Furthermore, UNIP’s supremacy over the other state organs, including parliament, undermined these institutions, including Cabinet. This was demonstrated by the fact that the Central Committee of the party became the supreme policy-making body of the government and where a decision of the Central Committee was in conflict with a decision of the Cabinet, the decision of the Central Committee prevailed (GRZ 1975: 2). Therefore, at institutional level, UNIP – being the sole organ of political power – made decisions related to the civil control of the military and any other policy in the land. Parliament translated these decisions into laws.
The executive then governed the nation using these laws and the judiciary interpreted the same laws.

The hierarchical structure of the party and its government explained above shows that during the one-party state period, policies related to the civil control of the military were decided by the party, which took steps to safeguard the security of the state and its leadership against the military. This was important for the country, as both the army and the air force had a large staff complement of expatriate personnel who were from the British Joint Training Team up to 1978. These consisted of officers and men who had close links with personnel of the rebel Rhodesian army and air force who ‘were their close friends, associates and relations’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1991).

At regional level, the country’s policy of giving bases to liberation movements made minority regimes surrounding Zambia adopt a policy of offensive defence or pre-emptive defence, a strategy that undermined Zambia as a country and the liberation movement’s logistics, infrastructure, morale and intelligence-gathering capabilities (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1976).

**Establishment of the Department of Military Intelligence**

In 1973 the party and government established the Department of Military Intelligence, which amalgamated the Zambia army and Zambia air force intelligence that had previously operated separately. This measure also brought to the fore two important divisions in the Office of the President, which eventually proved crucial in the civil control of the military in Zambia. These were the Department of Military Intelligence, which now drew its personnel from the army, the air force and the Zambia National Service, and the Special Division, which drew its personnel from civilians.

The directors of both departments were directly answerable to the Republican president. The liaison that took place between officers in the Department of Military Intelligence and the Special Branch regarding national security ensured that very few areas of insecurity went unnoticed. While all departments dealt with all matters related to national security, the Department of Military Intelligence had the added responsibility of dealing with operational and tactical intelligence during military operations. However, since both organisations reported directly to the government leadership, they became important tools of the government in power (Lt General Tembo: Interview 10/10/05).
These structures enabled intelligence officers to collect both positive and negative information concerning the professional and private activities of military officers, especially in relation to their loyalty to the party and its government. This information helped the leadership through the Defence Council to vet all disloyal defence personnel with regard to dismissals, demotions and promotions in various establishments.

**Establishment of Defence and Security Committees**

In 1978, the government passed Standing Defence and Security Instructions Number 1 of 1978 (UNIP Archives 1978: 1). These instructions provided for the establishment of defence and security committees at national, provincial and district levels. At national level, the membership of the committee was appointed by the president but chaired by the Secretary General of the ruling party. At provincial level, the provincial member of the central committee of the party chaired the committee. Other members included the provincial political secretary, permanent secretary and intelligence officers, regional commanders, officers commanding police and prisons and any other co-opted members, as the situation demanded. At the district level the district governor, who was also a member of parliament, chaired the committee (UNIP Archives 1978: 1–16).

At national level the committee met once a month. One of its functions was to advise the president on all matters concerning defence and security. The committee also kept the security situation in the country under constant review and examined all intelligence reports from the security forces and the party. In carrying out these functions, the Defence and Security Committee at national level depended on the advice given to it by the Defence and Security Advisory Committee, whose membership was appointed by the president.

The Defence and Security Advisory Committee relied for its advice on an operational committee called the Central Joint Operations Committee. This committee was composed of senior officers from the ZDF, the police force and the intelligence service. The committee updated, assessed and evaluated all information affecting counter-insurgency and internal security operations. It ensured that security forces maintained good relations with members of the public in all areas of contact and communications, as well as their efficient operation (UNIP Archives 1978: 3).

Provincial defence and security committees were responsible to the Defence and Security Committee in Lusaka on all defence and security
matters in the provinces. The committee also implemented all security instructions as given by the Defence and Security Committee from time to time. The committees worked out provincial plans and contingency measures for the entire population against external aggression, emergencies and natural disasters. The committees further conducted security education and directed and supervised district defence and security committees on all defence and security matters, including civil defence measures. The committee also reviewed intelligence reports from the security forces and the party and all progress of operations agreed upon at previous meetings, including the disposition of forces in their areas of responsibility. The committees further considered the logistical requirements for the operations of the security forces (UNIP Archives 1978: 1–16).

In carrying out these functions the provincial defence and security committees relied on the advice of the provincial joint operations committees, whose membership and functions were similar to the national one. The committees also specifically formed intelligence collection and assessment committees that dealt with any matter that was the subject of an operation (UNIP Archives 1978: 6–7). The district defence and security committees met once a week and functioned like the provincial committees at district level by supervising party branches and sections in all the districts on security matters (UNIP Archives 1978: 8).

As a result of the activities of both the military and civil intelligence, the government leadership during the one-party era foiled attempted military coups in 1980, 1988 and 1990. All anti-party and anti-government activities of citizens were monitored and culprits reported to relevant authorities for action. As a result of these measures the country was properly policed against both external and internal enemies and had a smooth transition to plural politics after the end of the Cold War. The relationship between the government leadership, the military and the citizenry remained strong and harmonious.

**Governance of the Military in the Third Republic**

The third republic is the post-Cold War period when a new Constitution was enacted that abolished the one-party state and replaced it with a multiparty democratic system of government. It is a period in which there was:
an increasing realisation that financing of defence and security programmes could not be isolated from broader developmental programmes and procedures, which in a liberal political dispensation lent themselves to the controls of prioritisation and open scrutiny (Roux 2004: v).

These developments called for changes in the nature, character and degree of civil control of the military in Zambia. It is important to note that Zambia was one of the few African states which had a smooth democratic transition. This was as a result of the establishment of workable structural policies and behavioural controls in the military establishment, which ensured that the military supported the leadership and government of the day. This section examines the methods of survival, growth and goals of governance that the new government developed during the re-establishment and consolidation of democracy in Zambia. These were mainly characterised by the restructuring of the structural policies and behavioural controls introduced by the two previous republics and the reassertion of parliamentary oversight functions over defence expenditure.

**Depoliticisation and Subordination of the Military to the Civil Authorities**

Internationally, this period marked the post-Cold War era, while in South Africa a democratically elected government replaced the apartheid regime, and Namibia attained majority rule. Since Zambia’s sovereignty was no longer threatened by external and internal threats, it became unnecessary for the executive to keep defence and intelligence budgets secret. In November 1991, the State of Public Emergency was lifted by parliament (Haantobolo 2003: 16). However, ‘Chapter 1 of the Constitution of Zambia, the Emergency Powers Act and the Preservation of Public Security Act Chapters 108 and 112 respectively continued to permit the detention of persons without trial for extended periods when a state of emergency was in existence’ (Ministry of Legal Affairs 1998: MOD164/5/1C/43/1: 26.1).

The abuse of the above pieces of legislation in the third republic was contrary to good governance. This is because the legislation worked against the rule of law, transparency and accountability, and violated citizens’ human rights. The new leadership of the third republic was aware that during the one-party period, President Kaunda had extensively used these powers to detain or restrict hundreds of Zambians whom he perceived to be enemies of the government during his 27 years in office. The official government report investigating violations of human rights in
Zambia between 1964 and 1995 documented ‘938 cases of people detained without trial in this period’ (Ministry of Legal Affairs 1998: MOD164/5/1C). Despite this lesson of history, President Chiluba and his Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) government continued to abuse this piece of legislation.

In 1991, the Defence Council decided that under the multiparty dispensation, it was important for the military to occupy a position of political neutrality above the play of partisan politics. On this basis, professionalism was introduced in the military through the policy of depoliticisation. This resulted in the abolishment of the Department of Political Education and Culture that was previously run by UNIP military officials. Under the reorganisation programme, the department was renamed the Department of Sports. All former office holders in the department were either forced to retire or retrenched from military service. Similarly, all members of the defence force who were appointed to political positions were either retired or retrenched from military service (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1991: MOD/64/9/6/sec).

However, these developments negatively affected the third republic’s control of the military as they began to sow seeds of antagonism between the government leadership and the military. This was because most of the officers were retired without the immediate provision of their retirement package. As a result, a number of these officers died from depression or sickness and many of them held the view that the government had neglected them in spite of the fact that they had protected the nation from minority regimes during their service. In the meantime, the government continued to argue that, under the new democratic dispensation, it was:

important for the Ministry of Defence to integrate the needs of the defence force into the nation’s overall priorities, competing for resources and ensuring that national objectives were realistically supported by an appropriately sized military force (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1994).

**Zero Option Plan of 1993**

As a result of the above problems, some former military officers worked out a scheme with the leaders of the former ruling party, UNIP, code-named the Zero Option Plan. Their aim was to wrestle power from the MMD government before the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections (Phiri 1993: 1). The government reacted to the Zero Option Plan
by withdrawing UNIP’s status as the official opposition in parliament and
reintroducing the State of Public Emergency. On 6 March 1993, a combined
team of police, civil and military intelligence officials raided homes of
suspects without police warrants. Two UNIP members of parliament, some
former intelligence officers, some former military officers, four teachers
and some members of the UNIP Central Committee were arrested and
detained (Phiri 1993: 1).

The physical and psychological torture that these political detainees
went through at the hands of police, military and civil intelligence
officers led to the premature death of Cuthbert Nguni, member of
parliament for Chama South. As in the second republic, the involvement
of military intelligence officers in the detention, torture and death of
political prisoners alienated both citizens and members of the defence
force. Phiri et al. noted that ‘using MMD’s majority in the House, the
Executive went ahead and ratified the State of Emergency’, which began
a process where the executive used the legislature to pass pieces of
legislation that violated human rights and institutionalised a dictatorship
under President Chiluba. This changed the relations that existed among
opposition parties, the ruling party, the citizenry and the military
(Phiri et al. 2004: 34).

Impact of the Privatisation of Parastatal Organisations
Between 1992 and 1996 the ‘Government actively pursued policies that
facilitated a private sector driven economy under the structural adjustment
programme supported by the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund and other collaborating partners’ (Central Statistical Office 1997: 3).
These adjustment programmes included:

privatisation of state owned companies including the giant
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, liberalisation of domestic
and international trade, liberalisation of foreign exchange markets,
stringent fiscal policy which included government operating on
cash budget to reduce inflation, health and education reforms
which included the introduction of user fees, and transformation
of the agriculture and transport sector (Central Statistical Office
1997: 3).

In 1992 the Zambia Privatisation Agency began selling government-
owned parastatal organisations to private companies. By October 1997,
187 formerly government-owned companies were privatised. Out of these, 19 companies closed after privatisation. These problems led to losses of 7034 jobs in addition to the 51000 jobs that were lost outside privatisation, mainly through liquidations and shedding of excess staff by companies like Zambia Airways, Livingstone Motor Assemblies and United Bus of Zambia (Zambia Privatisation Agency 2005: 3). Government also failed to account for the money realised from the sale of these companies.

The suffering that the jobless Zambians went through angered the military personnel who were related to them. In the meanwhile, the price of maize meal increased from K198 (Zambian Kwacha) in 1991 to K50000 in 1996. The HIV/AIDS pandemic also took its toll on the unemployed, who could not afford one meal a day. These problems further alienated most Zambians and the military from the MMD leadership and civil control of the military reached its weakest point since the country’s independence. This resulted in the 28 October 1997 attempted military coup d’état.

Unlike in the second republic, lack of government goodwill and funds for operational intelligence meant that neither civil and military intelligence officers nor government leadership had a clue as to the intentions of the coup plotters. In fact, the first they heard of it:

was when the 34 coup plotters entered the Zambia Mass Media Complex premises and took control of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation Studios and Captain Stephen Lungu announced over the radio the overthrow of the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ 2003: 1).

At about 10:00 hours on 28 October, loyal commando elite troops captured the coup plotters. President Chiluba, in consultation with his Cabinet, again declared a State of Public Emergency and evoked the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Emergency Powers Act, Cap. 108. These events revealed that civil control of the military in the third republic had reached its weakest point. Unlike in the second republic, there was very little coordination between civil and military intelligence and government leadership. If it were not for the existence of loyal troops within the rank and file of ordinary soldiers, the coup would have been successful. The 1997 coup attempt, therefore, served as a lesson to MMD and any future ruling party about the dangers of a government trying to rule single-handedly without budgetary support for operational, tactical and counter-intelligence.
Consequences of the Detention of the 1997 Coup Suspects

The torture inflicted on the coup suspects by combined police and civil intelligence, which resulted in death or permanent disability, worsened the relationship between the citizens and sympathisers of the coup plotters within the military and the government leadership (Post 18–19.08.04: 1). The nature of the civil control of the military now became dictatorial: any officer suspected of being disloyal was either fired or retrenched. However, the retrenchment of military intelligence officers ceased forthwith. Instead, most of them were taken for retraining in military colleges within the country. Thereafter, they were redeployed in all the military establishments through the Army School of Education as educationists and chaplains. Here they continued working both as educationists and military intelligence officers (Sinkamba et al.: Group Interview 02/10/05).

These measures resulted in the reinforcement of the structural and behavioural policies developed by the first and second republics. These policies were now backed by funds for operational intelligence which prevented the recurrence of what had happened prior to the 1997 attempted military coup. The government further reacted to the failed coup attempt by sending many military officers to peacekeeping missions in Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and the DRC, hence leaving a smaller number of military officers within the country that could be more easily monitored.

Volatile and strained civil–military relations were made worse when President Chiluba made it known that he wanted to amend the Constitution so that he could run for a third presidential term instead of sticking to the two-term limit. This move was thwarted through demonstrations by pro-democracy and human rights movements, churches, opposition parties and a split in the MMD. The military realised that the Chiluba regime was on its way out and decided to facilitate the transitional process by assisting the civil service by providing logistical support during the 2001 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Governance of the Military and Parliamentary Oversight of Defence Expenditure

While the executive wing made many mistakes during the democratic transition, the legislative wing recorded a lot of successes. In 1992 parliament was, for the first time since 1970, allowed to debate and approve the defence allocation in the Annual Estimates of Expenditure. Furthermore, from 1992 the Public Accounts Committee was allowed to consider reports of the Auditor General’s Office on defence expenditure.
The first specific report of the Public Accounts Committee was based on a ‘Special Report of the Auditor General on the Procurement of Goods and Services in the Zambia Army and Zambia Air Force for the period December, 1992 to 1998’ (GRZ 2001: 1–27). The report revealed a lot of irregularities in the way the Ministry of Defence expended public resources. In considering the report, the House deplored the fact that the army command considered itself above the law and, therefore, not obliged to adhere to normal procedures for financial transactions. The House directed that these practices should cease forthwith and that the service commands be compelled to comply with all established procedures and regulations. The House also directed the strengthening of the Ministerial Tender Committee:

through which all purchases were to be channelled for appropriate scrutiny and advice before execution. The House felt that this Parliamentary directive was imperative to avoid the negligence and the loss of public resources that had been brought up to the fore in the Auditor-General’s Report (NAZ 2001: 30).

The House further directed that all funds paid to suppliers were to be recovered immediately, especially where goods and services had not been received. In addition, the House directed that immediate and stern disciplinary measures should be taken against all the officers and other individuals involved in the irregular transactions leading to loss of public funds.

The House further expressed its concern and recommended ‘stern disciplinary action against all officers at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development who connived with Defence Personnel in making irregular payments of public resources’ (NAZ 2001: 30–31). It concluded its consideration by recommending the need to impose control over the financial operations of the services. The House also recommended that the ‘Defence Act (CAP 106) be reconsidered and amended to provide for a clear chain of authority in the handling of public funds in the services’ (NAZ 2001: 30–31).

Nevertheless, the parliamentary reports remained largely toothless until 10 January 2003 when, under the theme of curbing corruption, President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa’s government, which had come to power in the 2001 elections, directed that:
all the people implicated in the misappropriation of Government resources in the 16 Public Accounts Committee Reports for the years 1991 to 2003 that were approved by Parliament including those from the Ministry of Defence were to be arrested and prosecuted by the courts of law for corruption. In accordance with this directive the Government directed the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to proceed with the prosecutions of all those named in the Public Accounts Committee Reports (Post 11.01.03: 1, 5).

By 2004 the task force investigating the plunder of national resources under the Chiluba regime had arrested and prosecuted in the courts of law one of the former commandants of the Zambia National Service and Zambia Army and other officers involved in the dubious procurement of military hardware, both in the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance. In view of this, there is no doubt that the implementation of these parliamentary, executive and judicial measures was an effective method of civil control of the military in Zambia, in comparison with the methods of the first and second republics and the Chiluba regime.

Furthermore, a Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs was created by the Mwanawasa government, incorporating the Ministries of Defence and Home Affairs and providing checks and balances on policy matters in the same way as oversight of expenditure is done by the Public Accounts Committee. When the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs comes across financial irregularities in the Ministry of Defence during its scrutiny, it refers them to the Public Accounts Committee for further scrutiny.

In conclusion, one can safely argue that in the third republic the powers of parliament, the executive and the judiciary, with regard to the civil control, oversight and governance of the military, were restored.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has suggested how and why the civil authorities in Zambia survived, in spite of coup attempts. The introduction of liberal democratic structural reforms in the post-independence period, behavioural control of both the military and civilians under the one-party state, and the mixture of the two in the third republic, produced changing patterns of civil control of the military. The examination of how and why civil authorities
have survived coup attempts in Zambia and other African countries like Tanzania is a challenge to African scholars to develop a theoretical framework that would form a basis for improved analysis of African civil–military relations.
Following the achievement of independence by most African countries between 1960–63, the continent witnessed several military coups or attempted coups. Nevertheless, with the end of the Cold War and pressure from Western countries and the US for the continent to democratise, African states have emerged from authoritarian rule. Consequently, most countries have considered it important for the power held by the armed forces to be utilised in a responsible way for the benefit of society (Nathan 1996: 1).

There has not been a coup d’état or attempted coup in Namibia since independence. On a continent where the involvement of the armed forces in politics is common, Namibia’s success story is fairly unique. This chapter looks at how governance of the defence function in Namibia has contributed to security and stability since independence from 1990 to 2005. It does so in six sections. The first deals with Namibia’s civil–military relations in transition; the second and third sections examine the executive control and parliamentary oversight function; the fourth section looks at the civil–military relations in the Ministry of Defence (MOD); the fifth assesses the role of civil society and political parties. The concluding section draws some practical recommendations on how best to implement civil–military relations in Namibia.

Transitions in Namibia’s Defence Governance

The Colonial Legacy
A number of developments during the colonial period had critical implications for contemporary democratic civil–military relations in
Namibia. First, the country was colonised by Germany from the late 1800s and subsequently by South Africa from 1915 until independence in 1990.

The Germans introduced constitutional mechanisms of civil control in South West Africa, as the country was known then. For instance, the colony’s budget, including military expenditure, had to be approved by the German legislature in Berlin. In addition, the colonial military, known as the Schutztruppen, was designed as a small professional force and based within the colonial ministry rather than in the German Army High Command, further reinforcing civilian control of the armed forces (Bhebe et al. 2000: 104).

Second, the tradition of constitutional and civil supremacy continued under the South African regime. In 1975 whites in Namibia were given some form of self-government. The South West African Constitution Act No. 42 of 1925 established a Legislative Assembly, which had limited law-making capacity. Nevertheless, defence and a number of other critical legislative fields were reserved for the South African parliament (Soggot 1986: 20).

With the intensification of the armed struggle by the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), a state of emergency was declared in Ovamboland and the South African Defence Force (SADF) was deployed in large numbers in the north. After Angola’s independence in 1975, the SADF became the main security arm of the South African government in Namibia. The establishment of the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) in 1979, which consisted of ethnic battalions of black Namibians, further strengthened the SADF (Dale 1993: 12). These and other developments led to the weakening of civil control of the military.

**Liberation Struggle**

SWAPO, which was established in 1960, had its origins in the Namibian labour movement (Katjavivi 1988: 45). SWAPO’s primary strategy was the petitioning and lobbying of international organisations, such as the UN, to compel the South African government to end its occupation of Namibia and facilitate a process that would lead to independence. SWAPO was not banned inside Namibia, as the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress were in South Africa. Consequently, a limited civilian political experience, free from military intervention, was sustained. Nevertheless, as SWAPO’s Executive Committee was in exile, most of its operations were directed from outside Namibia.
In the mid-1960s the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO’s armed wing, was formed. It was created by the Central Committee of SWAPO which exercised civil control over the military. It should be mentioned here that members of SWAPO received military training and support from the former USSR, East European countries and China. Therefore, we could say, by and large, it was influenced by the communist model of civil–military relations. In essence, the structure of PLAN was subject to civil control by the party. For example, the SWAPO president was the commander-in-chief of PLAN, while the Secretary of Defence and commander of PLAN were all appointed from the Central Committee of the party. Therefore, military commanders were accountable and answerable to the SWAPO leadership, which was largely comprised of civilians. Moreover, there was party control over the activities of PLAN through commissar systems and political indoctrination of members of the military. In other words, PLAN was subordinated to the political leadership of SWAPO.

SWAPO as a liberation movement provided the overall political and military guidance to PLAN cadres. In terms of civil control, the Secretary of Defence, the commander and the deputy commander of PLAN, and the Chief Political Commissar were members of the Central Committee and politburo and accountable to the president of the party. The institution of civil control of the military in SWAPO was structured in such a manner that there was nothing that could be done without a directive from the Central Committee, which was the highest decision-making body.

PLAN members had to adhere to an oath of allegiance that required them to respect the hierarchy of SWAPO as well as members of the Central Committee. There was also a code of conduct that stipulated how members of PLAN should behave among the civilian population. For example, PLAN members were required to respect civilians and protect their property as well as not to abuse children. The supremacy of SWAPO over PLAN was emphasised at all times.

Moreover, the Central Committee of SWAPO was responsible for the formulation of military policy. The Military Council was instrumental for policy and strategic planning. The general staff (who were also members of the Military Council) was responsible for drafting military tactics as well as implementing policies. Members of the Military Council included regional commanders and commissars. Therefore, policy formulation followed the channel of command, that is, it was driven from the political level downwards to the military.
The decade preceding Angolan independence in 1975 proved to be a successful time for SWAPO. It was a period that saw a dramatic expansion of SWAPO’s military operations, especially in the wake of the transfer of its political and military headquarters from Zambia to Angola. According to Katjavivi (1988), this was followed by an intensification of the armed struggle with PLAN units being deployed in larger numbers deeper into the Namibian interior. By the late 1970s, PLAN had gained the upper hand over the SADF. PLAN had successful campaigns of urban sabotage in Windhoek, Swakopmund and Keetmanshoop, and established ‘no go’ areas. This, argues Bhebe and others, led to the armed wing becoming more assertive within SWAPO (Bhebe et al. 2000: 104).

This assertiveness became apparent in the mid-1970s with the outbreak of a crisis. In 1976 a segment of PLAN combatants who were operating from Zambia rebelled against the political leadership of SWAPO. They accused the leadership of lack of political accountability, military inactivity, and inadequate food, clothing and weapons supplies. The aggrieved combatants also accused the political leadership of being insensitive to their needs and called for a change in the leadership of SWAPO. Civil supremacy was only restored when the SWAPO executive called in the Zambian military to quash the military rebellion. The political leadership thereafter strengthened mechanisms of civilian control within all units of PLAN.

In the mid-to-late 1980s, in the context of a severe civil–military imbalance in favour of PLAN, another major crisis, which became known as the ‘spy drama’, emerged within the ranks of SWAPO. In an attempt to restore the civil–military balance, the SWAPO leadership created a security organ with the objective of neutralising the political influence of the military (Lamb 1999: 122–125). However, this organ, driven by extreme organisational suspicion, gained so much power and influence that it almost brought about SWAPO’s demise. Many members of SWAPO were either arrested or killed on suspicion that they were enemy agents, thus sowing seeds of fear and mistrust among the combatants.

Post-independence
In 1988, as part of the Angolan peace settlement, South Africa agreed to withdraw from Namibia, leading to the holding of democratic elections and the country’s independence in March 1990, thus ushering in a democratic dispensation. After winning democratic national elections with a majority vote of 57 per cent, SWAPO was mandated to rule the country
Namibia had no constitutionally established defence force at independence. One of the priorities of the new government was the formation an integrated Namibia Defence Force (NDF) against a background of mistrust and suspicion. The NDF was established immediately after independence in 1990 to protect the territorial integrity of Namibia. It is composed mainly of former adversaries – PLAN and SWATF.

Namibia, like most countries in southern Africa, has formal mechanisms that ensure civil control of the armed forces. Traditionally, civil supremacy in a democracy is enforced through the constitutional and legislative mechanisms. The constitutional responsibilities of the NDF – firstly, to defend and protect the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the people of Namibia against external attacks, and secondly, to assist civil authorities and communities when required – are fundamental in defence governance.

Significantly, the main framework for the transformation of the military was provided by the formulation of the Statement on Defence Policy, which provided the new vision of the NDF. The new vision is that of a broad representation of all Namibians at all ranks to reflect the demographic composition of the population, as well as a defence force that is trustworthy and legitimate in the eyes of the Namibian people. Subsequently, the transformation of the NDF included the following interrelated issues and steps:

- institutionalisation of civilian control over the armed forces;
- the reintegration of ex-combatants of PLAN, SWATF and the paramilitary police unit Koevoet into a national defence force;
- amendment of the Defence Act (No. 20 of 1990) amending the South African Defence Act (No. 44 of 1957);
- disarmament, demobilisation and downsizing of the armed forces;
- affirmative action and equal recruitment opportunity in the defence force;
- activities aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficient functioning of the NDF and the Ministry of Defence.

As in most transitions elsewhere, the process faced numerous impediments on the way to democratic governance. First, there was a violation of the ceasefire agreement between PLAN and the SADF on the eve of independence. This was followed by widespread intimidation of SWAPO supporters by the South West African Police in the run-up to elections. These events would have led to the resumption of the armed
conflict if it was not for the strict conditions put down by the regional and international bodies that negotiated independence.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants

United Nations Resolution 435 (1978) outlined a ‘peace plan’ for Namibia’s transition to independence under the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants from both sides were part of UNTAG’s duties, which included:

- monitoring the ceasefire;
- ensuring that troops of SADF and SWAPO were confined to bases;

Nevertheless, UNTAG did not have a post-conflict mandate to assist with the reintegration of demobilised combatants; this was left to the new government. Consequently, disarmament and reintegration of former opposing forces and the creation of a new national defence force that was ethnically and politically balanced characterised the post-election process.

Scholars such as Forman and Welch (1998) have identified two goals for demobilisation and reintegration. The first goal is that demobilisation of ex-combatants or soldiers in the short term provides an important window of time for the improvement of on-the-ground security. It also gives newly elected governments a chance to emerge without the threat of military repression or the need to spend scarce resources on a process that is expensive. Second is the medium- and long-term goal of giving ex-combatants a new start by returning them to civilian life. This last process needs greater consideration as it is vital for any process that promotes improved civil–military relations.

The reintegration process of ex-combatants into Namibian society was handled by government with the assistance of NGOs such as the Council of Churches in Namibia, the Socio-economic Integration Programme for Ex-Combatants as well as community committees. They assisted in activities such as job placements, and providing temporary shelter, food, clothing, counselling and transport. Bilateral donors such as the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and the European Community also assisted during the process. The government developed a training programme for the unemployed ex-combatants, the Development Brigade, that was later renamed Development Brigade Corporation, to impart sufficient practical agricultural and construction skills for sustainable future self-employment.
Institutional and operational problems such as lack of funds, technical expertise and qualified personnel in running programmes such as the Development Brigade Corporation were encountered, as well as the country’s slow and cumbersome land resettlement programme. Access to land was problematic for ex-combatants, who were not treated as a preferential target group under the land reform programme. This situation presented a potential threat to national security and stability in the mid-1990s when dissatisfied unemployed ex-combatants took to the streets: this was a red flag that political leaders could hardly ignore. In response, the government implemented a ‘Peace Project’ aimed at affirmative job placement of ex-combatants mainly in the public service. This project enhanced the prospect of long-term reintegration of ex-combatants into society as well as preventing them from causing insecurity in the country.

**British-driven Defence Governance**

Like many independent African countries whose armed forces adopted their former colonial masters’ security institutions, Namibia’s defence governance has been modelled on that of Britain, even though it was never a British colony. At independence in 1990, Namibia adopted a British-influenced liberal framework for civil–military relations under the British Military Assistance Training Team, which assisted in providing standardisation training to the NDF. The team also helped to set up the structure of the military and the MOD. The MOD operates along similar lines to the British ministry and also serves as the headquarters of the NDF.

For all practical purposes, the directorates and divisions of the MOD fall under the permanent secretary, who is the accounting officer. This ensures civilian involvement in military decision-making. In addition, the inclusion of a secretariat to the MOD structure enables civilians to work in areas such as finance, administration, justice and health, which can be done better and at lower cost by civilians rather than the military.

The structure of the NDF is subject to the powers of the minister of defence to ensure checks and balance. The minister directs the chief of the defence force in the execution of his duties. On the other hand, the permanent secretary performs such duties and functions as may be necessary for democratic and civilian management of the defence functions to enhance parliamentary and ministerial control.
Operations

In terms of the Namibian Constitution, the president is the commander-in-chief of the defence force with the authority to appoint senior military officers and to declare war (Government of Namibia 1989: Article 27, 32 sub-Article 4c). From a democratic perspective this is a cause for concern. Along this line of thought, Kahn (1997) notes that war results in military expansion, growth in the power and influence of government, and its intrusions into the lives of citizens as it increases taxes and limits individual freedom. This view was proved right, as this constitutional provision led to the deployment of the NDF in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998, without the knowledge or approval of parliament. Subsequently, Namibia’s defence budget increased so as to maintain NDF soldiers in the DRC. This meant that the taxpayers had to dig deep into their pockets to finance Namibian troops deployed along with Angolan and Zimbabwean armed forces to prop up President Laurent Kabila’s government, which was threatened by an external invasion. Without doubt, the deployment of troops in the DRC introduced a new dynamic into Namibia’s civil–military relations. Some analysts considered this action an abuse of constitutional power that could seriously undermine the democratic dispensation in Namibia.

The NDF has rendered a number of services in support of the civil authorities and communities, and has assisted in peacekeeping operations both in Africa and internationally.

Consolidation of Institutional Arrangements

Negonga (2000) states that the Constitution of Namibia outlines the following principles, structures, responsibilities and relationships necessary for democratic governance of defence:

• the president shall be the commander-in-chief of the defence force;
• the president may, with the approval of parliament, declare a state of national defence;
• the minister of defence shall be accountable to parliament for the activities of the defence force;
• parliament shall approve the defence budget annually;
• a joint standing committee on defence and security shall be established in parliament to investigate and make recommendations on matters affecting defence and security.

Civil control and supervision of the armed forces in Namibia is vested in democratic structures such as the Constitution, parliament and the
civilian-dominated MOD. The interim Constitution, which was drawn up during the negotiation process, provided for the establishment of a constituent assembly. This provided the basis for the elections and the establishment of a democratic government in Namibia. Article 118 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of the NDF; the Defence Amendment Act No. 20 of 1990 provides for its structure, roles and functions.

Traditional forms of political and parliamentary control over the armed forces that have been successfully applied elsewhere in the world are being practised in Namibia, including the institution of a strong and legitimate civil-dominated MOD; parliamentary committees that have a total or partial jurisdiction over defence and security matters such as the budget, public accounts, foreign affairs and intelligence; the authority of the Ministry of Finance over defence spending; the ombudsman system to whom aggrieved civilians or military personnel can refer military-related complaints; and the provision of legislation allowing the public access to and information on military-related developments.

Civil supremacy in Namibia was further consolidated by the failure of SWAPO to win a two-thirds majority in the first democratic elections when the opposition parties secured 31 out of 72 seats in the National Assembly. The existence of a reasonably strong opposition meant that the risk of the ruling party using the military for political reasons was significantly reduced (Lamb 1999: 7).

Executive Control

According to Hage G Geingob, the first prime minister of Namibia, many African countries have experienced problems in governance as a result of inadequate checks and balances. Therefore Namibia opted for an executive presidency with appropriate checks and balances (Geingob 2002: 8). Nonetheless, while this is a necessary condition for asserting civilian control over the armed forces, it is not enough. The head of state generally does not have the time or the skill to personally direct the formulation and implementation of defence policy. As a result, he/she will end up delegating responsibility to the minister of defence.

Scholars such as Giraldo (2001) have identified reforms necessary to strengthen the role of civilians in military matters. Firstly, civilian control is likely to be more effective if civilian power is intense and there is a single
clear-cut chain of command, to avoid the military causing confrontation among civilians within the executive branch. Secondly, he argues that bodies with strong military representation should be downgraded to advisory roles with reduced policy authority. Thirdly, the responsibilities given to civilians within the MOD should be defined or else many tasks may fall to the military.

In Namibia, as in most countries, the executive is comprised of the president and Cabinet ministers, and is accountable to the legislature. Members of Cabinet are responsible for providing parliament with regular reports on matters under their control. The executive formulates policies, suggests laws and implements laws passed by the legislature.

In Stepan’s (1988) view, the burden of developing civil–military relations consistent with democratisation lies on both the legislature and the executive. To this end, he outlines the main tasks for the executive as demilitarisation of the executive and Cabinet posts, such as the Ministry of Defence, and active intervention in redefining the existing military doctrine, force mission, goals, structures and training. He further identifies four responsibilities of the legislature: legislative self-empowerment concerning military matters and policies; the capacity to review military budgets competently; development of the legislature’s own research information and monitoring know-how; and an appropriate committee system.

**Parliamentary Oversight**

The specific role of parliament in civil–military relations is at the heart of issues of democratic control. Parliaments are expected to impose serious checks on the dictates, authority and roles of military establishments and structures. Additionally, parliaments should scrutinise the actions, not only of the military, but also of the executive.

The functions and powers of parliament, among others, are:

- to oversee the activities of government ministries/offices/agencies and ensure detailed scrutiny of the executive’s work;
- hold public hearings to hear the views of citizens on bills being considered;
- approve government spending and regulate taxation by considering the budgets prepared by government ministries;
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- approve international agreements entered into by the government of Namibia with other governments/organisations;
- debate issues and advise the president on matters the Constitution authorises him/her to undertake (Parliament of Namibia 2001: 2).

Both houses of parliament – the National Assembly and the National Council – have the constitutional power to create multiparty parliamentary committees with oversight powers of all defence and security activities (Article 59(3) and Article 74(2)). Thus the Constitution gives effect to the principles of transparency and accountability in the activities of the military. To this end, both houses of parliament have established standing committees on defence and security. The National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Security has the duty to:
  - monitor, investigate and make recommendations relating to any aspect of the legislative programme, budget, rationalisation, restructuring, functioning, organisation, structure, personnel or policy formulation in the MOD;
  - exercise an overall oversight function with regard to security matters in Namibia;
  - investigate issues relating to human rights violations;
  - obtain information from government regarding any real or perceived threat to the security of the country;
  - enquire into and monitor international protocols, conventions and agreements that may affect the security situation in Namibia (Parliament of Namibia 2003: 17–18).

The National Council, on the other hand, has a Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security whose functions are:
  - to review international and regional cooperation as regards trade, tourism, peace and security;
  - to review Namibia’s foreign policy and make recommendations to the council;
  - to review and monitor the defence and security policies and requirements and advise the council;
  - to deal with questions falling within the ambits of the ministries of foreign and home affairs, defence and security (Parliament of Namibia – National Assembly 1999: 56–57).

Nevertheless, despite the existence of the parliamentary committees on security and defence, none of these committees has effectively performed its duties so far. These committees are not active but react to security and defence issues that are of national concern. For instance, they seem to be
doing something when there is a bill to be debated, but on other days they are dormant. On top of that, members of parliament who constitute these committees are not well vested in security and defence issues. Moreover, there are not enough supporting staff to assist members of parliament in executing their duties.

Civil Military Relations within the MOD

The main responsibilities of the MOD are to formulate and execute defence policies for the government, to provide central operational and administrative headquarters for the NDF and to procure its equipment (Government of Namibia 2000: 389). The MOD is also responsible for the presentation of the defence budget to parliament. The MOD is headed by a minister who is a civilian and the political head of the ministry. He/she also chairs the Defence Staff Council, the ministry’s highest management committee. The minister also represents the ministry in the National Assembly and Cabinet. He/she is supported by the chief of the defence force who is responsible for the military effectiveness of the NDF, and the permanent secretary, who is responsible for the financial, administrative and political aspects of defence policy and its execution. The minister and the permanent secretary constitute the civilian authority on military matters on behalf of government.

Negonga (2000) writes that civilians formulate defence policy and are responsible for the political dimension of defence. Military officers execute defence policy and contribute to policy formulation on the basis of their functional expertise. The Defence Secretariat, which is civilian-dominated, is responsible for the coordinating function.

Civilians in the ministry are employed permanently on the basis of their specialised skills, while military officers are seconded for a certain period and rotate between defence force units throughout the country. The MOD consists of six directorates, namely, policy and operations, personnel, logistics, medical services, military intelligence, and finance. Due to financial considerations, the MOD fulfils the dual role as the headquarters of defence. The chief of the defence force and the MOD are located in the same complex. According to the Statement on Defence Policy, the principal advantage of this design is that it facilitates clear political control of higher direction and management of defence (Government of Namibia
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1993: 4). Civilians and military officers work side by side in these various directorates and divisions.

Be that as it may, practically, this arrangement may get in the way of civil supremacy as it could lead to unnecessary military influence in the affairs of the civilian-oriented MOD, especially as there are not enough civilian employees with the necessary capacity to support the political authority in the minister.

The Role of Civil Society and Political Parties

Scholars such as Forman and Welch (1998) are of the opinion that the extent to which civil society is permitted or wants to engage in military issues can be used as an indicator of the country’s maturity of civil–military relations. Stepan (1988) argues that the task of civil society is to commit itself to the defence of democratic rights and processes and stop inviting the military to interfere in political conflicts. Civil society, he argues, should be capable of challenging the existing security doctrine.

The military is expected to effectively perform its task of external security without infringing the rights of society; on the other hand, members of the armed forces have undertaken to fight and die for the nation, therefore society must be prepared to accept the unique requirements of military duty. For instance, society should accept inconveniences which may be caused by the armed forces, such as the use of land for training purposes or airspace for noisy aircraft. Above all, society should accept that the armed forces are entitled to proper pay, accommodation, living conditions, and friendship within the communities they serve. Military staff should also be welcomed back into the civil economy when they have completed their service or when they retire from active duty.

Civil society organisations in Namibia are registered under Section 21(a) of the Companies Act of 1973 as ‘not for gain’. These organisations are established, among others, for the purpose of:

- promoting religion, art, science, education, charity, recreation or any other cultural or social activity or communal group interests;
- advocacy – facilitating the development of policy formulation with increased participation of civil society;
- making people aware of their human rights and responsibilities and ensuring their role in a democracy.
Civil society organisations include the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), the Namibia Non-Governmental Forum, the Legal Assistance Centre, the Institute of Public Policy Research, academicians at the University of Namibia, media practitioners and political parties. These groups and institutions are, in one way or another, involved in education and advocacy for building the political culture necessary for democratic participation.

Nevertheless, civil society in Namibia has by and large not been actively involved in contributing to the debate on defence and security issues, although the NSHR has been involved to some extent in the defence of democratic rights of citizens in the context of security force operations.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter has examined the experience of governing defence in Namibia. The subordination of the military to civilian authorities and how it contributed to security and stability featured strongly. When SWAPO came to power, values, traditions and cultures which entailed the subordination of the military to civil authority continued after independence. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration played a prominent role in Namibia’s transition to independence and democracy, following the negotiated settlement to the long anti-colonial liberation struggle. The transitional period was characterised by historical mutual mistrust and animosity. However, earlier conflict dynamics did not prevent the reintegration of former adversaries into a new and legitimate national defence force that was central to post-conflict peace and nation-building. In addition, political institutions such as the Constitution and the legislature have laid a strong foundation for the country to move forward. Namibia has great respect for and treats its Constitution as a sacred document.

Although done for cost reasons, the co-location of defence headquarters with the MOD is a confidence-building measure for both civilians and the military. It reduces suspicions: for example, civilian officials and military personnel work together as a team in preparing defence budgets, policy formulation, etc. The minister of defence is also a member of parliament and therefore accountable to parliament for the operations of the military. Moreover, the fact that the defence budget is debated in parliament ensures transparency and accountability.
Notwithstanding all these, there are no guarantees that the currently stable civil–military relations will be sustained. Military personnel are poorly paid compared to their civilian counterparts and generally their living conditions are not good. This may eventually lead to disgruntlement within the military and cause some problems in the future for the civilian authorities. Furthermore, civil society organisations as well as political parties are not doing enough on issues of security and defence. Namibia has no significant NGO interface with government, as in some other countries. Political parties, especially those in opposition, do not play much of an advocacy role in bringing security issues to the fore because they are often overruled by the ruling party, which is increasingly dominant.
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