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Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southeast Asia

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been present in Southeast Asia for more than 30 years. Its country offices in Bangkok, Jakarta, Manila and Hanoi have been active in implementing national cooperation programmes in partnership with parliaments, civil society groups and non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and 'think-tanks', government departments, political parties, women's groups, trade unions, business associations and the media.

In 1995, the Singapore office was transformed into an Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Its role is to support, in close cooperation with the country offices, ASEAN cooperation and integration, Asia-Europe dialogue and partnership, and country programmes in Cambodia and other ASEAN member states where there are no Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung offices.

Its activities include dialogue programmes, international and regional conferences (e.g. on human rights, social policy, democratization, comprehensive security), Asia-Europe exchanges, civil education, scholarship programmes, research (social, economic and labour policies, foreign policy) as well as programmes with trade unions and media institutes.

Dialogue + Cooperation is a reflection of the work of the Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Singapore: it deals with ASEAN cooperation as well as the Asia-Europe dialogue.

- *Dialogue + Cooperation* will tell you about our activities in Southeast Asia by publishing important contributions to our conferences and papers from our own work.
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- *Dialogue + Cooperation* will be an instrument for networking by offering you the opportunity to make a contribution and use it as a platform for communication.

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Editorial: Dialogue + Cooperation 1 / 2005

Dear Reader

2004 was a 'Year of Elections' in Southeast and South Asia. More than a billion people in Asia have voted. Most of these elections were conducted under peaceful conditions and without widespread allegations of vote tampering. These remarkable features led Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung to convene an international conference in Berlin on 19 and 20 October 2004. Under the heading 'Elections in Asia – Is Democracy Making Progress?', some 50 scholars, journalists, politicians and civil society representatives from Asia and Germany discussed the matter.

This issue of *Dialogue + Cooperation* is dedicated to the conference and it contains all the major papers presented. They provide the reader with excellent analysis of and insight into the major events. I would not like to anticipate their reading and their conclusions. Therefore, I limit myself to my personal perception of the facts. Yes, in general, democracy is progressing in Asia but at different speeds in individual countries. How solid this process is, however, has yet to be seen.

This issue also contains the lecture given by Dr Andrea Fleschenberg in the aftermath of the conference at the University of Cologne on 21 October 2005. We found it most appropriate to share her astonishing research findings with you. They contrast the general opinion that politics and elections in Asia would be a 'male-dominated business'.

All the papers included in this issue reflect the opinion of the individual authors. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung would like to thank all conference participants and authors for their contributions. Last but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to my predecessor, Norbert von Hofmann. Without his diligent preparation of the conference results before handing over the office to me in February 2005, this edition of *Dialogue + Cooperation* would have been a cumbersome task.

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Elections and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Beyond the Ballot Box and Towards Governance*

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Introduction

Throughout 2004, many Asian countries conducted national ballots, including the Southeast Asian states of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. This prompted the *Economist* to pronounce the phenomenon as ‘that other miracle’. It proclaimed a triumph for democracy in Asian voters’ democratic sophistication and will to progress towards ‘real freedom’, as manifested in the use of their vote to reflect their intolerance for corruption, incompetence, petty politics and national insecurity (*Economist*, 24 April 2004).

There are elements in that analysis that this paper shares. Elections in the region to date have proceeded largely in peaceable conditions and without allegations of vote tampering that undermine their legitimacy. Moreover, notwithstanding the continued existence of Southeast Asian states without a democratic system of voting (Brunei, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam), the norm of democracy has been established. Democracy based on free and fair elections is now the key legitimating factor for governance and the ideal that most, if not all, Asians aim for.

Popular sentiment has shifted away from the tacit compact of governance in the years prior to the 1997 crisis. Then, in the years of the so-called ‘Asian miracle’, most governments in the region expressly rejected ‘Western style’ democracy and actively promoted ‘Asian values’ (Mahathir, 2002: 91-95; Kausikan, 1998: 17-27). For some, the ‘soft authoritarian’ governments that prevailed in most countries in that period provided stability and continuity as foundations for economic progress. In conjunction with crony capitalism and ‘Asian values’, these were said to justify alternative regional norms of governance (World Bank, 1993).

These arguments seem now to have been ‘devalued’ as much as some of the currencies during that financial and economic crisis. Political and social changes have followed in tow. Democratic voting systems now exist in the majority of Southeast Asian states – Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Most starkly, in Indonesia, 30 years of rule under President Suharto gave way to free elections, a multi-party system with greater

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Islamic representation, and a succession of three presidents in five years (Schwarz, 2004; 1999). Less dramatic, but no less important, were the political events and changes to democracies in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. In Northeast Asia, the relatively new democracies of Taiwan and South Korea appear to have strengthened during the crisis years, ushering in new governments that promised reform and recovery.

Yet, even if the conduct of elections in the region in 2004 was relatively successful, it is not clear at present if democracies in Asia have progressed, nor have they yet proven themselves to be successful. Democratization is an extended process that is said to encompass the change from an authoritarian regime to one in which society is firmly committed to the flourishing of democratic values. It can be said to comprise two essential stages – democratic transition and consolidation. Democratic transition involves not only the making of a country's constitution and the setting down of rules for political competition. It should also actively and effectively abolish authoritarian practices that inhibit political freedom. The lengthier process of democratic consolidation that follows is meant to gradually remove the uncertainties of democratic transition in order to fully root the state in the rule of law and political freedom. Major political actors must also recognize that legitimate authority comes only through democratic processes and should not try to wrest control or be unwilling to accept defeat at the polls. No political group can reject the action of the democratically elected. In sum, 'democracy must be seen as the "only game in town"' (Linz, 1990: 158).

This means that democracy should not only satisfy certain procedural requirements such as free and open elections and constitutional checks and

balances, but also, ideally, there should be substantive evidence of the guarantee of human rights, especially that of civil and political rights (Linz, 1990). Given the disparate array of 'democracy' in Southeast Asia, it is questionable whether the *Economist's* accolade of 'miracle' is justified. At present, there remain questions concerning the functions and real limits of democracy in present day Southeast Asia. We should be hesitant to echo Schumpeter's definition that the presence of universal suffrage necessarily equates with the presence of democracy (Schumpeter, 1976).

In some cases, the process of elections has uncovered abiding differences between different sectors of society, without generating a consensus within society as a whole. Political divides and divisive politics mark elections and democratic processes, for example, in Cambodia, Malaysia and, further afield, Taiwan. In other cases, the electoral process has become an arena for combat between different factions with political machinery and money but no clear mandate for national progress. The situations in the Philippines and Indonesia (although to perhaps a lesser extent than originally feared) point to these concerns. There is a continuing need to safeguard against the possibility that elections are used for no better purpose than to capture state apparatus for private and often corrupt ends.

Other cases of democracy in the region reveal changes in domestic political opinion that have far-reaching regional and international implications. In Malaysia and Indonesia, for example, a greater profile for Islamic groups has been part and parcel of more open electioneering and democratic competition. A more sceptical position towards the involvement of the United States may also be emerging among a new generation and government, as seen most clearly in South Korea.

Questions over the connections between democracy and other elements such as stability, economic progress and governance continue to be raised in Asia, notwithstanding the acceptance and increasingly competent conduct of elections. This should not be seen as an Asian attempt to oppose Western democratic theory where it is believed that democracy should be assessed independently of economic and administrative efficiency, societal security and orderliness, and economic openness (Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Huntington, 1994: 29). This tenet remains despite the fact that democracy is now widely admitted to conform to no particular set of institutions because different socio-economic conditions, state structures and institutional practices do result in variations among democracies (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Hence, it must be understood that these questions raise not so much questions about culture and 'Asian values', but rather more fundamental and universal issues about the relation of democracy to the circumstances of developing countries.

Moreover, it is a strong belief in Asia that the leader should not only represent the interests of his or her people, but must also further them. There is a conviction and desire that the government should lead in the capitalist market. Furthermore, a government that responds to the people's needs and welfare, and is publicly accountable so as to form and maintain civic order, is prized by Asians in general (Tu, 2000: 262). Hence, democracy is more than an expression of the people's will, but is also a summation of electoral hopes of what the new leader and government can do, for 'democracy is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a means to prosperity, security and job creation' (*Straits Times*, 20 August 2004).

As such, democracy, as examined in this paper, extends beyond the people's election

of a person or party and proposes that the analysis of Southeast Asian democracy post-elections should be linked to three concomitant factors, namely (1) civil society, (2) civil institutions and governance and (3) anti-corruption. This is because in Asia 'the institutionalisation of democratic political institutions assumes the existence of a civic political culture ... civil society ... political community and effective authoritative legitimate government which could mediate between heterogeneous ethnic groups and class conflict' (Chan, 1994: 9). While it would be premature and presumptuous to give a verdict on the state of democracy in these post-election states or the region as a whole, it is possible to chart the democratic potential possessed by the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. In addition, Cambodia is also considered, notwithstanding that its elections were held earlier, in 2003. This is because that country has only just overcome its political stalemate to convene a new government in July 2004, and indeed provides some interesting insights into the impact of different democratic systems on the effective and stable governance of a state.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide full technical details about the different electoral systems in these countries, or detailed proposals of possible constitutional and policy reforms that might bring about greater democratic progress in each state. But it is hoped that an analysis of the broader issues of civil society, civil institutions and governance, and anti-corruption measures will allow a general picture and preliminary analysis of the progress towards democracy and governance, as well as the influences that the elections of 2004 have made on that progress.

This paper first summarizes and provides a brief analyses of the elections in several countries in the region – Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Cambodia

– as case-studies. Second, the paper considers whether there are particular characteristics of democracy in the region. This critically re-examines some of the ‘Asian values’ debate and arguments for a model of ‘Asian democracy’. The paper finds that there are some observations on the particular needs of the region concerning democracy and development that may continue to hold legitimate interest. However, this paper does not share the view that these particular needs necessitate that democracy in the region should give way or be mutated to accommodate a return (or continuation) of ‘soft authoritarian’ governments and strong-man regimes. Rather, this paper suggests that these particular needs must be addressed as part of an agenda for reform and development for democracy in the region to progress further. In the third part of this paper, the elements of such an agenda are outlined.

The central and preliminary suggestion of this paper is that elections are having a diverse range of effects on democracy and the development of governance in the region. In the case of Malaysia, the 2004 elections seem to have helped signal changes in leadership and the political agenda, as well as a healing of political and social rifts. These augur well in regaining support from more ‘fundamentalist’ Muslim parties, as well as focusing citizen’s expectations on improvements on issues of governance and anti-corruption.

In the case of the Philippines and Cambodia, on the other hand, the observations in this paper are less sanguine. Elections in 2004 seem not to have healed but rather to have exposed continuing and deep divides in society. While electoral victors have been declared and accepted, real questions continue

concerning their will and ability to govern and develop the country for the benefit of the many. The exercise of voting has been more of a contest of power by means other than violence, but has not resulted in consensus and the legitimate and institutionalized consolidation of power towards the goals set by that consensus.

Somewhat in between these two extremes stand the elections in Indonesia, as we observe them. In that vast and freshly minted democracy, elections in 2004 have revealed schisms among the many diverse people and sectors of the country, the machinations and deal-making of a political system tainted by corruption and self-interest, and yet also the abiding rationality of the Indonesian voter. While many issues remain to be addressed, the elections of 2004 seem to represent continuing progress in Indonesia towards democracy and an abiding wish for good, stable government with economic progress.

From these observations, the paper suggests that civil society, civil institutions and anti-corruption efforts can and should be central parts of an evolving agenda for democratic consolidation in the region, above and beyond elections. These issues have not received sufficient attention as yet in the region. However, this paper argues that attention and progress on these issues is essential if the hopes and aspirations of the people of the countries in the region are to be fulfilled by democracy. In this regard, this paper takes the view that even if democracy is a key aspiration and new norm in Southeast Asia, it is not established as an end in itself, as some liberal theorists hold it should be. Democracy in the region instead continues to be tested against more pragmatic criteria and basic hopes of people, and aligned to the quest for good governance.

Country Case-studies: Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Cambodia

Malaysia

The 14-party National Front coalition (Barisan Nasional or BN), which includes the three largest political parties – United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), of which UMNO is the leader – emphatically won the Malaysian elections of 21 March 2004. The 2004 elections gave BN a landslide victory, with 198 seats out of 219. This continued its hold on power since Merdeka (independence), uninterrupted and (except for 1969) always with at least a two-thirds majority in the Federal Parliament. The 2004 result more than recouped the losses incurred by BN during the previous election in 1999, when the party won 148 out of 193 seats.

The elections were widely seen as a resounding affirmation of the new prime

minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who succeeded long-time premier Dr Mahathir Mohamed on 31 October 2003. While an UMNO victory was not in doubt, the margin of victory was seen to be critical in gauging public support for the new leader and his ability to address several underlying issues that had led to the relatively poor results of 1999. These issues included the rise of a more strident form of Islam with the opposition Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), the controversial sacking and treatment of former deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim, as well as economic progress, the distribution of benefits and corruption. The 2004 election result gave the Badawi-led BN some 90.4 per cent of the total vote – the biggest win BN has ever had. The following table compares the 1999 and 2004 results in more detail.

Comparison of the Results of the 1999 and 2004 Elections

Year of election	2004	1999
Total no. of seats	219	193
Barisan Nasional coalition members and no. of seats won	UMNO (109) MCA (31) MIC (9) Others (49)	UMNO (72) MCA (29) MIC (7) Others (40)
Total no. of seats for BN	198	148
Opposition	PAS (7) DAP (12) Keadilan (1)	PAS (27) DAP (10) Keadilan (5) PBS (3)
Total no. of seats for opposition	20	45
Others (Independent)	1	

* Source: Kuppuswamy (2004).

In addition to the overall margin, another factor that was closely watched was the contests between UMNO and PAS over

control of the east coast states in Peninsula Malaysia. PAS emerged from the 1999 elections on a high crest, with control over

two states – Kelantan and Trengganu. In the 2004 election, PAS lost control of Trengganu and held on to Kelantan by a mere three-seat majority.

The elections were generally acknowledged to be free and fair, notwithstanding some suggestions over the tweaking of electoral boundaries and a more pro-UMNO media. The 2004 elections also saw a relatively high voter turn-out, with at least 50-60 per cent in each of the states (Smith, 2004a).

The factors that led to this election result have been variously interpreted. The Malaysian economy was recovering and growing at a projected rate of 6 per cent, thus boosting general confidence and sentiment. In addition, in 2004 UMNO had campaigned on a broader basis to appeal to other Malaysians, emphasizing economic issues, promising farming subsidies and assistance as well as continued low-cost food and petrol, and emphatically vowing to end high-level corruption.

Beyond this, however, many of the positive factors were attributed to the new prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, and the considerable contrast he provided to former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, which many welcomed. In handling the issues of Islam, for example, the new prime minister was better poised to deal with the PAS opposition that had called for a theocratic state in the future with laws sanctioning execution by stoning and the amputation of thieves' hands. While Prime Minister Badawi did not overplay fears over the possible rise of Islamic fundamentalist groups, he advocated an alternative progressive form of Islam – Islam Hadhari (CNN, 6 May 2004). This appealed to the Malay heartland, in which Islam must and does remain a focal point. While a hard core of supporters remained with PAS, those who had been undecided or who had

wavered in 1999, came out more strongly for UMNO in 2004. This resulted in a high voter turn-out of over 70 per cent in Trengganu and Kelantan and UMNO's subsequent gains.

The qualities of the new prime minister allowed this. Badawi is a respected Islamic scholar and is seen by the public to be clean and humane, courteous, humble and down-to-earth, characteristics that the Malay culture identifies with. With Prime Minister Badawi's leadership and character, and Dr Mahathir's stepping down, UMNO has won back the voters who voted for PAS and Keadilan in protest against former Deputy Prime Minister Dr Anwar Ibrahim's perceived unjust imprisonment on charges of sodomy and corruption (BBC News, 3 September 2004). Prime Minister Badawi's strong anti-corruption stance also helped. In the run-up to elections, the prosecution of corrupt officials, including a former cabinet minister and a well known business leader, the former head of national steel company, as well as a firmer hand over spending on mega-projects, showed Prime Minister Badawi in positive light (*Time Asia*, 8 March 2004).

Most observers have welcomed the 2004 election results in Malaysia as a return to UMNO and BN, and the moderate Malay ground that they have stood for. The common analysis is that there has been a movement away from more strident Islamic politics, and this has increased prospects for greater stability in the short to medium term. The opposition PAS has faced set-backs such that the Chinese-led opposition, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), has re-emerged instead. As for Keadilan, a party presided over by Datin Seri Dr Wan Azizah Wan Ismail (Anwar Ibrahim's wife), which rose to prominence in the events surrounding Anwar Ibrahim's trial, some suggest that it is a spent political force. In this election, Keadilan only

retained one seat out of its previous five – that of Anwar Ibrahim's former electorate, Penang (CNN, 6 May 2004). In addition, the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) lost all three of its seats.

What about the impact on democracy and good governance? The progress on an agenda against corruption is particularly encouraging. Prime Minister Badawi showed his commitment to continuing a policy of good governance and efficient civil institutions while eliminating graft, even in the face of some opposition within the UMNO party to the strict code of ethics against corruption. The large election victory has been widely interpreted as giving a strong mandate for Prime Minister Badawi to continue and indeed strengthen this campaign against corruption. Any fight against institutional and systemic corruption will, however, be a sustained effort, rather than something that can be achieved overnight on the back of this election victory (Tay & Seda, 2003). This effort will face ups and downs, and indeed, even after this election victory, commentators suggest that Prime Minister Badawi suffered a backlash in the UMNO party elections because of party members' resentment and confusion over continuing 'money politics' (*Straits Times*, 25 September 2004).

Turning to the impact on civil society, the elections of 2004 seem to have had a mixed influence. Commentators generally regard the network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and politically active societal leaders in Malaysia as being quite strong, with many civil society leaders who regularly speak out against economic and social inequity, or otherwise initiate protest movements against lack of political

liberties and private rights. In recent years, civil society groups have raised problems such as political arrests (e.g. former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's arrest), detention without trial, corruption and press censorship (Lev, 1990: 147; Uhlin, 2002). In addition, NGOs like Aliran seek to enhance human rights consciousness, focusing on the moral dimensions of politics, social organization and economic change. When compared to 1999, however, the NGOs did not play such a strong public role in the 2004 elections.

Looking at civil institutions more broadly, the 2004 elections may also have had little positive influence on the development of the media in Malaysia. Some commentators suggest that the mainstream media turned to support Prime Minister Badawi too clearly and strongly, rather than serving as more impartial observers. The independent media, such as the internet-based Malaysiakini, have continued to face obstacles to their work from different sides of the political spectrum.

All these factors combined, it would seem that Malaysia under Prime Minister Badawi has returned to stability and moderate Islam, with a renewed emphasis on the central political role of UMNO. This has been welcomed by most observers in the media, in Malaysia and regionally. The development of democracy in the medium to longer term, however, remains unclear. Much depends on how UMNO and Prime Minister Badawi govern – whether they give room for further democratic development or seek to centralize power and influence within their governing regime for more terms to come.

Indonesia

By almost all accounts, the Indonesian 2004 elections were a success. In this, the

world's most populous Muslim country with 235 million people, at least

150 million were eligible to vote and most exercised that right without major upheaval or violence, and made their choice from a wide array of parties and candidates. The elections of 2004 were especially significant because it was the first time that the voters directly chose whom they wanted to lead the country. Elections under the Suharto regime had largely been formal endorsements of his continued leadership.

Even in the post-Suharto period, elections for the presidency were indirect. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) became president through an indirect vote and various back-room manoeuvrings among legislators. When he was impeached in July 2001, Megawati Soekarnoputri was appointed president to succeed him through the same process, helped by the fact that her party had the most number of parliamentary seats (Council of Foreign Relations, 21 September 2004).

This time around, elections in Indonesia in 2004 saw a three-stage process that ran through more than half the year. On 5 April 2004, elections for national parliamentary and local government representatives were held. This election determined the make-up of the legislature, and also which parties could nominate a candidate for president. Only parties that gained at least 3 per cent of the parliamentary seats or 5 per cent of the total vote would be eligible to make such a nomination (Smith, 2004b).

Seven parties met this threshold. Suharto's former party, Golkar (the Golongan Karya or Functional Group) re-emerged as the largest party in parliament with 21.6 per cent of the vote. After an internal struggle with Golkar chairman, Akbar Tanjung, General Wiranto emerged as the party's presidential candidate.

Those who were swept in after Golkar did not do so well. The Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, had carried many hopes for reform, given the profile of the party and its leader. Yet this second largest party suffered a substantive set-back, garnering only 18.5 per cent of the vote, as compared to 33.8 per cent achieved in 1999. Similarly, the National Awakening Party (PKB), associated with former President Abdurrahman Wahid, took 10.5 per cent of the vote, down from 12.6 per cent in 1999. In addition, Hamzah Haz's United Development Party (PPP) garnered only 8.2 per cent, while the National Mandate Party (PAN) led by Amien Rais, who was a well known opponent of Suharto before becoming speaker of the upper house of parliament, registered only 6.4 per cent of the vote, a slight drop from 7.1 per cent in 1999.

Given General Wiranto's service in the last Suharto and Habibie regimes, the strong performance of Golkar and the weakness of the post-Suharto parties caused some concern among those who hoped for continuing democratic reform in Indonesia. This raised suggestions that there was an increasing backlash against democracy and reform, coupled with nostalgia for the old parties that represented an ideal of past stability and economic growth; a phenomenon not unlike the experience of Eastern Europe after the fall of the communist bloc.

This initial analysis was, however, put to rest by the rise of two new parties. The first of these, Dr Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono's Democratic Party, finished in fifth place with a relatively high percentage of 7.5 per cent of the vote. A former general and co-ordinating minister under Megawati, Dr Yudhoyono campaigned on the platform of change

from both the Suharto regime, and the inefficiency of the past five years in Indonesia, promising a stronger and more capable leadership.

The other new party was the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) which, led mainly by university-trained intellectuals advocating

an anti-graft and Islamist agenda, gained 7 per cent. Both the new parties that advocated a 'clean and capable' image rose in votes, displacing many of the post-Suharto parties, especially the PDI-P of the former president, Megawati Soekarnoputri.

Parties and Percentage of Vote in the 1999 and 2004 Indonesian Elections

Party (nominated presidential candidate)	Percentage of vote (2004)	Percentage of vote (1999)
Golkar (General Wiranto)	21.6	22.5
PDI-P (Megawati Soekarnoputri)	18.5	33.8
Democratic Party (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono)	7.5	-
PKS	7.0	-
PKB	10.5	12.6
PAN (Amien Rais)	6.4	7.1
PPP (Hamzah Haz)	8.2	10.7

* Source: Smith (2004b)

After the parliamentary elections, presidential elections followed in two rounds, as no candidate gained 50 per cent or more in the first round.

In the first round of presidential elections on 5 July 2004, Dr Yudhoyono won 34 per cent of the vote and clearly emerged as the front contender. The incumbent, Megawati Soekarnoputri, trailed with 27 per cent, but ahead of Golkar's Wiranto, Amien Rais and Hamzah Haz. This reassured those concerned about the return of Golkar and General Wiranto, given allegations concerning the latter's human rights record (Rieffel, 2004).

In the second round on 20 September 2004, over 110 million people voted, and Dr Yudhoyono triumphed clearly with 60.6 per cent of the vote. His win was viewed as being both democratic and legitimate in an election that international observers and the domestic populace adjudged to be free and fair.

What does this election victory signify for the progress of democracy in Indonesia? Some preliminary suggestions can be made.

First, while Dr Yudhoyono has been associated with previous regimes, he campaigned strongly on a platform for reform, emphasizing the need for a government that is both clean and capable. This was anchored by the voters' perceptions of him as personally having these characteristics. The election victory therefore gives him a strong personal mandate to try to make these changes (Council of Foreign Relations, 21 September 2004).

Secondly, Dr Yudhoyono won despite an alliance between Golkar and PDI-P (Nationhood Coalition) to back Megawati Soekarnoputri. Given that these two parties had, between them, over 40 per cent in the parliamentary elections, the combination was thought by many pundits

to be more than a match for Dr Yudhoyono's fledgling Democratic Party, which only won some 7.5 per cent. The fact that the Golkar-PDI-P coalition failed suggests that their machineries were weaker than many supposed, especially with 'defections' from Golkar in favour of Dr Yudhoyono and continued internal differences between Golkar leader Akbar Tanjung and General Wiranto. Additionally, however, it has been suggested that Dr Yudhoyono's victory marks an advancement of Indonesian democracy, whereby individual voters expressed their choices to trump party machinery and systems of 'vote-buying'.

In this view, Dr Yudhoyono's victory continues the hopes of *reformasi* that began as a reaction to longstanding corrupt and authoritarian regimes experienced under Suharto, albeit in newer hands. In this interpretation of the results, therefore, the turn away from incumbent Megawati Soekarnoputri was not because she promised reform, but because she was adjudged to have failed to deliver it. Indeed, much of the 'debris of post authoritarianism in Indonesia' remained, impeding democratic progress (Heryanto, 2004: 71-77). The PDI-P was no longer regarded as reformist but part of the establishment that needed reform. The PDI-P's partnership with the Golkar *ancien régime* reinforced this image.

While proponents of stability may regret that Indonesia will now witness four presidents in five years (Habibie, Wahid, Megawati and now Yudhoyono), advocates of democracy may point out a consistent and growing trend. The aspiration to build a just and prosperous Indonesia has grown in the public mind, especially with the populace having had enough of corrupt and inefficient government. This sentiment has swiftly progressed from mere democratic parliamentary elections in 1999 (the first open parliamentary

elections since 1955) to culminate in a constitutional change that requires Indonesia to directly elect both its parliament and president within the span of just six years. These hopes and values are therefore consistent among the Indonesian voters, even if the presidents change (Rieffel, 2004; Heryanto, 2004: 82).

Other positive notes may be sounded. First, the campaigns and elections were carried out peacefully with little violence and protest. This was maintained even after the results were announced, and despite the fact that personality politics with song-and-dance political events were the norm and attracted many hundreds of thousands. In this, the Indonesian electorate has proved itself to be more responsible than many had feared. Connected to this, it may be noted that many civil society groups played a strong role in helping to educate voters on their rights and to monitor the elections (*Straits Times*, 20 August 2004).

Second, while the vast majority of Indonesians describe themselves as Muslims and with political Islam exerting a strong social force, it is notable that Muslim parties did not gain, but in fact lost ground. Moreover, even when Muslim leaders associated with the PKB paired to support General Wiranto and Megawati Soekarnoputri, this did not bring victory. In this respect, political Islam no longer exerts a great influence over how people vote as they now assert their own opinions about how they wish to live; 'religion has nothing to do with it' (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 July 2004).

This was also the case with historical affiliations and the charisma of the Sukarno name. Many Indonesians have come to resent what they perceive to be Megawati's attitude – that, as the daughter of Sukarno, modern Indonesia's founding president, she has 'an inherited right' to rule the country.

What will the new president do now? Dr Yudhoyono came to power on an almost exclusively secular platform with two key pillars. One is to strengthen security by controlling separatist movements in Aceh and Papua, curbing recurring unrest in regions like Poso and Maluku, and stopping terrorist attacks. The other is to shore up the economy, introducing anti-corruption measures, overhauling the unpredictable commercial courts and attracting investment. These proposals were buttressed by his upright image and military and political credentials. Beyond this, there is at present much speculation but no clear plan of what will be done.

What seems more certain is that Dr Yudhoyono will face considerable obstacles in pushing proposals through parliament to implement effective policy. At present, the Golkar-PDI-P alliance, with some minor partners, holds the power in parliament, with Golkar's Agung Laksono having been elected as parliamentary speaker. Some Golkar spokesmen have said they intend not to form a coalition with the president's party, and will instead represent Indonesia's 'loyal opposition' to maintain a system of checks and balances on government (*Economist*, 25 September 2004; *Straits Times*, 5 October 2004). While checks and balances are an essential part of democracy, there are concerns that Golkar intends to simply paralyse Dr Yudhoyono's government and render reform and effective government impossible.

There is some hope that the coalition that supported Dr Yudhoyono (comprising the Democratic Party, PAN, PKB, PKS and the Nationhood Coalition's recent defector, PPP) will be able to secure control over the People's National Assembly (*Straits Times*, 8 October 2004). Yudhoyono supporters also hope that dissension within Golkar will increase, and that Golkar's chairman, Akbar Tandjung, who

advocated the alliance with Megawati Soekarnoputri, will be deposed. This would pave the way for Golkar to ally with the new president (*Straits Times*, 5 October 2004).

Adding to the problem in other areas of civil institutions and governance, the upper house of parliament is assembling for the first time and it is uncertain what its role will be; also unclear are the mandates for the new constitutional court, Corruption Eradication Commission, Judicial Appointments Commission and similar independent agencies. In addition, Indonesia undertook a major decentralization of executive power in 2001 as a checks and balance system against possible authoritarian rule. With direct elections for provincial governors in 2005, the tenuous links between central and local government will be further complicated (*Economist*, 25 September 2004).

Besides these problems of civil institutions and good governance, there is the related issue of cracking down on corruption. Dr Yudhoyono has expressed admiration for Malaysia Prime Minister Badawi's method of using high-profile cases as a deterrent, as well as having his own 'clean' administration setting an example to Indonesian society. It is, of course, easy to see what needs to be done, but actually eliminating corruption in Indonesia will be very difficult given that it has become entrenched in public administration and in other sectors of society. As it stands, the problems touched on here do not even begin to describe the deeper institutional reform needed by Indonesia to move past the transitional stage of democracy (Robison, 2002). The difficulty of cleaning up corruption cannot be underestimated because since power has been decentralized with democracy, there are more mini-centres of authority which demand to be paid off (*Straits Times*, 9 October 2004). Yet corruption must be

eradicated as investors will be averse to greasing palms at every turn, as this raises costs and lowers productivity and efficiency, and thus ultimately has a crippling effect on economic growth.

Dr Yudhoyono now faces the immense responsibility of keeping his promise to the people who have pinned their hopes on him, amid the very real difficulties he faces in office. However, many observers believe he is the man who can steer Indonesia, not least the foreign investors

he is encouraging to boost the Indonesian economy and provide jobs. American investors through the Indonesia desk of the US-ASEAN Business Council have already expressed hope that 'things will get done' (*Straits Times*, 25 September 2004). Governance and anti-graft aside, civil society, which has been quite active thus far in Indonesia, can also look forward to a free press and freedom of association and expression by virtue of his record so far, boding well for a more enhanced democracy in the future.

The Philippines

Democracy advocates have often lauded the Philippines as the freest and most democratic country in Southeast Asia, with a flourishing civil society and active NGOs. However, despite having had elections for the past 18 years, negative signs of a lack of progress in the development of democracy could be seen in the elections of 2004. This seems to confirm that Philippine politics continues to be based on popular personality, with a competition for more power and wealth among an élite class. Indeed, while elections may be free, they are seldom called fair. Elections are fraught with violence, allegations of vote-buying and exclamations of fraudulent practices among the rival factions. In fact, many conversely see it as the most 'undemocratic democratic country in the world' (Rocamora, 2004: 200-204).

The 10 May 2004 election has not shown itself to be any different, with newspapers announcing that 'the presidential campaign, the election itself, and the canvassing have been far from perfect'. Electoral violence was considered 'minimal', even though police had to use water cannons and truncheons to break up a 1,500-strong

protest by the supporters of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's closest rival, Fernando Poe Junior, against her win (BBC News, 24 June 2004).

Ever since the People's Power Revolution in 1986 that overthrew corrupt dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippines has relied upon a United States-style political structure that is characterized by a strong presidency and a strict separation of powers from the legislature (congress) and the judiciary. Originally intended as a way to prevent usurpation of power by the president, this has conversely worked against the interests of the Philippine citizenry as the political system has entrenched itself as an institution where, more often than not, the powerful seek to strengthen their influence and build up political dynasties. Corruption is also regarded to be systemic in the country and through much of the political institutions.

With endemic corruption at all levels of society and the top-tier of the élite unwilling to relinquish its power and wealth, it is hard for any upright president to build an equitable society. Furthermore, as the Philippine Centre for Investigative

Journalism announced, there has been 'wanton abuse of congressional power' and 'congress has been a stumbling block to the changes that reform-minded presidents had wanted to introduce' (BBC News, 24 June 2004). Besides, not only is congress an impediment, but also the vice-president is another high-level obstacle as the posts for the president and the deputy are based on separate elections with the result that both often come from rival political parties (Dillon, 2004). In this system, private sector tycoons gain from backing political factions, and this often deepens the rich-poor gap in a country where the top 5 per cent of the population owns 90-95 per cent of the nation's wealth. With such constitutional difficulties, the Filipino democracy seems to be in need of an overhaul, if it is not to be written off (Channel News Asia, 9 April 2004).

The presidential elections of 2004 do not seem to have provided any impetus for such progress. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ascended to the position from the vice-presidency after Joseph Estrada was ousted from office in January 2001, owing to public anger over his corruption and mismanagement. The 2004 elections were therefore her opportunity to win a clear mandate for herself, based on her record after three years in office. This was not to be.

There were five candidates for the 10 May elections in which 35 million voted (81.4 per cent voter turn-out) (International Foundation for Elections Systems, 2004). These were incumbent President Arroyo, who won 40 per cent of the vote; the popular action film star and favourite of the poor, Fernando Poe Junior, who came a close second with 36.5 per cent; former police chief in the Estrada administration Panfilo Lacson with 10.9

per cent; educator-cum-religious evangelist Eduardo Villanueva with 6.2 per cent; and former education secretary Raul Roco who took 5.5 per cent of the vote. In this context, the winning margin of 3.5 per cent over Fernando Poe Junior, must be adjudged to be small, all the more so as Poe's supporters have made allegations against the president of vote buying and irregularities (BBC News, 24 June 2004).

Bearing in mind the Philippine political background and the election statistics, it has been said that President Arroyo did not really beat Fernando Poe Junior on the strength of her proposals to achieve security and economic objectives. Despite her track record of the past three years, which is adjudged to be 'mediocre' by some, she was chosen as the 'lesser of two evils' (BBC News, 20 June 2004). Fernando Poe Junior's early lead seems instead to have been diminished ultimately by the Philippine electorate's preference for President Arroyo's administrative experience, which has the potential to give them a better standard of living as opposed to the former's unclear policy promises. But despite having ousted Joseph Estrada three years ago, a large part of the Philippine public continues to support a similar figure in Fernando Poe Junior, also said to be Estrada's good friend. President Arroyo's popularity has marginally increased among the poor and working class that are seen as Poe and Estrada's constituency. These voters form the majority of the Filipino overseas migrant workers, and President Arroyo won over some of their approval when she stood firm against the disfavour of the United States and Australia in withdrawing Philippine troops from Iraq as ransom for the life of truck driver Angelo de la Cruz (BBC News, 23 July 2004).

Presidential Candidates and Percentage of Vote in the 2004 Philippine Election

Presidential candidates for 2004	% of total vote
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo	40.0
Fernando Poe Junior	36.5
Panfilo Lacson	10.9
Raul Roco	6.5
Eduardo Villanueva	6.2

* Source: International Foundation for Elections Systems 2004.

Notwithstanding the narrow margin of her victory, President Arroyo is in a position to make substantial changes. This is particularly as her party has a working majority in legislature, holding 14 out of 24 seats in the powerful senate, and more than 70 per cent of the seats in the house of representatives (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 9 July 2004). Still, it remains to be seen whether President Arroyo can and will deliver needed changes.

The Philippines is a society quite starkly divided between rich and poor, and the 2004 elections did not help bridge those divides. Indeed, in some ways, the elections aggravated them, with President Arroyo seen as the candidate of the élite, and Fernando Poe Junior as the populist.

This divide complicates many reforms that have been promised, and indeed seem indispensable. Chief among these is the president's express priority for economic measures to avert a fiscal crisis, with the necessary public support from all sectors of society, especially the élite (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 29 June 2004). Raising taxes is an essential component of this plan, but this will be hard to push through. It would mean a drastic change to the habits of the élite who 'show little interest in levying taxes they themselves might have to pay, or providing public services they themselves are unlikely to use' (*Economist*, 3 July 2004). Not only does tax reform

increase the opposition of powerful groups against her, but President Arroyo's proposals to raise taxes on cigarettes and alcohol are also likely to incur general resentment (BBC News, 24 June 2004). However, without more government income, it will be difficult to finance other priorities such as the promises made to the poor during President Arroyo's campaign and inaugural speech (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 29 June 2004). President Arroyo thus has little space to manoeuvre between the two levels of society with her planned economic reforms, which may not even be in time to avert the impending fiscal crisis that economists predict will happen in three years unless the budget is balanced (Dalpino, 2004).

Similar challenges face the president in seeking to build more efficient and non-corrupt civil institutions like the courts and other national administrative structures, and eliminate graft in the private sector. The 2004 Index of Economic Freedom has also ranked the Philippines as 'mostly unfree' due to corruption in the private sector as well as in the judiciary and police, while constitutional restrictions exist for foreign investments and there are inadequate legal protections for business (Dillon, 2004). Such a rating will deter the foreign investment that the Philippines needs to spur its own economy. Yet the Philippines (unlike Malaysia under Badawi) has no clear campaign against corruption.

Besides economic soundness, democracy needs security to flourish. President Arroyo has promised to secure peace in Mindanao in southern Philippines. However, there is more to pursue than the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the smaller Abu Sayyaf group, both of which have Jemaah Islamiyah links. There is also the Communist Party of the Philippines with its New People's Army. The two larger movements have been conducting insurgent movements for the last 30 years, which no government has been able to overcome, though the United States has been supporting President Arroyo's anti-terror campaign with funds and training in the recent past. Even if the Philippine military can suppress the violence, the underlying hatred of Filipino Muslims for the way title deeds to their ancestral lands were given to Christian settlers is a longstanding issue. Furthermore, the standard of living in the Muslim communities in southern Philippines is very low, leading to more resentment. Giving respect and compensation to these people would be

necessary for a lasting democratic peace and prosperity that includes all of the Philippines (Dalpino, 2004).

In all, the outlook for democracy in the Philippines depends on many urgent factors, with economic and security issues at the forefront. It is impossible to predict the efficacy of President Arroyo's administration in tackling all the above problems. She needs the cooperation and support of the ruling and business élite in carrying out her vision for the Philippines. The key to getting some of the resources the president needs to implement policies is to compel the élite to pay fair taxes and to convince them of the prudence of her reforms. Yet, this would mean the shrinking of their incomes and power, and that may be an impossibly tall order. Nevertheless, it is a principle of transitional democracy to expect (and receive) the generosity of the ruling élite in compromising their self-interest for the overall benefit of a democratic society (Lele & Quadir, 2004: 15).

Cambodia

Democratic progress in Cambodia has disappointed many, especially the citizens of Cambodia. They have unfailingly sought a government that can meet their needs, judging by the high voter turn-out – over 90 per cent in the first two elections and 83 per cent in the last (Gallup, 2002: 39). The national polls of 1993 under the auspices of the United Nations Transitional Authority of Cambodia (UNTAC), and the Cambodia-organized polls of 1998 and 2003 have not, however, brought about peace, good governance and economic progress.

Instead, there is endemic violence, corruption and a continuing contest for power among parties in the country, using extra-political means. This makes it

impossible to convene an effective government by overcoming intense differences and rivalry among political factions. This happened again in the July 2003 elections, where the inability to form a working coalition to govern Cambodia led ultimately to an 11-month impasse that was conclusively resolved when both King Norodom Sihanouk and the Cambodian National Assembly finally endorsed the reappointment of Hun Sen as prime minister in July 2004 (BBC News, 15 July 2004).

Part of the reason for this is the current electoral system. Constitutionally, the king, as head of state, must endorse the representative of the party that gains the most parliamentary seats to form a

government. In addition, parliament must give a two-thirds majority vote in favour of the new government – a constitutional measure which Hun Sen's party (Cambodian People's Party or CPP) insisted on after the 1993 elections to ensure it would not be excluded from future governments. This lack of specificity in government formation has given the CPP the chance to further its own interests, safeguarding a continuum of power (Gallup, 2002: 32).

In the 1993 elections, the royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh, won 58 parliamentary seats against the 51 seats of Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP). The Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) took ten seats and the Molinaka party one seat. Despite Hun Sen's refusal to cede power initially, a coalition government between FUNCINPEC and CPP was formed, with Prince Norodom Ranariddh becoming first prime minister and Hun Sen, second prime minister. The struggle for power led to a deadlock between the executive and parliament, with fighting between the armed forces of both factions in July 1997. Eventually, the CPP forces won and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen usurped power when Prince Ranariddh was abroad (BBC News, 14 July 2004). This led to international criticism and the drying up of foreign aid and investment, while sporadic violence broke out in the country.

A similar situation presented itself in the 1998 polls, where Hun Sen acquiesced to international pressure to allow Prince Ranariddh to return to Cambodia to run for the elections. However, this time the CPP secured a majority of 64 seats out of a 123-seat parliament, with

FUNCINPEC garnering 43 seats and the new Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) taking 15 seats. There was strong opposition and violence, with both FUNCINPEC and SRP declaring electoral fraud. After more than four months, FUNCINPEC finally agreed to a working coalition with the CPP, except that only Hun Sen became prime minister while Prince Ranariddh became the president of the parliament – the People's Assembly (Gallup, 2002: 32-39). Also, after the 1998 elections, a senate was created as a second chamber to the National Assembly to make the CPP's Chea Sim acting head of state in King Norodom Sihanouk's absence.

As can be seen, democratic elections have not lead to stable governments to date that are able to deliver progress and prosperity to the citizens. Instead, coalition governments have resulted that have been largely ineffective and unstable, given that there is no compromise on agreed policies, but rather a continuing fight within the coalition for spoils. This scenario is, unfortunately, likely to be repeated, notwithstanding the resolution in June 2004 of the political deadlock after the 2003 elections with a coalition between CPP and FUNCINPEC comprising a 60-40 split of ministerial positions (BBC News, 26 June 2004).

Hun Sen remains prime minister and Prince Ranariddh continues his presidency of the National Assembly. In the July 2003 elections, Hun Sen's party won 73 seats, and FUNCINPEC and SRP won 26 and 24 seats, respectively. Although the CPP gained the majority, it was prevented by the constitution from ruling alone as it lacked the requisite two-thirds majority. In addition, the two opposition parties had formed an 'Alliance of Democrats' to force it to concede certain measures (*Economist*, 10 July 2004).

Parties and Seats Won in the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Cambodian Elections

Parties	1993 Seats	1998 Seats	2003 Seats
CPP	51	64	73
FUNCINPEC	58	43	26
SRP	-	15	24
BLDP	10	-	-
Molinaka	1	-	-

* Source: Gallup (2002) for 1993 and 1998 elections; BBC News (26 June 2004) for 2003 statistics.

Even with the new government, many, like Cambodia scholar Margaret Slocomb, believe that FUNCINPEC has lost the ability to assert itself (*Asia Times*, 20 July 2004). This is in spite of Hun Sen's insistence that this time around the cooperation between CPP and FUNCINPEC 'is not only on paper' and that they 'will cooperate with each other from the top level to the grass roots' (BBC News, 15 July 2004). The autocratic rule of Hun Sen is becoming entrenched and FUNCINPEC ministers in the previous governments have said that civil servants prefer to follow the CPP agenda (*Economist*, 10 July 2004). Most tellingly, Hun Sen has declared that the coalition must stand for 'at least 20 to 30 years more' and the populace believes that he now has free reign to exert his will (*Asia Times*, 20 July 2004). This is reinforced by the fact that the CPP controls the army and police, and Hun Sen has imbued Cambodians with the idea that his party 'can be all-seeing and punishing'. Human Rights Watch observes that voters 'have little confidence in the free expression of their political rights or the neutrality of the political process'. Cambodians are becoming increasingly apathetic about their political system (*Asia Times*, 22 July 2003).

Hence, not only are the freedom and fairness of elections compromised, but also violence appears to be on the increase with politically motivated coercion and

murders. However, with civil institutions and governance weak, the judiciary seems reluctant to pursue such matters (BBC News, 6 March 2003). Moreover, Hun Sen is believed to have forced the acting head of state and head of the CPP, Chea Sim, out of Cambodia for allegedly refusing to endorse Hun Sen as prime minister, thereby consolidating his power within the CPP as well (BBC News, 14 July 2004).

With systemic corruption in governmental structures, the fragile economy is further threatened. The coalition government has added some 180 ministerial positions among other new posts. According to Dr Lao Mong Hay, head of the legal unit of the Center for Social Development, the 'Cambodian taxpayer ... can't afford that kind of burden'. Margaret Slocomb has also noted that there could be an economic crisis as 'the new government may have extended the line of bribe-takers too far' (*Asia Times*, 20 July 2004). Moreover, international aid groups like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank have already started to insist on greater transparency and accountability with the disbursement of funds. Major trading partners like the United States are demanding a better human rights record and more transparent systems (*Asia Times*, 22 July 2003). It is unclear at present whether such external efforts are going to have any impact.

Notwithstanding these problems, Cambodia enjoys a relatively flourishing civil society. This is made up of many local and foreign NGOs. They have been crucial in educating the public in human rights and democracy by issuing reports and conducting classes that inform Cambodians about their rights. By involving themselves as non-partisan supporters of good governance and free and fair elections, and by being pro-reform, their work has been noted and respected (Gallup, 2002: 69-70). In this manner, besides making incremental changes to the customary way politics and leaders are viewed, civil society is providing an avenue through which Cambodians can also have a real (though muted) role in political participation. At present, however, the ability of civil society groups to impact on fundamental political issues, as briefly

surveyed in this section, has been limited. Rather, their work and influence seems at best to improve things on the margins.

Cambodia's democratic transition is further complicated by the state of human rights in the country. New democracies often take steps to redress the wrongs of the previous non-democratic regime (Linz, 1990: 158). To this end, Hun Sen has proposed that Cambodia comes to terms with its violent past by instituting a court to try those who committed atrocities during the Pol Pot years. Although this catharsis is something that Cambodians want, it will be a loaded challenge to deal fairly with those who worked for the previous regime. The sensitivities of this issue could again threaten the fragile peace of Cambodian society.

Is There Such a Thing as Asian Democracy?

From the above case studies, is it possible to observe any common threads which point toward the formation of 'Asian democracy'? During the 'Asian values' debate in the 1990s, spokesmen from some Asian states doubted whether Western liberal democracy was appropriate for the region. These arguments were silenced with the 1997 crisis (Pye, 2000: 244-245). Systems of governance were not, in many cases, innocent of the financial and economic roots of the crisis. Corruption, cronyism and nepotism or 'KKN' were seen to be a key source of the problems in the region (Tay, 2003).

Democracy and reform were therefore twinned in the post-crisis period in the search for economic progress, social cohesion and participation by the people. In this context, democracy in many of these societies has come to mean a system in which votes are effective (rather than

bought or controlled by party machinery), leaders are accountable and responsible (rather than imbued with 'heaven's mandate' and the right to serve themselves), and the citizenry is empowered through political consciousness and participation within and without civil society (rather than being passive recipients).

This manifests a tangible East (or in this context, Southeast) Asian modernity (Tu, 2000: 265). It is an ideal that shares many attributes and characteristics with American and European models of democracy, yet it is important to note that vestiges of the 'Asian values' ideology still remain. What are these?

The first of the remaining vestiges from the 'Asian values' school of thought is the priority given to developing the economy. This is not necessarily an obstacle to democracy. As Lipset and Huntington have

expounded, economic development invariably pushes the democratic process forward. This is because there is a subsequent increase in the middle and urban working classes, who, in turn become more educated and politically aware, and naturally seek more political autonomy. Moreover, their increased personal capabilities and the availability of resources help in the development of civic and political bodies such as trade unions, human rights groups and developmental agencies to further their interest (Lipset, 1960; Huntington, 1991a: 59-69; 2000: 5). Indeed, as Huntington rightly predicted, this is what happened (and still continues to happen) in Southeast Asia.

However, the view that former Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed and Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew exhorted in the 1990s during the 'Asian values' furore – that the socio-economic aspect of human rights precedes the civil-political such that hard measures may be legitimately used if factional opposition endangers the state's economic progress – still remains and could curtail democratic progress (*Straits Times*, 27 August 2004). Democracy proponent and former president of Portugal, Mario Soares, states that 'democracy should not focus exclusively on its political, legal, and institutional requisites'. In his experience, democracy must go beyond the rule of law, separation of powers and protection of civil liberties. It cannot overlook the 'basic economic, social, and cultural conditions in which people live, as these necessarily have a profound influence on the functioning of democratic institutions' (Soares, 2000: 38). It is therefore important for newly elected reformers to deliver progress and reform. If they fail to do so, the citizenry could well be swayed into acquiescing to illiberal state policies in the name of economic development.

The second vestige of 'Asian democracy' is the tendency towards a dominant-party type of political system with a strong leader at the helm, or even a succession of leaders determined internally by the party (Huntington, 1991b: 26-27). An example could be the recent handover of power from former Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (now senior minister) to the then Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. While there was much talk of the liberalizing of Singapore society even more with the change of leaders, Goh Chok Tong simultaneously reasserted his belief in the stable continuity of leadership and power so as to ensure Singapore's prosperity (*Straits Times*, 11 August 2004). In the elections scheduled for 2005, it is expected that the People's Action Party (PAP) will again win. Malaysia under UMNO is a similar case in some ways. Given the earlier remarks of Prime Minister Hun Sen and his attempts at buttressing his power, it is likely that newly democratic Cambodia will have the same experience too. As for Thailand, once heralded for its democratization process, the potential for such a phenomenon occurring under Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) cannot be overlooked. There have already been criticisms of Prime Minister Thaksin's perceived attempts at power consolidation in preparation for the next elections (*Today*, 8 October 2004).

A third vestige of 'Asian democracy' in the region is the strong preference for unity in multi-ethnic societies. This is so, whether achieved through the ballot box and the preference for moderate parties (such as in Malaysia and Indonesia), or through power-sharing schemes, or the hope for a 'benevolent' strong man. 'Good government' that rules for society as a whole and that is capable and non-corrupt is still very much the hope for citizens in the region, and not just democracy as an end in itself.

In some ways, the Philippines is the country in the region that most clearly departs from these three characteristics of 'Asian democracy'. Some consider that it practises a United States-type of democracy, including what Philippine political scientist, Carl Landé, terms as its 'undesirable aspects' – the lobbying, patronage, undisciplined parties and personalistic politics (Landé, 1965). This perhaps, as Huntington says, can be attributed to its Spanish and American heritage. He goes so far as to suggest that the Philippines should not be thought of as an Asian society but more of a 'Latin American society that got loose and drifted thousands of miles to the West' (Huntington, 1994: 37).

It is notable therefore that the Philippine experiment in democracy seems to hold no strong appeal to others in the region. This is in large part because of the poor economic performance, the schisms and corruption in society, and the continuing political contention.

Where democracy struggles free from an authoritarian hand to show much promise of liberalization and active citizen participation is, perhaps surprisingly, in Indonesia, with only six years of democratic experience. This year, there was free and relatively fair campaigning and balloting, while the people appeared to be more aware of their political vote even if the elections seemed more of a popularity contest at times.

Given the above outline of Asian politics, it may be feared that the strong state influence may stunt democratic progress. Fortunately, civil society has arisen to counter this. In the 1980s and 1990s, the first and second 'waves' of state-civil society relations occurred (Riker, 1995: 194-196). For instance, in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, the emerging middle classes, comprising educated

professionals and university students, sought to substantiate democratic ideals and spread them to the rural classes. This generous sharing and identification with the struggles of the deprived classes created a sector of society where popular needs could be championed against the vested interests of the power-wielding élite (Lele & Quadir, 2004: 9-10). This critical political space also afforded the citizens the opportunity to resolve their concerns through mutual discussion and consultation without relying on the central government. More importantly, it provided an avenue for citizens to achieve their political needs during the period between intermittent elections, or when the state was unresponsive (Schmitter & Karl, 1991: 78-80). Hence, societies and NGOs have had a complementary role in development policies, as well as increased governmental accountability with regard to environmental, social issues, poverty and human rights.

Despite its representation of specific interests, civil society characteristically remains outside the sphere of political competition. It has no power to procure national decisions or to assemble alternative ruling coalitions (Gershman, 2004: 30). Nevertheless, the efficacy of civil society has been sufficient to bring about the 'third wave' – governments are feeling the growing pressure of civil societies such that they are trying to co-opt them or else neutralize the more politically active groups (Rodan, 1997: 161; Linz, 1990: 147).

Be that as it may, this increase in political consciousness is not likely to stop, nor is there any legitimate reason for it to be contained. This is because democratic civil society, as we now understand it, 'does not seek primarily to cut back the state or to oppose it; rather it seeks to make the state more democratically accountable to the citizenry and to better enable the widest

possible participation in governance' (Tay, 2002: 72-73). Furthermore, this social political movement is a formidable force and has awakened governments' realization that political aspirations are legitimate and are not to be dismissed, but have to be listened to and discussed before any plans of possible policy making.

Nonetheless, there is a stark difference between liberalization and democratization. The latter necessitates real transfers of power according to the people's choice. Even if rulers are compelled to liberalize society in a bid to reduce opposition, it is unlikely that this would satisfy social expectations in the long run. Conversely, it may even contribute to the growth of opposition, furthering eventual democratization (Linz, 1990: 147-148).

These Southeast Asian ideals are not trying to propound an antithetical model of 'Asian democracy', as was attempted in the 'Asian values' debate. Indeed, they are genuine beliefs that are translated into policy. Hence, there can be no single model for Southeast Asia. While there are some characteristics in common among the elections and democracies surveyed in this paper, there are many complex differences. What this may instead point to are the challenges for democracy in the region that are additional and ancillary to the conduct of free and fair elections. These challenges include the needs to form and empower effective and capable governments, to grow political, legal and civic institutions that can properly check but not paralyse legitimate government, to increase cohesion in the societies that are governed, and to provide economic opportunity, hope, security and stability even amid times of rapid change. These challenges must be addressed if the advances for democracy in the region are to be consolidated.

What then are the possible means of assisting democracy in sinking deeper roots in the Southeast Asian conscience?

Looking first at internal mechanisms, the most obvious bulwark of democracy – press freedom – has to be gradually established in an environment where the media largely has to work within certain parameters. In this respect, many Southeast Asian governments have to be convinced of the advantages of a free media. Much has been written about it, but simply stated, common opinion holds that open dissemination of information and the right of every person to express and receive alternative opinions guarantees democratic pluralism. It is obvious, nonetheless, that the media has to abide by strict standards of responsibility to avoid it becoming a travesty of the empowering institution it is meant to be (Soares, 2000: 35). This is crucial, as prudent exercise of the right of information is more likely to avoid the social chaos and dissension that both Asian governments and peoples are strongly opposed to.

In addition, the other fundamental need is education. It is insufficient to have information alone. This needs to be transformed into useful knowledge to further the democratic progress. In order for this to happen, people must be educated to possess the ability to assimilate and act upon the information given. To a certain extent, this continues the task of increasing public awareness and political participation initiated by the rise of economic development. Of course, this role of education is mitigated somewhat in Southeast Asia as the education system gears the people to be human capital for the market economy. Democratic consciousness is only a side-effect. It appears that overemphasis on technical education, so as to produce workers to satisfy economic demands, neglects the

development of critical thinking faculties. Thus, the degree of critical competence needed for democracy to flourish depends on the priorities of the state and its education system (Lele & Quadir, 2004: 13-14).

Fortunately, however, the importance of creativity and critical thinking is increasingly regarded with the rise of globalization and its capital markets. In the wake of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the economic turbulence of the recent years and the rise of China, Southeast Asian states are not immune to the fact that an innovative populace is more resilient in fighting such challenges. Notably, Singapore is encouraging creativity and critical thinking within its education system; while in Malaysia Prime Minister Badawi has called on Malays to not rely on the advantages of their *bumiputra* status but to improve themselves to compete in the world economy.

Moving beyond areas of traditional state involvement, we find that civil society has the means and legitimacy to ensure internal self-determination in its myriad forms. Not only should it continue to help improve equitable access to public resources, but it could also cooperate with opposition parties to help increase democracy if the opportunity presents itself. This phenomenon has already been witnessed in semi-authoritarian Slovakia, Croatia, Georgia and Serbia-Montenegro, where NGOs managed to unite the disparate opposition in lobbying for reform. Of course, the Central European-Eurasian experience cannot be superimposed upon Southeast Asia. Much depends on the 'maturity and independence of the NGOs, coherence of the opposition parties and the cooperation between the two'. The fact that there is no fixed model of such cooperation further complicates matters (Gershman, 2004: 30-33).

It is common knowledge that after a certain period, the structure of opposition parties tends to be highly bureaucratic, inflexible and unresponsive, and they become overly preoccupied with their own electoral survival. Moreover, in catering to the vested interests of sometimes corrupt patrons on whom they are financially dependent, they lose their ability to represent the interests of the deprived classes (Lele & Quadir, 2004: 10-11; Gershman, 2004: 28). Thus, cooperating with civil society groups (which generally hold cleaner reputations) could be a revolutionary means of democratic breakthrough in Southeast Asian states.

To be sure, it is unreasonable to expect civil society to exercise this extended role in the foreseeable future. This process demands a valid working and worthy political opposition. As illustrated, the quality of the opposition has been compromised under strong state leaderships in countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Cambodia, and thus is unlikely to convince the popular vote. It might work better in the Philippines and Indonesia, but again, the fractious opposition is too busy fighting within itself for a united push towards greater democracy.

Besides internal mechanisms, international alternatives of democratic promotion avail. To date, the United States is by far the strongest proponent of democracy worldwide. Democratic promotion is a stalwart of American foreign policy. Within the last decade, the Clinton Administration sent some 20,000 troops to Haiti and Bosnia, while pressuring Russia to hold its first free presidential elections (Daniel, 2000: 84-85). Similarly, President George Bush has justified the Afghanistan counter-terrorist strikes and the Iraqi invasion as a bid to uphold and protect the democratic ideal in a world threatened by fundamentalism and authoritarian despots.

There have been staunch supporters of such American-led democratization movements, in the belief that democracy is a great and universal ideal that ought to be possessed by all. In particular, Talbott and Kagan champion the United States' role as a 'benevolent hegemony', while admitting that advocating democracy does simultaneously advance United States self-interests (Daniel, 2000; Kagan, 2000).

With the ongoing Iraqi occupation and escalation of terror attacks, overt democratic promotion as part of foreign policy has slid into the background to avoid heightening anti-United States sentiment. It has been realized that overmuch exclamation could be adverse to itself. Thus, the United States did not voice dissent even when General Wiranto was a strong contender for the Indonesian presidency despite his chequered human rights record. Leaving the country to continue its electoral processes unimpeded has resulted in an Indonesian leader that appears to be committed to democracy and security, in line with much of the American expectations. Perhaps the United States is coming to terms with its own limitations and the important realization that 'no nation, not even a superpower, is morally entitled to impose anything, even democracy, on another nation' (Daniel, 2000: 86).

It may be thought that it would be more legitimate for international organizations to promulgate democracy instead. This is not true. The United Nations (UN) has a limited role in democratic promotion in Asia as this straddles the sensitive issue of internal self-determination. The UN-organized elections under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) were a unique occurrence. The Asian states remain

staunchly against external demands for democratization in exchange for developmental aid. This stand was clearly enunciated in the Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights in 1996. Moreover, it is felt that key international financial institutions (IFIs) like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank work more closely with the United States than the UN, and initiate democratic movements only to protect self-interest (Lele & Quadir, 2004: 13).

The role for the outsider that is more acceptable to Southeast Asians, and more helpful in the experience of the recent past, is one that is more limited and focused. Public education efforts about democracy and voting, technical assistance on the voting and counting processes, and support for local NGOs and civil society organizations have been the quiet and tangible means by which foreign assistance has contributed to democratic progress in some Southeast Asian states. This is especially true for Indonesia.

Given such perceptions of external democratizing forces, it may be better if the impetus for democratic consolidation comes first and foremost from within the nation itself. In this way, the progressive actions of civil society, media and educational reforms, together with the catalysing effect of information globalization, will be a more authentic part of the fabric of that society. The role of the outsider, especially those from developed Western democracies and even international organizations, will be relatively limited, and should certainly not lend itself to the perception that democracy is being imposed from without. The citizen in Southeast Asia will therefore be able to own his decision for democracy.

Conclusion

There are many dimensions to the challenges facing Southeast Asian states at present. External and internal security challenges persist. So do the needs for economic development and the engagement in international trade and investment. There are persistent social, ethnic and class divides in many of these societies. In many states, there are also widespread abuses of power, systemic corruption and weak systems of law and justice.

Even without a unique model, democracy is now part of many more people's aspirations in Southeast Asia. Yet democracy on its own – as a process that is idealized no matter what the results – is not sufficient to anchor it within the region. Beyond elections, democrats must find ways to work within democratic structures, and through such democratic means to address the full spectrum of social, political, economic and cultural challenges. Only by proving themselves effective, capable and 'good' governments can they entrench and indeed strengthen the democratic impulse in the region.

It is acknowledged that democracy does not promise to solve all problems. To avoid public disillusionment with democracy, it is the particular onus of the democratically elected leader to honestly admit those issues that need longer-term solutions to the public and convince them of that fact, even in the face of discontent. It is an ungrateful task, but economic, social and political justice has seldom been achieved within a single electoral term. It is thus necessary that democratic leaders and their governments lower public expectations while buoying the conviction that democracy is the better way to achieving stability and prosperity (Linz, 1990: 160-161).

Democracy's wave is not a permanent tide (Huntington, 1991a). Opportunities found in the aftermath of the Asian crisis must be taken and consolidated. Otherwise, democracy risks being thought irrelevant, may face rejection or be mistaken for the simple casting of a vote, to no particular end or improvement.

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Elections and Democracy in Asia: India and Sri Lanka – Beyond the Ballot Box and Towards Governance

Victor Ivan*

Elections in India and Sri Lanka: Similarities and Differences in Fundamental Trends

In 2004 there were parliamentary elections in India, the biggest country in South Asia, and in Sri Lanka, one of the smaller countries of the region. It was India's fourteenth parliamentary general election and Sri Lanka's thirteenth. At those elections, both the ruling parties (the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India and the United National Front (UNF) in Sri Lanka) lost.

Both governments pursued an open economic policy which encouraged foreign investment and emphasized privatization. Although the UNF government in Sri Lanka had only been in power for a little over two years, it had been able to bring about economic growth of 5.9 per cent from a zero level at the time it assumed office. The BJP government had also been able to maintain an economic growth rate as high as 8 per cent.

The defeat of the two governments, in spite of the economic dynamism, shows that the benefits of economic growth had not been distributed in a manner that satisfied all people. It indicates that policies of development had benefited the rich, but not the poor. The policy of privatization, too, had not pleased the ordinary people of the two countries. Although privatization had reduced the

budget deficit in India and Sri Lanka, privatized businesses were not able to give the people a better deal. Many of those institutions have improved their external appearance, but people are compelled to pay a higher price for inefficient services.

Racism and religion were not significant factors in the Indian election of 2004. The BJP, which had come to power on the basis of chauvinism, did not make it an instrument to retain power. Even Sonia Gandhi's foreign origin was not an important topic at this election. The differences based on racism and religion in India appear to be diminishing and the multi-ethnic and multi-religious national foundation of the country appears to be growing in strength.

In Sri Lanka, however, the situation is different. Racism and religion have been major factors in recent politics. The ceasefire agreement Ranil Wickramasinghe entered into with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in order to find a peaceful solution to the ethnic problem and his programme of peace talks were depicted by the Alliance parties as a treacherous attempt to betray the country to LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. The majority of the Sinhala people appear to have accepted that depiction. The best

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attempt so far to solve the ethnic problem was the one made by the Ranil Wickramasinghe government. After entering into the ceasefire agreement, his government removed all road blocks and security points as an expression of goodwill, disregarding the risks. The LTTE, too, opened route A9, which had strategic importance for them. At the third round of talks, the LTTE gave up their firm demand for a separate state and expressed their willingness to accept a federal solution that would ensure internal self-rule for the Tamil people. An important and unprecedented feature of this programme for peace was that all the countries that supported the peace programme were involved in it actively. The cumulative result of all these developments was the emergence of a warless situation in the country. The election results show the failure of the Sinhala people to grasp the significance of the space that had opened up for a peaceful solution. The fact that, for the first time, Buddhist monks contested the parliamentary elections on a religious basis and won nine parliamentary seats indicates that religious differences are being added to the racist tensions in Sri Lanka.

In 2004, India faced a normal election held at the end of the term of the thirteenth parliament. On the other hand, Sri Lanka had to hold a parliamentary election due to abnormal circumstances. The parliament of Sri Lanka was dissolved at a time when Ranil Wickramasinghe's UNF had a majority in parliament and when there were nearly four more years to complete the official term of parliament. President Chandrika Kumaratunga, who also functioned as the leader of the opposition party, used her executive powers and dissolved the parliament because she wanted to pursue a programme that would enable her to stay in office. She did this in spite of a clear promise in writing given to the Speaker,

stating that she would not dissolve the parliament as long as the government party had a majority in it.

Under the constitution of Sri Lanka, someone who is elected to the post of executive president can remain in office for only two terms. At the time in question she was serving her second term of office. She either wanted to amend the constitution or get a new constitution in order to prolong her term of office. She wanted a parliament in which her own party would have a majority. For that purpose she dissolved parliament.

It is the people who hold sovereign power in a democratic system. The people exercise that power through their vote at elections and surrender their sovereignty for a limited period of time to the parliament in countries where a parliamentary system prevails, and to the executive president and the parliament in countries where an executive presidential system with a parliament prevails. The parliament has the power to impeach and dismiss a president when it has reasonable grounds and the required number of members of parliament to support it. On the other hand, the president has the power to dissolve parliament when there are reasonable grounds. The people have the power and the right to elect a president and a parliament of their choice at elections. However, the latter always have to use their power in accordance with recognized democratic and constitutional traditions.

It is clear that in the political system of Sri Lanka there is a great space for politicians to act autocratically. Is this something inherent to Sri Lanka only? Or is it a feature inherent to both Sri Lanka and India? How does it come about? Does it flow from the political system itself? Or does it flow from the mechanism installed for the people to exercise their

sovereignty? Or is it a result of both? Does the absence of a mechanism to reflect the people's authentic will at elections lead to decay in the political system? The aim of this paper is to seek answers to this

fundamental question through a consideration of the system of electoral organization and the system of governance in these two countries.

Electoral Process and Governance: India and Sri Lanka

India

India is the seventh largest country in the world in terms of its territory and the second largest in terms of its population. The area of India is 3.28 million square kilometres. The population is 1.06 billion.

India won her freedom through a prolonged, bitter and non-violent struggle against British domination.

The constitution of India may be considered the longest in the world. It contains 395 articles, nine schedules and 78 amendments. The constitution was drafted by a constitutional council within three years. It was adopted on 26 November 1949. It came into force on 26 January 1950.

India is a federal republic with 26 states. The executive is responsible to the legislature, as in Britain. Although the president is head of the executive, all powers are in the hands of the cabinet headed by the prime minister. The cabinet is responsible to the Lok Sabha (the assembly of people's representatives). The legislature of India consists of three institutions, namely, the president, the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha (which is a council of representatives of the states).

There are 545 members in the Lok Sabha. All except the two Anglo-Indians nominated by the president are elected by the people. The Rajya Sabha is a permanent and continuous institution with 250 members. Out of these, 238 are elected by the members of the state assemblies.

The remaining 12 are nominated by the president from amongst eminent persons in various sectors. Of those members, one third are replaced once every two years. Those who leave are the members who have completed a period of six years.

The term of the Lok Sabha is five years. Only the Lok Sabha has the power to initiate a finance bill. The cabinet is responsible to the Lok Sabha.

The president is considered the chief executive in India. He is elected by an electoral college consisting of the members of the Lok Sabha, the Rajya Sabha and the state legislatures. The president has to act on the advice of the prime minister. However, all executive functions have to be performed in the name of the president.

The post of the prime minister goes to the leader of the majority party in the Lok Sabha. The president appoints the cabinet on the recommendations of the prime minister whose post is similar to the post of the prime minister in Britain. The prime minister is the symbol of the nation.

The supreme court of India may be considered the most powerful supreme court in the world except for that of the United States of America. The supreme court is the defender of the constitution. It also functions as the arbiter in disputes between the central government and state governments. The supreme court has the power to abolish laws that impede

fundamental rights. However, the president has the power to restrict some powers of the supreme court when a state of emergency has been declared.

According to the constitution of India (articles 324-329), full powers for holding elections are vested in the elections commission. The elections commission is a creature of the constitutional council that drafted the constitution of India.

The supervisory powers, the directing power and the administrative power in the holding of elections, including the parliamentary elections, the elections for the state legislatures and the elections for choosing the president and the vice president, are with the elections commission. The elections commission consists of a chief elections commissioner and elections commissioners appointed by the president from time to time. Until 1989, the elections commission had only one chief elections commissioner. However, in July 1989, two more elections commissioners were appointed to assist the chief elections commissioner.

The elections commission has a secretariat in New Delhi. It has 300 officers who assist the directors, chief secretaries and the deputy elections commissioners. In each state there is a chief elections officer in charge of the elections, who is elected by the elections commission from among the senior officers of the states. The state governments as well as the central government are bound to make the necessary government servants for election work at all elections available.

The Representation of People Act 1951 is considered the main electoral law of India. This law covers all important aspects of the elections such as the qualifications that a candidate must have, the periods within which the elections must be held, the supervision of elections, polling

centres, polling agents, voting, counting, election petitions, election malpractices, registration of political parties, nominations, provision of security and so on.

Important and various amendments have been added to this law. An amendment adopted in 1998 requires that detailed information about financial assistance received and financial expenditure incurred by all parties contesting the elections must be furnished. An amendment adopted in 2001 confirms the right of private companies to assist political parties financially. It was expected that these amendments would abolish the use of black money at elections.

A number of judgments given by the supreme court have confirmed the powers of the elections commission. A judgment of 1978 states that the elections commissioner has the residuary power to enact regulations in order to ensure free and fair elections in cases where the existing law is silent. In 2002, at a local government election in New Delhi, the elections commission appealed to the supreme court against a judgment given by the high court. The high court had decided that a directive made by the elections commission requiring the election candidates to submit, along with their nominations, affidavits giving details as to whether there had been criminal cases against them, was against the law. The supreme court agreed with the elections commissioner and annulled the judgment of the high court. In that court case, the supreme court confirmed the voters' right to get background information about election candidates. The supreme court not only declared that any election held without giving voters the right to get information about the election candidates was not free and fair, but also stated that the exercise of the vote is an important aspect of the freedom of expression. It ordered the

elections commission to make necessary provisions not only to get information as to whether there were criminal court cases against the contesting candidates, but also to get details about their educational qualifications and their assets and liabilities along with their nomination. Due to this historic judgment, the public now has the right to get a photocopy of the nomination papers of any election candidate. The supreme court also annulled a judgment given by the high court against a directive made by the elections commission to make identity cards compulsory for the voters. Accordingly, establishing the identity of a voter has become an essential condition for the exercise of the vote. The elections commission of India also has the right to impose directives for the purpose of establishing inner party democracy of the political parties.

The elections commissioner has also maintained a code of conduct for the political parties from 1996. It contains seven main topics, namely General Conduct, Meetings, Processions, Polling Day, Polling Booth, Observers and Party in Power. The Indian election commission has been able to maintain a state of affairs in which the politicians cannot use public resources for election activities.

Conducting a general election in India is similar in extent to the combined conduct of elections in Australia, Canada, Europe and the United States of America. At the first general election held in 1952, there were 176 million eligible voters in India. As many as 85 per cent of them were illiterate. In 1999, the electorate of India numbered 602 million. In 1952, the number of seats in the parliament was 489 and each member of parliament (MP) represented a population of 740,000. At present, the number of MPs is 545, and each MP represents 1.9 million people. In the election of 1952, there were 224,000 polling booths and in 1999, there were 774,000. Staff employed for the election in 1952 amounted to 336,000 persons. In 1999 the number was 5 million.

Although there are allegations that election malpractices occur in states like Kashmir and Nagaland where a peaceful atmosphere does not prevail, the elections commissioner has been able to maintain the electoral process in a satisfactory condition in India as a whole. According to an opinion poll held in 1999 by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies, the elections commission of India is the most trusted public institution in India. It shows the extent of the faith the people of India have in the electoral process.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka covers an area of 65,000 square kilometres. Its population is 19 million, with a literacy rate of 91 per cent. The per capita income is US\$858 per annum.

Sri Lanka attained independence from Britain without a struggle on 4 February 1948. The British colonial rulers had granted Sri Lanka universal franchise in 1931, only three years after the first election with universal franchise was held in Britain. Universal franchise came to

India 20 years after Sri Lanka.

Women above 21 years of age in Sri Lanka were given the right to vote in 1931, before the women in some European countries like France, Belgium and Switzerland were given that right.

Sri Lanka has adopted three constitutions from independence to date. The first constitution, the Soulbury Constitution, was the one received from the British. A

fully fledged parliamentary system based on the British model was created under this constitution. The status of the governor general was similar to that of the constitutional monarch in Britain. The cabinet, headed by the prime minister, functioned as the centre of administration. The bicameral legislature consisted of a house of representatives with 101 members, of whom 95 were elected by the people under the first-past-the-post system and six were nominated by the governor general, and a 30-member senate, of which 15 members were nominated by the governor general and 15 were elected by the members of the house of representatives. Under the Soulbury Constitution, the parliament derived its power from the British crown.

This system was changed and a republican constitution, which vested sovereignty in the people, was adopted in 1972. In enacting the constitution of 1972, the government party (a coalition of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party [SLFP], Lanka Sama Samaja Party [LSSP] and the Communist Party [CP]) made a constitution of their choice on the basis of the parliamentary majority, and neither considered the wishes of the opposition parties nor those of the minority communities. Although there were no changes in the parliamentary system, the bicameral nature of the legislature vanished and, with the abolition of the senate, it became a unicameral legislature. In the process of constitution-making the term of that parliament was extended by two years.

Subsequently, in 1977, the United National Party, which held five sixths of the parliamentary seats, abolished the constitution and adopted a new constitution that introduced an executive presidency. That constitution, too, was adopted with the help of the strong majority of the government party, and was

not based on a consensus which took the aspirations of the opposition parties and the minority communities into account.

This new system of government gave the executive president, who was elected by the people, a greater part of the state power, which so far had been concentrated in the parliament; the power of the parliament was therefore reduced. The first-past-the-post system was abolished and a system of proportional representation was introduced.

Under the new system, the president became the chief executive and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He was the head of government and the head of the cabinet, which he himself had appointed. He did not sit in parliament. The parliament could only criticize him in a motion for his impeachment. He could not be prosecuted in any court of law, except on an election petition.

After the adoption of an executive presidential system, a situation arose in which the sovereign power of the people and the system of elections were interfered with in the most adverse manner. As a solution to the ethnic problem, the Jayawardene government introduced a system of District Development Councils in 1981. In response to protests by Tamil youths at the election in Jaffna, the government launched a special operation aimed at winning the election there. The 150 officers selected by the commissioner of elections for the election work in Jaffna were replaced by representatives of the ruling party. This was the first instance in which the authority empowered for the conduct of an election was removed and that power was exercised by the political party in power.

Owing to the illegal and scandalous actions that occurred in Jaffna at that election,

the commissioner of elections resigned from his post, but he was made an ambassador and sent to Rome immediately for the purpose of silencing him. Thereafter, rather than filling the vacancy with the most senior official of the department, a senior official connected with the operation in Jaffna was appointed to the post of elections commissioner. In protest, the deputy commissioner of elections resigned from his post on the same day.

When President Jayawardene realized that if an election were to be held after the parliament elected in 1977 had completed its term he would lose his five-sixths majority, he held a referendum for the purpose of amending the constitution and prolonging the term of the parliament by six more years so that he could retain power for longer. In order to get the verdict he wanted in the referendum, he took opposition activists into custody. Two newspapers supporting the opposition were sealed. In the end, the required verdict was obtained by getting armed groups to force themselves into the polling booths and cast bogus votes in large numbers.

The second presidential election held in December 1988 and the ninth parliamentary election held in 1989 took place at a time when there was great bloodshed in the country. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, which was carrying on an armed rebellion against the government, followed a policy of killing not only members of opposition parties connected with election activities, but also election officials and the voters who came to cast their votes. Benefiting from this background, the armed political parties that contested the election crashed into polling booths and plundered the votes.

The parliamentary election of 1994, which resulted in a change of government, was

conducted in a somewhat free and fair manner. However, every election held by the Peoples Alliance, which came to power at that election, until 2003, was utterly corrupt. The Wayamba (North-Western) Provincial Council election held on 25 January 1999 was subject to an open plunder of votes. The elections commissioner himself publicly declared that it was the most corrupt election he had ever witnessed.

At the beginning of the presidential election in 1999, the commissioner of elections had to be hospitalized due to a heart ailment. Instead of appointing the next officer in the department to the post of acting commissioner, the president appointed an outsider loyal to her to the post. Thereafter, the government had the ability to regulate the work of the elections commission indirectly. The president was injured by a bomb attack by the LTTE on the night of the final day of the election campaign. Exploiting the shock and high emotions caused by the attack, a great operation to cast bogus votes was implemented.

Before the introduction of the executive presidential system, the electoral operations of the elections department under the commissioner of elections were in a sound state. Generally, all elections had led to a change of government and government officials as well as the police had conducted themselves independently.

Before 1999, the supreme court had a general level of acceptance. It was possible to appeal to the supreme court and obtain redress when there was a violation of the sovereign power of the people.

In June 1998, the elections commissioner had called for nominations for five provincial councils (Central, Uva, Wayamba, Western and Sabaragamuwa). However, when the president declared

emergency rule, the commissioner had to postpone these provincial council elections. Two journalists went before the supreme court in protest. They argued that the emergency was declared not for any genuine reasons but for the purpose of postponing the provincial council elections. The supreme court accepted their complaint and ordered the commissioner of elections to fix the dates for the provincial council elections that had been postponed.

After the Wayamba provincial council elections had been conducted in the most vile manner, two citizens went before the supreme court. Their grievance was that the provincial council elections that were to be held next could be as violent and corrupt. The supreme court summoned the elections commissioner and the Inspector General of Police (IGP) and ordered them to inform the court what steps they were taking to prevent a repetition of what had happened at Wayamba and to ensure a free and fair election. The provincial council elections that followed could be held under relatively fair conditions because of the new arrangements that the elections commissioner and the IGP had to make according to that court case.

However, the supreme court's course of action did not please the president. She wanted to change the supreme court so that it would support rather than be an obstacle to her autocratic actions. For that purpose, instead of appointing the supreme court's seniormost judge, she appointed a friend, who had been accused in a case before the supreme court, to the post of the chief justice. The vacancy was created when the former chief justice retired in September 1999, few months

before the presidential election. That appointment was a reversal of the course of action that had been followed by the supreme court up to that time. From then onwards, the supreme court became an institution that defended the autocratic actions of the executive instead of functioning as an institution that defended the rights of the people.

The seventeenth amendment to the constitution, adopted in October 2001, introduced a provision for an independent elections commission with wide powers. The constitution council sent a list of candidates for that commission to the president. However, although nearly three years have passed since the adoption of that amendment, it has not been possible to set up that commission to date because of the president's objection to one of the names on the list.

According to the seventeenth amendment to the constitution, the person who was holding the post of elections commissioner at the time the law was adopted must continue in that office until the setting up of the independent elections commission. As the elections commission had not been appointed, the elections commissioner was unable to retire although he had passed the age of retirement. The elections commissioner asked the supreme court to declare that his fundamental rights had been violated because he could not retire due to the fact that the elections commission had not been set up, although he had reached the age of retirement and was suffering from a heart ailment. The chief justice expressed his regret but said that the supreme court could do nothing about it and dismissed that fundamental rights petition.

Conclusion: India Looks Forward, Sri Lanka Looks Backwards

Elections may be considered the arteries of a representative political system. Elections are held periodically so that the people can elect a government of their choice and appoint representatives to the institutions of governance. They are the main method by which the people exercise their sovereignty in a democratic political system.

Countries where there is a system of sound administration that allows free and fair elections, where the people are allowed to join in the decision-making process, where administrators have scant opportunity to act autocratically and where there are necessary arrangements to ensure sound governance may be considered 'civilized' societies in a democratic sense.

According to such criteria India is an advanced country and Sri Lanka is a backward one.

India has a sound and advanced electoral system. India has been able to create a political environment that would not impede the functioning of that mechanism. There is only one instance on record in India in which the rulers interfered with the sovereign power of the people. In Indira Gandhi's period of administration she extended the term of the parliament by one year through an amendment to the constitution. That mistake was rectified subsequently, and there have been no more instances of such interference with the sovereign power of the people. In addition to the state administrators' support of the actions of the elections commission, the support by the supreme court has also been striking. Whenever any problems arise concerning the sovereign power of the people, the supreme court has always functioned as a defender of that power. The sound

functioning of the elections commission of India, and the system of governance that has been built in such a way as to absorb the diverse characteristics of India, have promoted India's progress.

The situation prevailing in Sri Lanka is quite different. The mechanism created for election procedure is weak. The election laws are unsatisfactory and there is no coherence in the system of governance. The interference by the executive and the legislature with the sovereignty of the people has become a normal feature in the politics of Sri Lanka. In the disputes that arise in relation to the sovereignty of the people, the supreme court of Sri Lanka has not acted as a defender of the people's rights but as a tool of oppression.

The supreme court has contributed the most to the unsatisfactory state of governance in Sri Lanka. If the supreme court had acted independently and had not become a puppet of the executive, the rulers might not have been so free to act autocratically. When great wrongs were committed, the people might have been able to seek redress through the supreme court. Unfortunately, however, the supreme court of Sri Lanka has not acted as a defender of the rights of the people but has violated those rights as required by the executive. The most important factor in this destructive tendency in the supreme court of Sri Lanka is the chief justice. When he was appointed in 1999, there were two complaints of corruption against him before the supreme court. The president appointed him to the post regardless of this. Thereafter, in the year 2001 and again in 2003, two impeachment motions were tabled against him in parliament. The president dissolved parliament on both occasions so that those

impeachment motions could not be proceeded with. Unfortunately, adequate international attention has not been paid to this factor, which has distorted the entire political system in Sri Lanka.

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Generation and Electoral Politics in South Korea

Kang Won-Taek*

For a long time psephologists have puzzled over the question of which factor affects voters most. Age can be a factor, although it is not so common. One interesting phenomenon in recent South Korean electoral politics is that a division of political views between young and older voters suddenly prevailed in the 2002 presidential election. The age factor also strongly affected voting choices and party preferences in the 2004 National Assembly election. Its sudden rise and the intensity of disagreement are very intriguing, particularly given that it has occurred in

South Korean society where the Confucian tradition lingers and so respect for senior people is still seen as a social virtue. In this regard, the young generation rebelled. This paper focuses on the generation gap in South Korean electoral politics. One of this paper's main purposes is to analyse the characteristics of the political division between generations and what political ideology stands for. This paper also illuminates the reasons for its sudden rise and its implications for South Korean politics.

Breaking the Mould?

Electoral politics in South Korea since democratization in 1986 have remained fairly stable. A single factor has almost completely dominated voting choices: regionalism. However, the seemingly invincible influence of regionalist voting began to wane visibly in the 2002 presidential election. Instead, the age factor suddenly came into play. In that election, candidate choices were clearly divided between generations, and this voting pattern repeated itself in the 2004 National Assembly election. The serious impact of age factor on voting choice is an unprecedented phenomenon.

Tables 1 and 2 show how differently voting choices were made between age groups in 2002 and 2004. A very distinctive pattern can be traced between voters in their thirties and younger on the one hand, and those in their fifties and older on the other hand. In the 2002 presidential election, two thirds of young voters voted for Roh Mu Hyun whereas he did not attract many older voters. Older voters (particularly those in their fifties and older) instead preferred Lee Hoi Chang from the Grand National Party. It is very intriguing that the proportion of support for Roh decreases as age increases, and Lee's support goes in the opposite direction.

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Table 1: Voting Choice by Ages in the 2002 Presidential Election

Age	Roh Mu Hyun	Lee Hoi Chang	Others	Number
20s	67.6	24.6	7.9	293
30s	61.1	32.6	6.3	334
40s	48.5	44.8	6.7	299
50s+	45.7	49.5	4.8	184

Note: Pearson chi-square = 74.8 $p < 0.01$

Source: Calculated from Korea Election Survey 2002 (KES02 hereafter).

Table 2: Voting Choice by Ages in the 2004 Legislative Election

Age	Constituency					Party list				
	Uri	GNP	DLP	NMDP	No.	Uri	GNP	DLP	NMDP	No.
20s	62.6	22.2	7.6	7.6	198	58.5	18.0	18.5	5.0	200
30s	62.7	25.1	7.4	4.8	271	58.9	20.7	15.6	4.8	270
40s	43.5	42.8	5.2	8.5	271	37.2	39.7	15.9	7.2	277
50s+	41.3	50.0	1.2	7.6	344	38.3	47.2	6.2	8.3	339
	Pearson chi-square = 97.9 $p < 0.01$					Pearson chi-square = 81.3 $p < 0.01$				

Note: GNP - Grand National Party; DLP - Democratic Labour Party; NMDP - New Millennium Democratic Party

Source: Calculated from Korea Election Survey 2004 (KES04 hereafter).

This pattern is more apparent in the 2004 legislative election. The governing Uri Party¹ wooed many young voters in their twenties and thirties. The Uri Party attracted around 60 per cent of young voters in both constituency and party list voting. By contrast, the conservative opposition Grand National Party (GNP) gained more support from old voters, particularly in their fifties and older. As Tables 1 and 2 clearly show, the GNP was favoured more by older voters, and given the cold shoulder by young voters. Among voters in their twenties the proportion of party list votes for the GNP was behind even the Democratic Labour Party, a newly established minor socialist party.

It is not unusual for young people to differ from older people in their evaluation and recognition of politics and political parties. In many countries, young voters tend to lack commitment to and trust of political institutions, and they are often disillusioned with politics. What is interesting in the South Korean case is that the age factor emerged out of the blue. Even though in previous elections old voters tended to prefer conservative candidates and young voters liked progressive candidates (Kang, 2003: 54-57), the difference in age factor preferences was not so striking. This begs the question why the age factor began to gain such political significance in 2002, and not, for instance, in 1997? An answer to this

1. The Uri Party was launched after the 2002 presidential election. It was a splinter party that was split from the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). Roh Mu Hyun was a candidate from the MDP in the 2002 election, and joined the Uri Party later.

question is related to the decline of regionalism. The fading effect of regionalism directly resulted from the retirement of former presidents Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung,² who were the driving forces of regional rivalry, as mentioned earlier. When the ‘two Kims’ disappeared from the political scene there was no other key player who had the charisma to mobilize voters with regionalist sentiment. Generational as well as ideological conflicts filled the vacuum instead. In this regard, the rise of the generational rift implies a transformation of a major political cleavage, and signifies that the electoral dealignment began to occur in 2002.

Another surprising phenomenon observed in 2002 and 2004 was the strong influence of ideology on voting choices. In the past, ideological difference was not very salient in spite of rapid industrialization and the consequent growth of the working class.

The conservative dominance is greatly attributed to the bitter experience of the Korean War and the lingering effects of the ‘red complex’, often exacerbated by the authoritarian regimes (Kang, 1998: 97). Even after democratization, ideology did not have any significance in South Korean politics, and as a result any progressive (or liberal) ideology, not to mention socialism, has not been properly represented. Unlike preceding elections, in the 2002 election ideology suddenly mattered.

The effects of ideology on voting can be traced in Table 3. The average ideological position of Roh Mu Hyun’s supporters was fairly skewed toward a progressive direction. By contrast, Lee’s supporters leaned in a conservative direction. In comparison with Lee’s supporters, the average ideological position of Roh’s supporters stayed further away from the middle point of 5.

Table 3: Means of Voters’ Self-placement by Chosen Candidates

Voted for	Mean	Standard Deviation	Number
Roh Mu Hyun	3.90	2.33	741
Lee Hoi Chang	5.59	2.37	509

Note: 0 = extremely progressive; 5 = in the middle; 10 = extremely conservative

Source: Calculated from KES02.

This pattern of voting choice was further reinforced in 2004. In many democracies, ideological attitudes are usually related to class or status. Conventional wisdom says that working class voters tend to support progressive (often socialist) candidates

while middle class voters tend to be conservative. By contrast, the ideological distinction in South Korea has been made between age groups rather than between classes.

2. In South Korea, a president serves for a five-year single term. He/she must not seek re-election by law.

Table 4: Ideological Self-placement by Age Groups

Age	2002			2004		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	ANOVA	Mean	Std. Dev.	ANOVA
20s	4.05	2.18	F=32.8 P<0.01	3.82	2.30	F=37.0 P<0.01
30s	3.87	2.24		4.02	2.14	
40s	4.83	2.56		4.91	2.42	
50s+	5.33	2.47		5.50	2.36	
Total	4.54			4.59		

Notes: Std. Dev. - Standard Deviation; ANOVA - Analysis of Variance

The original questionnaire of the 2002 survey has a five-scale measurement for ideological self-placement. For a comparison with the 2004 survey, every response was recoded into a 10-scale measurement [0 = extremely progressive; 5 = in the middle; 10 = extremely conservative].

Source: Calculated from KES02 and KES04.

Table 4 shows a clear difference of ideological stance between age groups, indicating that young voters tend to be progressive while older voters, especially in their 50s and older, are conservative. The younger a voter is, the more progressive stance he/she takes, and vice versa. It is noteworthy that voters in their

30s, not in their 20s, were most progressive in 2002. The results in Table 4 indicate that ideological connotation in South Korea may be different from those in other democracies. What South Korean voters have in mind when they perceive themselves as progressive or conservative thus makes for an interesting puzzle.

Generation and Ideology in the South Korean Context

The notion of ideology has been employed in a variety of different contexts and with a number of different meanings (Sanders, 1999: 183). The term 'conservative' can include various connotations and this is also true of the term 'progressive'. To understand the meanings of ideology in the South Korean context, three dimensions of ideology are taken into account. The first dimension is the widely used 'left versus right' continuum. This distinction is made mainly over the distribution of material and economic values, and includes competing concepts such as equality versus efficiency, distribution versus growth, state versus market, or labour versus capital, and so on. Some scholars call this a 'socialist versus *laissez-faire*' dimension (Heath, Evans & Martin, 1993; Campbell, 2004).

The second dimension is the 'authority versus libertarian' division. The former puts more emphasis on authority, tradition and law and order. People who tilt toward the 'authority' end want to preserve religious values and traditional norms, to uphold moral standards and to take tough measures to prevent disorder and crimes. By contrast, the libertarian ideology underscores individual rights and liberty, and generosity and care for social minorities like women or homosexuals. It also stresses freedom of speech and political participation, and opposes censorship. The third dimension of ideology is the 'modern versus postmodern' continuum. As Inglehart (1997: 32) put it, 'The economic miracles and the welfare states that emerged after World War II gave rise to a new stage of

history, and ultimately laid the way for the rise of 'Postmodern values'. The 'new' values are substantially different from the material values in industrial society, and have led to the rise of parties such as the greens.

These three dimensions of ideology seem common worldwide. However, in order to explain South Korean electoral politics, an additional dimension is needed. On the surface, the most serious social schism since 2002 is over the assessment of 'anti-communist ideology', which is closely associated with the protracted confrontation with communist North Korea since the end of the Korean War. Its 'progressive' view calls for the fundamental dissolution of the 'Cold War' scheme with the abolition of the National Security Law, lifting all restrictions against North Korea, and re-examining the relationship with the United States (or moving away from exclusive dependence on the United States for security). Its conservative stance states that 'anti-communist ideology' must be kept. There is a steadfast belief that anti-communist ideology has worked as a bulwark against another possible invasion from North Korea. This idiosyncratic dimension of ideology derives not only from the lingering Cold War legacy, but also from evaluation of the 'developmental state' period under the Park Chung Hee authoritarian regime.

From the above discussion, we can summarize the four dimensions of ideology which may affect contemporary South Korean politics as follows:

1. left-right dimension
2. libertarian-authority dimension
3. postmodern-modern dimension
4. challenge-embrace of 'anti-communism' dimension.

3. This survey was originally designed to measure features of ideology among the political élite (legislators) and the people in a comparative way. It was conducted by the Korea Political Science Association/*JoongAng Ilbo* (Joong-Ang Daily) on 15-16 June 2004 for the people and from 1 June to 10 July 2004 for legislators in the National Assembly. Each question includes four items designed to measure respondents' attitudes.

To measure the separate effect of each dimension of ideology, ten questions from a survey result are analysed.³ These ten questions represent as many key issues that divide public opinion. The ten questions in the survey can be classified into the four dimensions of ideology outlined above (see Table 5).

As noted, an idiosyncratic feature in recent South Korean electoral politics is that ideology is closely interrelated with age. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is employed to assess the different attitudes taken by each age group in these four categories. Table 6 (see over) is the measurement of the 'left-right' dimension of ideology according to age groups. Among the four questions, two issues of 'reforms of *chaebol* (conglomerates)' and 'introduction of class action' turned out to be statistically significant. The main targets of class action are '*chaebol*', and so these two questions are effectively identical. To both questions, young respondents tend to quite strongly agree that the government should impose regulations to curb the dominance of the conglomerates in the market. By contrast, older respondents, especially people in their fifties and older, have a different view on that issue. Interestingly, attitudes toward welfare policy, which is a critical issue dividing progressives and conservatives in many democracies, did not vary much between age groups. Attitudes toward education reforms, a very touchy issue in South Korean society, do not differ much either. All in all, the left-right dimension of ideology does not match well with the generation conflict, except with regard to issues of *chaebol* reforms.

Table 5: Ten Questions for Analysing the Four Dimensions of Ideology

Categories	Questions
Left versus right	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Do you support reform policies of <i>chaebols</i> (conglomerates)? 2. Do you agree with the introduction of class action? 3. Do you think that social welfare should be raised or cut? 4. Which do you think high school education reforms should pursue: standardization or competitiveness?
Libertarian versus authority	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Do you support the revision of the male-dominated Family Registry System in favour of women's rights? 2. Do you support the abolition of capital punishment?
Postmodern versus modern	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Do you think that environmental policy should be tightened or loosened?
Challenge versus embrace of 'anti-communism'	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Do you think that South Korea should expand or reduce aid to North Korea irrespective of its nuclear programmes? 2. Do you think that the relationship with the United States should be further strengthened or completely re-examined? 3. Do you think that the National Security Law should be maintained or repealed?

The second dimension is on the libertarian-authority continuum. In comparison with the left-right dimension of ideology, the libertarian-authority dimension appears fairly suitable to explain the relationship between ideology and generation. As seen in Table 7, a very clear distinction can be traced between age groups. Young people take quite a progressive view on these issues whereas older people have a strongly conservative attitude. This indicates that older people want to keep tradition and prefer tough measures for social order. By contrast, young people put

emphasis on social equality and human rights. This pattern is more apparent particularly over the issue of the 'Revision of Family Registry'. Its F score is very large, which indicates that there exists a huge difference between age groups over that issue. It is also worth mentioning that people in their thirties, not in their twenties, take the most progressive attitude toward the abolition of capital punishment. Table 7 clearly shows that the ideological differences between age groups are closely related to the 'libertarian-authority' dimension of ideology.

Table 6: The Left-Right Dimension and Generation

Questions	Age groups	Mean	ANOVA
Reforms of <i>chaebols</i>	20s	3.70	F=12.7 P<0.01
	30s	3.74	
	40s	4.69	
	50s+	5.72	
Introduction of class action	20s	3.62	F=6.1 P<0.01
	30s	3.41	
	40s	3.59	
	50s+	4.22	
Welfare policy	20s	4.04	F=0.7 p>0.1
	30s	3.72	
	40s	3.85	
	50s+	3.84	
Education reforms	20s	4.35	F=1.9 p>0.1
	30s	3.90	
	40s	4.48	
	50s+	4.20	

Note: 0 = progressive; 5 = in the middle; 10 = conservative

Table 7: The Libertarian-Authority Dimension and Generation

Questions	Age groups	Mean	ANOVA
Revision of Family Registry System in favour of women's rights	20s	3.96	F=66.5 p<0.01
	30s	4.47	
	40s	5.81	
	50s+	7.43	
Capital punishment	20s	4.70	F=17.6 p<0.01
	30s	4.54	
	40s	5.60	
	50s+	6.35	

The third dimension is related to 'postmodern values'. Table 8 shows the attitudes to environmental policies. This has been a key issue to explain the rise of a new generation and its political consequence in Western society. All respondents seem to recognize the need for regulations for the environment as the mean scores of all age groups are less than 5. The distinction of the attitudes between age groups is very narrow, even though young people put more emphasis

on environmental conservation and tough regulations for it. In a nutshell, the postmodern-modern dimension of ideology is not visibly very different.

The last dimension is on the 'challenge-embrace of anti-communism' continuum. This is an idiosyncratic dimension of ideology, and currently seems located at the heart of the generation gap. As seen in Table 9, all three questions in this dimension of ideology turn out to be

statistically significant, which indicates that the attitudes toward all three issues vary greatly from generation to generation. Young voters want substantial changes from the ‘old-fashioned’ political structure invented during the Cold War period. On the contrary, older people tend to resist

radical changes and the dissolution of the old structures. A most intriguing feature in Table 9 is that the most progressive age group is people in their thirties, not in their twenties, over all three questions. The progressive attitude of people in their thirties is very consistent.

Table 8: The Postmodern–Modern Dimension and Generation

Questions	Age groups	Mean	ANOVA
Environmental policies	20s	3.53	F = 4.72 P<0.01
	20s	3.53	
	30s	3.74	
	40s	3.92	
	50s+	4.32	

Table 9: The Challenge–Embrace of Anti-communism Dimension and Generation

Questions	Age groups	Mean	ANOVA
Relationship with the United States	20s	3.84	F = 28.4 P<0.01
	30s	3.76	
	40s	3.86	
	50s+	5.72	
	50s+	5.72	
National Security Law	20s	5.07	F = 15.0 P<0.01
	30s	4.83	
	40s	5.59	
	50s+	6.28	
	50s+	6.28	
Aid to North Korea	20s	5.49	F = 8.8 P<0.01
	30s	4.88	
	40s	5.69	
	50s+	6.11	
	50s+	6.11	

Voters in their thirties have often been dubbed as the ‘386 generation’. The number 3 stands for the fact that they are now in their 30s. The number 8 indicates that they went to colleges and universities in the 1980s. The number 6 represents that they were born in the 1960s. In comparison with the older generation who experienced the Korean War and

subsequent absolute poverty, the 386 generation was the first beneficiary of economic development. They were actively involved in the pro-democracy movement against a military-based authoritarian regime in the 1980s. A shared experience of such political protest against the anti-authoritarian regime made them a ‘cohort’ with similar political values.

They are generally reform-minded and have an affinity with progressive ideology. Various poll results also show that the 386 generation is ideologically more progressive than other age groups (Kang, 2003: 292-300).

During the 2002 election campaign, this age group attracted widespread attention in relation to their eagerness for political reform. The competition in the 2002 presidential election was exceptionally centrifugal because the ideological stances of the two major candidates were quite polarized. Roh Mu Hyun from the ruling Millennium Democratic Party took an unusually 'radical' stance in the South Korean political context. He is the first major candidate to publicly claim that his ideological stance is progressive, and challenged conventional political taboos like the National Security Law, the relationship with the United States and so on. Amid controversies over the 'Sunshine Policy' with North Korea, he boldly maintained that he would continue with that policy. On the other hand, Lee Hoi Chang, who then led the major opposition Grand National Party, took a very conservative stance. His ideological position was in stark contrast to Roh's, which made the competition very polarized. Many of the 386 generation were ardent supporters of Roh Mu Hyun. When 'NOSAMO',⁴ an Internet-based fan club for Roh Mu Hyun, was organized, most of its early members were from the 386 generation. NOSAMO members played a significant role in Roh's nomination in the party primary in 2002. At the initial stage of the 2002 presidential campaign they ignited Roh's popularity, which later spread to other age groups.

Their progressive view is in stark contrast particularly to people in their fifties and

older. As seen in Table 9, they represent very consistent and strongly conservative attitudes with regard to anti-communist ideology. Essentially, the conflict between generations is closely related to this dimension of ideology, and the core groups at the heart of the generational conflict are people in their thirties and in their fifties. In other words, the 386 generation has ignited a division between generations, and the key issue of the conflict is over the challenge-embrace of anti-communist dimension. The 386 generation represents progressive ideology while people in their fifties and older stand for conservatism in the South Korean context. As the 386 generation has taken centre stage of politics, they have pushed forward reforms for removing the lingering legacy of anti-communist ideology. As the older generation vehemently defies this attempt, the generation conflict has intensified.

From the discussion above, we can conclude that the ideological conflict between generations in South Korea has multiple meanings. The 'challenge-embrace of anti-communism' dimension has turned out to be very influential. A distinctive and consistent pattern of differences in attitudes can be found between age groups. At the same time, the 'libertarian-authority' dimension of ideology also sets generations widely apart. By contrast, the 'postmodern-modern' and the 'left-right' dimensions of ideology do not seem relevant enough to explain the generation gap. It is noteworthy, however, that the issues of *chaebol* reforms divide the attitudes of generations.

The next section examines how these idiosyncratic features can be explained in a comprehensive and comparable way.

4. NOSAMO is a Korean abbreviation meaning 'a group of people who love Roh Mu Hyun'.

'Libertarian-Authority' and 'Challenge-Embrace of Anti-Communism' Dimensions of Ideology

Perceptions of ideology should be placed in context. The origin of the 'challenge-embrace of anti-communism' ideology dates back to the authoritarian period, and its recent rise is closely related to the path of democratization and subsequent political development. Under authoritarian regimes, anti-communism ideology used to be an effective weapon to justify military rule and to suppress opposition to the regime. Not surprisingly, pro-democracy forces challenged anti-communism ideology, but it has remained intact despite democratization. This is because it occurred as a compromise between the authoritarian regime and pro-democracy forces, that is, the authoritarian regime was not completely defeated, and was able to cope within a new political environment. With the rise of regional antagonism, the former authoritarian force was successfully transformed into a political party that represented the North Kyungsang region. This political party even succeeded in winning the presidency in the first election after democratization in 1987, mainly due to a split between the pro-democracy leaders – the 'two Kims'.

Regional division reached its apex when the three parties merged into the Democratic Liberal Party in 1990.⁵ The creation of the DLP isolated the Cholla region. In addition, the merger was a marriage between a former authoritarian block and some of the pro-democracy forces led by Kim Young Sam, which meant another compromise between former enemies. The compromise made it difficult to get rid of anti-communist ideology, even when Kim Young Sam took the presidency (1992-1997). Under the Kim Dae Jung administration (1997-

2002), some elements of anti-communist ideology were challenged with the conciliation extended to North Korea called the 'Sunshine Policy'. However, as Kim Dae Jung was the foremost political leader of the regional rivalry, regionalism still mattered more than anything else. With the retirement of Kim Dae Jung in 2002 and the subsequent weakening of regionalist voting, the 'challenge-embrace of anti-communism' dimension started to gain political significance.

As noted earlier, the 386 generation shared common experiences, especially as university students in the 1980s. They had ardently fought against the Chun Doo Hwan authoritarian regime for democratization. Many student activists were severely afflicted and even tortured under the National Security Law. Roh had been a pro-labour lawyer and had actively participated in the pro-democracy movement, too. He made a name for himself as a maverick who challenged the prevailing regionalist party politics, and received acclaim as a champion of political reforms. As noted, Roh Mu Hyun dramatically highlighted his progressive views during the 2002 election. In this respect, the 386 generation and Roh Mu Hyun have much in common in terms of their experiences of the pro-democracy movement and challenges to anti-communist ideology. Both wanted to remove the negative legacy of the authoritarian era. In other words, Roh Mu Hyun's progressive stance struck a chord particularly with voters in their thirties. Roh once described the present South Korean situation 'as being at the crossroads of either going back to the dictatorial past of the Yusin era,⁶ or

5. For more details, see Kang (1998: 96-99).

6. In October 1972, the then president, Park Chung Hee, declared a state of emergency and established the dictatorship. Park called the creation of the new regime Yusin.

revitalizing reforms era, or moving forward to the future'.⁷


This is also true with regard to the issue of the relationship with the United States. A strong alliance with the United States has been the important pillar of national security and a critical element of the anti-communism ideology. People in their fifties and older firmly believe that military dependence on the United States is most critical for national security. By contrast, younger voters point out that the United States effectively supported the illegitimate authoritarian regimes as it needed a barrier to hold down the spread of communism in the Cold War era. Many of them think that the United States turned a blind eye to another military coup in 1980 and the massacre in Kwangju because at that time the United States military commander in South Korea controlled all military operations, including the South Korean army. The different viewpoints on the relationship with the United States also reflect the varying memories of the past authoritarian era. Responses and attitudes rely heavily on the assessment of the developmental state in the past and its anti-communist ideology.

To summarize, there are two general characteristics. First, the ideological conflict seen in the two consecutive elections has little to do with the left-right dimension of ideology. In terms of this ideology, attitudes between age groups do not vary much as seen in Table 6. If the socialist Democratic Labour Party becomes a major party, then the left-right dimension could gain political significance. However, the possibility of this happening seems remote. Second, the ideological

conflict in South Korea instead represents two other dimensions. One is over the libertarian-authority dimension and the other is the challenge-embrace of the legacy of the authoritarian era. These two dimensions have proven influential in creating a division between generations since 2002. Therefore, in order to understand the development and transformation of South Korean electoral politics as well as the nature of ideological differences, the combination of these two cleavages should be concurrently considered. Figure 1 illustrates the ideological positions of political parties and their supporters in the 2002 and 2004 elections. The horizontal axis represents the libertarian-authority dimension of ideology while the vertical axis stands for the challenge-embrace of anti-communism dimension. More generally, the latter dimension can be said to represent the negative-positive evaluation of legacies of the developmental state. The positions of conservative Lee Hoi Chang in the 2002 presidential election and the Grand National Party in the 2004 National Assembly election are located on the upper right. Older voters, especially those in their fifties and older, are located on the same position as them. By contrast, the ideological positions of Roh and the Uri party are located on the diagonally opposite side. The 386 generation and younger voters stay with them. That is, voters of each bloc are also divided in a polarized way. People in their forties stay more or less in the middle. Even though they slightly lean toward the pro-authority position on the horizontal axis, their ideological position does not look that distinctive.

7. <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200408/05/200408052256032739900090109012.html> (9 October 2004).

Figure 1: Ideological Cleavages in South Korea and Generation



Conclusion

This paper focuses on the effect of the age factor on ideological differences in the South Korean context. The most striking result is that the left-right spectrum of ideology does not seem to explain the generation conflict. By contrast, there is a clear distinction between generations in terms of the libertarian-authority as well as the challenge-embrace of anti-communism dimension of ideology. Fairly consistent patterns are found in these two dimensions, which highlights that these are the key issues yielding the generation gap. Young voters in their twenties and thirties tend to take a fairly progressive stance over these dimensions, which is in contrast to

the ideological position of older people, especially in their fifties and older.

Given the consistent and unambiguous effect of ideology on voting, the 2002 presidential election and the 2004 National Assembly election have ushered South Korean society into uncharted territory. Before the 2002 election, ideology did not matter much. However, since ideology represents the generational aspiration particularly of the 386 generation, it is likely to transform itself once their aspirations materialize. In that sense, South Korean electoral politics will continue to be in flux for the time being.

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The 2004 Election and Democracy in Malaysia

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What does the 2004 election signify for democracy in Malaysia? This is an important question, as the significance of the 2004 election in Malaysia – or, for that matter, of any election – can only be properly appreciated in the context of the larger political system. From this perspective, the 2004 Malaysian election signifies normalization (or a restoration of

normalcy) and continuity in the Malaysian version of democracy. So what is the nature of Malaysian democracy? And how does the 2004 election restore it to its normal state and ensure its continuation? Answering these questions requires an examination of elections and electoral competition in Malaysia.

Elections in Malaysia

A key feature, indeed the dominant feature, of electoral competition in Malaysia is its dominance by a single coalition – electorally a single party as it contests elections with a single slate of candidates. This dominant coalition is the BN (Barisan Nasional or National Front), which is an extension of the pre-1974 Alliance. Since independence

in 1957, this coalition has not only won all federal or parliamentary elections, but has also done so with more than the two-thirds majority that is required for amending the constitution (see Table 1). (In state elections, the BN has experienced defeat in only three of the 13 states since independence.)

Table 1: Parliamentary Seats and Votes Won by BN/Alliance

Election year	Total seats	No. of seats won	Per cent of seats won	Per cent of votes won	Per cent difference
1959	104	74	71.2	51.7	19.5
1964	104	89	85.6	58.5	27.1
1969	144	85	66.0	49.3	16.7
1974	154	135	87.7	60.7	27.0
1978	154	130	84.4	57.2	27.2
1982	154	132	85.7	60.5	25.2
1986	177	148	83.6	55.8	27.8
1990	180	127	70.6	53.4	17.2
1995	192	162	84.4	65.2	19.2
1999	193	148	76.7	56.5	20.2

Source: Funston (2000: 49), but ultimately the Election Commission.

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The BN dominance is the combined result of three main factors. In increasing proximity of effect these are the plural society, the party system and the rules of electoral contestation. (If one goes into factors-within-factors, the party system is partly the result of the goals and actions of political leaders, and the rules of electoral contestation are the result of the goals and actions of political leaders in power.)

According to the 2000 census, Malaysia's population of 22 million is made up of 53.4 per cent Malays (93.2 per cent of whom are in the 11 states of Peninsular Malaysia), 11.7 per cent other *bumiputra* or indigenous races (90.3 per cent of whom are in the two states of Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia), 26 per cent Chinese, 7.7 per cent Indians and 1.2 per cent others.

Political parties are generally either wholly or largely identified with race. The BN is presently a coalition of 14 parties led or dominated by UMNO (United Malay National Organization), the main Malay party. It occupies the political centre and effectively relegates the opposition parties to the ethnic flanks – both the Malay flank and the non-Malay/non-*bumiputra* flank. In fact, the BN is so syncretic or inclusive as to leave no significant opposition in the states of East Malaysia in 2004. In Peninsular Malaysia, opposition to the BN in 2004 came from three parties – the Malay PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia or Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party), the mainly Chinese DAP (Democratic Action Party) and the multi-ethnic although mainly Malay-led PKN (Parti Keadilan Nasional or National Justice Party).

The third and final factor is the rules of electoral contestation, which include the first-past-the-post electoral system and its operation within the larger Malaysian political context (Lim, 2002). This factor enhances the dominance of the already

dominant centrist BN by advantaging it (or disadvantaging the opposition parties) in both the competition or campaign for votes and the translation of votes won into seats in parliament.

In campaigning for votes, opposition parties are handicapped by various inequalities. These include the existence of various laws, principally the Internal Security Act, the Official Secrets Act and the Sedition Act, that inhibit political activity and campaigning alike, especially by the opposition; unequal access to and treatment by the government-controlled media; the BN's use of government resources for campaigning; the lack of evenhandedness in the issuance of police permits needed for holding indoor talks or *ceramah* that have replaced open-air campaign rallies (banned since 1978 ostensibly for security reasons); and the BN's resorting to its vastly superior financial resources made possible by the non-enforcement of limits on election expenses (see Ong and Lim, 2005 forthcoming, for more detail).

In the translation of votes won into parliamentary seats, the size of the BN's seat 'bonus' (ranging from 16.7 to 27.8 per cent), shown in the far-right column of Table 1, is not only due to the first-past-the post method of election. It also reflects the significant malapportionment in favour of largely Malay rural areas – thus benefiting all Malay parties but mainly the main Malay party, UMNO – and also some probable gerrymandering against the opposition in constituency delimitation.

With the first-past-the-post system, electoral constituencies can have an important effect on election outcomes or results. The re-delimitation of electoral constituencies (after at least an eight-year period) is done in the first instance by the Election Commission according to rules in the constitution and approved by parliament or the government. These rules have been

amended to remove, since 1973, numerical limits to malapportionment in favour of rural areas (so-called rural weightage). The Election Commission's liberal application of rural weightage has long led the main Chinese-supported opposition party, the DAP, to question its independence and impartiality.

Reflecting the above three factors, the dominance of the BN has set the pattern of electoral competition in the country from the start. Competition is between a dominant centrist coalition of ethnic (including ethnic-identified) political parties and ethnic opposition parties on both flanks, a pattern that has not been altered in any significant way by the emergence since 1999 of the more multi-ethnic PKN. The dominance of the BN is such that parliamentary elections are elections without choice in a crucial sense: voters do not see before them a choice of alternative ruling parties. No opposition party fields enough candidates to win the election and each only hopes to exploit voter discontent with the BN government in order to gain more seats for itself and achieve the resultant collective outcome (so far elusive) of denying the BN its two-thirds majority. Conversely, the BN seeks to keep voter dissatisfaction within bounds in order to contain opposition advances and to retain the two-thirds parliamentary majority that it has come to regard as the benchmark of satisfactory performance.

Of course, voters can still bring down the BN by deserting it *en masse*, but this has not even come close to happening. Thus, instead of offering voters a choice of alternative ruling parties, parliamentary elections in Malaysia serve only as barometers of discontent with the BN. The primary interest is only the margin of the BN victory and the extent of opposition gains against the BN and its main component parties.

Opposition parties are not immune to the well-known incentives toward two-party competition under the first-past-the-post electoral system. However, the ethnic-flank opposition parties are too far apart to come together as a durable coalition and offer a credible alternative to the BN. They have often cooperated in so-called electoral pacts for the purpose of avoiding three-cornered contests that split the opposition vote to the benefit of the BN – and it is on such occasions, most notably 1969, 1990 and 1999, that the BN has lost the most ground. In 1999, the opposition parties even called themselves the Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front) and issued a joint manifesto. However, each member party still contested under its own name and it is doubtful that most voters saw the opposition front as a viable alternative to the BN.

Nevertheless, the 1999 election shocked the BN: specifically, Malay voters delivered the greatest shock up to then to UMNO (Funston, 2000; Maznah, 2003). The BN secured 56.5 per cent of the popular vote and 76.7 per cent of parliamentary seats – down from 65.2 per cent and 84.4 per cent, respectively, in 1995. This decline in the BN overall performance was not as bad as in some past elections, thanks in large part to undiminished Chinese support. However, UMNO suffered its worst ever setback. Its seats were slashed to 72 from 89 in the previous election in 1995, and below half of the total number of BN seats for the first time. Funston (2000: 51) estimates that about half of the Malay votes went to the opposition. Focusing on the 58 predominantly (over two-thirds) Malay-majority constituencies, Maznah (2003: 74) calculates that UMNO won just below half the overall vote, representing a fall of 13 per cent from 1995. With the new PKN failing to make much of a mark, the UMNO loss was mainly PAS's gain. PAS increased its share of total votes to 15 per cent (from 7.3 per cent in 1995) and its

parliamentary seats to 27 (from seven in 1997), more than twice its previous best. It took over the position of opposition leader in parliament from the DAP, which won ten seats (up from nine in 1995).

It is difficult to disentangle the various factors that account for the UMNO setback in 1999. However, most observers give most weight to the 'Anwar affair' and the *reformasi* (reform) movement. This movement against corruption and abuse of power in the BN government was started by Anwar following his 1998 dismissal (as deputy prime minister) by Mahathir. In this view, much of the increased Malay support, especially among younger voters, for PAS in 1999 did not stem from Malay support for PAS or its advocacy of an Islamic state but was a Malay protest against the excesses

of UMNO and Mahathir in particular. If so, the fading of the Anwar issue with time, the leadership change from Mahathir to Abdullah in October 2003, and Abdullah's embrace of governmental reform, including fighting corruption, boded well for UMNO in 2004. In fact, there was much pre-election talk of a Malay return to UMNO, although whether this actually did happen has yet to be verified.

Thus the main question for the 2004 election was whether UMNO would recover and how. The recovery of UMNO would mean a return to normalcy, that is dominance by the UMNO-dominated BN, while further loss of Malay support to PAS would usher in a fundamental re-ordering of the existing pattern of political contestation in the country.

The 2004 Election

This background, highlighting the dominance of the BN and the rules of electoral competition, facilitates understanding of the 2004 election. But there was another important development in the electoral system that must be noted and that was the 2003 re-delimitation that produced a new set of electoral constituencies for the 2004 election. The 2003 re-delimitation covers Peninsular Malaysia and Sabah. (Under the constitution, Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak form separate units of review for the purpose of constituency re-delimitation.)

Previous re-delimitation exercises mainly disadvantaged non-*bumiputra* parties through increased malapportionment (rural weightage) and possibly some gerrymandering. The 2003 re-delimitation is widely seen as directed against PAS as well. The distribution of the 26 added parliamentary constituencies did not follow changes in state electorates and no

constituency was added to the predominantly Malay states (Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis) where the PAS challenge is strong. Also disadvantaging PAS was the re-delimitation in 2003 of Malay-majority constituencies that are more 'mixed', that is, those with a larger minority (over 20 per cent) of non-Malay voters. In a detailed examination of 2003 constituency boundary changes in the frontline state of Kedah, Ong and Welsh (2004) show this addition of non-Malay voters to Malay-majority constituencies, thus making them more difficult to be won or retained by PAS against UMNO. Their study also provides the best demonstration to date of the slice and splice of gerrymandering. The approval by parliament of the 2003 re-delimitation was met by a joint opposition walkout (*New Straits Times*, 9 April 2003). For the first time, re-delimited constituencies were also opposed by Malay and mainly Malay opposition parties and not just by the mainly Chinese DAP as in the past.

Now, looking at results, a new row for the 2004 election can be added to the bottom of Table 1.

Election year	Total seats	No. of seats won	Percentage seats won	Percentage votes won	Percentage difference
2004	219	199	90.9	64.3	26.6

In terms of percentage of both votes and seats won, the BN can be said to have fully recovered from its setback in 1999. Its share of votes, the second highest ever, is only slightly below the record achieved in 1995. Its share of parliament seats tops 90 per cent for the first time.

No less importantly, the BN recovery largely reflects the recovery of UMNO. The BN performance against the DAP, changed little from 1999 to 2004. The DAP saw little change in fortunes: its 12 seats (from ten previously) is only a fractionally higher percentage (5.5 compared to 5.2 per cent) in a parliament enlarged from 193 to 219 seats. Thus the change from 1999 to 2004 occurred mainly on the Malay side, or in the performance of UMNO. Of the 117 seats it contested, UMNO won 108 – largely at the expense of PAS, which saw its seats plummet from 27 to six, and to a lesser extent at the expense of PKN, which won a single seat compared to five in 1999.

Again, the best way to examine the relative performance of parties competing for the Malay vote is to look at constituencies with two-thirds or more of Malay electors. With the exception of one or two cases, all these predominantly Peninsular Malay constituencies saw straight fights between UMNO and either PAS or PKN in 1999 and 2004. It was also in these constituencies that PAS secured all its wins and PKN all but one of its wins in 1999 and 2004.

An examination of this (see Table 2) clearly shows the strong recovery by UMNO from 1999. In 2004, UMNO won 58 of the 65 seats (89.2 per cent), a sharp improvement from 27 of the 58 seats (46.6 per cent) in 1999. Its share of votes increased to 59.9 per cent in 2004 from 49.8 per cent in 1999. Seats won by PAS fell from 27 (46.6 per cent) to six (9.2 per cent) and votes won by PAS fell from 40.5 to 34.0 per cent between the two elections. PKN was also down from four seats (6.9 per cent) to one (1.5 per cent) and from 9.6 to 5.8 per cent of the votes.

Table 2: Results in Constituencies with Two-Thirds or More Malay Electors

Party	1999			2004		
	Seats won	% seats won	% vote	Seats won	% seats won	% Vote
UMNO	27	46.6	49.8	58	89.2	59.9
PAS	27	46.6	40.5	6	9.2	34.0
PKN	4	6.9	9.6	1	1.5	5.8

In addition to the sharp decline at the parliamentary level, including returning the post of opposition leader to the DAP, PAS retained control of Kelantan with a narrow

margin and lost control of Terengganu to the BN. PAS expected some decline from its peak performance in 1999, but was shocked by the size of its loss. It accused

the Election Commission of siding with the BN and thus of being unfair in conducting the election. This alleged unfairness by the Commission in the conduct of the election is difficult to prove. What did happen, however, were technical mistakes in using computerized electoral rolls that inconvenienced a large number of voters and prevented some of them from voting. Also, errors in the printing of ballot papers led to the postponement of voting in a PAS-contested state constituency. Although these lapses in competence in conducting the election were unlikely to affect the outcome of any contest, the Election Commission was widely criticized, including by government leaders. Opposition leaders even called for the resignation of the Commission's chairman. An internal investigation was promised and conducted,

but despite initial assurances the report was not made public.

To sum up, the 2004 election restored normalcy in Malaysian politics, that is, a dominant BN led by UMNO enjoying majority Malay support. The 2004 election also showed continuity in the rules and practices of electoral competition, many of which were regarded as unfair by the opposition. Public confidence in the Election Commission was further eroded. The 2003 re-delimitation accentuated longstanding doubts – now clearly voiced also by Malay opposition parties – about the Election Commission's impartiality, while shortcomings in the conduct of the 2004 election raised serious concerns about its competence as well.

Strengthening Democracy

Finally, what about democracy in Malaysia? Avoiding a detailed discussion of the term 'democracy', I shall simply accept the common characterization of Malaysia as a partial democracy – other terms used are 'limited', 'quasi-', and 'semi-democracy' (Zakaria, 1989; Case, 1993) – so as to briefly address the question of why democracy is only partial in Malaysia, how it can be made more complete, and the supposed obstacles to doing so.

Malaysia has regular elections and a wide franchise. Elections have been regularly held every four or five years (the maximum formal interval) and the 2004 election is Malaysia's eleventh since independence in 1957. All citizens of 21 years of age can register themselves as voters. Neither registration nor actual voting is compulsory, but participation in voting is relatively high. The Chairman of the Election Commission recently estimated that about 2.5 million or almost a fifth of eligible persons, presumably mostly the newly eligible young,

had not registered, and announced that a proposal would be submitted to the government to provide for automatic registration of those who have become eligible – in effect, to do away with the registration requirement (*New Straits Times*, 1 February 2005). Of the registered electors, over 70 per cent generally turned out to vote: the figure for 1999 and 2004 was 71.1 per cent and 72.9 per cent respectively. Where Malaysian democracy mainly falls short is in the rules and practices – or the restrictions and inequalities – in electoral contestation.

The absence of a viable alternative to the BN detracts importantly from the commonly held ideal and limits contestation in Malaysia. However, I wonder whether this should be the main reason or justification for calling Malaysia a partial democracy. The reason is that there is not much that can be done about it. Malaysia is an ethnically divided society with political contestation primarily among ethnic groups.

As Horowitz (1985: 410) points out: 'In an environment of ethnic conflict, there is room for only one multi-ethnic party or alliance. After one such party establishes itself, all the electoral opportunities are located on the ethnic flanks'. The opportunities on the flanks are inevitably limited compared to those at the centre. In other words, it is difficult for a centrist multi-ethnic coalition, once established, not to overshadow the ethnic parties on the flanks.

Something can also be said for a centrist multi-ethnic coalition in the Malaysian context: it is good for managing ethnic conflict. In fact, in Malaysia's ethnically divided society, it is difficult to think of something better and more practical for managing ethnic conflict than the BN coalition of more moderate ethnic parties.

A further point can be made. The BN is not completely free of competition or of the need to respond to societal preferences. Although relieved of much pressure by its invulnerability to defeat, the BN still has to be sufficiently responsive to contain the opposition from both flanks (Crouch, 1996) and safeguard its two-thirds parliamentary majority. The government has to respond enough not only to diverse ethnic interests, but also to pan-ethnic concerns, such as economic growth and corruption. It is noteworthy that under the present system of party competition voters can register both their ethnic and pan-ethnic concerns by decamping to an opposition party of their own ethnic group. Malay voters can express unhappiness with, say, corruption by crossing from BN/UMNO to PAS and not DAP (as probably occurred in 1999), while Chinese voters can do the same by crossing from BN/MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) to DAP and not PAS. Malaysians, including those from the middle class, still seem loath to cross the ethnic line in voting, but they do not have to in order to indicate their pan-

ethnic concerns. In short, under the present system of limited competition, the government remains significantly responsive to ethnic as well as pan-ethnic concerns.

What makes Malaysia a partial democracy, then, is primarily the limits to fair contestation that have been resorted to by the BN for its own electoral advantage. It may be recalled that these consist mainly of inequities in the competition for voter support and in the apportionment and delimitation of electoral constituencies that affect the translation of votes into seats won by various political parties. In other words, it is not the vastly different strengths of the players but shortfalls in a fair electoral process – or the absence of a level playing field – that should be seen as the main factor limiting democracy in Malaysia. And something can clearly be done about this. For the most part, what can be done is rather obvious, that is, the reduction of inequities in campaigning and constituency delimitation (see Lim, 2004, for more discussion). The more interesting question, therefore, concerns the effects of enhancing fairness in electoral contestation, including those effects that are regarded as obstacles to such an effort.

The strong argument in favour of enhancing fairness is its effects on government legitimacy and performance. Enhancing fairness would enhance government legitimacy by checking the erosion in public and opposition confidence in the electoral process and the impartiality of the Election Commission. It would reduce – but not eliminate – the BN dominance or the pronounced imbalance between the BN and the opposition, and thus enhance government responsiveness. The government's anti-corruption drive provides an important illustration. The launching of this drive shows the government's responsiveness to popular concerns and it contributes importantly to

the performance of the BN in the 2004 election. However, the thumping victory seems to have lessened the felt need and urgency for serious follow-up. Since the election, there has been growing concern that the anti-corruption drive has slowed down and possibly even been derailed. This concern has been exacerbated by the seemingly mixed support for reform indicated in the September 2004 party election in UMNO. It is not far-fetched to believe that fairer competition – and hence a less impressive BN victory or slower UMNO recovery – would have kept up the pressure for fighting corruption.

With over 90 per cent of parliamentary seats, the BN is now in a highly dominant position. Fairer elections would moderate this dominance. But BN leaders evidently do not want their dominant position diminished. This is the main obstacle to electoral reform. Two other factors are also commonly presented as obstacles: the need to secure Malay political control and the need to maintain order in the conflict-prone plural society (Zakaria, 1989). However, on closer examination, these obstacles are more imaginary than real.

Malay political control, it is argued, is necessary for sustaining democracy and order alike in Malaysia. Without disputing this, it can be pointed out that a fairer electoral process would not threaten Malay political control. The Malay population has increased and is increasing at a faster rate than the non-Malay population. The proportion of Malays (already an absolute majority, as noted earlier) and other *bumiputra* in the population and electorate is projected to continue to increase relative to Chinese and Indians. This clear demographic trend, plus the first-past-the-post electoral system, even without the present inequities, would clearly suffice to ensure Malay political control. Political control by Malays and other *bumiputra* combined is even more secure.

A strong government as well as restrictions on political freedoms, it is further argued, are needed to maintain political order or ethnic peace. Again, this need not be disputed and can be responded to in essentially the same way. While the stated imperative may justify some existing curbs on political freedoms and activity, it clearly does not require or justify perpetuating most present inequities in electoral campaigning (including the use of government resources, unequal media access and treatment, and poor enforcement of laws governing election expenses) and in constituency de-limitation (high levels of malapportionment and likely gerrymandering as well). Clearly, these electoral inequities serve – and are intended to serve – the interests of the ruling party rather than the interests of political stability or ethnic peace.

There can be little doubt that the main obstacle to enhancing fairness in electoral competition lies in the interests of the BN leaders in not having their dominant position diminished. Like ethnic politicians elsewhere, they have not been above exploiting the other two abovementioned factors when it serves their own interests. Perhaps ruling politicians cannot be realistically expected to voluntarily give up their advantages or completely refrain from using their power to secure power and to increase it further.

On the other hand, a fairer electoral process in the Malaysian political context would only reduce – not eliminate – BN dominance. Almost certainly, if past voting trends were to continue (as is likely), it would not even come close to jeopardizing what may be presumed to be their vital interest, namely continued victory in elections. This suggests that BN ruling politicians may accede to a fairer electoral process if it is the price they have to pay for legitimate power, or, in other words, if there is widespread demand for fair

elections. Perhaps it is the paucity of such demand in the larger Malaysian society that warrants pessimism, or at least calls for

deep patience on the part of those hoping for the strengthening of democracy in Malaysia.

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Institutional Continuity and the 2004 Philippine Elections

Julio C. Teehankee*

The 2004 synchronized national and local elections in the Philippines serve to highlight institutional continuity in the Philippines. It was the third presidential election, the sixth congressional and local elections, and the third party-list representative election since the restoration of formal democracy in 1986. However, flawed administration of the electoral

process, wanton use of government resources for partisan political purposes and allegations of fraud and massive cheating have diminished the political exercise as a credible legitimating mechanism. The 2004 elections, therefore, reflect the continuing challenges of redemocratization in the Philippines.

Philippine Electoral Experience

The Philippines takes pride in having the most extensive experience in electoral politics in the Southeast Asian region. Elections have been conducted at the national and local level since the Americans introduced them in the 1900s. However, the uneven social and economic development in Philippine society has engendered an élitist and clientelistic democracy embedded in an underdeveloped economy. Ferdinand Marcos exploited the illiberal nature of Philippine electoral democracy in 1972 to declare martial law and establish authoritarian rule for 14 years. The groundswell of opposition to the Marcos dictatorship led to a crisis of legitimation that marked the beginning of the authoritarian regime. The ouster of Marcos by a people power uprising in 1986 ushered in a wave of democratization not only in the Philippines but also in the region.

The post-Marcos democratic transition has seen intermittent periods of political and economic stability amid domestic and regional instability. Despite the threat of military coups, the administration of President Corazon Aquino managed to survive and oversee the drafting of a new constitution and the peaceful transition of presidential powers to her successor Fidel Ramos. President Ramos embarked on an ambitious peace and development programme that provided a period of relative economic growth and political stability. Nonetheless, the 1997 Asian financial crisis decimated much of the economic gains of the Ramos administration.

The election of popular movie actor Joseph Estrada to the presidency in 1998 and his subsequent ouster in a second people power uprising in 2001 that resulted in

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Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo being installed as president clearly demonstrates the fragility of Philippine democracy. The failed attempt of disgruntled Estrada supporters, largely drawn from the poverty-stricken masses, to mount its own people power uprising against President Arroyo marked the re-emergence of a legitimization crisis that is reflective of the deep political and socio-economic divisions in the country. This crisis was exacerbated by a mutiny led by junior military officers in late 2003.

Within this context of contemporary political history, the 2004 election can be seen, not only as a referendum on the performance of the Arroyo administration, but also as a means of addressing the crisis of legitimization in the Philippines. However, the conduct and outcome of the May 2004 national and local elections in the Philippines tend to reinforce the fundamental paradoxes of democratic governance in the country. This paper delineates the fundamental problems and paradoxes of democratic governance in the Philippines as manifested in the 2004 elections.

Institutional Framework

The current political institutions in the Philippines were forged in the aftermath of the successful struggle against 14 years of authoritarian dictatorship under the Marcos regime. In 1987, the Philippines completed its democratic transition with the adoption of a new constitution that was overwhelmingly ratified by three-quarters of the Filipino electorate. With the re-establishment of a centralized presidential democracy anchored on a majoritarian electoral system, the 1987 constitution restored institutional continuity with the previous 1935 constitution that was drafted under American colonial rule. Being the embodiment of the 'supreme law of the land', the 1987 constitution serves not only as the pre-eminent legal and institutional framework, but also as a primary source of legitimization. Legitimacy is viewed here as the citizens' willingness to comply with a system of rule, regardless of how this is achieved (Heywood, 2000). Hence, the maintenance of legitimacy does not depend on constitutional edict alone. It should also be sustained by the acceptance of political institutions by individual and collective actors. Institutions are not independent from the economic, socio-cultural and international context in which they are embedded. Set within the

'embedding context' of an underdeveloped economy, personalistic and patriarchal culture, a weak state combined with an ethno-linguistically diverse nation and neo-colonialism, political institutions and processes such as elections are sure to be filled with contradictions and paradoxes.

Political institutions are essentially formal and often legal components of state machinery that employ explicit and usually enforceable rules and decision-making procedures. An institution is 'an enduring and stable set of arrangements that regulates individual and/or group behaviour on the basis of established rules and procedures' (Heywood, 2000: 93). Historical institutionalism asserts that institutions are historically embedded and are shaped by their formation and critical junctures in their development. The historical choices made by states create branching points from which historical development moves on to a new path that often results in unintended consequences. Once this new path is taken, it is difficult to change track (Burnham *et al.*, 2004). The institutional argument presented by 'path dependency' asserts that 'when a government program or organization

embarks upon a path there is inertial tendency for those initial policy choices to persist. That path may be altered, but it requires a good deal of political pressure to produce that change' (Peters, 1999: 63). The issues and problems encountered during the 2004 Philippine election stem

largely from the institutional and electoral designs that were initiated by the framers of the 1987 constitution, who were overly mindful of the excesses and abuses committed by the authoritarian dictatorship of the Marcos regime.

2004 Philippine Elections

Over 55,000 candidates competed for 17,729 national and local offices in the synchronized elections on 10 May 2004. Candidates of 33 parties, including the four major parties Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC), Liberal Party (LP) and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), and 66 party list groups contested the elections. There were five candidates for the presidency, namely incumbent president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, movie actor Fernando Poe Jr., former education secretary Raul Roco, Senator Panfilo Lacson, and religious leader Brother Eddie Villanueva. Two major coalitions dominated the national and local elections – the administration *Koalisyon ng Karanasan at Katapatan sa Kinabukasan* (Coalition of Experience and Fidelity for the Future, or K4) and the opposition *Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino* (Coalition of United Pilipinos, or KNP).

The administration's K4 coalition dominated the 2004 national and local elections against its major competitor – the opposition KNP coalition. The 2004 presidential campaign again served to highlight two fundamental variables in Philippine presidential elections: popularity

and machinery. The president's narrow victory was a result of the massive mobilization of money, party and government machinery, the support of regional bailiwicks and the delivery of the religious command votes. Using the advantage of incumbency, the president managed to narrow the lead of her popular opponent in the public opinion survey.

Despite the relatively inclusive, moderately open and competitive nature of the 2004 national and local elections, the correctness of the results was undermined by the conduct of the process. Three issues serve to place the conduct of the 2004 elections in doubt: inefficient electoral administration, allegations of fraud and cheating, and the outbreak of election-related violence. As the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), a key member of the international consortium of election observers, stated in its Final Report, '[t]he 2004 Philippine election was characterized by serious administrative shortcomings brought about by failed automation plans, fiscal restraints, and poor management by the Election Commission. It was also characterized by significant violence and allegations of wide scale fraud' (Erben *et al.*, 2004: 36).

Legitimation and the Democratic Consensus

Two successful and one failed people uprisings have underscored the fragility of political institutions, which threaten the

democratic consensus in the Philippines. The temptation to undertake an extra-constitutional mode of political change

remains an option for the political élite, civil and political organizations, the military and the masses. Since the restoration of the democratic order in 1986, the polity has been subjected to a series of punctuated challenges to its legitimacy. These challenges – insurgency, secessionism, terrorism and military adventurism – emanate from and are sustained by deeply rooted socio-economic, political and cultural conflicts that simply cannot be resolved within the existing institutional framework.

The stability of the democratic process lies in its capacity to ensure that varied interests of citizens are considered and, in cases of discrepancy, a reasonable resolution of differences is achieved. Such is the advantage of the democratic framework in which almost every agenda is consolidated through the process of participation, and a tolerated level of competition exists among stakeholders within an institutional apparatus. The rules and constraints provided by institutions shape human interaction and provide behavioural incentives, thus reducing uncertainty through the establishment of stable and predictable structures for interaction among individual and collective actors. Paradoxically, in a fully institutionalized democracy, ‘the competitive nature of political process is ideally [characterized] by a recurring uncertainty of outcomes, thus encouraging a “rule bounded” commitment amongst political actors to the democratic process itself’ (Reilly, 2004).

Unlike economic institutions (e.g. the market) that function optimally in an environment where there is certainty of outcomes, political institutions (e.g. elections) thrive on a recurring uncertainty of outcomes. For example, election outcomes are essentially unpredictable and impermanent, individual candidates and parties may ‘win’ or ‘lose’, but their victory

or defeat is temporary until the next election cycle. The structural uncertainty of a democratic electoral process is an essential prerequisite for the development and institutionalization of behavioural norms of cooperation. The challenge for political scientists and policy makers is how political uncertainty can be managed in deeply divided and conflict-ridden societies. The proper choice of electoral system is one institutional remedy to redirect the trajectory of political competition towards the centre and induce a moderating and cooperative influence on the general political dynamics. As Reilly (2004: 6) argues ‘certain electoral systems, under certain circumstances, will provide rational political actors with incentives towards cooperation, moderation and accommodation between themselves and their rivals, while others will lead logically to hostile, uncooperative and non-accommodative behavior if individuals act rationally’.

Among the paradoxes of Philippine democracy is that despite the widespread commitment and enthusiasm of the citizenry to vote and participate in the electoral process through civil society, political parties and election administration, there is also a ‘deeply-rooted mistrust that characterizes the relationships between and among virtually all participants in the process’ (Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening [CEPPS], 2004: 4). Seemingly, there is lack of faith in the system or the honest intent of the participants, which is manifested in intricate election safeguards and intense poll watching. The basic integrity and legitimacy of every elective position is held in doubt, and election administrators, parties, candidates and their followers are presumed guilty of actual or planned misconduct. This contributes to a rising public cynicism that threatens the democratic consensus.

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Summary of the International Conference on 'Elections in Asia – Is Democracy Making Progress?

Norbert von Hofmann*

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Department for Asia and the Pacific of FES Germany jointly organized an international conference on 19 and 20 October 2004 in Berlin, Germany, with the aim of evaluating the elections that had taken place in Asia in 2004 and discussing whether these elections are a sign of democratic progress. The conference was attended by about 50 participants from Afghanistan, Cambodia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Korea and Thailand.

Asia is a highly diverse region in every respect. The conference participants looked particularly at recent elections and the progress of democracy in Afghanistan, India and Sri Lanka in South Asia as well as at Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia in Southeast Asia and at South Korea. Other countries, like Cambodia, Singapore and Thailand were also touched upon from time to time.

All these countries have different cultures and histories, and therefore do not have much in common. However, their development over the last 50-60 years has shown a number of mutual characteristics such as the fight against colonial powers, experiences with dictatorships and military governments, the emergence of civil society and the struggle for more democracy.

In 2004, more than a billion people of Asia went to the polls and had the opportunity to choose their future leaders. Most of the electoral processes were conducted under fair and peaceful conditions without widespread allegations of vote tampering. However, such a statement is only true when looking at the region as a whole. When observing individual countries, there were a number of contradictions.

Democracy has undoubtedly made progress in South and Southeast Asia. But participants were not yet sure if it is sustainable. The final verdict is not out, as one said. Individual countries are showing improvements, but it is difficult to speak about a general breakthrough. Democracy is entrenched as a new norm, but reality has yet to catch up with aspirations. There are still many challenges, both internally (the influence of old and local élites, the military, terrorism, etc.) and externally (the impact of globalization, the influence of super powers and/or powerful neighbours, etc.).

During the discussions it became obvious that it is difficult to measure the level of democracy within a country. Several different indicators do exist, such as those from Freedom House, Bertelsmann, Gallup and UNDP. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that there are plenty of countries both in East and Southeast Asia with hardly any democracy at all, for example Bhutan, Brunei, Burma/

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Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, to name a few.

It was recalled that in the past, Asian leaders often saw so-called 'Asian values' as more appropriate than Western concepts of democracy. Fortunately, this discussion more or less came to an end with the Asian financial and economic crisis of 1997/98. But this does not mean that there are no specific values circulating anymore. As expected, such values were mentioned at the conference, for example, the preference for stability and unity, the demand for a strong ruling party and strong leadership, and the preference for economic development over and above democratic development. However, it remains arguable to what extent these values really are different from those of European people.

Most Asian speakers defined democracy as a libertarian democracy based on civil and political rights. But nobody denied the strong relationship between democracy and social, economic and cultural rights. 'Good governance' was also seen as a prerequisite for democracy, as were democratic structures at all levels of society. Often such structures are lacking and people's participation is limited to certain levels. In this context, the interrelationship of democracy and decentralization was also talked about briefly.

The link between democratic and economic development was frequently mentioned and the question of whether democratic countries are more prosperous than authoritarian regimes was raised. 'Does economic development promote independent thinking of people and consequently promote democracy?'

Peaceful and fair elections are certainly not enough to make a country democratic. But going to the ballot box is a decisive part of democracy. Elections play an important role in nation building as

everybody has one equally counted vote, regardless of sex, cast, tribe, minority, etc.

Looking at recent elections in Asia, it was observed that most were peaceful and more or less fair. Voters seemed generally better informed than on previous occasions. However, in several countries, elections clearly showed up divisions within society. As one participant observed, 'Elections are often just a more peaceful continuation of civil war'. India was seen as a positive example, with regular free and fair elections since independence. But even there, the playing field was noted as being not sufficiently level.

A level playing field is a precondition for free and fair elections and is apparently missing in most countries discussed. The reasons given were:

- Dominant political parties are setting the election rules;
- Election systems are unfair (in this context the advantages and disadvantages of proportional or majority votes were discussed);
- The National Election Committees and the Supreme Courts are biased.

Another precondition for free and fair elections is the political environment in which elections are held. Fair elections alone are certainly not sufficient to remove a dominant party from power. Pressure from within society is also necessary.

Most participants agreed that bad elections are still better than no elections at all. Even bad elections are forcing ruling parties or élites to expose their programmes and list their achievements, giving people at least a chance to think and talk about issues.

It is important to keep the democratic momentum after elections. The democratic spirit embraced by people during elections has to be maintained by all actors involved.

With regard to different actors in election processes, the issue of political leadership in Asia and its impact on democracy was raised: 'Does Asia have or does it need a new breed of leaders?' In many cases, old élites and dynasties are still in charge, despite progress in democratization. Women still only play a minor role in Asian politics despite the fact that there are a few prominent women leaders. Often women are just proxies for husbands, fathers or brothers. The question of whether women have a specific role, or whether they can play a specific role in promoting democracy was unfortunately not sufficiently discussed.

Many political parties lack inner-party democracy and therefore make no room for new leaders. Nevertheless, political parties are by no means out of fashion, as only political parties can be carriers for long-term visions, objectives and programmes. Social movements, civil society groups and non-governmental organizations play an important role in elections and in promoting democracy. However, they cannot replace political parties.

The rise of civil society in Asia has led to greater accountability of political parties. As seen from the Philippine experience, 'people power' cannot be instrumentalized, which again works in favour of political parties. Furthermore 'people power' can have a positive as well as a negative impact on democracy, as there are several examples where 'people power' has supported populism in Asia.

A positive development is the number of social movements in Asia that are trying to bring change into the political environment with the prospect of shaping a new quality of political parties.

Some Asian participants asked whether strong opposition parties are to some extent a more Western concept? The demand for

consensus between government and the opposition seems much stronger in Asia in comparison to Europe. For Asians, opposition parties have to find a balance between being a watchdog on the one hand and assisting the government in nation building on the other. Such a balance (middle path) is also necessary between central, regional and local governments, as well as between president/prime minister and parliament. Opposition parties in Asia are often purely protest parties without programmes and realistic alternatives to incumbent governments.

In relation to the developments in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, the role of external actors such the United Nations in democratization was talked about, especially with regard to the problems arising from the risk that these external actors could leave a country before democracy became sustainable.

The media is another important actor in promoting democracy. All participants agreed that the media plays an important role in the democratic process and in elections. Democracy needs participation and therefore needs a free and independent media. The great diversity in East and Southeast Asia also applies to the media within the region. This ranges from India, with its more or less 100 per cent free press, to Sri Lanka with its considerable limitations, to the state-controlled media of Bhutan, or from the Philippines, which Freedom House considers to have the freest press in Southeast Asia, to Singapore, which has certain restrictions, to Myanmar which has no press worth mentioning at all.

However, the problems the media faces in Asia are quite comparable:

- Governmental restrictions (dozens of different laws and acts apply);
- unfair licensing (yearly renewal, etc.);

- self-censorship;
- concentration of ownership (government or private); and
- as the media becomes more and more technically sophisticated, there is the risk of creating a 'knowledge élite', which leaves large parts of society outside.

Finally, the media practitioners in the conference reminded the audience that the media is just a tool. One cannot download democracy from a web-site. The prerequisite for using this tool for the promotion of democracy is the political motivation of the user.


Women to Power in Asia's Election Year 2004?

Andrea Fleschenberg*

When asked to give an introduction to the topic 'Asia has elected – a breakthrough for democracy?', and looking into recent election analyses and public reports, something struck me: if we talk about elections, we quite often automatically think about democracies as both seem linked to each other. We demand that elections are free, fair, equal and general, meaning inclusive and representative for the concerned electorate. But until the beginning of the twentieth century, the history of democracy and democratic elections was characterized rather by exclusiveness in active and passive voting rights – only a small circle of citizens could vote or be elected for office. This was even more true for women, as the majority of them only received voting rights after the Second World War or in the wake of decolonization.

In 2004, elections for local or national parliaments as well as for heads of state or governments were held in nine Asian countries – Afghanistan, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Korea and Taiwan. In early 2005, parliamentary elections took place in Thailand and elections are scheduled for mid-September 2005 in Afghanistan. The election year 2004 was characterized by a surprising trend: the dominance of top female politicians on their way to power as opposition leaders, or, as acting prime ministers or presidents on their way to a second term in office. But this is not a new phenomenon: the world's first female prime minister, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, came to power in Sri Lanka in 1960, followed in 1966 by Indira Gandhi in India, one of the largest Asian countries. From the late 1980s onwards the trend of frequent

Figure 1: Women Presidents and Prime Ministers by Region (1945–2003)



Source: Author's own graphic, based on sources found at www.ipu.org, www.guide2womenleaders.com (accessed as of 1 January 2004).

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female political leadership in Asia has increased. So let us take a closer look at recent election results and prospects for Asia's election super year 2004 with regard to female political representation and participation.

It is striking how many governments or opposition movements in Northeast, Southeast and South Asia have been or are led by women: they were and are party president, opposition leader, minister or head of government. However, the political and socio-cultural context tells a different story, which makes the phenomenon of female political leadership in Asia even more remarkable in European eyes:

- Asian women have leading roles in the struggle against dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, and they have also taken part in competitive elections. Democratization processes were and are to this day led by women in Bangladesh, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and the Philippines.
- There are huge differences in nation states in terms of economic development, culture (religion) and political systems, with most cases of female political leadership occurring in developing countries. We find female leaders in predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, Christian as well as Confucianism or Islamic countries.
- Societies in the region are considered patriarchal and paternalistic. Gender relations – as a component of general social and political change – seem to take place only at the margins.
- None of the respective national governments can claim to have a particularly women-friendly political record.
- The proportion of women in other political institutions and organizations, such as parliaments or parties, is comparatively low.
- The gender-related development index (GDI) ranges between 0.4 and 0.725 (Industrialized Countries: 0.9) and the gender empowerment measure (GEM) ranges even lower, between 0.25 and 0.4 (Europe/OSCE: 0.65).
- Every Islamic country in the region except Brunei has produced a female leader. Even in post-Taliban Afghanistan women are reconquering the political space. Although data on the Afghan presidential election has to be read very carefully due to multiple and fraudulent registration, roughly one third of the 10.5 million registered voters are women. One reason might be the importance given to the election in the Afghan population as well as the fact that elections were held in a gender-segregated way, with different election rooms for women and men. But what is even more important is that among the 18 candidates, Massuda Jalal, a former doctor of Tajik origin, is Afghanistan's first ever female presidential candidate. One might think she serves as a kind of fig leaf for the democratic claim of election organizers, but Massuda Jalal is not a nobody and we have to consider the symbolic input of her candidacy and election campaign. In June 2002, she ran for the presidency of the Loja Dschirga (Afghan Assembly) and came second after Karzai, whom she criticizes for giving posts to warlords and being a United States proxy, thus damaging the public reputation of democracy. In an interview she referred to her election claim: 'I don't have blood on my hands, I haven't destroyed any cities. If the process were democratic and free from interference of warlords and their money, I could say that I would triumph in the election' (www.atimes.com). This is remarkable in light of the threats candidates and voters face and will face in the 2005 parliamentary elections, as well as the

poor record of Arabic Islamic regimes in terms of female political representation and participation.

The most well known (living) top female political leaders in Asia are:

- Sheikh Hasina Wajed and Begum Khaleda Zia in Bangladesh;
- Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma;
- Sonia Gandhi in India (Indira);
- Megawati Sukarnoputri in Indonesia;
- Wan Azizah Wan Ismail in Malaysia;
- Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan;
- Corazon C. Aquino and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the Philippines;
- Chandrika Kumaratunga in Sri Lanka (Sirimavo).

All have gained their current position as presidents, ministers or opposition leaders because of their descent from influential families. They are all daughters or widows of former government or opposition leaders, and in the case of Sri Lanka, the second female leader in line. Therefore, what they have in common is a dynastic descent and the fact that they have all gained their political position in a hereditary-like manner.

Currently, three women are leading their respective countries and between them govern about half a billion people in South and Southeast Asia alone: Khaleda Zia in Bangladesh, the recently re-elected president of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and Chandrika Kumaratunga in Sri Lanka. After the surprising landslide victory of the Indian National Congress Party in the parliamentary elections of May 2004, Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born widow of Indira Gandhi's son Rajiv, was close to becoming the prime minister of the biggest democracy in the world. But, in response to threats, boycotts and xenophobic accusations from the Hindu-fundamentalist opposition regarding her foreign origin and dynastic

background, she refused to take office. This refusal brought her a second victory, a moral one, which boosted her reputation among the so-called 'small people' who constitute the decisive electorate and who often perceive politicians as power-hungry and corrupt. Only few months later, she is considered one of India's kingmakers. But top female politicians in Asia are also to be found on the forefront of political opposition in several countries:

- Aung San Suu Kyi, winner of the Burmese elections in 1990, who is the overall accepted leader of the democracy movement despite her continuous house arrest;
- Wan Azizah Wan Ismail in Malaysia, who fought for the liberation of her formerly jailed husband Anwar Ibrahim and who has been head of the opposition movement Barisan Alternatif since the late 1990s. She was re-elected to parliament in March 2004;
- Benazir Bhutto, twice prime minister of Pakistan and head of the Pakistan People's Party, which won the elections in October 2002 despite Benazir Bhutto's self-imposed exile and her disqualification as a parliamentary candidate by the Musharraf regime;
- Sheikh Hasina Wajed, who has been fighting for more than 15 years with her fierce rival, Khaleda Zia, the current prime minister of Bangladesh, over the country's top office. The struggle between the opposing parties has been fierce and violent, ranging from verbal abuse to a recent assassination attempt against Sheikh Hasina.
- Park Geun-hye, party leader of the Grand National Party (GNP) and daughter of the former South Korean dictator Park Chung-hee.

All these women have in common their democratic legitimization, as each of them has been confirmed in her formal or informal position by elections, which is

Table 1: Female Political Representation in Asian Countries with Elections in 2004/2005

Country	Parliament				Senate			
	Year	Seats	Women	%/ ♀	Year	Seats	Women	%/ ♀
Afghanistan	6/2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hong Kong/China	9/2004	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
India	4/2004	541	45	8.3	11/2002	242	25	10.3
Indonesia	4/2004	550	61	11.1	-	-	-	-
Malaysia	3/2004	219	20	9.1	2003	70	18	25.7
Philippines	5/2004	220	36	16.4	5/2001	24	3	12.5
South Korea	4/2004	239	39	13.0	-	-	-	-
Sri Lanka	4/2004	225	11	4.9	-	-	-	-
Taiwan (in 2004)	2001	217	48	22.1	-	-	-	-
Thailand	1/2001	500	46	9.2	3/2000	200	21	10.5

Note: %/ ♀ = percentage of women.

Source: own graphic, sources: www.ipu.org as of 1 October 2004.

quite an outstanding achievement in this region. But there remains a huge gap between top female political leadership and general female political participation in the political spheres and the level of empowerment of the respective countries. Across the region, women constitute only 15.5 per cent of members of parliament and senate, compared to 18 per cent in Europe and America and 39.7 per cent in Scandinavia, and actually less than half of what is demanded by the United Nations criteria of a critical mass of 33 per cent female representation in legislative bodies.

This trend is echoed in the field of political participation: there is a huge discrepancy between Asia's successful top female politicians and a marginalized majority of politically active women. With the exception of Japan in 1993, no Asian national parliament has ever been presided over by a woman. In national governments, women only constitute a small minority of cabinet members or ministers: 5.9 per cent in Indonesia, 6.5 per cent in South Korea and 5.7 per cent in Taiwan. Higher numbers can only be found in India with 10.1 per cent and Malaysia with 10 per cent (in 2003).

This gender-specific dichotomy does not change when it comes to female political participation in the party systems of the respective countries. Although there are prominent female politicians leading parties – in Bangladesh (Sheikh Hasina of Awami League, Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh National Party), Burma (Aung San Suu Kyi of NLD), India (Sonia Gandhi of National Congress Party, Jayalalitha of ALADMK, Lakshmi Parvathi of Telugu Desam Party, Mayawati of Bahujan Samaj Party and Mamta Banerjee of All India Trinamool Congress), Indonesia (Megawati's PDI-P), Malaysia (Wan Azizah Wan Ismail's Keadilan), Pakistan (Benazir Bhutto and Ghinwa Bhutto), Sri Lanka (Chandrika's SLFP and Sirimani Athulathmudali of DNULF, in 2000) and South Korea (Park Geun-Hye's GNP) – female party members hardly have any say when it comes to influencing party policies, raising agenda issues autonomously or participating in the top-level decision-making process. Bangladesh is exemplary for the region: only 5.1 per cent of executive council posts are held by women. In the 1990s, in various elections across the region, women constituted an average of 6.53 per cent of

candidates in India, 3.9 per cent in Sri Lanka, 1.69 per cent in Bangladesh and 1.71 per cent in Pakistan (changed with the introduction of a quota system in 2002 elections). From this it can be concluded that top female political leadership and decision making does not have a trickle-down effect from the upper party and government level down to the lower levels of political life and decision making. Female politicians themselves are partly to blame for this. Several came to power with the support of women's organizations and lobby groups (Corazon Aquino, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benazir Bhutto), but failed or refused to actively follow or support a pro-women agenda with adequate positive measures such as quota systems on party lists or reserved seats.

How top did female politicians perform in the recently held elections throughout Asia? On a world-wide scale, the frequency of top female candidates in elections remains surprising, especially in countries with a misogynistic socio-political context such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, which both have a strong quota system on different legislative levels, but where women still find it very difficult to exercise their active and passive voting rights.

An analysis of female performance in the recent Asian elections, paints a mixed picture. On the one hand there are definitely winners, but on the other hand there are losers. And even some winners are not convincing with regard to their democratic credibility and political performance, especially considering the general systemic underrepresentation of women in the politically relevant decision-making processes of legislative and executive bodies as well as in intermediary organizations.

In India, Sonia Gandhi is a positive winner, having led the Indian National Congress Party to unexpected victory (United Progressive Alliance: 220 seats; BJP

National Democratic Alliance: 185 seats) after nearly a decade of political sidelining. With the support of her children Rahul and Priyanka on the election trail, the lasting symbolic strength of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty was once again proven. Priyanka in particular is viewed as an up-and-coming political star, in part due to her resemblance to Indira Gandhi. Sonia Gandhi's victory is mainly due to her strong campaigning in the Indian countryside, away from the modern middle classes and globalization winners. Despite the opposition's attacks on her foreign origin and threats, which eventually led to her refusal to become the next prime minister despite the support of her party and sympathisers, she convinced the electorate and remains a member of parliament and head of party – an influential kingmaker on India's political scene. One example is the posting of her chosen candidate, Manmohan Singh, a former finance minister, as the first prime minister of Sikh origin. This was a highly symbolic act as it was Sikhs who killed her mother-in-law Indira. Singh himself describes Sonia as an important figure and a unifying factor within the Congress.

A less positive picture emerges in Indonesia, where Megawati has come under heavy criticism for her poor presidential performance, especially with regard to issues of democratization and economic recovery, and for the endemic corruption under her administration. This is clearly mirrored in the election results of April 2004: Megawati's PDI-P lost up to one third of the votes and seats it had achieved in the 1999 elections, putting the party in second place after Golkar, the party of the former dictator Suharto. In the first round of the presidential elections on 5 July she was ahead of General Wiranto of Golkar, but came second to her mainly military competitor, former General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to whom she also lost the second round with 39 per cent to 61 per cent.

In Malaysia, the rather poor performance of Wan Azizah Wan Ismail's opposition party, Barisan Alternatif, has to be seen in a different light. The ruling UMNO party of Prime Minister Badawi, the successor of long-time Prime Minister Mahathir, was in a position to design the election process entirely to its own advantage – from announcing the election date with very short notice, which only left a little more than a week of election campaigning, to controlling the public media. This disadvantageous competition environment, the split of the opposition coalition and the negative perception of the remaining coalition partner, the Islamic party, have to be seen as decisive factors for the significant vote losses suffered by Barisan Alternatif (from 45 seats, 43.5 per cent, in 1999 to 21 seats, 33.6 per cent in 2004). Wan Azizah's Keadilan party was especially severely hit as it could only secure a quarter of its mandates: one out of five former seats, which was won by Wan Azizah herself in the former election district of her then still jailed husband, Anwar Ibrahim.

The third female opposition leader in Asia's election year, South Korea's Park Geun-hye, who is the first female party leader in 30 years, lacks a positive election record, too: her conservative Grand National Party lost 12 per cent of its seats (winning only 121 out of 137 seats), while President Roh's Uri party tripled its seats from 49 to 152. The main reasons behind this were the electorate's negative perception of the impeachment procedures that had taken place against the progressive President Roh, as well as rampant party corruption and lack of reform on the part of the opposition Grand National Party – challenges which Park Geun-hye will have to take on as the major tasks of her party leadership.

Sometimes a victory can be bittersweet, as in the case of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's recent re-election as president of the

Philippines with an increase of one million votes (as was the case in 1992 for Fidel Ramos). In the 2004 elections Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo won 12.9 million votes, former film star Ferdinand Poe 11.78 million votes, Arroyo's vice-presidential candidate de Castro 15.1 million votes and Poe's candidate Legarda 14.21 million votes (both candidates got nearly 2.5 million votes more than their running mates). Due to fraud allegations from the opposing Ferdinand Poe right up to Arroyo's swearing-in ceremony, the election results remained a hot potato until their final congressional confirmation on the night of 24 June and even beyond. During the election campaign up to 200 people were killed and numerous election irregularities were reported, apart from the fact that various groups challenged Arroyo's second run for office as unconstitutional as a Filipino president is only allowed one term in office.

In Sri Lanka, the ruling president, Chandrika Kumaratunga (SLFP), daughter of the world's first female prime minister, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, won a decisive power struggle over her prime minister, Ranil Wickramasinghe of the opposing UNP, regarding issues of a possible peace deal with the Tamil Tigers. After dismissing the majority of Wickramasinghe's cabinet, Chandrika Kumaratunga called for early elections on 2 April 2004. These were conducted freely and fairly, and were won by Chandrika's SLFP, who was the front campaigner for her party. Winning over 105 out of 225 seats, she was able to appoint as prime minister her own favourite, Mahinda Rajapakse, and consolidate her power base.

What conclusions can be drawn so far from female political participation in Asia's super election year 2004/2005?

1. The majority of top female politicians performed rather well and could defend

their offices or power basis, as was the case of Chandrika Kumaratunga, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Sonia Gandhi. But there has been no trickle-down effect from the upper levels of governance to legislative bodies.

2. Opposition politicians, Wan Azizah of Malaysia and Park Geun-hye of South Korea, had to face decisive losses in

votes and seats for different reasons.

3. For the upcoming elections in 2004-2005, there is unlikely to be a significant change in the political underrepresentation and marginalized political participation of women, despite newly introduced quota systems as is the case of Afghanistan.

Programme and List of Participants for the Conference on 'Elections in Asia – Is Democracy Making Progress'

Programme

Tuesday 19 October 2003

- 9:30 *Welcome address and opening of the conference*
Dr Roland Schmidt, Secretary General, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
- Introduction and orientation*
Dr Beate Bartoldus, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Head, Department for Asia and the Pacific
- 9:45 *Elections and Democracy in Asia: Beyond the Ballot Box and Towards Governance*
- Presentation of background paper for Southeast Asia*
Professor Simon Tay, Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore
- Presentation of background paper for South Asia*
Victor Ivan, Editor, *Raviya*, Sri Lanka
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- 11:10 *Interventions*
Mr Alok Mehta, Editor, *Outlook Saptabik Magazine*, New Delhi, India
- Malaiz Daud, Managing Director, Afghan Development Association, Activist of Afghan Youth Foundation for Unity, Afghanistan
- Professor Laksiri Fernando, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Sri Lanka
- Clemens Jürgenmeyer, Senior Researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute for Sociocultural Research, Germany
- Discussion*
Chair: Erwin Schweishelm, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Department for Asia and the Pacific
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14:00

Interventions

Dr Kang Won-Taek, Department of Political Science, Soongsil University, South-Korea

Dr Julio Teehankee, Department of Political Sciences, De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines

Dr Daniel Theodore Sparringa, Lecturer, Department of Sociology Airlangga University, Indonesia

Professor Lim Hong Hai, Associate Professor at the School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia

André Borgerhoff MA, Institute for Political Sciences, University of Munster, Germany

Discussion

15:45

General discussion

A Political Miracle in Asia: Marching Towards Freedom and Democratic Maturity?

Chair: Dr Claudia Derichs, University of Duisburg, Germany

19:00

Public panel discussion

A Festival of Democracy? Elections in South Korea, Indonesia and Afghanistan – Political Results Beyond the Ballot Boxes

Opening

Gernot Erler, Member of Parliament, Vice-chairman of the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag

Dr Kang Won-Taek, Department of Political Science, Soongsil University, South Korea

Malaiz Daud, Managing Director, Afghan Development Association, Activist of Afghan Youth Foundation for Unity, Afghanistan

Dr Daniel Theodore Sparringa, Lecturer, Department of Sociology Airlangga University, Indonesia

Erhard Haubold, Journalist, Germany

Chair: Sabine Muscat, Asia Editor, *Financial Times Deutschland*

Wednesday 20 October

9:00 *Democratic Elections and Political Transformation in Asia – The Role of the Media*

Presentation of background paper South Asia

Dr Rajeshwar Dyal, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, India Office, India

Presentation of background paper South-East Asia

Dr Indrajit Banerjee, Secretary-General, Asian Media Information and Communication Centre (AMIC), Singapore

Interventions

Victor Ivan, Editor, *Raviya*, Sri Lanka

S. Leo Batubara, Member of the Press Council, Indonesia

Chair: Axel Schmidt, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Department for Asia and the Pacific

11:00 *Interventions*

Steven Gan, Editor-in-Chief, *MalaysiaKini*, Malaysia

Dr Lee Eun-Jeung, Associated Professor at the Institute for Political Science, University Halle-Wittenberg, Germany

Vinia Datinguino, Head of Research of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), Philippines

Supinya Klangnarong, Free Media Campaigner, Thailand

General discussion

Chair: Dr Paul Pasch, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Department for Asia and the Pacific

12:15 *Political summary of conference*

Norbert von Hofmann, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Director, Office for Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, Singapore

12:45 *Closing of conference*

Dr Beate Bartoldus, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Head, Department for Asia and the Pacific

Responsible for the Programme:

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List of Participants

	Name	Institution
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2.	Bartoldus, Beate, Dr	Head, Department for Asia and the Pacific, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Germany
3.	Bartsch, Melanie	University Duisburg-Essen, Germany
4.	Batubara, S. Leo	Member of the Press Council, Indonesia
5.	Bersick, Sebastian, Dr	Free University Berlin, Germany
6.	Borgerhoff, André	Institute for Political Sciences, University of Münster, Germany
7.	Datinguino, Vinia	Head of Research, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), Philippines
8.	Daud, Malaiz	Managing Director, Afghan Development Association, Activist of Afghan Youth Foundation for Unity, Afghanistan
9.	Derichs, Claudia	Lecturer, University of Duisburg, Germany
10.	Dettmann, Heike	Federal Foreign Office, Department South Asia, Germany
11.	Dyal, Rajeshwar	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, India Office, India
12.	Enste, Gregor	Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Germany
13.	Erlar, Gernot	Member of Parliament, Vice-chairman of the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag, Germany
14.	Ernstberger, Petra	Member of Parliament, Deputy Chairwoman of the ASEAN Parliamentary Group, Germany
15.	Essbach, Michael	University of Heidelberg, Germany
16.	Fernando, Laksiri, Prof.	Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Sri Lanka
17.	Fleschenberg, Andrea, Dr	Lecturer, University Duisburg-Essen, Germany
18.	Flor, Alex	Watch Indonesia!, Germany
19.	Fritsche, Klaus, Dr	German Asian Foundation, Germany
20.	Gan, Steven	Editor-in-Chief, <i>MalaysiaKini</i> , Malaysia
21.	Gerke, Solvay, Prof.	Head, Department of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Bonn, Germany
22.	Hansen, Sven	Journalist, <i>Die Tageszeitung (taz)</i> , Germany
23.	Hartmann, Hauke, Dr	Bertelsmann Foundation, Germany
24.	Haubold, Erhard	Journalist, Germany
25.	Ivan, Victor	Editor, <i>Raviya</i> , Sri Lanka
26.	Jaura, Ramesh	Chairman, Global Cooperation Council, Germany
27.	John, Marei	Desk Officer, Department for Asia and the Pacific, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Germany
28.	Jürgenmeyer, Clemens	Senior Researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute for Socio-Cultural Research, Germany
29.	Kang, Won-Taek, Dr	Department of Political Science, Soongsil University, South Korea

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| 30. | Klangnarong, Supinya | Free Media Campaigner, Thailand |
| 31. | Lee, Eun-Jeung, Dr | Associated Professor at the Institute for Political Science, University Halle-Wittenberg, Germany |
| 32. | Lim, Hong Hai, Prof. | Associate Professor, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Malaysia |
| 33. | Löffler, Hans-Günter | Federal Foreign Office, Department Southeast Asia, Germany |
| 34. | Luther, Hans-Ulrich | Free University, Berlin, Germany |
| 35. | Melzer, Ralf, Dr | Online Editor, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung |
| 36. | Mehta, Alok | Editor, <i>Outlook Saptabik Magazine</i> , New Delhi, India |
| 37. | Molt, Christiane | Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Germany |
| 38. | Mu, Sochua | Former MP and Minister of Women Affairs; Member of the Steering Committee of the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), Cambodia |
| 39. | Muscat, Sabine | Asia Editor, Financial Times Deutschland, Germany |
| 40. | Narith Ouan, Nina | Researcher, Munich Institute for Social Sciences |
| 41. | Neumann, Christian | Head, Department for Southeast Asia, Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany |
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| 45. | Pfaff-Czarnecka, Johanna, Prof. | Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, Germany |
| 46. | Pfennig, Werner, Dr | Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, FU Berlin, Germany |
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| 48. | Piotrowski, Ralph, Dr | Desk Officer, Department for Asia and the Pacific, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Germany |
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| 51. | Schlender, Friedemann, Dr | Deutsche Welle, Germany |
| 52. | Schlicher, Monika, Dr | Watch Indonesia!, Germany |
| 53. | Schmidt, Axel | Desk Officer, Department of Asia and the Pacific, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Germany |
| 54. | Schmidt, Roland, Dr | Head, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Germany |
| 55. | Schweisshelm, Erwin | Desk Officer, Department for Asia and the Pacific, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Germany |
| 56. | Seidel, Anne | Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Afghanistan Office |
| 57. | Son, Johanna | Asia-Pacific Director, IPS-Inter Press Service, Bangkok, Thailand |
| 58. | Sparringa, Daniel Theodore, Dr | Department of Sociology, Airlangga University, Indonesia |
| 59. | Stockmann, Petra, Dr | Watch Indonesia!, Germany |

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| 60. Tay, Simon, Professor | Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore |
| 61. Teehankee, Julio, Dr | Department of Political Sciences, De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines |
| 62. von Hofmann, Norbert | Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Office for Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, Singapore |
| 63. Will, Gerhard, Dr | Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Germany |
| 64. Wischermann, Jörg, Dr | Free University Berlin, Germany |
| 65. Woinoff, Konstantin | Social Democratic Party, Department for International Policy, Germany |