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Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been active in Southeast Asia for more than 30 years. Its country offices in Bangkok, Jakarta, Manila and Hanoi have been active in implementing national cooperation programmes in partnership with parliaments, civil society groups and non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and 'think-tanks', government departments, political parties, women's groups, trade unions, business associations and the media.

In 1995, the Singapore office was transformed into an Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Its role is to support, in close cooperation with the country offices in the region, ASEAN cooperation and integration, Asia-Europe dialogue and partnership, and country programmes in Cambodia and other ASEAN member states where there are no Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung offices.

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Editorial: Dialogue + Cooperation 2/2003

Dear Reader

The unilaterally commanded war against the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein in Iraq should not and cannot hide the fact that the big international problems of the twenty-first century can only be resolved through a multilateral approach. Whether it is in the area of free trade, climate protection or the fight against terrorism, multilateralism has not seen its final days. The United Nations has by no means become 'irrelevant'. The European Union has not seen its final days, nor has the ASEAN Regional Forum become unnecessary.

The Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace and the Singapore Office of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung jointly organized in the last eight months two international conferences in Phnom Penh dealing with Europe's cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): First, in November 2002, on 'ASEAN at 35: Where Is It going?' and then in late May 2003 on 'The ASEAN Regional Forum at Ten and Europe's Contribution'.

This edition of *Dialogue + Cooperation* includes a selection of papers contributed to these two conferences and deals with the ASEAN Regional Forum, of which the European Union is also a member.

Paul Lim's paper was presented at the November 2002 meeting, while the papers of Dr Eric Teo Chu Cheow, Professor Alfredo C. Robles, Mr Pham Cao Phong and Mr Wilson McColgan, as well as the introduction by myself and the summary by Dr Kao Kim Hourn were presented at the meeting in May 2003.

As a reference, the Joint Co-chairmen's Statement of 14th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting of January 2003 and the Chairman's Statement of the Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum of June 2003 are included. Both documents refer to the shared commitment of ASEAN and the EU towards peace and stability and the increasing importance of the ARF for dialogue and cooperation on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

The paper 'Asia after the Iraq War: Realpolitik Dominates' was first published in German in June 2003 by the Department for Asia and the Pacific of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Germany. The paper is the abstract of a series of analyses undertaken by eleven offices of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Asia (the individual analyses on the impact of the Iraq war on Asian countries can be found at www.fes.de/asia).

Finally, this edition of *Dialogue + Cooperation* includes a paper presented by Professor Bernd Martin, from the University of Freiburg in Germany, on Japan's way of dealing with its past. Professor Martin presented this paper at a small meeting which the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's office in Singapore organized jointly with the Institute for Defence and Security Studies (IDSS) of the Nanyang University of Singapore on 16th October 2002.

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Introduction

The ASEAN Regional Forum at Ten and Europe's Contribution

Norbert von Hofmann*

The German Federal Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, said, in a policy statement to the Federal Parliament on the 'international situation' in early April this year:

> The problems of the twenty-first century can only be solved through a multilateral approach. Whether it is in the area of free trade, climate protection or the fight against terrorism: multilateralism has not seen its final days. The United Nations has by no means become 'irrelevant'. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has by no means seen its final days as a common defence alliance and an alliance of mutual assistance.

and I add to this statement: 'Nor has the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) become unnecessary'.

The ARF reflects this world-wide demand for multilateralism in East Asia. It is a regional response to the uncertainty and potential for instability we all have had to live with since the end of the Cold War, since 11 September and since the last Iraq war.

The objective of the ARF at its inaugural meeting in Bangkok in July 1994 was to create a more predictable and stable pattern of relationships between major powers and Southeast Asia. In this conceptualization was the recognition that regional issues required the engagement of the great powers in regional affairs. The ARF introduced a new norm into the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) process of cooperative security that emphasized inclusiveness through the promotion of dialogue among like-minded as well as non-like-minded states.[1]

While security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region are commonly seen as being ensured through United States military supremacy and a United States-led system of alliances, more and more observers also recognize the value of multilateral security cooperation as a support, as a complement and eventually perhaps even as an alternative to the present security order. In this context, the ARF is generally considered the most important multilateral regional security institution in the Asia-Pacific region.[2]

In the context of regional institution building, the ARF is unique. It was not created in the aftermath of war, like several European institutions that developed in the wake of World War II or in the shadow of the Cold War. It is not a treaty or alliance

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1. Berry Desker, 'The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum', *PacNet*, 36, 7 September 2001.
2. Nikolas Busse and Hanns W. Maull, 'Enhancing Security in the Asia-Pacific. European Lessons for the Regional Forum', *International Politics and Society*, March 1999, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. See http://www.fes.de/ipg

confined to participants from the Asia-Pacific region: the European Union is a member.[3]

The German Federal Republic is not itself a member of the ARF, but it participates in the ARF indirectly as a member state of the European Union (EU). The EU is represented at ministerial meetings by the EU Presidency, the Commission of the Western European Union (WEU) Presidency and the Council Secretariat, and at all other levels by the Troika or the WEU Presidency and Secretariat. All the defence officials who have participated so far have been WEU representatives.

From a German point of view, the main risks to stability and security in this Asian region do not stem from interstate disputes. Nor is there any indication of intentions to build up nuclear arsenals, or of the danger of the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction. As a matter of fact, in the Bangkok Agreement of 1995 (which came into force in 1997), the ASEAN countries declared Southeast Asia to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

It is to be feared, however, that the build-up of conventional arms, which was observed even before the Asian financial crisis, may accelerate in some countries as their fiscal situation improves, without any specific parallel cooperative security structures having been established yet within the context of ASEAN.

Let me re-call: The ARF has devised three stages for dialogue on security policy:

1. Promotion of confidence-building measures (CBM)
2. Development of preventative diplomacy (PD)
3. Elaboration of mechanisms for conflict settlement

A variety of 'soft' confidence and security building measures (CSBM) have been implemented, but the second stage is still in a very early phase. Three papers, on concepts and principles for preventive diplomacy, on the enhanced role of the ARF Chair and on the Terms of Reference of the ARF Experts and Eminent Persons' Register, drafted by Singapore, Japan and Korea respectively, were agreed at the eighth ARF Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi in July 2001. (However, the paper on Preventive Diplomacy was only adopted as a 'snapshot of the current discussion'). The EU strongly supports all three papers including the development towards more emphasis on Preventive Diplomacy.

Again, from a German point of view, considerable risks in Southeast Asia stem from the many religiously and ethnically motivated tensions, independence (or separation) movements and internal social conflicts, as well as from flows of migrants and refugees, and from disputes over the use of resources.

In the interests of securing stability in the region, European states are making efforts on the basis of their experience to convince ASEAN countries of the need for regional confidence-building and collective conflict prevention, and also – as part of an extended security concept – of the need to jointly combat international cross-border problems, such as terrorist movements.

The universal threat posed by international terrorism, cross-border organized crime, illegal migration, piracy and the traffic in human beings is recognized by all the dialogue partners.[4]

3. Lee Seo-hang, 'Multilateralism in East Asia: The Role of the ARF and its Future', *Dialogue + Cooperation* 1/2002, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Singapore.
4. German Federal Foreign Office, 'Tasks of the German Foreign Policy – Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands at the Beginning of the 21st Century', Berlin, May 2002.

The ninth ARF Ministerial Meeting in Brunei in July 2002 decided upon the establishment of an 'Intersessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism', which is built on a concept paper drafted by the United States of America and Malaysia. The EU welcomed these recommendations.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has features that have similarities with indigenous political developments in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the ARF, where Asian-European exchanges might be of use. In the Asia-Pacific region, the ARF has developed its own approaches towards cooperative security. Japan and the Republic of Korea have been associated with the work of the OSCE for some time, and the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) Vision Group, among others, has recommended that the OSCE and the ARF seek institutionalized forms of exchange and cooperation.[5]

However, the short history of the ARF is, to some extent, one of rejecting European role models. From the very beginning, policy makers and academics in Southeast Asia have fiercely resisted any attempts at developing the ARF along the lines of OSCE, EU or NATO. Two arguments were usually put forward to justify this position.

First and most importantly, many Asians felt that the security environment of their region was quite different from the European one. Thus, it was argued that many countries in Southeast Asia were preoccupied with problems of internal stability and economic development because the volatile process of nation building had not yet been completed, while European states by and large had developed into strong, well-consolidated nation-states. While Europe is predominantly land-oriented, Asia Pacific is a maritime region, and while the European security system had been strongly bipolar during the time of the Cold War, geo-strategic patterns in Asia were more complex, with an overlaying strategic triangle formed by the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China, but stronger local and sub-regional influences than in Europe. Southeast Asia is also widely perceived as being qualitatively more heterogeneous, more diverse and more difficult to organize than Europe. Lastly, it was pointed out that Europe benefited from a dense network of regional institutions, while the Asia-Pacific region was institutionally thin. Given all these differences, European security institutions with their focus on issues of military security seemed to be of little relevance.[6]

A second line of reasoning leading to the same conclusion suggested that the institutional structure of European organizations was not in tune with the dominant political culture in many parts of Asia. For example, the processes in the OSCE were seen as too legalistic, formal and rule-based for many ASEAN states who had made consensus-building and informal discussions the cornerstone of their own approach to regional cooperation.[7]

Still, looking back to the beginnings of the OSCE, the CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe) process, it started with the idea of creating a new framework for Europe, within which inherent regional problems could be solved. There was the will and the objective to create a Europe of stability, freedom and peace. As there was a similar idea behind

5. Joachim Krause, 'The OSCE and Co-operative Security in Europe: Lessons for Asia', IDSS Monograph No. 6, Singapore, 2003.
6. Nikolas Busse and Hanns W. Maull, 'Enhancing Security in the Asia-Pacific. European Lessons for the Regional Forum', International Politics and Society, March 1999, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. See http://www.fes.de/ipg
7. ibid.

the creation of the ARF, I still see the potential for sharing our experiences.

In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Europe arrived at a turning point and European leaders set out to create a political sub-region in which all nation states would defer from using violent means to solve conflicts. This was a departure from the military mechanisms previously used to solve problems.

A second element and idea in the CSCE process was to strengthen the dialogue, to negotiate and to work out common solutions, particularly in three core areas: security, economy and human rights, or, related to the latter, in the development of democratic structures in the different countries of the region. The ARF also considers negotiations to be a crucial instrument for strengthening regional stability.[8]

So, if the political will and the readiness to cope with regional security problems with a new approach is there, I am sure some steps towards such a new approach could be taken, based on the European experiences some years ago in the CSCE process.

8. Gert Weißkirchen, 'The CSCE Process in Europe', *Dialogue + Cooperation* 1/2002, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Singapore.

ASEAN's Role in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Will ASEAN Remain in the Driver's Seat? – A European Perspective

Paul Lim*

Introduction

To speak of a European perspective, the question is, is there one? Only the European Union (EU) participates in the meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Other non-EU European countries do not. A country like Norway, which has been active in bringing peace to Sri Lanka, does not participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). When it comes to the EU, we have also seen the United Kingdom and France wanting to participate as individual countries and not as part of the EU. If the United Kingdom and France are there as individual delegations, there will probably not be an overall European position in the ARF. Having said this, is there a European perspective? We can only speak of an EU perspective, if not my own, in this presentation.

EU Representation at the ARF

It is well known that each time the EU participates in an ARF meeting, there is a different Presidency participating in a Troika format (Commission, Presidency and incoming Presidency). The Presidency of the EU is sometimes accompanied by the High Representative for the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and at other times by the Commissioner for External Relations, depending on who is able to attend the ARF. However, officials from the three institutions are always there. ASEAN has not understood or questioned the EU's representation by a Troika format and for the EU itself, the issue of continuity raised by this rotating Presidency has not been addressed. Some kind of continuity has been assured by the Council Secretariat, but for some this is still unsatisfactory. I also doubt whether the EU could ever be in the driver's seat of the ARF if it cannot get its act together.

Views on the ARF

It is an open secret that in the past there were officials who saw the ARF as a talk shop without concrete outputs and where things moved very slowly. But I think today, with the new rotating staff, there is recognition that the ARF has its usefulness. It has a role as a meeting point for bilaterals and it affords an opportunity for countries on different sides of the fence to dialogue and negotiate in privacy. For example, at the ARF the EU can speak directly to Burma (Myanmar) about democracy and human rights.

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Viewpoints on the EU in the ARF

The EU may not be in the driver's seat, but it could play a more prominent role. It has experience in confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peace keeping, peace enforcing, etc. Participants in the ARF can judge for themselves whether the EU has made a contribution. The basic dilemma for the EU is that it is distracted by its commitments to other parts of the world, in other international fora. Unlike the Americans, it does not have sufficient staff to put enough people to work, for example, in the ARF. Participants of the ARF know the size of the EU delegation pales in comparison to the American delegation.

The EU should want to carve out a role for itself in the ARF, as it would not want the United States to dominate or lead the ARF. The EU wants to flex its muscles politically on the world stage, being, as it is, one of the largest markets in the world and one of the biggest aid donors in the world. The CFSP is in the throes of coming into being, albeit battered by national interests as policy over Iraq has demonstrated, but it is getting there. Hence, it is a common, not a single policy. The EU should be in a position to pull its weight after its enlargement. I assume that ASEAN would like the EU to come in as a counter-balance to the United States. But is this the prevailing view in ASEAN? Is the EU really a match to countervail the United States, especially post-September 11? Since September 11 the United States has taken the lead by coming into an anti-terrorism accord with ASEAN.[1] There is no similar accord with the EU as far as I know.

The fact that the EU has no objections to and indeed supports ASEAN being in the driver's seat of the ARF, was confirmed to me by a commission official I interviewed. In the driver's seat ASEAN assumes a kind of neutral position in the presence of the big powers in the forum. China would not feel comfortable if the United States were in the driving seat of the ARF. I think the EU understands this.

Viewpoints on ASEAN in the ARF

I think if ASEAN loses the driver's seat of the ARF, it will be for reasons internal to ASEAN itself. Yeo Lay Hwee stated that the Asian crisis and the lack of cohesion within ASEAN due to its recent expansion would have a negative impact on ASEAN's ability to lead and to move the ARF process forward. This was stated way back in 1999.[2] We are way past that now. Cambodia, a not-so-new member, is now taking the helm of ASEAN. It has just hosted the ASEAN summit. Cambodia's effectiveness in chairing ASEAN will also have a bearing on whether ASEAN will remain in the driver's seat of ARF in the immediate future. It is the same with the EU. What happens next in the EU depends also upon the performance of each presidency that takes over. Today, the common fight against terrorism has brought ASEAN together with its external partners. The Bali Bombing has shaken up Indonesia. A more active Indonesia is expected on this front, which means that at the next ARF, or in forthcoming Intersessional Support Groups (ISG), ASEAN leadership of the ARF could

1. This agreement was made at the ARF, as reported by BBC News, 1 August 2002.
2. Yeo Lay Hwee, 'The Role of ASEAN in EU-East Asian Relations', *ASIEN* (publication of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Asienkunde), No. 72, July 1999, p. 25.

be stronger. An internally stronger ASEAN would put it in a better position to be in the driver's seat.[3]

One of the reasons for establishing the ARF was to engage China. That was a wise decision. But the Spratly Islands issue is perhaps an example of where ASEAN is not in the driver's seat of the ARF, as some ASEAN countries are in dispute between themselves and with China over those coral reefs, sandbanks and shoals. Disputes between member countries put ASEAN at a disadvantage, as the Association is then not in a position to negotiate collectively with China. China has been able to insist on bilateral negotiations based on a 'divide and rule' policy. Thus the Spratly Islands issue has detracted from ASEAN's leadership in the ARF.

The declaration recently signed[4] to resolve this dispute through peaceful means is to be hailed. It is a reflection of a 'higher level of political trust', in the words of Zhu Rongji,[5] and points to the fact that the ARF, though a talk shop, has achieved a confidence-building objective. The meetings held between China and the ASEAN countries within the ARF framework over the years contributed to the building up of confidence between them, so that they were able to reach agreement outside the ARF. The ARF has a *raison d'être*. But a *Financial Times* report[6] stated the following in its conclusion:

> Yet ASEAN, which has always operated on a consensus basis, still lacks the ability to speak with a unified voice on sensitive political issues, which leaves it in a weak position in dealing with China. So, even as it commits to the tighter embrace of Beijing, ASEAN is courting other powers such as India.

Short of having a united ASEAN, the Association has taken out an insurance policy against being in the embrace of any major power by playing a multi-polar game. Another *Financial Times* report[7] stated:

> Southeast Asian countries would be well advised to respond to China's overtures – while strengthening their relations with Washington as insurance. In integrating China into regional and multilateral organizations, China's neighbours can throw ever more strings over the waking Gulliver.

Engaging China in the ARF, ASEM, ASEAN+3 and now ASEAN+China, resulting in a future free trade area, is a way of taming the giant by giving it recognition. And its place in the world community means that it has to live up to its status and behave responsibly. The *Financial Times*[8] describes China as determining to act as a responsible regional power, slowly asserting its ambitions to become the hegemon of East Asia, signalling harmonious relations with its neighbours and signalling its collaborative intent through a free trade agreement.

It is noteable that the *Financial Times*, a UK-based paper, does not mention strengthening relations with the EU. It is obvious that in the view of the *Financial Times* journalist the EU does not have the military muscle. Does ASEAN really want the EU's presence in Asia, even in a non-military way? Singapore's Minister for Information, Brigadier-General George Yeo, was quoted as saying, at the European Forum in Berlin, that Europe's presence in

3. BBC News, 30 July 2002, report on the ASEAN Ministerial Statement, 'ASEAN nations vow to fight terror'.
4. The Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, 4 November 2002.
5. *Financial Times*, 'China agrees pact on disputed islands', 5 November 2002.
6. *Financial Times*, 'Beijing looks to bring neighbours under its wing', 5 November 2002.
7. *Financial Times*, 'The Spratlys spat', 5 November 2002.
8. ibid.

East Asia would not be as decisive as that of the United States, but could be very helpful. In a Pacific power balance, with Japan acting between the superpowers China and the United States, a greater European presence in Asia would be welcomed as it would give everyone more options to play with.[9] If Yeo's comments can be seen as representing ASEAN, the EU has a place in Asia, albeit not a decisive one, and a reason to be in the ARF.

The EU itself is a coming together of states, but of states pooling their sovereignty towards a common foreign and security policy, and in the process of political and economic integration, which gives them a stronger voice and weight vis-à-vis the rest of the world including the United States. Something could be learned from the EU experience. ASEAN is not integrating, only cooperating. ASEAN insists on national sovereignty, non-interference and national interest. But for ASEAN to be in the driver's seat of the ARF, it will also have to deal internally with the issue of integration at some point in the future. Strength in ASEAN means strength for ASEAN in the ARF. ASEAN's strength can only come from its internal cohesion, otherwise it will always be playing one big power against another as an insurance policy.

The Korean peninsula is one issue, for example, on which ASEAN does not take the lead because neither ASEAN nor any of its members are playing a mediating role. The ARF, so to speak, is the host, or forum, at which the big boys meet the North Koreans, and this gives the ARF a certain *raison d'être*. Here ASEAN provides the infrastructure of the ARF for the actors to meet.

As a forum, the ARF, thanks to ASEAN, is perfect for Asia and its external partners to discuss September 11 and international terrorism, and to make agreements. Again, on this issue, it is not ASEAN but the United States that is in the driver's seat. It is not always possible for ASEAN to be in the driver's seat on international or global issues, although it did take the lead in bringing peace to Cambodia.

Coming back to the institutional ARF, if ASEAN members themselves make progress in confidence-building measures and in preventive diplomacy towards problem solving, then ASEAN is better assured of remaining in the driver's seat. Its external partners are waiting. They are not about to usurp its position. But if progress cannot be made, then they may conclude that the ARF is just a talk shop and lose interest. For a beginning, to be able to talk to each other is a success, but over time much more is demanded. Being comfortable is accepted, but a maturity of relationships should lead to problem solving. The ball is in ASEAN's court.

It is likely that, if the ARF evolves, even at a comfortable pace for every member, into an OSCE-type of organization, ASEAN may no longer be in the driver's seat. This will require much more than ASEAN is able to offer. Such an organization will require higher levels of commitment and participation from Asian countries. Northeast Asian countries, two of which have observer status in the OSCE, would want to play bigger roles. And would the United States and the EU also be observers in an Asian version of the OSCE? Perhaps the evolution of the ARF will not be in the direction of an OSCE-type of organization. At some point, ASEAN will have to come to terms with the fact that, while it is to be congratulated for initiating the ARF and building it up, in any realization of an OSCE-type of organization, it has to pass

9. See 'The Role of the EU in South-East Asia: A Political, Economic and Strategic Review', Working Paper, Directorate General for Research, European Parliament, External Economic Relations Series, REXT 102 EN, March 1999, pp. 84-85.

the baton on to others. Whatever the evolution, even now within the ARF framework, for the good health of the ARF, some thought should be given to giving a greater stake to non-ASEAN ARF members. This brings me to the next section.

CSCAP's Paper on the ARF into the Twenty-first Century

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) published a paper entitled 'The ARF into the 21st Century'. If there is a non-EU European perspective, perhaps it is in this paper, to which CSCAP Europe, of which I am a member, contributed or assented. I received the paper for comments. This paper states a number of things, but my focus here is on the section on the institutionalization of the ARF. There are five points, but I mention only three. One point is on the establishment of an ARF Secretariat. Perhaps it is too much ahead of its time, as it might seem that by suggesting an alternate chairing of the Secretariat by an ASEAN and a non-ASEAN member on one-year terms, ASEAN is being taken out of the driver's seat. It goes further by suggesting the decoupling of the ARF Chair from the ASEAN Chair, as is the practice now, and by proposing that ASEAN countries should be allowed to forego hosting the ARF if they fear they lack the capacity to do so. For a Track Two organization, it is easy to suggest such changes with the long-term view of an effective ARF, but in politics there are other considerations, such as national prestige. Politicians know better and I am not going to go into this. It reminds me of Luxembourg when it takes over the Presidency of the EU. It has a small administration and so what it does is to turn to the Belgian administration for help. I wonder whether this is thinkable in ASEAN. Possibly not. In the last point entitled, 'Locking in Major Power Commitment', it is suggested that future ARF meetings could be co-chaired with a non-ASEAN member. This simply extends the existing principle as meetings of the ISG are currently co-chaired by a non-ASEAN member. Is this too much? It is important too for non-ASEAN members of ARF to feel that they have a stake, or some 'ownership' of the ARF process, in the language we now use in development cooperation. For example, there could be non-ASEAN staff in an ARF Secretariat. I wonder how this paper was received? Was it discussed? Was it food for thought? Or was it politely received and then filed in the archives?

Conclusions

It has been difficult to write this presentation on a European perspective of ASEAN being in the driver's seat of the ARF, not knowing what non-EU European countries thought, or even what individual EU member states thought. One can only assume that when the Troika speaks at the ARF the positions taken are agreed upon in the General Affairs Council of the EU, and even at a lower level in, what is called in Brussels lingo, 'COASI' (European Union Council Working Group for the Asia Pacific), which brings together the top people from the foreign ministries of various member states with their Brussels counterparts. It is clear that the EU can offer a specific contribution to the ARF on the basis of its experience with security and in its wish to put itself on the world map via its CFSP on pooling sovereignty.

The EU's presence in Asia is welcomed 'as it gave everyone more options to play with'. Hence it has good reason to participate in the ARF.

What is definitely clear is that ASEAN's continued presence in the driving seat of the ARF is welcomed and accepted in view of the fact that it dilutes the dominance of one power, the United States. The EU collaborates with the United States through their transatlantic partnership but this does not mean that the EU goes along with any United States domination. The increasing tendency of the United States to be unilateralist does not go down well with the EU, which upholds multilateralism. We are here in the field of big power politics and there is an element of rivalry too. This is the short answer in support of the continuation of ASEAN's neutral position between the big powers.

I think that whether ASEAN remains in the driver's seat of the ARF or not is a matter internal to ASEAN. No external partner will take this away from ASEAN. Hence, this paper speaks of the effectiveness of the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN, refers to the cohesiveness of ASEAN by pointing out that being internally weak will not put ASEAN in the driver's seat of the ARF, with the example of the Spratlys, and that unless it is internally strong and cohesive ASEAN will always have to play off one power against another. Going beyond confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy towards problem solving will ensure ASEAN's leading position in the ARF. One possible way ASEAN might lose its driver's seat is if the ARF evolves into a real, fully fledged security organization, like the OSCE. More resources will be required and higher levels of commitment from Asian countries, in which case they will want more leadership or want to be the driving force in such an Asian security organization. Reference is made to CSCAP's paper on 'The ARF into the 21st Century' which opens the door to non-ASEAN partners to co-chair the ARF to the point that if an ASEAN country lacks the capacity to host the ARF, it can forego it.

Along the way, mention is made of the Korean peninsula and international terrorism. ASEAN is not in the driver's seat on these issues but the ARF nevertheless serves a purpose.

In conclusion, let it be repeated that Europe supports ASEAN's position in the driver's seat of the ARF.

Postscript

In the Joint Communiqué of the Thirty-sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh, dated 16-17 June 2003, there was a paragraph on Burma/Myanmar:

> We discussed the recent political developments in Myanmar, particularly the incident of 30 May 2003. We noted the efforts of the Government of Myanmar to promote peace and development. In this connection, we urged Myanmar to resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue among all parties concerned leading to a peaceful transition to democracy. We welcomed the assurances given by Myanmar that the measures taken following the incident were temporary and looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD members. We also reaffirmed our continued support for the efforts of the UNSG Special Representative Tan Sri Razali Ismail.

The BBC News of 17 June 2003 considered this statement an unusual departure from

ASEAN's policy of non-interference in member states' internal affairs. It quoted the Cambodian Foreign Minister, saying that ASEAN's ability to discuss the internal issues of a member country were 'a step forward in the relations between ASEAN members'.

No-one knows if this will happen again or what the view of the other ASEAN members is, but it is a step forward. Burma has been an embarrassment for ASEAN countries – at least they have privately admitted this. It has put ASEAN in a fix. ASEAN may have been right in wanting Burma to be part of ASEAN with an eye to China, but whatever decision is taken has a price. The junta's move to arrest and detain Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues put ASEAN under pressure and puts into question its constructive engagement policies.

What is important is that ASEAN's ability to solve problems within and between ASEAN member countries will earn it respect and keep it in the driver's seat of the ARF. It is one thing to be hailed as the initiator of the ARF, but then unable to solve problems within ASEAN. Moreover, trying to deal with Asian security problems in the ARF dents ASEAN's reputation. If ASEAN cannot solve problems within its member states, taking on security problems at the Asian level can be interpreted as deflecting from its internal problems, or inviting external help, or punching above its weight.

ASEAN can learn from the EU how to solve internal problems between member states by facing up to them and not sweeping them under the carpet, finding the consensus to solve them while staying engaged with the world's problems outside. To do this probably requires a big change in the mindset of ASEAN member states. It boils down to a cultural change of mind at the individual level, which is presently too touchy, face-saving and face-losing. An ability to solve internal problems within and between ASEAN countries will strengthen ASEAN and its place in the ARF and give it greater weight on the international stage.

Europe's Meaningful Contribution to the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Critical Assessment

Eric Teo Chu Cheow*

Europe, under the banner of the European Union (EU), has a seat at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), like all major powers with interests in the Asia-Pacific region. At one stage, France and Britain tried to lobby for separate seats (from the EU) in the ARF, but they ultimately failed in their attempt. France and Britain had argued that they had key and vital interests in the Pacific; in particular France's argument was that it has overseas territories, for example New Caledonia and French Polynesia, in Asia Pacific. Furthermore, both also advanced the argument that as permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, it would be appropriate for them to have a separate seat and voice within the ARF, like Russia, China and the United States. After much lobbying and immense difficulties in getting their arguments across, London, and subsequently Paris, abandoned their efforts to secure separate ARF seats and finally aligned their participation and presence to that of the 'rotating' EU seat, where the Union is traditionally represented by the Troika, namely the present and future EU presidencies, plus the Commission and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Once this episode between the two major EU members and the ARF was put behind them, the EU then began seriously evaluating the importance and role of the ARF in stabilizing both the security interests and the balance of powers within the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF is also perceived by Europeans as a forum where Western powers can dialogue, without prejudice, with Myanmar and even North Korea. For this reason, the Europeans see the ARF as a useful forum on regional security, where they can dialogue with states they would otherwise not necessarily be engaging with. Furthermore, many Europeans also see the ARF as something akin to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and hope that the ARF might lead to a more stable Asia Pacific, just as the CSCE and later the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) provided the basis for wide-ranging security stabilization on the European continent, from the time of the Cold War to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR. To the Europeans, the ARF could thus serve a similar function of engaging all states in the region in a meaningful security dialogue and cooperation, which could ultimately be beneficial to all.

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Benefits of the ARF to Europe

The ARF, however, has at least other three functions and benefits for the EU, which include:

1. Providing the EU with a place, a role and a voice in the fast-evolving security scene in the Asia-Pacific region, where the major powers (especially the G8) are found, among them the United States, China, Russia, Japan, Canada and India, and where major international security issues, like nuclear proliferation and the arms race, are also being actively discussed and played out.

2. Allowing the EU to maintain its vital interests in this part of the world; apart from France's strategic territorial outreach and presence, most EU countries have vital economic interests (commercial and investment interests) in the Asia-Pacific region, which they would need to protect and develop as Asia becomes an economic powerhouse of its own, especially with the rise of China.

3. Sharing their experiences in the CSCE in maintaining stability and encouraging cooperation, so as to keep the peace in a region which is vital to the EU's economic and political interests.

The EU has thus far perceived and measured the importance of the ARF to its own vital interests, both economic and political, since becoming a fully fledged member of the organization. But the EU is a 'diversified entity' as well, with different and multiple interests. The ARF's real importance and usefulness is perhaps even more true for the bigger and more powerful members of the EU, especially the Big Three (Britain, France and Germany), who have important economic, trade and investment links to Asia. The other big European powers, like Italy and Spain, as well as medium-sized powers like the Netherlands and Austria, also have vital economic interests, and thus value their EU seat within the ARF to some extent. Finally, the Scandinavian countries, which have very out-going links to the world, also perceive real benefits in being present in such an Asia-Pacific forum, if not to safeguard their vital commercial and maritime links and lifelines. The vital interests for the EU are therefore both economic and political, according to the circumstances of individual member-states; peace and security issues are therefore of utmost importance in determining and ensuring these two aspects.

The EU's meaningful contributions could indeed be made in two fundamental areas, namely traditional security and 'soft security' areas. Within the traditional security domain, the EU could contribute meaningfully in terms of sharing experiences from the CSCE/OSCE, peace keeping and anti-terrorism. In the 'soft security' domain, the EU's wealth of experience would be valuable in the fields of 'developmental security', cross-border security, and health and other aspects of human security.

Europe's Contributions to the ARF in Terms of Traditional Security Issues

Europe and the EU's contributions towards traditional security could be the most helpful in three areas or issues.

Firstly, Europe's contribution would be valuable in 'transposing' to Asia the lessons learnt in the organization of the CSCE/

OSCE, and how peace and cooperation have been effectively maintained in Europe right through the Cold War and after. Confidence building and preventive diplomacy have already been the main foundation concepts of the CSCE/OSCE and Asians could learn much from Europe and the CSCE/OSCE. The ARF is already a place for active cooperation and dialogue on security concerns and issues across the Asia-Pacific region, especially when political and security flashpoints exist, such as the on-going uncertainties on the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea Islands disputes, overlapping territorial and island claims, etc.

Secondly, the EU, with its vast experience, could be a source of inspiration in peace keeping and peace-keeping operations (PKOs). The Blue Helmet concept, under the auspices of the United Nations, has been developed by the Europeans since the 1950s, as they took part massively in peace-keeping operations in conflict zones in Africa, Latin America and Asia during their post-colonial and independence struggle periods. The wealth of expertise in organizing and maintaining PKOs by Europeans across the world could be most useful, as Asians are now beginning to share more international responsibilities and take part in PKOs in troubled spots. Even China and Japan are relatively new to PKOs and have much to learn from Europe. Asian countries also need to understand PKOs as and when they themselves may need to 'apply' them in their own territories, should conflicts erupt there, owing to secessions or territorial disputes, which are numerous across the Asia-Pacific region.

Thirdly, the EU could make meaningful contributions to anti-terror campaigns, which countries in the Asia-Pacific region could be facing more and more in the coming years. Southeast Asia and ASEAN are particularly vulnerable, although no Asian country (even India, China, Japan or South Korea) is really immune from terrorism nowadays. Major EU countries, like Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain have ample anti-terrorist expertise and could thus share their wealth of knowledge and experiences in intelligence gathering and analysis, counter-terror operations and planning, as well as the establishment of anti-terror legislation and judicial systems to counter such threats. In fact, the anti-terror experience of the EU is far richer than that of the United States, Australia or Canada, and Asia-Pacific countries could benefit from EU experiences and expertise in this particular field. The EU could also conduct open seminars and workshops, as well as 'closed' anti-terror classes for relevant special units from the Asia-Pacific countries. Intelligence sharing is also a key area for cooperation, as many terrorist operations could emanate or 'pass' through Europe from the Middle East or Central Europe.

Europe's Contributions to the ARF in Terms of 'Soft Security' Issues

Europe, and the EU in particular, could specially assist Asia-Pacific countries in the ARF in areas of 'soft security', or what is now termed more generally as 'human security', which is nevertheless a vital part of 'comprehensive security'. The EU's assistance and expertise could come in handy in at least three areas, namely developmental security, cross-border security, and health or other aspects of human security.

Developmental security is today recognized as paramount in assuring the stability and security of communities and countries. Nowhere in the world is this concept more developed and à la mode than in Europe today. Security and social stability cannot

be assured if development is 'unbalanced', or if social inequity exists and persists. The EU has always been a champion of development and consequently the concept of developmental security is contained in the EU's own developmental strategies. The structural fund in the EU, as well as being of important assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries under the Lome Convention, embodies this fundamental underlying principle. Development through trade, investments and equitable income distribution is key to the creation of a firm foundation of social stability and peace. The building up of a credible middle class in the Asia-Pacific region should therefore be key to its future stability and the best assurance that democracy will ultimately be more firmly anchored there. Equitable and sound development is therefore a form of security that may be considered 'non-traditional', but it cannot be over-emphasized at a time when globalization is widely perceived to be the cause of all social evils by many in the Third World. Developmental strategies are therefore crucially needed to ensure social peace and stability. The EU could thus contribute actively to helping poorer countries in the Asia-Pacific region achieve these fundamental goals through all kinds of assistance (including food, technical and financial), as well as via its wealth of expertise in helping these countries formulate effective policies for development and redistribution.

Cross-border security is another area in which the EU could impart valuable advice and experience to Asia-Pacific states facing the danger of being swamped by such problems. In fact, cross-border issues in this region would include the smuggling of drugs and arms, the clandestine traffic of women and children, high-sea piracy, money-laundering, clandestine labour movements (involving powerful snakeheads and triads) and terrorist activities, which could embrace and profit from all these cross-border issues. Three specific geographical areas where such cross-border problems are critical in the Asia-Pacific region are the Indochinese area (also linking up with neighbouring China and India), the archipelagic Southeast Asian area (where piracy and clandestine labour are particularly troublesome) and in Northeast Asia, where Chinese and North Korean transmigrational flux constitute a bilateral problem, and even a threat, to their immediate neighbours. In this specific field of cross-border security, the EU has had numerous experiences dealing with many similar cross-border issues and problems and is in fact still facing many such problems, though they are being dealt with today within the framework of the Schengen Agreement. A useful sharing of experiences between the officials and judiciary involved, from both the EU and the Asia-Pacific region, could be especially helpful to Southeast and Northeast Asian states, which are facing this growing problem. Further cooperation, either through Interpol or directly between the police apparatus in the EU and Asia-Pacific countries in the fields of intelligence-sharing over drugs, arms and people smuggling, would be particularly useful and helpful too. Cross-border security could be becoming one of the greatest security threats as the world globalizes and liberalizes.

Lastly, the latest Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic has once again demonstrated the utmost importance of health and aspects of human security to the overall community, as diseases and viruses themselves know no borders. The spread of SARS, AIDS or any other infectious diseases could constitute a real danger to a country's security, when infections spread and threaten active populations and the economic lifeline of countries involved. Collective efforts are undoubtedly necessary to contain such spread and infection, as the recent SARS

epidemic has clearly shown. Health and aspects of human security are therefore a cornerstone of the broader concept of comprehensive security, as societies and communities, which are vital to the economic lifeline and social well-being of a country, could be crucially and directly at stake. The EU could in this regard assist 'threatened' Asia-Pacific ARF members through technical and financial assistance, in order to help alleviate poverty (through the provision of clean water and sanitation) and cater to the health needs of poor rural communities (through the building of hospitals, training of doctors and nurses, and the provision of basic medical care). As clearly shown in the recent SARS epidemic, rich countries are far from being immune to the spread of diseases emanating from poorer and lesser-developed parts of the region, as viruses and infections cross borders and spread easily. The wake-up call from SARS clearly emphasizes the utmost necessity to ensure health and other aspects of human security at all costs, lest economic lifelines and social stability of communities and countries become fatally threatened.

Conclusion and Critical Assessment of the EU's Contribution to the ARF

The EU has undoubtedly been contributing to the 'soft security' aspects of the ARF, although this fact has not been necessarily recognized as such by the other members of the ARF. Perhaps, the security agenda should be 'updated' to clearly and better reflect the abovementioned 'soft security' aspects within the ARF.

It is nevertheless also obvious that the EU's contributions, in terms of traditional security, could be more forthcoming, especially in the areas of peace keeping and anti-terrorism. In these two areas, it is clear that the EU has good cards to play in transferring and sharing know-how to lesser developed Asia-Pacific countries. These countries are definitely facing increasing problems posed by the twin threats of terrorism and secessionism, which will require more external assistance and cooperation in the future. The EU could also actively impart its own experiences in the CSCE/OSCE to the ARF, as some similarities do exist between the two situations in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. The EU has, however, a greater card to play in the 'softer' aspects of security, especially in the fields of developmental security, cross-border security, and health and other aspects of human security. In these areas the EU clearly has the knowledge, expertise and resources to assist Asia-Pacific ARF members better than the other Western members of the grouping.

But it is also quite clear that one of the major obstacles preventing the EU from playing an appropriate role in the ARF is its 'wobbly' representation in the ARF. Not all EU member states have the same vital interests in Asia Pacific, and hence, some may not be as interested in this region as others. The rotational representational process leaves little continuity of action and focus for the EU, just as relations between the EU member states and the Commission in the specific question of the ARF may still be ambiguous. These three factors have hindered real contributions from the EU to the ARF, especially in maintaining the continuity of action and policies. Until and unless this is clearly formulated within the EU itself, the EU's role in the ARF would be at best secondary and ephemeral. This difficulty would unfortunately be further compounded when the EU expands to 25 by 2004, as there will be more countries which do not have any real vital interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and which will thus be completely 'lost' within the ARF. The key to the EU's

meaningful role and place in the ARF therefore remains squarely in the EU's own hands; it has to decide clearly how and for what reasons it should continue or not to have a meaningful role in the ARF process, as well as appreciate the real benefits it could derive from the ARF. Until and unless this is thought through, we can only expect a weak EU contribution and role within the ARF.

The ASEAN Regional Forum and the European Union as a Security System and a Security Actor

Alfredo C. Robles, Jr.*

East Asia poses specific – perhaps unique – challenges to the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In East Asia, the possibility of limited conflicts involving one or more major powers remains latent. As the German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs pointed out when presenting Germany's most recent Policy on Asia, 'some of the most dangerous centres of conflict (*Konfliktherde*) are to be found in Asia' (quoted in Hansen [2001:1]). In contrast, in Latin America, the guerrilla wars of the 1980s, in which one side was supported by the United States and the other (allegedly) by the USSR and its surrogates, have long since given way to more or less successful efforts at national reconstruction and reconciliation. Africa has not yet been delivered of the scourges of civil war, genocide and inter-state conflicts, but the Africans are more susceptible to pressure, both economic and military, from the European powers, particularly former colonial powers.

Conceptualizing a European contribution to East Asian security is more difficult in the post-Cold War period than it was in the 1970s and the 1980s, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Community (EC) were united by their condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. ASEAN and the EC successfully led the anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnam coalitions at the United Nations. At the time, the Europeans' interests in Southeast Asia, so Harris and Bridges assert, were to ensure that no hostile power controlled the region to the Europeans' disadvantage or to exclude them from the region; to reduce great power friction that might lead to generalized war; and to guarantee the safety of strategic waterways (1983:45). Concrete European contribution to security took the form of acceptance of Indochinese refugees, of which about one-seventh settled in Europe (Chiang, 1988:116).

Recent scholarly debates on the European Union (EU) as an actor (the EU's 'actorness') may help us to think through the factors that have conditioned the EU's modest participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in the first decade of the latter's existence. Taking into account the need to solve the 'agent-structure problem' (Wendt, 1987), Bretherton and Vogler explain the development of the EU's external role in terms of cyclical relationships between agency and structure. Agency is represented by innovative political actors that create internal EU capabilities, through policy instruments and decision-making processes (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999:31). However, their definition of structure, whether domestic or international, is less satisfactory. They do realize that structures offer opportunities and impose constraints on

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actors, a formulation that relies on Anthony Giddens' famous definition of structure. Yet at the same time they adopt Wendt's (1992) limited notion of structure, defined simply as intersubjective systems of meaning (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999:31).

Understandings about the EU, its roles, responsibilities and limitations allegedly form part of the intersubjective international structure, while the EU participates in the processes of constructing these intersubjective structures. There is very little sense of a structure consisting of more or less stable social relations, rooted in material conditions, that generate opportunities and constraints for human agency; nor is there any notion of contradiction between structures or between structures and intersubjective ideas (Robles, forthcoming).

The various ingenious and, at times, contradictory, attempts to define a European role in East Asian security demonstrate the limitations of an approach that is situated solely at the level of ideas and understandings – in short, intersubjective knowledge – without paying attention to underlying material conditions that determine the chances of translating these ideas and understandings into practice. At the beginning of the 1990s, several German scholars expressed the view that in the area of security, the Europeans no longer had any regional interests in Asia, with the exception of France's controversial colonial and nuclear policies in the South Pacific (Eschborn, Gardill and Mols, 1992:160). In the second half of the decade, with the growing European awareness of rapid economic growth in East Asia that had begun in the mid-1980s, Europeans writing on the subject, and even Asians, started to assert that Europe had a 'strong and increasing stake in East Asian security' (Godemont et al., 1995:1). The EU identified maritime security, denuclearization, the fight against drugs, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution as areas of dialogue with ASEAN (EU Doc. COM(96)314:11). Godemont et al. believed that dialogue could be carried out on global as well as regional issues. On global issues, Europe was said to have a role in creating an environment that would make China more likely to accept the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Europe could share its experience with East Asian states that wished to increase their role in peacekeeping; Europe and Asia could discuss ways to advance conventional arms control; they could share their experience in dealing with Russia; they could consult with each other about the United States and its global role, and lastly – just to make sure that nothing was left out – they could discuss general concepts of security (see also Mahncke, 1997). For Gerald Segal, Europe could help Asia to define new international roles for Asia (Segal, 1997:129). As regards regional issues, Godemont et al. pointed out that the Europeans provided support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO); could share their experience on the formulation and operation of nuclear free zones, handling of ethnic conflict and ensuring maritime security; and could cooperate with Asia in finding ways of integrating China into the international order (Godemont et al., 1995). The result resembles a 'laundry list', a mass of ideas without any clear priorities, as one European expert on Asian security admitted (Segal, 1997:134). The approach fails to address the question of whether the EU, assuming that it does have an interest in East Asian security, has the capacity to pursue these interests, given the structural context of action in Europe as well as in East Asia.

This is not to say that these scholars are unaware of the structural constraints that can and do limit the EU's margin of manoeuvre in fashioning a security role for itself in East Asia. First, at the time of the

launch of the Asia-Europe Meeting (1996), the Europeans were preoccupied with the implementation of the CFSP; and second, particular features of East Asian security shaped the nature of possible cooperation with the EU (Godemont et al., 1995:2-3). This paper concentrates on the structure of relations within the EU that creates a particular type of security system and a particular type of security actor. It argues that the EU as a security system will, by its very nature, be likely to contribute little to East Asian security, except perhaps as a model. As a security actor, the EU has recognized that its primary interests outside Europe lie in the developing countries in its periphery. This priority has not prevented it, on at least two occasions, from acting in East Asia in ways that highlight the structural weakness of the ARF. Since September 11, the fight against terrorism has altered the structural context of the ARF, possibly opening up space for security cooperation between Europe and East Asia.

I. The EU as a Security System and East Asia

The EU is often judged and dismissed as a security actor on the basis of its failure to create an army or to forge an alliance that could replace NATO. Notwithstanding these apparent failures, Ole Waever, one of the leading European experts on European security, asserts that the EU is 'the main pillar of stability in Europe' (Waever, 2000).

The argument begins from the observation that the end of the Cold War did not lead to the dissolution of the EU, nor did it trigger balancing behaviour on the part of the major European powers. In Waever's analysis, the EU, as an order marked by overlapping and unsettled authorities, generates mechanisms that pre-empt most security problems in Europe. It is this ability that justifies the analysis of the EU as a security system. The primary role of the EU is to keep the core intact, specifically the potential rivals for power on the continent, France and Germany. Second, the EU exercises a 'silent disciplining power' on its 'Near Abroad' – the Central and East European countries (CEEC) that are candidates for membership. For example, in the early 1990s, both the Czechs and the Slovaks sought to ensure that the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was carried out in a way that could be considered 'civilized' in the West and that allowed them to carry over their agreements with the EU. For similar reasons, the Hungarians downplay the issue of ethnic minorities in their country (Waever, 2000:261-62). This peculiar mechanism of generating security on the continent demands that the EU reconcile enlargement and deepening. Without the prospect of membership, the CEEC would have no incentive to behave in ways that 'desecuritize' conflicts. Without deepening, the candidate states would not be able to conceive of the EU as the organizing factor in their national future (Waever, 2000:262).

This form of security provision cannot be equated with collective security in that it does not organize state reaction to aggression; or with collective defence, because it is not directed against outsiders. Waever calls this security system 'regional unipolarity', 'quasi-empire', or integration in concentric circles. Whatever its name, it makes the EU the most important security organization on the Continent (Waever, 2000:265). This model of a security system, by definition, cannot function vis-à-vis states that have no prospect of membership in the EU. Therein lies the difference between the CEEC and the states of North Africa, even if in reality

the latter pose for the EU many of the same problems and threats as the former (Waever, 2000:264).

What are the implications of the existence of a European security system for East Asia? In the past, this question was often reformulated as follows: Can the European security system be a model for East Asia (e.g. Krause and Umbach, 1998). The near-unanimous response of Asians and European specialists of Asia has been negative (e.g. Dosch, 1998; cf. Möller, 1996:354). If this were the case, then there would be very little justification for European participation in the ARF, as European input would, by definition, be irrelevant. Challenging the dominant view, the German scholar, Kay Möller, has ventured the hypothesis that the differences between the European and Asian context can be traced to a time lag rather than to essential cultural differences between Europeans and Asians (Möller, 1996:367), but this argument has received little attention in East Asia.

From a different angle, the existence of a European security system, though geographically confined, can be construed as having a beneficial effect on East Asian security. In the view of the late Gerald Segal, if the Europeans assumed a greater share of the burden of ensuring security in Europe, American resources would be freed, enabling the United States to bear more burdens in Asia (Segal, 1997:131). Even assuming that such a causal linkage exists between the European security system and East Asian security, one should beware of relying on it as the basis for a European security role in East Asia. This approach would force one to consider any setback in the evolution of a European security system and/or United States opposition to any such security system as threats to East Asian security. At any rate, the continued development of the European security system could hardly be motivated by the desire to enable the United States to divert resources from Europe to Asia. Finally, this conception seems to entail a contradiction: Europe can make a contribution to East Asian security by concentrating on European security. One is tempted to say that in this view, the European presence in the East Asian security sphere would manifest itself in the form of absence.

The question that follows is whether the institutionalization of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the form of the CFSP, introduced by the Treaty of the European Union (the TEU, or Maastricht Treaty), has conferred on the EU the capacity to become a security actor in East Asia.

II. The EU as a Security Actor and the ARF, 1994-2000

The EU's capacity as a security actor is conditioned by the CFSP's goals, which are broad enough to cover East Asia, and its regional priorities and resources, which lead the EU to lay stress on other regions in the developing world. Nevertheless, the EU has been able to play a certain role in two security issues to whose resolution the ARF made only a marginal contribution, namely KEDO and East Timor.

a. The CFSP's Objectives, Regional and Security Priorities, and Instruments

As is well known, the CFSP's overall objective is to assert a European identity on the international scene. The objectives laid down in the Maastricht Treaty are quite ambitious: to safeguard the EU's common values, fundamental interests and

independence; to strengthen the security of the EU and its member states; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (TEU, Title V, Art. 6.1, para. 2).

While no geographic restrictions are attached to the realization of these objectives, the Lisbon European Council[1] (1992) identified factors that would enable the EU to determine its common interest and that would be taken into account when defining issues and areas for joint action: geographic proximity, important political interests in political and economic stability, and threats to EU security interests. The Lisbon Council also identified several areas where joint action in relation to individual countries or groups of countries appeared to be particularly beneficial, at least initially: Central and Eastern Europe, especially the ex-USSR and the former Yugoslavia, the Maghreb (North Africa) and the Middle East. In the future, the areas of common interest requiring joint action would be North-South relations, relations with the United States, Japan and Canada, and the coordination of action in international organizations and conferences (McGoldrick, 1997:154-55).

The TEU provisions on security envisage the eventual formulation of a common defence policy, which in turn might lead to a common defence (TEU, Art. J.4, para. 1). One of the main concerns of several EU member states was to preserve the transatlantic relationship, hence the provision that the EU's policy would 'respect the obligations of certain member States under the North Atlantic Treaty' (Art. J.4, para. 4). Other European Councils have identified specific areas or issues in the security field suitable for joint action. A 1991 Maastricht 'Declaration on Areas which could be the subject of Joint Action' specified four security areas in which the member states have important common interests: the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), disarmament and arms control in Europe, nuclear non-proliferation and the economic aspects of security. An Extraordinary European Council in 1992 envisaged joint action on the promotion of peace and stability in Europe, on election observation in Russia, and on the Middle East, South Africa and the former Yugoslavia. The 1993 European Council meeting in Brussels defined the general objectives of European security as the EU's territorial integrity, political independence, democratic character and economic stability as well as the stability of neighbouring regions (McGoldrick, 1997:155-56).

From this cursory survey, we may conclude that while certain issues, for example, nuclear non-proliferation, have Asian dimensions, East Asia as such was not a priority region for the CFSP. Apart from Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia), the regions of greatest concern to the EU are those that are geographically closest to it: the Maghreb (North Africa) and the Middle East.

The main CFSP instruments provided for in the Maastricht Treaty are systematic cooperation that may lead to the definition of a common position (Art. J.1,para. 3 and J.2, para. 1), and joint action in areas where the member states have important interests in common (Art. J.3). As of 2003, most of the countries to which the EU applied negative measures, such as embargoes, the prohibition of flights and the freezing of funds and other financial resources, were in Africa (Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia,

1. The European Council comprises the heads of state or government of the EU member states. It meets at least twice a year.

Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe). Other countries subject to negative measures were two European countries (Belarus and the former Yugoslavia) and four Asian countries (Afghanistan, Burma, Indonesia and Iraq) (Conseil de l'Union européenne, 2003).

This is not the place to survey the CFSP's record in the first decade of its existence, the criticisms of its failures in Yugoslavia and Kosovo being well-known already. Our focus here will be the institutional difficulties faced by the CFSP, difficulties that can be traced in part to the EU's pillar structure. The EC is the first pillar, the CFSP the second, and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) the third pillar. Since the first is supranational, while the other two are intergovernmental, this creates problems of coordination between economic policy (under the Commission) and foreign policy (under the CFSP) and between member states and the EU. Despite the differentiation into pillars, the CFSP is financed through the EC budget and must therefore comply with the EC's financial rules. Financing by member states remains possible, but only in exceptional circumstances.

Given these structural constraints, it is perhaps not so surprising that the challenge of identifying specific EU security interests in East Asia has proved to be so daunting. When such interests are identified, a laundry list tends to be the outcome. In the absence of adequate financing, the primary means of pursuing these interests is dialogue. The EU has been much more reluctant to use sanctions vis-à-vis Asia than other regions (Hansen, 2001).

In at least two instances, though, the EU has played a not insignificant role in two issue areas within the ARF's geographic scope.

b. The EU in East Asia: KEDO and East Timor

The process leading to the establishment of KEDO illustrates the potential as well as the limits of both the ARF and the EU's contributions to it.

In the first case, the immediate threat to East Asian security came from North Korea's possession of graphite-moderated nuclear reactors capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons, which could threaten not just South Korea but also Japan. North Korea used this threat as a bargaining chip in order to obtain economic and other assistance from the United States and the West. Its goal is to prop up its economy, which was hard hit by the collapse of the Eastern bloc. The United States and North Korea signed a Framework Agreement on 21 October 1994 and pursued negotiations that culminated in the establishment of KEDO on 9 March 1995 by the United States, South Korea and Japan. Under the agreement, the North Korean reactors would be replaced by two Light Water Reactors (LWR) for electricity, which would be safer from nuclear accidents and more difficult to use in the production of weapons-grade plutonium. They would be under monitoring, supervision and control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In return, the United States undertook to supply 500,000 tons of heavy oil; provide formal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States; and reduce barriers to trade, investment and communication (Lim, 1999:22-23).

The ARF followed the situation on the Korean Peninsula almost from the very start. However, as the ARF is a purely consultative forum, its 'action' was limited to welcoming the talks between North

Korea and the United States to implement the Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 (ARF, 1994:para. 5), urging the resumption of dialogue between North and South Korea, recognizing the importance of the KEDO (2nd ARF, 1995:para. 11) and urging other ARF participants to consider giving further financial and political support to KEDO (ARF, 1996:para. 7 [v]).

The EU's decision to accede to the KEDO Agreement was not so much a result of the ARF's urging as a response to Japan's demand that the EU participate in KEDO. This would be the quid pro quo for Japanese support for reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia. By a Joint Action of 5 March 1996, the EU expressed its desire to co-finance the KEDO; and on 30 July 1997 the Accession Agreement was signed, under which the EU would contribute ECU 15 million a year for five years. As Paul Lim puts it, 'EU participation in KEDO has been hailed as [an expression of] EU concern for the peace and stability of East Asia, nuclear safety, and nuclear non-proliferation' (Lim, 1999:22). EU participation in KEDO is all the more significant because of the structural differences between the security situation in Northeast Asia and that in Southeast Asia. War is now not very likely to occur among the members states of ASEAN, whereas this danger looms large in Northeast Asia. Yet the institutional weakness of ASEAN, which launched the ARF and claims to be ARF's driving force, has limited its financial contribution to the KEDO. On the other hand, the EU possesses its own financial resources and has a long tradition of active participation in its own right, i.e. separately from its member states, in international organizations, whether economic, technical or humanitarian. The following table illustrates the contrast between ASEAN and the EU.

Total Financial Support by Country to KEDO, March 1995 to December 2001 (US$)

Country/Organization	Total	Percentage
Total	1,376,905,507	
Republic of Korea	604,542,477	43.91
United States	310,886,000	22.58
Japan	292,603,930	21.25
Europe: EAEA (EURATOM)	82,118,897	5.96
Italy	1,821,429	0.13
Germany	1,011,485	0.07
United Kingdom	1,000,000	0.07
Netherlands	790,192	0.06
Finland	645,593	0.05
France	503,778	0.04
Greece	25,000	0.001
Subtotal Europe	87,916,374	6.39
ASEAN: Singapore	1,600,000	0.12
Indonesia	974,907	0.07
Brunei	423,690	0.03
Malaysia	300,000	0.02
Thailand	300,000	0.02
Philippines	150,000	0.01
Subtotal ASEAN	3,748,597	0.27

Source: *KEDO Annual Report*, Appendix I

It was to be expected that the Republic of Korea, the United States and Japan were to be KEDO's primary contributors. The three accounted for 87.74% of total financial support to KEDO from 1995 to 2001. Among the other contributors, which included non-EU European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland and Switzerland), ASEAN members, Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile and Mexico), Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Oman, the EU and its member states provided the largest share (over 6% of the total for the period), most of which came from the European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM). ASEAN's six original member states all made contributions, representing roughly a quarter of 1% of the total. ASEAN as an organization distinct from its members made no contribution at all. It goes without saying that the extent of financial participation conditions the influence of each group in decision-making within KEDO, affording the EU greater possibilities than those open to ASEAN.

That said, EU participation in KEDO also illustrates the obstacles to a more active EU CFSP. In order to meet the EU's financial obligations, the European Commission took ECU 5 million from the CFSP budget and an additional ECU 10 million from the budget for non-government organizations (NGOs), a circumstance that prompts the suspicion that the contingency had not been adequately provided for. When the European Parliament discovered this, it sought to delay payments for 1997 and 1998. The Parliament was unhappy at not having been consulted, but the Commission maintained that the contribution to KEDO was within the scope of the EURATOM Treaty Article 101, which did not require consultation with the Parliament. Faced with a *fait accompli*, i.e. EU accession to the KEDO Agreement, the Parliament agreed to approve the agreement on condition that the Council and the Commission sign an Inter-institutional Agreement on all nuclear matters under EURATOM and consult with the European Parliament. The Commission and the Council only consented to an exchange of letters giving the Parliament a consultative role in all international nuclear energy agreements, provided that these agreements were 'of particular significance'. This last condition implied that the Commission could choose not to inform the Parliament about any agreement that did not meet this criterion. Consequently the Parliament reserved the right to block KEDO contributions in the future (Lim, 1999:23-24). For the EU's partners and outside observers it is not easy to grasp the import of these intra-EU disputes, which can only undermine EU credibility and effectiveness as a partner.

If the ARF's role in KEDO did not go beyond that of encouragement, its role in the run-up to the independence of East Timor was even more ineffectual. Within the EU, the appropriate policy to adopt became a matter of controversy, but whatever positive contribution the EU made to East Timorese independence was achieved in spite of, and not because of, the ARF.

East Timor, which Indonesia had invaded in 1975 and occupied for more than two decades, only became a thorn in ASEAN-EU relations in the early 1990s, after Portugal, the former colonial power, had become an EU member and the EU itself decided to place greater emphasis on human rights, democracy and the rule of law in its relations with third states (the following is summarized from Robles, forthcoming). Despite Portugal's veto on the signing of a new ASEAN-EU agreement, European states which were supplying arms to Indonesia sought to placate the latter. It was not until the Suharto regime had fallen in 1998 that

Portugal and Indonesia were able to reach an agreement (5 May 1999) to organize a referendum on autonomy or independence. The Commission then proposed assistance worth 1 million Euros for monitoring the referendum, in addition to a long-term aid programme of 15-20 million Euros. The European Parliament requested that a UN police force be deployed immediately in East Timor, instead of entrusting to Indonesia responsibility for maintaining peace and order during the referendum. Regrettably this call was not heeded. The EU, for its part, sent an observer mission, which was impressed by the East Timorese population's determination to vote in the face of intimidation by pro-Indonesian militias. The Observer Mission also called for a rapid decision on the sending of a peace-keeping force. The massacres and forced resettlement that had compelled 250,000 East Timorese to flee to the mountains and 200,000 others to seek refuge in West Timor prompted several members of the European Parliament to denounce the 'obvious and premeditated will of the Indonesian authorities to embark on ethnic cleansing'; they called on the Commission and the Council to freeze all forms of cooperation with Indonesia, and on the EU and the UN to act to prevent East Timor from becoming the Kosovo of Asia. Finland, which at the time held the EU Presidency, urged Indonesia to end the violence and to request that the UN Security Council authorize an armed presence. NGOs and trade unions joined in the appeal to the EU to decide in favour of sending a peace-keeping force. The major powers, negotiating at the UN, refused to do so in deference to Indonesia (Cahin, 2000:144-48). But the EU was unable to turn a deaf ear to demands for action from European public opinion. In mid-September 1999, the Council of the EU imposed sanctions on Indonesia in the form of a ban, until 17 January 2000, on the export of arms, munitions and military equipment to Indonesia, which also covered contracts entered into before the embargo, as well as a ban on the supply of equipment that might be used for internal repression or terrorism. Bilateral military cooperation between Indonesia and EU member states was also suspended.

Regardless of the way we assess the effectiveness of the EU's actions, they contrast sharply with the ARF's inability to serve as a forum for discussion of the massacres in East Timor. Obviously between 1994 and 1998 no reference to it appeared in the statements of the ARF Chairmen. It was only in the summary report of the November 1999 and April 2000 meetings of the ARF's Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures that a first, timid reference to East Timor was made. Even so, most participants were still very cautious; as the statement puts it, 'the participants noted that some members mentioned in their statements the latest developments in East Timor and welcomed the positive developments that have taken place' (ISG CBM:1999-2000, para. 7). At the seventh ARF, participants were finally bold enough to welcome the positive trends that had taken place there, particularly the cooperation between Indonesia and the UN, and 'underscored the need for continued international attention to and support for the reconstruction, rehabilitation and nation building of East Timor' (ARF, 2000:§18). Curiously, the ARF participants deplored the death of a UN Peace Keeper but not that of several hundred thousand East Timorese during two decades of Indonesian occupation.

The ARF participants' caution can be explained by the insistence of many of them on the principle of non intervention and by the desire to defer to the occupying power, Indonesia, which sees itself as ASEAN's *de facto* leader. Nevertheless, this caution belies the claim made that the ARF participants 'have become more

comfortable with each other through frequent interactions in the various ARF fora. Such enhanced comfort levels have enabled ARF participants to exchange views frankly on issues of common concern, thereby encouraging greater transparency and mutual understanding' (ARF, 1999:para. 4).

It is possible to argue that the ARF's passiveness respected a tacit division of labour between the ARF and the UN, which had sponsored the Indonesian-Portuguese agreement and had brokered international efforts to set up an Observer Mission. This argument of a division of labour cannot be pushed too far, as it would call into question ARF efforts to discuss ratification and implementation of multilateral arms control treaties of which the UN Secretary General is a depositary. Interestingly enough, individual Indonesian scholars are now willing to admit that domestic problems may also become regional problems and that non intervention as a principle is passé. Jusuf Wanandi concedes, with the benefit of hindsight, that ASEAN's more active and immediate engagement could have prevented the bloodshed (Wanandi, 2001:30).

In brief, while the EU's contribution to the ARF may have been modest, KEDO and East Timor lead us to believe that the EU is also capable of playing a role in East Asian security without having to rely on the ARF. Is it possible that the further development of the CFSP, particularly in the form of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and the new prominence of the fight against terrorism will enhance cooperation between the EU and East Asia, if not the ARF?

III. The EU as a Security Actor: The ESDP, the Fight against Terrorism and the ARF (2000/01-)

Even with the ESDP it is quite likely that the EU will continue to concentrate on relations with the developing countries in its periphery. But the international fight against terrorism is compatible with changes in the conceptualization of security occurring in Europe, and may thus become an area for concrete security cooperation between Europe and East Asia.

a. The ESDP as an Instrument of Crisis Management and Prevention

The reform of the CFSP is an ongoing process. The Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1998, introduced several innovations, notably the appointment of a High Representative and special representatives for special issues; the introduction of potential qualified majority voting, which can be blocked by a potential veto; the shift towards a division of labour between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU); and the integration of Petersberg Missions – humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and crisis management, including peace making – into the EU (Dehousse, 1998:534-37). The Cologne European Council (December 1999) declared the EU's intention to provide itself with 'the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces and the means to decide to use them'. A Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the core of an EU military staff were set up to be operational in 2001. A Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was to be in place by 2003. It would be capable of deployment within 60 days, sustainable in the field for one year and able to carry out the Petersberg Missions.

The 2000 Nice Treaty seems to signal a new phase in the CFSP's evolution, through the endorsement of a European Security and Defence Policy. The name, though, may be misleading. To be sure, all but one of the references to the WEU were removed from the TEU, implying that the EU would henceforth be directly responsible for framing the CFSP's defence aspects and providing access to operational capabilities. That said, the ESDP's emphasis lies, for the moment, in conflict prevention and crisis management (Duke, 2001:159-60). This orientation is confirmed by the adoption at Göteborg in June 2001 of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, which declared that conflict prevention is one of the main objectives of EU external relations. Within this circumscribed security area, the EU decided that it should be able to decide autonomously on crisis management operations; that it should have the capacity to implement them autonomously if necessary, without the use of NATO assets; but that the EU will only implement operations 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged'. In application of the Nice Treaty, institution building has proceeded apace. The new Political Committee meets more regularly than its predecessor, the PSC. The EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff provide the structure for situation assessments and military direction of United States crisis management directions. By the time of its meeting at Laeken in December 2001, the European Council was able to declare that the ESDP was 'partly operational'.

The vital question is whether the EU's ability to act as a security actor in East Asia has been greatly enhanced by the EDSP. The underlying weakness of the ESDP, as Sven Biscop points out, is the lack of a strategic concept that can guide the military staff in preparing a typology of operations and conducting day-to-day policies, while at the same time guaranteeing democratic legitimacy and transparency and allaying the neutral members' suspicions regarding the CFSP's 'militarization' (Biscop, 2002a:4-5). The divisions among member states over NATO's role in European defence largely explain the somewhat surprising absence of a strategic concept. Rather than not make any progress at all, the EU member states decided to focus their attention on the issues on which agreement was possible, i.e. on institution building (Biscop, 2002a:3-4).

It is not impossible to discern the contours of a strategic concept, as Biscop argues convincingly. It should come as no surprise that it is the European periphery – Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean – that appears to be the ESDP priority. At the Seville European Council of June 2000, the EU expressed its willingness to undertake the operation following the NATO operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which protected international monitors from the EU and the OSCE who were overseeing implementation of the peace plan there. An EU Police Mission (EUPM) was also launched in 2002 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a follow-up to the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) (Biscop, 2002a:7).

Outside Europe, it is the developing countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean that will probably be the EU's main partners. Unlike the CEEC, these countries have little prospect of membership, yet because of the existence of numerous disputes, the high degree of militarization and the low level of economic integration, one cannot exclude that they will pose security risks to the EU (Biscop, 2002b:3-4). The EU already committed itself in 1995 to a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which, like the CSCE, has three baskets: a political-security partnership, an economic and financial partnership, with a free trade area between

these countries and the EU as a long-term goal; and a partnership in social, cultural and humanitarian affairs. So far the EMP has very few concrete achievements to its credit, apart from some very low-level confidence and security-building measures, such as training seminars for diplomats (Biscop, 2002b:4). This observation prompts us to ask the following question: if the EU has been able to make only very modest progress, in eight years, in a partnership with a region that is geographically close to Europe and where its political, strategic and economic interests seem to be fairly clear-cut, is it realistic to expect the EU to aspire to a more ambitious role in East Asia?

In the past, the Europeans have answered this question by admitting that Europe could not make an immediate contribution to the solution of longstanding conflicts. Rather its contribution to East Asian security would be indirect. It could, for instance, send peace-keeping troops in the framework of a UN operation (Harris and Bridges, 1983:44; Stares and Regaud, 1997-8) or put a fixed number of troops permanently at the disposal of the UN (Biscop, 2002a:8). A possible precedent may be the EU's decision in May 2002 to deploy 1500 troops as a peace-keeping force to the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is not in one of the CFSP's or the EDSP's priority regions. For the moment, though, there is little evidence that East Asian states are willing to call on UN peace-keeping forces, with or without a European contingent, as a means of addressing any of the disputes among East Asian states.

Significant changes in the nature of the security problematic in Europe in the post-Cold War period may combine with the fight against terrorism after September 11 to open a new area of security cooperation between Europe and East Asia.

b. The Changing Nature of the Security Problematic in Europe

The collapse of the Eastern bloc on the one hand, and the expansion of the security agenda on the other, have triggered two separate structural changes that are slowly blurring, if not dissolving, the distinction between internal and external security (this follows largely Bigo, 2000).

Now that the external enemy – the USSR – has disappeared, external security agencies – defence ministries and armed forces in individual European countries – have been searching for new adversaries, whose existence could justify the maintenance of defence and research and development (R and D) budgets. Increasingly these agencies have looked inside their own states for the new enemies and perhaps predictably, have found them among immigrants, the second generation population and even inhabitants of inner cities or the disadvantaged suburbs. The assumption is that unemployment and marginalization may drive these groups of people to crime. At the same time, internal security agencies – national police forces, the police with military status, border guards, and customs police – are looking beyond their respective borders in the fight against their internal enemies, who are assumed to be embedded in international crime networks. The new enemies are hooligans, migrants, asylum seekers, drug and human traffickers, terrorists and – why not – also Muslims. The result is convergence towards the same enemy (or enemies). For this reason, external security agencies are intensifying their collaboration with internal security agencies within countries, at the same time as the latter are also collaborating ever more closely with their counterparts abroad.

In this context, the fight against

international terrorism after September 11 cannot but appear to be a suitable area for security cooperation between Europe and East Asia. This does not at all prejudice the form that cooperation should take. In other words, the ARF will not necessarily be the ideal forum for this cooperation. For many years now, the EU has been holding separate dialogues with individual Asian states, particularly China, and with ASEAN. For instance, at an EU-China summit, held in 2000, discussion was pursued on joint action against trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration (Möller, 2002:26). The Fourteenth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, held in Brussels in January 2003, adopted a Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism (EU 5811/03 [Presse 19]). The ARF's inability to facilitate agreements could increase the attractiveness of bilateral dialogues while at the same time highlighting the importance of universal fora. The reference to the ARF in the joint declaration (para. 4) cannot hide the fact that out of seven possible measures, three would be implemented through ASEAN-EU cooperation. These include exchange of information, strengthening of links between EU and ASEAN law enforcement agencies, and capacity building [para. 6]. The other four measures require cooperation within a universal framework – implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, implementation of UN conventions and protocols, conclusion and adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and early entry into force of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its protocols.

For the Asian side, the growing prominence of these 'new' security threats carries with it the risk that citizens from their countries are increasingly identified with these risks. Avoiding this risk should be one of the objectives of a security dialogue with the EU.

Conclusion

If definition of the EU's security interests in East Asia and specification of the EU contribution to security in that region have proven to be arduous tasks for the EU and its member states, East Asian states have not been any more successful in articulating their vision of a European role. Kay Möller goes so far as to assert that China neither wants nor expects Europe to play a role in East Asia (Möller, 2002:30).

Although East Asian visions are essential, it would be hazardous to conceptualize the EU's role as a security actor by relying solely on expectations, ideas and intersubjective knowledge of the EU and East Asian states. Attention should be paid not only to the opportunities created by new structural contexts, but also to the constraints inherent in the international context, in the nature of the EU as an institution and in the nature of East Asian regionalism. Failure to do so creates the risk that discussions between the EU and East Asia will remain at the lofty level of 'common' or 'shared' interests, which are potentially infinite, without making any progress in materializing these interests.

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The European Union's Contribution to the ASEAN Regional Forum: Economic and Security Agenda

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The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept Paper adopted in 1995 stated that 'The main challenge of the ARF is to sustain and enhance this peace and prosperity' in the region.[1] In other words, the ultimate goal of the ARF is to maintain peace and stability in the region, facilitating the region's development. Between peace, stability and economic development there exists a strong nexus. In most cases, peace is the pre-condition for stability and economic development. Vice versa, without economic development, it is hard to maintain a long-lasting positive peace. It is commonly acknowledged among the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that the current fight against terrorism should be linked to the struggle against poverty. Without hunger elimination and poverty alleviation in underdeveloped areas in some countries, the issue of terrorism can hardly be tackled.

The European Union's (EU) contribution to the ARF, first and foremost, is to help the countries of the region achieve their goal of maintaining long-lasting and positive stability in the region by helping to boost economic development. To this end, the EU's socio-economic cooperation with the region through the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) should be continued and promoted.

The EU's contribution to the ARF through an economic cooperation agenda is also significant in the context that the ARF-8 has determined 'economic security is fast becoming a major concern of all nations, both developing and developed alike'.[2] Yet economic security, in my observation, is perceived in different ways by these two groups of countries. Developed nations define economic security as the ability of a state to maintain economic sovereignty against external threats, i.e. to preserve sovereign economic affairs without external interference. For developing nations, threats to economic security are not only found in the external dimension but also in the internal dimension: the requirement to satisfy people's 'needs and wants'. In this regard, the EU contribution is very much appreciated. Various measures can be named but I would like to draw your attention to two points. First, through the socio-economic cooperation agenda, the EU can help regional countries, particularly the less developed nations, to satisfy their own people's 'needs and wants' – material, physical (health), spiritual and cultural, narrowing the disparity and bridging the development gap between regional countries. Second, with their expertise, EU members, including Germany, can help ASEAN prevent a flow of old, backward technology, counterfeited goods and laundered money that will negatively affect

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1. ARF Concept Paper, http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/arf2conc.html
2. Chairman's statement, Eighth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Hanoi, 25 July 2001, http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/arf8_chairman.html

economic development of the regional nations.

Through nine annual ministerial meetings, the ARF has successfully created a security forum in the Asia-Pacific region. The greatest success among the three programmes so far has been with confidence-building measures (CBM). A number of confidence-building arrangements have exerted a positive influence on the regional security situation, particularly the question of transparency. This is a very important function of a regime that creates mutual confidence among regime members, thus avoiding the prisoners' dilemma. Also, it may help to reduce arms build-ups in the region. Currently, the ARF is moving to the second stage: preventive diplomacy. The ARF Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy (PD) adopted at the Eighth Meeting of the ARF in Hanoi, July 2001, provides that:

- the concept and principles of PD are not legal obligations;
- PD measures include: confidence-building efforts, norms building, enhancing channels of communication and the role of the ARF Chair. Norms building is defined as 'nurturing of accepted codes or norms of behaviour guiding the relationships among states in the Asia-Pacific region to the extent that the codes enhance predictability and strengthen cooperative behaviour in ensuring regional peace';
- the principles of PD are 'the non-use of force in inter-state relations, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of members, pragmatism, flexibility and consensus, consultation and accommodation';
- PD is a part of the ARF development process and is applied in the manner of gradualism, i.e. at a pace comfortable to all members. Decisions will be made in the principle of consensus and on the basis of non-interference in one another's internal affairs.[3]

Although there are a lot of questions as to what makes these norms effective, the set up of norms is very important. It proves that within the framework of the ARF, there are some specific agreements on matters of substantive significance within the issue-area.

In the ARF's moving forward as such, the EU could play an important role. First, the experiences of European countries in their integration processes could serve the building up of the ARF. However, Southeast Asian countries should draw their own conclusions after studying the successes and failures of the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Through a workshop held in Singapore three years ago on 'OSCE and its relevance to Asia-Pacific', it became clear that there is a big difference between Western and regional scholars in their respective approaches to the relevance of the OSCE to Asia Pacific. Westerners argue that the OSCE is relevant to Asia Pacific in that the two regions share several similarities: (1) The security threats stemming from ethnic issues and the arms-race; (2) The ARF, just like the OSCE, is advancing towards a multilateral security regime; and (3) Both the ARF and the OSCE are applying PD.

However, most Southeast Asian scholars argue that the regional environment is quite different from that in Europe, particularly with regard to questions of power balance, transparency and the level of development. Furthermore, Southeast Asia has not had

3. Annex D, ibid.

any experience in setting up a regional security arrangement. Some ASEAN researchers even argue that 'the ASEAN Way' is more efficient than OSCE measures, given the latter's failures in dealing with the Kosovo issue. In addition, the failure of EU cooperation in dealing with the United States concerning the Iraq war proved the limits of a regional setting.

It is a fact that both the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 1976 and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Documents (in the 1975-1990 period) set out cardinal principles: the non-use of force, the right of each nation to choose its own system politically, socially and economically, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and the need to enhance inter-state cooperation.[4] Besides, both the CSCE and the ARF offer dialogue to participating states to talk about security. Other areas of learning include: anti-transnational crimes and some of the OSCE's soft security policies, such as the policy to help settlement after a war and the policy of humanitarian aid.

However, the ARF should take a serious selective approach to the OSCE experience. A European scholar says that 'not all the functions developed by the CSCE/OSCE can be applied to the Asia-Pacific without qualification'.[5] While the ARF can learn from CSCE/OSCE experiences of CBMs, it is impossible to intervene in the same way that CSCE/OSCE has done, given the diversity of Southeast Asia and the commitment of regional countries to non-intervention.

Second, in the shadow of complexity in the post-Iraq war period, ASEAN should demonstrate its unity and strength in dealing with outside powers. If it fails to do this, ASEAN will fall into a power game – a category it has tried to escape since the end of the Cold War. To this end, the ARF should be further enhanced. The ARF was set up by a group of medium-sized and small countries that wished to be at the centre of a regional security framework. The notion of the ARF is based on ASEAN's wish to be the locomotive for any security regime set up in the region. The ARF's target is to 'intensify ASEAN's external dialogues in political and security matters as a means of building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-Pacific region' and to 'ensure and preserve the current environment of peace, prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific'.[6]

Europe can help ASEAN enhance its capacity building, particularly that of its newer members, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV). The lack of fluent English, for instance, might cause some difficulties for those countries' officials who are participating in the regional forum.

In short, it could be said that the ARF has provided frameworks for establishing legal liability (even if these are not perfect); improved the quantity and quality of information available to actors; reduced other transactions costs, such as costs of organization or of making side-payments.[7] In so doing, though it does not 'make agreement easier' as Keohane wishes when he discusses the function of a regime, it

4. Joachim Krause, *The OSCE and Cooperative Security in Europe*, IDSS Monograph No. 6 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 131.
5. Ibid., p. 129.
6. The Chairman's statements of the first and second ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, 25 July 1994 and Brunei Darulsalam, 1 August 1995, respectively, http://www.ASEAN.or.id/politics/pol_arf1.htm and http://www.ASEAN.or.id/politics/pol_arf2.htm
7. Robert O. Keohane, 'The demand for international regimes', in *International Regimes*, ed. by Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

does create mutual understanding among ASEAN countries as well as between ASEAN and other countries inside and outside the region. The ARF has made a significant contribution to the establishment of a strong foundation of trust and confidence among the members, thus instilling a high sense of collective commitment to regional peace and stability, eliminating security uncertainties in the Asia-Pacific region and defusing conflict situations before they become dangerous.[8]

The ARF is in the process of development with ASEAN as a locomotive. This is in the interests of all regional countries. In this process, the successes and failures of a fore-runner (the OSCE) can serve as experiences for a late-comer such as the ARF. It is a selective learning process – the ARF can glean for itself from the OSCE successes and failures. Given the differences in culture, economic development and integration levels between the two organizations, ASEAN, as the learning organization, can carry out serious research and take into consideration some relevant experiences while disregarding others.

8. Chairman's Statement of the Fifth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Manila, 27 July 1998, www.ASEAN.or.id/politics/pol_arf5.htm

The European Union's Contributions to the ASEAN Regional Forum

Winston McColgan*

This conference represents an initiative of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Second Track, which has already contributed positively and substantively to the process, but it addresses the performance of the ARF First Track, and as the Diplomatic Representative of the European Commission in Cambodia, I think the best contribution I can make is first to outline the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and then to give some information about how this policy is applied to our participation in the ARF.

Let me begin by outlining the objectives of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. These objectives are spelled out in the Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht in 1993. They were prepared by the EU Council, where all the member states and the European Commission participate in the formulation of policy. They were endorsed by the European Parliament and the national parliaments of all the EU member states. They came into force in 1999, following the formal ratification of the Treaty, and they are binding on EU member states and on all EU institutions.

The objectives of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy are as follows:

1. to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the United Nations Charter;
2. to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
3. to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the objectives of the Helsinki Final Act and the Objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
4. to promote international cooperation;
5. to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

These last three objectives, in particular, are highly relevant to the EU's participation in the ARF.

The EU implements these objectives by establishing Common Positions on specific issues, (which are also binding on all member states and EU institutions), and by undertaking Common Actions, where the capacities of the member states and the EU institutions are coordinated into a single action plan.

The EU also undertakes both public and private diplomacy. EU public statements on current political issues are made following discussion in the EU Council. In the area of private diplomacy, political dialogue is conducted on a continuous basis with a whole range of third countries. And confidential démarches are made to the governments of our partner countries at

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any time when the Council wishes to express its concerns about political developments or to obtain information.

Private diplomacy is usually undertaken in EU Troika formation. That means that a small group, made up of representatives of four EU institutions: the current EU Presidency, the Secretary-General of the Council (who also exercises the function of the High Representative for the CSFP), the European Commission and – when the Council so decides – the next member state to hold the EU Presidency. The Troika speaks on the basis of a 'steering brief' agreed by all the members of the Council and it therefore fully represents the EU. Such a Troika participated in the Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum Meeting in Phnom Penh in June 2003.

For completeness, I might add that, in addition to these regular CSFP mechanisms, the EU also maintains a political presence in a number of areas of crisis or conflict, by the appointment of EU Special Representatives. For example, Special Representatives have been appointed to the Middle East, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Afghanistan. Their purpose is to allow the EU to have an active involvement in the search for lasting solutions.

I might also recall that the CSFP is still developing. It has not yet reached perfect agreement on all issues. The EU is made up of 15 member states with different traditions and different experiences, and all of the participating governments are answerable to their different electorates. But the rapid return to 'business as usual' in the Council after strong disagreement by some members over the war in Iraq – which some commentators gleefully interpreted at the time as the irretrievable breakdown of the CSFP – demonstrated not only the wholehearted commitment of the EU as a whole to democratic debate, but also the strength of the machinery we have put in place to discuss differences freely and openly in the framework of the agreed CSFP objectives.

But let me return to the EU's participation in the ARF. The EU has been a dialogue partner of ASEAN for many years and warmly welcomed ASEAN's initiative to establish the ARF as a Regional Security Forum, the only one in Asia. We have been actively involved since the beginning, participating in the annual Ministerial and Officials Meetings, as well as the Intersessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building Measures.

The EU participates in the ARF discussions as equal partners with the other members. We fully share the evolutionary approach agreed by the ARF partners to develop from Confidence-building Measures to Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution in a step-by-step manner. While we respect the general view that this process should proceed at a pace that is comfortable for all ARF members, we have endeavoured to contribute our own experience of these areas of action to help such a comfort level to be achieved sooner rather than later.

I had the honour to be present myself when the Eighth ARF Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi agreed in July 2001 on three important papers for taking the process further. First, a paper on Concepts and Principles for Preventive Diplomacy, drafted by Singapore; second, a paper on the Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair, drafted by Japan; and third, a paper on Terms of Reference for the ARF Experts and Eminent Persons' Register, drafted by the Republic of Korea. The EU strongly supported these papers. We saw them as equipping the ARF to continue its development towards a more pro-active stance, even though the paper on Preventive Diplomacy was only adopted at

that time as 'a snapshot of the current discussion'.

The Ninth ARF Ministerial Meeting, held in Brunei in July 2002, continued the now well-established tradition of frank discussion of current political issues in the region – on that occasion developments in the Korean Peninsula and in India and Pakistan. Ministers also adopted a Statement on Measures against Terrorism Financing. This was followed up by an Intersessional Support Group Meeting on Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime in Malaysia in March 2003, in which an EU Troika delegation also participated.

The Brunei Ministerial also adopted recommendations for the future development of the ARF, including the enhancement of intelligence sharing, the consolidation of measures to combat international terrorism and to further the work on preventive diplomacy. These recommendations were supported by the EU.

As another small indicator of progress in the development of the ARF, it is worth mentioning that Brunei, as ARF Chair, issued the first ever ARF Political Declaration, following the events in the United States on September 11. This action was the first visible step in the implementation of the paper on the Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair.

In this context, I would also like to pay tribute to the efforts of the Royal Government of Cambodia, and in particular His Excellency Hor Nam Hong, Senior Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, for providing leadership for the ARF during the year of Cambodia's chairmanship, and to express my best wishes for the success of the Tenth ARF Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh.

From my knowledge of the preparations for this meeting, I can assure you that the agenda will again be both substantive and relevant. And I can assure you that the EU remains committed to the ARF, just as we are committed to the continued development of the ASEM dialogue process between Asia and Europe. (We are already engaged actively with our ASEM partners in the preparation of the Fifth ASEM Summit to be held in Hanoi in October 2004).

We also remain committed to the continued strengthening of our region-to-region relationship with ASEAN. (This was well illustrated by the successful EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in January 2003).

As a full participant in the ARF Track One process, the EU will work to contribute actively both to the Tenth ARF Ministerial Meeting and to the continued development of the ARF as a regional security organization equipped to face up to the challenges of today and tomorrow.

Summary

The ASEAN Regional Forum at Ten and Europe's Contribution

Kao Kim Hourn*

Background

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been making considerable progress in promoting regional peace and stability. Directly or indirectly, formally or informally, the ARF has become a legitimate political and security forum which has been fostering and cultivating dialogue on key international security and political issues, particularly in Asia Pacific. The ARF has been working on wide-ranging security issues, including a conventional security agenda addressing nuclear weapon and proliferation issues, as well as non-traditional security, including issues such as terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, the illegal arms trade and human trafficking.

As such, the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung jointly organized a conference entitled 'The ASEAN Regional Forum at Ten and Europe's Contribution' to discuss the following key issues in depth:

1. The ARF at ten: A decade of achievements and challenges;
2. The relevance of the ARF in today's changing security environment;
3. Europe's contribution to the ARF: A critical assessment;
4. Multilateralism: Is it an answer for ASEAN's security needs?; and
5. The future direction of the ARF: Issues, strategies and challenges.

In order to provide a balanced assessment of the ARF, the organizers invited regional and international experts to share their studies and perspectives on the evolution and relevancy of the ARF on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of this regional political and security forum. As a result, the following report is based on the points of view and issues raised by experts and officials who participated in the meeting.

The Report

This report is based on the substantive discussions of the abovementioned conference. While it elaborates on the activities of the conference, the assessments of the subject matter are for policy briefing, as well as the broader interests of academics and all other interested people. The objective of the report was to generate policy recommendations and to provide inputs into Track One as well as Track Two in the furtherance of discussion and research on the ARF. It also aims to help strengthen the linkages between Track One and Track Two.

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The ARF at Ten: A Decade of Achievements and Challenges

There are no doubts about the achievements and successes of the ARF. The ARF has been able to stabilize potential regional conflicts by enhancing trust and initiating work on preventive diplomacy. The ARF is not without a political and security agenda as some have argued. In fact, the ARF has the commitment of all participating states to discuss a wide range of political and security issues as well as the need to overcome institutional challenges within the ARF as it grows in importance.

For the ARF, security resolution or conflict resolution strategy and dialogue has been largely cultivated and practised through a culture of consensus building and confidence-building measures (CMBs). This habit of dialogue and consultation has enabled the ARF to build confidence and trust between and among the participating states, to mobilize support from ARF participants and to neutralize any potential security conflicts (for instance, the South China Sea). On the other hand, non-conventional security threats, namely, transnational crime, terrorism, human trafficking and the illegal arms trade all have implications for the political and security dimensions of the region. These threats are real in the region. As such, the ARF has strengthened consultations among the ARF participating states, and has helped manage the impact of growing concerns about all security-related issues.

In terms of hard security issues, the increasing unilateralism of the United States, the rise of China, the China Straits tensions and the Korean peninsula situation are of significant concern to all ARF participating members, including ASEAN, as well as to the world. Although the ARF has been successful with CBMs and has moved on with preventive diplomacy, the spirit and the letter of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) remain vital to both ASEAN and the ARF, given the role of ASEAN as a primary driving force within the ARF.

However, equally important, the ARF has been recognizing the role of Track Two in policy debate and analysis, especially the policy recommendations which can be integrated into ARF policy formulation. The ARF has acknowledged the important contribution of ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). Track Two contribution has reinforced confidence-building measures in the region and thus there has been a movement towards strengthening ties between the Track One (government) and Track Two (experts).

Since its inception, there have been growing expectations of the ARF, particularly in terms of its political commitment and institutionalization. The expectations have been that without formal institutionalization of the ARF, it would be difficult for the ARF to remain responsive to the increasing number of challenges to the political and security dimensions of the region today.

In this regard, the ARF must be seen to be dynamic in responding to new security threats. Such threats require the ARF:

1. to have a permanent secretariat (more institutionalization);
2. to employ innovative strategies and methods in responding to new security developments and dynamics (a more flexible role and practical strategy rather than always focusing on a consensus-building approach); and
3. to enforce collective action while balancing the preservation of the core value of sovereignty and non-interference principle (coalition of the willing).

On institutionalization, there is now a growing recognition that the ARF needs to move in this direction, as it is important for information sharing and transparency, and would thus minimize misperceptions and facilitate the maintenance of up-to-date information about other national interests and prospects for cooperation. But above all, it is the political will of participating countries that determines the effectiveness and further achievements of the ARF, especially in the coming decade.

In short, the ARF is a potential power balancer in an era of growing uncertainty, given the increasing unilateral role of the superpower in world politics today, and the rise of terrorism. The ARF has the potential to influence the Asia Pacific regional security architecture, and therefore it can remain dynamic in terms of moving ahead toward greater institutionalization and mobilization of greater political commitments for the support of the collective regional cooperative security framework.

For the ARF to become more effective, more relevant and more influential, it will need to focus more on the following issues:

1. stronger political commitments;
2. the provision of open information and access to information;
3. the promotion and enhancement of greater transparency;
4. becoming more willing to accept the policy recommendations of Track Two as well as to engage in dialogue with Track One on the ARF;
5. improving crisis response mechanisms;
6. identifying common threat perceptions;
7. keeping the process of the ARF moving through all the phases at a much faster pace

The Relevance of the ARF in Today's Changing Security Environment

The ARF is a relevant political and security forum. Although the ARF is experiencing institutional challenges, such challenges do not necessarily make the ARF irrelevant. Accordingly, legitimacy and the existence of the ARF are vital. Despite the challenges confronting the ARF, most participants agreed that the organization remains relevant and useful in neutralizing any threats and reducing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. They also stated that creating a system of cooperative security through inclusive dialogues among like-minded as well as non-like minded ARF participants is a positive step forward for the ARF.

However, some participants argued that the relevancy of the ARF is not an issue, as the standards of institutional relevancy vary from country to country and from region to region. Some Asians, for instance, have argued that the security environment of this region is in sharp contrast to that of Europe. Asia is culturally more heterogeneous than Europe; nonetheless, the ARF can still learn from the European experience, for example from the vast experience of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which has features that are comparable to its Asia-Pacific equivalent. However, it would be quite uncharacteristic for the ARF to assimilate the OSCE model totally.

What is required then from the ARF is the reality and ability of this grouping to resolve or manage certain conflicts. In that context, the ARF has not been able to provide cooperative security, even though the process of security consultation and cooperation provides temporary peace of mind.

A point in case, the Philippines has been forced to pursue convergent security because of the perceived threat from China in the Mischief Reef incident, which compelled it to depend on the established security protection and closer security relations with the United States. What is important is the fact that the ARF is not a regional security organization, and it does not pretend to be one in this regard.

In sum, the relevancy of the ARF is very much intact, but the absence of leadership, direction and political commitment may make the ARF become irrelevant. It is for this reason that the critics of the ARF still argue that the ARF is merely a 'talk shop'.

Europe's Contribution to the ARF: A Critical Assessment

The extent to which the EU has contributed to the ARF is still being debated. There are several reasons why the EU has not been able to contribute much to the development of the ARF. For one obvious reason, the EU institutional structure is characterized by different perceptions on foreign policy. A greater problem is that the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) ran aground against the identity and value of the ARF members.

It is well known that the CFSP objective is to assert a European Identity on the international scene. The objectives are laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, and are postulated as such: to safeguard common values, fundamental interests and the independence of the EU; to strengthen the security of the EU and its member states; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; and to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedom.

Given such concrete foreign policy objectives, the presence of the EU in the ARF indicates three specific agendas, albeit under the pretext of human security and the EU's interest in the region. First, the EU chair in the ARF is driven by political economy; second, the ARF is a communication channel to the rest of Asia Pacific; and third, the EU is keen to promote the OSCE model for the ARF.

Therefore, the assessment indicates that while the EU wants to be effective and active in helping the ARF, it has to resolve its own foreign policy commitment and leadership. The EU has been a supporting actor in two conflict resolutions: 1) the KEDO; and 2) East Timor.

Based on the level of participation and engagement in the ARF, the EU has been ambiguous with its commitments, while at the same time attempting to earn recognition for its presence in the region. Structural constraints have impeded the EU from delivering the needed components for strengthening the ARF, especially strengthening the identity of the ARF, and a commitment towards the forging of a Southeast Asian cooperative security.

Against this scenario, it is recommended that the EU should come up with a compatible cooperative security model for Southeast Asia. While the EU's CFSP is a respectable foreign policy doctrine, the ARF has yet to establish hard institutions on a par with those of the EU. On the other hand, EU and ARF relations depend on the level of the EU's commitment to helping Southeast Asia.

The EU can contribute to the development of the ARF through 'human security', technical support and economic cooperation such as investment and access to European markets.

Multilateralism: Is It an Answer for ASEAN's Security Needs?

Experts and participants debated the pros and cons of multilateralism versus bilateralism. The premise of the argument emphasizes the efficiency, effectiveness and resourcefulness of the approach. As such, ARF members presently adopt a multilateral approach to keep each other informed but simultaneously practice a bilateral approach to achieve specific objectives. On the other hand, the multilateral approach is perceived to minimize risk, but expand opportunities for strategic alliance. However, it should be noted that the multilateral approach is useful for critical issues but such an approach would require hard institutions to maximize consistency and predictability while minimizing contentions.

Multilateralism is therefore not a fixed solution to the ARF scenario. ARF member countries do adopt convergent security strategies, but not all will compromise their sovereignty to bring about regional conflict resolution. As a result, there is no commitment to any one particular approach. For instance, ARF member countries have different political systems, geography, levels of development and culture and these elements are sensitive to each member country. Nonetheless, the ARF continues to map out strategies to develop a comprehensive regional conflict resolution operation.

The Future Direction of the ARF: Issues, Strategies and Challenges

Participants argued that the future of the ARF rests entirely on the political commitment of the participating countries, leadership, institutionalization of the organization and its direction. While transparency in consultation is useful in moving the ARF process forward, the work of preventive diplomacy in the ARF remains a challenge. Therefore, the usefulness of the ARF will be the determinant of its relevancy and its ability to manage the political and security issues in the region. But the ARF can enhance its relevancy and role by redefining its function and response strategy against security issues such as transnational crime, illegal trade, narcotic and human trafficking, counter-terrorism and anti-piracy.

While the ARF sees the need for continuing consultation for cooperative security, it is important that it moves toward greater institutionalization, establishing greater interaction among the member countries, enhancing the role of the ARF Chair, and accepting greater inputs from Track Two, including the establishment and operationalization of Eminent and Expert Persons (EEPs) within the ARF framework.

Conclusion

In summary, it is important to highlight the following issues as part of the recommendations of this Track Two ARF Conference:

1. There is no doubt that the ARF is still very relevant in the Asia-Pacific region as a forum for consultation and dialogue on political and security issues. But there is a great need for more institutionalization and shared leadership between ASEAN and non-

ASEAN participating countries in the ARF.

2. There is a need for the ARF to move beyond the consensus-building approach and, if necessary, the 'coalition of the willing' approach may be explored. The ARF cannot remain static, as its evolution over the past ten years indicates the need to move the pace and process at a greater speed is vital to this regional political and security grouping.
3. While the EU experience and model cannot be duplicated or replicated, the ARF can still benefit from the EU's decade of trials and errors. In this regard, one point that may of interest to the ARF is the process of institutionalization.
4. While multilateralism is not an answer to all the political and security problems in Asia Pacific, it remains important for both ASEAN and the ARF, as ASEAN is still the primary driving force of the ARF.
5. There is a greater need for a more enhanced interaction and dialogue between Track One and Track Two in both ASEAN and the ARF.
6. The enhanced role of the ARF chair remains crucial to the organization, and it is important that the ARF chair plays its role to the maximum in consultation with the participating countries, especially in the period between the annual meetings of ARF ministers.
7. The ARF needs to move on from the CBMs phase to other phases. Although this should be done at a pace comfortable to all, it also has to be at a pace that keeps the ARF relevant and constructive in a period of growing transnational security issues.

The Fourteenth EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting: Joint Co-Chairmen's Statement*

Brussels, 27-28 January 2003

1. Foreign Ministers of the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Commissioner for External Relations, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ASEAN Secretary General met in Brussels on 27-28 January 2003 for the Fourteenth EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, under the co-chairmanship of Greece, acting as Presidency of the EU Council, and Lao PDR as the ASEAN country coordinator for the EU-ASEAN dialogue. The list of Heads of delegation of ASEAN and the EU appears as Annex I (not included). The Meeting was held in the traditional EU-ASEAN spirit of cordiality, openness and mutual understanding.

A Progressive EU-ASEAN Dialogue

2. Ministers reaffirmed the high importance they attach to the EU-ASEAN relationship, and agreed on the need to further deepen the EU-ASEAN dialogue as a fundamental building block for the strategic partnership between Europe and Asia. To this end, Ministers stressed their determination to further enhance their cooperation at bilateral, sub-regional, regional and multilateral levels.

3. Ministers welcomed the significant progress made in the cooperation since the Thirteenth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Vientiane in 2000. They reiterated that economic and development cooperation, as well as political dialogue and cooperation, are key aspects driving EU-ASEAN relations. In this respect, they welcomed the progress in these areas of cooperation, including positive developments in political and security cooperation and growth in two-way trade and investment between the two regions.

4. Ministers reiterated the shared commitment towards peace and stability and welcomed the current cooperation between ASEAN and the EU in enhancing regional security through bilateral and multilateral channels, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Ministers welcomed the increasing importance of the ARF for dialogue and cooperation on security issues in the Asia Pacific region. They encouraged the further strengthening of this Forum, in particular through a reinforcement of confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy and practical cooperation in tackling common threats and problems in keeping with the ARF's principle of consensus and step-by-step approach. In this respect,

* The text of this statement was taken from www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asean/intro/14mm.htm

they welcomed the convening of the first ARF Intersessional Meeting on Terrorism and Transnational Crime on 21-22 March 2003 in Karambunai, in Sabah, Malaysia.

5. Ministers encouraged further dialogue on issues of common concern. The dialogue between the two regions will continue to be conducted on the basis of partnership, respect for the equality of civilizations and the conviction that cultural diversity is an asset. In this context, Ministers reaffirmed their shared commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights, including the right to development and fundamental freedoms.

6. Ministers recognized the further potential for enhanced cooperation across the board, including economic cooperation as a result of accelerated ASEAN economic integration and the forthcoming EU enlargement. They noted with satisfaction the significant progress made in the implementation of development cooperation activities within the dialogue framework, and looked forward to the full implementation of the activities set out in the 1999 EC-ASEAN Work Programme.

Injecting New Momentum into EU-ASEAN Relations

7. During the retreat on the evening of 27 January, Ministers had extensive preliminary discussions on ideas for reinvigorating political, economic and social aspects of the relationship at regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels. In this context, the Commission reaffirmed its intention to issue a communication on a new strategy for EU relations with Southeast Asia in the first half of this year.

8. Ministers discussed the priorities for future actions under the ASEAN-EU Cooperation Program to support the ASEAN economic integration process and to enhance ASEAN-EU cooperation in the economic and development cooperation areas, as well as information actions. ASEAN welcomed the EU programming mission to the ASEAN member countries and the ASEAN Secretariat to identify new cooperation activities to inject further momentum into the cooperation.

9. Ministers agreed that future ASEAN-EU cooperation should contribute to new dynamism in the trade relationship including expanding trade and investment flows, closer cooperation on trade facilitation, market access and investment issues, and to foster greater understanding and cooperation on issues of mutual interest in order to make progress in the multilateral trade negotiations. They also agreed that future cooperation should focus on non-traditional security issues, establishing channels of communication between the ASEAN Secretariat and relevant EU counterparts as well as environmental and cultural cooperation. This cooperation in areas of priority for both ASEAN and EU will be based on a practical and flexible approach, and will be jointly developed and implemented.

Key Developments in the EU and ASEAN

10. Ministers noted the major outcome of the Eighth ASEAN Summit, ASEAN Plus Three Summit and the ASEAN Plus One Summits with China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea, held in Phnom Penh in November 2002 as well as the Thirty-fifth AMM/PMC and the Ninth ARF in Bandar Seri Begawan in July-August 2002. The EU welcomed ASEAN efforts in ensuring the peace and security, deepening economic cooperation and integration, combating terrorism and transnational crimes, and strengthening economic linkages with ASEAN's dialogue partners.

11. The EU briefed the ASEAN side on the outcome of the European Council in Copenhagen concerning enlargement of the EU and on the most recent developments in European Security and Defence Policy. ASEAN welcomed the progress in the enlargement of the European Union and the greater political and economic role the EU is playing in the global arena.

12. The Ministers welcomed the increasing political and economic integration in the two regions and expressed the conviction that these developments would contribute to further strengthening ties between Europe and ASEAN. ASEAN expressed a strong interest in drawing on the EU's experiences to further enhance regional economic integration within ASEAN. The EU reiterated its readiness to assist ASEAN in its integration process through appropriate and mutually agreed cooperation activities. In particular, the EU's experiences offered a useful insight into this process.

13. The Ministers also welcomed the launching of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), with ASEAN countries playing the pivotal role, that would promote Asia-wide cooperation and contribute to global economic development.

International Issues

14. Ministers discussed the rising threat of terrorism and strongly condemned the heinous attacks perpetrated in the last months. They reiterated their firm commitment to work together to combat terrorism under the leadership of the United Nations (UN). To this end they adopted the EU-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Terrorism affirming their commitment to work together and to contribute to international efforts to fight terrorism.

15. Ministers acknowledged that the establishment of the International Criminal Court is a positive development in the fight against impunity for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.

16. Ministers had a thorough exchange of views on developments in Southeast Asia and Europe. These discussions were held in a very open and free-flowing manner and covered a wide range of issues of mutual interest.

17. The Ministers welcomed the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea during

the Eighth ASEAN Summit on 4 November 2002 in Phnom Penh. They agreed that the Declaration would further contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea.

18. Ministers had a frank discussion of the situation in Myanmar. They reiterated their appreciation of and support for UNSG (United Nations Secretary General) Special Representative Razali's efforts. They noted the cooperation extended to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights on his visits to Myanmar, and cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the country. They recognized that the process of national reconciliation was fragile and required a shared commitment by all to an intensified dialogue aimed at national unity, a restoration of democracy and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Ministers noted the readiness of several states and the European Commission to assist efforts to combat HIV/AIDS in Myanmar.

19. Ministers reiterated their support for the stability, territorial integrity and national unity of Indonesia, and welcomed its efforts to solve internal conflicts through dialogue and negotiation. In this context they warmly welcomed the signing of the Aceh Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Geneva on 9 December 2002. They also welcomed the readiness of several Southeast Asian countries to dispatch observers to monitor the agreement, as well as the readiness of the European side to assist politically and financially in the post-conflict rehabilitation of Aceh.

20. Ministers deeply regretted the decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its termination of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to resume its cooperation with the IAEA and to reverse its decision to withdraw from NPT and supported all efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the issues through dialogue. They supported the active engagement of the international community and appreciated the efforts made by the ARF and its Chair towards this endeavour.

21. Ministers expressed grave concern about the current situation in the Middle East and condemned the latest wave of violence. They urged the parties to show maximum restraint. They welcomed all initiatives contributing to a final, just and comprehensive settlement with two States, Israel and an independent, sovereign and democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. They particularly supported the work by the Middle East Quartet concerning a common road map leading to the establishment of such a state by 2005.

22. Ministers discussed the grave situation in Iraq and agreed that Iraq must honour its disarmament obligation in conformity with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. Ministers reiterated their support for the UN process, and called on Iraq to cooperate proactively and without reservations with the UN weapons inspectors.

23. Ministers exchanged views on the important role of the multilateral trading system embodied by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in

contributing to world economic growth and reinforcing international economic relations. On the ongoing round of multilateral trade negotiations, both sides underlined their commitment to closely work together to make progress substantially and comparably on all the Doha Development Agenda subjects, including market access issues, rule-making issues and the Doha mandates referring to development, which aim at the better integration of developing countries in the multilateral trading system. Both sides reiterated their support to the early entry of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam into the WTO.

24. The Ministers had a wide-ranging discussion on the international economic situation and the present global economic outlook. In this context, the Ministers stressed the need for closer economic cooperation between ASEAN and the EU, that would contribute positively to the economic growth of the two regions and the rest of the world.

25. Following the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development the EU invited those ASEAN partners who have not yet joined the EU renewable Energy Coalition, to join. The EU emphasized its energy partnership initiative on poverty eradication aiming to improve access to adequate, affordable and sustainable energy services.

The Future of EU-ASEAN relations

26. On the basis of their discussion on injecting new momentum into EU-ASEAN relations, Ministers agreed to develop a comprehensive and balanced agenda for the future in line with the goals and priorities of both sides. This agenda should in particular cover the following areas:

- Promotion of bilateral trade and investment flows;
- Promotion of sustainable and equitable development;
- Cooperation to combat transnational crime and terrorism;
- Promotion of cultural cooperation and people-to-people contacts between ASEAN and the EU;
- Promotion of dialogue on issues of common concern, such as democracy, good governance, human rights and the rule of law.

27. In this context, the Ministers reiterated that the ASEAN-EU relationship is based on shared deep historical and cultural, economic, scientific and educational ties, and commitment to the promotion of peace, stability and development in the two regions. Future cooperation should continue to focus on promoting collaboration and dialogue in areas of common interest based on the spirit of partnership and mutual respect.

Next Meeting

28. Ministers agreed to meet again for the Fifteenth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in ASEAN in 2005.

Chairman's Statement of the Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum*

Phnom Penh, 18 June 2003

1. The Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum convened in Phnom Penh on 18 June 2003 under the chairmanship of H. E. Mr HOR Namhong, Senior Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Kingdom of Cambodia.

2. The list of delegates appears as Annex A (not included).

3. The Ministers commemorated the ten years of the ARF as having great significance for the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, observing that, despite the great diversity of its membership, the forum had attained a record of achievements that have contributed to the maintenance of peace, security and cooperation in the region. They cited in particular:

- The usefulness of the ARF as a venue for multilateral and bilateral dialogue and consultations and the establishment of effective principles for dialogue and cooperation, featuring decision-making by consensus, non-interference, incremental progress and moving at a pace comfortable to all;
- The willingness among ARF participants to discuss a wide range of security issues in a multilateral setting;
- The mutual confidence gradually built by cooperative activities;
- The cultivation of habits of dialogue and consultation on political and security issues;
- The transparency promoted by such ARF measures as the exchange of information relating to defence policy and the publication of defence white papers; and
- The networking developed among national-security, defence and military officials of ARF participants.

4. The Ministers noted with satisfaction that mutual confidence within the region had been significantly strengthened through the ARF's confidence-building measures and that the ARF had initiated exploratory work on preventive diplomacy. The Ministers reaffirmed the key role of the ARF for security dialogue and cooperation with respect to the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. However, they stressed that the ARF must keep pace with the times by adapting itself to the evolving situation, developing a greater sense of common security and building a more effective regional security framework, thus contributing to lasting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Toward this end, they placed importance on:

- Strengthening the implementation of the nine recommendations endorsed at the Ninth ARF Ministerial Meeting on 31 July 2002;
- Continuing work on confidence-building measures as the foundation of the ARF process;

* The text of this statement was taken from http://www.aseansec.org/14845.htm

- Implementing the 'Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy';
- Acting on ARF principles of peaceful settlement of differences and conflicts between states through dialogue and negotiations;
- Making the fight against international terrorism and transnational crime a priority of current ARF cooperation;
- Addressing non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues, including small arms and light weapons;
- Enhancing the role of the ARF Chair, including interaction with other regional and international organizations;
- Utilizing the services of the ARF experts and eminent persons (EEPs);
- Encouraging greater participation by defence and military officials;
- Enhancing linkages between Track One and Track Two ARF processes.

5. The Ministers expressed their appreciation to the Chairman for the initiatives that he had undertaken in accordance with the provisions and spirit of the paper 'Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair', which the ARF adopted in Ha Noi in July 2001. They noted the Chairman's discussions with the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe and the European Union (EU) and his consultations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other ARF participants on the Korean issue. They agreed that the ARF should play a constructive role in seeking a peaceful resolution of the issue.

Discussion of Regional and International Issues

6. The Ministers exchanged views on the regional and international situation and emphasized the key role of the United Nations (UN) in the maintenance of international peace and security. They reaffirmed that regional dialogue and cooperation are essential to regional and international peace and stability. The Ministers maintained their view that the ARF remains the principal consultative and cooperative forum for political and security matters in the Asia-Pacific region. This view was confirmed by today's meeting, which held extremely useful discussions on critical developments unfolding in the region.

7. Views were expressed on the situation on the Korean peninsula. The Ministers supported the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. They urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to resume its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to reverse its decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They called for a peaceful solution of the nuclear problem there for the sake of durable peace and security in the region. In this regard, the Ministers were of the view that the ARF has played a useful and constructive role and agreed to support further efforts by the ARF Chair to help ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The Ministers welcomed the resumption of high-level inter-Korean talks held in Pyongyang on 28-29 April 2003 and recognized the importance of inter-Korean dialogues and exchange at various levels as a channel to pursue peaceful resolution of outstanding security concerns. They welcomed the talks held in Beijing on 23-24 April 2003 among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United

States of America as a good start in the right direction. The Ministers were also of the view that outstanding security and humanitarian issues should be addressed through increased dialogues.

8. The Ministers reaffirmed their resolve to strengthen further the cooperation among their countries in the fight against international terrorism, which continues to menace the security of nations and peoples around the world, including those in the Asia-Pacific region. They deplored the terrorist bombing attacks in Bali, Riyadh and Casablanca. They reiterated their condemnation of terrorism and expressed their determination to take all necessary steps in order to raise public awareness and take effective action against terrorism. At the same time, they rejected any attempt to associate terrorism with any religion, race, nationality or ethnic group. They reaffirmed the significance of enhancing capability in the region to counter terrorism effectively, and the importance of cooperation and coordination by participants in building capacity for those who need assistance, within the framework established by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.

9. The Ministers welcomed the Declaration on Terrorism issued by the Eighth ASEAN Summit in November 2002, which called for intensified regional cooperative measures against terrorism and for support for them by the international community. They reviewed the implementation of their commitment to take specific and concrete measures to stop the financing of terrorism, as embodied in the ARF Statement on Measures against Terrorist Financing of 31 July 2002, and resolved to carry out those measures with ever stronger determination. They welcomed the joint declarations that ASEAN had issued with the United States of America and the EU on 1 August 2002 and 28 January 2003, respectively, pledging closer and more resolute cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

10. The Ministers noted the ongoing work of other international organizations on counter-terrorism and welcomed the continuing work of the United Nations Counter-terrorism Committee, the G8 Roma/Lyon Group, including the creation of the Counter-terrorism Action Group, and the establishment of the APEC Counter-terrorism Task Force as well as the cooperation Programme on Fighting International Terrorism approved in the context of ASEM. The Ministers also welcomed the Pacific Leaders' commitment at the 2002 Pacific Islands Forum to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Financial Action Task Force 8 Special Recommendations on terrorist financing and to put in place law-enforcement legislation. The Ministers noted that, with support from Australia, New Zealand and the United States, experts from the region are working on developing a legal framework for addressing terrorism and transnational crime in the Pacific.

11. The Ministers were gratified by the conduct and outcome of the Intersessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) in Karambunai, Sabah, Malaysia, on 21-22 March 2003. They expressed their appreciation for the work of Malaysia and the United States as co-chairmen

of that meeting. The report of the co-chairmen appears as Annex B (not included). The Ministers agreed that the ISM on CT-TC should continue its work and welcomed the offer of the Philippines and Russia to co-host the ISM on CT-TC in the next intersessional year. The Ministers adopted the ARF Statement on Cooperative Counter-terrorist Actions on Border Security, as proposed by the ISM. The statement, which appears as Annex C (not included), expressed the ARF participants' determination to take concrete, cooperative measures to strengthen security at their borders against terrorist threats.

12. The Ministers took note of the results of the International Conference on Anti-terrorism and Tourism Recovery in Manila in November 2002 and the Regional Conference on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Bali in December 2002. The Ministers expressed their commitment to facilitate the reinvigoration of tourist in the Asia-Pacific region by enhancing cooperation to maintain regional peace and security. They reaffirmed the need to fully combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

13. The Ministers noted the concerns expressed about the threat posed to commercial and general aviation by man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) in terrorist hands and the importance of curbing the proliferation of these weapons. The Ministers took note of the MANPADS initiative agreed upon at the G8 Summit in Evian, France, on 2 June 2003.

14. The Ministers also welcomed the establishment of the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

15. Deeply concerned about the rising incidence of piracy at sea in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministers adopted an ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security, committing their countries to undertake concrete cooperative measures for combating piracy and other maritime crimes. The text of the statement appears as Annex D (not included). The Ministers recognized the significant work being undertaken by ARF participants in cooperation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and pledged their continuing support for this work.

16. The Ministers noted with satisfaction the growing cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, including cooperation within ASEAN, in dealing with transnational crime – money laundering, cyber crime, drug and arms trafficking and trafficking in persons, as well as piracy at sea. They welcomed the issuance in Phnom Penh last November of the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues.

17. The Ministers welcomed the Second Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime held in Bali in April 2003 and encouraged participants to continue their cooperative efforts, primarily by implementing the action plans developed by the two *ad hoc* expert groups established by the First Conference in February 2002.

18. The Ministers welcomed the results of

the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime and those officials' meetings with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (SOMTC+3), with the European Union and with the United States on 9-13 June 2003 in Ha Noi. They were encouraged by the fruitful discussions on the implementation of the Declaration and Statements with China, the EU and the US. The Ministers expressed their determination to implement the joint Declarations and Statements.

19. The Ministers welcomed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which ASEAN and China signed in Phnom Penh on 4 November 2002. They expressed their confidence that efforts made by ASEAN and China in compliance with the Declaration's provisions and commitments would contribute valuably to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and would help create the conditions for the peaceful settlement of the disputes in the South China Sea.

20. The Ministers congratulated the Government of Timor-Leste on its progress since independence. In particular, the Ministers noted the positive relationship developing between Timor-Leste and Indonesia. They noted that a number of ARF participants continued to make major contributions to the post-independence multilateral effort in Timor-Leste. The Ministers stressed that, as part of the Asia-Pacific region, Timor-Leste's future was reliant on the development of economic, political and security ties with its neighbours.

21. Noting the importance of strengthening democracy as a fundamental element of regional security, the Ministers were briefed about the current situation in Myanmar. They urged Myanmar to resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue among all parties concerned leading to a peaceful transition to democracy. They welcomed the assurances given by Myanmar that the measures taken were temporary and looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD members. They reaffirmed their support for the efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative Tan Sri Razali Ismail to assist in this regard.

22. The Ministers re-affirmed their support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Indonesia. They recognized the efforts of the Indonesian Government to restore peace and order in Aceh. The Ministers expressed their appreciation to the Philippines and Thailand for their contribution in providing monitoring teams as requested by Indonesia in the recent efforts to resolve the Aceh problem through dialogue. They also pledged their support to deny the separatist movement access to means of violence through, among others, preventing arms smuggling into the Aceh province. The Ministers hoped that a peaceful solution can be found based on special autonomy as the final solution for Aceh.

23. The Ministers welcomed the recent positive developments in the relations between India and Pakistan, particularly the peaceful initiatives by the Indian Prime Minister. They expressed the hope that the two sides would continue their dialogue and cooperation and resolve their differences through peaceful means in the interests of the two peoples and

for the sake of peace and stability in South Asia and the world.

24. The Ministers welcomed the peace talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which were hosted by Thailand and the outcome of the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka, which was held on 9-10 June 2003. They encouraged the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to further their efforts to achieve a durable peace which safeguards the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and is satisfactory to all its communities. The significant pledges in Tokyo are evidence of a strong commitment by the international community to support the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sri Lanka.

25. The Ministers welcomed the continue progress in the peace process in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, now leading towards the preparations for the election of an autonomous government

26. The Ministers noted the deteriorating security and economic conditions in the Solomon Islands and the efforts of partner countries to provide assistance to the Solomon Islands Government.

27. The Ministers recognized the growing danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and reaffirmed their commitment to make further joint efforts to tackle the problem. Ministers reaffirmed that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. They emphasized the importance of promoting the universalization of non-proliferation and disarmament agreements, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocols, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and expressed concern about actions which damage global non-proliferation efforts and undermine mutual trust and confidence. Ministers called for the maintenance of the existing moratorium on nuclear testing. Ministers welcomed the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which came into effect in November 2002, as an important milestone in the effort to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and encouraged increased adherence by ARF countries.

28. In the area of small arms and light weapons, the Ministers underlined the importance of contributing to a successful first UN Biennial Meeting in July 2003 and encouraged all ARF participants to report to the UN on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. In reaffirming their commitment to addressing the multiplicity of concerns generated by and contributing to the proliferation and availability of small arms and light weapons, the Ministers commended participants on their efforts to follow up on the recommendations made at the regional seminar in Manila in July 2002.

29. The ARF defence and military officials attending the Tenth ARF met among themselves on 17 June 2003. The

Ministers concluded that the conduct and outcome of the defence and military officials' meeting reaffirmed the importance of these officials' active participation in the ARF process. This was in line with the endorsed recommendation of the Ninth ARF to widen their engagement and involvement, building upon Singapore's Concept Paper on Defence Dialogue within the ARF.

30. The Ministers took note of the need to develop a habit of dialogue among the Northeast Asian countries on security issues at Track One level starting with a free exchange of views.

Intersessional Activities

31. The Ministers were pleased with the success of the Track One and Track Two activities that had taken place during the current intersessional year (July 2002 to June 2003). They received with appreciation the summary report on the meetings of the Intersessional Group on Confidence-building Measures, which New Zealand and the Lao People's Democratic Republic co-chaired in Wellington on 20-22 November 2002 and in Vientiane on 26-28 March 2003. The Ministers commended the work of the ISG on CBMs in advancing the ARF process, noted the summary report of the co-chairmen, and endorsed its recommendations. The report appears as Annex E (not included).

32. The Ministers took note of the following activities that had taken place under the auspices of the ISG on CBMs:

- ARF Workshop on Defence/Military Officials' Cooperation, Seoul, 28-30 August 2002;
- Sixth ARF Workshop of Heads of National Defence Colleges/ Institutions, Moscow, 16-20 September 2002;
- ARF Workshop on Military Logistics Outsourcing Support, Beijing, 25-27 September 2002;
- ARF Workshop on Counter-terrorism, Tokyo, 1-2 October 2002;
- ARF Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Seminar, Singapore, 4-6 December 2002;
- ARF Workshop on Maritime Security Challenges, Mumbai, India, 27 February - 1 March 2003; and
- ARF CBM Workshop on Managing Consequences of a Major Terrorist Attack, Darwin, Australia, 3-5 June 2003.

33. The Ministers agreed that the ISG on CBMs should continue its work and welcomed the offer of Myanmar and China to co-chair the Intersessional Group on Confidence-Building Measures in the next intersessional year. They noted that the next meetings of the ISG on CBMs would take place in Beijing on 20-22 November 2003 and in Yangon in April 2004.

34. The Ministers welcomed the offer of Cambodia and the European Union to co-chair the Intersessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures (ISG on CBMs) in the next inter-sessional year 2004-2005.

35. The Ministers took note with appreciation the offer by Mongolia to host an ARF workshop in Ulaanbaatar in 2004-2005 inter-sessional year to discuss the changing security perceptions of the ARF countries.

36. The Ministers approved the work program for the next inter-sessional year (July 2003 to June 2004), as indicated by the proposed CBM activities listed in Annex F (not included).

Linkages Between Track One and Track Two

37. The Ministers stressed the importance of strong linkages between Track One (official) and Track Two (non-governmental) activities. In this regard, they took note of the ongoing discussions on this issue based on Canada's concept paper 'Strengthening Linkages between Track One and Track Two in the ARF Context', which appears as Annex G (not included). The Ministers noted the conclusions of the Track Two Workshop on Counter-Terrorism organized by the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies of Singapore and the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific – Canada (CSCAP Canada) in Vientiane on 25 March 2003. They agreed that efforts should continue to enhance Track One and Track Two interaction, as recommended in the 2002 Brunei Darussalam Stocktaking Paper endorsed by the Ministers.

The ARF Process and Its Future Direction

38. The Ministers reviewed the nine recommendations endorsed by the 9th ARF Ministerial Meeting in Brunei Darussalam on 31 July 2002 and expressed satisfaction with the progress made so far, especially in the areas of counter-terrorist cooperation and the enhancement of the role of the ARF Chair. They were of the view that the ARF's work in these areas could contribute to the development of the ARF towards preventive diplomacy and, therefore, should be continued and strengthened. They called for the continued cooperation and support of ARF participants and the ASEAN Secretariat's assistance for the ARF Chair in carrying out the mandates outlined in the paper on the 'Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair'.

39. The Ministers agreed to support the ARF Chair to have Friends of the Chair to assist the Chair in dealing with international situations, which affect the peace and security of the region.

40. The Ministers were satisfied with the level of confidence and trust that had been developed under ARF auspices and with the activities in the overlapping areas between CBMs and preventive diplomacy that ARF had begun to undertake. They resolved to further strengthen ARF confidence-building measures, which they considered as vital for the maintenance of regional peace and stability. While emphasizing the need for further consolidating CBMs, the Ministers underlined the significance of enhancing the role of the ARF Chair and advancing the ARF process. In this regard, the Ministers welcomed the offer by Japan to host an ARF workshop on preventive diplomacy in February 2004.

41. The Ministers considered that the ARF's work on preventive diplomacy was being advanced through, among other measures, the actions that it had taken to address the situation on the

Korean peninsula and to enhance confidence and cooperation in addressing common security threats, including international terrorism, transnational crime, piracy and other maritime crimes, and the support given to the ARF Chairman in carrying out the enhanced role of the Chair.

42. The Ministers welcomed the issuance of another volume of the Annual Security Outlook (ASO). The publication, they observed, was an important contribution to transparency, and therefore to confidence building, in regional security affairs.

43. The Ministers appreciated the publication of an updated Register of Experts/Eminent Persons (EEP) and took note of the efforts to finalize the Guidelines for the Operation of the ARF EEP by the ISG on CBMs and the ARF Senior Officials' Meeting. They urged further discussion on this issue and looked forward to the activation of the experts and eminent persons in helping to advance the work of the ARF. They commended the work of the ISG on CBMs and the ARF Senior Officials' Meeting in considering Guidelines for the Operation of the ARF EEP, and encouraged further consultations to finalize the Guidelines.

44. The Ministers noted that applications to participate in the ARF had been received from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Timor-Leste. They also noted that ASEAN countries agreed to lift the moratorium and to consider the application of new participants in the ARF on a case-by-case basis. They received the communication that ASEAN Foreign Ministers had reached a consensus to accept a new participant in the ARF. They agreed to keep these two inter-linked issues for further consideration.

45. The Ministers welcomed the proposal by China on convening an 'ARF Security Policy Conference' in which high military officials as well as government officers will be invited to take part. They looked forward to the concept paper to be circulated to the ARF participants in due course.

46. The Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the general progress of the ARF process and with the increasing usefulness of the forum for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

47. In advancing the development of the ARF process, the Ministers acknowledged ASEAN's continued leading role in the ARF and the need proceed at a pace comfortable to all.

Asia after the Iraq War: Realpolitik Rules

Anja Dargatz, Urmilla Goel, Marei John*

Violent protest, Islamic terror attacks, a destabilization of the region – such were the feared consequences of the Iraq War for Asia. And indeed, the majority of the Asian populations turned against war with Iraq. Anti-American feeling, which already existed, especially amongst Islamists, was strengthened. However, up to now, violent protests and an increase in terrorist activities have, by and large, not occurred. Peaceful protests against the war remained hesitant and were lead almost exclusively by small sectors of the population and the respective government oppositions. The position of most governments in Asia ranged from moderately critical to concurring with the war waged by the United States of America.

Domestic and regional problems, as opposed to the legitimacy of American action, dominated the political agenda in most Asian countries. They also determined dealings with the United States and the war with Iraq. The importance of American economic aid, development aid as well as military aid for solving their own problems was decisive as far as reactions to the war with Iraq were concerned. Various national dependencies on and loyalties to the United States lead to the situation whereby no government could or wished to appear openly in opposition to the United States. Despite this, a counterweight to hegemonial efforts on the part of the United States is considered necessary and so in most Asian countries a wish to strengthen the United Nations (UN) can be detected.

'Realpolitik' Defines Reactions in Southeast Asia

Violent protests against the Iraq War were expected, especially in Indonesia. This did not happen, as Muslim leaders, whilst condemning the war, ensured that protests did not escalate. In other countries of Southeast Asia, such as Singapore or the Philippines, either the government forbade open criticism or the population's interest in the Iraq War was limited. Just as the attitudes of populations in the region ranged from total opposition to total disinterest, similarly governments came to no common political position. The ASEAN states stressed the right to formulate individual stands according to national interests and they enacted this right. Official positions ranged from moderate protests, for example in Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, to concurring completely, as in the Philippines. Some countries, such as Thailand and Singapore, supported the United States, but in contrast to the Philippines, did not declare themselves officially part of the 'Coalition of the Willing'. Cambodia completely avoided making a clear stand.

Governmental negotiations in Southeast Asia are generally dominated by internal political issues and very strongly affected

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by 'realpolitik'. Nearly all governments condemned the 'War of Aggression' carried out by the United States, but official positions only reflect this in part. The majority of Southeast Asian states are dependent on good economic relations with the United States and upon its development aid. Furthermore, in some cases, the United States acts as a military ally and protective force. A consequence of this for a country such as Vietnam, which itself was subjected to American military intervention, is that here, criticism of America is rather hesitant. The dichotomy between the concerns about American hegemony and at the same time dependence on good relations with the United States meant that national negotiations took a pragmatic turn, but at the same time a desire to see a counterweight to the all-powerful superpower emerged.

Concerns for a Peaceful Solution to the Korea Crisis

Because of the formulation of the 'Axis of Evil' after 11 September 2001, North Korea as well as Iraq became a potential target for American attack. When at the beginning of 2003, the Korean crisis escalated into a nuclear crisis and both the United States and North Korea started using more war-like rhetoric, fear of a military attack gripped the whole Korean peninsula.

It is not possible to restrict a war to North Korea because of the geographical position of the country. The South Koreans are therefore afraid of becoming caught up in a military escalation of the crisis. Thus it is essential for South Korea to continue to be guaranteed backing from the United States and alongside this, support for a diplomatic solution. In order to please its ally, South Korea joined the 'Coalition of the Willing'. This happened even though government representatives condemned the American 'War of Aggression'. Opponents of the Iraq War within the opposition and the population at large greatly feared that this governmental move, in the case of the threatened Korean War, would jeopardize the support of the world community.

As a declared enemy of the United States, North Korea opposed the American 'War of Aggression' and offered support to Iraq. However, as the United States with surprising speed, announced a victory in Iraq, the position of the North Korean government as regards the atomic crisis changed. Whereas previously it had believed in the resilience of nuclear deterrence negotiated bilaterally with the United States, now it brought China into trilateral discussions.

The Struggle against Terrorism in South Asia

As in Southeast Asia, the majority of the population of South Asia was against the war and this was not only the case in Islamic countries. Fundamentalist groups used the Iraq War to affirm and focus upon their anti-American position. Violent protests were expected, particularly in Pakistan. However, the re-established democracy and Islamist opposition in parliament seemed to have steered protests into peaceful, democratic channels.

Official government positions in South Asia also diverged from general condemnation by the people and the opposition. They avoided taking a stand for as long as

possible, and when they were forced to, just like the governments in Southeast Asia, they remained moderate in their condemnation, verging upon agreement. Afghanistan even subscribed to the 'Coalition of the Willing'. As in the case of Southeast Asia, South Asian governments did not want to openly oppose the United States, despite their concern about American hegemony and the criticism that the United States applies different yardsticks in its international interventions. However, they did not publicly wish to take a stand against the United States. Apart from economic dependency upon the United States and upon American development and military aid, American support for the fight against terrorism in the region was the decisive factor.

In the wake of 11 September, United States' interest in South Asia has considerably increased. The first strike against terrorism, legitimized in this case by the UN, was carried out against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. To this end, Pakistan became the most important ally for the United States. Because of such 'preferential treatment' of its enemy, India felt marginalized and sought in vain to use the self-same American anti-terrorist rhetoric against Pakistan. Meanwhile the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka were declared terrorists by the United States. It seems that this step so pressurized the Tamil Tigers that they agreed to a ceasefire, thereby starting the peace process in Sri Lanka. Similarly the 'Maoists' in Nepal were branded terrorists by the United States with the consequence that the Nepalese government was supported by American military aid.

Both Sri Lanka and Nepal are negotiating peace processes, one with the Tamil Tigers and the other with the Maoists. Both governments are grateful to the United States for its help in the past and need further good relations with the superpower in order to reach a solution for their internal conflicts. Therefore neither government could nor wanted to set itself publicly against the American 'War of Aggression', even if, amongst other things, Sri Lanka experienced economic losses due to a drop in exports as a result of the Iraq War.

The situation is similar in Afghanistan. In order to continue the reconstruction phase of an as-yet-far-from-stable country, support from the United States as well as the international community is absolutely vital. What the Afghans fear most is that the Iraq War and possible follow-up interventions will divert both international focus and the delivery of aid packages to new crisis points.

Effects of the Iraq War can also be seen in the Kashmir conflict. The United States has announced that in this conflict, which has been going on for more than 50 years, a solution must also be found and that they will participate in bringing this about. This contradicts the Indian position up to now which has stated that the conflict was solely to be resolved by India and Pakistan, without the help of an external mediator. In this context, the Indian negotiation offer to Pakistan can be considered an attempt to keep the Americans out of the search for a solution to the Kashmir conflict. Again, in Pakistan, the Iraq War has kept fear of military intervention at bay and thus here too a broader readiness to solve the problem without the Americans can be detected.

Success of the US Strategy

War in Iraq has not harmed the position of the United States in Asia. In some cases it has even been strengthened. Despite not having open approval for their actions, notable protest was not evident either. American interests in the region, such as in raw materials, trade and the stationing of military personnel, seem not to have been endangered. The strategy of bilateral negotiations, as practised by the United States with European states in the run-up to war with Iraq, has expanded. National interests in individual Asian countries were used successfully. That is to say, it paid off that most Asian countries have been economically and militarily dependent on the United States for a long time. The important role development aid played in the way individual countries took a stand, justified the decision by American President George W. Bush to endorse a 5% increase in American development aid over the three-year budgetary period following the UN Conference on Development Finance 2002 in Monterrey.

From the point of view of the Bush government, the United States has proved that bilateral agreements work better than multilateral alliances. These have emerged weaker rather than strengthened by the war with Iraq. Moreover, preventive war has become accepted as an actual means of resolving conflicts. The fact that at present no Asian state shows significant interest in extending existing regional alliances further suits the uni-/bi-lateral foreign policy concept of the United States.

Divides between American Demands and the Population

The United States was successful in applying a strategy whereby it set Asian governments, sometimes explicitly, against the position of their populations, in the interests of maintaining good relations with the superpower. Many opposition groups had favoured a clear condemnation of the American 'War of Aggression'. Even in the case of pro-American groups, in India for example, the image of the United States suffered considerably. Particularly lamented were the double standards applied not only to different countries but also as far as values and standards are concerned. Groupings which had been anti-American already before the Iraq War, especially within Islamist circles, have been further strengthened by the 'War of Aggression'. In Pakistan, as in Indonesia, there is massive support for Osama bin Laden and others from amongst Muslim leaders denoted as terrorists by the Americans. Even in Singapore, 74% of the population were against the war. Governments, which, for 'realpolitik' reasons, have shown support, or at least not shown opposition to the United States, must see to it domestically that their populations do not turn against them. The dilemma of not wanting to upset the United States or their own population was acutely experienced by the Pakistani government. As a member of the UN Security Council, Pakistan would have had to take a stand and thereby attract the bad will of one side or the other, had the vote not been cancelled at the last minute.

The Western Concept of Democracy Loses Credibility

The way in which the United States prepared for and executed the war against Iraq lead to a growing conviction that force held sway over and above justice. Because the United States has itself gone against international law and has treated different countries differently, Western values and standards now seem completely haphazard and subservient to national interests. Therein lies the danger: not only for Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, but elsewhere too, democracy is increasingly considered as something Western – a concept unsuitable for Asia. Discussions based on the universality of values have become more difficult. According to a study from the American Pew Research Centre, in 2002, 64% of Indonesians were in favour of democracy, whereas in May 2003 this had fallen to 41%. This trend, however, is valid for only a minority of Asian states, as overall there is still broad agreement with democratic values. In Pakistan, democratic elections took place once again at the end of 2002, for the first time after several years of military dictatorship; here, over the same time frame, support for democracy was up from 44% to 57%.

Violent Conflict Resolution

The increasing acceptance of violence as a means of resolving conflicts has various effects on Asia. On the one hand, possible military intervention by the United States in conflicts has become so realistic that affected governments, as in the case of North Korea and Kashmir, are actively seeking other solutions. Only time will tell if these are sustainable. On the other hand, Asia increasingly fears military intervention. A significant 74% of Indonesians and 72% of Pakistanis fear such a scenario. Finally, Asian governments, in the wake of war with Iraq, also resorted to threat and use of violence as a legitimate means of resolving internal or regional conflicts. India for example, though in vain, used American rhetoric on Pakistan. In other areas, violent military procedures are similarly justified, as, for example, in the conflict around Aceh in Indonesia.

Multilateralism to Tame the Superpower

War with Iraq clearly showed the unilateral potential of the United States. Whether because of structural weaknesses or because of a lack of tenable concepts, neither the UN, nor the European Union, nor any other multinational alliances could do anything effective in opposition to the United States. The impression was confirmed that no country could oppose the United States unpunished. The consequence is an even stronger alignment of various national policies with American interests. This behaviour has further weakened multinational alliances. Regional Asian alliances played no part in positioning national governments.

Whilst recognizing the power of the mighty, a realization also came about that different rules apply for a superpower than for others. Even a good relationship with the United States does not afford one the same justice. India in particular experienced this when it in vain tried to copy the American

strategy. Asian countries recognized that if they wanted to realize policies of national interest which did not coincide with those of the United States, then they needed international support. That is how global, multilateral structures in contrast to regional groupings, gained in credibility in their eyes.

The division of Europe vis-à-vis the Iraq crisis, on the one hand, weakened the attraction of the European Union as a partner, and consequently encouraged nations to turn more to the United States. On the other hand, it was very sympathetically noted how France and Germany made a clear, if unsuccessful, case for opposition to America's 'War of Aggression'. This, in Pakistan for example, softened anti-Western feelings. Consequently interest in multinational alliances with Europeans has increased.

Despite all 'realpolitik' a general dissatisfaction with American hegemony remains, as well as a general wish to establish a counterweight to it. Thus multilateralism is being given a fresh chance. The European Union, and Germany especially, should make the most of these newly won sympathies in order to build up stronger multinational structures. In order for this to come about, the European Union must first consolidate itself, showing it can apply common policies and demonstrating a unified stand. Only then can it present alternative negotiating concepts and thereby become a partner to be taken seriously for Asian countries. At the same time it must be clear that any anti-American position has no future. A common future can only be construed with the United States on board and not in opposition to it.

From the Pacific War to a Policy of Good Neighbourliness: Japan's Way of Dealing with the Past

Bernd Martin*

What are the links that connect the present with the past? That is a question which in Japan today plays a decisive role in the country's domestic as well as foreign policy, much more so than in Germany. The Japanese sense of identity rests on their attitude towards and assessment of the last war – especially the genocide in China – and the post-war period. To this day there is no general consensus on the country's criminal past, a consensus that has been at least basically established in Germany since before and especially after its unification.

There are striking similarities between Japanese warfare in China and German warfare in the Soviet Union. To 'the most terrible, most brutal, most inhuman and most destructive war in all Asian history', starting in 1937, corresponded the biggest war of extermination and enslavement of all time that started with the German Wehrmacht and its rear unit invasion of Soviet Russia on 22 June 1941; a war that had been meticulously planned and was expected to cost millions of 'Slavonic sub-human' lives. In both theatres of war perfectly ordinary Japanese and German people, family men as well as young conscripts, willingly committed unimaginable crimes. However, the degree of irrational ideological indoctrination and ethnic unity was much higher in Japan than in Hitler's Germany. While Hitler's subordinates over-zealously followed their orders to plan the war of extermination in the East, in Japan there existed no drafts or blueprints whatsoever for the conquest of China. Japanese warfare bordering on genocide in the 'Middle Empire' did not need ordering; rather, it was a more or less self-evident consequence of more than a century of rivalry between the two countries now confronting each other: militarized, fanatically nationalist Japan and China fighting for its national unity. Genocide in China was not ordered, but, once it had begun, it could not be stopped.

War Tribunals and Political Purges: Survival of the Traditional Elites

With the cease-fire agreement on 15 August 1945, Japan started to cover up the traces of any crimes: almost all the ministries destroyed their files, and incriminated persons were given advice on how to survive. The Japanese military in charge of all the prisoners of war issued an official order to the Japanese personnel of all detention and prisoners' camps to destroy all documents. Any persons who were guilty of criminal offences against prisoners of war, or who were liable to be accused of such were to go into hiding immediately, leaving no traces. The Americans marched in on the day of formal capitulation – 2 September 1945 – but failed to seize any

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documents. They had to rely on the assistance of Japanese officials and consequently had a hard time tracking down war criminals in their hideaways.

Despite vehement protests from the Soviet Russian and Australian prosecutors, Emperor Hirohito remained untouched. By now it is common knowledge that he was well informed of all the crimes, as well as of the conditions in the prisoner-of-war camps.

In this way, the Imperial myth and the idea of Japanese singularity remained unquestioned, and, what is more, the emperor's social position was in fact strengthened by the fact that he himself was never charged. Henceforth, if only as a symbol, he remained the incorporation of Japanese ethnic unity and an integrating figure of traditional society, whose norms of collective subordination thus found their way into the modern industrial society of Japan.

All in all, at the Tokyo war tribunal, seven death sentences were passed by majority vote, six of them on leading military personnel, among them General Tojo, and one on the former foreign minister, Hirota Koki, who had been in office during the Rape of Nanjing and was consequently considered to be among those responsible for the atrocities. At the tribunals which followed in those countries that had fought against Japan – with the exception of recently independent India – a total of 5,472 persons were charged; 3,099 prison sentences were pronounced, 334 of them life sentences, and 920 death sentences were handed down. In Germany, almost the same number of war criminals were executed. In Japan, more than half of those condemned regarded their impending execution as a sacrifice for Japan and its emperor. Only nine of the accused considered themselves guilty (in the Christian sense). The majority (405) of the condemned persons were non-commissioned army officers, mostly less than 35 years old and of rural origin. These sons of farmers had been particularly easy to indoctrinate with the ideology of Japanese superiority and the special mission (*kokutai*) of Japan, the godlike country.

The political purges, on the other hand, applied to only a small minority of about 210,000 persons. More than 80% of those accused belonged to the military, the police or the secret service (*Kempetai*). From the American point of view, only the military were to blame for the Japanese war of aggression, in particuler army officers and some fanatical nationalists. The Japanese military, whose reputation in the eyes of the Japanese public had been ruined anyway because of the defeat, was now made the scapegoat by the occupation power for the pernicious developments since the days of the Meiji government.

The economy and bureaucracy, on the other hand, remained more or less untouched. Working closely together as old elites in new guises, the leading representatives of these two sectors took a decisive part in shaping post-war Japan. The military and the Court no longer served as the centres of power; henceforth politics were dominated by the economy. A symbol of economic continuity was the former armaments minister, Kishi Nobusuke. Although a convicted war criminal, Kishi, as prime minister between 1957 and 1960, paved the way for the biggest leap forward for Japan since the founding of the country, at a time when his German counterpart (Albert Speer) was still doing time in Spandau Prison.

Restoring the Traditional Concept of History: Contemporary History in Research and Textbooks

According to official doctrine, Japanese history began with the accession to the throne on 23 February 660 BC of Jimmu Tenno – a direct descendant of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu. Since then the 'land of the gods' has been ruled in uninterrupted continuity by one dynasty. This concept of history as an unchallenged singular unity of sovereign and people does not divide the course of history into epochs or periods, as does Western historiography, but according to the duration of an emperor's rule, which to this day marks the Japanese calendar. (The year 2003, for instance, corresponds to the fourteenth year of the Heisei era.)

Traditionally, Japanese historiography has always consisted of chronicles. This style is still apparent in research studies today which are often overloaded with facts and lacking in methodical and analytical stridency.

Critical analysis of Japan's recent past, therefore, implies a thorough revision of method and can thus be achieved best from the outside. During the post-war period, Marxist historiography provided such an alternative to Japanese intellectuals, that their approach at first even resembled one of liberal leftist American historians influenced by the New Deal.

Unlike Germany, during the two post-war decades in Japan, historical research did not correspond with social restoration, but was – thanks to American coaching – dominated by Marxist theory that disapproved of the imperial system in general and understood the war as the logical consequence of feudal and authoritarian rule. Accordingly, it was Japanese militarism and, in its wake, imperialist aggression that precipitated the country's ruin, and only rigorous social reforms could achieve its revival. In unison with the occupation power, the capitalist Tenno system was held responsible and the war was explained in terms of the patterns of class struggle. Neither the orthodox Marxist outlook prevailing among the Japanese left, nor the sociocritical view of liberal leftist American historians during the 1950s met with any response from the traditionally-minded Japanese people.

The American occupation power carefully controlled the contents of textbooks, suppressed any apologetic interpretation of the war and made sure that the term 'Greater East Asia War' was replaced by the term 'Pacific War'. Thus the war in East Asia was reduced to the American-Japanese fighting between 1941 and 1945, with the war in China (starting in 1937) seemingly a mere forerunner. Therefore, after the war, the genocide in China was not the focus of interest, all the less so since Chiang Kai-shek's national China, hard-pressed by the Communists, had generously renounced any claims for compensation. At the latest, after the outbreak of the Korean War (1950), Japan was to be joined to the anti-Communist front in East Asia, so that for the time being, both the victorious and the defeated powers were quite willing to forget about the Japanese atrocities committed in China. The peace treaty of San Francisco (1952) did not even mention the question of reparations.

With the American occupation troops and administration leaving, the Japanese leftist approach to history and its Marxist basis were no longer protected. At once the traditional forces sprang back to life. As early as 1953, former members of the general staff published a 12-volume work with the characteristic title: 'The Secret History of the Greater East Asia War' and three years later the ruling Liberal

Democrats issued the first public memorandum on 'The problem of the deplorable textbooks'.

The revision of leftist thinking, which had been imposed upon Japan and had taken root only amongst academics, was completed by the 1970s. Most important was an officially sponsored seven-volume study on 'Japan's Way into the Pacific War' (1962) that was partly translated into English by American experts on Japanese history. By explaining the war as a mere lapse, this book played a decisive part in establishing revisionism: Pre-war Japanese history was reduced to foreign and military policy, while the country's internal development into a 'nation in arms' was not mentioned, and nothing was said about the Japanese occupation policy in China. A little later, the Department of Military History of the Self-Defence Forces published a giant history of the war in 104 volumes, in which every detail was meticulously described and the military and its values were generally exonerated. At the same time, a formerly leftist writer (Hayashi Fusao), who had joined the radicals during the war, for the first time justified the Japanese war of aggression in Asia in his much-noted book *I Agree to the Greater East Asia War* (1963/5).

The conservative camp had formed, and research on the war and imperial Japan was polarized between Marxists and supporters of the old system. The liberal centre, which in Western countries dominates social sciences and often succeeds in bridging the gap between extreme positions, did not and still does not exist in Japan, despite certain points of contact between the enemy camps. Both the nation and the historians are torn between extremes. Instead of dialogue, fixed opinions are exchanged, as in a ritual fight.

A typical example of this kind of dealing with the past is the 40-year-old quarrel over whether or not the books by Ienaga Saburo should be used as textbooks in schools. His *History of the Pacific War* – the only leftist study so far translated into English – dates the beginning of the war to the year 1931, when the forcible occupation of Manchuria took place, and puts the outbreak and radicalization of the war down to the misguided inner development of Japan. He explicitly mentioned the Japanese crimes in China, the Rape of Nanjing, the medical unit 731 and the forced prostitution, but time and time again these references were deleted by the censors. Only in August 1997, did the Japanese Supreme Court allow him compensation, and in its verdict explicitly stated that forbidding Ienaga to name the crimes was a blatantly unconstitutional act. However, as a reaction to Ienaga's rehabilitation, prominent historians at once gathered in powerful movements such as the 'Research Community for a Liberalist View on History' or the emergency action group 'Write New History Books!' One of their leaders, Fujoka Nobukatsu, Professor of Pedagogic at the renowned Tokyo University, officially stated that admitting the fact of forced prostitution ('comfort women') by a Japanese court of law was tantamount to the beginning of Japan's ruin. His statement in 1998 was widely approved by the Japanese public, but at once triggered sharp protests from the country's Asian neighbour states. The Japanese way of dealing with the past, which supposedly had been decided for good by the 1970s, has long since turned into an international political issue. Since Tokyo's diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1972, protests from China concerning Japanese textbooks could no longer be filed away and neglected in the way similar protests from Seoul (Korea) had been.

The Burden of the Past in Japan's Asian Policy: Resentment and Rivalry with China

The dark clouds of the past, which within Japan itself had more or less been dissipated by glossing over the facts, resurfaced whenever high-ranking representatives of the allegedly purified democratic country went on official visits abroad, or on certain memorial days. When, in 1974, a Japanese prime minister travelled on a goodwill mission to Southeast Asian countries formerly occupied by Japan for the first time, he faced huge demonstrations everywhere; on the island of Java there were even riots and casualties.

In those countries, the former occupation regime had systematically smashed the colonial economy (plantations) during the war and now, one generation later, dictated their economic development. For the Japanese reparations 'voluntarily' paid in the 1960s were linked to developmental projects which opened the respective markets to Japanese companies only, and to this day no compensation has been offered to the victims of the war or for property losses. Even Emperor Hirohito when on state visits – whether to the United States, Great Britain or the Netherlands – was confronted with a wave of hatred that each time shocked the Japanese. And even in Germany, Japan's former ally, the emperor was greeted as a 'war criminal' by protest posters.

The past regularly caught up with Japan abroad, exacerbating the negative image commonly held of the rising industrial nation and disturbing binominal relations. The Chinese and the Koreans, as former victims of Japan's brutal military aggression, especially resented the combination of Japanese historical arrogance and economic overbearing.

The Japanese refusal to deal with the past became a political issue to ward off the economic and as of late military threat posed by Japan, and whenever possible to humiliate the strong rival in the struggle for predominance in the Far East.

In 1982, the fiftieth anniversary of the forcible occupation of Manchuria, the internal Japanese conflict about textbooks grew into an international crisis. According to guidelines, the Monbushu (the Japanese Ministry of Education) had had the term 'aggression in China' replaced by 'gradual advance', 'war' by 'conflict', and 'capitulation' by 'end of fighting'. Japanese politicians (Matsumo, Head of the Planning Department, for instance) had even gone as far as to find mistakes in Korean textbooks, claiming, for instance, that in 1910 Korea had not been annexed by but rather reunified with Japan. As a consequence, in 1982, for the first time, the People's Republic of China got into contact with South Korea, hitherto considered an enemy country, by diplomatic protest notes and boycott movements, and together they demanded an official apology from the emperor, a frequently repeated demand that to this day has not been granted. In 1982, Beijing recalled its ambassador and received Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki in such an icy way that upon his return from the state visit Suzuki was forced to resign. Under massive pressure Tokyo stepped back and at least officially announced a revision of the textbooks. The emperor was then asked to react to the embarrassing situation by finding the appropriate soothing words on the next state visit from a South Korean president. However, all the former god-emperor could be persuaded to say was: 'We caused you inconveniencies'. The new prime minister, Nakasone, a former paymaster of the imperial navy, made up for the diplomatic softness in foreign policy by a demonstrative official visit to the

Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, where he officially paid his respects to the fallen soldiers, including those executed as war criminals.

In connection with the fortieth anniversary of the capitulation (1985) the quarrel over how to interpret the past adequately escalated again, both at home and abroad. Textbooks such as the *Newly Edited Japanese History*, inspired by army circles, read like war-time textbooks. When the responsible minister openly declared that Korea had itself to blame for having been annexed by Japan, there was a volley of international protests. The war seen as the liberation of Asian brother nations, the claims of the godly descent of the Japanese and the denial of the Rape of Nanjing – all this was more than the governments of the formerly occupied countries could stomach. Beijing declared this kind of presumption insufferable to the Chinese people, Seoul accused the Japanese of arrogance and lack of feeling, and even Singapore made it clear that the Japanese obviously suffered from amnesia. Again the government stepped back: history teachers were officially ordered to use the term 'aggression', and the prime minister this time sent a lower charge to the Yasukuni Shrine. At once, however, 41 representatives of his party counteracted this concession by openly declaring that the war in China had been a mere coincidence, and not a result of the pursuit of any expansionist aims.

In 1991, with the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the war between Japan and the United States drawing nearer, the atmosphere between the two countries became markedly colder. By now, the Americans were also expecting the Japanese to apologize formally for their insidious attack on Pearl Harbour, which of course they did not. Moreover, the Americans bitterly deplored the fact that not even 10% of Japanese youth connected any meaning to the term Pearl Harbour. Japanese textbooks were apparently not only biased, but also, depending on the respective teacher's convictions, their contents were simply not being taught to pupils.

The internal as well as international debate on Japanese war guilt reached a peak in 1995, with the fiftieth anniversary of the Tenno Empire's capitulation. The new Japanese emperor, on his first state visit to China (23 to 28 October 1992), expressed his 'deep regret for the Japanese war of aggression'. Murayama Tomiaki (June 1994 to January 1996), the first socialist prime minister after 45 years of unquestioned liberal democratic rule, for pragmatic reasons did his best to admit to Japanese war guilt for once and for all in order to stimulate stagnant trade relations, and while touring Southeast Asia he formally apologized for all Japanese crimes.

In an attempt to appease the national opposition roused by such a gesture of penitence, the socialists accepted the symbols of imperial Japan – the national anthem and the colours of the rising sun – and ordered them to be integrated into all official school celebrations. A commemoration by the Diet was planned together with the passing of an anti-war resolution for 15 August 1995. This did not take place, however, as 221 liberal democratic representatives (about 40% of all the members of the Diet) provocatively pronounced the war to have been a 'war to liberate colonized Asia'. The anti-Western point of this resolution was not meant to be overheard and of course all the former enemies of Japan felt piqued so that the Tenno Empire stood isolated once again.

Since then, with the Liberal Democrats back in government, the ground of international relations has become even more slippery for the Japanese. The Chinese president's state visit to Japan in 1999 was a failure as, once again, the

expected formal apology was missing, and relations between the two countries dropped to their lowest point since the war. In 2000, before the Japanese prime minister's visit, Beijing expressly demanded a written apology for the crimes committed in China, but in vain. In September 2002, Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi visited North Korea, the first official visit to that country of the Japanese prime minister. Again, all the Japanese crimes committed against the Koreans and the question of responsibility appeared like ghosts. Koizumi had no choice but to apologize. But he was in a much better position since the North Koreans also had to apologize for kidnapping Japanese subjects more than 24 years ago. There was, so to say, an equal standing. Moreover, Koizumi carefully chose his words and relied on the statements his socialist forerunner Murayama had used in 1995.[1] Back in Japan, these apologies were counteracted by strong statements about Japan's innocence. This time, Prime Minister Koizumi named North Korea an 'outrageous country'.[2]

Conclusion

Because of its refusal to deal with the past, Japan is still today easily put under pressure – a situation that is frequently exploited by China. But in counterbalance, Japanese politicians continue to deliberately use great East Asian slogans dating back to the war in order to humiliate China and Korea, and to stress Japanese claims to leadership. In the struggle for supremacy between China and Japan, the past is more than ever being used as a political weapon. The fight between the two unequal brothers – the bigger weaker one, China, which is however regaining its strength, and the smaller, yet still more powerful one, Japan – might mark and possibly even continue throughout the 'Pacific Century', and might prevent the two countries from rising together, and economically and politically threatening the rest of the world.

1. Frankfurter Allgemein Zeitung 18, September 2002. Süddeutsche Zeitung 18, September 2002. Neue Züricher Zeitung 18, September 2002.
2. *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 15 October 2002. 'It is certainly an outrageous country. It snatches, removes and then kills Japanese'.

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