The ASEAN Regional Forum and the European Union as a Security System and a Security Actor

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East Asia poses specific – perhaps unique – challenges to the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In East Asia, the possibility of limited conflicts involving one or more major powers remains latent. As the German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs pointed out when presenting Germany's most recent Policy on Asia, 'some of the most dangerous centres of conflict (Konfliktherde) are to be found in Asia' (quoted in Hansen [2001:1]). In contrast, in Latin America, the guerrilla wars of the 1980s, in which one side was supported by the United States and the other (allegedly) by the USSR and its surrogates, have long since given way to more or less successful efforts at national reconstruction and reconciliation. Africa has not yet been delivered of the scourges of civil war, genocide and inter-state conflicts, but the Africans are more susceptible to pressure, both economic and military, from the European powers, particularly former colonial powers.

Conceptualizing a European contribution to East Asian security is more difficult in the post-Cold War period than it was in the 1970s and the 1980s, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Community (EC) were united by their condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. ASEAN and the EC successfully led the anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnam coalitions at the United Nations. At the time, the Europeans' interests in Southeast Asia, so Harris and Bridges assert, were to ensure that no hostile power controlled the region to the Europeans' disadvantage or to exclude them from the region; to reduce great power friction that might lead to generalized war; and to guarantee the safety of strategic waterways (1983:45). Concrete European contribution to security took the form of acceptance of Indochinese refugees, of which about one-seventh settled in Europe (Chiang, 1988:116).

Recent scholarly debates on the European Union (EU) as an actor (the EU's 'actorness') may help us to think through the factors that have conditioned the EU's modest participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in the first decade of the latter's existence. Taking into account the need to solve the 'agent-structure problem' (Wendt, 1987), Bretherton and Vogler explain the development of the EU's external role in terms of cyclical relationships between agency and structure. Agency is represented by innovative political actors that create internal EU capabilities, through policy instruments and decision-making processes (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999:31). However, their definition of structure, whether domestic or international, is less satisfactory. They do realize that structures offer opportunities and impose constraints on

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actors, a formulation that relies on Anthony Giddens' famous definition of structure. Yet at the same time they adopt Wendt's (1992) limited notion of structure, defined simply as intersubjective systems of meaning (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999:31).

Understandings about the EU, its roles, responsibilities and limitations allegedly form part of the intersubjective international structure, while the EU participates in the processes of constructing these intersubjective structures. There is very little sense of a structure consisting of more or less stable social relations, rooted in material conditions, that generate opportunities and constraints for human agency; nor is there any notion of contradiction between structures or between structures and intersubjective ideas (Robles, forthcoming).

The various ingenious and, at times, contradictory, attempts to define a European role in East Asian security demonstrate the limitations of an approach that is situated solely at the level of ideas and understandings - in short, intersubjective knowledge - without paying attention to underlying material conditions that determine the chances of translating these ideas and understandings into practice. At the beginning of the 1990s, several German scholars expressed the view that in the area of security, the Europeans no longer had any regional interests in Asia, with the exception of France's controversial colonial and nuclear policies in the South Pacific (Eschborn, Gardill and Mols, 1992:160). In the second half of the decade, with the growing European awareness of rapid economic growth in East Asia that had begun in the mid-1980s, Europeans writing on the subject, and even Asians, started to assert that Europe had a 'strong and increasing stake in East Asian security' (Godemont et al., 1995:1). The EU identified maritime security, denuclearization, the fight against drugs, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution as areas of dialogue with ASEAN (EU Doc. COM (96)314:11). Godemont et al. believed that dialogue could be carried out on global as well as regional issues. On global issues, Europe was said to have a role in creating an environment that would make China more likely to accept the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Europe could share its experience with East Asian states that wished to increase their role in peacekeeping; Europe and Asia could discuss ways to advance conventional arms control; they could share their experience in dealing with Russia; they could consult with each other about the United States and its global role, and lastly - just to make sure that nothing was left out - they could discuss general concepts of security (see also Mahncke, 1997). For Gerald Segal, Europe could help Asia to define new international roles for Asia (Segal, 1997:129). As regards regional issues, Godemont et al. pointed out that the Europeans provided support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO); could share their experience on the formulation and operation of nuclear free zones, handling of ethnic conflict and ensuring maritime security; and could cooperate with Asia in finding ways of integrating China into the international order (Godemont et al., 1995). The result resembles a 'laundry list', a mass of ideas without any clear priorities, as one European expert on Asian security admitted (Segal, 1997:134). The approach fails to address the question of whether the EU, assuming that it does have an interest in East Asian security, has the capacity to pursue these interests, given the structural context of action in Europe as well as in East Asia.

This is not to say that these scholars are unaware of the structural constraints that can and do limit the EU's margin of manoeuvre in fashioning a security role for itself in East Asia. First, at the time of the
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launch of the Asia-Europe Meeting (1996), the Europeans were preoccupied with the implementation of the CFSP; and second, particular features of East Asian security shaped the nature of possible cooperation with the EU (Godemont et al., 1995:2-3). This paper concentrates on the structure of relations within the EU that creates a particular type of security system and a particular type of security actor. It argues that the EU as a security system will, by its very nature, be likely to contribute little to East Asian security, except perhaps as a model. As a security actor, the EU has recognized that its primary interests outside Europe lie in the developing countries in its periphery. This priority has not prevented it, on at least two occasions, from acting in East Asia in ways that highlight the structural weakness of the ARF. Since September 11, the fight against terrorism has altered the structural context of the ARF, possibly opening up space for security cooperation between Europe and East Asia.

I. The EU as a Security System and East Asia

The EU is often judged and dismissed as a security actor on the basis of its failure to create an army or to forge an alliance that could replace NATO. Notwithstanding these apparent failures, Ole Waever, one of the leading European experts on European security, asserts that the EU is ‘the main pillar of stability in Europe’ (Waever, 2000). The argument begins from the observation that the end of the Cold War did not lead to the dissolution of the EU, nor did it trigger balancing behaviour on the part of the major European powers. In Waever’s analysis, the EU, as an order marked by overlapping and unsettled authorities, generates mechanisms that pre-empt most security problems in Europe. It is this ability that justifies the analysis of the EU as a security system. The primary role of the EU is to keep the core intact, specifically the potential rivals for power on the continent, France and Germany. Second, the EU exercises a ‘silent disciplining power’ on its ‘Near Abroad’ – the Central and East European countries (CEEC) that are candidates for membership. For example, in the early 1990s, both the Czechs and the Slovaks sought to ensure that the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was carried out in a way that could be considered ‘civilized’ in the West and that allowed them to carry over their agreements with the EU. For similar reasons, the Hungarians downplay the issue of ethnic minorities in their country (Waever, 2000:261-62). This peculiar mechanism of generating security on the continent demands that the EU reconcile enlargement and deepening. Without the prospect of membership, the CEEC would have no incentive to behave in ways that ‘desecuritize’ conflicts. Without deepening, the candidate states would not be able to conceive of the EU as the organizing factor in their national future (Waever, 2000:262).

This form of security provision cannot be equated with collective security in that it does not organize state reaction to aggression; or with collective defence, because it is not directed against outsiders. Waever calls this security system ‘regional unipolarity’, ‘quasi-empire’, or integration in concentric circles. Whatever its name, it makes the EU the most important security organization on the Continent (Waever, 2000:265). This model of a security system, by definition, cannot function vis-à-vis states that have no prospect of membership in the EU. Therein lies the difference between the CEEC and the states of North Africa, even if in reality
the latter pose for the EU many of the same problems and threats as the former (Waever, 2000:264).

What are the implications of the existence of a European security system for East Asia? In the past, this question was often reformulated as follows: Can the European security system be a model for East Asia (e.g. Krause and Umbach, 1998). The near-unanimous response of Asians and European specialists of Asia has been negative (e.g. Dosch, 1998; cf. Möller, 1996:354). If this were the case, then there would be very little justification for European participation in the ARF, as European input would, by definition, be irrelevant. Challenging the dominant view, the German scholar, Kay Möller, has ventured the hypothesis that the differences between the European and Asian context can be traced to a time lag rather than to essential cultural differences between Europeans and Asians (Möller, 1996:367), but this argument has received little attention in East Asia.

From a different angle, the existence of a European security system, though geographically confined, can be construed as having a beneficial effect on East Asian security. In the view of the late Gerald Segal, if the Europeans assumed a greater share of the burden of ensuring security in the developing world, the United States would be freed, enabling the United States to bear more burdens in Asia (Segal, 1997:131). Even assuming that such a causal linkage exists between the European security system and East Asian security, one should beware of relying on it as the basis for a European security role in East Asia. This approach would force one to consider any setback in the evolution of a European security system and/or United States opposition to any such security system as threats to East Asian security. At any rate, the continued development of the European security system could hardly be motivated by the desire to enable the United States to divert resources from Europe to Asia. Finally, this conception seems to entail a contradiction: Europe can make a contribution to East Asian security by concentrating on European security. One is tempted to say that in this view, the European presence in the East Asian security sphere would manifest itself in the form of absence.

The question that follows is whether the institutionalization of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the form of the CFSP, introduced by the Treaty of the European Union (the TEU, or Maastricht Treaty), has conferred on the EU the capacity to become a security actor in East Asia.

II. The EU as a Security Actor and the ARF, 1994-2000

The EU’s capacity as a security actor is conditioned by the CFSP’s goals, which are broad enough to cover East Asia, and its regional priorities and resources, which lead the EU to lay stress on other regions in Europe, American resources would be freed, enabling the United States to bear more burdens in Asia (Segal, 1997:131).

As is well known, the CFSP’s overall objective is to assert a European identity on the international scene. The objectives laid down in the Maastricht Treaty are quite ambitious: to safeguard the EU’s common values, fundamental interests and
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independence; to strengthen the security of the EU and its member states; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (TEU, Title V, Art. 6.1, para. 2).

While no geographic restrictions are attached to the realization of these objectives, the Lisbon European Council (1992) identified factors that would enable the EU to determine its common interest and that would be taken into account when defining issues and areas for joint action: geographic proximity, important political interests in political and economic stability, and threats to EU security interests. The Lisbon Council also identified several areas where joint action in relation to individual countries or groups of countries appeared to be particularly beneficial, at least initially: Central and Eastern Europe, especially the ex-USSR and the former Yugoslavia, the Maghreb (North Africa) and the Middle East. In the future, the areas of common interest requiring joint action would be North-South relations, relations with the United States, Japan and Canada, and the coordination of action in international organizations and conferences (McGoldrick, 1997:154-55).

The TEU provisions on security envisage the eventual formulation of a common defence policy, which in turn might lead to a common defence (TEU, Art. J.4, para. 1). One of the main concerns of several EU member states was to preserve the transatlantic relationship, hence the provision that the EU's policy would 'respect the obligations of certain member States under the North Atlantic Treaty' (Art. J.4, para. 4). Other European Councils have identified specific areas or issues in the security field suitable for joint action. A 1991 Maastricht 'Declaration on Areas which could be the subject of Joint Action' specified four security areas in which the member states have important common interests: the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), disarmament and arms control in Europe, nuclear non-proliferation and the economic aspects of security. An Extraordinary European Council in 1992 envisaged joint action on the promotion of peace and stability in Europe, on election observation in Russia, and on the Middle East, South Africa and the former Yugoslavia. The 1993 European Council meeting in Brussels defined the general objectives of European security as the EU's territorial integrity, political independence, democratic character and economic stability as well as the stability of neighbouring regions (McGoldrick, 1997:155-56).

From this cursory survey, we may conclude that while certain issues, for example, nuclear non-proliferation, have Asian dimensions, East Asia as such was not a priority region for the CFSP. Apart from Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia), the regions of greatest concern to the EU are those that are geographically closest to it: the Maghreb (North Africa) and the Middle East.

The main CFSP instruments provided for in the Maastricht Treaty are systematic cooperation that may lead to the definition of a common position (Art. J.1, para. 3 and J.2, para. 1), and joint action in areas where the member states have important interests in common (Art. J.3). As of 2003, most of the countries to which the EU applied negative measures, such as embargoes, the prohibition of flights and the freezing of funds and other financial resources, were in Africa (Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Liberia,

1. The European Council comprises the heads of state or government of the EU member states. It meets at least twice a year.
Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe). Other countries subject to negative measures were two European countries (Belarus and the former Yugoslavia) and four Asian countries (Afghanistan, Burma, Indonesia and Iraq) (Conseil de l'Union européenne, 2003).

This is not the place to survey the CFSP's record in the first decade of its existence, the criticisms of its failures in Yugoslavia and Kosovo being well-known already. Our focus here will be the institutional difficulties faced by the CFSP, difficulties that can be traced in part to the EU's pillar structure. The EC is the first pillar, the CFSP the second, and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) the third pillar. Since the first is supranational, while the other two are intergovernmental, this creates problems of coordination between economic policy (under the Commission) and foreign policy (under the CFSP) and between member states and the EU. Despite the differentiation into pillars, the CFSP is financed through the EC budget and must therefore comply with the EC's financial rules. Financing by member states remains possible, but only in exceptional circumstances.

Given these structural constraints, it is perhaps not so surprising that the challenge of identifying specific EU security interests in East Asia has proved to be so daunting. When such interests are identified, a laundry list tends to be the outcome. In the absence of adequate financing, the primary means of pursuing these interests is dialogue. The EU has been much more reluctant to use sanctions vis-à-vis Asia than other regions (Hansen, 2001).

In at least two instances, though, the EU has played a not insignificant role in two issue areas within the ARF's geographic scope.

b. The EU in East Asia: KEDO and East Timor

The process leading to the establishment of KEDO illustrates the potential as well as the limits of both the ARF and the EU's contributions to it.

In the first case, the immediate threat to East Asian security came from North Korea's possession of graphite-moderated nuclear reactors capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons, which could threaten not just South Korea but also Japan. North Korea used this threat as a bargaining chip in order to obtain economic and other assistance from the United States and the West. Its goal is to prop up its economy, which was hard hit by the collapse of the Eastern bloc. The United States and North Korea signed a Framework Agreement on 21 October 1994 and pursued negotiations that culminated in the establishment of KEDO on 9 March 1995 by the United States, South Korea and Japan. Under the agreement, the North Korean reactors would be replaced by two Light Water Reactors (LWR) for electricity, which would be safer from nuclear accidents and more difficult to use in the production of weapons-grade plutonium. They would be under monitoring, supervision and control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In return, the United States undertook to supply 500,000 tons of heavy oil; provide formal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States; and reduce barriers to trade, investment and communication (Lim, 1999:22-23).

The ARF followed the situation on the Korean Peninsula almost from the very start. However, as the ARF is a purely consultative forum, its 'action' was limited to welcoming the talks between North
Korea and the United States to implement the Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 (ARF, 1994:para. 5), urging the resumption of dialogue between North and South Korea, recognizing the importance of the KEDO (2nd ARF, 1995:para. 11) and urging other ARF participants to consider giving further financial and political support to KEDO (ARF, 1996: para. 7 [v]).

The EU’s decision to accede to the KEDO Agreement was not so much a result of the ARF’s urging as a response to Japan’s demand that the EU participate in KEDO. This would be the quid pro quo for Japanese support for reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia. By a Joint Action of 5 March 1996, the EU expressed its desire to co-finance the KEDO; and on 30 July 1997 the Accession Agreement was signed, under which the EU would contribute ECU 15 million a year for five years. As Paul Lim puts it, ‘EU participation in KEDO has been hailed as [an expression of] EU concern for the peace and stability of East Asia, nuclear safety, and nuclear non-proliferation’ (Lim, 1999:22). EU participation in KEDO is all the more significant because of the structural differences between the security situation in Northeast Asia and that in Southeast Asia. War is now not very likely to occur among the members states of ASEAN, whereas this danger looms large in Northeast Asia. Yet the institutional weakness of ASEAN, which launched the ARF and claims to be ARF’s driving force, has limited its financial contribution to the KEDO. On the other hand, the EU possesses its own financial resources and has a long tradition of active participation in its own right, i.e. separately from its member states, in international organizations, whether economic, technical or humanitarian. The following table illustrates the contrast between ASEAN and the EU.

### Total Financial Support by Country to KEDO, March 1995 to December 2001 (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Organization</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,376,905,507</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>604,542,477</td>
<td>43.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>310,886,000</td>
<td>22.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>292,603,930</td>
<td>21.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe: EAEA (EURATOM)</td>
<td>82,118,897</td>
<td>5.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,821,429</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,011,485</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>790,192</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>645,593</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>503,778</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal Europe</td>
<td>87,916,374</td>
<td>6.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN: Singapore</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>974,907</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>423,690</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal ASEAN</td>
<td>3,748,597</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KEDO Annual Report, Appendix I
It was to be expected that the Republic of Korea, the United States and Japan were to be KEDO’s primary contributors. The three accounted for 87.74% of total financial support to KEDO from 1995 to 2001. Among the other contributors, which included non-EU European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland and Switzerland), ASEAN members, Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile and Mexico), Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Oman, the EU and its member states provided the largest share (over 6% of the total for the period), most of which came from the European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM). ASEAN’s six original member states all made contributions, representing roughly a quarter of 1% of the total. ASEAN as an organization distinct from its members made no contribution at all. It goes without saying that the extent of financial participation conditions the influence of each group in decision-making within KEDO, affording the EU greater possibilities than those open to ASEAN.

That said, EU participation in KEDO also illustrates the obstacles to a more active EU CFSP. In order to meet the EU’s financial obligations, the European Commission took ECU 5 million from the CFSP budget and an additional ECU 10 million from the budget for non-government organizations (NGOs), a circumstance that prompts the suspicion that the contingency had not been adequately provided for. When the European Parliament discovered this, it sought to delay payments for 1997 and 1998. The Parliament was unhappy at not having been consulted, but the Commission maintained that the contribution to KEDO was within the scope of the EURATOM Treaty Article 101, which did not require consultation with the Parliament. Faced with a fait accompli, i.e. EU accession to the KEDO Agreement, the Parliament agreed to approve the agreement on condition that the Council and the Commission sign an Inter-institutional Agreement on all nuclear matters under EURATOM and consult with the European Parliament. The Commission and the Council only consented to an exchange of letters giving the Parliament a consultative role in all international nuclear energy agreements, provided that these agreements were ‘of particular significance’. This last condition implied that the Commission could choose not to inform the Parliament about any agreement that did not meet this criterion. Consequently the Parliament reserved the right to block KEDO contributions in the future (Lim, 1999:23-24). For the EU’s partners and outside observers it is not easy to grasp the import of these intra-EU disputes, which can only undermine EU credibility and effectiveness as a partner.

If the ARF’s role in KEDO did not go beyond that of encouragement, its role in the run-up to the independence of East Timor was even more ineffectual. Within the EU, the appropriate policy to adopt became a matter of controversy, but whatever positive contribution the EU made to East Timorese independence was achieved in spite of, and not because of, the ARF.

East Timor, which Indonesia had invaded in 1975 and occupied for more than two decades, only became a thorn in ASEAN-EU relations in the early 1990s, after Portugal, the former colonial power, had become an EU member and the EU itself decided to place greater emphasis on human rights, democracy and the rule of law in its relations with third states (the following is summarized from Robles, forthcoming). Despite Portugal’s veto on the signing of a new ASEAN-EU agreement, European states which were supplying arms to Indonesia sought to placate the latter. It was not until the Suharto regime had fallen in 1998 that
Portugal and Indonesia were able to reach an agreement (5 May 1999) to organize a referendum on autonomy or independence. The Commission then proposed assistance worth 1 million Euros for monitoring the referendum, in addition to a long-term aid programme of 15-20 million Euros. The European Parliament requested that a UN police force be deployed immediately in East Timor, instead of entrusting to Indonesia responsibility for maintaining peace and order during the referendum. Regrettably this call was not heeded. The EU, for its part, sent an observer mission, which was impressed by the East Timorese population's determination to vote in the face of intimidation by pro-Indonesian militias. The Observer Mission also called for a rapid decision on the sending of a peace-keeping force. The massacres and forced resettlement that had compelled 250,000 East Timorese to flee to the mountains and 200,000 others to seek refuge in West Timor prompted several members of the European Parliament to denounce the 'obvious and premeditated will of the Indonesian authorities to embark on ethnic cleansing'; they called on the Commission and the Council to freeze all forms of cooperation with Indonesia, and on the EU and the UN to act to prevent East Timor from becoming the Kosovo of Asia. Finland, which at the time held the EU Presidency, urged Indonesia to end the violence and to request that the UN Security Council authorize an armed presence. NGOs and trade unions joined in the appeal to the EU to decide in favour of sending a peace-keeping force. The major powers, negotiating at the UN, refused to do so in deference to Indonesia (Cahin, 2000:144-48). But the EU was unable to turn a deaf ear to demands for action from European public opinion. In mid-September 1999, the Council of the EU imposed sanctions on Indonesia in the form of a ban, until 17 January 2000, on the export of arms, munitions and military equipment to Indonesia, which also covered contracts entered into before the embargo, as well as a ban on the supply of equipment that might be used for internal repression or terrorism. Bilateral military cooperation between Indonesia and EU member states was also suspended.

Regardless of the way we assess the effectiveness of the EU's actions, they contrast sharply with the ARF's inability to serve as a forum for discussion of the massacres in East Timor. Obviously between 1994 and 1998 no reference to it appeared in the statements of the ARF Chairmen. It was only in the summary report of the November 1999 and April 2000 meetings of the ARF's Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures that a first, timid reference to East Timor was made. Even so, most participants were still very cautious; as the statement puts it, 'the participants noted that some members mentioned in their statements the latest developments in East Timor and welcomed the positive developments that have taken place' (ISG CBM :1999-2000, para. 7). At the seventh ARF, participants were finally bold enough to welcome the positive trends that had taken place there, particularly the cooperation between Indonesia and the UN, and 'underscored the need for continued international attention to and support for the reconstruction, rehabilitation and nation building of East Timor' (ARF, 2000:§18). Curiously, the ARF participants deplored the death of a UN Peace Keeper but not that of several hundred thousand East Timorese during two decades of Indonesian occupation.

The ARF participants' caution can be explained by the insistence of many of them on the principle of non intervention and by the desire to defer to the occupying power, Indonesia, which sees itself as ASEAN's de facto leader. Nevertheless, this caution belies the claim made that the ARF participants 'have become more
comfortable with each other through frequent interactions in the various ARF fora. Such enhanced comfort levels have enabled ARF participants to exchange views frankly on issues of common concern, thereby encouraging greater transparency and mutual understanding (ARF, 1999:para. 4).

It is possible to argue that the ARF's passiveness respected a tacit division of labour between the ARF and the UN, which had sponsored the Indonesian-Portuguese agreement and had brokered international efforts to set up an Observer Mission. This argument of a division of labour cannot be pushed too far, as it would call into question ARF efforts to discuss ratification and implementation of multilateral arms control treaties of which the UN Secretary General is a depositary. Interestingly enough, individual Indonesian scholars are now willing to admit that domestic problems may also become regional problems and that non intervention as a principle is passé. Jusuf Wanandi concedes, with the benefit of hindsight, that ASEAN's more active and immediate engagement could have prevented the bloodshed (Wanandi, 2001:30).

In brief, while the EU's contribution to the ARF may have been modest, KEDO and East Timor lead us to believe that the EU is also capable of playing a role in East Asian security without having to rely on the ARF. Is it possible that the further development of the CFSP, particularly in the form of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and the new prominence of the fight against terrorism will enhance cooperation between the EU and East Asia, if not the ARF?

III. The EU as a Security Actor: The ESDP, the Fight against Terrorism and the ARF (2000/01-)

Even with the ESDP it is quite likely that the EU will continue to concentrate on relations with the developing countries in its periphery. But the international fight against terrorism is compatible with changes in the conceptualization of security occurring in Europe, and may thus become an area for concrete security cooperation between Europe and East Asia.

a. The ESDP as an Instrument of Crisis Management and Prevention

The reform of the CFSP is an ongoing process. The Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1998, introduced several innovations, notably the appointment of a High Representative and special representatives for special issues; the introduction of potential qualified majority voting, which can be blocked by a potential veto; the shift towards a division of labour between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU); and the integration of Petersberg Missions - humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and crisis management, including peace making - into the EU (Dehousse, 1998:534-37). The Cologne European Council (December 1999) declared the EU's intention to provide itself with 'the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces and the means to decide to use them'. A Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the core of an EU military staff were set up to be operational in 2001. A Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was to be in place by 2003. It would be capable of deployment within 60 days, sustainable in the field for one year and able to carry out the Petersberg Missions.
The 2000 Nice Treaty seems to signal a new phase in the CFSP’s evolution, through the endorsement of a European Security and Defence Policy. The name, though, may be misleading. To be sure, all but one of the references to the WEU were removed from the TEU, implying that the EU would henceforth be directly responsible for framing the CFSP’s defence aspects and providing access to operational capabilities. That said, the ESDP’s emphasis lies, for the moment, in conflict prevention and crisis management (Duke, 2001:159-60). This orientation is confirmed by the adoption at Göteborg in June 2001 of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, which declared that conflict prevention is one of the main objectives of EU external relations. Within this circumscribed security area, the EU decided that it should be able to decide autonomously on crisis management operations; that it should have the capacity to implement them autonomously if necessary, without the use of NATO assets; but that the EU will only implement operations ‘where NATO as a whole is not engaged’. In application of the Nice Treaty, institution building has proceeded apace. The new Political Committee meets more regularly than its predecessor, the PSC. The EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff provide the structure for situation assessments and military direction of United States crisis management directions. By the time of its meeting at Laeken in December 2001, the European Council was able to declare that the ESDP was ‘partly operational’.

The vital question is whether the EU’s ability to act as a security actor in East Asia has been greatly enhanced by the ESDP. The underlying weakness of the ESDP, as Sven Biscop points out, is the lack of a strategic concept that can guide the military staff in preparing a typology of operations and conducting day-to-day policies, while at the same time guaranteeing democratic legitimacy and transparency and allaying the neutral members’ suspicions regarding the CFSP’s ‘militarization’ (Biscop, 2002a:4-5). The divisions among member states over NATO’s role in European defence largely explain the somewhat surprising absence of a strategic concept. Rather than not make any progress at all, the EU member states decided to focus their attention on the issues on which agreement was possible, i.e. on institution building (Biscop, 2002a:3-4).

It is not impossible to discern the contours of a strategic concept, as Biscop argues convincingly. It should come as no surprise that it is the European periphery – Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean – that appears to be the ESDP priority. At the Seville European Council of June 2000, the EU expressed its willingness to undertake the operation following the NATO operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which protected international monitors from the EU and the OSCE who were overseeing implementation of the peace plan there. An EU Police Mission (EUPM) was also launched in 2002 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a follow-up to the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) (Biscop, 2002a:7).

Outside Europe, it is the developing countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean that will probably be the EU’s main partners. Unlike the CEEC, these countries have little prospect of membership, yet because of the existence of numerous disputes, the high degree of militarization and the low level of economic integration, one cannot exclude that they will pose security risks to the EU (Biscop, 2002b:3-4). The EU already committed itself in 1995 to a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which, like the CSCE, has three baskets: a political-security partnership, an economic and financial partnership, with a free trade area between
these countries and the EU as a long-term goal; and a partnership in social, cultural and humanitarian affairs. So far the EMP has very few concrete achievements to its credit, apart from some very low-level confidence and security-building measures, such as training seminars for diplomats (Biscop, 2002b:4). This observation prompts us to ask the following question: if the EU has been able to make only very modest progress, in eight years, in a partnership with a region that is geographically close to Europe and where its political, strategic and economic interests seem to be fairly clear-cut, is it realistic to expect the EU to aspire to a more ambitious role in East Asia?

In the past, the Europeans have answered this question by admitting that Europe could not make an immediate contribution to the solution of longstanding conflicts. Rather its contribution to East Asian security would be indirect. It could, for instance, send peace-keeping troops in the framework of a UN operation (Harris and Bridges, 1983:44; Stares and Regaud, 1997-8) or put a fixed number of troops permanently at the disposal of the UN (Biscop, 2002a:8). A possible precedent may be the EU’s decision in May 2002 to deploy 1500 troops as a peace-keeping force to the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is not in one of the CFSP’s or the EDSP’s priority regions. For the moment, though, there is little evidence that East Asian states are willing to call on UN peace-keeping forces, with or without a European contingent, as a means of addressing any of the disputes among East Asian states.

Significant changes in the nature of the security problematic in Europe in the post-Cold War period may combine with the fight against terrorism after September 11 to open a new area of security cooperation between Europe and East Asia.

b. The Changing Nature of the Security Problematic in Europe

The collapse of the Eastern bloc on the one hand, and the expansion of the security agenda on the other, have triggered two separate structural changes that are slowly blurring, if not dissolving, the distinction between internal and external security (this follows largely Bigo, 2000).

Now that the external enemy - the USSR - has disappeared, external security agencies - defence ministries and armed forces in individual European countries - have been searching for new adversaries, whose existence could justify the maintenance of defence and research and development (R and D) budgets. Increasingly these agencies have looked inside their own states for the new enemies and perhaps predictably, have found them among immigrants, the second generation population and even inhabitants of inner cities or the disadvantaged suburbs. The assumption is that unemployment and marginalization may drive these groups of people to crime. At the same time, internal security agencies - national police forces, the police with military status, border guards, and customs police - are looking beyond their respective borders in the fight against their internal enemies, who are assumed to be embedded in international crime networks. The new enemies are hooligans, migrants, asylum seekers, drug and human traffickers, terrorists and - why not - also Muslims. The result is convergence towards the same enemy (or enemies). For this reason, external security agencies are intensifying their collaboration with internal security agencies within countries, at the same time as the latter are also collaborating ever more closely with their counterparts abroad.

In this context, the fight against
international terrorism after September 11 cannot but appear to be a suitable area for security cooperation between Europe and East Asia. This does not at all prejudice the form that cooperation should take. In other words, the ARF will not necessarily be the ideal forum for this cooperation. For many years now, the EU has been holding separate dialogues with individual Asian states, particularly China, and with ASEAN. For instance, at an EU-China summit, held in 2000, discussion was pursued on joint action against trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration (Möller, 2002:26). The Fourteenth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, held in Brussels in January 2003, adopted a Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism (EU 5811/03 [Presse 19]). The ARF’s inability to facilitate agreements could increase the attractiveness of bilateral dialogues while at the same time highlighting the importance of universal fora. The reference to the ARF in the joint declaration (para. 4) cannot hide the fact that out of seven possible measures, three would be implemented through ASEAN-EU cooperation. These include exchange of information, strengthening of links between EU and ASEAN law enforcement agencies, and capacity building [para. 6]. The other four measures require cooperation within a universal framework – implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, implementation of UN conventions and protocols, conclusion and adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and early entry into force of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its protocols.

For the Asian side, the growing prominence of these ‘new’ security threats carries with it the risk that citizens from their countries are increasingly identified with these risks. Avoiding this risk should be one of the objectives of a security dialogue with the EU.

Conclusion

If definition of the EU’s security interests in East Asia and specification of the EU contribution to security in that region have proven to be arduous tasks for the EU and its member states, East Asian states have not been any more successful in articulating their vision of a European role. Kay Möller goes so far as to assert that China neither wants nor expects Europe to play a role in East Asia (Möller, 2002:30).

Although East Asian visions are essential, it would be hazardous to conceptualize the EU’s role as a security actor by relying solely on expectations, ideas and intersubjective knowledge of the EU and East Asian states. Attention should be paid not only to the opportunities created by new structural contexts, but also to the constraints inherent in the international context, in the nature of the EU as an institution and in the nature of East Asian regionalism. Failure to do so creates the risk that discussions between the EU and East Asia will remain at the lofty level of ‘common’ or ‘shared’ interests, which are potentially infinite, without making any progress in materializing these interests.
Bibliography


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