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Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southeast Asia

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been active in Southeast Asia for more than 30 years. Its country offices in Bangkok, Jakarta, Manila and Hanoi have been active in implementing national cooperation programmes in partnership with parliaments, civil society groups and non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and 'think-tanks', government departments, political parties, women's groups, trade unions, business associations and the media.

In 1995, the Singapore office was transformed into an Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Its role is to support, in close cooperation with the country offices in the region, ASEAN cooperation and integration, Asia-Europe dialogue and partnership, and country programmes in Cambodia and other ASEAN member states where there are no Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung offices.

Its activities include dialogue programmes, international and regional conferences (e.g. on human rights, social policy, democratization, comprehensive security), Asia-Europe exchanges, civil education, scholarship programmes, research (social, economic and labour policies, foreign policy) as well as programmes with trade unions and media institutes.

Dialogue + Cooperation is a reflection of the work of the Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Singapore: it deals with ASEAN cooperation as well as the Asia-Europe dialogue.

- *Dialogue + Cooperation* will tell you about our activities in Southeast Asia by publishing important contributions to our conferences and papers from our own work.
- *Dialogue + Cooperation* will contribute to the dialogue between Asia and Europe by systematically covering specific up-to-date topics which are of concern for the two regions.
- *Dialogue + Cooperation* will be an instrument for networking by offering you the opportunity to make a contribution and use it as a platform for communication.

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Editorial: Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2003

Dear Reader

The German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, said on 12 November 2001 in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York:

We must counter the terrorist strategy designed to bring about the clash of civilizations with a “dialogue of cultures and religions”. We need a spiritual debate based on mutual understanding that attempts to reach genuine agreement on the fundamental values that unite us. Such a dialogue presupposes the existence of shared values, but also respect for other traditions and differences between peoples. . . . Any dialogue must build on the universality of human rights. It must be conducted with respect for the dignity of all involved, in tolerance and openness. It must start “at home”, within the cultures themselves. It can only bear fruit if it is pursued free of all constraint. And it only has a purpose if all participants are also ready to offer self-criticism.

In many places in the world, such as Northern Ireland, the Balkans, the Near East, Central Asia, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, political fronts run along religious borders. The enemy is the person with the different faith. However, religious differences are often a front for ethnic or social tensions. Religion is simply a propaganda instrument in the hands of power cliques or interest groups, and it is used to spread fear and fright.

Nevertheless, the ‘clash of civilizations’ concept is flawed. It is probably more correct to speak about clashes within civilizations. Even a short view of the comparative history of Islam and Christianity shows that, with regard to ‘human rights’, Islam comes off considerably better than Christianity. In past centuries Islam was clearly more tolerant of other religions than Christianity.

In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech on 10 December 2000, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung said:

In Asia, long before the West, the respect for human dignity was written into systems of thought, and intellectual traditions upholding the concept of “demos” took root.

There are several ideologies and religions in Asia, which put people above all as Kim Dae Jung noted:

“The people are heaven. The will of the people is the will of heaven. Revere the people as you would heaven.” This was the central tenet in the political thoughts of China and Korea as early as 3000 years ago.

He went on to point out that 500 years later, Buddhism taught in India that the dignity of the individual and the rights of the individual are of highest value. And 2000 years before the English philosopher John Locke developed the theory of the people’s sovereignty, Mencius, a student of Confucius, is attributed with saying that ‘The king is the son of heaven. Heaven has sent him to serve the people in justice. If he fails and oppresses the people, they have the right to remove him in the name of heaven’.

Today mainly economic activities influence the development of relationships between states, peoples and cultures. These economic activities determine if relationships develop with aggression and confrontation, as has been the case so often in the past, or if they develop more cooperatively, peacefully and humanely. To achieve the latter, it is essential that economic globalization embraces cultural, religious and civil conditions. The world is more than just a global market or one global culture. There is a need for a world-wide compatible 'global civic identity', based on equality, respect for different cultures and different ways of life and a common perception of universal human rights.

The ongoing process of globalization leads inevitably towards a more intensive exchange of different cultures, which is often desired and fruitful, but also often enforced and conflict-laden. To achieve the most important prerequisite for peaceful coexistence all people have to learn to bear religious differences and intercultural tensions.

September 11 and its political consequences are reasons enough to revitalize the idea of a serious and permanent dialogue between moderate and democratic forces in all cultures. Such a dialogue may be uncomfortable and annoying, but it is necessary, otherwise 'others' will capture the agenda, destroying the very basis of a shared global existence.

With this in mind, on 18 and 19 November 2002, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung invited 25 politicians, academics and non-government organization representatives from Southeast Asia and Europe to discuss their specific cultural backgrounds and the implications for regional and national politics as well as for intercultural dialogue in times of globalization. Like the conference on security policy in 2001, this meeting was overshadowed by a horrific incident – in October 2002 about 190 people died in a terrorist bomb attack in Bali. Bali was where this meeting was originally meant to take place, but after this incident the venue was shifted to Singapore.

This issue of *Dialogue + Cooperation* contains the statements of the participants. It is a collection of thoughts and meanings from people of different nationalities, cultures and religions – people who, nevertheless, share common values. The reader will be provided with interesting insights into specific national experiences, with analysis of the roots of conflicts between different cultures or identities, and with an outlook of how to meet the challenges of the tensions between them. Against this background the intercultural dialogue is an important instrument for a 'Fight against Terrorism' – without weapons.

As an introduction to the topic we have selected an essay by Wolfgang Thierse, President of the German Federal Parliament. We would like to thank the periodical 'Deutschland' for allowing us to reprint this article. Thanks go also to Mr Jens Kayser, who as an intern in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung office in Singapore helped to compile all the documents for this publication.

Finally, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung would like to express its sincere appreciation to all the conference participants for their contributions.

The Editor
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Introduction

Dialogue of Cultures – The Foreign and the Familiar*

Wolfgang Thierse¹

Ignorance of other ways of life is the breeding ground of extremism. But how can we create the conditions necessary for a true dialogue of cultures?

It is a widely held but erroneous view that money rules the world. Of course, nobody would seriously dispute the influence that business and economics exercise over our lives. Nonetheless, the recurrence of major crises demonstrates time and again the need for political order and the indispensable role of politics as a mediating and vital shaping force – a role underlined as never before by the events of 11 September 2001. The breed of international terrorism that is fuelled by fundamentalism poses a daunting array of political challenges. The primary challenge is to prevent a fanatical, globally operative minority from committing even more murders. Terror is the most extreme and most perverse manifestation of aggressive fundamentalism.

In the long term, of course, it will take more than a military campaign to thwart this appalling phenomenon, and in Germany we have already begun asking ourselves what additional action needs to be taken. An indisputable component of such action will be the establishment of international tribunals, in which the United States of America also plays a full role, able

to indict and bring war criminals and international terrorists such as Bin Laden to justice. We need the means to combat international crime and to deny international terrorists access to financial and logistical resources. There can be no doubt either that the time has come to breathe real life into solemn calls for intercultural dialogue.

Samuel Huntington, from whose pen the dangerous catchphrase ‘the clash of civilizations’ first originated, recently hit the nail on the head: the terrorists want to embroil us in a conflict in which the civilized world must refuse to engage. Consequently, I believe the second challenge is to resist the chimera of imaginary enemies. There is no such thing as a hostile culture. Neither is it possible – given the usurpation, politicization and instrumentalization of religion by Islamic fundamentalism – to reduce this conflict to the terms of a clash between religions. Narrowing the dialogue between cultures down to a religious dispute would simply be to fall into the Islamist trap described by the islamologist Mathias Rohe. The third and most formidable challenge is to spell out the right way to engage in a ‘dialogue of civilizations and religions’ – in other words how to make such a dialogue as all-embracing as possible. I believe there

* This essay has been printed with the kind permission of the periodical *Deutschland*, in which it was published in the 2/2002 edition.

1. Wolfgang Thierse is a Member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and he has been President of the German Federal Parliament (Deutsche Bundestag) since 1998.

is an urgent need for interreligious dialogue, one which, above all, promotes peaceful coexistence in our own society. Lack of knowledge about other religions is fertile ground for the prejudices and hostile projections of extremists on all sides. The dynamic of globalization inevitably goes hand in hand with more intensive exchanges between different cultures. While these contacts are often sought and fruitful, they are just as frequently the source of conflict. In order to achieve our minimum and, at the same time, most important objective – peaceful coexistence – we will need to learn to tolerate religious differences and intercultural tensions.

One of the strengths of our open society is surely its will to understand the unknown, the antithetical other, and the capacity this gives it to find appropriate answers to this challenge. Tolerance is certainly a difficult and severe virtue, not to be confused with easy-going *laissez-faire*, value relativism or lack of convictions. Tolerance only qualifies as the essential prerequisite for a dialogue of the cultures if it is based on mutual respect, not on indifference. True tolerance, I believe, manifests itself in repeated attempts to get to the bottom of the divergent values, the dissimilar processes of thought underlying decisions and the widely differing expectations that underlie so many conflicts. Organizing the communication and translation processes that this effort demands is the most important task of any intercultural dialogue.

This dialogue is not just an abstract, international task; it must begin here and now in our own country. Several million Muslims live in Germany – are we really aware of the scale of the challenge? What are we doing to prevent the establishment of Turkish ghettos in our towns and cities? How can we reconcile the complex and conflicting demands of religious liberty and the need to protect young people from

fundamentalist religious indoctrination? Might not an evolving form of 'European Islam' offer better opportunities, including in immigrants' countries of origin, for stimulating a debate about the most appropriate dividing line between church and state? Might it not even be in the genuine interests of our state to create a framework for a 'Muslim public institution' in a form similar to that taken for granted by and instituted for the benefit of the Christian churches? Such a dialogue will not be easy. Ushering in a dialogue of cultures implies accepting painful challenges and demands openness and a willingness to change on both sides. Dialogue can be neither a panacea nor a placebo, but will be bitter medicine for all those engaging in it. The biggest potential affront to Islam is likely to be its encounter with Western openness, with secularization and religious liberty.

This stage of development – the separation of church and state and the process of enlightenment – is the product of hundreds of years of European history. Islamic societies, on the other hand, are being asked to complete the same journey in next to no time at all. Recognizing that this is an exacting demand is not the same as exempting Islamic societies from this task. It does, however, imply the recognition that every country must find its own path into the modern world. For the West, the greatest challenge will almost certainly be acknowledging that we cannot shy away from – in the broadest sense of the phrase – the 'cultural implications' of our mode of economic, productive and market behaviour. Are we really aware of the profound impact these, for us uncontroversial, mechanisms are having on the centuries-old, traditional cultural practices of other peoples? Do we really appreciate how our actions are destroying the traditional ties and bonds that are indispensable in these societies, if not for our own Western social order? Many

Islamic scholars harbour huge misgivings about our societies and are concerned about the obvious link which appears to exist, like two sides of the same coin, between globalization and individualism, and the threat to religious and cultural cohesion which these pose to Western and non-Western worlds alike. Reason enough to engage in self-critical reflection.

The mixture and interpenetration of different cultures does not take place as part of a relationship among equals: the balance of power is skewed. What we refer to today as globalization is a Western-dominated form of economic power which is breaking and entering into all the world's cultures and which endeavours to reduce people to their economic functions as consumers and producers. In Germany and many other European countries, the social market economy is the most successful attempt to achieve a balance between economic success and social obligations. A long process of development has led to a broad and stable consensus in society in favour of the social state. However, this consensus is showing signs of fracturing precariously as globalization increasingly enables companies to cancel their part in the social pact: by relocating jobs to low-wage countries, transferring profits to tax oases, avoiding environmental regulations, and exploiting the political impotence of countries in the southern hemisphere.

An old question has suddenly found its way to the top of the agenda: how might the West respond most appropriately and sensitively in political terms to feelings of economic and cultural oppression? The terrorist attacks have made us aware of things which we had previously ignored – whether out of egotism, apathy, or a sense of helplessness. They have robbed us of the illusion that economic, political and cultural dependencies are one-sided and successful. Western societies invulnerable. As long as we fail to take action to secure the

material, social and cultural living conditions of people in the poorer regions of the world, our security will continue to be endangered. In view of this existential threat a series of new questions arise. How can we cope with the consciousness of the vulnerability of the high-tech modern world? How do we achieve 'common security'? How can we establish a civilized world order in the form of an enforceable legal order.

Hunger, poverty, natural catastrophes and the feelings of powerlessness and hopelessness which these provoke represent the biggest threats to world peace. The gulf between the winners and losers of globalization is becoming ever wider. It is shameful that we have only now begun to consider the consequences which must have long been apparent to us: if people believe that their own cultures are being marginalized, their religion disdained, their ties and bonds undermined, then their reactions are predictable – in the West, too. The danger is that apprehension about change and a need for simple answers will result in people turning to radical solutions.

Unlike Goethe's sorcerer's apprentice we still have the chance to banish the spirits we have conjured up. What must and can we do? To begin with, we are, at least in part, responsible for the fact that the international financial markets set off bouts of speculative fever and currency crises which only exacerbate the impoverishment of people living in the poorest parts of the world. We need rules, means of regulating these markets, similar in kind to the controversially discussed Tobin tax. Secondly, we must also accept responsibility for creating conditions of fair trade and production on global markets. Thirdly, we need to implement international standards on the world's labour markets which guarantee humane working conditions for all. And fourthly and most importantly, we bear a share of the

responsibility for the depletion of the world's natural resources which allow people to make a living at all.

Because the market itself cares not a whit for these natural resources, is incapable of establishing social justice and has no respect for different ways of life, it is essential that globalization is subject to political control. The United Nations will have to play a credible and effective role in this respect. International agreements are, however, only as effective as national governments allow them to be. The lack of willingness of national governments to adhere to self-imposed commitments has been dramatically demonstrated by the fate of the environment and climate conferences from Rio to Marrakech. The prospects for a new global political initiative may perhaps have been improved by the horrors of 11 September. Perhaps there is even a chance that the oft-ridiculed notion of a 'supra national domestic policy' might finally take on concrete form. The first priorities for such a new world order must be to combat the exploitation and looting of natural resources, and to tackle hunger, deprivation and disease. This task also calls for a global social policy capable of creating humane conditions of life, a minimum of social security and improved educational

opportunities for all. The world cannot be governed simply by allowing businesses to pocket all the profits of globalization and restricting political action to the management of the problems left in globalization's wake.

The indisputable market success of Western economies should not be used to justify their unbridled expansion – and certainly not with the aim of establishing a 'globally homogenized culture' (Richard Rorty). Economic behaviour in particular is a major determinant of the relationships between states, peoples and cultures: aggressive and confrontational, as so often in the past, or – hopefully – more cooperative, peaceful, humane and more respectful of human culture. This hope will only be fulfilled if economic globalization embraces the cultural, religious and civilizing conditions which will enable our 'one world', with all its differences, to become more than just a global marketplace, and more than a global culture. Which is also why we need a globally sustainable, civilizing 'corporate identity' based on cooperation between partners with equal rights, respect for different cultures and ways of life, and a shared commitment to universal human rights.

'Clashes within Civilization' or 'Clashes between Civilizations'?

Abdurrahman Wahid
Donald Sasson
Surin Pitsuwan
Hawazi Daipi

Abdurrahman Wahid – Indonesia

Thirty years ago, I was invited by Yomiuri Shimbun to Tokyo, where I met with professors who spoke from a Confucian viewpoint. I remember them mentioning then that the concept of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West is a new one.

Of course, there are differences between civilizations and I would say that this is normal. But as the West learns more and more about the East, I think it is very risky to talk about a clash of civilizations. There are differences and at the same time there are also clashes between elements of different civilizations, the West and the East, but not clashes between whole civilizations. This I absolutely reject.

There are elements that misunderstand each other, in the West as well as in the East. For example, there are orthodox Jewish groups in Jerusalem who throw stones at passing cars in the belief that driving a car on the Sabbath (Saturday) is working and therefore breaking the religious law. But these people are still considered children of the Western civilization, while far less militant Islamic groups are classed as children of the Islamic civilization. How can we understand Professor Huntington if he uses such double standards? To me, the idea of a clash of civilizations is not acceptable. There are

clashes within civilizations, but not between civilizations.

Within civilizations, we have so many differences. In Southeast Asia we have the tradition of non-governmental organizations which are formed by people outside of government. In many Southeast Asian societies, if you speak against the government you have to go underground to avoid punishment, as some governments react adversely to any criticism against them. The only way for such underground movements to criticize their own governments is to criticize Westernization, despite the fact that many of them envy the West. Take, for example, the mullahs of Iran. During the days of the Shah, they fought the government which they perceived as representing Westernization. What they were against was Westernization, not the West itself. This is important, because later it can be narrowed down to Americanization. This is what is behind the protests of Muslims all over the world – as well as the impending bomb attacks on Iraq. We are not against the West per se, but Westernization, particularly the idea that it should be the only way of life to follow. While some wear trousers, many still wear sarongs.

Another example is the tradition of institutionalizing Islam or defending

Islamic institutions. This is important because it is also about defending culture. What Michael Mastura said about Mindanao was that he does not defend the MILF or the Filipino government, but a way of life followed by the Filipino Muslims, which should be part of the way of life of Filipinos in general. On the agenda of many meetings of Muslim leaders is the question of how we should modernize. In my thinking, modernization is fine, but please do not destroy culture in the process.

Freedom of expression does not exist in Muslim societies everywhere, especially because there is no room for dialogue. As long as you pay tribute to Allah, you are a Muslim. Even if you never pray or fast, and don't follow a religious way of life, formally you are a Muslim. But there are still many different approaches to social life within Islam, many differences in the study of so-called classical Islam. Southeast Asian Islam, for example, is different from Islam in Afghanistan, or from South Asian Islam which covers Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka.

Malaysia has had a history of Islamic kingdoms, and that's why, in 1945, it was easy for us to say that the Southeast Asian Muslims should follow the state Islam, which is still applied now. But, at the same time, on 22 October 1945, Muslim groups called on Muslims to see it as obligatory to defend the Republic of Indonesia, a non-religious state, and not an Islamic state. So, it was natural that at its national congress in 1993, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)¹ adopted the position of continuing to support the Republic of Indonesia and not favour an Islamic state. This decision is still in place. The National Awakening Party of Indonesia is composed of non-

Muslims as well as Muslims from both the reformist and traditional sectors of Islam. But, I think it is important that while the leadership is Muslim, we also defend the right of the state to be separated from Islam.

The clash within society has taken place in Islam as well as in other civilizations. One of the reasons for this development within Islamic society is the fact that Muslims are witnessing the diluting of their tradition. Educated and professional Muslim people of today have become estranged from their Islamic traditions and heritage. This tradition includes interpretations of the Koran and other Islamic texts which have been handed down through generations and provide a key for Muslims to cope with the challenges of the modern world. Now these educated and professional Muslims are going straight to the written sources and translating them for themselves, without the knowledge and reference of hundreds of years of Islamic tradition and interpretation. In so doing they come up with extremist views and become fundamentalists.

I can cite an example of this. When I was chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, a friend from Pakistan, a scholar, noted that the Pakistani people were (at that time) ruled by a woman, Benazir Bhutto, and that according to the prophetic saying, calamity would be visited upon a tribe which is ruled by a woman. His interpretation was that only a man's leadership is strong and right. My answer was that this prophetic saying should be read in the context of its origins in the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh and eighth centuries. At that time, leadership took the form of one person. Now the situation is different. We have institutionalized, not personalized

1. The Nahdlatul Ulama is a Muslim scholarly organization. It was founded on 31 January 1926 with the goal of maintaining and developing Ahlul-sunnah-wal-Jamaah Islamic teachings and following one of the four madzhab in Islam in the Republic of Indonesia under the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Since its establishment, NU has demonstrated itself to be a social movement based on religious values.

leadership. Benazir Bhutto could not take any decisions without cabinet approval. And the majority of the cabinet is male. The cabinet bases its decisions on the law maintained by the parliament. And most members of parliament are male. And the constitutional body of the parliament is all

male. The scholar finally agreed with me.

Besides, Huntington's concept overlooks the fact that hundreds of thousands of Muslims study in the West each year, which means Islam and the West are involved in mutual learning about each other.

Donald Sassoon – United Kingdom

I will discuss the concept of fundamentalism from a European perspective. The concept originated from a clash within European civilization. The word 'fundamentalist' was first used in the nineteenth century to describe those who opposed Darwin's explanation for the origin of the human species. Those who disagreed with him, mainly Protestants, adopted a literal reading of the biblical account of the Creation, hence 'fundamentalism'. This was not just a clash within a civilization but also a clash between different conceptions of the world within a particular social system and, at first, within a particular country, Victorian England.

Subsequent meanings, of course, have enriched the term 'fundamentalism', so that it is now generally simply used to denote strict adherence to traditional and religious values. Rhetorically it is also used to denote any extreme position. The way in which I would like to discuss this in terms of European history is to point out that the defeat – if one can call it a defeat – of fundamentalist positions in Europe is very recent. The last two hundred years of European history have seen a struggle between a variety of positions. One of these conflicts has been on the question of the distinction between church and state. That these should be sharply distinguished has been the basis for nation building throughout Europe, with some exceptions which are interesting in themselves. Basically all European countries have gained their nationhood, their sense of nation, by promulgating the principle of the separation between state and church. The main exceptions are Poland and Ireland, where the struggle for national liberation and hence for nation-building was undertaken against Russian domination in the case of Poland, and British domination in the case of Ireland. In both instances, allegiance to the Roman

Catholic faith (against the Russian Orthodox Church in the case of Poland and against Protestantism in the case of Ireland) was an essential component of nationalism. This meant that it was possible to be an Irish nationalist and a Roman Catholic, a Polish nationalist and a Roman Catholic. By contrast it was almost impossible, or at any rate difficult, to be a French nationalist or an Italian nationalist and a supporter of the Roman Catholic Church at the same time.

If building up the nations of Europe took almost 200 years, the establishment of a wider concept of tolerance is far more recent. Take, for instance, the idea of tolerance towards ethnic minorities: European legislation against racism began only in the 1970s – a mere 30 years ago. Take the idea of equality as an operating principle of modern states: though adopted in general (such as in France) its actual implementation is also relatively recent and many would admit that there is still a long way to go. Take democracy: the vast majority of European countries were not democratic by any definition of the term until as recently as 1940. More than half of European nations were not democratic in, say, 1974: in that year all of Eastern Europe was under communism and three Southern European countries, Greece, Spain and Portugal, were under right-wing dictatorships. Even the basic principle of equality in voting is a very recent achievement. True universal suffrage – that is, including women – has appeared in Europe in broad stages: after the First World War for a large number of countries and after the Second World War for Belgium, Italy and France. Switzerland joined the democratic club only in 1970.

The principal forces behind the principle of secularism and political equality have been two political families, which have

usually been at loggerheads. One is liberalism, in the sense of the defenders of free market capitalism, the other is social democracy. They opposed each other on how to run the economy and how to control the market, but they both defended secularism against religious interference and both upheld the idea of basic rights and formal equality.

Within the European system, in almost all countries (there are exceptions), there were religious-based parties. These were the Christian Democratic parties, which, on most issues regarding the separation of state and church, were opposed by liberals and Social Democrats. Traditionally, the most important of these issues was the question of religious education in schools – one of the dominant aspects of politics in almost all European countries. Over the last 30 years, other questions with a bearing on the issue of the separation of church and state have been abortion and divorce.

Although we often think of European politics in terms of left versus right, when we actually look at the issues, things are more complex. On most welfare issues, we find that religious-based parties like the Christian Democratic parties are often close to Social Democratic parties, leaving pro-capitalist Liberals isolated. The whole construction of a European polity over the last 50 years cannot be understood as a left-right clash, since liberals, conservatives and Christian democrats were, initially, pro-European while the left was opposed or divided. Now the left is broadly in favour of European integration while the right is divided.

The success of secularism in Europe is fairly recent. And I would stress 'in Europe' because this is not the case in countries that are normally included in the definition of the West but are not in Europe. If you wanted to find the largest source of fundamentalism in the 'West', you would

find it in Israel and the United States.

Only 25 or 30 years ago, the two leading Israeli parties, the Labour party and the right-wing Likud party, both secularist, had the overwhelming support of the electorate. Now their vote, if taken together, is less than 50%. Ruling in coalition with Ariel Sharon, the present Israeli Prime Minister, there are four growing fundamentalist parties.

In the United States, the strength of the fundamentalist Christian lobby is, by European standards, quite astonishing. You do not find anything like it in Europe. And this fundamentalism can be, in its extreme forms, as deadly as that of Islam: the most devastating terrorist attack in the United States prior to 11 September 2001 – the Oklahoma bombing – was the act of a Christian fundamentalist.

That does not mean, of course, that there are no problems with extremism in Europe. There are, in fact, growing problems. New xenophobic parties in France, Austria, Italy, Holland and Denmark, among others, are a matter of concern for anyone in favour of universalism, secularism and human rights. But these new parties are not religious, nor are they fundamentalist in any recognized sense. They do not think in terms of religion (the churches, in fact, usually oppose them bitterly). They think in terms of race, residence, national culture or ill-defined origins. These parties are something anti-foreign. The religious factor is not particularly strong, yet they represent right now, I think, the most important threat to the basis of democracy.

At the same time, the successes of the last 20 years or so should not be underestimated. The level of ideology and dogmatism in Europe has decreased. It is not a small matter: until 1989 Europe was divided into two. One side had an authoritarian communist one-party system.

Now you have civil rights, the rule of law and the operation of the democratic system. There are political parties. Oppositions have become governments, and governments have become opposition. In the next few years the European Union will be enlarged and will include most of Eastern Europe. One of the tickets a country has to buy to enter the European club is the acceptance of democratic principles and human rights. In fact, the possibility of joining is already giving rise to changes, even in countries that are unlikely to join over the next five years. I am thinking of the important reforms that have taken place in Turkey, such as the abolition of the death penalty, precisely because that is one of the conditions required in order to enter the European Union. One of the reasons why the Franco dictatorship in Spain was demolished so quickly after the death of the dictator was because all the entrepreneurial groups understood that participation in the European Union required the legalization of all parties, including the parties they were opposed to, such as the Communist Party.

Let me conclude by suggesting that one of the main problems Europeans will encounter is connected, paradoxically, to the non-fundamentalist and non-ideological aspect of current European politics. Many people cannot see significant differences between the left and the right – now usually

referred to as 'centre-left' and 'centre-right'. This opens up a space not only to xenophobic movements, but also to a general disdain and contempt for politics altogether. The fastest growing political party in Europe is the party – if one may call it a political party – of abstentions. With each election, the level of abstentions increases. This trend cuts across frontiers. It spares no-one. It prevails in Britain, in Italy, in France. An ever-growing number of people simply cannot be bothered to vote; they do not think voting will make any difference.

Here there is a growing convergence between Europe and the United States. The American model is based on a massive abstention from politics on the part of 50% of the population. No European country has such a low level of political participation. The strength of the religious lobby in the United States is related to the low level of participation. Most Americans are not particularly religious (though more are than in Europe) and religious fundamentalist organizations may represent less than 20 million people. But when more than half of the country does not vote, 20 million is a very powerful force in the electoral process. In Europe too, the strength of xenophobic voting appears greater than it is because of abstentions. This would suggest that the best weapon against intolerance is, today as yesterday, democracy.

Surin Pitsuwan – Thailand

The guiding question that I have been bothered by – and that I have been very much frustrated with – has been this issue of tensions and misunderstanding, mutual distrust or mistrust between and among ourselves here in Southeast Asia in the recent past, even before the idea of a clash among civilizations.

At the same time I do believe that here in Southeast Asia we have evolved a culture of tolerance, accommodation and cooperation. And that is a very unique feature of Islam in Southeast Asia. President Wahid referred to Islam in Africa, Islam in South Asia, Islam in Southeast Asia as being different from dogmatic Islam in the heartland. I think a proper name for it is Islam in the periphery. A unique feature of Islam in the periphery is that it has had to adapt, adopt, integrate, innovate and be creative in its own evolution in the past few hundred years, in Southeast Asia in particular. Why would it have to do this? Because when Islam came to this part of the world, the peoples here were already informed by other high cultures and civilizations: Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. So from the very beginning, the Muslims in Southeast Asia have been accommodating, or living a life of accommodation with other value systems, other cultures, other civilizations. In that sense, the phenomenon of fundamentalism has been absent from the very beginning, because it could not be rigid, exact and pure in the sense that it was puritanical in the heartland of Islam. There, it was pretty much in a vacuum – with the desert, the tribal system and no real unifying ideology, religion or theology before the coming of Islam. But when it came to Southeast Asia, it had to accommodate.

Such accommodation has been a feature of Southeast Asia – not only between Islam

and others, but also between other belief systems like Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. They have all been coexisting to a large extent in an atmosphere of peace, respect, security and stability.

I think the first wave of fundamentalism – at least in Islam here in Southeast Asia – came sometime at the end of the nineteenth century in the distinction between the old form of Islam *qum tuwab* and the new form of Islam *qum muda*. There were a few years of violence in Indonesia, during which time many leading Indonesian personalities were forced to disperse around Southeast Asia. Some of them landed in Southern Thailand because of that clash at the last quarter of the nineteenth century in West Sumatra.

Now we are facing a new kind of pressure – a global pressure – known as globalization. The tensions that used to be contained within particular communities or cultures, whatever tensions there were, or between some cultures or civilizations, not too evident here in Southeast Asia, have become globalized in the sense that all of them have been under pressure. With the process of globalization, we are losing our identity, we are losing our values, we are losing our social organizations, we are losing the traditional state control over many features of our lives. So, when a community's religious groups and 'civilizational' groups are under pressure to make rapid change, the natural reaction of many is to try to hang on to something permanent, something secure, something solid and sacred that they have evolved as a people or as a community. And very often that is religious identity. Most people, whether in North America, in Israel, in Europe or in the Asia Pacific, would like to hold on to their own particular identity. But what used to be the bedrock of security for all of us, for every community, has all of a sudden become a source of insecurity.

Rigidity, a sense of righteousness, or ultra-righteousness, has become a new source of tension among us and between us.

So the challenge for all of us in Southeast Asia now – and in other parts of the world for that matter – is how to manage the pressure from outside in the form of globalization, and maintain this solidarity, security and mutual trust that we used to have as a unique feature of our region. I think this is a great challenge and all of us will have to think about it and will have to find a way of managing it. It would be a great loss for our various communities in Southeast Asia to lose control of it and not to be able to continue to evolve together slowly in the way of peace, cooperation, respect and accommodation that we have accomplished in the past.

I do believe that the new way of fundamentalism, particularly in Islam, is in itself a feature of globalization. I do believe that in the heartland of Islam, the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf, wealth came two or three decades ago from the natural resources there, and somehow reinforced a sense of righteousness, a sense of confidence, a sense that everything is going right. The thinking is something along the lines of: 'we can have all the features of modernity, all the luxury, along with the Law that we have, and therefore, everything that we have is correct'. Wealth has given a false confidence. And, it is further assumed that 'it is our responsibility to go out and try to help the rest of the Muslim world to purify itself, to bring the real Islam and the purity of Islam to countries in Southeast Asia – Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines'. And that sense of responsibility from the heartland of Islam is beginning to affect and to destabilize the accommodation, the security

and the mutual respect that we have evolved in the region as the people of Southeast Asia. All of a sudden, people feel estranged from things they have been familiar with and identified with. Many Muslims in the region are beginning to feel 'the state is not mine, the legal system is not mine, the various features of the cultures here are not mine'. As a result of that wave of fundamentalism from the heartland, from the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, many Muslims in Southeast Asia are feeling that they are aliens in their own environment. This is a real source of friction, instability and insecurity today in our region.

There is an aspiration and a yearning to have Islamic law or *Sharia*. There is a yearning for the Islamic state because for a long time it has been 'wrong'. Now Muslims are saying 'we want our own state, our own legal system, our own government'. And this is the real swamp of instability. Political powers are now under pressure, and are being brought into question, because of this aspiration for Islamic states, Islamic law, Islamic courts, Islamic banks. All these things have increased pressure in various societies and communities in the region.

For us in Southeast Asia, secularism is a necessity. All states in our region are secular states in the sense that there is no state religion. Just imagine if Thailand became a Buddhist state. Where would the Muslims in the south be? Similarly in the Philippines. Even in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, there is pluralism, there are other communities. That is why, rather than have an Islamic state, from the beginning *banchasila*¹ has been the ideology of the state. But within that *banchasila* ideology, there is a stake for everyone, including the Muslims.

1. Panchasila is the state ideology of Indonesia. Avoiding any particular religion as the state religion or ideology, the Indonesian leadership from the beginning invented something neutral to all religious communities – Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity.

So, while secularism in Europe is a result of the separation between church and state, however recent it has been, in the Muslim world the concept of secularism has long been unacceptable because it would mean the authority of the state would be removed from religious authority. This cannot be accepted by the majority in the Muslim world. But in Southeast Asia, it has to be, it has been and must continue to be because of the unique evolution of Islam in this area.

In 1997, when we were writing our new constitution in Thailand, the issue of whether to make Buddhism the state religion came up. And it was a rather big issue. The decision was ultimately taken by the highest level of authority in Thailand: the monarchy. The king decided that

Buddhism should not be the state religion. It was regarded as sufficient to specify that the king must be Buddhist. This illustrates the point that I have made from the beginning. In Southeast Asia, all communities have evolved together based on respect, mutual confidence and the principle of accommodation. This, I think, is a very unique feature of Southeast Asia: Fundamentalism is largely alien to our part of the world, particularly religious fundamentalism. Somehow, we have to maintain and sustain that. And that is why a forum like this is important for us, to look into our past and to help each other find a way to maintain this under the extreme pressure of globalization, which is bringing a lot of tensions, conflict, insecurity and instability to all regions, but particularly to Southeast Asia.

Hawazi Daipi – Singapore*

I share many of Abdurrahman Wahid and Pitsuwan Surin's concerns and views about Islam and fundamentalism. I think the approach in Southeast Asia has largely followed the Shafie school of thought in that it has been led by debate and discussion – it has been non-reactionary. The challenge is for us to maintain this in the face of growing fundamentalism and the globalization of terror. I think this is a new challenge that we have to understand and to which we must respond.

It is partly a result of the process of globalization of the economy. But I think one of the major concerns in many countries and societies of Southeast Asia is how to manage the globalization of fundamentalism and terror in all religions. Unfortunately, following the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States, and the political consequences of those, we have seen the revitalization of the 'clash of civilizations' theory. The debate is now commonly centred on the clash between Islam and the West, whether we like it or not. According to Samuel Huntington, 'Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase of the evolution of conflict in the modern world'. Huntington maintains that civilization identity will be increasingly important and the world will be shaped by the interactions between seven or eight major civilizations. These include the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African civilizations. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

To illustrate this, Huntington cites the conflict along the fault line between the Western and Islamic civilizations. According to him, the centuries-old

conflict between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. Indeed, it could become more virulent due to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.

The term 'Islamic fundamentalist' has been used by the media to refer to terrorists who happen to be Muslim. I think this is inaccurate. Fundamentalist Islam is the conservative wing of Islam. Most fundamentalists are pious individuals who strictly follow the teachings of Mohammed, attend mosques regularly and promote the study of the Koran. Most Islamic terrorists are probably fundamentalist, but they share little with their fellow fundamentalists. The terrorists represent an extremist, radical wing of fundamentalism. Such terrorists believe that an Islamic state must be imposed on people from above, using violent action if necessary.

The terrorist movement is fuelled by social, religious and economic stressors in many of the Muslim countries: a lack of democracy; autocratic, unelected political leaders; extreme wealth for a minority and often extreme poverty for the majority; poor human rights records; and high unemployment. Perhaps the greatest stressor is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has lasted for over five decades. The issue of the Palestinian state and rights is a concern for Muslims in many parts of the world and colours attitudes towards the West. The United States is viewed as supporting Israel by providing military and economic aid. The lack of a peace settlement, the continuing expansion of Jewish settlements in occupied lands and the status of the Dome of the Rock at the Temple Mount in Jerusalem are major flash points.

What about the issue of clashes between

* The views expressed here are my own and do not represent those of the government of Singapore.

or within civilizations? Despite Huntington's theory and the efforts by the Western media to portray it as such, it can be said that history has not been a clash between the West and Islam. My disagreement with Huntington is that he depicts civilizations as highly unified entities. Huntington seems to indicate that states are going to act and approach various issues based on civilizational affinity. Among the stereotypes of Islam, he supports the notion that its followers are an undifferentiated mass of people. But the reality is different. Islam might be a single religion but Muslims are diverse.

Muslims inhabit different parts of the world and inherit diverse historical traditions and a variety of cultural characteristics. The diversity of the *Umma*, the global community of the Muslims, is underscored by the fact that Muslims do not have international hierarchy. The diversity ensures that no central power of the *Umma* can capture the global Islamic agenda, and, in a confrontation, turn Muslims everywhere against the antagonists of that Islamic centre of power. Islam's diversity is apparent in the existence of the two main groups – the Sunni and the Shiites. Thus, the Islamic world is a diverse one, rooted ultimately in the central tenets of a faith that believes in peace and tolerance.

Professor Charles Kimball, an American scholar of religion, wrote in 1998 that 'It is highly misleading when politicians and journalists speak about an "Islamic threat" as some type of monolithic entity. Such stereotypes serve to reinforce popular perceptions of Islam as somehow inherently violent and menacing. In fact, the vast majority of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims are as offended by a violent act carried out in the name of Islam...The facile association of Islam with fanaticism and violence confuses rather than clarifies issues.' And may I add that I think Muslims are themselves victims in such acts

of terror.

To see the conflict over terrorism in terms of Muslims versus others is not only patently incorrect – because Muslims, by and large, do not subscribe to violence – but also dangerous, because the struggle against terrorism requires the unity of people of all faiths against the purveyors of terror. There are fundamentalist Muslims as much as there are fundamentalist Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and Jews.

I would argue that the real clash today is actually not between civilizations – the Muslim world versus the Christian, Hindu, Buddhist and Jewish worlds – but within civilizations. The clash-of-civilizations school of thought represents part of the truth of the matter, not the fundamental truth. It exaggerates the extent of agreement in outlook, values, ideas and loyalties among people who share the common history and culture that define a civilization. In fact, there are as many battles over these issues within civilizations as between them.

Huntington's theory misses the most important cause of recent events concerning terrorism: the enormous clash within the Muslim world between those who want to reform, to secularize, and those whose power is threatened or who want to take power in the name of fundamentalism. This has been the basis of the conflict in past decades in Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, India and most violently of all, Afghanistan. Religious fundamentalists in all societies aim to seize power – political, social and gender – within their own societies. Their greatest foe is secularism and modernity.

The 'clashes' within Islam, between the modernists and the fundamentalists have actually been going on for years. The al-Qaeda organization is part of an extensive network of terrorist organizations that represent the violent extreme of the violent

Islamic fundamentalist movement. Their popular support can be traced to a growing hostility against what the West stands for – the principles and values that it practises and professes.

Hence, if we take the view that the terrorists' hostility is directed at 'the principles and values' of the West, what they hate is not the West as a society or a civilization per se, but rather the culture of modernity.

In this light, the real clash is actually between tradition and modernity – medieval forces versus modern progressive forces – within every civilization, whether Islamic, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist or Jewish. Westerners and Muslims alike are stranded between the deep waters of tradition and modernity.

It must be noted that Huntington did concede that conflicts and violence could also occur between states and groups within the same civilization. But to him, such conflicts are likely to be less intense and less likely to expand than conflicts between civilizations. Common membership in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise occur.

But in most Islamic societies there is a perception of Western hegemony, that the Western way of life and thinking is being forced on them. I think members of the Western community should look into this issue with great sympathy, and understand how and why Muslim communities all over the world, particularly in countries with large Muslim populations, react the way they do.

I would urge more dialogue between civilizations to avert any clashes. In 1998, the United Nations launched the idea of a dialogue among civilizations. One way civilizations could come closer is through

the power of cultural resources in a globalized world. There is a book, entitled *Crossing The Divide: Dialogue Among Civilizations*, that celebrates this aspect of dialogue via cultural exchanges and imagination. This book reflects the input of a group of eminent persons selected by the United Nations secretary-general, including distinguished public intellectuals such as China's Tu Weiming, France's Jacques Delors, Germany's Richard von Weizsaecker, India's Amartya Sen, Iran's Javad Zarif, Italy's Giandomenico Picco, Palestine's Hanan Ashrawi, Singapore's Tommy Koh, South Africa's Nadine Gordimer, Switzerland's Hans Kueng and the United States' Leslie Gelb. The book argues that a true dialogue among civilizations must celebrate human diversity, but it also recognizes that, for a true dialogue to take place, the inheritors of those civilizations must first confront a divide created by tribal, racial, gender, religious and national divisions which are poisoned by economic inequities that mock the concept of a global village. It believes that respect for human diversity is the key to bridging the differences by which geography, history, politics, religion and economics have divided people and civilizations.

I appreciate very much what Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been trying to do through this kind of dialogue. But I think the greatest challenge is within each society. Most of us really are multiracial – no society in the world can claim to be homogeneous. All of us, including the nations of Europe, really are multireligious and multicultural. Whether we talk about a clash of civilizations or not in the global context, we all have to contain the clashes within our own society, whether they are between communities or within each individual sub-community.

Muslims in Singapore are facing not a clash of civilizations, but the question of how to

respond to modernity, how to respond to new forces of globalization. In the sphere of education, we have had debates on *madrassa*¹. The issue came into focus when four Primary One school girls went to school wearing the *tudung* or head scarf. Students are required to wear the school uniform prescribed by the school which excludes the *tudung*. It was seen as an attempt by the government to prevent Muslim girls from wearing the *tudung* to school. Developments like this could turn into confrontations between the Muslim community and the government. I am using this to illustrate potential problems within a domestic entity as well as within each

ethnic community. Within the Muslim community of Singapore there has been a debate about whether we should promote Islam through our attire or whether we want to develop Islam as a modern, responsive way of thinking that helps Muslims respond to the new challenges created by globalization.

I am sure that sincere dialogues of civilizations, between moderate and democratic forces in all cultures, could foster a mutual understanding of the fundamental values that unite us – and strengthen the basis of a shared and peaceful mutual existence.

1. An Islamic school attached to a mosque at which boys and girls learn to read the Koran.

Sources of Friction

Kevin McNamara
Claudia Derichs
Datu Mastura

Statement by Kevin McNamara – United Kingdom

Northern Ireland, I believe, is a case study that brings together the issues of religious differences, differences within civilizations, economic disparities, racial antagonisms and questions of national identity. These all exist in Northern Ireland. Before I come specifically to the recent history of Northern Ireland I will briefly explain Britain's strategic interests in Northern Ireland and in Ireland over past centuries.

Britain's strategic and economic interests in Ireland came to the fore at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century with the discovery of what is known as the New World of the Americas.

Earlier, the fall of Constantinople to the Turks had put the Mediterranean and the overland route to India and the East from Europe under threat. Although this route was not completely abandoned, the question of sea power and the ability to sail around the coast of Africa to the Far East and across the Atlantic to the Americas became important.

Ireland, a small island in the north-eastern corner of Europe, is the nearest part of Europe to the Americas. The island of Ireland is adjacent to Britain, but that bit further out into the Atlantic. The strategic importance of Ireland to the United Kingdom thus becomes apparent. In the past, whoever controlled Ireland, controlled the main sea routes and ports of England, Scotland and Wales. So London, Bristol,

Liverpool and Glasgow were all vulnerable to any hostile forces using Ireland. The strategic position of Ireland meant that in the time of sailing ships and sea power, it was important to control the entrance to the English Channel, that bottleneck of water leading from the Atlantic to the North Sea which gives access to the richest countries of Europe, the Low Countries and the Rhine Lands. A country in control of Ireland could control the Channel entrance and put a stranglehold upon Britain.

It was the strategic importance of Ireland that raised the question of British control in the past. There were British invasions of Ireland from the twelfth century onwards, but the invaders had been assimilated into the Irish population, even becoming Irish chieftains. Later on the English fought against the Spaniards and the French on Irish soil to prevent the island falling into their hands, and more recently Ireland was under constant threat from Germany during the two world wars. Now, with the development of new technologies of warfare, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, Ireland has become less important strategically, and, as both Britain and the Republic of Ireland become more engaged in Europe, less important politically.

The rise of Ireland's strategic and economic importance to Britain coincided with the Reformation in Europe, which split western Christianity into Protestants and Catholics.

England adopted a form of Protestantism similar in many ways to Catholicism. The Irish retained their Catholicism and their allegiance to Rome because, amongst other reasons, they believed their Spanish and French co-religionists would help them secure their independence from Great Britain. In order to try and control Ireland, particularly the most rebellious part of it – the north-eastern corner known as Ulster – successive English and then British kings and queens planted Protestants there, mainly Calvinists, who were at that time very suspicious and hostile towards Rome and Roman Catholicism. This brought about conflicts of religion and race. British colonialism sought to wipe out the old Celtic culture of Ireland and replace it with one that was basically Protestant and Anglo Saxon.

Ireland has experienced it all – racial, economic and national conflicts. I shall not dwell on the struggle between the Celts and the Anglo Saxons for the next three or four centuries but move on to the aftermath of the First World War when the greater part of Ireland – 26 out of 32 counties – achieved independence as the Irish Free State, and in 1948 became the Irish Republic. Six of the nine counties of Ulster remained under British rule and are known as Northern Ireland.

From its creation, Northern Ireland was an unstable state. When it was decided to partition Ireland, the Unionists and all those people who wished to remain part of the United Kingdom took the biggest area of land they thought they could politically dominate. They drew a boundary around six of the nine counties of Ulster where the population was roughly one third Catholic, who resented partition, and two thirds Protestant, who wished to remain part of the United Kingdom.

It has been difficult to maintain this balance in the population over the passage of time.

Programmes of enforced emigration of Catholics and Nationalists ensured that the balance remained roughly the same whenever it appeared it might be changing. Now the Unionist majority may disappear over the next 10 to 15 years.

Northern Ireland's instability stemmed from the fact that one third of the population looked to Dublin rather than Westminster and London, effectively identifying with a foreign country. The minority was large enough to be perceived as a threat to the majority, while the majority was not large enough to confidently sustain a dialogue with the minority. This prevented the establishment of institutions that would be acceptable to the whole population. In Northern Ireland the new prime minister established 'a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant people', although in fairness a Catholic State for Catholic people was being created in the Irish Free State.

Britain held on to these six Irish counties because in the 1920s, when sea power was still dominant and Britain still had a large Empire, Northern Ireland put them that bit further into the Atlantic.

Discrimination against Catholics in public housing, jobs and employment became the order of the day, and was harsh and repressive. The police force was almost totally Protestant, as was the auxiliary police force, the notorious 'B Specials'. Repressive legislation, the Special Powers Act, which was to become the envy of apartheid South Africa, was introduced. Gerrymandering was practised in the demarcation of political boundaries (in the City of Derry, for example, two thirds of the population were Catholic and one third Protestant, but the local town council was one third Catholic and two thirds Protestant, and remained so until the late 1960s).

As a result of economic and social reforms,

introduced mainly by the Labour government between 1945 and 1951, a Catholic middle class appeared which was able to serve its own community, supplying doctors, lawyers, accountants and other professional jobs. This was something it had not been able to do in the past. However, by the early 1960s, the number of these jobs was limited in comparison to the number of applicants. Catholics were unofficially barred from certain jobs.

The creation of a Catholic middle class, together with the influence of the American Civil Rights Movement and the student revolts in both Europe and the United States, assisted the creation of the Civil Rights Movement in Ireland, supported initially by members of both the Catholic and the Protestant communities. In the late 1960s, the old smoke stack industries of shipbuilding, heavy engineering and printing were becoming subject to new technologies and foreign competition. Guaranteed jobs for working class Unionists were disappearing. As the threat to the economic security of the Unionist and Protestant working class increased some of their support for the Civil Rights Movement petered out. The Unionists' world was being turned upside down. They were urged to clutch to their bosoms Catholic Nationalists whom they had previously been told were vipers and enemies of the state who threatened their political, social and economic hegemony. Their children's employment and security was no longer guaranteed. Support shifted to the Protestant and extremist Unionists, challenging the work of the Civil Rights Movement and slowing down the reform process. Counter demonstrations fermented by Protestant extremists led to violent street clashes. Communal riots and ethnic street cleansing took place while the police stood idly by. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), re-emerged on the back of by public demand from the Catholic Nationalists. It had gone into decline in

the late 1950s after coming increasingly under Communist influence, which sought social change rather than a military confrontation. During the bitter riots of 1969 the graffiti on the walls of Belfast in the Catholic areas proclaimed 'IRA = I Run Away'. With Catholics being expelled from their homes, the IRA were forced back into their traditional role of protecting vulnerable Catholic communities.

This communal violence led to what we would now call terrorism, the emergence of the Provisional IRA and Loyalist Paramilitaries. The British government became reluctant to continue with social, economic and political reforms in the face of the terrorist threat. The Conservative government, under Prime Minister Ted Heath, attempted to reach a settlement, known as the Sunningdale Agreement.

Early detention without trial was introduced against a background of increasing violence. An attempt was made to have a devolved government sharing power between Protestants and Catholics, but it was brought down by the great strike of Protestant workers, which the Labour government in 1974 refused to confront. Para-military activity increased on both sides.

The toll of the period between 1969 and 1999, known as the 'Troubles', was 3,000 deaths and 30,000 people injured, not to mention those who were traumatised by death and injury on both sides of the political divide. The government tried to confront the terrorism by legal and illegal means: repressive legislation, extra judicial assassinations (the most famous perhaps being in Gibraltar), British agents colluding with Loyalist death squads, executive detention without trial (suspended in 1978 but still on the statute books), allegations of torture and inhumane and degrading treatment in interrogation centres (curtailed by the Americans).

Constitutional politicians in both Britain and Ireland condemned violence and tried in difficult circumstances to protect human rights. Accepted political wisdom was that Northern Ireland was a problem which could never be solved, or only by such severe repression that it would not be acceptable in modern Europe. It was said in the British parliament that every time it appeared that the Irish question was about to be solved the Irish changed the question. The Irish retorted that the British had only one answer to the Irish question and that was continuous repression, and, in any event, the wrong question was being examined. The problem was the role of Britain in Ireland.

The first steps towards finding an acceptable settlement were made by one of the most right wing of British Prime Ministers, Margaret Thatcher – a political realist. She later condemned herself for having done it. However, during her premiership three important things happened. First, having held firm during the period of the hunger strikes, which saw an enormous deterioration in the political situation in Northern Ireland and increasing popular support for the Provisional IRA, Mrs Thatcher made an agreement with the Irish Republic in 1985, the Hillsborough Agreement. For the first time a British government admitted that the Irish government had a role to play in achieving a settlement in the North. Margaret Thatcher recognized the existence of a different community in Northern Ireland, the Nationalists, who held different allegiances to the rest of the population. Under the terms of the agreement, the Irish government was entitled to raise with the British government any matter affecting Irish Nationalists in the North. It was a tremendous concession. It recognized the right of a foreign government to interfere in the domestic affairs of another sovereign country. This would be equivalent to the President of Mexico building a hacienda

on the White House lawn and being entitled to raise any matters regarding the treatment of Spanish Americans in the United States with George Bush.

Second was the appointment of the most sophisticated and sensitive Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brook. When asked if he would negotiate with the IRA he said 'I think it very dangerous to use the word "never" in politics'. It was an important signal to the IRA, and during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher unofficial contacts were made and maintained between British Intelligence Services and the Provisional IRA. Towards the end of her time as prime minister, almost immediately before she was deposed, Mrs Thatcher allowed Peter Brook to make a statement concerning Britain's long-term aims in Northern Ireland. This she did at the behest of John Hume (of whom more later). She allowed Peter Brook to make the statement that the British government no longer had any selfish, economic or strategic interests in Northern Ireland. This was a positive signal to both the Unionist and the Nationalist communities. To the Unionists, Britain was saying that it would honour its commitment to support the majority, but that this support could not be taken for granted and there had to be compromises. To the Provisional IRA, it was a signal that Britain was no longer the arch enemy and there was now a need to find an accommodation with their Unionist opponents in the North. It was a principle to change and was driven by the fact that the strategic importance of Northern Ireland was no longer significant, largely because of the development of new technology in modern warfare. There had not been a NATO base in Ireland since the early 1960s.

Margaret Thatcher had, perhaps unwittingly, prepared the ground for change, but credit for the agenda of change

must go to John Hume, Nobel Prize Laureate, member of both the United Kingdom and European parliaments, former Minister of Commerce during the Sunningdale Agreement and a former member of the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly established following the Good Friday Agreement. He understood the problems in Northern Ireland and his signature 'Hume Speak' became part and parcel of the speech of politicians. His ideas were encapsulated in the phrases 'respect for differences' and 'honouring diversity'. The issues tearing his country apart and of the 'Troubles' he said 'are problems not that of a divided territory but that of a divided people. ... With people so divided there can be no victories that are absolute, only agreements. ... The only victory that can benefit all is reaching an agreement that everyone can live in peace. ... People have a right to self determination but where there is division, the way which self-determination can be exercised must first be agreed by the divided people'. He was vigorous in opposing violence. It was derided as 'a single transferable speech' but it was effective.

Having persuaded the British government that they no longer had any economic and strategic interest in Northern Ireland, he was able to turn to the Nationalist paramilitaries, the Provisional IRA, to persuade them that a military victory against Britain was not possible. Equally Britain could not have an acceptable military victory against them. The people that the Provisional IRA had to convince were not the British, who would, if they felt they could do it with honour, leave Northern Ireland, but the Unionists whom they would have to persuade of their mutuality of interests and integrity and respect for their position. What had to be done was to address the causes of the conflict, however painful that may be. 'It is not easy, for if it was easy we would not have a conflict. It would have been solved years ago. But we

have got to do it', he said. He was instrumental in getting the Irish Diaspora in Britain, but more particularly, America to take an active interest in the peace process and achieve a settlement in the North. The culmination of this was the active interest President Clinton took and the pivotal role he played in the peace process.

Hume insisted that everything should be brought to the table. He analysed the problem as three-dimensional, or a triangular relationship, later known as the 'three strands'. The first strand was the relationship, within Northern Ireland itself, between Catholics and Protestants, Nationalists and Unionists. The second strand was the relationship between the North and the South of Ireland. Almost 80 years of separate existence had engendered problems, suspicions and resentments between the Republic and the North. The third strand was the relationship between Dublin and London. The suspicions were very real because of Ireland's colonial history and the fact that Ireland was neutral during the Second World War.

John Hume's analysis led to the Good Friday Agreement. It accepted a further proposition from Hume that there could not be agreement on any of the three strands separately. Nothing was to be agreed until everything was agreed. No one party to the discussions could cherry pick. That Agreement was signed on the Christian holiday of Good Friday in 1978 – hence the 'Good Friday Agreement'. It created institutions that must reflect the three-dimensional approach.

Northern Ireland has a proportionally elected assembly of 101 seats. This is a very large legislative for a population of half a million people, but it is necessary to ensure that all interests have a voice within the assembly. The second strand created inter-

governmental bodies between the North and South of Ireland, with representatives from both the devolved government in Northern Ireland and the government of the Republic. These bodies were charged with dealing with common interests like tourism, water control, transport, animal health and matters of infrastructure, which on a small island should never have been subject to separate jurisdictions and certainly should not be in competition.

The third strand, East-West relations between Westminster and Dublin, was addressed by establishing the British Irish Council on which are represented not only two sovereign governments but also the devolved parliaments and assemblies of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, as well as the autonomous islands of Man, Guernsey and Jersey. There was already in existence a British Irish Inter Parliamentary Body representing the parliaments of Britain and Ireland, but this was changed to accommodate representations of the devolved parliaments and assemblies and the autonomous islands.

The Irish government dropped its territorial claim to Northern Ireland, and the British government agreed that if at any time there was a majority in the North that wished to unite with the Republic of Ireland it would legislate accordingly.

The Good Friday Agreement was endorsed by the British and Irish parliaments and, more importantly by the overwhelming majority of people of Ireland, both North and South, in a referendum. Paramilitary prisoners, i.e. those who had committed the latest terrorist offences (to some they were freedom fighters and to others terrorists) predating the Agreement and who belonged to paramilitary organizations at the time of the ceasefire, were released.

New Equality and Human Rights Commissions, a reformed criminal justice

system, a police ombudsman and a new police board came into being. The name of the police force was changed from the Royal Ulster Constabulary to the Police Service of Northern Ireland with the aim of gaining cross community support. In addition, a public enquiry into Bloody Sunday, the killings in Derry in 1971, was initiated. An international judge was appointed to look at all allegations of collusion between the security forces, North and South, with parliamentary bodies of both jurisdictions, and to recommend whether a public enquiry should be held into political assassinations and other events in which the security forces had allegedly been involved. Interrogation centres have been closed down and demilitarization has been started. All these matters are aimed at overcoming the suspicions and hatred that exist. It is no longer a zero-plus game. Every party has an investment within the Agreement. Every party has something at stake in the Agreement and can go back to their communities and say 'we have established this particular matter and our position is protected'.

The Unionists can say that the Irish government has given up its territorial claim on Northern Ireland, has recognized the legitimacy of Northern Ireland and has agreed to the principle of consent before there can be any change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. The Nationalists can claim they have a role in the devolved government by right and the recognition of their right to join an United Ireland if there is a majority in the North for it. We have freedom for our political prisoners. We have equality and parity of esteem for our community. Reforms are taking place, particularly in the security and human rights and judicial systems, which meet our principle objections. The unity of the island is being encouraged by increased cross border cooperation and joint policy-making

committees in the North and the South.

It is an impressive list but there is still a long way to go to overcome the suspicions and the hatred that have accumulated over centuries. It is not peace accomplished: it is a peace process. It is something that is continually evolving.

Although the systematic killing and terrorism is gone there is still spasmodic terrorism. At present, the parliamentary institutions of the Agreement – the Legislative Assembly, cross border and inter-governmental institutions – have been suspended by the British government because the Unionists see the continuing activities of the Provisional IRA as incompatible with Sinn Fein's membership of the devolved government and have threatened to walk out of the Assembly altogether. This is the third time the Assembly has been suspended, but in the past it has returned and it is hoped that it will do so again. An election to the Assembly is due in May and it seems certain to take place. I hope then the present impasse will be overcome. There may be a major political alignment, with Sinn Fein becoming the predominant nationalist party supplementing the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) and the Democratic Unionist Party, the major Unionist party replacing the Official Unionist Party. An Assembly of the majorities of two extremes in either camp will make matters difficult but they will be elected and it can be argued that the difficulties can be overcome. It is still very much a peace process.

As well as the pivotal role of people such as Margaret Thatcher, John Hume and Peter Brook, there are, I suggest, three basic principles that underline attempts to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict. These, I believe, are uniform and applicable to all similar cultural, religious, ethnic, racial and national identity conflicts that exist in any conflict.

The first is that there has to be an open agenda for all the relationships and a list of all the causes that underlie the conflict, however deep the initial distress and however painful it is for one side to face up to what the other side finds hateful.

The second, and this was one of the most difficult to establish in Northern Ireland, is that it is necessary to create a political process that is inclusive of all parties to the conflict. That does not mean that only political representatives of constitutional parties should be present, but also representatives of paramilitary organizations. This caused a great deal of pain in Northern Ireland, but it was accomplished when the paramilitaries declared a ceasefire and their political representatives took their places at the talks.

The third is that there should be a fixed timetable so parties are not drawn into discussions that are too prolonged and might be used by opponents to strengthen their political positions and gain a military advantage.

The question then arises, what does one hope will emerge from discussions held on these same three principles? It is only possible to speak in generalizations, but I think it is necessary to create social, judicial and political institutions which are strong and firm enough to maintain, if not uncritical admiration, political respect and support from the whole community. Institutions that are flexible to meet any future challenges that might occur. When I was the Labour Party spokesman for Northern Ireland I announced many of the ideas that appeared in the Good Friday Agreement. At some time the Nationalists in the North might achieve a political majority. There is already a majority of Catholics in the schools. Protestants live longer than Catholics – that is a result of past discrimination, poverty, ill health, poor

jobs and bad housing. Nevertheless political change may come. I used to argue that if the Unionist majority becomes the minority within the North, the political institutions must be capable of being turned upside down so that they are strong enough to defend a Unionist minority, should that be necessary, just as they defended the Catholic minority in the past.

I have stressed that what we are discussing is a peace process – a process that is not over. By addressing the fundamental issues supported by the Clinton Administration, centuries of suspicions and hatred have to be overcome.

The three principles of an open agenda, inclusive representation and a fixed timetable have universal application and are not just for Northern Ireland. If participants are willing they can establish an environment in which opposing parties can reach an agreement. It may be very difficult. It is a high mountain to climb – in Northern Ireland I believe they are almost at the summit. But the most arduous part must be the last few hundred metres before they can reach the top and see the promised land.

Statement by Claudia Derichs – Germany

I would like to add a few points to the general theme of the sources of friction. I would like to relate to some facts and realities which we have to identify when we look at different societies, and then refer to some goals or targets we might want to pursue when we start to resolve friction or to regulate sources of friction with the help of dialogue.

Let me begin with the ‘social realities’. We do have multiple and even conflicting identities, which means that the pluralism of cultures and civilizations as well as the pluralism within these civilizations and – I want to stress here – within nation states is a very important phenomenon. The nation state is an important dimension. Pluralism causes different layers of friction, especially within a nation state. Within the frame of the nation state, frictions tend to become social and political problems, or at least topics for discussion.

One example of such a friction or topic of discussion within a nation state is the debate on women’s rights in Islam. This is a hotly and very controversially debated topic within Muslim societies. And there are very controversial opinions within women’s groups themselves. Some demand the abolition of polygamy, for example, whereas others support the idea of having more than one wife. There is thus a plurality of opinions that might lead to social friction between the ‘progressives’ and the ‘conservatives’. This friction leads to people’s yearnings and demands, which are usually uttered in order to achieve a betterment of the community’s or an individual’s own situation – materially, socially, politically. One example is the yearning for *Sharia* laws in Islamic societies. People demand the introduction of these laws because they are disappointed with the shallow performance of the existing judicial institutions. It is not that they

would like to see hands or feet cut off, but that they hope to have a more reliable institution with a *Sharia* court handling judicial affairs. Yet there are other people who are intent on a roll-back to the times of the prophet Muhammad and the implementation of harsh laws, which they believe will deter Muslims from committing crimes.

Given these facts – pluralism, friction, yearnings and demands – what aims, targets and goals could the dialogue we are trying to initiate here pursue in order to reduce the frictions within a society or even to resolve the conflicts? From the European perspective, or looking through the glasses of the Western world, I think one has to be alert and to differentiate between and really recognize the pluralism and the dynamics within societies. These dynamics do, more often than not, cause the same social and political friction all over the world. Progressives come up against the arguments of the conservatives, the young confront the old and so forth. The information which is officially published does not always reveal the real situation. In Germany, for example, we have many young Turks who have great difficulty submitting themselves to the rules of their Imams in the mosques. They want to live their lives without an Imam as a moral watchdog. In the course of dialogues and in the days of ‘open mosques’ in Germany, this inter-generational conflict was hardly ever mentioned. In the perception of the German public, a Muslim automatically means a person who prays in the mosque and adheres to traditional family rules. The dialogue gets blurred with such a one-dimensional image of Islam and Muslims.

The nature of the friction within societies, however, is basically the same. It only evolves in very different shapes. If we look at the nature of friction, we have

progressive rules versus conservative rules, we have generational conflicts and so on, but the way they are carried out may take very different forms in different cultures because of very specific cultural features. On an analytical level, every society (in a nation state) has the same sorts of friction and conflict, no matter what image the state officially displays. An Islamic state may seem different from a state like Germany, but both societies have to cope with similar frictions: young and old, left and right, modern and traditional, etc. Last but not least, this situation serves the social dynamics within the nation state.

Once we accept and incorporate the fact of intra-societal pluralism and the fact of intra-societal dynamics, we have already taken a great step towards dialogue. Given that this pluralism and these dynamics are a sign of certain frictions, we may ask why it is so often a friction within nation states and not between nation states. Let me recall here one experience I had recently in Germany, in a dialogue session between an Islamic group and a European group (the majority of the European participants were German). The Muslim group consisted of one or two representatives each of almost every Muslim society in the world, including Bosnia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Arab states. It was a very plural group representing many parts of the Muslim world. Among the most interesting things to come out of the discussion was the fact that the Muslim group agreed upon one shared feeling: that the problem in performing the dialogue is not cultural but political. They ended up with the demand, directed at the Europeans, that civil society groups in Muslim societies should be supported in their struggle for democracy. The conventional rhetoric of 'mutual understanding' and 'respect for each other' was relegated to second rank – in favour of the wish to understand that the real problem affecting most of the states with a

Muslim majority is not Islam but a lack of democracy. This was a remarkable outcome because it shows that many people in the different nation states of the world want to display the plurality of their societies by showing that there is more than one opinion, and that critical opinions are often neglected because they do not please the powers that be.

And here we have once again one of the core problems in the 'dialogue of cultures': very often the ruling regimes in nation states of the world – be they rich, poor, Muslim, whatever – reveal themselves to be untrustworthy and unable to establish state institutions that are capable and reliable. Thus, we find phenomena like demands for the *Sharia* coming from well-educated, anti-fundamentalist, anti-extremist segments of society. Such educated, open-minded people demand *Sharia* laws, for example, because they feel frustrated about the malfunction and the lack of accountability of state institutions. The state's legal institutions are seen as eroded, and this nurtures the demand or yearning for greater reliability – which might be found in *Sharia* institutions.

In conclusion, globalization and the differences in economic development and progress are certainly sources of friction, but it is not poor people who start rebellions! The problem of frictions within nation states as well as between cultures is very much a political problem, and it has to be tackled, among others, as a problem of international relations. Relations can take place on an inter-governmental level, but they should also (and maybe even more so) take place on the level of civil society. Without taking the scope of civil society into account – the plurality of groups and individuals, the social dynamics it generates, the conflicts it seeks to solve – the sources of friction will not be contained.

Statement by Michael Mastura* – Philippines

I am more a lawyer than a sociologist or an economist. And although I am a historian I will try to 'go current' because we are talking about issues that have their roots in history.

As you know, the Philippines is an archipelago. So how do we deal with our archipelago and the question of the nation state?

It is perhaps not widely realized in Southeast Asia that the issue of Sulu¹ – the status of Sulu as a sultanate and its dependencies – was at one time a bone of contention between Germany, England and, of course, Spain. The islands that Sulu possessed at that time included North Borneo; that is why there is still this question of the Sabah claim. But the point I am making now is that this issue of what to do with Sulu was related to the wider issue of trade with China.

The entry point to the colonization of China was the British asking and forcing China to open itself to the Europeans. In the process they occupied Hong Kong and Canton. Trade between China and Europe (and later North America) had always involved trade relations with Southeast Asia. There were scrambles for territory in Southeast Asia just like there had been in Africa. The British were already in Southeast Asia, Rajah Brooke was in Sarawak and the Spaniards were in Manila. The Germans took over what they called the Carolinas, known as the Marianas to the Spanish.

Each of these colonies eventually became independent nation states. But the borders of these countries have not always been

settled indisputably. For example, there is a little strip of river between Brunei and Sarawak, now part of Malaysia, that is still in dispute. People tend to blame the former British Empire for leaving many things unsettled, Kashmir for example. Sabah, too, falls into that category.

I am making reference to the nineteenth century because during that period trading in arms and gun powder was allowed in Southeast Asia and I am trying to explain why the Moros² have until today not stopped dealing with violence, gunrunning and kidnapping. The question for us, who live in the Muslim areas of the Philippines, is how to participate in the nation state as it is presently constituted. How can we be properly represented in the national polity, or national organization, known as the nation state.

There is an unresolved identity problem. It has something to do with the function of voting and the principle of democracy. The idea is that we are electing leaders, but those leaders are not exactly representative of our people. In some cases the people are given autonomy, but, for example, the governors are nominees of Manila, so nothing much has changed from the time of the Spaniards in Manila.

Economically, Mindanao is worth a fortune to the state. It is very rich; it has many natural resources. But Mindanao is just used as a resource base for maintaining Manila. This argument is, in a way, also used, for example, by the liberation movement in Aceh, an Indonesian province in Northern Sumatra, where there are also many rich resources. It is a centre-periphery issue. The centre does not seem to be able

* The footnotes in this article have been added by the editor.

1. Sulu is an island and a province in the extreme southern Philippines, the population of which is 95% Muslim.
2. Moros is the name given by the Spaniards to Muslims in Southeast Asia. Today it refers to Muslim communities in Mindanao, an island in the southern Philippines.

to develop the periphery and return the resources for the development of that area. I think this is an important source of conflict.

The term 'terrorism' is not defined, or not definable yet; maybe it will be defined eventually. In the south of the Philippines, Muslims are pushed into this framework: what they do is perceived as the equivalent of the work of pirates. This is not how the Malaysian or the Thai or the Indonesian Muslims are seen, but the Muslims in the Philippines have always been seen by the central government in Manila in terms of that imagery. There is something of an East-West-clash within the Philippines: the *reconquista*. The Spanish arrival in the Philippines was really defined by that mood of *reconquista*, the impulse not only to claim land but also to expel Muslims and Jews. And to this day, that kind of prejudice is still there.

There is also the undefinable question of the minority-majority relationship. For example, in Lebanon, at one point in time there was a reluctance to define who were the majority and who were the minority, or what their numbers were. There was a formulation (no longer used) that if the prime minister were a Muslim, the president should be a Christian and vice versa. When Indonesians come to Jakarta to protest against the establishment, they are not mobilizing as minorities – they are all Indonesians. When Muslims in the Philippines mobilize and protest in Manila, however, they are demonstrating as a minority, and yet their demands are popular rather than minority issues. That holds true with economics because there is a tendency

to dismiss mass demonstration as a socially unproductive activity. It is an unproductive form of social behaviour. It is even an anti-social behavioural pattern that does not promote trade – rather it scares away investors.

Even the Armed Forces of the Philippines, aided by all the military sophistication of the United States on the small island of Basilan,³ have not been able to completely wipe out the so-called Abu Sayyaf⁴ terrorists. Here again, I am not justifying or trying to be the spokesperson for the Abu Sayyaf. I have no relationship with them; I will not defend them in court. But you will notice that in the Sipadan incident⁵ the victims were also multinationals – German, French, etc. The media covering that event were also international. What kind of sophisticated weapons or transport system did the perpetrators use? Many Muslims in the Philippines doubt that locals could produce these resources, or sophisticated transportation like speedboats and so on. Is this really the work of local terrorists? Or are there other people behind those activities? Is it a very good business in which some people have invested?

In the case of Bali,⁶ if you destroy the island, you destroy a source of income, supposedly from tourism. But, on the other hand, you must look at exactly who the major investors in Bali are. It is not just a question of religiosity. Just because Bali is predominantly Buddhist does not mean that the heinous act must have been done by Muslims, such as the Jamiat Islamiya. Again, I am not defending those groups, but I am trying to present the other side of the coin.

3. A Philippine province located at the southern tip of the Zamboanga Peninsula on Mindanao island.
4. The Abu Sayyaf group, whose name means 'Bearer of the Sword', split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991. It is the smaller of the Islamist groups fighting to establish an Islamic state in Mindanao.
5. On 23 April 2000, six pirates, armed with AK47 assault machine guns and a bazooka launcher, took 9 Malaysians and 11 foreigners hostage on Sipadan Island off the Sabah coast in Malaysia.
6. On 12 October 2002, a bomb exploded in Bali's entertainment precinct, killing more than 200 people.

The cause of war is not something to worry about because there will always be reasons to go to war, but it is the consequences of war (whether the Kosovo war, the Bosnia war, or the war in Mindanao) that displace people. The Vietnam War, for example, displaced a lot of people. It became an international question, for example, whether Australia should accept refugees, or the consequences of the Philippines accepting Vietnamese 'boat people', and so

on. More recently there was an incident, not the result of a war, where so-called 'illegals' (migrant workers) were forced out of Sabah.⁷ It is a displacement which has affected the relationship between Malaysia and the Philippines.

I am trying to reflect how disorderly the situation can be even as we sit here, as very orderly people with very orderly intellectual minds.

7. On 1 August 2002, Malaysia increased the severity of its laws against illegal immigrants with a minimum punishment of six months in prison and six strokes of the cane. According to Malaysian government figures, more than half a million Filipinos live in the east Malaysian province of Sabah, most of them illegally.

Democratization of Societies and Citizenship in Multicultural Societies

Paul Scheffer
Axel Schulte
Zulkifli B. Baharudin

Statement by Paul Scheffer – The Netherlands

There is a lot to be said for comparisons between European and Southeast Asian experiences, and common words can be used, but often these shield different experiences. It is very easy to use words like 'social order', but it is much more difficult to understand what is behind these words and what is implied by them. Even in Europe, where there are so many shared experiences and a long shared history, and where countries border each other, it is difficult to find common denominators or ways to bridge the divide between nations. This makes me a bit more humble in my objectives. Looking at the European experience with regard to citizenship, multiculturalism and immigration, it is really difficult to find ways of using such words and understanding what they mean, because a word like 'tolerance' might mean one thing in a Dutch context and something else in a French or German context, but also because it could refer to something very specific within the realm of political culture.

That is not the only obstacle. There is also a tendency to find unity not in a shared initiative or ambition but in a common enemy. It would be a huge mistake for Europe to find in the criticism of America, or in the criticism of American foreign policy, a common denominator that we cannot find in our own experiences. There is a tendency in Europe, and also possibly in Southeast Asia, to try to bridge the gap

between the European experience and the experience in Southeast Asia by saying 'Well, at least we have one thing in common, and that is our criticism of American foreign policy.'

It would be helpful if it were true. But I doubt it, because behind the justified and shared unease about the American attitude towards the Middle East are vastly different experiences. On the whole, the American influence in Western Europe, or in Europe at large, has been largely beneficial. And perhaps – and this is for others to evaluate – the influence of the United States in Southeast Asia is far more ambiguous, complex and controversial. But even if you can occasionally win an election in Europe by criticizing the United States, in the end, what is really important and what holds the most weight is the shared experience of two world wars and the Cold War, the very vivid presence of America in Western Europe and cultural bonds which cannot be denied. All this superficial criticism of the United States will not lead us into a simplistic shared attitude. I would hope that we do not fall into this easy way out.

I will try to convey some of the different experiences surrounding the questions of multiculturalism and immigration. There are perhaps some shared experiences, shared words, shared feelings of uneasiness, within very different backgrounds. But I would like to convey the sort of debates

that are going on in Western Europe. I shall divide this into three sections: First I shall discuss the background to the rise of populist parties in Western Europe, second I shall examine to what extent the rise of these populist parties has been stimulated by deep misunderstandings about what a multicultural society is and the issue of immigration; and third I shall consider the conditions of citizenship in societies as culturally diverse as ours have become in the last 40 years.

First, let us look at the rise of populist parties. It should be an invitation for some reflection that in a relatively prosperous and open-minded society like the Netherlands, a party that was improvised around a platform against immigration was, within a period of four months, on the verge of becoming the largest party in the country, until its political leader was murdered this spring. How is it possible that, in circumstances of ongoing prosperity which are largely shared by a population with a very low level of social inequality, such a party, such a mood of resentment, could surface at elections? This is in itself an interesting question because the Netherlands is seen as an example of an open and tolerant society. I can see that for some the Dutch situation is not *per se* the measure of all things, but it is interesting because it is not an isolated case. It shows us a shift in public mood on the European continent and I suspect in Britain as well. If you look at Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, Italy or France, indeed almost everywhere, you find the same sort of parties or beliefs hidden within conservative parties like the Conservatives in Britain, or the CSU in Bavaria/Germany. You find the same sort of sentiments and the same sort of questions arising. And of course that leads to the question that should be answered.

First of all, I think it really shows that there is a democratic deficit in the sense that a

lot of the questions that should have been asked by the established parties were not asked. And I will discuss later what sort of questions I mean. Essentially there was already a shift in the public mood – research shows that it was well under way – with regard to questions of law and order, immigration and crime prevention, for example. But there was no political representation for these sorts of questions within established political parties. As a result, new parties came on the scene and addressed a lot of these questions, albeit in a resentful manner, which I do not defend.

These populist parties argue along the lines: ‘we feel alienated, we are representing those citizens who are not part of the democratic mainstream, who do not feel represented; we are arguing against an elite which is basically linked to an international class which does not fit into our society anymore’. There are some common trends: in the 1930s there were similar movements. What is behind this is, I think, not a social problem. There are no social issues that are going to explain it, not in societies like the Netherlands, and also not in Denmark or Austria. It is not, as Thomas Meyer says, that the vocabulary of these parties hides a sort of social conflict. Sure enough there are social divisions within societies, which are not helpful, but basically it is not, I think, social inequality or an unequal access to resources that explains the rise of this resentful mood, because it is not the losers of globalization alone who are the backbone of these parties, but also the prosperous middle class. It is far too easy to say, if you look at the larger cities in Western Europe, that it is only those left out by modernization who are losing out, who support this kind of thinking. This is simply not true, so further explanation is needed.

One explanation perhaps lies in the political culture. There is an analogy to be drawn

with the discontentment with democracy in the 1960s. You cannot explain the rise of discontent in our democracies in this era in social terms. There was a large cultural change in the 1960s, and I think we are witnessing another cultural change in our societies, but it is different in nature. Whereas in the 1960s discontent in democracies was largely fed by an impulse for further democratization, it was very much under the sign of freedom of the citizen, of individual rights. Now, the cultural change that we are witnessing is not so much about the freedom of the citizen as it is about the protection of the citizen. It is not so much about individual rights as it is about obligations. It is less about individualism and more about the question of what sort of community we belong to and what we still have in common. How do we maintain a sense of social order amidst all the diversity that characterizes us as a society?

I share very similar views to those put forward by one of the leaders of the Australian Labour Party recently in a speech entitled 'The Cultural War'. He said that it is not so much the traditional agenda of politics that used to characterize our societies, but rather cultural conflict and conflict of values that is at stake. He argued:

We know that a strong society relies on a high level of solidarity and cohesion. We recognize that one of the pillars of social justice is the shared expectation that people are responsible for their own behaviour. At a time of popular concern about issues such as terrorism, illegal migration and crime, these views remain valid today. Too often the political debates offer a forced choice between order and freedom.

That is basically my argument as well. The shift in perceptions and cultural change we are seeing explains some of the discontent in our democracies, but it is more about the question of what sort of values we have

in common and how we can find a new balance between individual rights and obligations towards society at large.

That leads me to my second point – why this change is so strong, and why the mood is so resentful in many countries. It has a lot to do with – and all research indicates this – ongoing immigration. And it is interesting to see to what extent immigration feeds the sort of general debate I have described. I think that immigration for many people simplifies a sense of world disorder. It is a world disorder not seen from the distance, but which reaches our societies. It is living in the midst of our societies. Immigration is not only a sign of vast inequalities between North and South, but also an indication of failed states or civil wars, for example, in Northern Africa, the Middle East or Afghanistan. Migration is connected with a sense of disorder and with a loss of sovereignty. Many say that migration is a condition we are living in today, that it is ongoing, that if we do not create room for legal migration, illegal migration is inevitable. And this simple discourse about migration has caused, I think, deep resentment because it gives people a feeling of loss of sovereignty and loss of control. This is, of course, a more common feature in our globalizing world, but I think that migration is very much linked to the perception of losing control, to a feeling that we live in insecure circumstances, that we can no longer shield ourselves from the disorder that surrounds us. And in that sense, migration should not only be seen as the problem that it is now, for it exemplifies much more than people arriving at our borders and asking for entry.

I understand very well those feelings of insecurity and unease surrounding the debate on immigration in our societies, partly because it is part of my own reaction to living in a city like Amsterdam, which has changed dramatically in the last 40

years. Half the population of Amsterdam is now made up of first and second generation migrants, often coming from Morocco or Turkey, bringing in very different experiences, and coming from very different backgrounds. People from rural backgrounds find themselves in urban environments and people with very traditional religious beliefs find themselves in the middle of highly liberal and secularized societies, with all the resultant tensions and frictions. It is also a question of how to maintain institutions and adapt them to this new reality.

I can very well understand why the whole demographic change in the larger cities of Western Europe causes so much friction, unease and conflict. So when we talk about a dialogue of cultures, it is a dialogue within our own societies. It is not a question of cultures being external to each other, but the much more complex and discordant situation in the midst of the societies we inhabit. It is there in our streets, in the cities in which we live. We have to find new answers to a lot of old problems, perhaps. And there are also new questions to be asked.

I think that we have generally been too naïve in our expectations. As many as 75% of second generation migrants who are born in the Netherlands marry someone from the country of origin of their parents. So three quarters of Turkish or Moroccan children born in Amsterdam find themselves in traditional surroundings. This gives rise to a clash, for example, in ideas about what a family is, between the very liberal ideas of the mainstream and traditional cultures in which arranged marriage is the norm. And all the conflicts that follow from there, about family values, for example, are very interesting to observe and necessary to speak about. But what this illustrates is that the expectation that people who are born in the Netherlands will somehow find their way in Dutch society

was far too naïve and simplistic. The reality is far more complex.

We have found, especially after 11 September, that we are not an integrated society after all, but more an archipelago of different cultures. After 11 September of course you saw much more resentment towards the Muslim community. But this is only one issue amidst many larger questions surrounding the capacity to live together in such a diverse society.

Many politicians who visit mosques basically say nothing more than 'It is very good that you are here, it is very interesting that we have all this cultural diversity'. They pat everybody on the back and go home without asking anything. If I were to visit a mosque, I would probably first of all ask a lot of questions, and then I would say 'I think Islam should have its place in our society. I cannot see why a society which lives on the presumption of religious freedom and tolerance should not be able to live with Islam in its midst. But if you insist – and rightly so – on the right for religious freedom, which is in our constitution, you also have to defend this right for other religions and for other views of the world at large. And if you are not willing to do that a resentful mood is created and propagated against the sort of society we have. If it is true that people are being told to stay aloof and not become part of society, then the question should be asked, and will be asked, how can you claim some of the rights without defending them for others? And if you do not accept this reciprocity, then you lose certain rights.'

That is the problem. That is the debate going on. And it is absolutely necessary to ask this question. This leads me to my third point. I think one of the basic questions that should be asked in these new circumstances is, 'what does it take to defend an open society in a world without borders?' It is not at all evident that open

societies are stimulated in a world without borders. It is much more complex. And it leads us to rethink what the cultural foundations of a living democracy are. What do we need to have in common to be able to disagree in a meaningful manner? For too long it has been thought that insisting on freedoms only would be the answer to that, that ongoing democratization would instil a sense of trust and a sense of tolerance.

I think that we have now learnt a hard lesson, that we need a much more balanced approach, that multiculturalism as such has only deepened segregation in our societies, and that by only insisting on our diversity we have lost sight of what we need to have in common to be able to sustain this diversity. So you lose a lot and gain little by living by the slogan – in my view a rotten slogan – ‘What we have in common is our diversity’.

Shared citizenship in my view has a lot to do with cultural integration, with a sense of community and mutual trust. The ill-conceived cosmopolitan view that ‘we live in a world without borders, so we are not going to talk anymore about what it means to cross a border’, I think, has led to politicians saying ‘Close the border’.

In reaction to those who say that there is no longer such a thing as a nation or a process of nation building, politicians (such as those in Australia, the Netherlands and Austria) have retorted ‘One nation, we know who we are’. There are those who argue that we live in a global village, but do not want to understand what it really means and how this global village could be perceived not only as an invitation but also as a threat by many. This leads to a situation in which politicians play on fears that we live in a beleaguered village. So I think we need a more balanced as well as a more complicated approach. There is nothing against expanding the boundaries

of society, or expanding the sense of responsibility as long as it is a feeling of responsibility. Too often, however, globalization has led to an idea of escaping a social contract. I still think it is very much about citizenship, a sense of social contract in very different circumstances. We have to rethink a lot of the old words in a new context. But we cannot do it without the ‘we’. A lot of people ask who the ‘we’ is in fast changing societies, in cultural pluralism. But when you say there is no such thing as a ‘we’ anymore it becomes very difficult to express shared responsibility. Without the ‘we’ there is no citizenship. The word ‘we’ does not only relate to a sense of achievement but can also instill feelings of shame for developments which went wrong.

My sense is that we have to reinvent or to redefine the ‘we’, but we cannot escape the ‘we’ in our societies. We need a project of nation building, a more conscious and engaged project of nation building, under circumstances that have vastly changed. But we cannot do without it. I will give you just one example: If somebody says to me ‘You cannot insist on teaching about the period 1944/45, the years of German occupation, because half the class are children from Morocco or Turkey, and that is not their problem!’, it looks like a tolerant idea, but it is not. It is a form of exclusion. And why is that exclusion? Because you are basically saying that these children will never be part of the collective memory, which is forming itself and reforming itself in our societies. Why can they not be part of the living memory, which is going on in our societies? By excluding these children from being part of, or giving them access to this collective memory, for example about the war, you exclude them from the possibility of influencing the way society remembers itself.

What I see drifting apart in Europe are two attitudes – on the one hand, a sense of

loyalty, this is who we are, and on the other hand, tolerance and open-mindedness. I see a gulf between a sense of tradition and an openness towards the world. And that is what explains for me this resentful mood. We are not able – we do not yet have the vocabulary – to combine what needs to be combined. If we are not able to combine a sense of tradition and a sense of openness towards the world, we will see a confrontation between these two attitudes. So what we need to facilitate is a combination – a more conservative instinct, aligned to a sense of perpetual change and openness. But if we do not have this sense

of one generation succeeding the other – our society is also a contract between generations – and if we fail – as I think we have in past decades – to see that it takes a lot of energy and engagement to preserve the sense of social and cultural capital within our societies and transfer it from one generation to the other, then we will end up in societies that are disrupted and imbalanced.

In essence, to defend an open society in a world without borders takes much more energy, much more conscious effort in nation building than we used to think.

Statement by Axel Schulte* – Germany

I want to make some remarks on integration and democracy, and perhaps give some kind of answer to the question of the 'we' that has been discussed.

I will insist on the concept of democracy. By this I mean not a static or conservative democracy, but a concept of democracy that I hope to develop in a progressive way. I hope to promote and strengthen democracy in the policy field of migration and integration.

The background to the discussion about multicultural society in Western Europe is the issue that Stephen Castles and Mark Miller have chosen as the title of their book, *The Age of Migration*. In Germany, as well as in other European countries, important processes of immigration have occurred in the past. And these processes will continue very probably in the future because of globalization and internationalization.

With reference to these permanent settlements of different types of migrants in Western European countries, we can speak of the formation of new immigrant or ethnic minorities in the receiving countries, especially in certain quarters in the big cities and the core regions. In this context, particular European countries have developed into immigration countries and Western Europe as a whole has become an immigration continent – whether or not these processes are politically recognized.

It has been said that we have been too naïve, but I think that public policy in particular has been naïve towards immigrants. For example, in Germany the slogan 'Germany is not an immigration

country' was always politically dominant. This was naivety and I think that politicians and public policies have an important influence on the social perception of the processes of social and cultural change which have occurred and still occur. This change also has a cultural dimension in the sense of the pluralization of culture and ethnicity. And these cultural changes raise many political questions, problems and challenges.

One of these questions is that of newcomers, the new immigration, which is the subject of the so-called immigration policy. Another is the question of immigrant or integration policy which deals with the people who have settled within the country. These are two issues which are interconnected, but we must also distinguish between them.

I will concentrate my reflections on integration processes and integration policies. Integration in multicultural societies is a difficult, comprehensive and continuous challenge in scientific as well as in political terms. Let me explain some aspects of integration and democracy in multicultural societies. In my view, the concept of integration has two aspects: The first is the integration of immigrants into the receiving countries. This must be discussed because the structural situation of a considerable number of immigrants to Western Europe is one of social inequality and disadvantage in most West European countries. And this social problem – I think it is a social problem – is comprehensive. That is to say it is related to different social fields, such as the labour market, housing, education and legal status.

* This statement relies principally on a publication written by the author at the request of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, entitled 'Integrations- und Antidiskriminierungspolitik in Einwanderungsgesellschaften: Zwischen Ideal und Wirklichkeit der Demokratie' ('Integration and Anti-Discrimination Policy in Immigration Countries. Between the Ideal and Reality of Democracy'). Bonn: 2002. It can be ordered from Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. *Gesprächskreis Migration und Integration* (ISBN 3-86077-977-X) or downloaded from the Internet.

It is also durable in the sense that it affects not only the first generation but also the descendants who are born and grow up in the receiving country. There are also problems in cultural terms with the integration of immigrants.

The second aspect of integration is the maintenance and development of the cohesion of society on different levels – local, regional, national and transnational. To discuss these two aspects is important because multicultural immigration countries are not idyllic or romantic paradises, but are characterized by many problems, tensions and conflicts, which also raise the question of the disintegration of society. It is in this sense that Arthur Schlesinger, an American social scientist, talks about the ‘disuniting of America’, the danger of Balkanization.

The concept of integration can be understood as a process and a state that should be aimed at. Processes of integration are influenced by many factors on the part of immigrants as well as on the part of the majority of society. If integration is to be successful – the contrary is disintegration – then it is not only a question of time, or the approach of a laissez-faire policy, but the result of conscious efforts. As German president Johannes Rau said, integration is not so much the question of whether, but how majorities and minorities can live together. This implies active political formation, and it is a political task.

The concept of democracy has – and in my view it should have – great importance for the conceptualization, implementation and evaluation of integration policies. It is true that there are other possibilities for the orientation of integration policies, for example, the concept of modernization or the use of human resources. But if integration policy is oriented towards democracy or democratization, it is

connected to other rules and values of Western democracy – human dignity, human rights, the rule of law, the welfare state and the principle of federalism. Human rights imply liberties but at the same time also duties. Democracy is on the one hand a guiding political principle, and on the other hand a legal norm. It implies obligations, it is containing and binding, and it provides a framework for policies on different levels.

The principle of democracy has three possible functions for the conception, implementation and evaluation of integration policies.

Democracy – and here I refer to Norberto Bobbio, the Italian philosopher’s concept of democracy – offers first a binding framework for politics, polity and policy in the form of a set of rules and procedures. This is the formal conception of democracy. This aspect is important because democracy is a special form of government and distinguished from other forms of government, especially autocratic government. These procedures of democracy assure that political decisions, which affect all members of the group and are binding for all of them, are taken or legitimated by the members of the group themselves. In brief, in a democracy, political decisions are taken or legitimated from below and autonomously. Democratic rules establish who is authorized to take decisions and which procedures are to be obligatory, for example the general universal character of voting rights, majority rule, the possibility to choose between different political alternatives and the guarantee of basic rights. These rules are primarily formal. They do not determine which decisions are taken, but how these decisions are taken. They are open to different political options.

Second, democracy is not only a formal procedure, but also an ideal, a guiding

principle for integration policies. Democratic procedures are based on certain material and substantial values and ideals, and are directed towards the implementation of these values. In this sense human rights are particularly important, especially the principles of freedom and equality. Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.' And this is an expression of a global consensus. This view has a specific philosophical foundation. According to Bobbio, human rights 'are based on the individualistic concept of society and the primacy of the human being over every social formation of which the human being is naturally and historically a part. This is connected to the conviction that the individual has value in itself, and that the state is made for the individual and not the individual for the state.' This is what Bobbio calls ethic individualism, and this is the foundation of democracy.

Beyond these principles of liberty, equality and individualism there are other ideals characteristic of democracy. One of these is the value of participation. Democracy as a form of government should make possible and assure the direct or indirect participation of citizens, and in this way the influence over and control of political power and decisions. Then there are the ideals of non-violence, the gradual renewal of society, free debate, dialogue, possible changes of attitude and way of life – for example, in favour of more political participation – the principle or ideal of toleration, which is directed against – and this is the specific stand of the principle of toleration – any form of fanaticism which is a threat to world peace, and of course the ideal of brotherhood, the 'fraternity' of the French Revolution.

Third, the concept of democracy offers a measure of evaluation of integration

policies. Besides its ideal aspect, democracy also has a practical side. Important elements of democracy are goals, aims or objects which have yet to be reached or realized. In this sense, Bobbio commented on Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

The freedom and equality of human beings is not a reality but an ideal which has to be pursued; not an existence, but a value, and not a being, but a must.

This function of democracy can be conceptualized as a project, a process, or an 'unfinished journey' (J. Dunn). Between the democratic ideals and the actual existing democracies, between the ideals and the facts there are many gaps and discrepancies. So Bobbio speaks of the broken or unfulfilled promises of democracy. These gaps and defects of democracy exist in different forms and intensity within real existing democracies in different countries. As a measure of evaluation, democracy offers and requires comparison between the ideal and the reality in Western democracies. In this sense, integration and integration policies can be understood as an element of democracy measuring or a kind of 'democracy audit' (David Beetham).

This concept of democracy is also important for the interpretation of the processes, strategies and policies of democratization. Processes of democratization are directed with the support of and within the framework of democratic procedures. This reduces existing defects and deficits of democracy and strengthens it. It also reduces social inequality, enlarges opportunities for autonomous and equal self-determination and participation, and regulates social conflicts in a non-violent way. In this sense, the preambles of both the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and of the International Convention on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, recognize that 'in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the ideal of free human beings, enjoying freedom from fear and want, can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone enjoys these economic, social and cultural rights as well as the civil and political rights.' I think this sentence is important because of the unity of the different rights – political, civil, social, economic and cultural rights – and for the discussion of human rights in the context of reality, and not only on the level of ideals and norms.

However, we have to keep in mind that the concepts of democracy are rather general and must be consolidated and specified in historical and social conditions. Different historical and political cultures and traditions can be distinguished in different Western European countries. With regard to integration policy, for example, Stephen Castles and Mark Miller distinguish an ethnic model in Germany, a republican model in France and a multicultural model in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

Let me now turn to the specification of these general considerations. How can we interpret the policies of integration by democratization? I give just one example: the integration of immigrants who are resident within particular countries through more freedom and equality. This is, I think, a problem of the 'we'. Are they considered an integral and included part of us (the 'we'), or are they excluded?

With regard to more freedom and liberty for immigrants we have to consider the comprehensive sense of these principles. We can distinguish between the liberal, democratic and social view of the concepts of liberty and equality. In the liberal view liberty means freedom from the state and

equality before the law, in the democratic view liberty means autonomy, participation in the state and political equality, and in the social view liberty means equal social rights and liberty by the means and support of the state.

Jeroen Doomernik, a Dutch researcher from Amsterdam, has studied the effectiveness of integration policies, comparing France, Germany and the Netherlands. Structurally, he defines integration as a successful state of being, as a situation in which immigrants hold a position which is similar to that held by native people, with comparable relevant characteristics, notable in terms of age, education and gender.

To judge their position it is necessary to look at the level of the structural social situation of immigrants in certain societal fields, such as housing, the labour market, their legal status and the educational system. In his research, Doomernik found that in all three countries there are remarkable signs and trends of disintegration amongst immigrants, both in the first generation and in the second, subsequent generation. If the principles of democracy are taken seriously, in my view one of the most important tasks of integration policy should be to reduce this social marginalization and structural disintegration of immigrants and to make possible their successful participation with the same outcome in the life of the society in which both groups, foreigners and nationals, form part.

Doomernik has developed certain recommendations, and I think these are a concrete example of an integration policy which aims at more democratization. Firstly he has emphasized the necessity of recognizing the membership of immigrants as an integral part of the receiving countries – and this is also important, I think, for the question of the 'we'. To quote

Doomernik:

If governments accept the importance of social coherence between all people residing in their territory, it is of primary importance that immigrants are encouraged to feel themselves to be members of the society. The same holds true for the native population. There should be no doubt about the government's commitment. Apart from the obvious need to ensure the integration of immigrants and their descendants into the labour market, to this end the granting of social, political and legal rights is of the utmost importance.

I think he stretches the rights and not the duties because a significant number of immigrants do not yet have these rights, such as the right to permanent establishment, the right to family reunion, the right to vote and the extension of rights of free movement within the European Union, not only for citizens of European Union states, but also for so-called third country citizens.

Doomernik then notes two further important requirements: the necessity of combatting discrimination in all fields of society (see *Council Directive 2000/43/EC* of 29 June 2000, implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin); and the necessity of monitoring the situation of immigrants.

With regard to the concept of cultural integration, there are, I think, two different main concepts: The first of these, the concept of cultural assimilation, implies that immigrants and their descendants completely assimilate into society and that they are no longer culturally different. In contrast, the second, the concept of cultural integration, gives immigrants the possibility of retaining much of their own culture, but makes them equal to natives in their access

to society's resources and institutions.

The concept of the multicultural society is a controversial issue. It is evaluated negatively by some who view it as a danger for national identity, public order and the unity of a country, or as barrier for the integration of settled immigrants. Then there are the critics who see the concept of the multicultural society as an ideology, a romantic dream. Other positions regard the multicultural society in a more neutral manner, as a social fact. Others still evaluate it more positively, as an opportunity for the development of the integration of open society.

In my view the concept of cultural democracy – an expression which I take from Peter Haeblerle, a Swiss writer – is important. Cultural rights primarily concern individuals, but they also have collective dimensions. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: 'In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exists, persons belonging to such minorities should not be denied the right – in community with the other members of that group – to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion or to use their own language.' It is an open right that can be interpreted and used in different ways. So for members of immigrant groups there is the possibility of maintaining their own culture, but there is also the possibility of developing this culture. For the receiving country, I think it is important to develop policies and preconditions, especially ones which do not ignore and disregard the different cultures that exist within immigration countries in Western Europe, and to ensure that there are autonomous possibilities to decide in which direction these rights should be used and implemented.

I have only explained the so-called direct or special parts of integration policies that

are targeted mainly at people belonging to immigrant groups, but I think these policies must be complemented with general integration policies. I mention this because, for the cohesion of society as a whole, there must be processes of political democratization, social democratization and democratization on the international level. In my view it is important to consider the input as well as the output of integration policies. Democratization concerns primarily the input of the political process, but it also implies the output in the sense that there must be policies that are aimed at the reduction of social problems. I think it is important to ask what the reasons are for the feelings of insecurity and disorder which are widespread in Western European countries. Are processes of immigration responsible for these feelings? Or is it the presence of immigrants within these countries? Or are immigrants only an expression of other mechanisms, causes and processes? I think these are important questions. To reduce social problems is important because existing social problems have direct and indirect negative effects. Direct negative effects are on the social

situation of most parts of the population, and indirect negative effects promote tendencies to develop feelings of insecurity on the part of immigrants.

Finally I have to mention the question of the limits of liberties. In every society limits must be erected and respected. It is important in democratic societies that social conflicts are regulated without recourse to violence and that fundamental procedures and the law are respected. This can additionally be promoted by measures of conflict regulation, by mediation or by education.

In my view, the aspects, orientations and measures that I have explained can contribute to progress being made in the direction of a more civil and democratic coexistence in multicultural immigration societies. This does not imply that there are no conflicts or problems, but that these are regulated within a framework, with the support of procedures and on the basis of the values of constitutional, political, social and cultural democracy.

Statement by Zulkifli B. Baharudin – Singapore

Singapore has often been accused, as a small country, of talking big about itself, but revealing very little in the process. At the same time, Singaporeans seem to have a lot to say about others. I hope to shed some light on this matter.

I must first say that the issue of the clash of cultures to many of us in Singapore is not merely a topic of academic interest. It is very much a part of our identity. In my case, for example, my mother's family comes from Java. My father was born and raised as a Peranakan Chinese in Malacca. My wife is Cantonese and my sisters and I spent some time in a Christian missionary school. English is the common language in my home.

So conflicts of culture, race and religion are common daily occurrences to me. We, however, grew up with the belief that such interaction would one day produce a multiracial Singaporean society. This was given further impetus by the government's adoption of the 'melting-pot' philosophy as part of the nation-building process.

Much has changed since then. The 'melting-pot' philosophy was abandoned when the government realised that cultural, ethnic and religious 'pulls' were far too strong to be 'melted down'. We are still historically rooted to external influences of larger civilizations. Today we seek whatever little commonalities exist to bind us together. Even this search is proving to be unexpectedly challenging. How do we bind ourselves together when increasingly we seem to be emphasizing our differences? The challenge is for Singaporeans to really live together while being able to accommodate and celebrate our distinct diversities.

I shall look at the state-society relationship in Singapore to show how ethnicity has

always been part and parcel of nation building. When the British administered Singapore, they decided to separate people geographically. The result of this was the establishment of Little India for the Indians, Chinatown for the Chinese and a Malay quarter for the Malays in different parts of the island. These ethnic communities were left to themselves to look after their own cultural, religious and even educational needs. What emerged was a strong civil society led by philanthropic leaders who built mosques, temples and churches, schools and hospitals. Access to and membership of these organizations were based on race and religion. The British were happy to leave things as they were as long as the peaceful coexistence remained.

However, when Singapore became independent, the need to develop a nation out of these diverse people made a change of attitude towards civil society necessary. Many leaders and organizations had acquired tremendous moral standing within their communities. The new People's Action Party (PAP) government had to deal with them as essential partners. This proved problematic, as many organizations had developed close relationships with elements of the Malayan Communist Party in sympathy with its broader anti-colonial campaign against the British.

The government found itself in direct competition with the communists who had already acquired the skills and knowledge necessary to win the support of these organizations. So although the government, actively cultivated support from these organizations, it was initially suspicious of them, especially their ability to mobilize public support.

The Internal Security Act and the Societies Act are often cited as legislation that reflects the government's attitude towards civil

society. However, these laws were enacted to deal with the circumstances then existing. Since then, much has been said about the need to relax some of the provisions of the legislation. That this has not been done has been interpreted as indicative of the government's lingering doubts and suspicions about civil society today.

However, it must be noted that the government's views on civil society have been progressive in the case of the Malay-Muslim community. Of course, much has to do with geopolitical realities and the recognition that the Malays were having difficulties keeping up with the progress of other ethnic communities. Meeting their religious and cultural needs was a sure way of demonstrating the government's paternal interest in the Malay community. Thus, a Minister in Charge of Muslim Affairs was appointed and the government initiated a comprehensive programme to redevelop mosques to keep pace with growing demands for better facilities, especially in new housing estates. Such programmes were not available to other communities.

While domestic political agendas have shaped the nature of state and civil society relationships in the past, future relationships will, however, be defined by forces beyond our domestic influence. I will attempt to illustrate this by examining the issues that will affect the relationship between Malay-Muslims and the state in the future.

It is increasingly difficult for the Chinese and Indians in Singapore to understand why issues in the Muslim world, such as the Palestine conflict, are having a greater influence on Singaporean Muslims. The Malay-Muslim '*Umma*' or brotherhood is perceived to be indicative of the closer affinity of Malay-Muslims in Singapore to Muslims elsewhere. During the current economic crisis, while issues of jobs,

homes and education preoccupy most Singaporeans, the Malays appear to be more concerned about issues of race and religion.

The Internet has made it possible for Muslims to be kept abreast of developments in the Muslim world. Such news is seldom featured in the main media in Singapore. Malay-Muslim consciousness about these issues is seldom shared or understood by other Singaporeans.

Meanwhile, the growing importance of China has led to a greater emphasis on the need for Singaporeans to become more aware of the history and culture of China and economic opportunities in China. Malay-Muslim Singaporeans are generally less excited about opportunities in China than they are about opportunities in Malaysia, Indonesia and other Muslim countries. The common factor is less about economic opportunities than it is about race and religion and the comfort of being able to relate better to people with similar backgrounds in terms of race and religion.

There is also a lot of difficulty in understanding how increasing affluence and prosperity is in fact propelling greater religiosity amongst Malay-Muslims. This is indeed ironic and poses problems for the Singapore government which has built its political legitimacy and motivation on delivering increasing prosperity to its people. The Malays seem to be the odd ones out in that they are not motivated by progress and prosperity. It is difficult for non-Malays to comprehend why many of the growing group of Malay professionals are sending their children to Muslim religious schools despite the bleak or limited job prospects for these children.

The Malays appear ungrateful to the government despite the huge religious infrastructure that the government has provided for them. But Islam is a religion

of the spirit, and as such, the provision of this infrastructure accounts for nothing or very little. Instead, Malay-Muslims look to the government to be more accommodating, for example with issues such as allowing the Muslim dress code in national schools.

The dilemma the government faces is to balance the need for greater space for people to practice their religion and way of life in a multiracial society and yet not allow the various communities to become increasingly distant in the process. Ironically, the search for more commonalities to bind people together is instead requiring compromise on the part of the various races. Recent experiences suggest that the improved infrastructure of mosques has led to the provision of services that are parallel to or in competition with government-sponsored social services. Mosques now provide education from pre-school to adult learning, as well as welfare and a host of recreational services. As a result, the Malays are becoming less and less dependent on government agencies. There are indications that this is leading to the Malays having fewer contacts with Indian and Chinese Singaporeans. The introduction of compulsory education and new conditions attached to independent Muslim religious schools were deemed to be necessary in order to manage the growing number of Malay children choosing to go to religious schools instead of national schools and to ensure that minimum standards are met so that these students are not deprived of further education and employment opportunities. This is important to ensure that opportunities for integration in schools and work places remain open.

Religious orientation not only affects children in schools. There are also indications that this growth in spiritual movements could result in a direct clash with the government, as was seen when a

group of Malay-Muslim professionals, backed by Muslim religious organizations, suggested a new form of 'collective leadership' in determining and selecting future political leaders. This was seen as an attempt to define suitability for leadership more on the basis of the possession of religious qualifications and moral standing within the community. But it also reflects the desire of the community to have leaders capable of helping the community acquire more 'private space' to fully practice their Muslim way of life.

Unfortunately, there are no easy answers here. While there are restrictions on free speech as far as race and religion are concerned, a more enlightened attitude towards the debate on race and religion is required to allow Muslims to arrive at a consensus on what should be accepted norms in the daily lives of Malay-Muslims in Singapore. Compromise is crucial. Ideological debate is necessary to resolve many of the practical issues of adopting the varied interpretations of Islam that would be suitable for multicultural Singapore.

It is, however, essential that Malay-Muslim organizations in Singapore find new partners to forge a consensus on the increasingly difficult issues of the interpretation of the teachings of the Koran. While Saudi Arabia has been a useful partner in providing moral and financial assistance to support the Muslim cause in Singapore, it is increasingly becoming less relevant in guiding Muslims to manage the complex issues brought about by modernization and multiculturalism. It has not been generally accepted by Muslims in Asia that the practices and norms of Islam as practised in the Middle East are unsuitable for Muslim life in Southeast Asia. Muslims in many parts of Europe face the same problems. We can help these organizations work together to deal with this common problem. It is important that

these organizations are seen to be credible to ensure that they have the strong moral persuasion to take on those who have more extreme tendencies.

It is crucial for Singaporeans to face these issues head-on as the political will to find a solution is strong. But Malay-Muslims in Singapore must first realize that there exists the opportunity for Singapore to indeed

emerge as the model of a progressive Muslim society within a multicultural society. Singapore Muslims would then contribute to a huge Muslim cause. The community must be collectively brave because past norms and old linkages will become less relevant in this quest for the progress and prosperity of the Muslim community.

Towards a Global Civic Identity

Christa Randzio-Plath
Thomas Meyer
Ignatius Wibowo Wibisono
Chow Kon Yeon

Statement by Christa Randzio-Plath – Germany

The challenges of globalization and the feelings of insecurity and anxiety, the questions of lost identity and the question of home have all been discussed. Not many see a brighter future if their home is no longer in a 'nation state' but in a 'global world'. Those who do belong to an elite which has access to money, education, language skills, the Internet and travel. The haves, and not the have-nots, have the keys to this globalized world. Despite Seattle, Rome, Genoa, Geneva, Seoul and the many other protestations against international organizations or gatherings of the G7, the G10 and the World Trade Organization, there is not really an expression or idea of a global civil identity. There are only shared interests and a sense that there are some issues of concern that should be or are shared by some movements or non-governmental organizations.

However, I stand by my position that this global world is not open to employees but rather to employers, and more open to academics than to those who are illiterate. Even this debate about a global civic identity is not very fair to those outside these doors.

We have to respect the people in the European integration process. We therefore have to rely on the civil society in states and in regions in order to be inclusive and not exclusive. This takes time, even in the Internet age and even at a time when cross-

border travel is cheap and available.

In the European community we stress that we are a community of values. This is agreed upon. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the broad majority of Europeans are very satisfied with the European Union and the process of integration, they do not feel themselves to be Europeans from the perspective of a personal regional identity. This has something to do with the European integration which has been created by nation states and their governments. A real union will only be possible if the European Constitution makes progress and enables more integration. We have not yet achieved a collective entity, and I think in order to achieve a real collective civic identity, which is not solely linked to the nation state or to a region, you need a collective entity.

We have to rethink this whole notion: even democracy is not suitable without a collective entity that regards itself as such. Our question must be: Can such a collective identity be assumed and exist on levels other than the nation state? And this highlights the issue of the regional identity in Europe, Asia, Southeast Asia, and/or the call for such a collective identity at a world level.

This is the problem of the so-called 'demos'. But demos is not just the population, it is also identified by certain criteria. If you do not have an entity such as the modern

nation state, you have to look for shared values, at how you can organize interaction, and how you can rely not only on history and common experience, but also on projects which might be key for the building of a civic identity.

It is therefore important to look at the concept of civil society. We cannot have a civic identity without creating a civil society and having a functioning civil society. We have civil society at the level of the nation state. This is an old concept. Cicero spoke about it and long before him even, Aristotle. In the antique world, civil society meant that members of society fulfill their duties as citizens. By the nineteenth century the term had acquired associations of moral and social ethics. Good citizenship meant good breeding, good manners and impeccable social conduct. It was precisely this that disturbed Hegel and Marx, and they attacked this concept for being biased and one-sided. They identified civil society with a bourgeois individualistic world view, with formalized regulations and civil law – a real crossroads between liberalism and socialism. More recently Alexis de Tocqueville and Max Weber introduced a different concept and a new interpretation of modern civil society by looking at it in relation to the state in which the citizens have to live.

It is important to look at the citizens and their identity not only from a values point of view, but also from a functional point of view. Such a concept of civil society should be taken into account because the concept of civil society is of a dynamic nature and it denotes both situation and action. The participatory model of civil society also provides an opportunity to strengthen consensus in the democratic system, so that a more favourable climate and innovation can develop.

The concept of a civil society, in which citizens live and work, and to which they

contribute, is one which integrates culture. Culture determines the definition of civil society and has a bearing on all concepts of civil society. Such concepts guarantee pluralism, concerning not only the substance but also the form of how social groups are acting and interacting. This has to be done on the basis of tolerance and free will. This goes without saying. An example is the democratic culture of the multi-party political system, but this would go beyond the topic of my presentation.

Civic identity calls also for a kind of autonomy and a kind of solidarity. Participation, as I have already mentioned, is one of the key words in this concept of civil society.

I would say that in Europe we have a functioning civil society, and this covers not only political parties but also non-governmental organizations. The European Union concept of improved or good governance encompasses both so-called organized and non-organized civil societies. Organized societies include not only democratic institutions but also social partners, and non-organized civil societies consist of, for example, green movements or women's unions.

It is interesting to examine how these organizations are shaped on the European level in order to ascertain whether a European civic identity could be moulded from the pattern of the cooperation of such non-governmental organizations – organized as well as non-organized. It is likely that most of the actors of civil society who bring together people wanting to do cross-border work are really issue-oriented. So for a European civic identity of this type you would engage those citizens who are also issue-oriented. I take as examples the environment and consumer-protection. These issues may very well have the best networks and lobbies. Not only are the issues identified but also rights are claimed

for them and political organizations and institutions are obligated. Clean water and the safety of food are examples of issues that have identified even at the level of school classrooms. Access to clean water and food safety have now been claimed as fundamental rights. Peoples' engagement creates elements of a civic citizenship because people realize that only international communities can find solutions to address problems with cross-border implications. This recognition might serve as a building block for the European House and also for a European civic identity.

Other issues cannot be counted upon in a comparable way. For example, the European organization of trade unions is weak because the patterns of salaries and wages are always decided upon at a national level, sometimes even at a regional or local level. It is very difficult to conclude negotiations on a European level without instruments, because power and influence are limited and identity formation is very weak. However, with the issue of gender there are not only networks on a regional and national level, but also on the European level. Moreover, this is backed up by the competence and obligation of the European Union to deal with these issues. On the one hand there is a bottom-up process and on the other hand a top-down process. An instrument such as this can help to build an European identity.

The problem is that there is no real, broad and streamlined European identity. It is more an issue-oriented identity on a regional level. And I would say that even an issue-oriented identity is not achievable in those regions of the world that do not have the sort of governance that we have in the European Union. For a civic identity it is necessary to have a form of governance, a framework in which you organize a society. This – in my opinion – is very important.

We very often ask ourselves if we are indeed working together with civil society, and how representative the representatives of civil society are. We try to work out whether there should be criteria for non-governmental organizations, for those claiming that they are really representing people, to be invited to a dialogue with political institutions. In the European Union's discussions we have a very modest pattern. We say that for this real dialogue it is necessary that a European organization must exist permanently at the level of the European Union. It should provide permanent access to its members' expertise and have constructive consultation. It should present general concerns that cover the interests of European society, that comprise values which are recognized at the nation state and European Union level as representative of a particular interest. It should have member organizations in most of the European Union member states. It should be an organization that provides accountability to its members, that has the authority to represent and act at the European level, that is independent and mandatory, not bound by instructions from outside – and finally – that is transparent, especially financially and in decision-making structures.

These conditions might prove inadequate. But we could draw upon the initial pattern we have given ourselves in order to be able to organize the dialogue with civil society. We in the European Parliament organize a dialogue with civil society because we see parliaments as part of civil society and in the committees of the European Parliament we work very closely with non-governmental organizations. We invite them if there are issues related to their status and activities. This is very important.

We rely on civil society as a means to build up a European identity as well as achieve better governance and better decision and

law making on the European level. It is clear that civil society represented by non-governmental organizations cannot replace parliament in a democracy. But it is very important that we take into account the different general interests represented by those organizations. You could ask why we reflect on global civic identity, given the limited success of the European Union in building up a European civic identity, since most people still think of themselves as coming from their home town or their own nation state.

I am persuaded that we have to undertake this exercise because we need a global framework for political decision making. We no longer have the primacy of policy in the world, rather we have the predominance of market forces. And in order to regain the primacy of political action it is necessary to raise the idea of global governance through a changed United Nations, through a different kind of Security Council on Economic Affairs which looks not only at war and peace but also at other questions of human survival. We need – in that way – global governance. This global governance has to be organized, but I have yet to see how we can really make it democratically accountable.

For 15 years now we have been working on this ideal of making international organizations like the World Trade Organization accountable. And one of the issues now under discussion is that non-governmental organizations have to be listened to. They should be allowed to go to Geneva and express their opinions, not only at the big trade conferences, but also at the institutions. We are even giving them some financial help. We also decided that we needed a parliamentary assembly of the World Trade Organization. But in this case, the International Parliamentary Union (IPU – also with a seat in Geneva) has already taken the initiative of trying to organize a sort of a parliamentary consultative

assembly, similar to the one in the Council of Europe. This is quite different from what we initially had in mind, but apparently, in the context of the World Trade Organization this is more feasible. However, this will not lead to a global identity which reflects the interests of citizens and people. But it might work in the context of the World Trade Organization and improve the involvement of parliaments on the regional and national level in the decision making of respective governments. Transparency rules in the World Trade Organization and other international organizations have to be improved, as well as strictly applied and implemented.

Let me raise a final question: Is it possible to create a sort of a global civic identity in the framework of the big United Nations conferences? I have participated in several big United Nations conferences as a representative of the non-governmental organizations. And we all felt a sense of global responsibility, despite the fact that we were coming from different nations, different political families and different interest groups, because we wanted to achieve something. But, again, here we followed an issue-orientated approach.

Therefore, I would like to come back to my initial conclusion. I do not see that there is a realistic chance of organizing and living with a general global civic identity. All types of global civic identity will remain issue-oriented. At the women's conferences of the United Nations it was the gender issue that pulled all of us together, despite being Muslim or Christian, Filipino or American. We really felt the necessity of making gender mainstreaming an issue for all governments and all institutions. And perhaps we have to limit ourselves to the model of this approach. Additionally, when conferences of this type are over, in this Internet age there is still the possibility of continuing the networking. This is not only a European experience, for it has also been

the experience of women in Asia. This happened not only after the Beijing conference, but also in the wake of the Cairo, Vienna and Monterrey world conferences.

In conclusion, I see the necessity of building up a broader civic identity rather

than an identity linked to the nation state. But nations will still be homes for women, men and children. So we should necessarily combine reality and vision. But let us continue to strive to achieve a global civic identity, so as to avoid an elitist approach and end up with a global civic identity clash.

Statement by Thomas Meyer – Germany

Defining Citizenship

By global civic identity, we understand some form of cosmopolitan citizenship, for a civic identity relates to a kind of citizenship in terms of shared political values, although not necessarily cultural values. Civic identity is based on a shared sense of belonging and shared responsibilities and concerns related to political problems and issues. By citizenship we understand commonly a certain pattern of cooperation between individuals in establishing frames and rules for running their lives. This specific pattern of cooperation consists of the mutual assurance of equal rights, obligations and opportunities for active political participation in decision-making processes. The open question is, however, to what degree can such a concept of civic identity and citizenship be transferred to a global context?

Prior to coming to this point we need to ask the question: To what extent does the concept of citizenship need to be transferred to the global level in the present day world? And only then can we turn to the question of feasibility. Since matters are now more than ever in a dynamic process, we should remain well aware that what does not seem to be feasible today may well be feasible tomorrow, especially when we push for it and press for it out of sheer necessity.

In the pre-global era of democratic culture, citizenship was organized in the nation state as the appropriate arena in which political problem causation and resolution were coextensive, as were the addressees and authors of political jurisdiction. The existence of coterminous political arenas was the core idea of the legitimacy of a democratic nation state, so that the scope of political problems and political competence were roughly the same. This

was the main condition of political legitimacy in the era of the democratic nation state. Under this condition, national citizenship and democratic legitimacy were generally in accordance with each other – this was the basic political fact.

In our present era of globalization, this condition has changed fundamentally in a variety of ways. As the examples of the external effects of global markets, the threat to global ecology, security issues, the spread of certain diseases and many other developments demonstrate, the coextension of the arenas of political problem causation and political jurisdiction is lost. This is a fundamentally new situation.

Today a broad variety of regional and global political problems and risks that challenge both the idea and the reality of democracy are in place. Both the idea and the reality of established national democracies are challenged by this new situation of non-coextension. National democracy, in so far as it is no longer able to tackle the political problems of its citizens in such a situation, is increasingly deprived of its legitimacy. And so is a global society that is in many respects one common polity in real terms, but not yet in terms of legitimate forms of governance. The main challenge to democratic legitimacy is the fact that the world order – or rather world disorder – is deprived of legitimacy. But also deprived of legitimacy are the concept and the reality of national democracy itself, because national political actors are no longer in a position to tackle some of the most pressing political problems of a nation's citizens.

A Global Community of Fate

The political community of fate in many respects is regional and global, but our patterns of civil deliberation and governance are still mainly national and

only in some parts of the world – and only in some issue respects, as was rightly stressed several times – are they regional and to an even lesser degree global.

The modern idea that political problems need to be tackled through legitimate procedures, based on democracy and human rights, thus requires new transboundary forms of governance and citizenship. The main argument is: Just to maintain democratic legitimacy in such a changed situation, new transboundary forms of governance and citizenship are required. Both are emerging, and are, to a certain degree, already in place, albeit in embryonic form. Both, therefore, need to be developed, enhanced, extended and intensified without much delay. Otherwise, we will not be able to maintain or regain democratic legitimacy. A crisis of democracies might soon occur with heavy and hard consequences.

Four Models

There are four models under discussion for the required new forms of transboundary governance, in political science, and also – to a certain degree – within the political arena.

The first is the model of a democratic subsidiary world republic with a large measure of statehood as the final aim of organizing world governance. This is discussed, for instance, by the German political philosopher Otfried Höffe, and has an impact on the discussion in the political arena as well as in some social democratic parties. I think such a model of global statehood, however it might be relativized in terms of subsidiarity, seems neither feasible nor desirable, because the envisaged global statehood would make participation very difficult and would render great amounts of power to centralized global bodies. Such strategies might increase problems instead of solving them. But this is a model under intensive

discussion, and some people in Germany subscribe to it. I myself, however, do not.

The second is the model of demarchy, as offered by several Anglo-Saxon authors. It is under discussion particularly within the world-wide civil society and anti-globalization movement. This model of demarchy, as different from democracy – democracy is presently identified with insufficient forms of representation – draws heavily on the concept of civil society. Civil society here should not only play a major role as in some of the competing models, but should also replace the rotten structures of representative democracy step by step rather than extending them beyond national borders. And I think that even authors like Benjamin Barber, who are of substantial influence in the world-wide civil society movement, subscribe to that model – more or less. This model of demarchy, I think, needs to be criticized in one crucial respect: There is no place for organized supranational power in the concept. And without organized political and democratically legitimized and controlled power, there cannot be control of an illegitimate economic power. In order to control a legitimate economic or private power, we need legitimized democratic power. But, certainly, civil society, even a world-wide civil society, has a relevant part to play in a global democracy. It is, however, not fully legitimized to act on behalf of the entire society. Due to its selective procedures and composition it cannot replace legitimized political transnational institutions nor collect the power necessary to implement decisions.

The third concept is one called cosmopolitan democracy. It is espoused by authors like David Held, and it resembles to a substantial degree the model of global governance that has been forwarded by the Commission on Global Governance.

The fourth concept, that of global

governance, is very interesting because it is to a certain degree in place already, though certainly in a very embryonic way. But I think most of the scholars and political actors who are active in the field would subscribe to this model, and therefore it would probably be able to muster the largest support and broadest coalitions when it comes to political action.

The model of global governance proposes a four-pronged approach to global democratization. The first is to extend, to democratize and to make more inclusive transnational institutions such as the United Nations. The Commission's report says that an Economic Security Council should be added, there should be a People's Assembly and an assembly for Civil Society Associations, and there should be more equality and more inclusiveness in all these institutions. The second prong is functional, concerning the area of issue-related regimes that need to be democratized, as well as made more inclusive and equal in their procedures of deliberation and decision making – such as the World Trade Organization, the International Labor Organization and the World Bank. These are the functional political regimes. The third is the necessity for an active world-wide civil society. Recent research in transboundary civil society says that there are already 40,000 civil society agencies in place world-wide – most of them issue related. And fourth there need to be systems of regional political cooperation, which in their turn network and cooperate with each other. I remember when Willy Brandt was in Southeast Asia in 1990 he said that these systems of regional cooperation and networking were the 'building blocks of a political world society'. Michael Harrington, the 'chief ideologue' of Socialist International at that time used to say that the world is socialized in real terms, but not yet in political terms. And Willy Brandt considered this to be the proper analysis and the main goal to achieve in

order to have a bottom-up approach in building a democratic form of global governance.

This four-column building of democratic multilateralism is relevant for the European Union, for ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), for SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) and for many other embryonic systems of regional political cooperation. It is the backbone for the strategy of global governance.

Global Civic Identity

The whole concept of global civic identity requires and reinforces new forms of multilevel civil identity, new forms of citizenship at the national, regional and global levels. There are, in present day discussions, four approaches to citizenship in a globalized world. I want to expose them in order to make the concept clear and to show which alternatives we do have in this field, and what the different alternatives entail.

The first – of course – is Huntington's negative approach. Huntington says explicitly that there cannot be a common global community of values. This is due to his relativist basic assumption. And therefore, there can be no such thing as a civic identity. Citizenship at the global level would need to be underpinned by certain political values that are shared by all people of the world to a sufficient degree. If you want to share political values, you also need to share a minimum of certain cultural values, at least the values of political culture. This means that there is no common ground in Huntington's view at the value level, and therefore there is no basis for something like a global civic identity, or a global concept or reality of citizenship. There are only competing cultural and political identities. The ideological content of Huntington is: If dialogue is not possible, prepare for conflict

or prepare for war! This is the basic consequence of this ideology. This is the message it forwards to the leading groups in the United States and so it is interpreted widely in many parts of the world.

The second concept is that of Yasemin Soysal. Her approach is widely discussed in political science. She says that the concept of citizenship by its very nature is linked to the concept and the existence of the nation state. Therefore it needs to be replaced in a globalized world by a human rights approach; by universal human rights that entitle individuals, notwithstanding their specific forms of citizenship and belonging, to certain rights of protection and participation wherever they live. This pertains particularly to the European Union. Soysal says that there are people who live in certain nation states of the European Union, who are not citizens there, who do not have full citizenship rights, but who nevertheless enjoy certain human and even political rights. We should, she says, discuss the whole matter in terms of human rights rather than citizenship. People should be able to enjoy human rights wherever they live, whoever they are, independent of their citizenship. I think this concept is not sufficient because it means that these individuals are deprived of political rights, active participation and decision-making rights concerning the framework of their lives and the rights they enjoy. This renders them passive consumers of these rights instead of being their active constituents. Therefore, this concept falls short of what is really needed.

The third approach is most favoured in civil society initiatives as well as in parts of the anti-globalization movement. This is the concept of post-modern citizenship. It is also widely discussed and widely accepted in many sectors of political science. Post-modern citizenship is a form of citizenship that is only related to political issues and political responsibilities and is

completely detached from statehood as an institutionalized form of polity. That means we are citizens with rights to participate in deliberation and decision making wherever issues of concern for us emerge, and in order to enjoy these rights of citizenship we do not need institutionalized structures to which are attached these rights of citizenship or any form of statehood to which we belong.

I think for reasons discussed earlier this is also not a sufficient approach, because we need, to a certain degree, cosmopolitan law, transnational law, transnational structures and institutions that create binding solutions and power structures. Citizenship must relate to rights and duties within such structures of binding decision making.

Only the fourth concept, the concept of cosmopolitan citizenship, is sufficient in order to tackle the problems of global political responsibility. And by cosmopolitan citizenship I understand what David Held and others do – a form of multiple citizenship, related to multiple overlapping political authorities in a multilevel global polity. Cosmopolitan citizenship is thus a form of multiple institutionalized citizenship. We remain citizens in a nation state that continues to play a role. We are citizens in emerging regional systems of political cooperation, and to a certain degree we are also citizens in a global polity when it comes to binding cosmopolitan law, maybe human rights or maybe decisions or rules that are established by transnational political institutions.

It is this form of multiple citizenship that I would like the concept of a global civic identity to embody. As discussed earlier, this form of global citizenship requires certain overlapping consensual political norms, and also some common cultural norms such as tolerance, mutual responsibility, recognition of the other, equality, etc.

In addition, this cosmopolitan citizenship needs to be post-liberal. That means it needs to include social rights, social citizenship, as well as political and civic rights. It also needs to be post-national by its very definition, as well as post-communal, which means to be detached from communal belongings. And it is related to the multilevel political system, which is created step-by-step through a process of global governance. It certainly needs to become partly institutionalized at the national level, in some regions at the regional level, and also at the global level when it comes to institutionalized decisions, but it will remain partly non-institutionalized when it comes to civil society activities which are only issue related.

Interregional Relations

Now let me come to a conclusion with respect to our discussion between Southeast Asia and the European Union. I think if my analysis is correct – or sufficiently correct at least – it entails that we arrive at a consensus that we share a civic identity at the twin levels of interregional cooperation and global jurisdiction (because some of the issues of global jurisdiction are common issues). We should come to a consensus about the way in which global issues need to be tackled, because issues such as, for example, controlling the global markets and embedding the global markets within a socially and ecologically responsible framework, are of common concern and in our common interest. In that sense we need to develop a common political and civic identity between us. As far as the interregional level is concerned we need to develop identities in our regional systems and also in the field of interaction between the systems of political cooperation, as well as come to a certain consensus and overlapping in this field too.

We know from history and research that

civic identity is nothing that exists prior to common political deliberation and decision-making procedures. There is, as Jürgen Habermas has put it, a situation of mutual causation. It starts as a process of political deliberation with a certain feeling that we belong together already, and then in the course of that process of deliberation and decision making this consciousness and feeling of belonging together, of a common identity of our civic aspirations and fates, is structured and reinforced. This is the process of circular causation – we know this from the European Union too – that needs to be set in motion. And once it is set in motion, it will work, not without obstacles or setbacks, but gradually with success. Only so much overlapping of cultural values should be developed as is necessary to set this process in motion.

Dialogues, normally, are necessary not so much to create common values and norms that are not in place, but to show that they are enshrined already in the different cultures and traditions and to deliberate on them in order to make them surface, to make them conscious and clear. This is, I think, what needs to be done today. Dialogues contribute to this process by showing that a minimum overlapping of cultural norms and values form the foundation of such a civic identity. I think this is not only possible, it is also necessary, because otherwise we would deprive the world order as a whole, and also our national democracies, of much of their legitimacy. If that happens, resistance, crisis, fights and non-cooperation would become normality.

The identity of Europe demands cooperation with the United States in such a way as to push permanently in the direction of multilateralism, because this concept of global governance is the concept of multilateralism. There are enough groups, forces and currents in the United States who look forward in that direction.

And it is the obligation of the European Union and of Europe to strengthen its own political identity by cooperating with the United States and other regions in order

to promote multilateralism through a step-by-step process of bringing about and democratizing global governance.

Statement by Ignatius Wibowo Wibisono – Indonesia

The Case of Indonesia

If 'global identity' is understood as the result of the process of mutual learning,¹ it is important to know what the people of ASEAN can learn from the European. In my opinion, 'global identity' – understood as a set of attitudes and behaviour committed to moral values shared globally – is part of the modernity project which emanated from (Western) Europe from the time of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century and spread to the whole world during the twentieth century. It constitutes a conscious commitment to a series of values, specifically peace, justice and solidarity. Thus we can imagine someone with a global identity to be a person who adheres to such values wherever he/she is.

Just as the concept of the 'nation state' is of European origin,² so too is the concept of 'global identity', for which Europe should also provide itself as a model. This is not to say that the values of peace, justice and solidarity are known only in Europe, but to accept the fact that those values have been explicitly formulated by European philosophers.³ To some extent the Europeans have carried out experiments – some successful, some not – to bring about peace, justice and solidarity in their respective countries. It is not an exaggeration, therefore, to say that Southeast Asians (and other people too) still need to look to Europe, at least for an inspiration, still better for a model.

At the moment, however, one question lingers: what can Southeast Asians learn

from Europe and what have Southeast Asians failed to do? Let me start with what Southeast Asians can learn from Europe. I can still remember when I was a child my father saying, 'If you want to see a good society, look at the Netherlands.' It was 'the Master' of Indonesia at that time. He also told me to look to Europe or the United States for guidance.

Today, many of us would not agree with this kind of statement. Many Southeast Asians have been disillusioned and disappointed with Europe. One of the causes for disillusionment has been the decline of the welfare state in Europe. Southeast Asians trying to build a kind of welfare state have seen that in Europe the welfare state is gradually being dismantled, starting in the Great Britain of Mrs Thatcher, with other European countries following suit to various degrees.

Although the dismantling of the welfare system is correct according to economic calculations, this process has unfortunately brought the issue of solidarity into question.⁴ Do Europeans still value solidarity? Because by dismantling the welfare state, Europeans are teaching us that the value of solidarity is diminished. The implication is that it is no longer feasible in this world and that we should rather be thinking about lowering taxes, and more in terms of things being 'pro-business' or 'pro-market'. But the net result of these neo-liberal policies is injustice.

Europe was the birthplace of liberal

1. There is a great theoretical debate concerning the word 'identity' which I am not going to delve into. See, for instance, Jonathan Rutherford (ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990).
2. Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985).
3. Debates are also taking place among philosophers outside Europe, but the recorded forms that we have today mainly come from Europe. See, for example, Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.), *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
4. Ramesh Mishra, *Globalization and the Welfare State* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999); cf. Will Hutton, *The State We're In* (London: Vintage, 1996).

philosophies, but in the past 20 years Europe has witnessed the rise of illiberal philosophy, which is expressing itself in the form of right-wing parties, whether on the basis of nation, religion or race. 'Liberal' has become a dirty word in some parts of the continent. This has given Southeast Asian people some thought about what could happen in their own countries. Could parties such as these also appear in Southeast Asia? What would happen? Do we have to continue imitating the Europeans or should we set up our own norms? For a long time we have been taught that good norms emanate from Europe. So we find the emergence of right-wing parties in Great Britain, Germany, Italy and France perplexing. But when there are right-wing parties in Southeast Asia, we think that this is quite normal.

There is also the erosion of the institution of the family in Europe. We have always been taught that in Europe there are good family values that we should look up to. But now divorce has become normal practice. In other words, the family is not as important today as it once was.⁵

At the philosophical level, there is an increase of extreme individualism. This is supported by post-modern philosophers who reject all the 'grand narratives'. They argue strongly against anything that is normative and reject any type of authority. In its place, they put the individual as the ultimate norm.

Some people in Indonesia still think that Europe is a Christian continent. Christian heritage and, to some extent, Christian tradition may still exist, but it does not follow that Europeans are Christians, as most Europeans today would rather claim that they are living in a 'post-Christian'

society. Many Europeans today classify themselves as atheists, agnostics, socialists, communists, nationalists and other ideological denominations which have nothing to do with God or religion. Christians (Catholics and Protestants) only form a minority.

Despite their aversion to Christianity, interestingly, some Europeans have been eager to create their own 'religion'. In the past 30 years we have witnessed the rise of 'New Age' movements in Europe, a combination of different religions and science. They have their own holy books and conduct rituals at appointed times in the year. In almost all standard bookstores in Europe there are sections of New Age books, an indicator that they have a good number of followers.

This phenomenon, unavoidably, has forced many in Southeast Asia to ask questions: What should we do with our religion? Should we imitate the Europeans? Should we go along with them in secularism, to some extent?

Corruption scandals in the West are further opening the eyes of Southeast Asians. European governments were wont to criticize Indonesia as a poor country full of corrupt officials. But now we see the West is not immune from corruption either. The most glaring example was the one in the United States which led to the bankruptcy of Enron.⁶ How can you accuse us of being corrupt when you yourselves are also corrupt? This is the kind of question which many in Southeast Asia are now asking.

What about the area of international trade? 'Free trade' has become the credo of most European countries. Recently, however, the

5. Anthony Giddens, *The Transformation of Intimacy. Sexuality, Love & Eroticism in Modern Societies* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).

6. On the collapse of Enron, see Loren Fox, *Enron: The Rise and Fall* (London: John Wiley, 2002).

European Union has been slowly closing its market, giving almost unconditional support to all the American initiatives. For example, I learned from a non-governmental organization activist who had been working at the World Trade Organization in Geneva that they had what they called 'the green room' where all the delegates from the European Union and the United States would negotiate and set up their own common agenda before they negotiated with the rest of the world.⁷ So, for instance, the World Trade Organization demands that there should be no subsidy for agriculture, but France, United States, Germany and Australia go ahead and give subsidies to agriculture in their own countries. If such unilateralism persists what then is the value of the World Trade Organization? There is clearly more hypocrisy than honesty here.

Europe knows that it is facing a serious crisis with regard to the values it has upheld for many centuries – peace, justice and solidarity. But its elite – politicians and businessmen – seem to be ignoring this fact, and continue to pursue policies which possess the potential of destruction. Violence, injustice and individualism are much more visible in Europe today than they were 40 years ago.

Let us now turn to Southeast Asia, in particular Indonesia, where the social institutions are complex and confusing. First, there is the rapid social dislocation. People move to the cities, and some even move abroad, to Hong Kong, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia for example, to become migrant workers. They migrate from their small villages into the vast world with little preparation to cushion the culture shock.

The same is true for the middle class, who move from one city to another. At the global level they work in Jakarta, then move to

New York, but have their headquarters in Sri Lanka. They work for multinational corporations which can assign their employees around the globe almost at will. As such they develop their own culture, typical of 'globe trotters'.

These processes, unavoidably, lead to social dislocation and create confusion. What is their target of loyalty? The nation-state or the corporate state? What kind of culture should they adopt? Indonesian culture or cosmopolitan culture? This dilemmatic situation, not surprisingly, produces psychological problems, if not schizophrenia.

There is indeed a love-hate relation with regard to the West. Last year in Jakarta and Surakarta there were big demonstrations against foreigners, especially Americans. The demonstrators expressed their hatred for Americans by 'sweeping' hotels. Curiously, at the same time, they tolerated people who ate at McDonalds or Pizza Hut, and drank Coca Cola. There was no attack against those who watched Hollywood movies, or those who wore Levis. Thus, on the one hand, they expressed an anti-American attitude, but on the other hand, they did not oppose the enjoyment of American products.

In Indonesia, we now talk about democracy almost every day. Radios, televisions and newspapers are full of discussions about democracy. But in private, people fondly hark back to the time of Suharto when they felt that 'everything was under control'. There is a kind of irony here: they dream of democracy, but they long for authoritarian leadership.

Many Indonesian people are caught in what I call 'materialistic dizziness' at the moment. People have become obsessed

7. Aileen Kwa, 'Power Politics in the WTO: Developing Countries' Perspectives on Decision-Making Processes in Trade Negotiations', *Focus on the Global South* (June 2002), pp. 41-67.

with the materialistic things they pursue day after day. This is especially true among the ruling elite and the middle class who display their wealth openly, ignoring the poverty of the majority of the people. They do not hesitate to use any available means to acquire wealth, even if it means having to get involved in corruption.

There are also right-wing groups in Indonesia. As in Europe or the United States, some groups in society have become so aware of their racial identity that they have used it to discriminate against those who do not belong to their own racial group. As you may remember, in May 1998 the biggest riot ever against the Chinese citizens in Indonesia took place. Their shops were looted, their residences were burnt and there were also reports of Chinese women being raped. Many Chinese fled the country, taking their money with them. And they were criticized for doing so: 'The Chinese were born here, work here, make money here, but then they take their money out the country.' Thus, the hatred deepens.

Another type of right-wing attitude expresses itself in religion. Islam in Indonesia is being scrutinized by the whole world as a source of fundamentalism which culminates in acts of violence (the Bali bombing in October 2002 is often cited as evidence). But, if we observe closely, there are also right-wingers amongst Protestants and amongst Roman Catholics. These people are simply intolerant towards other people of different religions, and in the name of God they attack each other. In the case of Islam, the fundamentalists would like to set up an Islamic state based on the Koran.

Thus, we have a confusing situation in which people are wandering around

without a clear destination in terms of values to be pursued. Talk about peace, justice and solidarity is overshadowed by ambiguous thinking about pragmatic considerations. In Indonesia – also ASEAN in general – one can find a mixture of contradicting attitudes and behaviour, none of which squares up with globally-shared values.

When we talk about a global identity, we are actually talking about 'civil culture'. People all over the globe are expected to arrive at one culture in which people are committed to peace, justice, and solidarity. This is exactly what the Enlightenment project of Europe aspired to realize. But with the rise of capitalism in the form of neo-liberalism in 1980s, this project has been abandoned, totally in some places and partially in others. The slogan 'time is money' occupies the best and the brightest minds. 'Who wants to be a millionaire?' becomes the dream of all. In the end, we see a stark individualism, which transforms itself into libertarianism. Instead of 'civil culture', we now have – to borrow Pope John Paul II's phrase – a 'culture of death'.⁸ It seems as if everybody is now 'licensed to kill' by profit motive, religious motive, or any motive one can imagine.

It is amazing that Europe, which has, since the Renaissance, provided leadership in terms of 'civil culture', is gradually losing its original role. It is sinking deeper and deeper into individualism, an attitude typically born out of raw capitalism.⁹ As a result, along with the United States, it can only provide a bogus global identity – the 'Visa Identity'. As long as you hold a Visa credit card, you are welcome everywhere as a 'normal citizen' of the globe.

Still looking for a model, Southeast Asians are perplexed with this development. 'Visa

8. Pope John Paul II, Christmas message, 25 December 25 2000.

9. Larry Sidentop, *Democracy in Europe* (London: Penguin Books, 2001).

Identity' is certainly not the type of identity which can satisfy their deepest needs. Capitalism can hardly fulfil lofty desires. If Europe fails to fill this need, perhaps Southeast Asians will find a good excuse for also failing to develop a true global

identity. It is imperative, therefore, that Europe still firmly stands as the proponent of 'global identity', supporting the enduring values of peace, justice and solidarity. Global identity, indeed, needs a global mirror.

Statement by Chow Kon Yeow – Malaysia

The statement made by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the organizer of this conference, focuses on the need for a world-wide compatible civic identity, based on the notions of equality, respect for different cultures and different ways of life, and a common perception of universal human rights to govern the relationship of states, people and culture. I would like to extend this a bit, to see, coming out of this process, a global civil society in this multiethnic world – not only multiethnic, but also multireligious and multicultural – and finally, maybe to achieve the objective of a common global government.

The decade of the 1990s was characterized by the growing importance attached to the global norms and global values that we hear so much about – human rights, the environment, social justice and so on. This global society movement was beginning to displace the geopolitical discourse of international affairs as a result. It can be said that this global civil society was effective in promoting and influencing a number of important international treaties, for example the ban on land mines, the international criminal court, global climate change and other global issues. This is often described as a way of minimizing the role of the state in society, and also as both a mechanism to restrain state power and a substitute for many functions of the state.

But who should determine what a global value or norm is? If a political institution like the United Nations or a state were to do so, it could be said to have a political agenda. If it came from a global civic society to a certain extent the distrust over a political agenda could be resolved, but we could not rule out that even international non-governmental organizations and global civil society have their own agendas. Nevertheless if a global civil society came forward to promote this civic identity, the

distrust of certain countries in this world would be minimized.

However, the global polarization which has resulted from 11 September and the 'War against Terror' may have squeezed the political space for a global civil society and the quest for a global civic identity – a process which we had seen developing positively right up till then.

This global polarization can be seen in two recent developments, one in early November 2002 and the other over the last few months. The first development was that the United States mid-term elections, which gave President Bush's Republican Party control of the Senate and retained their control of the House of Representatives, showed support for Bush's unilateralist and war-mongering foreign policy. And the second development, at the other end of the spectrum, is that in countries such as Turkey, Bahrain, Pakistan and Morocco, Islamic parties have done well in recent elections and have gained popularity over secular parties. In light of these two developments arising from 11 September, we ask ourselves, is the world poised on the verge of a global clash between the Muslims on the one hand and the non-Muslims on the other?

It is my view that both Islamic fundamentalism and the use of terror can be seen as direct attacks on global civil society. But at the same time, the unilateralism of the United States administration also undermines both the concrete achievements of the global civil society and the values and norms promoted by global civil society. Because of this we could be seeing a return to geopolitics and the language of national interest and realism in the dealings of international affairs and relations. I mentioned earlier that we had observed the trend of moving away from

the geopolitical discourse of international affairs. But after 11 September there are signs that we are turning back to it, and also getting further away from the process of searching for and strengthening the global civil identity that we want.

Despite the pessimism, I think all is not lost as 11 September also exposed the vulnerability of all states and demonstrated the reality of global interdependence. And it revealed a greater need to create a global civic identity to govern such relationships of interdependence.

It is argued that 11 September, despite the problems it created, represented an opportunity to set a new global agenda and to construct a new set of global rules. Therefore it is a new challenge for global cooperation, and also a challenge for European and Southeast Asian cooperation.

How are Europe and Southeast Asia going to position themselves in this global polarization between Islamic fundamentalism and United States unilateralism? If American unilateralism is a problem for the world, maybe the multilateralism of Europe could be the means to lessen conflicts in the world.

Some of us may focus on attempting to humanize and civilize globalization, some wish to reverse or to transform it, and for others the priority is the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, real enforcement of human rights or a genuine dialogue between cultures. Whatever our cause might be, what all of us can agree on is that global civil society is needed now more than ever to express the range of different voices in the world – whether from the First or the Third World. And civil society, such as anti-capitalist, peace, human rights and green movements, have the capacity to play a role, to reach out across borders to the excluded groups in

the world – especially among the Islamic community. They can also offer alternatives to the appearance of fundamentalist groups.

I think at this conference there has been a lot of talk about and concern shown for the developments of the world today, focusing very much on the Muslim world and Islam. We have many views on this, but it is my belief that any global discourse towards creating a global civic identity will not achieve the desired results unless Muslims feel at ease and able to participate on an equal basis. And the issue of the Islamic world distrusting the rest of the world must be addressed.

How can Europe and Southeast Asia cooperate and respond to this challenge? The European Union is indeed equipped to meet this challenge. But the same cannot be said for Southeast Asia. The Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprising ten Southeast Asian countries, is a grouping that focuses mainly on trade and economic cooperation. It also has this policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member countries. So it is rather difficult for any member country of ASEAN to be seen poking a nose into the affairs of another ASEAN country. Of course, there are exceptions. I recently proposed in parliament that Malaysia, which plays a very dominant role in the war against terrorism in the region, should also adopt the policy of constructive engagement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the Southern Philippines because of the recent linking of the MILF and many Islamic organizations in Malaysia with al-Qaeda. But the Deputy Foreign Minister responded to my suggestion by saying that we will not engage nor take the initiative to engage in another country, except upon invitation. That shows the limitation of ASEAN or any member country to assume this role of promoting civic identity and

other democratic norms and ideas in this region.

Despite the shortcomings of ASEAN, I do feel that we in Southeast Asia have a role to play, at least because we are a region that is currently embroiled in this debate and controversy over international terrorism and al-Qaeda. We could play the role of leading opinion in our discussions. We could promote religion and religious identity in the conceptualization of a global civic identity, because the current condition of globalization really shows that religion everywhere is socially constructed, dynamic and implicated in social, economic and political power relationships.

It is necessary therefore for global civil society to address the concerns of fundamentalists, and not just deny them the opportunity of using their grievances to mobilize political support, because such issues are integral to what civil society is supposed to ratify. I think Southeast Asia should also promote the idea that global civil society makes an approach to promote and support the understanding of religion which is more conducive to a positive relationship with the global civil society. Given a choice, I would like to see liberal Islam as a direct response to fundamental Islam, and liberal theology respond to the injustice and disempowerment that can fuel

fundamentalism. In Malaysia today the question of Islam is consuming a lot of national attention and debate.

I am a representative of a secular party. Despite the fact that we are secular, we are committed to working or engaging with progressive Muslim elements of Malaysia's political parties to bring about political reform in order to check government and ensure that fundamentalists do not destroy the political agenda and pursue fundamentalism. We often ask whether Islam is compatible with human rights, civil rights, women's rights and so on, and it is through this constructive engagement that we are able to see liberal elements and progressive elements taking over the agenda of the community. There must also be efforts to promote and sustain liberal understanding of Islam in different parts of the world. We are happy to note that there are developments to this end: in Iran, Turkey and other countries we are seeing liberal and progressive elements coming to power.

And finally, there is the phenomenon of Islamic globalization in evidence. But we should make an effort to ensure that this Islamic globalization phenomenon is liberal Islamic globalization and not the fundamentalist Islamic globalization promoted by the likes of al-Qaeda.

Conference Summary

Norbert von Hofmann

Twenty-five politicians, academics and non-governmental organization representatives from six Southeast Asian countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and three European countries (Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands) – Buddhists, Christians, Jews and Muslims – came together on 18 and 19 November 2002 in Singapore in an informal, confidential conference to discuss common questions of intercultural cooperation. The conference was originally going to be held in Bali, but the venue was changed to Singapore after the cruel terrorist attack in Bali in October.

All the participants had had some kind of contact with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Asia and Germany. The dialogue in Singapore was intended to give them the opportunity to discuss their countries' and regions' specific cultural backgrounds and the implications for regional and national politics – not comparing the precepts of one with the practices of another, but comparing precepts with precepts and practices with practices.

Four issues or questions were introduced and thoroughly discussed in the plenary sessions: “Clashes within Civilizations” or “Clashes between Civilizations”?, ‘Sources of Friction’, ‘Democratization of Societies and Citizenship in Multicultural Societies’ and ‘Towards a Global Civic Identity’. The limited number of participants allowed the active participation of everyone.

“Clashes within Civilizations” or “Clashes between Civilizations”

Most of the participants quickly agreed to

speaking rather of clashes within civilizations or within certain values of a region. Conflicts between certain elements of different civilizations were also discussed. However, nearly all participants dissociated themselves from Samuel Huntington's ‘clash of civilizations’. Huntington's catchwords were also seen as an instrument of certain political and economic interests. Abdurrahman Wahid reproached Huntington for not seeing the wood for the trees:

Cultures in Southeast Asia are not monolithic influence spheres and it is wrong to speak of a lack of common social and political values between Europe and Southeast Asia.

Thomas Meyer put it in a nutshell by noting that the present ongoing dialogue is evidence of common values.

Surin Pitsuwan referred particularly to the culture of ‘accommodation’ and tolerance in Southeast Asia. Islam has been absorbed and changed by already existing cultures (i.e. Buddhism and Hinduism) in the region. This culture of accommodation distinguishes Islam in Southeast Asia substantially from the Islam of the Arabian peninsula. Secularization is, and remains, a basic condition for the existence of Southeast Asian states. But the ongoing process of globalization puts the Southeast Asian model of Islam more and more under pressure:

We lose our identity, our way of living, even our sovereignty. In such insecure times people fall back on their religion, and the signals they receive from the “heartland” of Islam are “Sharia, Islamic

law, Islamic banks, etc.”, demands which are questioning the principle of “accommodation”.

Sources of Friction

Most of the participants identified social and economic imbalances as well as the implications of globalization as the main reasons for tensions within civilizations. Cultural or religious differences only contribute to cover up economic and social tensions. However, Paul Scheffer’s opinion was that social and economic differences play only a subordinated role and that, instead, cultural differences stand in the foreground. Therefore, for Paul Scheffer, growing fundamentalism is not only the result of a fight for fair distribution within cultures but also a mirror of cultures gradually being deprived of their national identity.

This argument then led to the question of how both regions would meet the challenges of modernization and globalization without destroying their cultural values. Europeans, among others, respond by retreating into their private spheres and with a de-ideologization of society. This, among other things, provides an open space for fundamentalist groups. Furthermore, the large migration movements from the east to the west have, despite enlarging many peoples’ horizons, also reinforced the vulnerabilities in Europe. In this context many participants criticized the media for paying more attention to conflicts than to common grounds.

To the issue of ‘Sources of Friction’ also belong questions of conflict solution, peaceful coordination of interests and reconciliation. Conflicts per se are not reasons for tensions as long as they can be settled without violence. Kevin McNamara demonstrated with the case of Northern Ireland how such a conflict could widen during the centuries and how hard it could become to get out of this situation. He

identified three principles, contained in the Good Friday Agreement, which are essential for every type of conflict solution:

1. An open agenda without a partial selection of the issues.
2. The start of a political process that includes all parties concerned.
3. The creation of institutions, which are accepted by everybody and at the same time flexible enough to accommodate changes.

The Northern Ireland example indicates that centuries of conflict are only solvable in long sustained processes.

The increasing discrepancy between tradition and modernity, also as a result of globalization, has to be overcome in both regions to cope with the growing insecurity and apathy of many people. For that, more commitment is needed, but also more self-criticism. Civil societies could make an important contribution at all levels. A new balance has to be found between individual freedom and responsibility towards society.

Democratization of Societies and Citizenship in Multicultural Societies

Migration is the result of a changed world order. States, due to globalization, are losing elements of their sovereignty and the nation state is today in a limited position to fulfill its traditional task of safeguarding its citizens. So, for example, economic globalization is being used as one reason for terminating the longstanding social and solidarity contract between the generations in Europe.

Traditions and cosmopolitan attitudes are suffering from this development. But Paul Scheffer does not want to meet these challenges by allowing more personal freedoms and individuality, but by looking for more conservative approaches, which are capable of freeing people from fear – a view which most of the Southeast Asian

participants shared. A lack of answers would only lead to further mistrust among people and towards the political class.

Thomas Meyer identified three types of multicultural integration policy: the cultural melting pot, assimilation and separated development – none have proven entirely successful. European attempts at complete assimilation have led to withdrawal and de-ideologization. Zukifli Baharudin demonstrated on the basis of the Singapore example how the ‘melting pot’ model has failed. For him, one reason is the exclusion of questions concerning race and religion from the integration process. Likewise, the model of ‘separate development’, such as that used in Malaysia, became a stumbling block for the further development of the country. This compels a search for new ways of living together based on a minimum amount of common values and allowing sufficient differences. The interrelation between democratization and integration plays a decisive role here. The word ‘we’ has to be redefined!

Pluralism and democracy still remain a basic condition for the living together of people of different identities.

Towards a Global Civic Identity

According to Christa Randzio-Plath, common civic interests and the common feeling of civic identity are terms aimed more at elites than at ordinary people. The same is certainly true for the statement ‘The European Union is a community of values’. There are collective identities within regions of a national state as well as within a national state. But we are still very far away from constructing a regional, say European, or even global identity. This does not mean the goal is completely out of sight. One key towards this goal is the growing importance of the civil society at all levels – local, national, regional and global.

Thomas Meyer brought the discussion back to the impacts of globalization. These impacts are ultimately deciding which forms a global civic identity, or ‘world citizenship’, has to take on in order to handle, for example, a globalized economy, questions of global security and even of global health risks. Democracy, or rather national democracies, are no longer capable of acting sufficiently, because they are, at least partially, deprived of their legitimacy.

According to Thomas Meyer, the first steps for a redefinition of citizenship in a globalized world have already been taken. A transnational cultural dialogue is already taking place. The future could lie in a cosmopolitan, multiple civil society of a post-liberal world with overlapping political norms such as equality and responsibility – norms which should only be partly institutionalized.

A minimum of such overlapping cultural values has already existed for quite some time. Michael O. Mastura could not imagine an ‘International Court of Justice’ if there was not a deeply rooted global system of values. But how can we define the common grounds which would allow us to live together peacefully and at the same time enable us to remain ‘different’? Who is determining the necessary limits for tolerance and liberalism?

Chow Kon Yeow, could also imagine the development of a global civil society based on equality, universal human rights and respect of others’ cultures, but he too left the question of who should determine what global values or global norms there should be unanswered.

The events of 11 September 2001 confirmed the necessity of a more global cooperation and are seen as a chance for a new global agenda.

Multilateralism is a possible basis for closer European-Asian cooperation and an essential condition for a human and democratic globalization. But under no circumstances should anti-Americanism be allowed to become the basis of cooperation. Europeans have to give the liberal and accommodating Islam of Southeast Asia a chance to resist the calls of a more fundamental Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. European participants suggested in this context that Southeast

Asian institutions should cooperate more constructively with progressive elements of global civil societies.

At the end of the conference many questions remained open, giving sufficient reasons to continue the discussion in the future. At the centre of a further round of discussions could be the search for ways of bridging the tensions between tradition and modernity, resulting from a growing globalization.

Programme and List of Participants

Programme

18 November 2002

09:00 Welcome and Opening

09:30 Session 1

'Clashes within Civilisation' or 'Clashes between Civilisations'?

The phenomena of fundamentalism

Chairperson: Thomas Meyer
Introductory Statements: Southeast Asia: Abdurrahman Wahid
Surin Pitsuwan
Hawazi Daipi
Europe: Donald Sassoon

14:00 Session 2

Sources of Friction

Changes in the economy, technology, culture and society induced by globalization – migration, impoverishment, income disparity, ecological disasters, etc.

Chairperson: Ooi Giok Ling
Introductory Statements: Europe: Kevin McNamara
Claudia Derichs
Southeast Asia: Datu Mastura
Heng Monychenda

19 November 2002

09:00 Session 3

Democratization of Societies and Citizenship in Multicultural Societies

The relationship between state, society and individual and its implication for the political culture in Southeast Asia and Europe

Chairperson: Judo Purwowodagdo
Introductory Statements: Europe: Paul Scheffer
Axel Schulte
Southeast Asia: Zulkifli B. Baharudin

14:00 Session 4

Towards a Global Civic Identity

A new challenge for European-Asian cooperation

Chairperson:	Hans-J. Esderts
Introductory Statements: Europe:	Christa Randzio-Plath Thomas Meyer
Southeast Asia:	Ignatius Wibowo Wibisono Chow Kon Yeow

Conclusions and Recommendations

Participants

Europe

Professor Dr Thomas Meyer, FES-Bonn, University Dortmund, Germany

Paul Scheffer, Publicist, the Netherlands

Professor Dr Donald Sassoon, Professor of Comparative European History, Queen Mary College, University of London, United Kingdom

Kevin McNamara, MP, United Kingdom

Dr Claudia Derichs, Gerhard-Mercator-University, Duisburg, Germany

Professor Dr Axel Schulte, University Hannover

Dr (h.c.) Christa Randzio-Plath, MdEP, Member of European Parliament

Dr Hans-J. Esderts, Head of Office, FES-Jakarta

Norbert von Hofmann, Head, Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia, FES-Singapore

Cambodia

Heng Monychenda, Director, Buddhism for Development

Indonesia

Abdurrahman Wahid, former President of the Republic of Indonesia

Mochamad Munib Huda, Assistant to Mr Abdurrahman Wahid

Dri. M. Riefqi Muna, Vice Executive Director, Research Institute for Democracy and Peace

Dr Judo Purwowidagdo, Executive Director, Centre for Empowering, Reconciliation and Peace

Dr Ignatius Wibowo Wibisono, Director, Centre for Chinese Studies

Malaysia

Professor Dato Syed Hussein Alatas, former Vice-Rector, University Malaya

Mr Chow Kon Yeow, MP, Democrat Action Party

The Philippines

Professor Datu Michael O. Mastura, President, Sultan Kudarat Islamic Academy

Lawrence Wacnang, Congressman, Cordillera Region

Singapore

Zulkifli B. Baharudin, former Nominated Member of Parliament

Hawazi Daipi, MP, Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Education

Dr Ooi Giok-Ling, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Policy Studies

Mushahid Ali, Senior Fellow, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

Thailand

Dr Surin Pitsuwan, MP, former Foreign Minister

Paisal Suriyawongpaisal, Chairman, Think@Asia Forum