Contents

v  The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southeast Asia

vii Editorial

viii List of Abbreviations

1 Conference Background
   Norbert von Hofmann

3 Opening of the Conference
   Hans-Ulrich Klose

5 First Panel: The Contribution of Track-two Dialogue to Crisis Prevention
   Jürgen Rühl: The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia
   Norodom Sirivudh: The Cambodian Experience

25 Second Panel: The ASEAN Regional Forum and European Security Interests
   Lee Seo-hang: Multilateralism in East Asia: The Role of ARF and Its Future
   Gert Weißkirchen: The CSCE Process in Europe

39 Third Panel: Security Policy and Global Stability
   Rudolf Scharping

47 Fourth Panel: German/European Security Interests in Asia
   Gernot Erler: German/European Security Interests in Asia
   Wang Guoqiang: Both China and the European Union Shall Play a More Important Role in the New Century
   Ashok K. Mehta: The India Case

63 Fifth Panel: Multipolarism and ‘Global Players’ in Asia
   Hans-Joachim Gießmann: Multipolarism and ‘Global Players’ in Asia
   Tan See Seng: Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony?
   Naeem Ahmad Salik: The Situation of Pakistan

89 Sixth Panel: Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises
   Riefqi Muna: Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises
   Wolf Oschlies: The Situation in the Balkan Region
107  Seventh Panel: Reasons for Regional Instability: Intergovernmental Tensions
   Surin Pitsuwan: The ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia and Beyond
   Antti Turunen: Inter-governmental Tensions and European Union Contribution to Crisis Management

121  Conference Summary
   Norbert von Hofmann

127  Conference Programme and Participants
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southeast Asia

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been active in Southeast Asia for more than 30 years. Its country offices in Bangkok, Jakarta, Manila and Hanoi have been active in implementing national cooperation programmes in partnership with parliaments, civil society groups and non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and 'think-tanks', government departments, political parties, women's groups, trade unions, business associations and the media.

In 1995, the Singapore office was transformed into an Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Its role is to support, in close cooperation with the country offices in the region, ASEAN cooperation and integration, Asia-Europe dialogue and partnership, and country programmes in Cambodia and other ASEAN member states where there are no Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung offices.

Its activities include dialogue programmes, international and regional conferences (e.g. on human rights, social policy, democratization, comprehensive security), Asia-Europe exchanges, civil education, scholarship programmes, research (social, economic and labour policies, foreign policy) as well as programmes with trade unions and media institutes.

Dialogue + Cooperation is a reflection of the work of the Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Singapore: it deals with ASEAN cooperation as well as the Asia-Europe dialogue.

- Dialogue + Cooperation will tell you about our activities in Southeast Asia by publishing important contributions to our conferences and papers from our own work.
- Dialogue + Cooperation will contribute to the dialogue between Asia and Europe by systematically covering specific up-to-date topics which are of concern for the two regions.
- Dialogue + Cooperation will be an instrument for networking by offering you the opportunity to make a contribution and use it as a platform for communication.

Head of Office: Norbert von Hofmann

Address: 7500A Beach Road
#12 - 320/321/322 The Plaza
Singapore 199591
Tel: (65) 62976760
Fax: (65) 62976762

E-mail: enquiries@fesspore.org

Website: http://www.fesspore.org
Dear Reader

On 19 and 20 October 2001, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung convened an international conference on ‘Security Policy: An Asian-German Dialogue’ in Berlin. More than 50 representatives from governments and parliamentary commissions, scientists from notable research institutions and high-profile military experts from Asia and Europe gathered to exchange their experiences, profoundly discuss security policy concepts and challenges, and identify common ground for future collaboration. However, the convention was overshadowed by the brutal terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001. Though the attacks were not considered in the conference programme, the situation in Afghanistan and its implications, the anti-terror alliance and the challenges to nation-states were reflected in all statements and discussions during the conference.

This documentation of the conference contains the research papers submitted and presented by scientists from research institutions, and policy papers and speeches delivered by political representatives. The papers, statements and speeches reflect the opinions of the individual authors. They provide the reader with excellent analysis of and insight into, from various perspectives, the history, institutions, main actors, security fields, roots of conflict, instruments and methodologies for conflict prevention and solution, regional challenges and developments, in light of enhancing the security policy dialogue and in bringing peace and stability to the world.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung would like to express their sincere appreciation to the conference participants and conference speakers for their contributions.

The Editors
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia
Singapore
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Ministerial Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>ASEAN People's Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEF</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-ISIS</td>
<td>ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAEC</td>
<td>Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence-building Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICP</td>
<td>Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCA</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Cooperation in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence- and Security-building Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUESP</td>
<td>Chulalongkorn University European Studies Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIAS</td>
<td>European Institute for Asian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIR</td>
<td>Institute for International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISEAS</td>
<td>Institute for Southeast Asian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia); Institute of Security and Development Studies (Thailand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISG</td>
<td>Intersessional Support Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIIA</td>
<td>Japan Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMD</td>
<td>Nuclear Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAFTAD</td>
<td>Pacific Trade and Development Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PECC</td>
<td>Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM C</td>
<td>Post-ministerial Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDSC</td>
<td>Strategic and Defense Studies Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEANWFZ</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIIA</td>
<td>Singapore Institute for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>Senior Officials Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treaty of Amity and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theatre Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conference Background

Norbert von Hofmann*

Since reforms began to take place in the People's Republic of China and with the end of the Cold War, the foreign and security policy in Asia has changed fundamentally. While a major war has become more and more unlikely, regional conflicts are increasing in both dimension and frequency. The open nuclear armament in South Asia since India and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests has changed the strategic situation in Asia and this calls for a new regional and international dialogue. Asia needs a new security architecture, taking into account the security needs and interests of all states, including the People's Republic of China.

ASEAN + 3 (Southeast Asia, China, Korea and Japan), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are promising starting points for future cooperation. However, there has been no real input into strengthening the ties between South Asia and Southeast Asia. The development of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is presently blocked due to the Kashmir conflict, and alternatives have hardly been discussed.

In many Asian countries, there exist economic, social, political, cultural, ethnic and religious conflicts, leading quite often to violent war-like situations. The expanding distribution and usage of small arms is resulting in an increase in violent conflicts and victims. Next to the war of secession in Sri Lanka, the situation in Indonesia gives cause for concern. The disintegration of a large country like Indonesia will challenge the stability in Southeast Asia and will have unforeseeable consequences. In addition, there is a growing number of conflicts in Central Asia, including the political instability in Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in that region.

The Asian Economic Crisis made many Europeans aware of how closely the two continents are linked. Any destabilization in Asia has a direct impact on Europe economically, and economic consequences can easily develop into social turmoil.

The promotion of democracy and social justice and the strengthening of human rights are the key strategies and long-term objectives of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. To attain these goals, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung gives high priority to the support of peaceful conflict resolutions and crisis prevention. Further to cooperation with governments, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung fosters dialogue, particularly with civil society organizations and international and multilateral institutions. Within its framework of activities, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung attempts to bridge different interests through the encouragement of dialogues, preparing the ground for sustainable problem resolutions and mechanisms. A peaceful future in Asia will make the world safer and is therefore also in the interests of Europe and Germany.

* Norbert von Hofmann was at the time of the conference Head of the East Asia Desk at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Headquarters in Germany. Currently he is the Head of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia, in Singapore.
To strengthen the international and regional dialogue on security policy between Asia and Europe, and to discuss European and Asian concepts for peaceful conflict resolution and crisis prevention, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung organized an International Conference on Security Policy in Germany and Asia in October 2001, in Berlin. Conference participants, many of them partners of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's security-oriented projects and activities in Asia, had the unique opportunity of discussing in depth security policy concepts and exchanging their experiences with representatives from governments, parliamentary commissions, research institutions, universities and major non-government organizations, from Germany, the European Union and Asia.
Opening of the Conference

Hans-Ulrich Klose

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you today to the international conference on security policy in Asia. I feel particularly honoured, since I am the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Federal Parliament and also a member of the Executive Board of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

In particular, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to those conference participants who have come from abroad to Berlin. I have been studying the list of participants and was very impressed that there are representatives from Korea, the Philippines, India, China, Pakistan, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Cambodia. We all appreciate you accepting our invitation and know that German participants will benefit substantially by your presence and by your contributions.

This conference will focus on security policy. Sadly, I realize that our conference will be overshadowed by tragic events which have placed security policy at the top of the world’s agenda. Because of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the United States government is now waging a military campaign in Afghanistan. The objective, the goal of this campaign, is to crush the terrorist network al-Qaed and those who offer shelter and support to terrorists. This means the United States is not fighting against the people in Afghanistan, and the United States is not fighting against Islam. We have to make this quite clear every time we talk about this campaign. We are fighting terrorism. I stress the word we because the United States government has not reacted unilaterally. The procedure was and is cooperative via the United Nations and via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO, as you may know, stated that the terrorist attack against the United States is an attack against NATO too. The United Nations Security Council recognized and approved unanimously the right of the United States government to defend individually or collectively its territory.

The German government, like all allies, made it quite clear from the very beginning that we stand firmly alongside the United States of America, which includes giving military assistance.

This conference has not been convened to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. The situation and its global impact, however, cannot be bypassed. The developments of the last month demonstrate how fragile peace and stability are, not only in Asia, in and around Afghanistan, but also in all other parts of the world, and this unfortunately on a daily basis.

Peace and stability, I am afraid to say, are never secure or safe indefinitely. Constant efforts on the part of governments and responsible leaders are necessary to initiate and foster dialogue and cooperation so as to prevent and eradicate violence and counter violence.

Hence, I am very pleased to welcome this group of responsible leaders to this conference - diplomats, politicians and experts. We are all part of the game that ought to be a game of peace. Once again, thank you very much for coming, and thank you in advance for your contributions.
First Panel
The Contribution of Track-two Dialogue to Crisis Prevention
The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia*

Jürgen Rüland

Introduction

Globalization, economic liberalization and the concomitant growth in interdependence have given rise to the emergence of new actors in international relations. International organizations and regimes as well as transnational actors, such as multinational corporations and internationally organized non-government organizations (NGOs), are not only proliferating, as empirical evidence suggests (Kaiser, 1969; Shanks, Jacobson and Kaplan, 1996), but are also playing an increasingly prominent role in international politics. So visible have they become that liberal institutionalists see them as seriously challenging the nation state as the main actor in international relations (Keohane and Nye, 1989; Czempiel, 1999). Accordingly, these new actors have ceased to be considered merely as dependent variables of international relations. There is growing recognition that they are well able to influence international relations as an independent variable.

Think tanks are part of this new set of transnational actors. They have been a well-known phenomenon in the United States for a long time, but it was only in the 1980s that they began to mushroom in Asia. Their rise went hand in hand with the period of unprecedented rapid economic growth in East and Southeast Asia prior to the Asian Crisis. In many instances, the emergence of Asian think tanks was a product of modernization under the auspices of authoritarianism, an admission by military and civilian rulers alike that they had lost the capacity of handling the growing complexities of newly industrializing societies. It was a conservative and minimalist way of power sharing to preserve the economic miracle and, by coincidence, their legitimacy through the professionalization of government operations. Such think tanks were considered conservative and minimalist, since they delegated some advisory and recommendatory authority to a small group of persons whose only resource was technical and scientific knowledge in a specific and narrowly defined policy sector. These technocrats could hardly challenge authoritarian rule because they lacked a constituency of their own. Moreover, many of them with a decidedly elitist outlook firmly believed that popular participation in political decision making was at variance with technical rationality and therefore had to be curtailed.

Think tanks proliferated in two policy sectors: the economic sphere and the field of security. Both sectors, however, were closely interconnected. Economic growth - endowing East and Southeast Asia's authoritarian regimes with the 'legitimacy of results' (Simon Tay)¹ - was strongly dependent on a favourable international environment in which tension and armed conflicts were to be minimized, or better still, completely eradicated. Development

* The article will be published in the autumn 2002 issue of ASIEN.
was seen as the best remedy against communist insurgencies, which at the time were viewed as the most serious internal security threat. External and domestic stability were thus regarded as major prerequisites for the attraction of foreign investment on which the East and Southeast Asian growth model hinged.

The close relationship between economic growth and security called for a specific concept of security: a concept of cooperative and comprehensive security. Cooperative, because peace and an economically favourable international climate depend on congenial neighbours and, hence, on joint efforts to address sources of interstate conflict. Comprehensive, because economic growth was obviously interlinked with a great variety of social, cultural and environmental ‘issue-areas’ which were basically regarded as domestic risks. As a result, the need for a regionally coordinated security policy became a major catalyst for the networking of think tanks on a regional scale. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, academics from the leading Southeast Asian think tanks had evolved into epistemic communities, defined by Peter M. Haas as ‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (1992:1).

In the process, this academic community became the backstop for an emerging track-two diplomacy which gained increasing influence on policy making both in the economic and in the security domain. The latter was designed by security thinkers in the region as an approach to discuss, analyse and minimize the manifold security risks of the post-bipolar era in the Asia-Pacific region. Whereas official government diplomacy has become known as track one, track two brings together think tank experts, diplomats, military officers and politicians – the latter three in an unofficial capacity. Track two is accorded the task of focusing on issues too sensitive for official negotiations, which, as a consequence, are bracketed by track one. The non-official, informal and, to a certain extent, confidential format of these meetings gives participants ample opportunity to discuss issues frankly and free from fears that any party would be embarrassed in the process (Wanandi, 1995). Issues are discussed until a solution takes shape. At this point the issue is swiftly transferred back to track one for final resolution (Rüland, 1995; Johnston, 1999:301). The Asian version of track-two diplomacy thus deviates from North American and European connotations of the concept. The latter regard track-two processes as only one among many tracks in a so-called multi-track diplomacy which relies much more than the Asian format on the mediatory roles of NGOs and other elements of civil society (Notter and McDonald, 1996).

**The Rise of Track Two in Asia Pacific**

Track-two processes in Asia first developed in the field of economic cooperation under the auspices of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). Founded in 1980, the PECC evolved into an international network of scholars, officials and business representatives, and is widely acclaimed as the precursor of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

Security-related track-two processes in Asia were spearheaded by the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). Building on contacts among individual scholars and their institutions, ASEAN-ISIS was officially launched in 1994.
The main objective of ASEAN-ISIS, which is registered with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat as an NGO, is to strengthen cooperation in the field of research on strategic and international problems. ASEAN-ISIS also organizes the prestigious annual Asia-Pacific Roundtable, which in the past was attended by more than 300 policy makers, business leaders and academics (Ball, 1993b:42).  

ASEAN-ISIS soon became a key player in the establishment of a wider Asia-Pacific network known as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). CSCAP was organized ‘for the purpose of providing a structured process for regional confidence building and security cooperation among countries and territories in the Asia Pacific region’ (CSCAP, 1993:9). Established in 1993, the founding members, apart from ASEAN-ISIS, were the Strategic and Defense Studies Center (SDSC) at the Australian National University, the University of Toronto-York Joint Center for Asia Pacific Studies in Canada, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), the Seoul Forum for International Affairs and the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the United States. CSCAP formed four working groups which undertake studies in the areas of Maritime Cooperation, Security Cooperation in the North Pacific/Northeast Asia, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security, as well as Confidence and Security-Building Measures. In the meantime CSCAP has expanded to 20 member committees.  

A third major track two process was launched in the immediate aftermath of the first summit of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), held in Bangkok in March 1996. Formed in June 1996 by 12 European and Asian institutes, the main purpose of the Council of Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC) is ‘to encourage and facilitate greater cooperation among Asian and European intellectuals and policy specialists in order to enhance discussions about the future direction of Asia-Europe relations’. Subsequently, CAEC task forces studied the functional and institutional contributions to global governance of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) or discussed more specifically security-related topics. 

Apart from these major track-two dialogues, a plethora of other frequently overlapping track-two meetings emerged. Some of them, such as the meetings in

---

2 The four founding institutes were the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia; the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; the Singapore Institute for International Affairs (SIIA); and the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand. These were complemented by an individual scholar from the Philippines who later became the director of the Institute of Security and Development Studies (ISDS). The Institute for International Relations (IIIA), Vietnam and the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) joined in 1995 and 1997, respectively. See Kao, 2000:135.

3 For a critical assessment of the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, see Dickens, 2000.

4 A fifth working group on Transnational Crime was added in 1996. See CSCAP Homepage (http://www.cscap.org).

5 Member committees have been set up by Australia, Cambodia, Canada, the European CSCAP, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, China, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, United States and Vietnam. See CSCAP Homepage, (http://www.cscap.org).

6 These are: the Centre for Pacific Asia Studies, Stockholm University; the French Institute of International Relations, Paris; the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Berlin; the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; the Italian Institute of International Affairs, Rome; the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta; the Ilmin International Relations Institute, Seoul; the Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing; the Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo; the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; the Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore; and the School of Pacific-Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. The Australian membership is surprising as Australia, despite expressing great interest, is not a member of ASEM.

7 See Japan Center for International Exchange, n.d.
Venice (1995) and Manila (1996) were partly funded and organized by the European Union, others by governments or foundations, such as Germany's major political foundations, the Herbert Quandt Foundation in Munich, the Asia Foundation and, with increasing frequency, the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). Other frequent organizers were the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore, the Chulalongkorn University European Studies Program (CUESP) in Bangkok, the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) in Brussels, the Foundation for Science and Policy in Berlin (previously Ebenhausen), the APEC Study Centres set up by in the Pacific Rim countries and prestigious British conference organizers Wilton Park and Ditchley, to name a few. As a result, by the mid-1990s, track-two meetings had virtually evolved into a growth industry in the region.

**Track Two and Crisis Prevention**

After having briefly sketched the genesis and the key actors of the track-two processes in the Asia-Pacific region and between Asia and Europe, this section seeks to assess the performance of track two in terms of crisis prevention. All in all, pre-empting the answer, security-related track-two processes represent an innovative response to the region's security problems and, at the same time, help shape an Asian security identity. However, while track-two processes had their merits, they did not match the high, sometimes exaggerated expectations placed on them, although they did better than the economic track two. A few examples may illustrate this.

One of the avowed objectives of security-related track-two processes in the Asia-Pacific region is the prevention of armed, interstate conflict through reducing uncertainties and threat perceptions. Paramount among these uncertainties which helped to generate track two was the transition from the old bipolar to a new, still unknown world (dis)order. The most salient of the sources of post-cold war uncertainty was the reduction of the American military presence in Asia which, many feared, would create a power vacuum in the region. This was seen as facilitating the rise of new regional powers with suspected hegemonic ambitions such as China, India and Japan. Many states in the region responded to these developments by deftly increasing defence spending, thereby creating the spectre of an arms race.

Viewed against this background, the ASEAN-ISIS track-two dialogue must be credited for keeping the region's emerging security dilemma manageable. ASEAN-ISIS has successfully lobbied Southeast Asian and other governments in Asia Pacific to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which may be regarded as a Southeast Asian 'Magna Carta' for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Although the proposal to create a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) dates back to the mid-1980s, and hence cannot in the first place be attributed to track-two dialogue, ASEAN-ISIS persistently pushed for its realization. In 1995, ASEAN's Fifth Summit, held in Bangkok, finally launched the SEANWFZ to which all ten Southeast Asian nations acceded. Unfortunately, however, track two

---

8 Such a conclusion may be drawn from assessments such as Desmond Ball's. He argues that 'the importance of the track-two process to the new CSBM activity is distinctively Asian' (see Ball, 1994:173).

9 For details, see Hänggi, 1992.
was unable to convince the five officially recognized nuclear powers to sign a protocol of accession.

Equally important, ASEAN-ISIS was also instrumental in the launch of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which now constitutes the framework for a fledgling multilateral security architecture where previously there had only been bilateral alliances. A memorandum prepared by ASEAN-ISIS in 1991 for the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore (1992) called for the establishment of an Asia-Pacific Political Dialogue which, supported by similar initiatives from Canada and Japan, was adopted by ASEAN leaders and paved the way for a decision made at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Singapore in 1993 to establish the ARF (Ball, 1993b:41; Kerr, 1994:402). The first ARF meeting was held as part of the annual AMM Post-ministerial Conferences (PMC) in Bangkok in 1994. Since then, the ARF has met regularly every year after the AMM. The Forum was further strengthened by the creation of an intersessional Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) which was entrusted with preparing and implementing decisions of the ARF (Ball, 1993b:41; Kerr, 1994:397; Nesadurai and Stone, 2000a:26). CSCAP, for its part, was paving the way for engaging seclusive North Korea which first participated in CSCAP's North Pacific/Northeast Asia Working Group before becoming a member of the ARF in 2000.

Although the ARF proposal replaced earlier Canadian and Australian initiatives for the establishment of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), a security regime to be patterned after the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Uhe, 1996), ARF nevertheless adopted key components of the European security regime. Among them were confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy and moves to establish an Asian arms register. In the process, Defence White Books were published by a number of countries, military manoeuvres announced in advance and intentions declared to contribute to the arms register. Yet, while these moves enhanced to some extent the transparency of military strategies and defence policies, many of them had a placebo effect at best. The White Books, for instance, were of limited value as for the most part they were little more than statements of well-known facts and figures. In most cases - though China is usually singled out in this respect - they did not provide any deeper insights into the country's arms modernization and defence expenditures, which remained anyone's guess, even well-informed defence analysts. Moreover, Asian track-two dialogues did little to address the enormous rise in the region's defence spending. Military acquisitions - even of a power projecting and, hence, offensive quality - were usually downplayed to mere acts of defence modernization. Dangers that the purchases of military hardware could escalate into an arms race were in most cases flatly denied. Unlike in Europe, few voices lobbying for disarmament were heard from inside the track-two dialogues.

In other areas, too, track two failed to substantially reduce uncertainties. The fact that Asian governments distanced themselves from proposals for a CSCA, may, in the first place, be attributed to the pivotal role democracy and human rights played in Basket One of the Helsinki Declaration (von Bredow, 1991:58), which was widely - not only in Asia - interpreted as a factor facilitating the implosion of the socialist bloc. Adopting such norms was seen as seriously undermining national

10 Proposed were bilateral military exercises, exchange visits and training programmes of military officers, exchange of intelligence information and the notification of forthcoming military exercises.
sovereignty, thereby subjecting Asian countries to interference in their internal affairs. Moreover, these norms were at variance with ‘the Asian Way’ - a relativist and essentialist response to Western conditionality. It may be noted here only incidentally that ASEAN-ISIS has been a prime mover behind these exercises of identity building. Cooperative security as propagated by the region’s track-two dialogues may thus be characterized as the CSCE’s tool kit minus the normative substance.

While it was undeniable that ASEAN-ISIS gained tangible influence over ASEAN governments - perhaps most adequately represented by the fact that since 1993 ASEAN-ISIS delegations have annually met with ASEAN’s senior officials prior to the AMM - its impact on the region’s other lingering problems was less clear. Although ASEAN-ISIS has consistently discussed the conflicting maritime claims in the potentially resource-rich South China Sea, in more than a decade it has not brought the issue closer to a solution. Neither has CSCAP. Yet, members of both networks support - and, in fact, are involved in - a series of informal ‘Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea’ organized by the Indonesian government and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which in more than ten meetings has discussed a wide range of maritime topics, but has conspicuously avoided the key political and jurisdictional issues. Although early workshop resolutions may be regarded as a precursor to ASEAN’s ‘Declaration of the South China Sea’ (1992) (Busse, 2000:175), neither the workshops, nor ASEAN-ISIS, nor CSCAP initiatives have so far succeeded in extracting from China (and, by coincidence, ASEAN members as well) an unambiguous commitment to the acceptance of a ‘Code of Conduct’. Consequently, the ongoing talks at various levels notwithstanding, claimants have not abstained from unilateral actions which raise tensions in the region.\footnote{For a more optimistic assessment of the norm-building effects of ARF and the South China Sea workshops see Busse, 2000:172-180.}

Viewed through the lens of a European observer it must appear that the strengths of Asia’s track-two dialogues undoubtedly lie in the area of preventing and defusing interstate conflicts. Yet, it is a well-known fact that armed interstate conflicts have been declining in frequency. Instead, the post-World War II period has seen the rise of violent domestic conflict.\footnote{Asian security experts did not seem to concur with this assessment. An ASEAN-ISIS memorandum, for instance, states that internal disturbances have dramatically declined if not definitely arrested. The main security challenge consists of defence of their (ASEAN countries, J.R.) territories, including their exclusive economic zones (EEZs). See ASEAN-ISIS, 1993:9.} Much of this conflict has its roots in ethnic, religious and linguistic grievances. The 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have tragically but unequivocally highlighted another, though not entirely new, danger - the threats emanating from transnationally organized terrorism. While Asia - in consonance with the rest of the world - has virtually been unprepared to deal with the latter threat, Asian track-two dialogues also did little to address the region’s internal rebellions and thereby may have, at least to some extent, unwittingly helped to compound the latter problem. Addressing the numerous insurgencies in ASEAN member countries has been an anathema for track-two dialogues as well as they have adopted the track-one mantra that these conflicts constitute internal affairs and their discussion would be a violation of ASEAN’s sacred principle of non-interference. NGO conferences on East Timor, organized in Manila, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur in the second half of the 1990s, were obstructed by the
governments of the host countries at Indonesia's insistence. Participants were harassed by security forces and in one case even by mobilized mobs. It is thus hardly surprising that ASEAN as a regional organization was unable to formulate a collective response to the East Timor crisis unfolding in 1999. ASEAN’s silence – which must basically be attributed to its unresolved debate over the non-interference principle - left the leadership of the intervening international force to Australia, a problematic choice if taking into account the sensitive love-hate relationship between Indonesia and Australia. The laudable participation of large Philippine and Thai INTERFET (International Force in East Timor) and UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor) contingents mitigated, but could not repair the damage done to the reputation of ASEAN as a regional peace broker.

In line with their comprehensive security concept, ASEAN-ISIS, the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, as well as CSCAP have been busily addressing so-called non-conventional security threats. Annual seminars on human rights and occasional conferences on democratization, international migration, environmental problems, disaster relief, transnational crime and social security are among the topics discussed. This shows that the close interrelationship between these ‘issue-areas’ on the one hand, and security and economic development on the other hand, has been recognized by the policy communities of Asia Pacific. In the ASEAN case, this has facilitated in good functionalist tradition the establishment of functional cooperation. Yet, while track-two dialogues may have enhanced consciousness for these problems, generated new ideas and served as agenda-setters, they have had little impact on crisis prevention.

Although individual ASEAN members such as the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia have set up human rights commissions, there is – frequent calls for it notwithstanding – no such body at the ASEAN level. Track-two concerns over Burma’s accession to ASEAN were ignored by policy makers, as was the ASEAN-ISIS memorandum on the Cambodian coup in 1997. Similarly, track-two dialogues could neither prevent the repeated disastrous forest fires in Indonesia and the resultant smoke haze which choked many parts of the region, nor were they able to delineate workable strategies to decisively combat the problem. ASEAN’s functional cooperation – though elevated to a priority in 1995 – has never received the same attention as ‘high politics’ and economic issues. Moreover, many of ASEAN’s modest activities in this area are overly dependent on external funding.

Economic development has likewise been a persistent topic of Asian track-two dialogues which could draw from earlier dialogue networks such as the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) and the PECC (Ball, 1994:169). It would certainly be unfair to blame participants for failing to predict the collapse of several Asian currencies in 1997 and the subsequent Asian economic crisis. Virtually nobody did, calling into question the prognostic capacities of social scientists and economists. Perhaps the only exception was American economist Paul Krugman, although his famous Foreign Affairs article, forecasting the slowing down of...
of Asia’s economic growth, rested on arguments different from those causing the collapse. Yet, while Krugman – as he himself would maintain – was 10 per cent right, think tank economists in the Asia-Pacific region (and, of course, elsewhere too) were 150 per cent wrong.\(^{16}\) The great majority of them were unable or unwilling to read the signs, such as high current account deficits, mounting foreign debt and a sluggish export performance. Educated in the United States, many of them were – and still are – unperturbed adherents of a neo-liberal growth model, which they saw thriving on the economic virtues of the Asian value hypothesis. As the Asian value hypothesis was a deliberate attempt to construct a distinct Southeast and East Asian regional identity, few Asian scholars were prepared to admit publicly the contradictions between an intransparent (because highly personalized) patronage-driven political culture and the neo-liberal agenda which needs a certain degree of predictability, good governance and rule of law. Critical voices refusing to consent with the all-too-familiar euphemisms portraying corruption and nepotism as personalism, pragmatism and flexibility, and warning of the widening social disparities and regional imbalances, were branded as mavericks rocking the boat. When the crisis finally struck, it became very obvious that Asia’s think tanks and track-two dialogues had failed to develop contingency plans to deal with a major recession. This is surprising as some Southeast Asian countries had already gone through a short, yet painful recession in the mid-1980s. Evidence for this was the fact that in the ASEAN track-two dialogues as well as in the ASEAN ministerial rounds, monetary issues had played an absolutely subordinate role. The hubris displayed by some public figures during the boom years and the firm belief that the twenty-first century would be the Pacific Century and see ‘Asia’s rise to the sun’ (Mahbubani, 1993) left virtually no room for the discussion of more austere scenarios.\(^{17}\) Political decision makers as well as epistemic communities thus ignored the well-known aphorism of ancient Chinese strategic thinker Sun Tzu: ‘To rely on rushed decent and not prepare is the greatest of crimes, to be prepared beforehand for any contingency is the greatest of virtues’.\(^{18}\)

The Asian-European policy networks, which, beyond a somewhat bumpy political dialogue, also chiefly centred on economic relations, likewise did little to prevent the crisis. One may even argue that the Asian-European dialogue accelerated the unfolding of the crisis. It induced European banks and other investors, who, as latecomers, felt they were losing out in the race for a foothold in the world’s most economically dynamic region, to indiscriminately step up investments. The race to Asia’s markets resulted in less than prudent investment decisions as investors teamed up with dubious partners and channelled large amounts of money into intransparent projects. On the eve of the crisis, European banks were much more exposed to non-performing loans than their competitors from North America and even Japan. As a result, when the crisis struck, panicking European bankers feverishly struggled to pull out their investments from the region, thereby only exacerbating the downward spiral. CAEC, as most think tanks and track-two networks, also responded belatedly to the crisis. A steering committee meeting in November 1997 decided to set up a task force on the ‘Changes in the Global Financial System’

\(^{16}\) Quoted from Rüdiger Machetzki’s lecture at the conference ‘Asien: Zum Wandel verdammt – Wege aus der Krise’, organized by the German Society of Asian Studies, The Institute of Asian Affairs Hamburg, on 20 November 1998 in Bonn.

\(^{17}\) For a more positive evaluation of Asian multilateralism to crisis management, see Harris, 2000.

\(^{18}\) Quoted from Ball, 1994:173.
The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia

half a year after the crisis erupted. Moreover, none of CAEC’s task forces addressed the social security issue. This is surprising, since the crisis has tragically exposed the lack of social security networks in Asia. ASEM in cooperation with the World Bank has set up a trust fund to study social security systems and Europe has considerable expertise to offer in this domain.

Conclusion

Summing up, there is no doubt that track-two dialogues have enhanced the consciousness of decision makers and the wider public of a broad range of policy issues in the region which, if left unattended, would have the capacity to evolve into serious crises. But there is also no doubt that, except for the area of ‘high politics’, track-two dialogues did not meet high expectations that they would be a mechanism towards crisis prevention. They have not effected paradigmatic changes in the region’s strategic thinking, and their role as ‘propellers of policy learning’ (Nesadurai and Stone, 2000b:183) must be seen in proper perspective. In fact, track-two dialogues are no panacea where track one has failed. Much depends on the framework within which they operate. In this regard, several constraints must be discussed.

Undeniably, most track-two participants were renowned experts in their domain. However, taking into account the authoritarian origins of think tanks and track-two meetings, the issue of autonomy inevitably emerges (Kraft, 2000). Most think-tank scholars and other track-two participants, even though attending in an unofficial capacity, are closely affiliated with their governments. While this does not necessarily mean there is ‘self-censorship’ as maintained by Pauline Kerr (1994:400), it is nevertheless true that there are limits to the scope of experimentation with reformist ideas. Yet, it should not be overlooked that in the aftermath of the Asian crisis and the concomitant intensification of democratization in some ASEAN countries, track-two dialogues have also developed a more open, more pluralist and more discursive format.

This proximity to government circles may explain why track-two dialogues are still identified with a conservative, essentially state-centric approach to security (Kraft, 2000). The cooperative security rhetoric of the dialogues, which seem to pave the way for institutionalist policies such as preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures, are frequently exposed as a thin veneer over deeply entrenched realist thinking. As a result, eminent realist concepts such as ‘balancing’ and ‘power’ still permeate track-two dialogues (Cheeseman, 1999:335). In classical realist tradition, military power is still viewed by many as the resource most able to influence the outcome in other ‘issue-areas’ as well. Institutionalist policies are further inhibited by the norms of ‘the ASEAN Way’, which eschews institution-building and favours relationship building (Ba, 1997). The primacy of sovereign statehood tallies well with an intergovernmental concept of cooperation and ‘à la carte multilateralism’ targeting the enhancement of national power. More advanced concepts of sovereignty pooling and supranational cooperation, however, have been an anathema to this discourse (Rüland, 2000). Accordingly, track-two

19 For this term, see Goody, 2001:40.
20 This, at least, is the substance of concepts such as national and regional resilience.
Discourses have been unable to prevent governments from resorting to unilateralist moves whenever such exit-behaviour seemed to pay off for them. This failure became most evident during the Asian crisis when ASEAN, as a regional organization, did not even attempt to formulate a common position vis-à-vis the International Monetary Fund in the negotiations over the bail-out packages. Disunity in times of crisis sets a bad precedent for future cooperation. Even though persistently denied by high-ranking ASEAN spokesmen, there is no question that since then the grouping has been in serious disarray.

The strong involvement of government officials is not only making a fiction out of the non-official nature of track-two dialogues, it is also creating new orthodoxies to which bureaucracies tenaciously cling. Based on my own observations, diplomats are particularly cautious and averse to bold brainstorming, even if operating under the protection of Chatham House rules. Discussions are thus rarely the frank discourse which organizers advertise them to be. There is still the tendency – well known from track one – to avoid controversial exchanges of opinion, to resort to euphemisms, to indulge in self-congratulatory rhetoric and to sweep problems under the carpet. This holds true for Asian and European diplomats alike. Consequently, as a rule of thumb, it may take two to three years to convince them that ossified, often essentialist formulas, maintained for the sake of political correctness, need to be adjusted to changing political realities.

Track-two dialogues in Asia Pacific have also been rightly and repeatedly criticized for failing to incorporate the NGO community and other representatives of civil society (Kerr, 1994:399). Although the problem has been acknowledged and is being tackled with the establishment of the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), track-two dialogues by and large have not been able to serve as a bridge between the authorities and the activist NGO networks known as track three. Neither have track-two meetings been able to bridge the generational gap. Participant observation in Asian-European track-two meetings suggests that younger ASEAN scholars take a more critical view of the orthodoxies of ASEAN cooperation and are less inclined to be remote-controlled by their governments. Track-two meetings are noted for the great regularity with which certain people are invited to different meetings while others are excluded, writes Herman Joseph Kraft, calling track two an ‘exclusivist club’ (2000:349). His criticism not only reflects a lack of inclusiveness but also a lack of diversification of think tanks in the region. While in the West think tanks specialize along sectoral lines as a response to the growing complexity of policy matters, in Southeast Asia ASEAN-ISIS dominates most themes. The contribution made by the recycling of conventional wisdom to the enhancement of knowledge is limited.

These deficiencies, however, must be weighed against the continuity provided by ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP. Their member institutes are a stabilizing factor, especially in countries with a clientelist political culture such as the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, South Korea. While governments come and go, usually reshuffling the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, ASEAN-ISIS remains in place serving as a ‘institutional memory’ (Kerr, 1994:399), providing badly needed expertise to the novices in the cabinet and the bureaucracy.

21 See also Dosch, 1997:95.
While there is ample room for discussing reforms of track two based on the foregoing analysis, the crux of the matter is the political will of governments to adopt the advice provided by the policy community. Yet, given a foreign policy establishment that is still exposed to the strong influence of the military in many Asian countries, and a historically and culturally deeply entrenched distrust toward the outside world, it must be suspected that think tanks and track-two processes in Asia Pacific will fight an up-hill battle towards a truly cooperative security concept for a long time to come.

References


Nesadurai, H. and Stone, D. 2000a. 'Southeast Asian Think Tanks in Regional and Global Networking', Panorama, 1.


The Role and History of Track-two Institutions in Asia


The Cambodian Experience
Norodom Sirivudh

I wish to take this opportunity to express my most sincere appreciation to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for inviting me to participate in this very important security dialogue conference. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been a very close partner of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), of which I am the Chairman of the Board of Directors, since its inception in 1994.

As a leading track-two think tank in Cambodia, the CICP's role is very similar to many other track-two institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, the only exceptions perhaps being the approach, style, level of engagement and complexity of issues facing each society. Nevertheless, I want to share the Cambodian experience with regard to the role of a policy-oriented institute in engaging policy dialogue on a number of critical issues at the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels, in particular the security dialogue. Indeed, the close cooperation of the CICP with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has made it a leading think tank on security and foreign policy issues in the country. At the same time, over the years, the CICP has joined well-established networks of friends and partners with which it has regular contacts, dialogues and consultations through strategic track-two frameworks, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Through these strategic networks, the CICP has reached out beyond Cambodia's borders and has engaged other like-minded institutions on strategic issues such as peace, security and development. Besides working on national issues of great importance, the CICP has engaged in regional and international issues affecting Cambodia's vital interests. In addition, in terms of crisis prevention, I believe the CICP has played an instrumental role in a number of areas, as outlined below.

(1) Confidence and Trust Building

At the national level, the role of track-two institutions, such as the CICP, is important for the promotion of confidence-building measures (CBMs) as well as enhancing trust among key political leaders across political parties, where suspicions and misunderstandings have been the order of the day. A newly established institution would often be quickly labelled one way or the other. The approach here is to get key political actors to engage in a policy dialogue with the opportunity to exchange views and perspectives on issues of mutual interest.

The critical factor is to initiate a constructive policy dialogue in which parties would begin to interact with one another and to build trust in the process of interaction. At the regional level, informal diplomacy or track-two consultation is a very useful, important process in which officials, semi-officials and track-two people engage in a consultative process and open discussion on vital issues of shared interest. The process could certainly be expanded to the international level. In essence, the promotion of CBMs is essential to the
building of an environment conducive to political dialogue and engagement. Over the years, the CICP has been active in the promotion of CBMs in the country and between Cambodia and other countries. This is important for crisis prevention and a critical factor for conflict management.

(2) Contribution to the Change of Mindsets or Building a Broader View

Another important contribution of the track-two institution is the promotion of a change of mindset among policy makers and the public at large, especially through intellectual debate and active discussion, where the logic of reason and the art of persuasion prevail. Policy makers from countries which have been isolated from the world for sometime, such as Cambodia, need to be actively engaged in order to change their mindsets and their views of the region and the world. Changing mindsets could be considered one of the most critical contributions of the work and activities of track-two organizations. For example, the CICP has been working for some years to change the mindsets of some key people so they can better understand the region and the world around us. Key policy makers at various levels need to have longer and broader views and perspectives in order to understand the policy options that they have. Given the current process of globalization and growing interdependence, leaders and intellectuals need to have a broader view of regional and global perspectives. The change of mindsets could contribute to growing tolerance, mutual understanding and improved relations. In this context, the change of mindsets could contribute to crisis prevention and conflict settlement.

(3) Promotion of an Integrationist Policy as an End to Isolationist Policy

Another important contribution of policy research institutes such as the CICP is to actively promote the integration process, in particular Cambodia’s integration into the region and the world. The CICP undertook enormous work in preparation for Cambodia’s membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as Cambodia’s engagement with the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Cambodia’s membership in these regional organizations helped end the country’s decades of isolation and made it a ‘normal’ member of the community of nations. At the same time, Cambodia’s integration into ASEAN contributed to positive regional political reconciliation, which enhanced regional peace, security and stability. In this respect, the track-two institution has a pivotal role to play in shaping the policy formulation process and the thinking of leaders in the way countries make their own decisions.

(4) Promotion of Active Policy Debate and Consultation

One of the most important activities which most think tanks are involved in is the promotion of active policy debate and consultation as a way of brainstorming ideas and proposing possible scenarios for policy makers to deliberate. In this context, the
intellectual input or the contribution of innovative ideas by track-two institutions are absolutely essential. The policy formulation process in Third World countries becomes even more relevant and important, and I would argue that it does not work in an intellectual or track-two vacuum. Most leading think tanks would have to become more involved in the policy debate and policy formation process in order to ensure the best policy for the country, especially in the area of crisis prevention.

(5) Promotion of Constructive Partnership between Track-two Institutions and the Government

However, in order to ensure that track-two institutions become more effective and relevant to policy implementation, they have to engage in building constructive partnerships between themselves and the government or government institutions. Acknowledging that this is a two-way process, track-two institutions need some degree of credibility and legitimacy to take a lead role. In this respect, I would argue that think tanks should strengthen their relations with the government in order to proactively play a substantial role in crisis prevention.

Present and Future Roles of Track-two Institutions

Having raised the above issues, I wish to focus on the Cambodian experience. For the immediate future, there are key issues which have an impact on Cambodia as well as regional and international repercussions. These issues include the effects of globalization and non-traditional security issues or transnational issues such as the environment, trafficking of drugs and humans, illegal migration and small arms proliferation. The evolving security threats are not traditional in terms of being exclusively military, but are transnational in character. Current phenomena, such as population growth and non-sustainable development patterns, unregulated population movements and transnational crime, are particularly pertinent in the Southeast Asian region. The combination of unmitigated population growth and non-sustainable development have resulted in rapid environmental degradation with the ensuing effect of creating resource shortages that may result in increased food shortages. The ever-increasing migration of people within the countries of Southeast Asia has put added strain on governments, challenging national labour market policies and governmental social services, and may provoke cultural and ethnic tensions. Another aspect of Cambodia’s demographics that has to be considered is the estimated population growth of 50 per cent in the next ten years, challenging the structure and all sectors of Cambodian society. The complexity of these human security issues within a rapidly changing and technology-dominated age may be further aggravated by the lack of experience and the inability of governments and countries to deal with them. Countries such as Cambodia are just re-emerging on the regional and international platform. Under
the prevailing circumstances, the possibility of failing to devise solutions or policy options and apply appropriate measures to address those adequately is high.

In light of the challenges mentioned above, Cambodian think tanks or the track-two community have to be much more involved in shaping politics and policies. Given the daunting tasks ahead, the question arises whether track-two institutions have sufficient capacity to address the multitude of complex issues with which the country is confronted. There is no doubt that today's global challenges and national trends put more pressure not only on think tanks but also on civil society organizations as a whole. Cambodian track-two institutions have limited staff, skills, resources and funds to carry out necessary research projects. In order to be more effective and more dynamic, Cambodian think tanks will have to strengthen their research capacity as well as expand their resource base.

Track-two institutions need to cover more ground and more sectors, including crisis prevention. There is a trend for think tanks to increasingly team up to work in collaboration on research projects, pool together available experts and resources and concentrate on policy issues. Government leaders suggest informally or request directly policy studies in certain fields of policy where more input is needed. Similarly, at times, government officials comment positively on the role and the work of track-two institutions in Cambodia and provide feedback on the studies or strategies of institutes. For example, the CICP has received a number of comments concerning its work in the past seven years. Some suggest that the CICP should consider inviting more government officials to its meetings. Others suggest that the CICP should work more closely with government institutions. In fact, the CICP appreciates suggestions and feedback from government ministries, public institutions and other organizations helping to improve the quality of its activities, its research agenda, and in meeting the ever-changing needs of society. In this context, the CICP strives to remain a relevant institution taking up the challenges of the day. The need to balance the political interests of all groups within society is one of the most critical challenges Cambodian think tanks are currently facing. Otherwise, they risk losing public trust and confidence.

Conclusion

It is evident that the role of think tanks in Cambodia is vital, making government leaders and law makers, the private sector and the general public cognizant of all aspects and pertinent issues affecting them, in particular the impact of globalization, regionalism and human security. Policy analysis and vigorous debate remain the cornerstone on which policy-oriented institutions like the CICP carry out their mandate. Cambodian think tanks and civil society institutions strive to build human resource capacity through training and workshops, contributing to national institutional development and, in particular, to crisis prevention. Disseminating information through the distribution of think tank publications, using the ‘information highway’ and hosting lectures and conferences ensures that information gleaned by research institutes as well as their policy recommendations, are made accessible to a wide audience. In undertaking these challenging tasks, track-two institutions assist in creating a constructive and non-confrontational process for rehabilitation and the rebuilding of one of the world’s most recent democracies in the post-conflict era.
Second Panel

The ASEAN Regional Forum and European Security Interests
During the Cold War period, security in the entire Asia-Pacific region was maintained on the basis of a network of bilateral security arrangements, with the United States playing the central role. Unlike Europe, Asia Pacific had no region-wide anti-communist security alliance, mainly due to the diverse histories and cultural roots as well as the peculiar local patterns of rivalry and enmity in the region. As a result, alliances in Asia Pacific assumed the familiar 'hub and spokes' architecture whereby states largely dealt with one another on security matters through the Washington hub. However, there was little in the way of horizontal linkage among alliance partners (Foot, 1995:230).

Since the end of the Cold War, two noticeable trends have developed in security thinking, planning and policies promoting multilateralism simultaneously: regionalization of security politics and the growing importance of a cooperative approach to security. The emergence and background of these trends in the region can be explained in various ways.

First, there is a growing need to reduce political uncertainties in the post-Cold War era. Given the lack of any multilateral institutions in the region, it is observed that greater independence from the old restraints imposed by Cold War bipolarity could lead to a dangerous regional power vacuum. This, in turn, could result in extreme rivalry between potential power contenders for regional military predominance. They may seek more independent security postures and incur greater defence expenditure, perhaps based on an assumption that alliance affiliation with extra-regional powers may diminish unless such alliances can be adapted to suit the changing local security situation.

Indeed, the two regional rivalries in East Asia – namely, China and Japan – appear to have been engaged in accelerating military arms proliferation over the past few years, and this acceleration of regional arms build-up is made more worrisome by the absence of any multilateral security arrangements. Reasons for the military arms build-up in the region no longer stem from ideological conflicts but rather from growing concerns with strategic uncertainty and differing national interests, that is, the urge to protect or expand a sphere of influence and the fear of losing it. In order to avoid or extinguish the risk of this type

---

1 There are two senses in which the terms 'multilateral' and 'multilateralism' can be applied to state behaviour. It is important to differentiate between them. The first is as a nominal, or quantitative, descriptor; that is, the term 'multilateral' used as an adjective to refer to instances of coordinating national policies or behaviours by groups of three or more states. The term 'multilateralism', on the other hand, has come to be used to distinguish the character or qualities of the behaviour of coordination among states. In this qualitative sense, multilateralism is a form of state practice that accords with certain principles and that involves the development of norms, collective identities and institutions (formal and informal) concerning cooperation and conflict management over extended periods of time. For more details on the concept, see Job, 1997:165-191 and Ruggie, 1993:3-47.
of arms race in the region, it is argued that the need for multilateral security dialogues and consultations can no longer be neglected and that the time has come to craft some sort of multilateral security framework as a measure to enhance confidence, dissipate possible tensions and reduce political uncertainties.

Second, another major reason for the emergence of multilateralism or a multilateral approach to security is the need to meet the broadening concept of security itself and the related growing awareness of the non-conventional threats to security in the region. Today, states in East Asia tend to articulate security in broad terms and the phrase ‘comprehensive security’, first coined by Japan in 1980, is now gaining currency in most other states in the region (Alagappa, 1998:624). In the entire Asia-Pacific region, military security has not vanished as a key element of regional security. However, the concept of regional security has expanded to include economic and environmental security, as opposed to being merely the underpinning of traditional security concerns.

Security concerns now include such things as environmental problems (the pollution of the atmosphere and the oceans, nuclear waste dumping and the dangers of climatic change), various forms of transnational criminal activity (terrorism, drug trafficking and piracy), as well as the uncontrolled movement of people across national frontiers, civil war, poverty, political repression and natural disasters. These issues do not involve direct military deployments, but they may give rise to the threat or use of force.

Governments cannot solve these problems through unilateral means. Moreover, the prevailing bilateral relations in the region are not sufficient to solve such problems. They have the potential to be fully prevented or resolved with effective international cooperation among nations. In this context, meeting the unconventional threats to security in the post-Cold War era requires institutional innovations and an emphasis on a multilateral approach in the region (Harding, 1994:439).

Third, interest in regional security arrangements has also been stimulated by economic regionalism in East Asia. Generally speaking, economic regionalism is believed to enhance self-confidence and encourage greater self-reliance in matters of security. Over the past few decades, the economies of the entire Asia-Pacific region, through active regional cooperation, have grown more rapidly for a longer period of time than any other economies in world history. As a result, the Asia-Pacific region, including East Asia, has become the main source of dynamism in international trade and the largest source of surplus savings for international investment, although this has recently been somewhat weakened.

Recognizing this, there is a need for multilateral dialogue and cooperation in order to maintain regional stability and facilitate the economic development of the region. The preservation of such economic cooperation in East Asia has become the basis for countries in the region to promote and to strengthen cooperative and political relationships.

Finally, the new set of conditions generated by the end of the Cold War – the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the lifting of the common threat – and the advantages of a multilateral security dialogue, gleaned from the European experience, have raised the need for a multilateral approach in East Asia. With the end of the Cold War, the immense ideological barrier that for decades gave rise to distrust and hostility among states has collapsed. The implications of this new situation are that all regional states in East Asia are able to cooperate with each other,
promoting peace and security in ways that were impossible during the Cold War.

There are many advantages for each of the major powers in East Asia in becoming a part of the multilateral security dialogue. For instance, the United States would profit from the institutionalization of the American presence in the region, since at the present it has neither the resources nor the political will to become involved in security problems in all areas of the region. It is not necessary to postulate a relative decline in American power in the region to consider this an advantage. In fact, a multilateral mechanism is not likely to be established in the absence of assertive and creative American diplomacy. The advantage lies not in postponing retreat, but rather in offering an additional method of engagement and a forum for managing a peaceful transition in East Asia (Goodby, 1992).

These are the conditions in which multilateralism or a multilateral approach to security has proliferated in the region. In particular, the current trend emphasizing comprehensive security by states is channelling the regional interest in multilateral security dialogue and cooperation to prevent conflict through confidence- and security-building measures.

However, with the onset of Asia's financial crisis in recent years, it has been argued that multilateralism in the region is almost inoperative. Thus far, the regional response to the crisis has received heavy criticism from those who believe that the regional multilateral mechanisms have done little to resolve Asia's financial vulnerabilities. Paradoxically, the Asian crisis has illustrated the need for stronger regional institutions for cooperation, while underscoring the incapacity of existing institutions to mount an adequate response to the crisis. Keeping this criticism in mind, the author would like to examine the role of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as the foremost example of the existing multilateral security mechanisms in East Asia, and explore ways to strengthen the organization in order to secure regional peace and stability.

Existing Multilateral Mechanisms in East Asia: The Case of the ARF

1. Characteristics and General Assessment of the ARF

The ARF, reflecting the abovementioned trend of multilateralism in East Asia, is a regional response to the uncertainty and potential for instability resulting from the end of the Cold War. It is a ministerial-level annual dialogue established by the member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to engage all their Asia-Pacific neighbours for the first time in a structured multilateral dialogue on broad-ranging Asian security issues. The Chairman's Statement issued at the end of the inaugural ARF meeting in Bangkok, Thailand, in July 1994, underscored the commitment of participating nations 'to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern' in order to make 'significant efforts toward confidence building and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region'.

As shown in the Chairman's Statement, the

---

The objective of the forum was to create a more predictable and stable pattern of relationships between major powers and Southeast Asia. In this conceptualization was a recognition that regional issues required the engagement of the great powers in regional affairs. The ARF introduced a new norm into the ASEAN process of cooperative security that emphasized inclusiveness through the promotion of dialogue among like-minded as well as non-like-minded states (Desker, 2001).

In the context of regional institution building, the ARF is unique. It was not created in the aftermath of war, like several European institutions that developed in the wake of World War II and in the shadow of the Cold War. It is not a treaty or alliance confined to participants from the Asia-Pacific region. It also includes the European Union as a member. In addition, the ARF deliberately sought the participation of the major powers as well as mid-sized powers such as the Republic of Korea, as well as large India which has a significant impact on regional developments. Its membership was not limited to like-minded states. Instead, the focus was on inclusiveness – bringing in participants with an interest in broader Asian issues who traditionally had been excluded from the consultative processes initiated by ASEAN in its Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) dialogues with major Western states and China. (For the structure and members of the ARF, see Table 1).

Table 1: The Structure and Members of the ARF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>July 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>ASEAN: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners: Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia, the European Union and the United States. ASEAN’s Observer: Papua New Guinea. Others: Mongolia and North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Objectives</td>
<td>• To promote confidence-building measures. • To develop preventive diplomacy. • To elaborate approaches to conflict resolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Economic cooperation is clearly the most immediate factor in forging closer cooperation between Asia and Europe. However, political-security cooperation should not be deemed unimportant. After all, the world is one and peace is indivisible, and economic globalization as well as the advancement of technology in transportation and information have brought about much closer relations between distant places and different parts of the world. This argument has been ASEAN’s justification for bringing the European Union into the ARF.
In the seven years since its inauguration, the ARF has taken an important step toward the creation of a sense of strategic community in a region where there is little history of inclusive multilateral approaches to security and defence. It has shown that it has an important role to play in encouraging regional support for international regimes against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While it is unwise to tackle all the challenges it faces at present, the ARF foresees a gradual evolution. The evolution of the ARF could take place in three stages:

1. the promotion of confidence-building measures
2. the development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms; and
3. the elaboration of approaches to conflict.

This evolutionary scheme appears to be a somehow idealistic vision of development, since the ARF is still located at stage one. It is noteworthy, however, that the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the ARF in 1997 agreed on moving towards the second stage of consideration of ‘preventive diplomacy’. It is also meaningful that the ARF members, including China and the ASEAN countries, which were sceptical of a rapid movement of the ARF to the second stage of preventive diplomacy, have agreed to consider moving to preventive diplomacy played at the official level, although this consideration will take place in the intersessional group meetings on CBMs.

In the light of these positive considerations, it is possible to highlight the achievements of the ARF (Desker, 2001).

First, the ARF is the only regional forum that discusses sensitive regional issues. It has even started to discuss sensitive domestic issues. While there has been little progress on Myanmar, a process of discussion has begun which would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

Second, the ARF has helped to build comfort levels and to create an atmosphere conducive to cooperative security in a region that has not been accustomed to cooperation on security-related questions.

Third, the ARF has facilitated the reduction of tension and the management of regional relationships. It has not resolved disputes or prevented the outbreak of conflicts but it could be used to minimize the impact of differing perceptions and interests.

Fourth, the ARF has begun the process of creating predictable and stable relationships among regional states. It has engendered an increasing awareness of regional norms among the major powers and has alerted the regional states to the changing values and perspectives arising from today’s globalized environment.

Despite its significant achievements, the ARF receives much criticism. For example, Taiwan is not permitted to participate and mainland China has insisted that ‘internal Chinese affairs’ not to be put on the agenda, effectively blocking ARF discussion of cross-strait tensions, despite their obvious broad regional implications. Members also tip-toe around many sensitive issues due to the need for consensus. For instance, it was merely noted in the ARF Chairman’s Statement of last year that ‘the Ministers exchanged views on the situation in South Asia and some expressed their continuing

---

4 The nuclear non-proliferation issue has been a subject of the ARF since the first meeting.
concern. The Ministers expressed the hope that efforts be made to bring about positive developments in the region.  

There are some illusions regarding the speed with which the ARF will move ahead. The agreement at the Second ARF Meeting to ‘move at a pace comfortable to all participants’ was aimed at tempering the desire of more Western-oriented members for immediate results in favour of the ‘evolutionary’ approach preferred by the ASEAN states, claiming the process as being as important as its eventual substantive products. The time-honoured Asian principle of ‘non-interference in one another’s internal affairs’ places some important topics essentially off limits. The Chinese have even been reluctant to address conflicting claims in the South China Sea at the ARF, insisting instead on talks with ASEAN or other claimants on an individual basis.

Meanwhile, the need for consensus ensures that the ARF will move ahead only as fast as its most cautious members desire or permit. This indicates that the evolution of the ARF from a confidence-building measures ‘talk shop’ to a true preventive diplomacy mechanism (as called for in its 1995 Concept Paper) will be a long and difficult one (Cassa, 2000).

Finally, as an initial step, the view or suggestions on specific issues agreed upon by the ARF members need to be transmitted by the ARF Chair to the countries or parties concerned. This is an opportunity to transform the ARF from a ‘talk shop’ to a genuine body of security cooperation in Asia and the Pacific.

2. Recent Development of the ARF

North Korea’s Participation in the ARF

The most notable development of the ARF in the past few years is that North Korea joined the Forum as its twenty-third member in July 2000. Since the end of the Cold War various frameworks of multilateral security cooperation and dialogue have been established in the Asia-Pacific region, but North Korea had remained internationally isolated, refusing to participate in these arrangements. In June last year, however, North Korea held a summit with the Republic of Korea and began to change its diplomatic policy dramatically by taking a range of positive steps, such as starting dialogue with the United States, Japan and some European countries. North Korea’s entry into the ARF and the changes taking place in the nation strongly impressed Asia Pacific.

All ARF member countries welcomed North Korea’s entry. The Chairman’s Statement issued at the Seventh ARF Ministerial Meeting welcomed North Korea’s participation. Additionally, referring to the inter-Korean summit of June, the statement noted with satisfaction the positive developments on the Korean Peninsula and expressed hope for further progress in inter-Korean talks, United States-North Korea talks and Japan-North Korea talks. The Chairman’s Statement of the previous year had expressed ‘concern’ over the missile launch by North Korea, saying that it ‘could heighten tensions and may have serious consequences for stability in the Korean Peninsula and the region’.

Considering that statement, it can be noted that North Korea made considerable diplomatic gains through its participation in the ARF. Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan, who chaired the meeting, welcomed North Korea’s participation,

6 See the Chairman’s Statement of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the ARF, Bangkok, 27 July 2000.
saying that it would contribute to regional peace, better understanding and a higher level of confidence in the region.

However, it remains to be seen how North Korea's presence at the ARF will affect the multilateral dialogue. In addition to promoting greater understanding, the ARF Ministerial Meeting made it possible for senior officials to meet directly - out of the ARF context such contacts would have been difficult, if not impossible, to arrange. For instance, the ARF meeting in 2000 set the stage for the first ever official meeting between the North Korean Foreign Minister and the United States Secretary of State. And, of course, the ARF meeting provided an opportunity for continued high level and direct interaction between North and South Korean officials.7

Slow Progress in Preventive Diplomacy
At the Second Ministerial Meeting in 1995, ARF members agreed to promote the development of the Forum in three broad stages, namely, the promotion of confidence-building measures, the development of preventive diplomacy and the elaboration of approaches to conflict. The ministers agreed to create an Intersessional Support Group (ISG) on confidence-building measures prior to the next meeting. At the Fourth Ministerial Meeting in 1997, the ministers agreed to start government-level studies on the second stage of ARF development, namely, preventive diplomacy, and requested the ISG on confidence-building measures to clarify approaches to preventive diplomacy. At the Fifth Ministerial Meeting in 1998 participants agreed to begin exploring the overlap between confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy with the focus on the concept and principles of preventive diplomacy. In this regard, the ministers welcomed the offer by ASEAN to prepare a report on the concept and principles of preventive diplomacy.

In light of these developments, attention was focused on which agreement on preventive diplomacy the ARF would reach at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting in 2000. However, it was not until this year that a report on the concept and principles of preventive diplomacy was adopted, but this was not followed by a specific action plan.

Regarding overlaps between confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy, it was confirmed at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting that agreement has been reached in four points: the enhancement of the role of the ARF chair, the preparation of the ARF register of security experts and eminent persons, the publishing of the annual security outlook, and the voluntary background briefing on regional security issues. In this respect, the ministers requested the ISG on confidence-building measures to further develop the implementation of these efforts. Concerning an enhanced role of the ARF chair, the ministers noted that progress had been made in promoting exchanges between the ARF and the United Nations, the Organization of American States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as interactions between intergovernmental meetings (track one) and non-intergovernmental meetings (track two).

In addition, the first edition of the Annual Security Outlook was published in 2000, which had been prepared voluntarily by

7 However, the North Korean Foreign Minister did not attend this year’s ARF Ministerial Meeting, which was held in Hanoi, sending instead his deputy.
member states without any editorial role by the ARF chair. Documents on the enhancement of the role of the ARF chair and the ARF register of security experts and eminent persons were finally adopted at the Eighth Ministerial Meeting in July 2001.

**Conclusion: The Need to Strengthen the ARF**

The ARF, the largest framework of political and security dialogue in Asia Pacific, has a large role to play in securing regional peace and stability. However, in spite of the agreement reached on its three-stage development process, the ARF has yet to move from the first-stage process of confidence-building to the second stage of preventive diplomacy. For this reason, doubt has been voiced about its effectiveness. Judging from the level of institutionalization, the ARF has not made much progress. The ARF, however, is a security forum flexible enough for North Korea to be fully associated with. It is agreed that the ARF’s development process must be acceptable to all participating countries. The level of institutionalization is just one of the criteria used to evaluate the effectiveness of the ARF. There is a need for a multidimensional analysis comprehending a medium- and long-term perspective. There is also a need to appreciate the very fact that security dialogue during the ARF session itself is contributing to promoting confidence-building among participants.

In addition, in the light of concerns raised about the Forum’s weakness and the changing regional environment, some measures have to be put in place to strengthen the ARF, for instance through the establishment of an institutional framework for the implementation of preventive diplomacy, the concurrent convocation of meetings for senior officials of defence ministries and of foreign ministries, the establishment of a secretariat and a shift from an exchange forum to a problem-solving institution. Only a strong ARF will be capable of facilitating closer inter-regional security cooperation with Europe.

**References**


The CSCE Process in Europe

Gert Weiβkirchen

Professor Lee provided an excellent analysis on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) process, which I would like to comment on. Our former minister, Egon Bahr, introduced a similar process some years ago: the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the CSCE process. I would like to see the ARF playing a parallel role since the outcome of the CSCE process was a real step forward.

It started with the idea of creating a new framework for Europe, within which inherent regional problems could be solved. There was the will and the objective to create a Europe of stability, freedom and peace. If this is the idea behind the creation of the ARF, I see the potential to share our experiences from the CSCE process.

In the European process, Europe arrived at a turning point in the late 1960s and early 1970s. European leaders set out to create a political sub-region in which all nation states would defer from using violent means to solve conflicts. This was a departure from the military mechanisms previously used to solve problems.

The second element and idea in the CSCE process was to strengthen the dialogue, to negotiate and to work out common solutions, particularly in three core areas: security, economy and human rights, or, related to the latter, in the development of democratic structures in the different countries of the region. As I understand, the ARF also considers negotiations to be a crucial instrument for strengthening regional stability.

The third point I would like to mention is that negotiations taking place in the ARF are not really touching the core issues and sensitive problems of the Asian region. In my opinion, this is a weakness. A new attitude would try to tackle the problems from the bottom up.

There should be the political will and the readiness to see the real problems. From an analytical point of view, this is no problem. But it may be necessary to fight these problems with a new approach, and the new approach could be gleaned from our experiences some years ago in the CSCE process.

You have two good instruments in the ARF process. These are the track-one and the track-two instruments. The first track deals with the official point of view, the interests of the governments, and the second track combines this with the non-government organization (NGO) level, with the society level. This worked well in the CSCE process because governments sought to tackle the hard problems, as this is their interest and they have to do this. But in order to create a constructive atmosphere, an atmosphere of confidence, you need the support of the people, of the public, the actors in society.

But again, and this is a second criticism, I think you should not only use this instrument, but implement it, strengthen it, enlarge it, and allow the public to integrate and participate. And then you should allow some of these NGOs to criticize their different governments more openly. This could be helpful too in order to create a new atmosphere, to strengthen responsible governments, to give this process more impact, to be more creative and to find new ways and new instruments in order to tackle the problems.
In Asia, I personally think the repercussions of the deep financial and monetary crisis can still be felt if you visit the different countries. But most countries have drawn their conclusions and have introduced urgent structural reforms. This is a very good step, and a good indication. The crisis thus not only led to problems but also offered the countries affected great opportunities to bring about substantial reforms, thus creating a firm foundation for lasting and sustainable development. In this regard I think that the European Union should be much more helpful than it was in the past and I see the September conclusion of the European Union one of the good outcomes of this debate and the changes that are going on in your region.

The lesson to be learnt from the Asian Crisis in my mind is that good governance based on human rights, the division of power and a functional legal and constitutional democracy, as well as the protection of the environment, are the best basis in Asia for peace and successful economic development. Those Asian countries which already had a firm democratic foundation in place when the crisis hit, or quickly launched democratic and rule of law reforms in its wake, have either experienced relatively few repercussions from the crisis or recovered from it sooner than others. This shows that if you could create a firmer framework, and the ARF could be such a framework, it would intensify these processes from the bottom up and strengthen democracies in the whole region. This would be very helpful in creating an atmosphere of reform. In this regard I think that the ARF may have a promising future in strengthening all the different forces in the region, in trying to create and enhance democracy in the region, and, if necessary, in seeking more help from the outside world, meaning the European Union in this context. I hope that the European Union is ready to be helpful in this regard. And I am pleased to note that you now are in the process of rethinking ways in which the ARF could be more of a catalyst for a better future for all the different countries in the ARF.
Third Panel

Security Policy and Global Stability
Security Policy and Global Stability

Rudolf Scharping

Since 11 September, we have been confronted with a threat directed against the values and the security of the whole civilized world. This threat can only be fought on a world-wide basis. These cowardly terrorist attacks underscore the profound changes of the strategic landscape since the end of the former East-West conflict.

The old threat disappeared more than a decade ago and was followed by a substantial gain in stability and security, both in Europe and elsewhere. However, the threats of the Cold War were replaced by a new spectrum of risks and new sources of instability, which led to new security requirements. The broad coalition of states and institutions engaged in combating international terrorism gives impressive proof of a new way of thinking about global security. The community of states has joined forces to stand up against those who are endangering their peace and their freedom. Germany is part of this coalition. Chancellor Schröder has confirmed continuously our solidarity with the United States and our willingness to contribute with all our assets to reducing this threat to international peace and security.

The terrorist attacks do not per se constitute a new threat. But they point to a new reality, characterized by complex new challenges to security and global stability. In recent years, we have been adapting our policies and armed forces to the new situation. In 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, adopted a Strategic Concept which calls for an improvement in the ability of our forces to respond to today's diverse and unpredictable threats, including international terrorism. It also highlights new chances emerging through the development of new partnerships and cooperative relations with non-NATO states, including Russia.

The European Union (EU), too, has created a political framework for both military and civilian crisis management to implement its common Security and Defence Policy. It will increase the range of instruments to respond to crises in and outside Europe.

In Germany, we have started to implement a comprehensive reform of the Bundeswehr to adapt our forces to the new reality of multinational and multilateral crisis management operations in the framework of NATO, the EU and the United Nations (UN). In the last few years, NATO has collaborated with the UN, the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in comprehensive political and military conflict prevention and crisis management activities in the Balkans. In Kosovo, the Alliance sided with those who were threatened by ethnic cleansing, intolerance and forces which had no respect for international law and human rights.

Terrorist attacks have reinforced the logics of our approach to security. As NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson recently said in Berlin, 'The core of what we do made sense before 11th September and continues to make sense after 11th September. But international terror has shown us that we have to speed up our efforts to formulate a security policy that truly matches the new agenda in the global
I want to answer these questions by formulating three tasks associated with a modern security policy.

The First Task
We must adopt a comprehensive approach to security when we address the complex challenges.

Modern security policy is more than deterrence and the defence of national borders. It cannot be confined to one region and cannot be ensured by military means alone. Security today is global in scope and consists of several dimensions.

Our security can be endangered by a plethora of new challenges and risks - among them, ethnic and religious conflicts, economic and social problems, demographic factors, humanitarian disasters, international terrorism, organized crime or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

To cope with those challenges, we need a wide spectrum of political, military, economic and cultural instruments. We must pursue a long-term and comprehensive strategy aimed at tackling the roots and causes of crises wherever they arise.

This strategy must extend to preventive measures. In fact, prevention is key to any successful foreign and defence policy. In the world of growing interdependence and cross-border risks, any investment we make in the political and economic future of a country or region, in democracy, in the rule of law and in the conservation of the natural environment is a preventive investment in our security.

We should have no illusions: only the rule of law, democracy and sound economic and social perspectives provide the basis for internal stability and a peaceful foreign policy.

The Second Task
We must promote regional cooperation and stability.

The political resolution of conflicts is an integral part of any comprehensive approach to security. Without determined efforts to defuse the underlying political causes of tensions and the use of force, stability will remain an illusion.

Cooperative structures in various regions of the world - in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Maghreb or elsewhere - are important for stability and security, not only in a regional but also in a global context. Progress in the Middle East peace process in particular is key to isolate terrorism especially in Arab or Islamic countries.
If we don't succeed in supporting this progress, the use of force will prevail, political developments will have a destabilizing effect on adjacent regions and regional conflicts will act as a catalyst for international terrorism.

The global age is witnessing the emergence of a multipolar world in which key regions are gaining influence and in which the interdependence between these regions is rapidly growing in terms of politics, economic development and security. There is no state or region that remains unaffected by today's turmoil, conflict or war in another state or region. Drug trafficking, international terrorism, organized crime and other developments pay no heed to national and regional borders.

That's why cooperative approaches within regions, like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the newly founded Shanghai Cooperation Organization, are so important for moving forward in the field of common regional security. That's why dialogue and cooperation between Europe and Latin America, Europe and Africa, or Europe and Asia are key to dealing efficiently with developments undermining global security. The European-Asian cooperation in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) framework, for example, will gain more and more importance. The ASEM summit in Seoul last year made it clear that the nations of both continents are ready to accept their common responsibility for the manifold challenges ahead.

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shanghai will – for the first time in its history – issue a political declaration on combating terrorism. President Bush and President Putin will attend this summit. This is another excellent example of the coordinated inter-regional action we need today. The EU is ready to engage in regions not only beyond the territory of its member states, but indeed beyond Europe, to a certain degree commensurate with both its responsibility and its resources.

The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, initiated by the German government and the EU, reflects our approach to modern, preventive security. The EU's role will be further strengthened through the development of the European Defence and Security Policy. And it will be better prepared to work together with partners in other regions, for example in Asia or in the Middle East. Having a history of conflict and confrontation, Europeans might contribute to further the process of mutual understanding and in identifying political solutions in other parts of the world.

Germany's foreign and defence policy is firmly embedded in the common European Policy for peace and stability. In recent years, in this context, Germany strengthened its relations and its dialogue on politics and security with key countries in Asia. This reflects our strong and common interest in a stable international environment.

The Third Task
We must strengthen international security organizations and improve cooperation between them

Taking a look at the management of the crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, and international efforts against terrorism, you will note that comprehensive and preventive security policy has become the main responsibility
of international coalitions and institutions.

To respond efficiently to the new and challenging conditions, we even need more effective regional and global multilateral security organizations. In the Euro-Atlantic area, for example, we need a strong NATO; we need a European Union capable of taking action in security matters; we need a strengthened OSCE and other regional organizations.

At the global level, we need a United Nations organization which is able to assume its indispensable role in establishing and preserving world peace. They all have their role to play in ending conflicts and finding political solutions. And they all have their role to play in dealing with the new transnational threats which are not confined to any particular state or region. NATO and the EU are reviewing their political concepts to adapt to the new agenda. The UN, for its part, will become a leading and indispensable force in our struggle against terrorism. The Security Council has codified an important and far-reaching change in international law by declaring international terrorism to be a ‘threat to international peace and security’.

Cooperation between the various institutions has gained a special weight going beyond the potential of any single organization. We need their complementary strengths to master the globalization of threats and the ever more complex political, economic, social, cultural and military context of today’s crisis management processes.

I am not exaggerating when I say that since the events of 11 September we have entered a new phase of international relations. We have witnessed horrific scenarios and brutal acts of destruction. But we have also taken up with chances for cooperation that arise whenever mankind faces a threat to their existence. We are not fighting against Afghanistan, we are not fighting against Islam - but we are fighting against terrorism and regimes that support terrorism, we are fighting for our common values and interests, for our common security and for our common freedom.

We are doing this by working together, not by creating a division between cultures and religions. We are doing this by promoting a dialogue between cultures and religions. The attacks of 11 September made it clear to everybody that all of us are part of one world. We should not forget the fact that in these attacks more Germans, more Britons, more Indians, more Pakistanis, more Muslims and more Christians were killed than in any other terrorist attack since World War II. No one should believe that making the world a safer place can be left to others. This is a task for all of us. Solidarity must go beyond paying lip-service.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo around 50,000 troops from around 34 and 38 nations, respectively, are working together to secure a stable environment, to build up democracy and a market economy system. In Macedonia, troops from 19 states are implementing ‘Operation Fox’, Germany being the lead nation. NATO, the EU and the OSCE are working closely together to give the multi-ethnic Christian and Muslim society in this country a peaceful future and be part of a democratic Europe. For decades such collective action was simply unimaginable. But it is an excellent example demonstrating the possibilities and the spirit of cooperation needed for today’s security environment.

In Europe we have witnessed the turns history can take. European integration and cooperative structures are features of a new Europe that developed after the end of the Cold War. We are applying this approach in southeastern Europe and in Serbia after
the end of a ruthless dictatorship. This may not be a blueprint for other regions. It might, however, encourage others not to abandon their efforts to bring about peace, freedom and partnership. Cooperation is the name of the game when it comes to mastering the tasks we are confronted with today. Germany and its European partners are committed to work for this objective in and with other regions of the world.

Broadening and deepening our dialogue with our Asian partners is part of this endeavour. Conferences like this one, organized by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, are important for furthering our mutual understanding and for promoting common strategies to enhance global stability.
Fourth Panel

German/European Security Interests in Asia
The events of 11 September have shown that conflicts can no longer be confined to a particular region. Now, every regional conflict almost inevitably has global dimensions. The attacks on New York and Washington confront us with new international challenges and therefore inevitably affect our relationship with Asia. The priorities in international policy making have shifted. The fight against terrorism, which is supported by a broad alliance of states, is not a war of cultures. Members of this alliance such as Russia, China, India and Pakistan, to name a few, are countries that each represent a distinct culture of their own. Recent events show us once again the need to adopt multilateral approaches in tackling the world's major problems. The United Nations Security Council has, in a number of resolutions, underscored the need for strong action against terrorism. In this way the United Nations is fulfilling its major responsibility in the current situation and demonstrating that today, more than 50 years after its foundation, it is a vital instrument in the process of resolving the world's crises and conflicts.

Kofi Annan summed the situation up well by saying: 'There are those who will hate and who will kill, even if every injustice is ended, but if the world can show that it will carry on, that it will persevere in creating a stronger, more just, more benevolent, and more international community across all lines of religion and race, then terrorism will have failed'.

What has changed over the past five weeks in German and European perceptions of Asia in terms of security policy? Where are the elements of continuity on which we can build? These are the questions which we must answer.

Even before 11 September the European Union (EU) had stepped up its efforts to come to the fore as a foreign policy player. This is reflected for example in its intensified efforts in the Middle East Peace Process and quite specifically in relation to Asia. The visit of the EU Troika to the Korean Peninsula to support the very fragile process of reconciliation was ground-breaking and sent out an important signal. Europe's involvement in resolving the crisis in East Timor and its active conflict prevention moves within the framework of cooperation with Indonesia are further proofs that Europe is not just a bystander but also an active partner in conflict prevention and resolution.

Kofi Annan is right again when he says that overcoming social conflicts is not sufficient on its own to defeat terrorism. It is nevertheless an important element of the strategy. The Middle East conflict illustrates that Osama bin Laden is exploiting the suffering of the Palestinians in order to legitimate his world-wide terrorist activities. Of course his main concern is not really the fate of the Palestinians, but the unresolved problems between Israel and Palestine provide him with a welcome opportunity to exploit the situation for his own benefit and style himself a freedom fighter.

There are other examples in which unresolved problems and tensions are exploited for political aims. The United States' military operations in Afghanistan
against positions of the al-Qaeda network and other Taliban installations have caused Muslim extremists and parts of the Islamic world, including sectors in such Asian countries as Indonesia, Malaysia and of course Pakistan, to express their solidarity with the Taliban. This illustrates how vital it is to eradicate the breeding ground for terrorism. People with social and economic prospects are generally less susceptible to seduction by fanatical ideologists.

I would like to make a few remarks about Pakistan. We know about the conflict between Pakistan and India that has persisted for more than 50 years, and the still unresolved problem of Kashmir, which has claimed thousands of lives in recent years. I fully respect the way the Pakistan leadership has behaved in the current situation. There has been a great deal of internal dissent in Pakistan regarding the country's support for the anti-terror alliance and there have been many violent demonstrations. It is in nobody's interests to see Pakistan destabilized. The collapse of Pakistan would plunge the entire region into chaos. Hence, the EU has highlighted the importance of ensuring that humanitarian aid is channelled without delay to Pakistan. The country needs to be strengthened economically and politically. Such moves must include debt relief. The EU Commission called for a new cooperation agreement between the EU and Pakistan to be signed without delay. Perhaps the present crisis offers Pakistan an opportunity to recognize that only an unconditional commitment to fighting terrorism can guarantee political stability in the country in the long term. Whoever trades with terrorism is at the mercy of terrorism and will ultimately become the victim of terrorism. The only option therefore is to fight it unconditionally.

We all know that terrorism cannot be combated by military means alone. Security includes political, economic and social stability. Efforts must be intensified in these areas to remove the conditions that enable terrorism to breed. What are Germany and Europe's concrete security interests in Asia?

Our primary interest is stability, and this does not mean only in the region of Pakistan and Afghanistan and their neighbouring countries, on which attention is currently focused. China and India are two rising regional powers with an enormous influence on the development of the whole of Asia. As their economic power increases so does their political standing and their political responsibility. Both have joined the anti-terror alliance. Perhaps this will provide workable approaches to overcome other regional conflicts in the future.

Further potential for conflict, in part highly explosive, lies in the continued tensions in the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and Indonesia. There are other examples too. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) plays an important role in this context. The ARF's efforts to contribute to confidence building and conflict prevention within the framework of multilateral dialogue are actively supported by Germany and the EU. Particular attention is given to the issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Multilateral dialogue contributes to confidence building and conflict prevention and is an important element on the way to gaining more security and stability.

Another priority concern for the EU is to promote the development of the poorer countries of Asia. The EU and its member states already provide 30 per cent of their external development assistance funds to Asian countries. The EU Commission is working with our Asian partners on a five-year development programme that will focus on the areas of health and education.

Another key element of German-European-Asian policy is the assertion and
upholding of human rights, good governance and the rule of law. European-
Asian policy is not in conflict with American policy for the region. There are
many areas of agreement and shared interests and goals. Europe and the United
States have many common partners in Asia with whom they work in close cooperation.

I believe that recent events have revealed to all of us that only when we act together,
beyond all cultural, political and religious borders, will we be able to free the world
from this scourge of terrorism. The world has moved closer together, so have Asia and Europe. The attention that Europe and Asia are currently paying to each other must be further strengthened. We must look beyond the context of the present crisis and expand and intensify our relations in the future.
Both China and the European Union Shall Play a More Important Role in the New Century

Wang Guoqiang

In geographic terms, Asia and Europe make up the Eurasian continent. In geopolitical terms, the continent is the centre of the international strategic structure. As political powers, the European Union (EU) is located in the west of the Eurasian continent, while China is located in the east. Both China and the EU ought to be the key components of the current and upcoming international strategic structure.

In the post-Cold War era, the United States became the unique super power. The appearance of the EU marked the entry of a new and strong power into the strategic game and will propel the world towards the multipolar process. China is not a great power from a global viewpoint, but quite an influential one from a regional perspective. Being a key pole of the current structure, the EU requires several preconditions – harmonious political regimes, integrated economic systems and a unified and independent security policy.

China needs political stability, economic development to be maintained at a higher level and a definite security policy and corresponding defence strength. A common and important factor to both China and the EU is good geopolitical circumstances.

Analogous to our positions in the international structure, both of us must promote comprehensive cooperation, whether in a global context or in regional security affairs. Both sides are not only competing counterparts, but also beneficial partners. Treating each other like partners should be the most important element in a bilateral relationship.

In my personal opinion, both China and the EU, two of the most important strategic powers in the world, can search for cooperative opportunities in the following four fields.

(1) The Multipolar Process

The new multipolar world heralds a brand-new historical period in international relations and a ‘fresh’ system in the world structure. The multipolar system was bred within the bipolar system and born after its collapse. The elements determining the nature of the new structure emerged, developed and grew up within the old structure, and have inherited from it some aspects worth preserving. Other aspects of the old structure, namely certain elements representative of its nature, may still give expression and be stubbornly present at first, but will eventually wane and disappear. Hence the new structure is both a mutation and an incremental process.

There are three aspects to the multipolar process.

First, the new multipolar world is one fraught with struggle and competition. The world is unlikely to be tranquil, since various international forces are trying to
seek better positions for all, with two kinds of social system existing in parallel and 190 nations attempting to get along with one another. Nevertheless, the danger of a world war has indeed diminished.

Second, the multipolar process will belong. In ancient times the history of the old multipolar world spanned millennia, and in modern times it has a history of at least 300 years. In comparison the bipolar system represents nothing but a variation, a flash in the pan. It is only natural that the new multipolar world, having emerged amid the upheavals of human society, will also last a long time. How long it will last is hardly predictable, but it will continue for at least one or two centuries and even longer, unless sudden, earth-shaking changes take place.

Third, the new multipolar world will go through several developmental stages. In the early stage, which we are in, a host of powers stand side by side constituting the new multipolarity, with the division and realignment of forces still continuing in international relations. In the middle stage, division and realignment of international forces will come to an end, but new divisions and realignments are possible as the international situation changes. There will be both cooperation and competition between various international forces. At a later stage, a new international political and economic order will be realized. All countries will be equally developed economically, with an improved quality of life for the majority of people.

(2) Structures of Power: From the 'Concert of Europe' to the 'Concert of Powers'

Since the Congress of Vienna, many statesmen have sought a way to achieve eternal peace and security among nations. At that time it was referred to as the 'Concert of Europe'. Although the Congress didn't succeed, its very spirit is still of value to us in posterity. Today, as we continue to seek for harmony among nations, and peace and security in the world, Europe can, with its profound experience, contribute a lot. To achieve this historical goal, China will align with Europe.

In the world today, the security and interests of different nations are interlinked, so their mutual relationships should be based on an equal footing, rather than relationships in which one great power takes the lead for its own policy objectives. This would certainly give rise to contradictions, frictions and conflicts, and even intensify conflicts with other great powers to various degrees. Hence, even though there are differences in national strength, the level of development and size, the general principals of mutual respect, treating others as equals, mutual understanding and mutual benefit should prevail. Having long-term strategies in mind, the objective to adjust relations among great powers should be based on the development of equal partnerships in which contact, cooperation and coordination play a predominant role.

No great power can possibly attain genuine security by jeopardizing the security of another power, nor can it seek its own stable development by impeding the development of another power. This is true for both China and the EU. Only through consultation on an equal footing and mutual compromise will great powers resolve their differences and disputes. As Chinese President Jiang, who is also the chairman of the Central Military Commission, pointed out to German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping, 'The force of one single polar can not achieve balance and only the combination of multipolar can ensure equilibrium'.
Both China and the European Union Shall Play a More Important Role in the New Century

(3) Arms Control and Disarmament

To achieve world peace and regional stability are the fundamental and long-term interests of the 1.2 billion Chinese people. China will strive for a long-term peaceful international environment and work towards lasting peace and common security for all countries in the world.

After the Cold War ended, international disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation made some progress. Unfortunately, the good start was bogged down and the process of nuclear non-proliferation is suffering a serious setback. Obviously, the United States cannot back out from its responsibility. The United States stepped up its efforts to push through hegemonism and power politics, and tried to establish a unipolar world. It determined to deploy the missile defence system, attempted to revise the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, greatly increased its military expenditure, refused to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and so on.

I believe most people understand that the stability of the world structure relies on the relative balance in strategic forces among the powers. Seeking absolute security would break the balance, and it may also cause a rise in factors of uncertainty in China's surrounding security environment. Similarly, it has put the European allies of the United States in a dilemma, and inevitably the nuclear missile defence (NMD) system will result in the United States leaving Europe to face the renewed danger alone.

If the United States really cares about global security, it should use its resources to deal with the real hurdles the world is facing today, such as environmental crises and international terrorism, rather than create new scourges to scare the world.

Preventing threats to China's security and development is one of the major purposes of China's security policy. China opposes arms races in any shape or form. China does not want a confrontation with the United States, nor a confrontation on NMD issues, nor an arms race between the two countries. But China will not allow its legitimate means of self-defence to be weakened or even taken away by anyone, in any way. This is one of the most important aspects of China's national security. Similarly we don't believe that NMD is in the interests of international peace and security as a whole.

(4) Global Problems

Observing the development of political multipolarization and the economic globalization of the world, many non-traditional security factors are playing a more and more important role in the peace and stability of the world. Seeking security in economy and finance, preventing group crime, and the protection and fight against international terrorism have been the important features of a nation concerned with security policy.

The importance of the problem of economic security is becoming increasingly clear. Although present circumstances make a world war unlikely, with world-wide competition for the growth of comprehensive national strength centred on developing sciences and technologies, increasing economic power and the accelerated development of economic globalization, the issue of economic security is a central concern for all nations.
The threat to economic security lies in the fact that an economic crisis in a country will likely cause, at the domestic level, political turmoil with a decline of national cohesion and even a change in government, and at the international level, a lowering in international position, with a drop in world ranking of national strength, and even forfeiture of sovereignty to the control of others.

In many countries, economic security has replaced military security and leapt to first place in national security interests. At the same time, broader problems relating to security in political, social, cultural and other fields have also become prominent. World-wide problems, like ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorist activities, cult organizations, drug trafficking, smuggling of goods and human beings, criminal networks and other crimes, as well as problems concerning energy resources, over-population, environmental pollution and food shortages, are increasing in their seriousness.

The next five to ten years will mark an important period for China's economic and social development, as well as its reform. Modernization is our central task. Reform and opening up are the basic state policies to ensure the accomplishment of this. Over the past two decades, China has deepened the reform of its economic system, visibly increased its overall national strength and steadily expanded its foreign economic cooperation and trade. However, China still feels the effects of the 1997 East Asia financial crisis. Terrorist activities, drug smuggling and other criminal problems are threats to the stability and security of China. Threats caused by the terrorist activities of splinter groups in particular will be one of major challenges for China's security policy.

Can China Play a Leading Role in the Asia-Pacific Region?

With the end of the Cold War, the strategic security situation in the Asia-Pacific region is generally more relaxed. The area is hopefully entering a long period of sustainable peace and development. However, as in other regions in the world, potentially unstable elements exist. Nevertheless, nations in Asia Pacific find themselves increasingly integrated and interdependent in economic, political and even military fields. These countries, including China, thus have a strong desire to promote economic development and social progress in a peaceful environment, as well as further enhance mutual exchanges and cooperation.

How should the responsibility for regional stability and peace be shouldered? How should the important roles in the process of constructing the multilateral security structure be filled? For China, these are the major issues relating to its long-term development. Foreign friends told me, 'In 1997, the Asian financial crisis provided China with an opportunity to exercise a constructive leadership role in the region. China's refusal to devaluate its currency, its support for the International Monetary Fund packages and its contribution to an effective response to any future financial crisis were all noted and welcomed by its neighbours'. With a critical role to play in almost all dimensions of Asian organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Pacific Forum, China will become much stronger economically, more powerful strategically, and more confident politically over the course of this century. Some people think that China ought to hold a leading post in the regional security structure. But I don't agree with them.
Both China and the European Union Shall Play a More Important Role in the New Century

China hasn’t such leadership capability and it cannot be a leader. China would be more confident playing the role of competitive or cooperative partner to other nations. As Dr Helmut Kohl, the former chancellor of Germany, said at the International Forum on China and the World in the Twenty-first Century in Beijing: 'We are now in a multipolar world. People in the United States must understand that in addition to the United States there are many world powers like Europe, Russia, China and India. The European Union will not become a world superpower. It aims to be a reliable partner for America, Russia and, of course, China. A powerful, stable and liberal Europe - both economically and politically - is in the interests of the aforementioned nations'.

In my view, the new security concept of 'cooperative security', proposed by the Chinese government in recent years, has shown its practical and immediate significance. This new security concept has taken shape gradually in response to the objective situation, and therefore has greater vitality. It was emphasized as a 'comprehensive security concept' and adopted as a 'cooperative security concept' which seeks a common security target for all nations in the world, and is in conformity with China's essential security interests.

China faces tough economic and social challenges, particularly in trying to ensure that development in its western provinces keeps pace with the coastal areas. Regional cooperation can help this effort. The inauguration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, comprising China, Russia and the Central Asian republics, is a significant step forward in regional cooperation. This organization is undoubtedly a contribution to regionalization in the Asia-Pacific region. Although it can't keep up with the EU, the most successful regional cooperative organization in the world, it has succeeded in promoting substantial cooperation with its members on political and security issues. This is a unique experience and different from the EU development.

I have reason to believe that closer China-EU cooperation within the framework of the United Nations will contribute to arms control, the prevention of human trafficking and a halt to environmental deterioration. In the twenty-first century, there is ample room for bilateral cooperation to be expanded. And a sound China-EU relationship is of much greater significance for maintaining the world's stability than it was 25 years ago. China is more integrated into the world's political and economic systems. It shoulders greater responsibility in the international community as it has joined several world organizations. China favours the multipolarization of the world and calls for closer cooperation to narrow the gap between developed and developing countries.

China's long-term point of view is that world peace is not obtained through military alliances but is achieved through mutual trust. The development of sophisticated arms will only destroy world peace and spark new rounds of arms competition. I believe deepening cooperation between China and the EU can further promote the development of the multipolar process. It should be a win-win model.
The India Case

Ashok K. Mehta

I would like to focus on the security situation in South Asia and how we in South Asia look at our security relations with Germany and the European Union (EU). First of all I would like to raise some points on the impact the events of 11 September might have on security policy in South Asia. I will then look at the South Asian security policy and the Asia security situation from an Indian perspective. Following a brief encapsulation of the security situation in South Asia, I will provide a statement in broad brush strokes on South Asia-EU relations and India-Germany relations relating to security.

The Impact of 11 September on Security Policy in Asia

In the wake of the brutal acts of terror on 11 September, a common track has emerged. A broad international coalition has been formed to fight terrorism together and to deal with the most immediate security problems the world, and in particular Asia, is facing today. The understandings and terminology in security policy and political affairs in general are undergoing enduring changes. The distinction between ‘terrorism’ and the ‘fight for freedom’ has been narrowed down substantially, or has even vanished. The same applies to the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security threats. The German Minister of Defence, while visiting India last February, noted that there are now both opportunities and risks. Opportunities in the current scenario may consist of providing the chance for former alienated states to form functional coalitions, establishing dialogue between diplomatic corps and expert groups, or becoming partners in the programme to eradicate terrorism. At this point, reference is given to India and Pakistan. The United States president himself referred to this great opportunity for both countries to march alongside each other and enhance mutual understanding. In fact, President Musharraf of Pakistan clearly distanced himself from the terrorist acts in his speech on 1 October. Colin Powell, the United States Secretary of State, when referring to the security situation in South Asia, defined the violence in Kashmir as terrorist acts, preparing the ground for both parties to fight terrorism together and without forcing either side to identify with and take responsibility for the terrorist acts in Kashmir.

In the last 12 years, from a South Asian perspective, India has been crying out against terrorism. However, that cry has not been heard. I have some figures of people who were killed and wounded in these conflicts. These casualties make up almost two thirds of the casualties the Americans suffered in the war in Vietnam. Sadly, in 12 years there were nearly 30,000 casualties. Out of these, there were 12,000 civilians, and among them 11,000 Muslims. Nearly 22,000 people were wounded. I was a bit surprised when my friend Salik Naem Ahmad mentioned that 60 per cent of these casualties had been inflicted by our security forces. This is paramount to barbarity by any standards.

The good news is of course that the terrorist bases in Pakistan and the problems
associated with them will be addressed more aggressively and more seriously in the region. India has given the reassurance via the United States that the next phase of the security operations will be to drain the swamps and eliminate the roots and branches of terrorism that have spread in that region.

Security Policy in Asia and the Indian Perspective

In the last two years, India has hosted two seminars on Asian security. And I am glad to report that almost every Asian country attended them. At the end of these seminars, participants agreed that Asia is too diverse to possess one common security concept. There are already many regional groupings in Asia.

Asia's diversity calls for an emphasis on the need to support regional linkages at economic and security levels, and to strengthen structures and mechanisms that already exist. Even though references are made to 'Asian security' there is really no such thing. India has identified six power poles in the Asian security region: these are China, Russia, Japan, the EU, the United States and India.

The security situation in South Asia is unfortunately a hostage of the relations between India and Pakistan. I say unfortunately because it has resulted in a stalemate in regional and economic cooperation, and it has brought further instability to the region. Looking at the Indian subcontinent, in fact looking at South Asia ('South Asia' incidentally is a term introduced by the United States State Department to neatly differentiate the regions, whereas India considers the Indian subcontinent as covering countries from Afghanistan to Burma and even including China), there are three nuclear powers in the region and they all share at least one border with the other two. Among these three nuclear powers, India has border problems with China and Pakistan. But India and China have peace treaties and concerning Pakistan, with whom we have an on-and-off political dialogue, we hope that the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan will bring our relations to fruition.

The area is linked to destabilizing forces. To the north of the subcontinent, in Nepal, there is a festering insurgency. Five years ago, nobody would have thought that the kingdom, the ultimate Shangri La, would be riddled by such problems. In the south of the subcontinent, you find the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the Tamil Tigers, one of the world's most deadliest guerrilla forces. In the east, the Golden Triangle, and in the west, the Golden Crescent, now the epicentre of terrorism. India, at the heart of the subcontinent, is affected by this easy access to drugs and small arms. The spill-over effect and destabilizing forces include problems associated with migration into India. But, as mentioned earlier, there is some good news - President Musharraf, since 11 September, has made the right strategic choice of dumping the Taliban and changing course towards modernization. It is in the best interests of India, the region and the subcontinent.

Relations with Europe and Germany

At this point, I regret to note that ironically Germany, and in fact the rest of the EU, only took notice of the region after India and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests. The
same is true for the United States. However, that policy towards the region is changing dramatically.

In 1999, I happened to be in Germany when the German leadership was preoccupied with the Presidency of the EU and the war in Kosovo. It seemed to me then, and to many Germans, that Germany had no clear vision or strategic position towards South Asia, but such a position is very noticeable now.

At the end of this month, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder will be visiting India. There is an institution of strategic dialogue between India and Germany as there is with India and other countries of the EU. In fact, only last week, the German Foreign Minister visited Delhi with an agenda for strategic dialogue, as mentioned earlier. In February of this year, the German Defence Minister was in India, exploring how to strengthen those relations, the strategic dialogue, the security dialogue and military relations between India and Germany. I’m glad to report that substantial progress in this direction has been made. But I think most progress was made in two areas which lend themselves eminently to cooperation: peace-keeping and the fight against terrorism.

In fact, joint working groups on terrorism have been established with several countries of the EU. There have been conferences on security of the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean for the transit of trade, energy and oil. And there are continuing political and security dialogues, intended to further bind these relations in the fields of security and economics. I would like to note that from a South Asian and an Indian perspective, there have been great strides in furthering the security relationship between India and Germany. In India, we realize and recognize that Germany is the fulcrum of the EU in the political sense, an economic power in this region, and is considering participating in a peace-keeping mission once parliament has approved this proposal.

The terrorist attacks on 11 September were horrific. We should take the chance now to enhance the security dialogue, not just with the EU and Asia, but also with the international community. We must ensure that this opportunity is not passed by, that the tasks are not left incomplete and that common responsibilities are taken and completed, based on the willing cooperation of the entire coalition of forces that are arrayed against the scourge of terrorism.
Fifth Panel

Multipolarism and ‘Global Players’ in Asia
Multipolarism and ‘Global Players’ in Asia

Hans-Joachim Gießmann

The most recent terrorist attacks on the United States of America and the quick international response to them have altered and will further alter the coordinates of global security politics. It may be too early to provide a conclusive answer to the question of whether the challenge of cross-border terrorism will eventually lead to new multilateral patterns of behaviour in security affairs. However, the initial and somewhat surprising commonality of views among the big powers of Asia, Europe and America on how to react to this specific challenge may hint at new chances of improved, yet probably limited, political interaction on a global scale. For years China, Russia, India, Indonesia and other nations have faced the problem of spreading violence, fuelled by either ethnic or religious extremism. The governmental counter-strategies of these nations have usually been criticized by the West, in particular with reference to the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in their home countries. It cannot be excluded that this criticism will become less direct and outspoken in the future, overshadowed by the harsh American counteraction against the terror network of Osama bin Laden. However, the patterns of domestic and cross-border security policies of nations in Asia may also be affected, having an impact on neighbourhood relations and regional stability in an as yet undetermined way. Moreover, any military escalation and the spread of terror and counter-terror into Asia may pose a serious threat to the security situation of most peoples in Asia.

There can be no doubt, however, that organized global terrorism, which is motivated by fundamentalism and hatred, poses a crucial challenge, and not only to nation-states and international organizations. It is also linked to far-reaching changes induced by globalization in economy, technology, culture and society. Certain uncomfortable questions have to be answered: (1) whether these changes and the reactive methods which have been applied so far to tackle them politically may even have contributed to the further spread of fundamentalism; (2) whether globalization has resulted in significant losses for large groups of people within transforming societies, which people attribute to the politics of the ‘rich’ part of the world; and (3) whether or not the spread of political conflicts, triggered by these losses, feeds incentives to either use or tolerate force as a legitimate tool for resisting what is being perceived as a threat to sustainable living conditions for millions of people? Although the United States appears presently to be the main target for cross-border terrorist attacks, it may become an issue for other nations as well. Asia, in particular, could be concerned as the gap between the richest and the poorest groups of Asian society has widened much more than within the societies of Europe or America.

A Strong Case for Regional Security-building in Asia

At first glance, the basis of post-Cold War security politics has shifted to the strength of nation-states within regionally structured security architectures. However, while few
nations have maintained global influence in selected areas, only the United States can, and has, acted as a global superpower. Nevertheless, the United States has painfully experienced a relative loss in its national impact on security matters. At present, security matters are essentially driven by globalization and fragmentation. They can, for the sake of regional stability, only be tackled through multilateral cooperation. This has become more evident in the case of Asia than in any other part of the world.

Although the significant progress made in regional security building in Asia cannot be ignored, certain developments have triggered a growing concern that this progress may be overturned by parallel deteriorating trends, such as the potential escalation of war and violence in and around Afghanistan, the difficult transformation in Indonesia, the situation in the Kashmir region, the possibility of political backlashes on the Korean peninsula, the sensitive issue of several territorial claims in East Asia, the ongoing arms race, the horizontal and vertical proliferation of weapons throughout the whole region and, last but not least, growing problems with piracy, cross-border organized crime and the spread of terrorist threats. Each factor in itself challenges the stability of regional – and probably global – security. As Howard French has correctly noted, the region is presently home to many of the most explosive loose ends (IHT, 2000:1, 11), none of which can be tied up unilaterally. Therefore, the essence of security multipolarism in Asia can be described in two ways. On the one hand, it is an existing patchwork of relatively independent yet interdependent areas of conflict, which may possibly be tackled only on the sub-regional or even local level. And on the other hand, if these conflicts are not resolved or sufficiently harboured, they may pose a threat to many other nations in, as well as beyond, Asia. Nonetheless, even though ‘global players’, whether major powers, economic actors (e.g. transnational corporations), state or non-state international institutions or organizations, may exert significant influence on each of these areas, they can hardly take responsibility for solving these issues on their own. Each issue requires the cooperation of different actors on different levels of action. The prospect of solving these issues, however, is not as discouraging as it appears to be at first glance, mainly because any escalation or spread of conflict would be harmful to all international actors’ vested interests, and because awareness about the imminent risks of escalation has grown.

Threats to security, however, originate not only from spreading conflicts, but also from deteriorating trends that make the cooperative resolution of a conflict more difficult. The most imminent – and partly interrelated – trends can be summarized as follows:

- the growing gap between wealth and poverty, between prosperity and misery, within the developing societies of Asia;
- the spread of violence, motivated by, or based on, ethnic, religious or cultural divergence;
- xenophobia and the oppression of human and minority rights;
- the weakening competence and ability of many states to balance the basic political, social and economic equilibrium causing a growing dependence on, and influence on domestic affairs by, foreign states or non-state actors;
- the impact of ‘globalization losses’ or negative ‘globalization effects’ on states, such as organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, erosion of cultural values and social identities, alienation, the privatization of the monopoly of force, etc.
Notwithstanding these risks and trends, the possibility of Asia successfully coping with the transformation of the global security system does not look too bad. For example, over time, Asia has experienced growing regional coherence (Naisbitt, 1996:11), which is primarily due to the emergence of a prospering market that is twice as large as that of Western Europe and the United States combined. The growing market coherence on the one hand and growing interdependencies on the other have fostered incentives among the regional actors to seek closer cooperation, as well as a more stable security environment. It is clear, however, that the policies of the major players, namely the United States, other regional powers and not least international organizations and financial institutions, have to contribute in a constructive way if these incentives are to be translated into a stable regional security system. For the time being, however, the prospects for such a 'constructive engagement' remain uncertain.

A Strong Case for a Multi-layered Regional Security Approach

Although several initiatives to create a regional security system sui generis have failed in Asia, a strong case can still be made for a multi-layered security system. The complex regional identity, overlapping economic, ethnic and social structures, and also the possibility of searching for face-saving trade-offs between the various interests of all regional actors constitute a sound basis for a broadened architecture of cooperation. The ARF (1994), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (1993) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967) have become significant regional actors, but they lack intrusive security mechanisms. So far, security matters have usually been dealt with on the bilateral or sub-regional scale, such as in the case of Korea. Even if such an approach sufficed in the past, it can hardly deal with the requirements of the future, especially if new threats and challenges for security, such as global terrorism or proliferation, are considered.

While the ARF approach can, to some extent, be compared with that of the former Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), directly cloning European experiences may not be the ideal solution for Asia. The founding conditions of the CSCE differed extensively from those that presently exist in Asia. Yet while the bipolarism of the Cold War was occasionally considered an advantage for forming the CSCE in the case of Europe, the heterogeneous multipolarism of present-day Asia - in combination with
growing economic coherence, political pressure for closer cooperation and a long tradition of bilateral pragmatism – may provide a good opportunity for creating a regional security system. As Klintworth noted a decade ago already, 'economic interdependencies are channeling common interests and structures. Economic interdependence has opened up new channels for regional cooperation, confidence building and transparency in security relations between Asia-Pacific states. Most countries are speaking the same language as far as trade, investment and economic cooperation are concerned. This has been matched by a habit of dialogue on a broad range of regional, diplomatic, humanitarian, political, environmental, cultural, security, nuclear, military, intelligence, trade, development and economic issues' (1992: 221-231).

The comparative advantage of a multi-layered approach in Asia lies in the possibility of trade-offs and the immediate win/win results of cooperation. While it hardly makes sense to search for a unique security system in Asia, the already existing web of organizations and mechanisms may equally serve the purpose if its elements efficiently reinforce each other. Essentially, ten mechanisms form the basis of a multilateral security system:

1. global multilateral state-to-state cooperation (UN)
2. issue-related multilateral state-to-state cooperation (WTO, Missile Technology Control Regime)
3. cross-regional state-to-state cooperation (APEC +)
4. regional state-to-state cooperation (ARF)
5. multilateral ad-hoc state-to-state cooperation (e.g. Cambodia)
6. sub-regional multilateral state-to-state cooperation (ASEAN +)
7. issue-related sub-regional state-to-state cooperation (e.g. the Korean Peninsula)
8. bilateral state-to-state cooperation
9. regional NGO-interaction (e.g. CSCAP)
10. issue-related ‘track-two’ cooperation.

**Multipolarism vs. Multilateralism?**

Much has been said and written about why it would not make sense to directly apply Europe's experiences to East Asia: the existence of bilateral disputes on territorial matters; Russia and mainland China's absorption in domestic politics; the possibility of nuclear blackmail; heterogeneous political, economic, social and cultural structures; asymmetric and asynchronous power balances; greater distances (land and sea) that are to be bridged between the centres of strategic decision making; the lack of neutral intermediaries; and the sharp asymmetries of economic performance. However, some of the conditions that led to initial rapprochement in Europe can also be detected in East Asia: high levels of military confrontation and mistrust between the regional players; competing vested governmental interests; a gradual shift in the distribution of regional power projection; growing interest in stable patterns of cooperation being a prerequisite for increasing economic prosperity and for diminishing the likelihood of war; and a habit of loose dialogue, especially within the framework of the ARF, on a broad range of issues that might serve as a basis of generic security networking.

The ARF appears to be more comparable to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) than, for
example, ASEAN, which has a much stronger focus on economic cooperation, and which has always ruled out commitments in the realm of military security. However, close cooperation between ASEAN and APEC members with the ARF may provide a supportive economic dimension of cooperation to the ARF. Such a scenario did not take place in the years of the CSCE. The missing link between multilateral economic and political interests, as well as the lack of regional security structures, has frequently made politicians and experts feel that an OSCE-like organization, an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia (cf. Gills, 2001), could lead to a more stable environment in East Asia. Yet the analogy itself may lead to wrong conclusions, because the OSCE per se could not be implemented in East Asia. It is more likely that the principles and norms underlying the OSCE may be applicable to East Asia, while the mechanisms and instruments must be generated according to the striking challenges in the area. These require a made-to-measure approach. Some should be dealt with by an enlarged audience, others may require bilateral negotiations, or mediation based on good services. The ARF, however, is not likely to transform into a Jack-of-all-trades. This role was, for example, only adopted by the CSCE in Europe at a late point in time, after 15 years of incremental steps and several backlashes. On the other hand, such a role may serve the best security role by harbouring, comprising and curbing the most essential security interests of all major players, as well as those of all other nations and peoples in Asia.

References


International Herald Tribune (IHT), 16 October 2000.


Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony?

Tan See Seng

As proverbial wisdom says, when two elephants fight - or mate - the grass beneath them suffers. The Chinese and the Americans, to be sure, are neither at war nor in love, even though Sino-United States ties, following the horrendous terrorist attacks of 11 September in New York and on the Pentagon, have improved significantly from the difficult relations that existed from the time George W. Bush assumed the United States presidency. This is not to imply that enduring concerns are now on course for any sort of dramatic resolution. As a Chinese analyst, speaking in the context of Sino-United States collaboration in the current 'war against terrorism', recently put it, 'Cooperation isn't changing relations fundamentally. It's changing the atmosphere. We're not focused on those negative issues'.

There are many points in the United States-China relationship that continue to worry many in East Asia: the Taiwan 'question'; the Bush Administration’s definition of China as a strategic 'competitor' rather than - as per the Clinton era - 'partner'; American concerns over alleged human rights abuses and religious persecution in China, and so on. 'The US-China relationship is complex and multifaceted', Lee Kuan Yew, the Senior Minister of Singapore, recently observed. 'Between an incumbent superpower and an emerging power there will always be both competition and cooperation, both friendly and adversarial situations'. Furthermore, the inclusion of Japan into the fray makes it a rather complicated menage à trois. From the vantage point of tiny Singapore, with three elephants involved, the 'grass' - and it may also refer to the East Asian region - is in for some 'very serious trampling'.

The sort of great power dynamics in contemporary East Asia that I have just described strongly suggests that the region is characterized by what international relations, theorists and foreign policy practitioners call multipolarity. And although these nations are clearly not the only international subjects, much less 'global players', it would seem that the great powers here in question are either de facto world players or, to that end, 'wannabes': the United States, as undisputed superpower (or, as the French foreign minister put it, 'hyperpower' [Heisbourg, 1999/2000]); Japan, the world's second largest national economy, although it is strategically reliant on the United States; and China, the (in Michael Yahuda's words) 'regional power with global influence'.

Clearly, the smaller nations in the region are concerned about the effects of multipower diplomacy on their region. At best, it may compete with existing processes of multilateral activity - such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN '10+3' formula, or Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) - and, at worst,
undermine them. Since 1994, the ARF has been the focal point of much of the multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the so-called ‘driver's seat’ with regard to setting and managing the ARF agenda and process - at times to the dissatisfaction of the great powers for different reasons. As Amitav Acharya has noted, 'this apparent “bottom-up” approach to multilateralism will be threatened if the great powers are to organize their interactions outside of the ARF framework with a view to manage and influence the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region' (1999:2) - and, we may add, that of the East Asian region.

Acharya's concerns are well taken. An ASEAN weakened by financial crisis, overly rapid expansion, bilateral disputes between members (e.g. Thailand-Myanmar, Malaysia-Singapore), and a serious case of navel-gazing is hard pressed to manage the kinds of great power manoeuvrings that have impeded efforts to advance the ARF beyond its 'talk shop' status - not that ASEAN is guiltless in this regard, especially with the inveterate fidelity of some of its members to the 'non-interference' principle. But instances of great power obduracy have obstructed the multilateral process. For example, more ambitious confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as advanced notification of military exercises have been stymied by Sino-United States differences. China is opposed to any role of the ARF in preventive diplomacy on the grounds that it may lead to outside interference in its internal affairs (read Taiwan). Indeed, China has expressly rejected any role of the ARF in conflict mediation and resolution, preferring to keep the forum as a vehicle for dialogue and consultation - 'out-ASEANing' the ASEAN Way, so to speak.

Research Aims

Against this backdrop of great power diplomacy in the East Asian region, I want to revisit some of the theoretical and conceptual propositions of multipolarity. To be sure, few - if any - analysts and practitioners who view East Asia as multipolar actually think, per multipolarity theory, that the great powers therein share parity or near-parity in terms of capabilities and influence. There are those who see a multipolar East Asia as inherently dangerous, and others who see the region not as unequivocally peaceful but plausibly peaceful under certain conditions. The concern here, whether explicit or implicit, centres on whether multipolarity would usher in a period of regional peace and collaboration, or a perilous one of great power conflict and confrontation.

However, it would be remiss of any discussion of multipolarity to eschew discussing the notion of unipolarity - an important conceptual (and, equally for many, empirical) distinction that better describes and explains the contemporary global strategic milieu as well as that of East Asia (Krauthammer, 1990/91:23-33). Certainly one may say that this is particularly true for many Chinese for whom American unilateralism in foreign policy can be - and indeed has been - the means by which the latter seeks to consolidate its unipolar position.

In particular, I will focus on the Bush Administration's proposed development and deployment of missile defence - a policy especially vexing for China, but a boon for Japan. The United States Department of Defense's 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review - released after the 11
September tragedy - reiterates the administration’s commitment to missile defence, notwithstanding potential disenchantment within the American public for that policy in the now glaring light of other more obvious threats. Assuming the Bush Administration chooses to continue pursuing their missile defence policy, it is my contention that (1) an aggressive effort by the United States to deploy missile defence will likely destabilize the East Asian region, and (2) all three great powers must necessarily exercise reason, restraint and responsibility in their policy making and implementation, or face the sobering prospect of East Asia as a future setting of great power conflict.

Multipolarity

Few, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War's abrupt conclusion in 1989-1990, might have thought that liberals rather than realists would, in all likelihood from thereon, dominate the intellectual milieu of international relations. As Charles Kegley noted in his presidential address to the International Studies Association (1993:131-132):

As the Cold War has ended, the emergent conditions in this 'defining moment' transcend the realpolitik that has dominated discussion of international affairs for the past five decades and invite a reconstructed paradigm, perhaps one inspired by idealist ideas associated with the Wilsonian vision.

Further, in the view of some former senior members of the American foreign policy establishment - James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger included - the diplomatic horizon of the post-Cold War world was multipolar in kind (Kegley and Raymond, 1994:23, 22). Indeed, no less an authority on the notions of global economic hierarchy and hegemony than Immanuel Wallerstein, writing in 1993 (145, 151), has described the transformed strategic milieu in what seemed like multipolarity:

The United States is less strong today, a lot less strong - economically, politically, culturally - than it was in the 1960s. Europe and Japan meanwhile became relatively stronger... The heady days of hegemony are gone, never to return. The United States needs to accept that it is just one major power among many in a world of great disorder, a disorder that promises to increase considerably into the next century.

Yet it's worth remembering that the first significant shots fired in the post-Cold War international relations debate in the main were those by a so-called structural realist, John Mearsheimer, who raised the spectre of a multipolar world as a great deal more unstable and war-prone than the bipolar world of the Cold War period. The argument, in a sense, was irresistible, particularly in the light of the litany of regional conflicts that bloodied the 1990s: the Gulf War, Somalia, the Balkans, and so on. Treading a well-worn path eked out by Kenneth Waltz, Mearsheimer and other like-minded neorealists, balance-of-power thinkers have argued the benefits of bipolarity over those of multipolarity.

Others, however, taking umbrage at Mearsheimer's claims, proved more lenient and willing to grant that multipolarity, under specific conditions, actually contributes to international stability (Kegley and Raymond, 1994). They pointed to the fact that the so-called 'long peace', as John Lewis Gaddis famously christened the

bipolar Cold War period, was merely a provincial interpretation of the absence of hot war between the superpowers - a peace evidently denied many parts of the developing world insofar as these were treated by Washington and Moscow as playgrounds for their Cold War power-political games. One recalls, for example, Hans Morgenthau's grim indictment (1985:379) of Cold War bipolarity as having reduced the international system to the primitive spectacle of two giants eyeing each other with watchful suspicion. They [bent] every effort to increase their military potential to the utmost, since this is all they [had] to count on. Both [prepared] to strike the first decisive blow, for if one [did] not strike, the other might. Thus, contain or be contained, conquer or be conquered, destroy or be destroyed, [became] the watchwords of Cold War diplomacy.

Further, unlike earlier proponents of multipolarity who preach the normative merits of multipolarity, present-day advocates expressly assume post-Cold War multipolarity as a given and proceed from there to focus on conditions under which a multipolar system would be peaceful (Kegley and Raymond, 1994:3). In any case, both camps began at the same starting point, i.e., the post-Cold War world is essentially multipolar.

Both camps are represented among East Asia watchers, although more has been made of contemporary East Asia as a rather unstable region - a view that, according to some, has received partial vindication by the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Recall, firstly, Aaron Friedberg's grim scenario of post-Cold War East Asia as the future 'cockpit of great power conflict' (1993/94:7). Elsewhere, Kent Caulder (1996) has theorized on what he sees as the plausibility of accelerating military build-ups and deepening geopolitical rivalries in the region as the undesirable consequences of a combination of factors, notably, high-speed economic growth, impending energy shortages and political insecurity. Although the impact of the recent financial crisis has somewhat blunted the force of Caulder's argument, not many - including the more optimistic among Asia watchers - would necessarily oppose his contention that energy and politics constitute potentially serious problems for the region's constituents. Finally, Richard Betts, reasoning that peace in present-day Europe, relative to East Asia, is more plausible due to 'the apparent satisfaction of the great powers with the status quo', notes that in Asia 'an ample pool of festering grievances [exists] with more potential for generating conflict than during the Cold War, when bipolarity helped stifle the escalation of parochial discourses' (1993/94:64).

Clearly, doom-and-gloom scenarios are not without warrant. On the other hand, there are others who, though acknowledging the region's potential for conflict, are nonetheless confident that major conflagration in East Asia can and has been avoided because - as Kishore Mahbubani, a senior Singaporean diplomat, put it - of the ability of the great powers to 'forge a consensus' over the region. Indeed, as far as Mahbubani is concerned, great power agreements are necessary if East Asia is to defy the historical odds and make a smooth transition from one order to another. As he once wrote, referring to the 1996 missile crisis in the Taiwan Straits:

We faced a danger then, but we also saw a new opportunity because it woke up key minds in Washington, Tokyo and Beijing on the importance of preserving the status quo. A new consensus emerged in the region: "Let

See, for example, the classic study by Deutsch and Singer, 1964:390-406.
sleeping dogs lie". This is why we have not had any major geopolitical crisis in East Asia since March 1996, despite phenomenal historical change in our region.  

Whether framed in a pessimistic or optimistic light, the foregoing views are agreed on an apparently irrefutable 'fact': the pervasive influence and persistent involvement of the great powers in the affairs of East Asia. To be sure, two of the powers that I have in mind are themselves Asian nations, namely, China and Japan. The third in question, the United States, has, for the better part of the last century, been engaged in this part of the world, including active participation in two hot wars of the Cold War period, i.e. the Korean War and the Vietnam War (Zekilow, 2000:19-30). Indeed, in the view of some, American engagement in East Asia almost seems inevitable. According to Joseph Nye, ‘History, geography, demographics and economics make the United States a Pacific power’ (2001:96).

**Unipolarity**

The argument for American unipolarity in the post-Cold War world is rather straightforward: notwithstanding the audacity of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, there are few if any state actors ready or willing to challenge the preponderant power of the United States. According to Mastanduno and Kapstein, two arguments are central to writings on unipolarity (1999:5). In contrast to neorealist balance-of-power politics of the sort propounded by Kenneth Waltz (1979), which typically treats unipolarity as an inevitably brief transition to either a bipolar or multipolar situation (Layne, 1993:5-49), the first proposes that the principal post-Cold War foreign policy challenge for other East Asian great powers has been the adjustment of their strategies to the emergence and likely endurance of a unipolar distribution of power in the region.

According to this reasoning, most regional states have chosen to ‘join the bandwagon’ with the United States and depend on American power for their security. The case of Japan is somewhat of a moot point since it is a strategic ally and dependent on the United States. At times such ‘bandwagoning’ is not without risk to one’s own domestic stability (and, paradoxically, one’s national security), as is presently the case for some Islamic nations or countries with significant Muslim constituencies in the Washington-led coalition against terrorism. Although China has demonstrated its willingness to assist the United States on that front (and in doing so possibly receive help in its effort to manage Islamic radicalism at home), as a great power it has hitherto been less ready to join the bandwagon with the preponderant power. Nonetheless, it has sought, since the Cold War’s end, to integrate into the United States-dominated global economic order. In short, neither Japan nor China, nor any other state, whether individually or as part of a collectivity, has attempted to balance American power — just the sort of behaviour predicted, erroneously in this case, by neorealist theory. Going further than most unipolar theorists would allow, Peter Van Ness, appropriating the Gramscian concept of hegemony to international relations (Cox and Sinclair, 1996; Gill, 1993), has argued that China and Japan, each in their  

---

different ways ‘strategic dependents’ of the United States, devise their respective national security policies according to their common perception of a hierarchical world environment, structured in terms of a combination of US military-strategic hegemony and a globalized economic interdependence’ (Van Ness, forthcoming). Beginning in the late 1940s, the United States in effect ‘spun a web of institutions that connected other states to an emerging American-dominated economic and security order’ (Ikenberry, 2001:21). By participating in this hegemonic system, China, like many other nations, has received and continues to receive substantial benefits as, in this alternative sense, a strategic dependent of America.

This is not to imply that China is therefore disinterested in balancing preponderant American power in the future (or, indeed, in more subtle ways at present), especially if the hegemony insists on making certain changes to the rules of the system—say, Washington’s proposed abrogation of the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty as a rationalization for missile defence—thereby rendering bandwagoning a problematic policy choice. As a senior Chinese ‘track-two’ (or, as some wags are wont to say, ‘track-one-and-a-half’) member once said, China can ‘tolerate’, but not ‘accept’ American strategic dominance in East Asia. ‘China is rapidly modernizing its modest military capability’, Van Ness writes, ‘and its greatest strategic concern is a fear that the United States may in the future decide to stand in the way of China’s rise to power’ (forthcoming). Visions, correct or not, of a China biding its time on the sidelines and chomping at the bit to supplant the United States some day—economically and technologically, if not militarily—have no doubt prompted comments such as those by National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice that ‘China is not a “status quo” power because it resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region’ (2000:56).

The purported absence of balancing, however, does not imply the concomitant absence of competition and/or conflict among the great powers. To that end, the second argument emphasizes the significance of ‘positional competition’ among powers outside the realm of military security (Mastanduno and Kapstein, 1999:5). Such positional competition helps a state achieve relative gains over other states against which it competes: positional competition over resources, markets, prestige and influence. As Randall Schweller (1999:47) has put it:

Among the present great powers, the rivalry for status is no longer being fought on battlefields for the purpose of establishing a preferred political, religious, or ideological order. These kinds of conflicts have been replaced by a far less dangerous but equally brutal global competition among the developed countries to attract investment, to strengthen the global competitiveness of their national firms and workers in key high-tech sectors, and, most noticeably, to assist (by any means necessary) domestic firms competing for a share of the more than one trillion dollars in infrastructure megaprojects...in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

China may not yet be involved in this sort of positional competition against the United States— not in any significant way at least— but its economic muscle is already being felt by some Southeast Asian countries, particularly over the migration of foreign capital and investment from the latter to the former. From the vantage point of the United States, whose goal is, according to Bush’s Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, to establish ‘a strategy that will
shape the world so as to protect and promote US interests for the next 50 years' (2000:63), the spectre of a rising China raises the prospects of future intense positional competition. Indeed, as John Mearsheimer recently argued, American interests are so entrenched in East Asia that Washington 'has not wanted a peer competitor', remaining to this day 'firmly committed to its goal' of preserving a certain regional order that precludes another great power from hogging the limelight (2001:46).

Missile Defence as a Destabilizing Factor

Loud if not boisterous are the voices decrying the missile defence agenda as a major destabilizing factor in East Asian security. The most prominent of these belong to the Chinese. China sees the United States as employing missile defence as an effective military means to enhance its strategic superiority in East Asia. According to this reasoning, the United States will guard against any potential development on the strategic front in the region that might be at odds with its will and interests, such as the growing economic and military power of China (Wang, n.d.:1). In so doing, this reasoning concludes, America seeks to preserve its unipolar position in the world. I, too, want to suggest that the United States' aggressive promotion of missile defence will likely destabilize the East Asian region. However, the notion of the Bush Administration being motivated by the obsession to maintain American unipolarity is, to my mind, rather suspect. But equally troubling, to an extent, is the Bush Administration's view of China as a plausible 'rogue state' or, to paraphrase National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, a non status quo power (2000:56). A United States-China reconciliation or, at the very least, a joint commitment by the two powers to manage their differences via peaceful means is cardinal to the current and future stability of the East Asian region.

China

Today no one contests the notion that China is a rising power, and for good reason. Since opening its doors in 1978 and embarking on its four modernizations, China, first under Deng Xiaoping and now under Jiang Zemin, has worked hard to 'save the social revolution', so to speak, by way of a reconciliation with a decidedly capitalist mode of production and consumption. Put differently, China has benefited immensely through its participation in a global economic system largely underwritten by the United States. In short, China, as Van Ness (forthcoming) has put it, is a strategic dependent of the United States, rather than a revisionist power seeking to revise the existing rules of the international system under which it has gained so much. As such, the status quo has been good for China. Contrary to the Bush Administration's view of China as a non status quo power with revisionist intentions, China has sought, for the most part, to play by the rules that have served its agenda well.

Nevertheless United States' concerns over alleged Chinese ambitions are not totally off-kilter. China's dependent role rankles - a dissatisfaction that has become more apparent today in the light of strong nationalist pride that serves, for all intents and purposes, as the ideological glue holding the Chinese together in lieu of the
now bankrupt Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology. Historical affiliations once denied by red-book-carrying Maoists in the disastrous period known as the Cultural Revolution now rekindle Chinese imaginations seeking to reconnect with the glories of their Middle Kingdom past (Van Ness, forthcoming). Add to this the painful memory of Chinese humiliation at the hands of Western powers and Japan during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and what emerges is a powerful contemporary reaction to the fear that the United States is committed to opposing China's rise to power.

As such, against American protestations that missile defence is essentially a defensive system that will, in effect, stabilize the East Asian region, the Chinese understandably see missile defence, among other things, as an instrumental means to deny China its 'rightful' place among the world's great powers. Beijing therefore sees United States-led alliances as the means to encircle - i.e. 'engage' or 'congage' - China. Further, China sees American intervention in Taiwan as a bald-faced attempt by the former to interfere with a so-called 'family concern', an in-house matter. From Beijing's vantage point (in rhetoric at least), two 'alleged points of contention' are notable: first, the potential direct provision by the United States to Taiwan of missile defence systems and related paraphernalia; and second, the potential incorporation of Taiwan into the United States-Japan protection umbrella (Wang, n.d.:5).

Fundamentally, missile defence, as a contemporary expression of the doctrine and policy of extended deterrence, constitutes a significant strategic problem for the Chinese if the deterrence umbrella is expanded to cover Taiwan. Strategic deterrence theory, culminating in the doctrine of 'mutual assured destruction', is predicated upon what Henry Kissinger once called 'the balance of terror'. In this respect, an effective missile defence system would destabilize the entire structure of strategic deterrence, mutual assured destruction and arms control (Friedman, n.d.:3). The logic of destabilization, understood in this context, is simple. If State A fears that State B is building a missile defence system that can effectively neutralize State A's nuclear arsenal, State A might be compelled to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike against State B. At issue here is Beijing's concern that missile defence would effectively neutralize China's second-strike capability.

Ultimately, as David Shambaugh has noted, Taiwan is a 'hot-buttoned issue' as far as Beijing is concerned. In contrast to China's readiness to compromise, say, in the United States spy plane incident, Taiwan is an entirely different matter altogether. In the words of one Chinese analyst, 'China has no room whatsoever for any compromise on this issue [i.e. Taiwan]. This is a red hot line. Untouchable' (Wang, n.d.:3).

---

8 We use 'alleged points of contention' for good reason, for although China is understandably concerned about a Taiwanese missile defence capability, the following conditions hold, nonetheless: (1) China can easily saturate any Taiwanese defence with missiles based in Fujian and other littoral provinces; and (2) China can just as easily pilfer missile defence technology from the Taiwanese - a possibility that might have partly influenced Mr Bush's decision last April to drop the coveted Aegis destroyers from the arms package bound for Taiwan. See Friedman, n.d.:5.
Much has been made of the fact that Japan, as the world's second largest economy and boasting the most modern conventional military in East Asia after the United States, is not a 'normal' nation because it continues to opt for strategic dependence on the United States. Part of the answer, of course, has to do with history, notably, its self-image as a 'pacifist state', the strong opposition from its Asian neighbours to a greater military role for Japan and its dubious distinction as the only country ever to have been attacked with nuclear weapons (Van Ness, forthcoming).

North Korea's surprise launch of a multi-staged intercontinental ballistic missile over Japanese airspace in 1998 has been cited as motivation for the Japanese to embark on a missile defence joint development programme with the United States. However, some analysts, particularly Chinese analysts, seem to think that there are other more compelling reasons than merely responding to the North Korean missile threat. They point to Japanese collusion in the United States goal to maintain strategic deterrence and superiority in the East Asian region using missile defence as an effective means (Wang, n.d.:2). In this respect, Japan's contribution can also be interpreted as an expression of Tokyo's desire to substantially enhance its overall military strength and aggrandize its political position on the international stage - a move that is partly 'legitimated' by coupling its goals with those of the broader United States strategic enterprise. Indeed, it has been suggested that Japan's concern is less with North Korea than with China.

It is quite possible that United States-Japan cooperation on missile defence might well be the prelude to a resurgence of Japanese militarism. The same concern has again been raised most recently in view of Japan's participation in the Washington-led coalition against terrorism. This is clearly a 'non-negotiable' for many East Asian countries, and may trigger an arms race in the region. Indeed, even in the unlikely event that Japan's Asian neighbours may not regard Japan's potential military resurgence as threatening, the fact that defence spending rose in post-Cold War East Asia, especially Southeast Asia, at a time when the rest of the world was cutting back does not augur well for the region.

To be sure, post-1997 defence spending in the region has markedly decreased because of the recent financial crisis. But the likelihood that the situation will revert once regional economies pick up again is strong. Hence, even if missile defence does not engender a regional arms race spiral, a militarizing imperative born largely of so-called 'prestige acquisitions' - keeping up with the Joneses, in short - is not inconceivable, with missile defence systems being the 'Hello Kitty' of military acquisitions rather than, say, F-16s. The United States is expected to lean on its alliance partners for burden sharing insofar as missile defence is concerned. Japan is no exception. Although committed to joint research and development with the United States on missile defence, Tokyo has, by and large, been tacit in its support for an operational commitment on its part, due partly to the opposition it will likely face from other East Asian countries.

The United States

The United States' relatively recent history pales in comparison with China's millennia of rich historical experience. At the risk of oversimplification, the Chinese seem to treasure continuity and privilege the social collective, whereas Americans celebrate
revolution and valorize autonomy and the ‘can do’ spirit – or at least these are their ideals. This is not to imply that Americans do not believe in continuity or group identification. But it offers some glimpses into an American psyche that is short on memory and prone to unilateral thinking and doing. Is the United States, by way of strengthening its alliances and rejuvenating extended deterrence, bent on maintaining and enhancing its alleged strategic unipolarity, as the Chinese seem to think? Is the United States, as the existing hegemon, wilfully resisting the balancing effects of emerging Chinese power in the gradual transition of the international system, as neo-realist have postulated, from a state of unipolarity to one of multipolarity?

Attention to the Bush Administration’s rhetoric and to the written comments of some of President Bush’s top officials suggests that the United States’ evolving policy toward East Asia is less about preserving American unipolarity. Rather, as William Tow (2001) has observed, President Bush is concerned with generating a functionalist, realist and selective foreign policy aimed, quite specifically, at promoting and protecting the United States’ interests in the region.

If so, what then are America’s interests in East Asia today, particularly in the light of missile defence? Several analysts have noted that the key issue is no longer about the strategic nuclear balance. Instead, in the words of a commission chaired by Donald Rumsfeld on outer space management and organization – the other better-known, Rumsfeld-led commission being on missile defence – the United States may someday soon face a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’ – that is, a devastating sneak attack against American satellites orbiting the planet (Krepon, 2001:2). In other words, it is very possible that the United States fears a growing vulnerability of satellite communications and sensor systems to missile attack. Understood in these terms, American missile defence is principally about seizing the strategic high ground of space. To be sure, there is a symbiotic logic to this, for missile defence systems cannot function properly unless the space-based surveillance systems on which they depend are free from the threat of being tampered with or destroyed. If so, missile defence, especially space-based systems, may not prove the best option for the United States to pursue, given the huge price tag from research and development through to actual deployment. Missile threats from rogue states, as George Friedman has suggested, are better addressed by way of subsonic Tomahawk or air-launch cruise missiles (n.d.:5).

If the protection of space-based assets is what ultimately concerns the Americans, then current attempts by the Bush Administration to either revise or abandon the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty should not detract us from what the real issue at hand might be, i.e. the 1967 Outer Space Treaty - signed by the United States and the USSR during the height of the Cold War – that bans the deployment or use of weapons of mass destruction, whether in the earth’s orbit or in deep space (Krepon, 2001:4). As such, the American push to abrogate the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty could well be the preliminary step toward subsequent efforts to seek the revision or elimination of the Outer Space Treaty. From this vantage, American protestations that China is not and never was the primary target of missile defence may well be true. This may partly explain why some United States officials seem to think – erroneously so – that if the Bush Administration can successfully convince China of the merits of missile defence, China would agree to theatre missile defence (TMD) deployment in Australia, though certainly not in Taiwan or Japan (Tow, 2001).

All this, of course, neither undermines the
claim that the United States desires to remain, in Joseph Nye's words, the 'top dog', nor calls into doubt America's commitment to protecting Taiwan, or possibly even future Taiwanese independence, at least where some members of Congress are concerned. If anything, China cannot afford to commit the analytical error many pundits have attributed to Iraq regarding the Gulf War, namely calling Washington's 'bluff', because of the erroneous conjecture that post-Vietnam America is war-shy. Indeed, in the light of the United States' success in the Gulf, it might not be inconceivable to suggest that the Bush Administration may have coupled extended deterrence with the Powell Doctrine's 'neo-Clausewitzian' concept of total war fought with clear political objectives. If so, then missile defence can be understood as a technologized - in the 'revolution in military affairs' sense - version of the Powell Doctrine (Tow, 2001).

A Call to Reason, Restraint and Responsibility

Given the United States' overwhelming military superiority and China's rapidly modernizing, but still modest, capability, few if any analysts doubt the outcome of a hot war between the two powers. My plea is that the great powers in East Asia would refuse the temptation to take the unilateral route. The ASEAN states do not want to be put in a position whereby they are forced to choose between the United States and China in a conflict. Missile defence will certainly complicate, and quite possibly destabilize, the East Asian region. The great powers need to be sensitive to the region's needs and to be committed to processes of multilateral consultation; they ought to resort to quiet diplomacy, rather than grandstanding and finger pointing, to manage and resolve disputes. Better, in Churchill's terms, to 'jaw, jaw' than 'war, war'. In other words, careful reasoning and strategic restraint in the making and practice of great power foreign policy and collective responsibility to the stability and well-being of the region are both called for. In short, one pleads against arrogance but welcomes prudence in the great powers: that they stay the course of reason, restraint and responsibility not only where the missile defence question is concerned, but also, indeed, where all regional security questions are concerned. Indeed, by collectively refusing the all-too-easy recourse to ethnocentric policy thinking and doing, and instead aiming for a 'fusion of each other's security horizons', so to speak, the great powers, in conjunction with the rest of East Asia, can write the region's future together in cooperation rather than apart in conflict.

References


9 The notion of 'fusion of horizons' is borrowed from the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer.


Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony?


Wallerstein, I. 1993. ‘Foes as Friends?’, Foreign Policy, 90, Spring.


The Situation of Pakistan

Naeem Ahmad Salik

I would like to bring into perspective the genesis of the current crisis which is unfolding in our part of the world and I start with the problem of Afghanistan. It is commonly said that the Afghans are only at peace once they are at war. This reflects the volatile nature of the people of Afghanistan, and they have indeed had a very turbulent history. For many years they were the chess board of the great game between the Russian and British Indian Empire, and they have suffered for being treated as a buffer between two imperial powers. The Soviet intervention in the early 1980s created problems, and not only for Afghanistan. It also created a dilemma for Pakistan since we were faced with the dreadful two-front war security scenarios. While we had a hostile relationship with India on the eastern front, we had at the western borders a hostile situation with the Soviet Union as well. During the crisis in 1987 we almost went to war with India. However, once the Soviets left Afghanistan, the United States and other interested powers chose to leave the Afghans to their fate. That caused the present day problems we are facing. Pakistan had to face the repercussions of the crisis all by itself, and in Afghanistan where almost two million people were killed in a decade, turmoil continued infecting the whole region and still continues to simmer even today.

As a result of the fall-out of the Afghan conflict, Pakistan faced new threats to its internal security, resulting in the radicalization of Pakistani society. The so-called ‘Arab Afghans’, people who had been picked up from various Arab countries and trained and armed to fight inside Afghanistan against the Soviets decided to stay on in Afghanistan at the end of the war. In fact, most of the Arab countries, refused to accept their own nationals back into their countries. Of those people who stayed back in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden is one particular example, a person who was picked up by the Americans themselves, trained by the CIA, used for their own purposes, and is now being dubbed a monster by them.

In addition to the radicalization of Pakistani society, there was a flood of weapons – weapons that were provided to the Afghans in abundance by American funding and some which were taken over from the Soviet forces. Many of these were sold in Pakistan, and from one corner of the country to another there was pilferage of automatic weapons, creating a very serious challenge to the internal security situation. We are trying to grapple with that situation by devising new policies. Keeping these weapons has been made illegal and some people have voluntarily surrendered them. Security agencies also still carry out raids to recover illegal weapons which have not yet been surrendered, but it is a very difficult and gigantic task.

The second problem has been caused by narcotics and drug trafficking. As everyone knows, Afghanistan is one of the main sources of narcotics in the world. Due to the crisis in Afghanistan, Pakistan became the main route for trafficking narcotics from Afghanistan to the outside world, resulting in legal, social and economic problems. A large number of Pakistanis became addicted to drugs, posing a long-term problem for the Pakistan state and society.
Due to the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan is confronted with a number of social, economic and environmental problems as well. In the northwestern province of Pakistan live the Pashtuns, the same ethnic group to which the Taliban belong. However, there is not much sympathy left for Afghanistan amongst large segments of population in the province since 3 million Afghan refugees came to Pakistan, and even today around 2 million Afghan refugees are settled in the northwestern province, and partly in the Baluchistan province. As a result of this permanent settlement of Afghan refugees for more than two decades, vast socio-economic problems have arisen. Pakistanis complain that refugees take up the labouring jobs and other manual work for just 50 per cent of the wages of local Pakistanis. They cause environmental damage by cutting down trees to use as fuel. They also brought along their animals, making pasture land scarce. They occupied land belonging to Pakistani people and established on it their settlements and camps. Where a high percentage of Afghan refugees have settled, dissent in rural society is widely prevalent.

As a result of leaving Afghanistan to its own devices, various fragmented groups who fought against the Russians, war-lords and their armed gangs, contributed to the persistent instability in Afghanistan, which in turn gave rise to lawlessness and illegal business activities, undermining the social fabric of Afghan society. In the beginning, the Taliban were seen as non-political people, recruiting their supporters from religious schools. They were able to gain power in Afghanistan without facing much resistance. They were able to occupy 90 to 95 per cent of the territory of Afghanistan, and were welcomed by people for bringing stability and peace to the areas which were under their control. We may not agree with the means they used, but they definitely brought peace and stability to Afghanistan.

Our problem in Pakistan was that we had to live with the Taliban because we could not wish them away nor could we push them out of the areas adjoining Pakistan. In Pakistan, we have a semi-autonomous tribal belt along the Afghan border. The tribes are divided between the two countries. For almost 200 years, the British tried to pacify this region and to subjugate it by bringing it under the control of the central authority, but they did not succeed. The tribal belt was permitted an autonomous status, which they maintained even after independence. There is nominal control of the federal government through political agents but the structures of governmental authority are non-existent there. To further complicate the situation the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan stretches to almost 2,500 kilometres. It is a very inaccessible and mountainous border region. Once you consider closing down the official check points and entry posts, it has to be admitted that there are many hidden mountain tracks, which can be used by people to move either into Pakistan or into Afghanistan. It is virtually impossible to physically control the border with Afghanistan.

However, despite all these historical, social and geographical linkages with Afghanistan, once the current crisis emerged on 11 September, Pakistan took a very decisive stand to join the global alliance against terrorism. This is notable because Pakistan is the only country amongst a large number of professed allies which faces the most real threats to its internal social fabric and security by taking the decision to join the anti-terrorist alliance. However, we are determined to stick to the principled position we have taken.

Globalization may provide economic opportunities to some countries but may at the same time cause the loss of economic opportunities for others, particularly
The effects of globalization have not really manifested their true colours, and it is difficult to evaluate whether some of the problems have been caused by internal or global factors. However, the interrelation between the two has to be critically examined. For instance, poverty and deprivation basically act as a breeding ground for hatred and terrorism. Unless these issues are addressed—whether resulting from globalization or the unequal distribution of resources amongst various countries—we cannot really address the issue of terrorism.

Another problem is the information revolution, which we have seen emerging in the past few years. Anything happening anywhere can instantly be seen in the remotest corners of the world and these images have a lot of power in building the perceptions of people. When people in the Middle East and Arab countries are exposed to the media and able to witness Israeli tanks shooting Palestinian youth or Israeli gunship helicopters firing at Palestinian townships, no government can moderate the adverse impact of those images on the public mind. The second aspect of it is that, while we may say that the information revolution promotes the exchange of information, it has in fact largely been one-way traffic. The Western world has been able to spread its precepts and its values, and its media networks dominate this "information exchange" significantly. This has caused a certain degree of resentment against the West amongst certain groups in other societies. Recently we have seen the phenomenon whereby one of the television networks from the Third World, the al-Jazeera network, projected certain images depicting the other side of the story to the West, but the Western public found it hard to swallow and there have been calls to ban its transmission. We have to agree that this cannot be one-way traffic; we have to listen to each other, accommodate each other's views, and try to understand each other.

The nuclearization of South Asia in 1998 has transformed the security environment there. There is potential for devastation and at the same time there is potential for improving the relations between India and Pakistan. Pakistan has adopted a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence and has deliberately taken a decision not to get involved in the nuclear arms race with India. As a manifestation of this policy we have frozen our defence budget in the last two years, despite the fact that the Indian defence budget has in the meantime increased by more than 40 per cent.

The other problem is the impact of Sino-United States relations. Pakistan is in a very difficult position since China is a traditional friend and neighbour and we have strong ties to China as a friendly nation. We also have a very long tradition of friendly relations with the United States. Whenever there is a problem between the United States and China and their relations sour, there is a negative fall-out for Pakistan. It is like getting in the line of fire. For instance, there is the controversial issue of ballistic missile defence. Pakistan is not directly affected, but we are concerned that if and when a decision is taken to deploy it, China is likely to respond, which will in turn have a spill-over effect on South Asia. India will build up its missile forces in response to any expansion of Chinese forces, and at some point Pakistan will have to respond in one way or another. To us, this is a potential danger for South Asian stability.

I may now turn to the role of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). There are several successful groupings in multilateral settings like the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The SAARC unfortunately has
not been able to play that kind of role in the South Asian region. This might be due to the structural imbalances and associated problems in SAARC. On the one hand there is a large country like India - the second most populous country in the world and which probably will be the most populous country in the next 10 to 20 years - while on the other hand there are the Maldives and Bhutan, among the smallest countries in the world. With this kind of imbalance it is very difficult for the grouping to run the organization efficiently. Another major problem affecting SAARC is the continuing tension between the two main partners in SAARC, India and Pakistan. For this reason SAARC has not been able to take off or fulfill the role it was supposed to play.

However, there is a need for a continued dialogue between India and Pakistan. We have always welcomed the role of the United States or any other foreign power as a facilitator. Because there is so much mistrust between the two countries, we feel that we cannot go far without somebody cajoling and patting both sides on the back and keeping them moving forward in that direction. Our commitment to continue this dialogue is clear. President Musharraf called Prime Minister Vajpayee to renew the invitation to visit Pakistan, despite the fact that Mr. Vajpayee had already announced publicly that he had cancelled his planned visit to Pakistan. Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh has also been invited by our foreign minister. We hope that this process will resume and will bring some positive developments to the whole region.

Pakistan supports multilateral agreements and United Nations conventions against terrorism. Pakistan has signed nine out of eleven United Nations conventions on anti-terrorism, the remaining two are being discussed and are under serious consideration by the Pakistani government. Pakistan has over the years contributed significantly to United Nations peace-keeping missions. I believe at present Pakistan is one of the largest contributors of troops to United Nations peace-keeping missions. We recently sent 6,000 troops to Sierra Leone to replace the Indian contingent there.

In general, we have always tried to move within the multilateral and international framework of security. However, the present situation on our western borders is of major concern to us. The situation is extremely difficult but still manageable. I don’t see any problems or situations really threatening Pakistan’s stability. But I think it is important that the campaign is not allowed to linger on indefinitely. The longer the campaign continues, the more problems it will create, not only for Pakistan but for many countries in the Middle East as well. It was a surprise to see people getting out on the streets and demonstrating in a country like Oman. The situation is very uneasy in Saudi Arabia and some other countries, and if a quick solution is not found to this problem, I really think these countries have the potential to explode.
Sixth Panel

Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises
Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises

Riefqi Muna

Prologue

This paper attempts to address some of the potential causes of regional instability and insecurity problems in Southeast Asia in the immediate future, with reference to the continuous problem of mass displacement. It also discusses the Indonesian experience with security problems and displaced persons.

Since the 1990s, the security architecture in Southeast Asia has changed dramatically. The cleavages between socialist-oriented ideology and anti-communist thinking have reduced significantly. In this context, ASEAN enlargement, which embraces the whole of Southeast Asia, is the most credible move in Southeast Asia's new politico-security complex. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has shown its commitment to building a security community in the region.

A further significant step at the macro level is the notion of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) providing a larger framework for security cooperation, not just for Southeast Asia but for the whole Asia-Pacific region. An attempt to promote confidence-building measures (CBMs), directed at avoiding interstate conflict in the region, has been seriously undertaken, not only at the track-one diplomacy level, but also at the track-two level. This has played a very crucial role. By learning from the European experience of CBMs, the enthusiasm for promoting trust and confidence in the Asia-Pacific region has led to a serious debate on how compatible the European approach is with Asia-Pacific.

However, considering the 'strategic culture', there is a need for careful observation and a cooperative security approach.

Despite the positive direction of regional security in the region, there are several aspects that need to be observed. Security concepts are changing, and there is a global shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts. Identity and sub-nationalism is rising in ASEAN countries. These trends will shape internal fractures and crises. They will also have implications for the problem of mass displacement.

In this situation security policy has to adapt to the growing concept of security itself. Following the progress of human emancipation, its core should enlarge to deal with not only state-centred military security, but also human security. Issues of sovereignty are still important and will continue to be important. However, the focus of security has enlarged to embrace the individual as well as society. The area of security is also expanding from traditional/conventional (military) security to encompass non-traditional issues such as environmental security, economic security and human security.

Within this complexity, a new trend in international conflict has emerged. In the last ten years international conflict has shifted from interstate into intrastate conflict. Even when a conflict is considered to be a low intensity conflict, it still causes tragic problems in the human security sphere. The horizontal conflict or
communal conflict is the most serious aspect that needs to be observed by policy makers, and human security conflict solutions should be promoted, especially with regard to mass displacement.

**Intrastate Conflict, Identity and Sub-nationalism**

Another important explanation for growing intrastate conflict is that identity has been a potential source of internal conflict. Within the framework of identity, the discourse of otherness is developing. This is happening in major communal conflicts in parallel with growing sub-nationalism to some extent. By the end of the twentieth century, ethno-nationalism had become a significant discourse in world politics. It is the source for the construction of the identity of sub-nationalism. Identity, however, is not necessarily based on a single ethnological background. It can also be created by a region’s so-called imagined community. The process of negotiation and bargaining over interests between local-regional forces and the central government has often ended in violence, the scale and intensity of which has, at times, led to an intrastate conflict or war.

The world is still witnessing the struggle for sub-nationalism, which is sometimes expressed through violent conflict. Examples include places such as the Balkans, the Caucasus, many parts of Africa, as well as many parts of Asia. Struggles which began as mere ‘dissatisfaction’ and resentment, have turned into political discontent and fights for independence. The so-called disenfranchisement of the nation-state, or Balkanization, became a new political discourse in world politics following the break-up of Yugoslavia and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Indeed, ethno-nationalism has become a source of intrastate conflict.

Following the separation of East Timor from Indonesia, there has been a growing demand in other regions to separate or to have a more autonomous status. Some of these regions are the provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya (Papua), Riau and East Kalimantan. Centrifugal forces are threatening the national identity of Indonesia, and could, in turn, determine the future status of the unitary state of Indonesia. The interests and demands of regions to have greater sovereignty could lead to more violent conflict with the central government as struggles develop into insurgency movements.

Identity, sub-nationalism and political violence will affect the future direction of mass displacement. Indeed it already has. We are witnessing such movements in East Timor, Aceh, Moro, Papua, Riau, as well as cases in Kalimantan at the lowest level without a sub-nationalist dimension. The situation in Burma with armed groups such as the Karen, Shan, Kachin, etc., also supports this argument. So, ‘Balkanization’ (to use a fashionable word) or ‘disenfranchisement’ based on identity will contribute to the creation of mass displacement in the future.

**Trends of Conflict**

In the post-Cold War environment, there is a shift from interstate to intrastate conflict. The likelihood of interstate conflict is diminishing in the ASEAN region as it is at the global level. Looking at the nature of current international relations, few
nations go to war in the traditional sense. Future conflict is most likely to be 'low intensity' to 'medium intensity', and mostly internal, stemming from religious, ethnic, economic or political disputes. States with poor governance, with ethnic, cultural and religious tensions, or with weak economies or porous borders will be prime areas for insecurity (Gannon, 2001).

There are two dimensions to intrastate conflict: (1) vertical conflict ranges from grievances, rebellion and insurgency to civil war, which is either manifested or remains latent between one or more groups of people against the state or government; and (2) horizontal conflict is a communal or inter-group conflict that can take the form of ethnic, communal or religious conflict – mostly at a low intensity level. 'Ethnic conflict' (Roe, 1999; Gurr, 1993) is among the clearest description of what is going on in Indonesia. The conflicts in Ambon, Kalimantan and Aceh all fall into this category.

During the Cold War, as the communist movement from the North advanced and gained support in Indochina, it was feared that there would be a domino effect throughout the region. ASEAN was thus created, and given Western support to counter this threat.

ASEAN experienced a high influx of people in the 1970s. The causes of displacement were civil and ideological war, repression and military invasion. In particular, the 'boat people' from Vietnam and 'monk people' from Cambodia created serious challenges for ASEAN countries. The fall of Saigon triggered mass displacement from the Indochina sub-region, with an en masse movement of refugees out by sea, dispersing mostly through the Indonesian archipelago. Indonesia provided a processing zone at Galang Island.

Cambodia and Vietnam are no longer sources of displaced people. Many are repatriating voluntarily as the economic and political situations in those countries improve. However, Burma has become a source of displaced persons due to the continued political repression there. Continued military operations against guerrilla movements in several states (Kachin, Karen, Shan, etc.) has created much misery and thousands of people have fled their homes, many of them crossing the border to Thailand, and some, particularly Muslim Rohingyas, to Eastern Bangladesh. In the Philippines, the continued violence in South Mindanao has also prompted the movement of people.

In Indonesia, the scorched-earth policy of pro-Jakarta militias sparked violence across East Timor and many people fled the region out of terror and insecurity. More than a hundred thousand East Timorese are still in the Eastern Nusa Tenggara Province in the surrounding Atambua. The fresh communal conflict in the North Maluku/Ambron regencies in Kalimantan and in Aceh has displaced around one million people. The government lacks the budget or the commitment to deal with them.

In sum, the problem of displacement in Southeast Asia is still continuing at present. The main causes are torture and repression in the case of Burma, fleeing clashes with the insurgency movement in the case of Moro, and avoiding bloody communal conflicts in certain areas in the major case of Indonesia.
Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002

Case Study: Indonesia's Instability

Indonesia will undoubtedly become the third largest democratic country in the world. However, despite a positive democratic process, the nation is in extreme crisis— a multi-dimensional crisis: political, economic, legal, social and cultural. It is difficult to label the country a 'normal state'—a 'state in an emergency' is more apt. Paradoxically, the culture of consumerism of the wealthy elite colours Jakarta, for example brand new luxury cars conspicuously contribute to the city's traffic jams. The elite 'struggle' is blended with mass politics, with fighting at the elite level spilling over to the masses. Parliamentary street brawls are becoming every-day occurrences. Many politicians believe that he 'who controls the street controls the state'.

However, ignorance and a lack of a sense of crisis, except in terms of political ambition, are creating more problems for the country. The efforts of the elite to manage the crisis are becoming less clear. There are no signs that present policy will meet the challenges. Despite the crisis, the president has continued to enjoy overseas trips, and some political leaders seem to lack concern about the security challenges that have the potential to destroy the nation.

Horizontal and Vertical Conflict

Areas in conflict continue to proliferate. There are no exact numbers reported, but in the last two years an unofficial figure estimated that conflict and 'amok' claimed more than 12,000 lives, including Ambon (8,000) and Sambas (5,000), as well as several in Ketapang, Semangi, etc. In the new conflict that has just broken out and is still going on, more than 250 people have been killed and mutilated. Two years of horizontal conflict in Indonesia has caused more deaths than there were in five years of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, during which around 10,000 people were killed.

Indeed, conflict has also had another consequence: the growing number of in-border refugees (known as Internally Displaced People – IDP). The number of IDP in Indonesia is believed to be more than 650,000 (and they are mostly women and children). This includes 50,000 Madurese who fled East Kalimantan (Sampit and surrounding areas), as well as 440,000 from Maluku/Ambon, 30,000 Madurese from West Kalimantan, Indonesians displaced from East Timor and East Timorese seeking refuge in West Timor.

On the other hand, the vertical conflict has not ended. Centrifugal forces continue to challenge Jakarta's legitimacy. Aceh, Irian Jaya (Papua) and Riau are examples of states demanding independence. There are similarities and differences in the content of movement against Jakarta. All these regions are very rich in natural resources. They cite the centralist model as the major reason for their demands. However, each of these regions has its own distinct social and historical background which strengthens its demand for independence. At the local level, regional identities are forming and demanding their own provinces. Consequently, new provinces are emerging.

1 Based on calculations from several national and local media.
2 This number was released by the Coordinating Ministry for Social Affairs. See Suara Pembaruan, 28 March 2000. The number of IDP from Sampit has not yet been clarified as the conflict is still underway, but several media sources report estimated numbers.
Within the framework of vertical conflict, human rights abuses still continue, as reported by the Commission for Disappearance and Torture (KontraS). Reports released in December 2000 state that, in the year 2000 alone, the number of cases of abuse of human rights reached 1,216, with 2,119 victims. Most of these instances were in Aceh.\(^3\)

Based on these cases, security in the broader sense will remain a vital issue in the current social-political landscape in Indonesia. It is related to various complicated aspects of the continuing multi-dimensional crisis. Indonesia is a country which faces tremendous problems that relate directly or indirectly to security issues at all levels.

The atmosphere of lawlessness is the background to determining security in the country. Increasing uncertainty about security in the community is a concern. There is, for example, anger toward the police, which has not yet been able to transform into a clean, professional civilian force. The community's loss of trust in the police and judicial institutions has unleashed a trend of mass 'street justice' toward criminals. There is a growing trend of militarism and 'premanism' (hooliganism) in society.

The growing use of violence within the community can be traced back to the New Order regime, which preferred to use force for the purpose of conflict resolution. There are rumours that in many cases, mobs, crimes or clashes involve either an individual or a group of military or police personnel. In the Poso upheavals in 2000, it was disclosed by the military office that 28 soldiers were involved in the unrest. And in 1999, around 80 police posts were badly destroyed in an 'amok', according to a media report - an example of the negative interplay between the community and the police.

Since weapon acquisition is prohibited to citizens, the use of bombs to terrorize people, light firearms (such as those used in the bloody communal religious conflict in the Malucas), grenades (such as those used in the attack in Medan), or the explosion of ammunition (such as the instances in East Java) fuel concerns that some undisciplined security personnel may be involved.

The continuation of horizontal conflicts (communal conflicts) is another concern. Sporadic conflicts have emerged in several places, caused by minor incidents. This trend seems set to continue, especially due to the high degree of frustration within society. The absence of preventive action and the lack of an early-warning system also ensure the continuation of the security problem.

At the operational level, questions are being raised in relation to the capability, inability or unwillingness of the security apparatus to perform its task of securing the nation. A shortage of personnel and a lack of professionalism and resources are among the internal causes. On the other side of the coin, people have psychologically lost control and have chosen muscle over mind to resolve the problem. Thus human security or community security is at stake while the state is challenged by threats such as disintegration as well as difficulties in establishing order. In general, individual security is beyond the capability of the security apparatus as it lacks numbers as well as professionalism.

The clear outcome of these trends and the fact that the conflict is proliferating horizontally and vertically is the 'certainty of uncertainty' itself. The prolongation of

---

\(^3\) As quoted in Riau Post, 10 December 2000.
multi-dimensional crises indicates that the prospect for security is far from certain. Security and defence policy is still in the process of finding a model through the institutional/legal process and reformulation. The National Security Act is still in the process of submission to the House of Representatives (DPR), as is the Police Act.

Capabilities and Responses

The Military

With the current security problems in many regions, there is a need to assess existing troop posts, the level of protection and measures which should be taken by the military and the police in zones of conflict.

After decades of adopting the doctrine of dual functions, which provided the military with the right to get involved in politics and security affairs, the armed forces are now concentrating on their primary function as a defence force. Only under an extreme situation and only if asked, will they help the police force to maintain internal security and order. However, this function as an additional force is also limited.

The Indonesian armed forces are slightly over 400,000 personnel out of a total population of more than 210 million. When the police was still part of the armed forces, the overall number was just over 600,000 personnel. Out of this number, the army is still the largest force, with around 250,000 personnel. They are posted in various locations throughout Indonesia.

The highest concentration of troops is still in Java, which comprises only 6 per cent of land area, but is inhabited by around 60 per cent of the total Indonesian population. The largest contingent of troops, which are two divisions of the Army's Strategy Reserve Command (Kostrad) are located in the Bogor regency, West Java, and in Malang, East Java. Outside Java, the troops are scattered in the hinterland of Sumatra, evenly scattered across posts in Kalimantan, and positioned at some strategic points in Sulawesi and in certain areas in the eastern part of Indonesia.

In a crisis situation, deployment of troops to the remotest areas takes 8-14 hours, with the most effective combat attack needing at least half a day to mobilize. In term of scale, the combined forces of the military and the police can only be deployed to five areas with the highest scale of conflict, such as areas marked with insurgencies. This means that if the major hotspots were to explode simultaneously into large-scale riots or communal conflict, the combined forces would fail to control the situation.

Jakarta is the most important city to keep under control. Under the first alert situation, such as on the previous annual session of People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the maximum number of troops deployed in Jakarta was 13,000. This is half the number deployed in a similar situation in March 1998, when the assembly elected Soeharto for his seventh consecutive term as president, and about a fraction of the 120,000 personnel deployed during the riots in May 1998.

These calculations were done by RIDEP in July 2000. See TRACwS - Biweekly Strategic Analysis, 1(3), July 2000.
Different units have their posts in different areas, according to the degree of their importance and characteristics. For example, two of the largest units of the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus), which are now going to be downsized, are located in Batujajar (West Java) and Kartasura (Central Java) respectively, but their headquarters are located in East Jakarta. The marines are also concentrated in the two most important and largest cities, Jakarta and Surabaya.

The Police

Since the separation of the police force from the Indonesian armed forces, the responsibility of internal security has shifted from the military to the police. This means that in troubled areas the chain of command lies in the hands of the police. This is more so in non-conflict areas.

The law stipulates that only when the police cannot control the situation can they ask the military for help. The police retain the right to command joint operations. After three decades as part of the armed forces, however, it is not easy for the police to take over the responsibility for security and order from the military.

Local police headquarters (Polres - Polisi Resort [resort police]) are located at the regency or city level. With the rise of social disorder/conflict areas, it is clear that the police force lacks the maximum capability to control medium and large-scale conflict.

Security Consequences: Mass Displacement

In the past decade, millions of peoples have been forced from their homes by armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, etc. Many of them have moved across borders, while others have stayed within their countries because of geographical considerations or the political attitudes of bordering countries which prevent them crossing. ‘Internally displaced’ people are refugees in their own countries. Often IDPs face worse conditions than refugees who have crossed international borders.5

Internal displacement always has severe humanitarian implications. These displaced persons are at the greatest risk of starvation, have the highest rate of preventable disease, and are the most vulnerable to human rights abuses. IDP are

5 See Huggler, 2000. This paper does not attempt to distinguish ‘refugee’ from ‘displaced person’ for humanitarian considerations only.
a symptom of state dysfunction that poses a threat to political and economic stability at national, regional and international levels. Violence and instability can spread through entire regions, forcing neighbouring states to bear the brunt of massive refugee flows. IDPs are now as acute a problem as the refugee crisis. But in the case of the latter, humanitarian needs, coupled with practical, political and economic interests, have brought about international protection and assistance for those displaced outside their native countries.

The problem of displaced people is getting worse. It was reported by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) on 29 June 2001 that tens of thousands of people had fled their homes in the Central African Republic following a failed coup attempt a month earlier that triggered a government crackdown on the opposition. There are 4 million internally displaced people in Sudan alone. Across the globe, according to the United Nations, there are around 25-30 million displaced people. Some 60,000-70,000 have been displaced internally in areas south of the Central African Republic capital of Bangui. Another 14,000-17,000 Central African Republic residents went to Equateur Province in the northwestern corner of the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNHCR, 2001).

ASEAN Burdens

Today the ASEAN region is burdened with a huge number of internally displaced people, mostly scattered across the islands of Indonesia and at the Thai-Burma (Myanmar) border. In Indonesia, following the rampant violence of pro-Jakarta militias in East Timor, the East Timorese left their homeland for the province of East Nusa Tenggara. The new ethnic conflict in several Kalimantan districts has forced thousands of Madurese to flee their homes to save their lives. Ambon is also facing the same problem. At the Thai-Burma border crossing remains difficult.

The Cold War may be over, but low intensity conflicts are displacing large numbers of people around the globe from the Balkans, Africa, Asia and Latin America. Displacement is becoming a global humanitarian problem that is complicated, and in many cases politically very sensitive, particularly in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN was built on the legacy of Konfrontasi between Indonesia-Malaysia. It was an attempt to promote economic and social cooperation, but it is essentially for politico-security purposes. For much of the Cold War, Southeast Asia was in conflict and divided along political, ethnic and ideological lines. Yet before the end of this century, this once fractious and still diverse region will be under the aegis of ASEAN, fulfilling the dream of the group's founding fathers in 1967. The end of the bipolar Cold War order is compelling Southeast Asian states to take on a wider regional defence and security role for the first time in their modern history (Dupont, 1996). However, looking at ASEAN's future development and its environment, there is a dangerous conflict potential that could arise from the internal destabilization of members of ASEAN (Hermann, 1999).

Ethnic and religious tensions persist among ASEAN members. These states also have to contend with an increasingly complex range of territorial and resource issues that unless carefully handled could easily flare into disputes. Domestically, questions of political legitimacy and succession will
Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises

continue to confront Southeast Asian elites at a time when traditional values and ideologies are being eroded by the twin forces of modernization and globalization. The decline and loss of old values, both at the political and personal level, have complicated the task of government and prompted many Southeast Asian political leaders to search for alternative ideologies.

Table 1: Refugees and IDP in Southeast Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Refugees and Asylum Seekers</th>
<th>Displaced</th>
<th>Type and Causes of Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>600,000-1million</td>
<td>Repression, Independent movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Myanmar)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16,000 (in Vietnam)</td>
<td>War of intervention (during Vietnam invasion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100 (in Thailand)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>120,000 (East Timor)</td>
<td>750,000-850,000</td>
<td>Horizontal conflict, Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>800 (Others)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>57,000 (Philippines)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Politics and economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150 (Indonesia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50 (Burma)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>200 (Others)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>Separatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>216,700 (Burma)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Identity struggle, especially in the South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600 (Others)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Refugees and Asylum Seekers World Wide; World Refugee Survey 2001.

Prognosis: Contingency Plan

While ASEAN still maintains its non-interference and 'ASEAN Way' policy, there is little hope that this regional organization can have any active involvement in solving the problem of displacement in Indonesia and its potential repercussions for the ASEAN region. The non-interference policy compels member countries to deal with problems unilaterally and bilaterally (focused more on a government to government approach) without criticizing other countries. The over-sensitivity of ASEAN member countries is a stumbling block for the future development of the organization.

Diverging levels of political stability and allegations of political interference in internal affairs easily strain relationships among the members, as Michael
Richardson notes in his article ‘Forced Smile in Southeast Asia as Relations Turn Sour’ (2000). This approach has made ASEAN unwilling to confront the humanitarian issues of displaced persons as many of them were forcibly displaced by political movements and identity struggles.

ASEAN is a sovereign and political body, while the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is a non-political and humanitarian agency. One of the crucial points of the contingency plan to deal with possible future mass displacement in Southeast Asia is the promotion of a new partnership between the existing regional organization (ASEAN) and UNHCR. The only ASEAN dialogue partner from the United Nations agencies is the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Cooperation between these two bodies could maximize its contingency plan through regional perspectives.

Even though this is a difficulty that needs to be addressed, the humanitarian problem of people’s displacement could be handled more easily with a cooperative effort. It is true that ASEAN is political (sovereign) in its orientation compared to the UNHCR which is non-political and operates beyond sovereignty. However, there should be a consistent approach that brings the two closer in order to deal with the magnitude of problems that exist in the field of displacement, in particular in Indonesia and on the Burma/Thailand border.

Currently, many ASEAN countries are experiencing economic crises. Some, such as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, have been able to move on, but Indonesia is still suffering from deep economic anaemia. Indonesia is facing tremendous challenges in terms of economic recovery as well as in managing its democratic transition, which, if not carefully handled, could result in the Balkanization of the country. Recovery programmes will determine the future stability of many ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia. The national economy that was previously built upon KKN (acronym for corruption, crime and nepotism in Bahasa Indonesia, i.e. bad governance) needs a clear and clean process to recover, otherwise the country could collapse, regional conflicts could explode and people will again be on the move to find safer places to live.

Despite the principles of the ‘ASEAN Way’, and other principles agreed upon within ASEAN such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ASEAN countries still concentrate on their own national interests based on classic sovereignty. Indeed, ASEAN does not have mechanisms to address any conflict that happens in a member country. The non-interference policy has destroyed the possibility of contingency planning that could be used externally.

Finally, the most important point is how to avoid mass displacement in the first place. For that a peace-building strategy is needed to ensure that disputes, armed conflicts and other major crises (including crises in government) do not arise. Peace building can only be done by a comprehensive approach that enables people to live in harmony. However, in the case of Indonesia which is currently struggling to recover from multi-dimensional crises, it seems that the failure to stage a recovery could bring further chaos to the country, or even bring the country to the verge of collapse, a state that will bring about the recurring nightmare of mass displacement.
References


The Situation in the Balkan Region

Wolf Oschlies

Are we optimists, being convinced that all the problems of security can be resolved through the experience the Europeans have accumulated in the course of history, that common sense and actual evolutions will help to overcome all barriers? Are we realists, who believe that people have never developed immunity against evil and violence that know no limits? Or are we pessimists, forecasting, especially with regard to the latest events in New York, that the next decades will make the nineties of the twentieth century a period of relative calm despite the tragedies of Yugoslavia and other parts of the world?

The contemporary world is undergoing drastic transformations. On the one hand, there are unprecedented opportunities for quick progress toward building a new world order, based on undiminished security, joint responsibility and cooperation. On the other hand, mankind oftentimes lags behind the course of events and does not have effective mechanisms to meet contemporary challenges which could be ruinous for international and European stability - such as inter-ethnic conflicts, international terrorism, belligerent separatism, gun running and drug trafficking.

Ten years ago we believed that after the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union, huge, democratic changes would take place in all the East European countries. In this context, the major mistake was that Western Europe underestimated the forces of hatred behind Yugoslavia's conflict and tried to integrate it into the beautiful picture of peaceful Europe. Many European states believed that the conflict in the allegedly ‘most civilized and democratic’ country of the former East-European camp would be easy to resolve. Therefore, the conflict was viewed rather as a 'training field' for the new kind of conflict management - the soft one. The results are well known.

Yugoslavia was - like the other countries - a para-state order, which means that it was constituted upon a totally different principle of power, not through an institutionalized set of principles. There was a set of constitutional institutions, which were more a kind of constitutional facade. The second factor is the role and the understanding of 'nation' in reference to ethnicity - the Balkan obsession with a pre-political concept of ethnicity: it is the ethnicity which makes the political community. That has a lot to do with the historical background: the Balkan peoples lived for centuries in Empires, the Ottoman and the Austrian, where this feeling of ethnicity was developed in counterposition to the state in which they lived. Something of this has remained as part of their political perception.

It was by no means a coincidence that the three ex-communist multi-ethnic federations - the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia - dissolved. Communist powerholders perceived every constitution only as an instrument of power and not a limit of power. The bearers of sovereignty, the constitutive parties of the federal order, were nations in their republics and provinces - nations in the sense of ethnicity. The consequences were fatal ones: There was a massive transfer of political loyalty to republics because only republics (and autonomous provinces like
Kosovo) were perceived as a nation's state in the sense of an ethnic state.

Here we have configurations determining the political situation in the newly emerged states of former Yugoslavia: Ethnic states can only exist as such in a defensive sense, in trying to protect themselves against others. Actors of an autocratic nature often dominate ethnic conflicts. Inter-ethnic conflict served the function of reinforcing intra-ethnic political strength. The federation had to legitimize itself by saying: forget about individuals - nations are equal in their rights. Forget about political equality, individual rights, political pluralism, and witness the image of pluralism created by confronting ethnic interests through representing their mother republics.

Another problem of the ex-Yugoslav crux is the minority question. Yugoslavia was taken as an example of a nation providing minority rights, in particular with a legal and constitutional relevance. But, viewed against the aforementioned background, Kosovo is not a problem of minority question. Not only the nations, but also the minorities - especially the most numerous in Vojvodina (Hungarians) and Kosovo (Albanians) - were given a constitutional status which enabled them not to protect their cultural identity, but to act politically as an ethnic collectivity. Minorities had para-state positions too, and perceived them as a guarantee of their own liberty which had to be defended at federal and republic levels. That means, if you have a system which has no positive legitimization at all - like the systems in East Europe and Yugoslavia - all political elites within their collectivities, or ethnic groups, had to push their differences as a part of their identity. To be different and to have problems with others - this is what ensures respective powerholders a long stay in power. That means your 'right' is based on your tactics to remain different and stay away from the others, because the others are always the ones who are potentially endandering your 'rights'. That is why and how the Albanians in Kosovo perceive their 'rights', but not only the Albanians: every people in Southeast Europe feels deeply discriminated against, when in fact they are all victims of a systematic manipulation, perpetuating to the present the negative legitimacy which has a never-ending disastrous outcome.

In former Yugoslavia, the other Balkan nationalisms at play are not morally superior to Serbian nationalism. Croatian, Albanian and Bosnian Muslim nationalism are no less free from the temptations of violence than Serbian nationalism. Nevertheless, President Bush, addressing United States forces in Kosovo last spring, gave a rather optimistic picture of the region. The president applauded the fact that ‘for the first time in history, all the governments of the region are democratic, committed to cooperating with each other, and predisposed to joining Europe’. He commended progress made by individual countries: ‘Croatia has become a responsible source of regional stability’... ‘The people of Yugoslavia have chosen democracy over dictatorship’... ‘Albania’s recent elections, while less than perfect, were still a step forward in its democratic development’... ‘Moderate governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina are willing to work as serious partners with the international community in preparing their country for European integration’.

On the other hand, Bush pointed out, the region still faces difficult challenges: ‘Civil institutions are weak and vulnerable to corruption, organized crime is widespread, sometimes hiding behind narrow, nationalistic agendas. There is too much dependence on foreign assistance and not enough foreign investment. And ethnic extremists are still stoking the flames of intolerance and inciting violence, hoping
to subvert democracy, redraw borders, or advance pursuits'.

Bush called on the people of Kosovo to concentrate on developing civil institutions that work and a political climate that supports and sustains democracy, the rule of law, ethnic tolerance and cooperation with neighbours. But another reality in Kosovo was described recently by James Perdew, Deputy Special Advisor for the President and Secretary of State for Dayton and Kosovo. Perdew said: 'There is much left to do. Kosovo remains unstable and dangerous. Tolerance and acceptance do not happen overnight, and extremists on both sides use every opportunity to promote their agenda and disrupt the efforts of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and KFOR [Kosovo Force] to establish peace and security. Resources remain a problem, both in terms of personnel and in terms of prompt delivery of pledged contributions'.

Only the criticism in such statements can be taken as a realistic description of the situation in the Balkan peninsula, where all the states or provinces are more or less failed ones – especially those which are in fact protectorates of the international community, Bosnia and Kosovo, and, to a lesser degree, Albania. Bosnia, divided by the Dayton Peace Agreement into entities, represents itself as an ensemble of dwarfish units fighting each other with all kinds of politically and nationalistically motivated methods of obstruction. The implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement has hardly begun, in particular Annex 7 which states that 'all refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin'. Many refugees are still fearful of returning to their towns and villages because of attacks against returnees. It is rare that those who commit these crimes are caught and brought to justice, and the attacks appear to be increasing. In addition to violence and legal difficulties in reclaiming homes, returnees usually face poor living conditions and high unemployment. The lack of educational facilities is also a problem for returnees with children. Some areas remain heavily mined. The interest of international donors seems to be declining and it is likely that available funds for housing reconstruction and de-mining efforts will decrease over time. As a result, Bosnia has become an open door for masses of illegal immigrants – a business where hundreds of millions of dollars can be earned each year.

Albania remains a land of anarchy. During the spring and summer of 1997, the collapse of fraudulent pyramid investment schemes brought the Albanian population to violent protest against their government. Many areas of the country have fallen under the control of rebel groups or local criminal bands. During the 1997 upheaval, military bases, barracks, bunkers and police stations were attacked and up to a million personal weapons were looted, together with an estimated 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition, now destined for use by rioters or criminals. The struggle for independence in neighbouring Kosovo created a huge demand for light weapons across the northern Albanian border. Although intensive terrorist actions by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA [UCK]) did not start before winter 1997/98, a significant amount of both Albanian and foreign weaponry reached the area several months earlier, very soon after the crisis erupted in Albania.

Kosovo is a special case – an example of the decline of state-supported terrorism and the increase in terrorist groups engaged in drug trafficking and similar activities. In any case, we can ask who has overtaken whom – criminality over politically motivated guerrilla groups or vice versa. Enduring cooperation between two separate groups – one criminal and the other political – has occurred in Kosovo, where the KLA maintained a strategic alliance with
Albanian criminal syndicates before and during the Kosovo crisis.

After the demise of the Berisha government in Albania in 1997, the ensuing disorder allowed Albanian organized criminal groups to secure their hold on heroin trafficking through the Balkan route - a well-travelled smuggler's corridor that transports an estimated $400 billion worth of narcotics per year. At roughly the same time, the KLA emerged as an organized guerrilla force seeking an independent state from Serbia.

The next step was a 16-month insurgency in southern Serbia, where ethnic Albanian rebels had been using the internationally patrolled buffer zone to launch attacks against Yugoslav forces. Yugoslav security forces showed maximum restraint and did not respond to these numerous attacks and the Serbian government succeeded in driving the rebels out of the region. As a result, veterans of the (supposedly disbanded) KLA set up a Macedonian offshoot, similar to the extremist groups active in southern Serbia. Due to the lack of concrete action by the international community and the unsuccessful demilitarization of the KLA, the crisis has spilled over from Kosovo to Serbia to Macedonia, and nowadays even to northern Greece. The Albanian terrorists - under the pretext of fighting for the human rights of the allegedly oppressed Albanian minority in Macedonia - went further and further, trying to create a Greater Albania of ethnic cousins now dispersed in four countries.

That was the situation before 11 September. Since that day new findings and data show that Osama bin Laden's followers operated all over the Balkans. Bin Laden's organization, al-Qaeda, was present in both Albania and Macedonia, and had two bases each in Bosnia and Kosovo. In the light of this penetration of Islamic terrorism into the Balkans, we are facing an entirely new situation in the region. The Balkan states jointly condemned the terrorist attacks on the United States and pledged to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. Each country can and will contribute to the global anti-terrorism campaign knowing that the Balkans had become, more or less, a stronghold for supporters of Osama bin Laden. But according to the Croatian President Stipe Mesic, 'People must realize that concrete crimes must be blamed on concrete people or organizations, and not on nations or religions'.
Seventh Panel

Reasons for Regional Instability: Inter-governmental Tensions
The ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia and Beyond

Surin Pitsuwan

From now on, you will be presented with examples of the proverbial 'ASEAN Way'. One of the definitions of the ASEAN Way stipulates that we always have to explain to others why we do and don't do certain things in a certain way, and the other side usually does not fully understand the explanation but is half convinced by our efficacy.

I think the session on Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises and this session will dovetail into each other quite well. The issues that Riefqi Muna touched upon in the previous session were of an internal nature, but many of those internal conflicts have a tendency to spill over into neighbouring countries and the entire region. Therefore, while some of the issues that we are now facing in the region are purely domestic in nature, somehow, as a result of globalization and its driving force, information technology, the whole world is having to face those problems, including those occurring or percolating in Southeast Asia and East Asia.

The traditional flash points in Asia and Southeast Asia are the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, the Taiwan Straits and, latterly, the southern part of the Philippines as well as the Indonesian phenomena. Indonesia's problems have implications for all of us in Southeast Asia. And then I think it wouldn't be fair to leave the situation in Afghanistan out. All of us, whether immediate neighbours or far-away friends and allies, will feel the impact of this turmoil, great or small.

I will provide a quick survey of the problems in East Asia and Southeast Asia and then conclude with Afghanistan, drawing on the experiences that we have had in dealing with some of those problems in 'the ASEAN Way'. And I will offer my view on the new East-West tension, which is assuming a civilizational dimension.

North Korea’s Entry into the ASEAN Regional Forum

The Korean Peninsula has been a point of contention for a long time and it still is a flash point. But last year there was a very interesting development, an attempt to bring about a rapprochement between the two Koreas. And the world has been mesmerized by the pace of this reconciliation process. We in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) tried to contribute to that process of accommodation by inviting, enticing, North Korea, the last component, the last piece of the jigsaw in the East Asian security landscape, into the ARF forum. It was a long process and required tortuous effort on the part of all the ARF members. Every year since the inception of the ARF in July 1994 in Bangkok, the issues of the Korean Peninsula had been discussed without the participation of North Korea. So we considered it not only beneficial but also essential to get North Korea into the forum. But the issue was how to create a level of confidence so that North Korea would feel comfortable enough to join us without feeling pressured by all the participants.
Moreover, North Korea, as we realized, is not used to dealing with the kind of multilateral, multidimensional and open dialogue that is used in the ARF.

I happened to be the Chair of the ARF during that crucial year when the momentum was being built - 1999 to 2000. I had to find a way to break the ice wall between North Korea and the other members of the ARF. I discovered that of all the countries in Southeast Asia/ASEAN, the original and core members of the ARF, the one that had the closest connection with North Korea, happened to be the newest member of ASEAN – Cambodia. When King Sihanouk took refuge abroad during the crisis in Cambodia, he went to Pyongyang, North Korea. He still uses North Korean cooks for his meals; his butlers and his bodyguards are also North Koreans. So who would be the best link from the ARF, if not King Sihanouk?

So I appealed to Mr Hun Sen, the Prime Minister of Cambodia, in March 2000, to view this as an opportunity for the newest member of ASEAN to contribute to ASEAN diplomacy and the ARF. He was very interested and eager to help. He did his bit by calling King Sihanouk who was undergoing medical treatment in Beijing. I asked that the King would use his connections to persuade the North Korean government to come out and join other members of the East Asian and Southeast Asian community in order to complete the jigsaw of our security landscape and fill the gap that has been so obvious every time the Korean Peninsula issue comes up for discussion in our security forum. That was the key to the entry of North Korea into the ARF: a very personal key.

At the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Cartagena, Columbia, in March 2000, I personally tried to convince the foreign minister of North Korea to be in the vicinity of Bangkok ‘next July’ so as to be available if an occasion came up for him to drop by and visit the ARF meeting underway then. Only a week later in Havana, at the Group of 77 Summit, I courted him again to ‘come by and visit us in Bangkok in the third week of July’. That was the time of the ASEAN Ministerial and ARF Meetings.

The original idea was only to invite the North Korean foreign minister to be in the region at the same time as the ARF was taking place in Bangkok, and then conveniently he would be able to come in and have breakfast with some of the members, but not join the ARF formally. But by the time the meetings came round the level of comfort that we had created for him and the appeal of King Sihanouk convinced him, or convinced the leadership of North Korea, that it was safe and it would be acceptable for him to come to Bangkok and join the ARF. So that was how we contributed to some of the relaxation of the tension in the Korean Peninsula. Not all of it, but we have made a modest contribution to one of the most contentious issues in the Asia-Pacific security equation.

We hope that this will evolve into something that will be long lasting. Last July in Vietnam, North Korea didn’t show up, I think partly because there was not enough legwork on the part of the host. I think the host, this being their first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, did not want too many issues on the plate. So not enough of the preparations necessary to bring North Korea back to the ARF were made. Also the change of attitude and approach in Washington as a result of the change in leadership there made the issues of Northeast Asia contentious once more. But at least North Korea is formally in the ARF now, despite the fact that more efforts are needed to integrate it fully into the security network of the region.
The Taiwan Straits

I think the issue that all of us are always concerned about and familiar with in the region is that of the Taiwan Straits. Every time we want to bring the issue of the Taiwan Straits into the ARF our Chinese colleagues object to it. This is considered ‘an internal affair’. But I think the strategy of our friends in Beijing would be: keep politics and security discussion on the Taiwan Straits out of any multilateral forum, but let us work on the economic imperatives of the issue, i.e. push for World Trade Organization entry first, and then let economic dynamism, market realities and financial relations help solve the problems of the tension between Taiwan and the mainland.

And I think that strategy seems to be working, i.e. let time, let the economic results, economic development and economic imperatives of the issue solve the problems or at least reduce the tension of the problem. And in the end it will be resolved.

I think the United States and Japan would also prefer to leave the issue hanging there, unresolved, dragging on. The United States would guarantee the security of Taiwan, while Japan would agree to extend the security agreement between Japan and the United States to cover Taiwan in order to keep the issue percolating, to keep Taiwan from being fully integrated into mainland China before it is ready. At the same time the United States and Japan can maintain their presence and play active roles in the region.

If the ARF were a forum where any issue of concern on the part of any party could be discussed, provided that all the parties agreed to the items on the agenda beforehand, Japan and the United States would certainly be interested in bringing the issue of Taiwan up for discussion. But the Chinese would say no to such an item on the agenda. To outsiders this is the weakness of the ARF. It is too rigid, too formalized, not flexible, not spontaneous, and therefore unable to respond to critical and sensitive issues relating to the threat to common security.

But even though we have not been able to bring the issue of Taiwan to the table of the ARF, the ASEAN Way has ‘invented’ a way of accommodating the problem of such sensitivity. For, in the periphery, outside the meeting room, in the corridors of the main forum, every year, without fail, we talk about it, joke about it, discuss it. That is also an ASEAN Way, not formal, but providing the atmosphere, the venue, where such things can be talked about in that way, reducing the prospect of open conflict.

The South China Sea

There are many claimants to many islands of the South China Sea, but all the claimants realize, and all the powers that have interests in the safety and security of the sea-lanes of the South China Sea also realize that the issue cannot be allowed to degenerate into open conflict. It would affect everyone’s interests: the United States, Japan, Korea and now China because of her growing dependency on export. The ASEAN states cannot afford to let the South China Sea issue degenerate into open conflict. So we have attempted to draw up what we call a non-binding ‘Code of Conduct for the South China Sea’. Beijing has assured us that once the ASEAN states complete the Code of Conduct, they will join in. But for some
reason the Southeast Asian/ASEAN countries have not yet reached a consensus on a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea.

Despite the fact that the issue is active and alive at the ARF every year, year in and year out, there is an element of caution and restraint on the part of every party. But this is exactly the end-result of this effort. It doesn’t matter if it is binding or non-binding, or if it leads anywhere conclusive, the fact that it is alive and on the table is important; the accumulative effect of this effort is what we call ‘preventive diplomacy’, not leading to open conflict. We are not able to drive at the root cause of it. We are not able to decide on the lines of sovereignty of all those islands in the South China Sea, but at least we keep the situation under control. The result is preventive diplomacy itself, confidence building amongst all of us, guaranteeing to the other side that force will not be used.

East Timor

I think ASEAN has also had a very unique experience in the management of the East Timor conflict. And I want to use this as a starting point to go into the case of Afghanistan later. The case of East Timor presented us with a dilemma, a real dilemma. How to get involved in an internal issue of a member who was still ambivalent about what happened in one of its eastern provinces, East Timor. And that member state happened to be the largest state of ASEAN and has served as the leader of ASEAN since its inception in 1967. The principle of non-interference in ASEAN is sacred, but this time it did not concern a small member of ASEAN or a new member of ASEAN, but one of the oldest, the largest, the most effective leader of ASEAN. What could ASEAN do? Well, ASEAN had two choices, and neither of them were very appealing: (1) Do nothing and rest on the principle of non-interference but face the consequence of losing the confidence of the international community. The impression would have inevitably been that ASEAN is ineffective, it is irrelevant, it cannot even resolve the problems in its own backyard. Or (2) Do something, but then risk tampering with this sacred principle of non-interference.

The issue was very sensitive for everyone because the ten ASEAN members came together not on the bedrock of any commonality of values or common ideology, but on the basis of mutual convenience. Thus the sacredness of the non-interference principal is very difficult for outsiders to understand, but for ASEAN’s continued existence, it is the core of the operating procedure, the modus operandi, among us. So we were presented with a dilemma. The new members (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar) were afraid that the issue of East Timor would serve as a precedent for the future. They did not want the fact that ASEAN had done something with regard to East Timor to be a reference point, as ASEAN would then have grounds for doing the something with regard to the internal issues of some of its member states, so an absolute ‘no’ from Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and from Cambodia.

The old members of ASEAN – Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand – were also reluctant because they did not know where this step forward for the territory of East Timor, already strengthened by the overwhelming result of the referendum but still not totally separated from the state of Indonesia, would lead. The process of state building
was underway, chaotic situations were unfolding, violence raged on. What could ASEAN members do?

I went to Jakarta in mid-September 1999 and talked to General Wiranto, the Supreme Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and conferred with President B.J. Habibie on how ASEAN could bring peace and order back to East Timor. And this was the appeal from both of them: ‘Do come, come in large numbers, we would like to see our ASEAN brothers in East Timor’. And I told the president, ‘Your Excellency, it would be very difficult because we don’t have the numbers, we don’t have the logistics, we don’t have the technology, we don’t have the equipment in order to do the job’. And he continued, interrupting me, ‘And do take the command of the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET).’ Let Thailand or the Philippines or Malaysia or Singapore take the command of the international forces’. I replied, ‘It would be difficult Your Excellency’. And do you know what he said, and this is something relevant to Afghanistan now, he said, ‘Then go to one of the Nordic countries’. What he didn’t say was, avoid Australia. But he did say we should go to one of the Nordic countries, away from our region, because that was more palatable to the prevailing public sentiment in Indonesia then.

So, reluctantly, the original members of ASEAN went into East Timor at the request of the highest authority of Indonesia. We did not take the command of the INTERFET, but we helped bring down the level of anxiety for the entire international community by making the operation a ‘regional’ rather than ‘extra regional’ one. But we had to make it clear among ourselves that we went in an individual state capacity, not as ASEAN forces. Thus we preserved ASEAN’s principle of non-interference and also fulfilled our regional role of security cooperation.

Why did I say that the East Timor operation has some relevance for Afghanistan now? Because in my view, Afghanistan is even more complicated a situation than East Timor. There are so many actors, players, local sensitivities, internal complexities, regional dynamics and international implications. If we are not careful, the Afghan crisis could turn into a long-term tragedy for all of us. And I know Europe, Germany in particular, is very determined to play a constructive role there. We need to be careful.

**Afghanistan**

I am glad that present among us here as our first commentator is someone now working in the office of Mr Solana, who has been given the authority or the mandate to work on Afghanistan on behalf of Europe. Europe should be thinking about this issue very carefully.

The three components of the Afghanistan situation are this: military, diplomacy and the political solution. Humanitarian too, but right now we are looking into the political solution. Each and every one of the surrounding states has its own agenda in Afghanistan. There would be a lot of problems trying to create a political coalition, trying to establish law and order in Afghanistan post-military conflict, if it were dependent on the states surrounding Afghanistan. Whether it were Uzbekistan, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan or China, you would have problems of mutual suspicion of each other’s agendas.

And I think all of us here realize the fact that the Taliban were so much supported
in Afghanistan was partly to avoid the influence of Shi'ism from Iran. So there is a reason why the Taliban prospered in Afghanistan. Each and every country around Afghanistan has a stake in the development in Afghanistan. My point is this: take a cue from President Habibie who said, because of local sensitivities and regional complexities, 'go to the Nordic countries'. But in this context the European Union and the United Nations should think about a country or countries in Southeast Asia where Muslims are present in large numbers. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country and Malaysia is probably the most successful Muslim country in the world because of its attempt to accommodate modernity and globalization. I think those two countries, and I'm not here speaking on behalf of those two countries, have a role to play and a contribution to make. I'm just speaking as an observer. I think those two countries are facing their own problems internally because of this problem in Afghanistan. Their population is agitated and frustrated. There is a perception that the West is ganging up on the Muslims, all Muslims. Islam is facing another Crusade. A Jihad is the response. But if these countries are given a chance to play a role in Afghanistan they will be able to pacify their own dissatisfied elements. 'Look', the leadership could say, 'we have a role to play now'. It would give them a sense of responsibility. It would be an opportunity for those two governments. So I think the political components would have to be put together quickly and carefully and comprehensively and creatively, otherwise there will be a prolonged period of instability, uncertainty and insecurity in Afghanistan. And the implications for the entire world are quite obvious.

If you all think the problem in Afghanistan is a problem of Islamic extremism, then you must consider a strategy to handle it in such a way that moderate Muslim countries have a direct role to play. To contain Islamic extremism we must try to promote Islamic moderation. Moderate Muslim countries must be able to play an active role in the resolution of the Afghanistan problem. Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia seem to fit the bill at this moment. We should seriously think about involving them meaningfully and effectively. In that way, we will be perceived to be working with the Muslim World to solve the problems of a Muslim state, much like the ASEAN countries tried to cooperate with the international community on the issue of East Timor.

11 September and the Clash of Civilizations

I think we are trying to say that this is not a war between the West and Islam, this is not 'the clash of civilizations'. But I think the perception of Muslims is that THIS IS IT. We are not talking about the reality, we are not talking about rational definition, we are talking about the perceptions of people on the street. And this has to be taken into consideration.

Already some of the words being used are putting oil on the fire. When the word 'crusade' was used in Washington, you could imagine the other side coming up with 'Jihad'. When the operation was called 'Infinite Justice', the other side saw the West as trying to play God, playing Allah, because the name 'Infinite Justice' is reserved for God alone. Do you see the cultural elements in this conflict? Do you see the difference of values in this conflict?

The other day in Bangkok a Filipino friend asked me, 'Is bin Laden the anti-Christ?' I said, 'Why do you ask me that question?' She said, 'He looks like one'. Now in
Islamic mythology there is also a type of anti-Christ coming. And if that question were asked in the Muslim world, the response from Muslims would be 'Well someone in the West is also an anti-Christ'. So you can see the clashes of religious symbolism, the conflicts of values. We have to avoid the prospect of these phenomena leading to 'the clash of civilizations'. No matter how much we try to say that we are avoiding it, in the perception of those people we are walking down that road - the clashes are playing themselves out on the world stage, between East and West, Islam and the Western World.

What do we do in the long term, looking at Afghanistan as the short term? Let me make a proposal. I think the global community needs to learn from each other more and more urgently now than ever before. I think the events of 11 September presented us with two prospects. One is the prospect of destruction, widespread and non-stop, because you cannot put a break on this kind of confrontation. You can say it's finished today, but the other side won't be finished. They are everywhere. A lot of the radical elements passed through Germany, didn't they? They won't stop.

But precisely because of that event on that fateful morning in September we now understand that we have the power in our hands to get to know each other better, to reduce the levels of ignorance among us and between us that have been accumulated through the ages, to use the power of technology and the power of information technology. I think this was the first time in human history that the entire human family witnessed an experience, saw events in real time together like never before. We would have wished that the first such experience for all humanity had been a more pleasant one. But it was not like that; it was a very horrifying experience. But at least we have the prospect of using the same technology, the same information technology, to help us reduce the walls that separate us, the levels of mutual ignorance that divide us.

It just so happened that the United Nations General Assembly declared this very year the Year of Dialogue amongst Civilizations. And it was a Muslim leader, President Mohammad Khatami of Iran, who proposed in September 1998 that 2001 should be the Year of Dialogue amongst Civilizations. A couple of years before that Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy prime minister of Malaysia gave a speech at Georgetown University, proposing what he called then 'a civilizational dialogue'. These two Muslim leaders proposed this in response to the prediction of an inevitable 'clash of civilizations' in 1993. Now I think we should let Iran take the lead on the other side (we cannot depend on Anwar Ibrahim now that he is in jail, not yet anyway) to bring the leaders, the thinkers, the spiritual leaders and the scholars into a forum like this and talk to the West. Try to learn from each other what the problems are, what the issues of conflict are, what the prospects are for all of us to get out of this very, very bleak predicament for the world and for humanity.

I don't think one year is enough. I think the entire first decade of the new millennium should be devoted to 'dialogue amongst civilizations'. And I think it is going to be proposed at the General Assembly and I hope that our German friends, the German government, will support the extension of this one year into ten years at the United Nations. And let us work together in order to reduce the prospect of the clash of civilizations that would not be good for anyone, for any country, for any nation.

There are many reasons for tensions between states and amongst states in regions but there are also ways of handling and managing those tensions and conflicts. Each
region will have to handle their own problems in their own way. You have your way in Europe. We have our way in ASEAN or Southeast Asia. But I think since 11 September the issue is too large for one region to manage and to handle. We must be creative and experimental. We must try to string various elements together in an effort to contain the unfolding conflicts.

The only way forward for finding long-term solutions to this civilizational tension - not in any particular region but in the entire world - is 'dialogue among civilizations'. It has started. We only have to carry it forward with sincerity, mutual respect and commitment. And we will, I believe, have at least a chance to avoid the wider, more devastating conflicts, the more destructive confrontations, which loom large on the horizon of our common future.
Inter-governmental Tensions and European Union Contribution to Crisis Management

Antti Turunen

This presentation focuses on the European Union's potential role in enhancing regional stability in Asia. After the tragic events of 11 September in the United States, the European Union (EU) has become much more attentive to developments in Asia. International activities against terrorism and the situation in Afghanistan have been the focus of much EU diplomatic and humanitarian action since September. On 17 October 2001, EU foreign ministers discussed measures to combat terrorism, preparing the ground for the informal meeting of EU heads of state and government in Ghent on 19 October. The full impact of the latest events on the EU's policy on Asia remains to be seen, but some aspects can already be outlined at this stage, on the basis of current policy.

Current EU policy on Asia is characterized by the following factors: cooperative engagement, a multilateral approach and the promotion of basic values. The EU is interested in developing good relations with Asian countries, which, until the mid-nineties, were based principally on the economic interests of member states. Since then, political dialogue has gradually become an important element of the EU's relationship with Asian countries. A key objective of the political dialogue has been to enhance mutual understanding and cooperation on issues like non-proliferation, the environment and the fight against international threats, drug trafficking and terrorism.

The EU's multilateral approach in Asia has been characterized by an emphasis on cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The EU has also launched initiatives like the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process in order to promote wider regional dialogue with Asia and Europe. During the past ten years, this trend has been complemented by the development of an enhanced dialogue with Japan, China, India and Indonesia.

Promotion of open markets and human rights have been key to the EU's political engagement in Asia. This will undoubtedly continue, but, following the 11 September events, EU policy in Asia will take on a new dimension. I will discuss this later, but let me first turn to current interstate issues in Asia, where the EU might also have to focus in the future.

The strategic dynamic in Asia has evolved profoundly during the last ten years owing to a number of contributing factors. One of these is China's rapidly developing economic and political influence in the region; another is Japan's current economic stagnation, which is turning it towards a more inward-looking foreign policy. Thirdly, there is a long-term trend of moving from autocratic regimes towards gradual democratization. The cases of the Philippines, Indonesia and inter-Korean dialogue illustrate the latter trend.

Fourthly, the potential for violent regional conflicts remains high in parts of Asia. In the subcontinent, the ongoing war in Afghanistan and clashes between India and Pakistan illustrate this point. Likewise, the latent tension across the Taiwan Straits and the security and freedom of navigation and
rival territorial claims in the South China Sea continue to be of major concern.

Fifthly, the Pacific Basin has become the primary area of concern for the United States, and Washington is reorienting its forces away from its traditional European focus and giving greater attention to the Pacific and East Asia.

Furthermore, nuclear and missile proliferation and high levels of defence spending in the region emphasize security risks in the present situation. These and many unsolved border and minority issues maintain inter-governmental tensions in Asia. From the point of view of conflict prevention, the institutional framework for confidence building and conflict resolution is still very weak compared to the situation in Europe. Nevertheless, the late 1990s have seen a marked increase in efforts at regional dialogue and cooperation, particularly in East Asia, with the birth of the ‘ASEAN + 3’ dialogue (and the earlier establishment of an East Asian presence in ASEM), with the gradual strengthening of the ARF as a confidence-building forum, and with increasing signs of a growing sense of East Asian identity.

At the same time, ASEAN seems to have lost some of its momentum in recent years, partly reflecting Indonesia’s preoccupation with internal concerns, and partly reflecting the underlying difficulty of some of the issues with which ASEAN has been faced (for example, in completing the ASEAN Free Trade Area [AFTA], in responding to the financial crisis, and in absorbing three new members). In South Asia, which in many respects remains distinct from the rest of the region, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation offers the opportunity for broad regional cooperation with diversified aims, even if political tensions continue to hamper it.

The economic crisis of 1997 already showed how vulnerable many Asian economies and societies are to external shock. The repercussions of the terrorist attacks in the United States illustrated this again, with incidents of social unrest in Muslim countries in the region, and with the risk of violent conflict spreading to Kashmir and elsewhere. Now, the focus of the international community has turned to South Asia, notably to Afghanistan and its neighbours. A failure in Afghanistan, or even an extended stalemate, may unleash forces that could create an unmanageable situation in countries with large Muslim populations. This is also a direct concern for the EU because of its economic and political interests in Asia.

How could the EU address these issues?

It is too early to tell exactly what changes our foreign and security policy will undergo, but a new emphasis on external security issues is one likely outcome. The EU has already decided to enter into deeper dialogue with third countries on terrorism. This will include cooperation in the field of information exchange, closer ties between security and intelligence units and a multitude of cooperative measures to track down and bring to justice all perpetrators of terrorist acts. In Asia this could lead to more focused discussion on terrorism with individual countries, complementing the work already initiated by the G-7, the United Nations (UN) and the ARF.

Another level of activity will be an enhanced information campaign in order to overcome the misperception that anti-terrorist action is directed against Muslim nations. The EU is in a good position to develop mutual understanding between cultures because of its own multicultural character and, in particular, its traditionally good relations with Muslim countries.

Moreover, the EU can promote regional stability in South Asia by engaging the
neighbouring states of Afghanistan in a dialogue for a peace settlement. The EU has no ambition to become a major player in the peace process, but we can support the UN-led process, which can hopefully be launched as soon as the military action is over. In its contacts with the countries in the region, the EU could enhance common understanding on an internationally acceptable peace settlement in Afghanistan. It is likely that the EU will also play an important role in possible reconstruction efforts as part of an international peace plan.

The EU’s active engagement in strengthening global action against terrorism is enhanced by new capabilities in the sphere of foreign and security policy. The EU’s external relations have been transformed as a result of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy was created in 1993. This was strengthened in 1999 by launching a European Security and Defence Policy and the increasing importance of justice and home affairs issues in our external relations. The role of the High Representative, supported by the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and the EU Military Staff, in addition to the enhanced capabilities of the Commission, have increased the possibilities for the EU’s global action.

An example of the EU’s timely involvement in Asia was the EU Troika trip last May to Pyongyang and Seoul in order to reinvigorate the peace process in the Korean peninsula. In the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks the EU has been engaged in dialogue with countries in South Asia and Middle East. These events highlight the fact that the EU, in cooperation with the United States, can complement other international efforts towards a more stable and secure world. Furthermore the EU’s financial contribution to international humanitarian assistance and reconstruction are an important part of the European tool box for conflict prevention and crisis management, which provide possibilities for engagement in Asia as well.

Just before the events of 11 September, the Commission issued a proposal on a new Asia strategy which aims – among other things - to contribute to peace and security in the region and globally through a broadening of EU engagement with the region. The first EU Asia Strategy of 1994 has served us well, but the world has moved on since then, with significant economic and political changes both in Asia and in the EU, and with the acceleration of globalization. In the coming years, the EU will experience a further transformation, with enlargement on the horizon, with the single market and single currency achieving their full potential, and with a continued strengthening in EU policy coordination, both in foreign policy and in justice and home affairs policies.

Preparations are currently well underway for the enlargement of the Union from 2003 onwards, with the eventual perspective of a European Union of up to 28 members, and a population of 544 million. The Nice Treaty, when ratified, will further consolidate EU institutions and prepare the ground for enlargement. With its enhanced capabilities the enlarged Union will be able to play a more significant role in world politics in support of democracy, peace and prosperity.
Conference Summary

Norbert von Hofmann

From 19-20 October 2001, more than 50 politicians, scientists and military experts from eight Asian countries and Germany gathered in Berlin to discuss common aspects of security policy and related fields. Most of the participants had attended events on security matters convened by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Asia or Germany in the past. In Berlin, the dialogue was geared to provide an opportunity to exchange experiences, to enhance the regional and international dialogue on security policy in Asia and in Europe, and to discuss European and Asian concepts of peaceful conflict settlement and crisis prevention.

When this conference was planned in late April 2001, no-one could have foreseen the brutal terrorist attacks which would take place in New York and Washington DC in September 2001. Even though the outcome of these attacks was not explicitly part of the conference programme, there was reference given to the situation in Afghanistan and its implications in nearly all the statements, drawn like a red thread through the discussions.

Nevertheless, the participants came to the conclusion that terrorism had already been in existence long before 11 September and that the world has therefore not changed profoundly. In many parts of Asia terrorism has an old and long history. Hence, international terrorism was seen at most in a new light, a new dimension, or as a new factor in transnational relations.

It was in this context that Professor Hans-Joachim Gießmann, from the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, posed the following questions:

- How far have changes, caused by globalization, in economy, technology, culture and society, contributed to the rise of fundamentalism in the world?
- Is the result of this globalization an ever-expanding injustice and inequality?
- Does the spread of political conflict legitimate the tolerance or the use of violence as a means to conflict resolution?

Most participants agreed that terrorism in its final analysis is only a symptom. It has its roots in poverty, the mismanagement of resources and world-wide inequality. Therefore the world has to cope with the root causes. It is not advisable to start dividing the world into ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The former foreign minister of Thailand, Dr Surin Pitsuwan demanded that we all share the moral high ground: the world should not be divided into one group claiming ‘high morality’ exclusively for themselves and another group to which any morality is denied.

It was greatly regretted – and not just by participants from South Asia and Southeast Asia – that in the past the West had taken very little interest in problems associated with terrorism in the Asian region. In Asia terrorism is a prevailing problem that existed long before the September 2001 attacks.

German experts provided insightful views on the threat of terrorism and its impact on German policy. German Minister of
Defence Rudolf Scharping outlined the consequences for the German government as follows:

1. A comprehensive approach to security should be adopted to address those challenges. For that purpose a wide spectrum of instruments, not only military, but also political, economic and even cultural, have to be put in place.

2. The promotion of regional cooperation and regional stability must be strengthened substantially. Progress in the Middle East process has to be put at the top of the agenda. Regional groupings will gain in their significance, and there are many promising examples in Asia like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Europe should share its experiences in regional cooperation with its Asian partners.

3. International security organizations and the cooperation among those organizations have to be strengthened, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Asia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Europe, and the United Nations (UN).

4. The enlargement and deepening of the dialogue with Germany’s partners in Asia is part of the German government’s response to the new challenges. Long-term visions are necessary to do justice to all day-to-day decisions.

Many participants suggested that after the horrific attacks the world community should take the chance being offered to enhance cooperation. 11 September also offers, despite all risks and conflicts, clear opportunities for the future. Mr Gernot Erler, a security expert in the German Federal Parliament drew a parallel back to history when the anti-Hitler Alliance was formed in the 1940s. The global alliance against terrorism could also result in a new political world order. But joining alliances carries responsibilities for all participating nations, for example, solving regional and local conflicts. In the same way as South Asia is hostage to the Kashmir conflict, conflicts in Europe, like those in the former Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Northern Ireland, have to be solved when shaping a new political world order. The anti-terror alliance should be just the first step towards enhanced long-term cooperation.

A crucial instrument to link long-term visions to short-term actions could be a dialogue between cultures and civilizations as demanded by Dr Surin Pitsuwan. The representatives of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung at the conference promised to explore this idea for further proceedings.

Mr Gernot Erler as well as Mr Antti Turunen from the Policy Unit of the EU pointed to three main areas of European interest in Asia:

1. stability;
2. economic and social development; and
3. compliance with human rights, good governance and the rule of law.

In the discussion, a main focus was given to the role of security institutions in Asia and in Europe. Asian participants highlighted that Asia is too diverse to reach a common security policy. Regional powers, like China or Russia, are focusing on internal policy; nuclear armament is alarming; there are enormous differences in political systems which span from absolute monarchy to communist regimes; economies vary from the richest industrialized state to the poorest developing country; in geographical terms the distance between West and East Asia is tremendous. From this perspective, Europe was seen as forming much more of a solid
block, sharing a common history and experiences, and with a profound practice in multilateralism. For most Asian participants it was therefore rather difficult to compare Asian regions or Asia to Europe, or to use Europe as a model for Asia and regional cooperation.

In Asia, the ARF is today by far the largest framework for a regional security dialogue. Unfortunately the ARF has still not gone beyond the first stage of confidence-building measures. The second stage, to implement mechanisms for preventive diplomacy, has not yet been reached. This was partly explained by the lack of instruments, including the lack of institutions.

According to Professor Hans-Joachim Gießmann, there are several settings the Asia of today shares and compares with the Europe at the beginning of the Helsinki process. At the Helsinki Conference, Europe was also considered too diverse for a common security arrangement: there was a high degree of military confrontation, mistrust amongst political leaders, and national interests dominated, but there was also increasing interest in finding a form of cooperation. Professor Gießmann advised against the pure cloning of European experiences from the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process to Asia. Instead he suggested studying the norms and principals of the CSCE process. The two German parliamentarians and foreign policy experts, Gert Weißkirchen and Gernot Erler, supported this idea and asked the Asian participants to at least study and apply some of the concepts of the CSCE process.

Dr Surin Pitsuwan provided several positive examples of how ASEAN dealt with regional conflicts, like the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea and East Timor. Europeans tend to see too little progress with the ARF and regret that ASEAN and ARF are not institutionalized enough. The Western approach is, in his opinion, too focused on institutionalization and substantial outcome. Asians, for example, tend to evaluate the simple fact that North Korea is joining the ARF as remarkable progress already.

In Asia, non-interference in internal affairs still characterizes the key of inter-regional relations. But there are some cautious chances evolving, and terms like ‘flexible engagement’ or ‘increased mutual influence’ are being used.

Professor Lee Seo-hang from Korea provided his expertise on the institutional process of the ARF, which has for him the furthest reaching framework for a continental security dialogue. Professor Lee summarized that only a strengthened ARF will ensure inter-regional security cooperation with Europe.

According to European participants, current local and regional conflicts in Asia might influence the regional and global stability and security of tomorrow. Professor Gießmann pleaded for a strong multi-layered security system and suggested several mechanisms, amongst them global cooperation within the framework of the United Nations, regional cooperation of NGOs and issue-related cooperation of track-two institutions.

The role of track-two institutions was examined on the first day of the conference. Professor Jürgen Rüland from the Arnold-Bergsträsser Institute at the University of Freiburg argued that the track-two dialogue was supposed to connect political decision makers with the broad public and raise the consciousness within both groups for political issues. Unfortunately it did not meet these high expectations. This became especially obvious when track two as well as ASEAN itself did not respond sufficiently to the financial crisis in Asia. Professor
Rüland identified several reasons for weak track-two institutions:

- track-two institutions rely too much on their governments (track one);
- track-two members are often recruited from or work part-time for public offices like government, administration, or the military;
- there is very little or no cooperation between track two and NGOs/civil society (track three).

But, on the contrary, Prince Norodom Sirivudh, the Chairman of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) as well as Dr Surin Pitsuwan, highlighted the outstanding role of track two in Asian countries and advised against judging them only in the context of the financial crisis. The CICP, being part of ASEAN-ISIS (ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies), had a crucial role preparing Cambodia for ASEAN membership and in overcoming the country's isolation.

Participants agreed that multipolarism is a result of and an answer to globalization. But there is also the risk of increasing fragmentation and rising nationalism, as observed in Indonesia. The rapprochement of the United States and China was viewed sceptically by several Asian participants. Dr Tan See Seng from the Singapore Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies brought the enlightening example, 'it doesn't matter whether two elephants fight or mate, the grass beneath them suffers'. Whatever big or regional powers do, it will affect the smaller countries. Dr Tan warned against a scenario where small countries have to side with one of the super-powers, inevitably dividing Asia as it was before the end of the Cold War.

Colonel Wang Guoqiang from the Chinese Academy for National Defence also stressed the need for multilateralism. He confirmed that China's growing economy would result in a greater strategic role for it in Asia and in more political confidence in the region. But at the same time he emphasized that China would not take on a leading role in a possible regional security structure. China does not have, in his words, the capability for this kind of leadership. In his opinion, most Asian participants would prefer a collective security system to a comprehensive security system like NATO.

The discussions on corporative security, collective security and comprehensive security were further expanded by Mr Riefqi Muna from the Indonesian Research Institute for Democracy and Peace. From a different perspective and from his Indonesian experiences he outlined two levels of security: a vertical level starting at the bottom with human security and ending at top with global security; and a horizontal level which covers, for example, economic security and environmental security, like the impact of deforestation. He demanded that we should always raise the questions of who would benefit from security and why do we want security?

There has been a shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts. Today, 90 per cent of conflicts are intrastate. Again, such intrastate conflicts can be divided into vertical conflicts ranging from rebellion to civil war and horizontal conflicts in the form of ethnic, communal or religious conflicts. Very few military personnel suffer from these conflicts compared with the very large numbers of civilians that do. And they suffer not only from injuries or death, but also from mass displacement, malnutrition, loss of work and educational opportunities and many more.

Mr Wolf Oschlies from Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin stated that regional instability and huge mass
displacements are not only an Asian issue but still occur in Europe today. Even Europeans with all their experience and multilateral institutions were not prepared to respond efficiently to the disaster in the former Yugoslavia. The Balkans has become a stronghold for supporters of Osama bin Laden, demonstrating once again how fast local and regional conflicts may reach a global dimension.

Finally, Dr Beate Bartoldus, Head of the Asia-Pacific Department in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung closed the conference with the following remarks: 'We in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung have the feeling that this conference was not only timely but also topical. We have started to exchange our views, we even referred to each other's opinions during the discussions. I am especially mentioning that because this cannot always be taken for granted in such a high level conference. Often participants just make statements instead of talking to each other. In this regard we see this meeting here in Berlin as a successful starting point of an ongoing security dialogue between Asia and Germany'.
Conference Programme

19-20 October 2001, Berlin

Friday, 19 October 2001

9:00 am  Opening of the Conference
          Hans-Ulrich Klose, German Federal Parliament

9:15 am   The Contribution of Track-two Dialogue to Crisis Prevention
          Jürgen Rüland, University of Freiburg, Germany
          Norodom Sirivudh, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace

10:45 am  The ASEAN Regional Forum and European Security Interests
          Lee Seo-hang, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea
          Gert Weßkirchen, German Federal Parliament

11:45 am  Security Policy and Global Stability
          Rudolf Scharping, German Federal Ministry of Defence

2:30 pm   German/European Security Interests in Asia
          Gernot Erler, German Federal Parliament
          Wang Guoqiang, Chinese Academy for National Defence
          Ashok K. Mehta, Indian Defence Review

4:30 pm   Multipolarism and ‘Global Players’ in Asia
          Hans-Joachim Gießmann, University of Hamburg, Germany
          Tan See Seng, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore
          Naeem Ahmad Salik, Ministry of Defence, Pakistan

7:00 pm   ‘The Contributions of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung towards International Security Dialogue and Peaceful Conflict Solution’ – Dinner speech by Anke Fuchs,
          Member of the German Federal Parliament, Vice President of the Deutsche Bundestag, Vice Chairperson of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
## Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2002

### Saturday, 20th October 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Organizations/Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:30 am</td>
<td>Reasons for Regional Instability: Internal Fractures and Crises</td>
<td>Riefqi Muna, Research Institute for Democracy and Peace, Indonesia</td>
<td>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wolf Oschlies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15 am</td>
<td>Reasons for Regional Instability: Inter-governmental Tensions</td>
<td>Surin Pitsuwan, Parliament of Thailand</td>
<td>Antti Turunen, EU Policy Unit, Brussels, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:30 pm</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Norbert von Hofmann, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn/Berlin, Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00 pm</td>
<td>Closing Remarks</td>
<td>Beate Bartoldus, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn/Berlin, Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conference Participants (in alphabetical order)

Germany

Dr Beate Bartoldus, Head, Department for Asia and the Pacific, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Professor Egon Bahr, former Federal Minister
Brigadegeneral Jürgen Bornemann, Federal Ministry of Defence
Mr Detlef Dzembritzki, Member of Federal Parliament, Member of the Economic Cooperation and Development Committee in the German Federal Parliament
Mr Gernot Erler, Member of Federal Parliament, Deputy Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Parliamentary Group
Mr Roland Feicht, South East Asia Desk, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Professor Dr Hans-Joachim Gießmann, Deputy Director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg
Professor Dr Volker Grabowsky, Westfälische Wilhelms-University, Münster
Dr Günter Gruber, Head, Southeast Asia Department, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr Ernst-J. Kerbusch, Director, Division for International Cooperation, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Dr Hans-Ulrich Klose, Member of Federal Parliament, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Federal Parliament, Member of the Board of Directors of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Dr Klaus Kübler, Lawyer, former Member of Federal Parliament
Dr Kai Möller, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Professor Dr Wolf Ossenies, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Dr Wolfgang Piecha, Head, ASEAN Department, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Professor Dr Werner Pfennig, Freie Universität, Berlin
Mr Johannes Pflug, Member of Federal Parliament, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the German Federal Parliament
Mr Fritz Rademacher, Asia Desk, Federal Ministry of Defence
Dr Wolfgang Röhr, Head, East Asia Department, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Professor Dr Jürgen Rüland, Director, Arnold-Bergsträßer Institute, University of Freiburg
Mr Dirk Sawitzky, Expert, German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Parliamentary Group
Mr Dieter Schanz, Advisor on Asia Affairs, German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Parliamentary Group
Mr Rudolf Scharping, Member of Federal Parliament, Federal Ministry of Defence
Dr Walter J. Schmid, Head, Disarmament and Arms Control, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr Erwin Schweisshelm, Southeast Asia Desk, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Mr Antti Turunen, EU Policy Unit, General Secretariat, Council of Europe
Mr Frank Umbach, Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations
Mr Norbert von Hofmann, East Asia Desk, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Dr Klaus Julian Voll, Freie Universität, Berlin
Dr Gudrun Wacker, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Mr Wolfgang Weege, Deputy Head, Department for International Policy, Social Democratic Party of Germany
Professor Gert Weißkirchen, Member of Federal Parliament, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the German Federal Parliament
Dr Almut Wieland-Karimi, South Asia Desk, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Asia
Mr Roskan Affandi, Political Department, Indonesia Embassy
Mr Puneet Agrawal, Second Secretary, Policy Department, Indian Embassy
Dr Clarita Carlos, Director, National Defence College of the Philippines
Mrs Chen Huaifan, Member, Chinese Association for Arms Control and Disarmament, PR China
Mr Du Kening, Council Member, Chinese Association for International Understanding, PR China
HE Mr Asif Ezdi, Ambassador, Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Dr Gao Zugui, Expert, Research Institute for Contemporary International Relation, PR China
HE Mr Hwang Won-Tak, Ambassador, Republic of Korea
HE Mr Rahardjo Jamtomo, Ambassador, Republic of Indonesia
HE Mr Surapong Jayanama, Ambassador, Royal Thai Embassy
Mr Oscar Kerketta, Head of Chancellery, Indian Embassy
Brigadier Harwant Krishan, Military Attaché, Indian Embassy
General Ashok Krishna, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, India
Mr George Lekahena, Second Secretary, Indonesian Embassy
Dr Lee Seo-hang, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea
Mrs Lin We, Third Secretary, Sub-Division Western Europe, International Department, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, PR China
General Ashok K. Mehta, Consulting Editor, Indian Defence Review, India
Mr M. Riefqi Muna, Vice Executive Director, Research Institute for Democracy and Peace, Indonesia
HRH Prince Norodom Sirivudh, Supreme Privy Counsellor to H.M. The King, Member of the Senate, and Chairman of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace
Professor Paik Jin-hyun, Seoul National University, Korea
Mr Mark Pierce, Councillor, Australian Embassy
Dr Surin Pitsuwan, Member of Parliament, former Foreign Minister, Thailand
Brigadier Naeem Ahmad Salik, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Pakistan
Dr Tan See Seng, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Colonel Wang Guoqiang, Research Professor, Institute for Strategic Studies, Chinese Academy for National Defence, PR China
Mrs Wang Lanping, Head of Department, Sub-Division Asia, International Department, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, PR China
HE Professor Walter Woon, Ambassador, Republic of Singapore
Professor Wu Xingtang, former Secretary General, Chinese Association for International Understanding, PR China
Dr Chao-Tzang Yawngwe, Member, Strategic Policy Committee of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma
Mrs Yu Xiaoxuan, Second Secretary, Embassy PR China
Mrs Clara Yuwono, Director for External Affairs, Centre for Security and International Studies, Indonesia
Mr Stephanus Yuwono, Councillor, Political Department, Indonesia Embassy
Mr Zaw Oo, Director, Policy and Research Programs, The Burma Fund, Washington DC