VALUES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Overview of the main findings of the 2019 European Values Study

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Sarajevo, 24 August 2020
INTRODUCTION

The European Values Study, EVS, is a longitudinal survey research programme covering 38 European countries. This major research project had started in 1981 when it was implemented in three Member States. In the most recent values study (2014-2019), Bosnia and Herzegovina was included for the first time as an associated EVS member. The life values study is conducted every ten years using the same methodology and measuring instruments in all countries. With the aim of achieving a higher scientific level, the EVS has rigorous methodological guidelines that are upgraded and improved following each survey wave; the questionnaire is adjusted and expanded to include topics that are important in the decade of preparations. The preparatory phase of the most recent wave of the EVS was marked by the migration crisis, so in addition to the broad range of life values such as: society and politics, family values, gender equality, work and leisure, sexuality and education, religion, it also included the topics of tolerance and solidarity with marginalised groups. Importantly, however, the basic questions have remained the same, allowing researchers to monitor the development of trends in the value system.

In our country, the European Value Study project was implemented by the Psychology Department at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Sarajevo. Jadranka Kolenović Đapo, Ph.D., is the National Programme Director for Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Jelena Brkić Šmigoc, Ph.D. is the Deputy National Programme Director.
METHODOLOGY

Sample

The survey was conducted on a representative sample of citizens (male and female) of BiH (N= 1724). The sample for our country was designed by Ivan Rimac, Ph.D. from the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb. Following strict methodological pre-determined sampling methods that are used in all countries participating in the survey, the target population was the whole population of Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 18 and above at the time of the survey. Persons in health and social care institutions were excluded from the sample. The survey sample adhered to the rules of probabilistic sampling, where the probability of being selected to became part of the survey sample can be tracked. This produced a three-stage probabilistic sample of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina over 18 years of age (the upper age limit was not defined). The sample is heterogeneous according to all parameters: sex, age, geographic, ethnic or social origin. All citizens of BiH over 18 were equally likely to be selected for the final survey unit, and the probability that a settlement would be selected was proportional to the number of adults living there. In the second stage of sampling, constituencies were randomly selected for further selection of the respondents, which was done by counting 10 dwellings, starting from the first dwelling, and the 10th dwelling was selected to participate in the survey. Households were defined as dwellings irrespective of the number of families living in that particular dwelling. In the third stage, a household member over 18 years of age living in the chosen dwelling was randomly selected (using the last birthday method) to participate in the survey.
As already mentioned, the survey included 1724 respondents, 751 men and 973 women. With regards to their education level, 135 respondents had not completed primary school; 212 had completed primary education; 1071 respondents had completed secondary school. 263 respondents had completed two or more years of post-secondary education programmes, and 23 respondents had masters or doctorate degrees (21 respondents left this question unanswered). Out of the overall sample, most respondents were married (942); 460 were single; 222 were widowed persons; 56 were divorced; 18 respondents lived in a partnership; six respondents were separated from their families; 18 respondents chose not to answer and two respondents selected the option “unknown”.

**Measuring instrument**

The questionnaire included 110 questions that had been translated into Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian languages, and forms were printed in Latin and Cyrillic script. The questions from the questionnaire measure the values an individual cherishes with respect to marriage, family, personal well-being, job satisfaction, work ethic, the role of the state and the community in general in the life of the individual, and questions that measure social identity values (national and religious), attitudes towards others and towards political parties and institutions.

**Procedure**

The data were collected between 1 February and 30 May 2019 at 151 locations in BiH. More than 3,000 households were contacted to ultimately generate data from the sample of 1740 respondents. The field survey was implemented by the CustomConcept Agency from Sarajevo, with strict internal and external controls. The survey was conducted by 75 interviewers. The interviewers had undergone training given by the National
Programme Director. According to EVS rules, the selected interviewees or households were to receive the Notification Letter beforehand. For the purpose of achieving the highest possible response rate, all EVS rules related to attempts to contact the respondents were implemented. It was necessary to have at least four contact attempts to increase the likelihood of having the selected respondents agree to the interview. The time of the first contact was precisely defined (after 6 pm on workdays and after 10 am on Saturdays). The survey was conducted using the face-to-face method. The survey was done in line with all the relevant ethical principles and in accordance with European regulations and the Law on the Protection of Personal Information of the respondents who had given their informed consent beforehand. The respondents were also informed that the survey was anonymous and that the data would be stored and available in the EVS data achieve, DAS, which is maintained by GESIS in Cologne. The interviewers were given the necessary equipment for conducting the survey: a tablet, general instructions, accreditation letter, interviewers’ ID card, interviewer control form, notification letter, cards containing the offered responses, questionnaire with the form for contacting the respondents, country/language codes and occupation codes. The interviews lasted 45 minutes on average.

Results

The obtained data are presented as percentages, and for some of the variables we calculated their mutual relation and tested the differences based on socio-demographic characteristics. The following variables were included among socio-demographic characteristics: sex, education level, generation of the respondents, and administrative units: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska and Brčko District. In view of the particularities and variations among different generations, we decided in favour of the criterion that is currently

This Review Paper features the main findings of the Values Study in BiH.

**Psychological well-being of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Out of the total sample (N=1722), when asked “Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?”, the greatest percentage of respondents (58%) said they were happy; 31 percent reported being “very happy”; 9.2% said they were “not very happy”, and 2.2% that they were “not at all happy”. Similar data was obtained from both sexes. The results are consistent with results reported by other authors too. Analysis of percentages for age cohorts suggests some variations among generations. The highest percentage of those who see themselves as “very happy” was found among Gen Z respondents (48%), followed by Gen Y (42%), while Gen X respondents exhibited a significantly lower share of those who were “very happy” (28.5%), similar to Gen BB respondents (21%). As expected, higher percentages of “not very happy” responses were found among members of Gen BB (14.3%) and Gen X (8.2%).

In terms of education level, 17% of respondents who had not completed primary education said they were “very happy”; 61% that they were “quite happy”, 26% “not very happy” and six percent reported that they were “not at all happy”. Out of the total number of respondents who had completed primary school, 22% reported being “very happy”, 62% “quite happy”, 11% “not very happy”, while five percent of the respondents were “not at all happy”. Most of the respondents (59.2%) with secondary education see themselves as “quite happy”, there
are 31.2% who feel “very happy”, eight percent are “not very happy”, and a minute percentage say that taking all things together, they are not at all happy. Among the university educated respondents, the highest percentage (54%) see themselves as “quite happy”; there are 31.3% who are “very happy”, while eight percent say that they are not that happy. The respondents with the highest level of education are “very happy” (87%) or “quite happy” (21%).

And finally, an analysis of overall happiness was conducted with respect to the administrative division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A little over one half of all respondents from FBiH, RS and DB said they were “quite happy” (59%, 56% and 52%, respectively); most of those who are “very happy” are in the Brčko District (46%), followed by the Federation of BiH (31%) and Republika Srpska (30%). Most of those who are “not very happy” are to be found in RS (12%), followed by the Federation of BiH (8.2%) and the Brčko District (2.3%).

Health status self-assessment

At the time of the survey, citizens assessed their health status as “good” (32.9%), “very good” (30.7%), “fair” (27.8%), “poor” (7.4%) and “very poor” (1.3%). Health status assessment showed some variation between men and women in the sample. While 33.6% of men see their health status as “very good”, a somewhat lower percentage of women say that their health is “very good” (28.5%). 8.75% of women and 7.1% of men see their health as “poor/very poor”. Differences between how men and women assess their health may also be caused by biological and socio-cultural factors. Generally, in contrast to men, women go through several critical periods in their lives: pregnancy, birthing, menstrual cycle, menopause. In addition to biological factors, women are in an unequal position compared to men. In many societies, women are exposed to more stress
because of the housework they are expected to do, and this impacts their health among other things.

Also, important inter-generational variations were found when it comes to the self-assessment percentages. Most of the Gen BB respondents assessed their health as “fair” (45.1%), most of Gen X (40.3%) as “good”, while the majority of Gen Y (50.3%) and Gen Z respondents (60.7%) said they were of “very good” health. Differences in health assessment were also found among respondents of different education levels. The highest percentage of people who see their health as “very good”/“good” was found among respondents with doctorate/master’s degrees (95.7%), followed by respondents with university education (76.7%), with secondary education (68%), and primary education (47.4%), while the lowest percentage was found among respondents who had not completed primary education (25.2%). There was a negligible percentage of respondents with a university degree or secondary school education level who described their own health as “poor”/“very poor” (5.7%; 4.9%), as opposed to respondents with primary education (15.9%) and those without completed primary education (31.8%) who described their health as “poor”/“very poor”. Other authors have also noted that the healthier population is also the better educated one (for example, Pilić and Džakula, 2013). Better educated people have higher incomes that enable them to enjoy better health conditions, better health information, thus making them more “health literate”, which in turn helps them make the right decisions about their treatment. It is well documented that individuals with lower education levels have lower levels of health literacy, which is reflected in their poorer health outcomes (more chronic illnesses, less cooperative in implementing recommended treatments, bad lifestyle choices, higher mortality rates, etc.). This situation negatively impacts not only the health but also the social and economic
development of BiH. The results obtained in this study should translate into priority strategic objectives of BiH authorities at all levels. Taking care of peoples’ health is directly linked to the economic development of a society.

Furthermore, the obtained mean $M = 7.82$ ($SD = 2.157$) suggests that citizens are generally happy with their lives. Similar average values were obtained for both sexes and for all age cohorts. However, the lowest mean value was calculated for the group of respondents who had not completed primary education ($M = 5.1$), who say they are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with their lives.
GENERAL LIFE VALUES

Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were first asked to assess the importance that the following have in their lives: family, religion, politics, work, friends/acquaintances and leisure time. They were asked to circle on a scale of 1 (very important) to 4 (not at all important) the number that best corresponds to the importance they assign to the above value systems. For the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, family is the most important aspect of life (97.7%), followed by work (66.3%), friends and acquaintances (53.29%), leisure time (47.6%), religion (40.1%), and finally, the least important in their view is politics. Politics is not at all important for 41.9% and not unimportant for 33.7% of respondents. Out of the total sample, only 18% of citizens said politics was quite important for them. The order of importance of values is similar irrespective of the respondents’ sex.

Of all the value systems in BiH, family is the highest ranked value. In numerous surveys that have addressed the structure and hierarchy of values over the past three decades, family remains the most important value (Raboteg-Šarić, Pečnik, Josipović, 2003; Mrnjaus, 2008). Clearly, the function of family is not mere reproduction of the species. According to Gecas (1990) and Hess (1995), the family is a social institution with a dual role: (1) it enables the reproduction of society, and (2) it promotes the psychosocial development of individuals across their lifespan. Integrating these two functions, Caprara and Cervone (2003, p. 296) state “[t]he family carries out these functions by transmitting social values and norms and by supporting the next generation’s development.” The authors see these two functions of a family as mutually related forms of social control and individual promotion. More specifically, Caprara and Cervone (2003) see this form of social exchange as a cycle where
family members work together, trading obligations and limitations on their personal freedom in exchange for support and assistance from other family members. Consequently, family support “contributes to the achievements of the individual and the society”. Next, work is the second-ranked value. Generally, work has great value in the life of an individual primarily because it satisfies a basic human need – the need for security. This need gains urgency as society becomes poorer. Work as a value system exceeds the primary need for security and provides an individual with additional privileges, impacting his or her personal development. Interestingly, the highest percentages of respondents for whom work is very important belong to Gen Y and Gen X, while it is somewhat less important for the youngest (Gen Z) and the oldest (Gen BB) generations. Younger generations are often less contented with their lot, more eager for change and less tolerant of routine (Csikszentmihalyi, 2006). The differences can also be explained by the trend of moving away from the traditional way of life, where “work was meaningfully related to people’s identities and their ultimate goals”. As foreseen by Csikszentmihalyi (2006, p. 274), young people will likely “keep widening the gap between jobs that are necessary but unpleasant, and leisure pursuits that are enjoyable but have little complexity”. Friends and acquaintances are the third-ranked value system, which is understandable since, on the one hand, we are biologically programmed to see others as important parts of the world, and on the other, we are social beings per se with a “deeply rooted need to connect to other people.”

Marriage and family: duration and survival

Citizens of BiH have a generally positive opinion of marriage. Out of the total sample, 90.3 percent of respondents believe that marriage is not an outdated institution, with only 9.7 percent believing it to be an outdated institution. The institution
of marriage is generally accepted positively in BiH, despite statistical data gathered by the Agency for Statistics of BiH that show an increase in divorce rates in BiH. As the most important determinants for a successful marriage or partnership, respondents have identified faithfulness (85.7%), followed by children (75%), an adequate income (50.7%), good housing (58.6%), and sharing household chores (46.8%), while 43% of respondents think that for a successful marriage/partnership, it is also very important to have time for one’s own friends and for personal hobbies and activities. Although in the overall sample children were ranked high as a determinant for a successful marriage, right after faithfulness, a significantly lower percentage of Gen Z respondents (64.4%), compared to other generations, believe that children are very important for the quality of a marriage/partnership.

Out of all the independent variables, and irrespective of education level, generation, sex, and administrative division, faithfulness and children were identified as the two most important determinants of a successful marriage or partnership. Although children are the second highest-ranking determinant for a successful marriage/partnership, statistics show that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the first nine months of 2019, there were 20,171 live births, which is 3.98% less compared to the same period in 2018; and that in the same period there were 27,985 deaths – 2.95% more than in 2018 (Agency for Statistics of BiH). This percentage should sound the alarm for the government and urge it to do everything in its power to reduce this negative trend in population growth.

**Family traditionalism**

Family traditionalism was measured by three statements. On the Likert scale of four degrees, the respondents were required to express their agreement with the following statements, as-
signing them a value from 1 – agree strongly to 4 – disagree strongly. Responding to the first statement: *Homosexual couples are as good parents as other couples,* 70.1 percent of respondents said they disagreed or disagreed strongly with the statement. 16.6% of respondents had a neutral opinion, while 13.2% of respondents expressed a positive opinion.

The results clearly show that the majority of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina believe that homosexual couples cannot be as good parents as other couples. We observed a difference in views between men and women in the degree of agreement with the above statement. There were also inter-generational differences: a smaller percentage of younger generations were found to express the traditional and conservative opinion compared to older generations. A pronounced negative position was registered among respondents with the highest and those with the lowest levels of education. Such results were expected in light of data indicating that citizens of BiH are not very tolerant of homosexuals. Clearly, traditional prejudices are alive and well; however, lack of confidence in homosexual couples as parents is also a consequence of deeply rooted social representations of maternal and paternal roles that are internalised by children very early on. Numerous findings in different cultures have shown the effects of raising children by heterosexual couples and they strongly suggest that the psychosocial adjustment of children is more dependent on the quality of parenting than on the sexual orientation of the parents.

An analysis of the responses to the statement: “*It is a duty towards society to have children*” suggests that persons with lower education exhibit more family traditionalism. Namely, among respondents with less than primary education, the largest percentage (60.1%) believe that having children is a duty towards society, followed by people with completed primary education
(47.2%), and respondents with secondary education (35.8%), while 29.1 percent of respondents with master’s/doctoral degrees and 30.3 percent of respondents with university education said they agreed/agreed strongly with the above statement. Conversely, 43.2 percent of respondents with university education as well as 30.4% of respondents with master’s/doctoral degrees disagree strongly that having children is a duty towards society. The third statement from this set of family traditionalism questions was “Adult children have the duty to provide long-term care for their parents.” The majority of citizens of BiH (80.4%) agree/agree strongly with this statement. Similar trends were observed among different socio-demographic groups (sex, education and generation) and in all administrative units of BiH (BD – 88.8%; FBiH – 80.6%; RS – 79.5%).
ATTITUDES TO GENDER EQUALITY

The questionnaire used in the survey contains eight statements that examine individuals’ views regarding gender equality. A composite value scale was used and respondents were asked to express their degree of agreement with the following: Q1: When a mother works for pay, the children suffer. Q2: A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children. Q3: All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job. Q4: A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family. Q5: On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. Q6: A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl. Q7: On the whole, men make better business executives than women do. Q8: One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud.

Having analysed the responses, Bašić (2020) concludes that there is an evident clear pattern of polarisation of respondents’ views depending on the area where the gender roles are being examined. Specifically, respondents have positive opinions about equality of men and women in the public sphere, however, 56.4% of the respondents believe that family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job; the same percentage of respondents agree with the statement that most women really want a home and children. A significantly lower percentage (38.5%) of respondents believe that it is the man’s job to earn money, while the woman’s job is to look after the home and family. With respect to public gender roles, significantly fewer respondents (approximately 25%) believe that a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl; that men are better business executives than women do; and that men make better political leaders than women do (28%).
Interestingly, more women than men (65.4%) express traditional views and believe that it is the man’s job to earn money and the woman’s is to look after the home and family. Distribution of percentages by generations, as noted by Bašić (2020), suggests negligible differences in views among the generations regarding the role of women in the private sphere, where it is evident that members of Gen BB and Gen X incline more towards traditional positions, i.e. 62% of the Gen BB and 58.6% of Gen X respondents believe that women fulfil their potential primarily through family and children, and 51% of Gen BB and 46% of Gen X respondents are of the opinion that children suffer when the mother works for pay. Analysis of the percentages suggests a trend of breaking free from traditional gender roles (man as provider and woman as care giver) from one generation to the next: 44% of Gen BB and 31.3% of Gen Z respondents support a traditional division of labour. Less than a third of respondents agree with the statement that men make better political leaders and business executives than women, with noticeable differences in the opinions of respondents from different age cohorts. Specifically, a higher percentage among the oldest respondents believe that men make better political leaders and business executives than women do (29.1% and 25.9%) compared to Gen Y respondents (25% and 20.9%). The lowest level of agreement that university education is more important for boys than for girls is found among Gen X (8.4%) and Gen Y (12.6%) respondents. When explaining the inter-generational relatively stable patterns of gender inequality in the private sphere, Bašić (2020) relies on conclusions offered by Scott (2006). Actually, generational shift is not in itself a factor that contributes to changing values; what does so is secularism. Also, in addition to the openness of society, education has been shown to be the more important contributor to liberal gender views than sex or age group.
The results of the EVS study in our country show that respondents with lower levels of education have a more traditional (conservative) view of gendered division of labour, compared to respondents with higher levels of education. Thus, 47.7% of respondents with lower education believe that men make better political leaders than women do, and 50.4% believe that men make better business executives than women do. This percentage becomes significantly lower (20%) among respondents with higher levels of education.

Analysis by administrative units in BiH came up with some interesting findings. Significantly more respondents from BD (84.5%) believe that family life suffers when women work full time, compared with views of respondents from the entities: FBiH (51.6%) and RS (37.7%). Respondents from RS show more liberal views with respect to gender roles in both the private and the public sphere.
TRUST, SOLIDARITY AND TOLERANCE – VALUES THAT MAKE A BETTER COMMUNITY

The European Values Study (EVS) focuses special attention on monitoring community development and achieved modernisation level. This section presents responses regarding the perception of social identity and how individuals understand their relations with the community and its other members. Parameters such as the perception of one’s own identity (national); assessment of the importance of an essentialist/primordial national and European identity; the degree of identification with a local as opposed to a supra-national identity all point to the perception of one’s own community and territory as such.

Social identity and attitude towards it

When examining their social identity, respondents were asked to mark on a scale of 1 to 4 their agreement with statements that described the essentialist, primordial determination of a community. According to this understanding, the community is viewed as an integrative, basic, “biological” element of each individual. A primordial/essentialist understanding of community is assessed through the perception of necessity of a common history, language and customs. In the EVS study, questions regarding the primordiality of the community were geared towards assessing belonging to the national community, although ethnic and religious identity of the community is what is typically assessed in practice. This group of questions included the following variables: “being born in Bosnia and Herzegovina”,” respecting the political institutions and laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, “having ancestry from Bosnia and Herzegovina”, “speaking a language of the constitutive peoples of BiH (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian)”, and “sharing the culture of
Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Apart from determining the meaning of state/national identity, an assessment of European identity is also important for this study.

99.4% of the sample said they were citizens of BiH. When asked about affiliation with their country, 74% of the citizens said they are “very proud” or “quite proud” of being citizens of BiH, as opposed to 26% of citizens who said they are not proud of being citizens of BiH. The responses were evenly distributed among men and women, and among different generations. The responses do differ by level of education, with individuals with less than primary education being very proud of their BiH citizenship (81.9%), and respondents with university education demonstrating “national” pride to a somewhat lesser degree (68.5%). Still, it is important to note that the greatest difference was observed among the different administrative units in BiH. People from BD are the proudest of their BiH citizenship (88%), followed by those in FBiH (82.1%) and RS (66%).

The results of the expressed assessment of the degree of identification with the physical territory where a person lives suggest that the respondents, as expected, feel more affiliated with their local identities than those that are geographically and physically more distant. They feel mostly affiliated with their own city (91.7%), followed by the region (87.3%) and the state of BiH (80.7%), and they identify almost equally with Europe (56.6%) and the world (54%). Similar results were obtained from respondents irrespective of their sex or generation, while differences were observed among groups with different levels of education. The respondents with the highest level of education identify most closely with each of the offered categories of identity (60.9% with the world to 91.3% affiliation with one’s own city). We assume that education “expands horizons” and opens a person’s mind to various contexts of life, raising their awareness of multiple and fluid identities.
When disaggregated by administrative unit, the responses follow the general trend, showing stronger affiliation with local compared to supra-national contexts. Still, it is noticeable that respondents from FBiH express stronger affiliation with each level of geographic affiliation (58% with the world to 92% with their own city) compared to the other two groups. Equally, respondents from BD feel less affiliated with the European (44%) and world (40%) identity than respondents from RS (European 52%; world 57%) and FBiH (European 59.6%; world 58%).

When determining the essentialist understanding of identity of citizens of BiH, the highest values were obtained for the response “sharing the culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (88.2%), followed by “speaking a language of the constitutive peoples of BiH” (85.5%), and “respecting the political institutions and laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (83%). Somewhat lower, although still very high results were obtained for the determinant “being born in BiH” (77.2%) or “having BiH ancestry” (74.9%). Each of these characteristics is seen by citizens as very important for determining the identity of a BiH national. The same trends of results were found when considering the sex of the respondents, their generational cohort, education level and administrative unit.

Similar questions were asked regarding the description of European identity; the highest score was obtained by the determinant “to share European culture” (78.1%), followed by “to be born in Europe” (73.8%), and “to have European ancestry” (72%), while the lowest was given to the determinant “to be a Christian” (40.4%) as an essentialist/primordial element of European identity. The response trends did not vary by sex, generation or education level. With respect to each of the offered determinants of European identity, there are some discernible differences depending on the administrative unit of BiH. Namely, respondents from BD, as opposed to respondents
from RS or FBiH, see “to be born in Europe” and “to have European ancestry” as important elements of European identity, while the element “to be a Christian” is seen as the least important. At the same time, 51.9% of respondents from RS see “to be a Christian” as an important element of European identity, compared to 36% of the respondents from FBiH. Regarding other determinants of European identity, responses given by respondents from RS and FBiH suggest that citizens from RS see each of the offered determinants of European identity as less important than citizens from FBiH.

**Social trust**

Results of the survey suggest that a high percentage (90.4%) of citizens of BiH (N=1706) believe that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people. Responses given by men (9.4%) and women (9.8%) show equal assessment of low social trust. Analysis of the previous research wave from 2008 for the ExYu area showed that men tended to have less social trust than women, but the findings from that wave have not been confirmed on the sample in BiH (Bešić, 2014). Also, similar trends of social distrust have been observed in intergenerational analyses. With respect to the level of education, people who had completed primary school showed the highest social trust (11.9%), while those with the highest levels of education (master’s and doctoral degrees, 4.3%) show the lowest levels, despite the fact that according to the hypothesis of the socialising effect of education, the opposite would be expected. Inglehart (1997, qtd. in Vecchione et al. 2014) underlines that highly educated people are more likely to exhibit pro-participatory values and attitudes, resulting in increased political participation and social interaction of persons with higher education levels. The low level of social trust in transition countries has been reported by many authors (Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Fuchs & Klingemann, 2002; Mishler & Rose, 1997, qtd. in Rimac
and Štulhofer, 2004). Widespread corruption and a dysfunctional justice system have the most significant negative impact on the development of social trust.

In line with expectations regarding particular trust, the respondents showed the highest level of social trust with respect to their family (88.6% respondents have complete trust), followed by (although with significantly lower percentages) trust in people they know personally (23.3%) and people in their neighbourhood (17.2%). Citizens of BiH have the least social trust in people they meet for the first time (2.3%) and people of a different religion (5.9%) or ethnicity (5.7%). These results suggest the existence of general social distrust, all the more because most of the responses were grouped around the responses that one should trust people “partially” or “not too much”. These results are in line with the previously described generally low level of social trust (Brkić-Šmigoc, 2020).

Analysing the results of EVS (2008), Bešić (2014) found that the former socialist countries exhibit much lower levels of social trust compared to Western societies, and that being a citizen of a country that used to be part of the former Yugoslavia, due to the specific war and transition related experiences, makes things even more difficult and further diminishes the level of social trust compared to both the West and other post-communist countries of Europe. Social trust in BiH has been continuously low (Šalaj, 2009; Puhalo, Petrović, Perišić, 2010; Brkić Šmigoc, 2015). The steep decrease in social trust from 26.6% to 9.6% (EVS 2008 vs. EVS 2019) over one decade suggests that the protracted lack of political and social progress in BiH has contributed to citizens feeling that they are being constantly neglected (Brkić-Šmigoc, 2020).
Closeness and solidarity with others was measured by having the respondents use a scale of 1 (I am not at all concerned) to 5 (I am very much concerned) to assess how concerned they were about the living conditions of (1) sick and disabled people; (2) immigrants; (3) unemployed people, (4) elderly people; (5) Europeans; (6) fellow countrymen; (7) people of the region they live in; and (8) people in their neighbourhood. The results indicate very pronounced social concern for the living conditions of elderly people (34.8%), sick and disabled people (43.3%), and unemployed people (31.0%). In view of the migration wave affecting our country, it is interesting that the citizens of BiH are not overly interested or disinterested in the living conditions of migrants. None of the citizens are very concerned, 35.2% of the respondents are fairly concerned, while 33.9% of the respondents reported a moderate level of concern, and 30.3% are slightly interested to completely uninterested. The highest level of indifference was found with respect to the living conditions of Europeans (81.4%), and the lowest for the estimated living conditions of people in the neighbourhood (57.6%). Pronounced concern for others is shown more by respondents without completed primary education, followed by respondents with primary education and master’s/doctoral degrees, then by people with secondary education or university degree. These last two groups are the ones showing the least concern about the living conditions of the above groups.

Furthermore, this chapter also examined social distance: racial/ethnic intolerance and behavioural intolerance. Racial/ethnic distance concerns the level of expressed intolerance towards people of different religious or ethnic identity. In our study, racial/ethnic distance was measured by the respondents’ assessment of which of the following groups they would not want to
have as neighbours: immigrants–foreign workers, Christians, Muslims, Jews or Roma people. Behavioural distance concerns the distance from others because of their behaviour or characteristics that result from such behaviour. The questions indicating behavioural intolerance examine the respondents’ openness to having homosexuals, alcoholics or drug addicts as their neighbours.

The results show that citizens of BiH express stronger behavioural distance than racial / ethnic intolerance. Results on social distance support the interpretation that the value of tolerance is low and underdeveloped. There is a clear bias away from those who do not behave in line with applicable social norms. More than half of the citizens would rather not have alcoholics or drug addicts, or homosexuals as their neighbours. Roma are an undesirable group for more than one third of citizens, followed by immigrants, and members of different religions or races. The attitude of people of BiH towards immigrants and their influence on the development of BiH is moderately to very negative. Most people in BiH think that the effect of immigrants on the development of BiH is quite bad or very bad (49.8%), or neither good nor bad (40.0%), while only 10.1% of the population believes that the influence of immigration on the development of BiH is quite good/very good. There are some significant differences depending on the administrative unit of BiH, with people from FBiH expressing mostly neutral views (41.9%) to very negative (45.1%), while in RS people’s views are negative (62.2%) to neutral (33.3%). In the Brčko District, views are mostly neutral (72.7%).

Immigrants are a partially desirable group in the community and are perceived as a security rather than an economic threat. In addition to the general assessment of the effect that the immigrant population has on the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, views and positions were also examined
with respect to the threat immigrants may present to the employment of BiH nationals, the influence of immigrants on increased crime in society, and the strain they may place on the welfare system of BiH. Respondents made an assessment on a semantic differential scale of opposing positions ranging from 1 to 10. The resulting central values suggest that citizens see immigrants as a group that puts a strain on the welfare system (C=3.00), and makes the crime situation worse (C=3.00). Assessments of whether it is better if immigrants to maintain their distinct customs and traditions after arriving to BiH society are neutral (C= 5.00). Assessment values are very high with respect to the opinion that immigrants do not jeopardise the jobs of BiH citizens (C=8.00).
WORK VALUES IN THE POPULATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

Work values were measured using the two key areas of work: preferred job characteristics and work ethic. The respondents’ task was to select what they consider the most important aspects of a job among the following six options: good pay, good working hours, opportunity to use initiative, generous holidays, feeling that you can achieve something, and a responsible job. According to the obtained indicators, as noted by Bašić (2020), the majority of the respondents consider extrinsic values to be of importance: good pay (83.7%) and good working hours (67.6%). The intrinsic value of “feeling that you can achieve something” ranks third according to slightly more than one half of the respondents (56.1%). The least selected job aspects were the intrinsic values of ‘a responsible job’ (30.5%) and ‘an opportunity to use initiative’ (27.8%). Also, slightly less than half of the respondents value generous holidays (43.2%). When looking at the obtained results along the axis of extrinsic-intrinsic motivation for work, it is clear that the material (extrinsic) dimension/advantages of work are highly ranked (pay, working hours, holidays). Only one third of respondents consider the opportunity to use initiative and having responsibility at work to be important. Similar data were obtained from respondents of both sexes. Good pay is important for 84.2% of men and 83.4% of women, and good working hours are considered equally important (67.6%) by both men and women. However, women selected intrinsic work values more often than men. Hence, the only highly-ranked intrinsic factor – “feeling that you can achieve something” – was chosen by more women (58.8%) than men (52.7%). There was a similar trend for
the variable of “a responsible job”, which was chosen by 32% of women compared to 28.6% of men (Bašić, 2020).

Generally speaking, the most significant work motivation for all generations is good pay, and we can see the percentages steadily growing higher from one generation to the next: from 81.3% - Gen BB, 84.3% - Gen X, 85.7% - Gen Y to 87% - Gen Z. The second most selected source of motivation was good working hours, which was selected by more respondents of Gen Y (76.6%) and Gen X (71.7%), compared to the 62.3% of Gen BB and 63% of Gen Z respondents. Increasing percentages were also found for the extrinsic motivator of generous holidays: every subsequent generation has a higher percentage of those to whom this aspect of a job was important: from 37.9% of Gen BB respondents to 50% of Gen Z respondents, and the same is true of the intrinsic motive of “feeling that you can achieve something”/meaningful job, which is important for 53.6% of Gen BB, 55.1% of Gen X, 61.1% of Gen Y and 60.3% of Gen Z respondents. On the other side, the readiness to select a job on the basis of it being responsible is on the decline: while 33.7% of Gen BB respondents found a responsible job important, this percentage amounts to only 24.8% for Gen Y respondents. The intrinsic value of self-initiative, which is important for only a third of the respondents, is slightly more represented among Gen Y (35.7%) and Gen Z (29.4%) respondents. These data correspond to a certain extent to the results of research on the position of young people in BiH (Bašić, 2015). Namely, when choosing a job, young people take into account the amount of pay (45.4%) and job security (30%), whereas job satisfaction is significant for only 15% of young people (all according to Bašić, 2020).

In explaining the results, Bašić (2020) cites a comparative analysis of work values for nine European countries included in four previous value studies (Tchernia, 2017). Comparing the
expressed work values on the axis of material advantages (extrinsic) and the content of work (intrinsic), Tchernia concludes that there are significant variations among European countries in both these dimensions, depending on the geographic area: material work values are given the most importance in Southern and Eastern Europe, while they are given the least importance in Northern and Western Europe. Expectations concerning the content of work seem to be particularly important in Luxemburg and the Netherlands, as well as in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia (2017:129). The population of poorer countries values the material expectations from work, while in richer countries more importance is attributed to the content of work rather than to material expectations. Tchernia correlates this to post-materialist theory, suggesting that an increase in material prosperity brought about by the socio-economic development of a country leads its population to seek less material satisfaction and place more emphasis on personal fulfilment and collective responsibility (2017).

Attitudes related to the work ethic (the significance and role of work in the life of an individual) were measured using five statements, with the respondents indicating their degree of agreement with each on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Out of the total sample, the largest percentage of respondents strongly agreed/agreed with the statement that it is humiliating to receive money without having to work for it; this was followed by the statements that People who do not work become lazy, In order to fully develop your talents, you need to have a job, Work is a duty towards society, and, to a lesser extent, the respondents strongly agreed/agreed with the statement that Work should always come first. It is interesting that there are certain inter-generational differences. For instance, a majority percentage (74.7%) of Gen BB respondents consider that it is humiliating to receive money without having to work for
it compared to 66.6% of Gen Z respondents. When it comes to the inter-generational differences in terms of the work ethic, the obtained data correspond, to a certain extent, to the results of studies that highlighted certain changes in the understanding of work and its role among the post-Baby-Boomer generations (Bašić, 2020).
Religiosity in the EVS-2019, as noted by the author of this chapter Abazović (2020), was examined using the “more-or-less standard sociological dimensions of religiosity: believing, personal religiosity/significance of religion in daily life, practice, belonging, and the public role of religion”. The largest percentage (85.9%) of respondents stated that they were religious; 11.7% that they were not, while 2.4% of respondents declared themselves as atheists. Women are more religious than men (88.9% of women and 82.0% of men). When looking at administrative units, the degree of religiosity is slightly higher in the Federation of BiH compared to Republika Srpska (87.2% compared to 83.6%).

The second set of questions in this area was related to examining belief in God, heaven, hell, life after death, and reincarnation. As stated by Abazović (2020, p.172), it is noticeable that the largest percentage (95.6%) of respondents believe in God, with a noticeably relatively low percentage (26.2%) of those who believe in reincarnation. Women scored higher than men in all variables (for example, 96.9% of women believe in God compared to 94.2% of men; 28.5% of women believe in reincarnation compared to 23.4% of men). Responses were also similar among different generations of respondents, except that there is a slightly higher percentage of persons who do not believe in God among Gen Z respondents compared to other generations (within Gen Z – 7.0% of respondents do not believe in God, followed by Gen Y – 4.5%, which is followed by Gen BB – 3.9%, and finally among Gen X respondents that percentage was 2.6%). Interestingly, 73.7% of respondents believe in life after death.
Religious beliefs were also examined using the question: Which of the given statements comes closest to your beliefs? In their selection of pre-set responses, 80.2% of respondents stated that they were convinced of the existence of God; 13.3% of respondents believe that there is some sort of spirit or life force; 4.2% of respondents answered that they didn’t really know what to think and 2.3% of respondents answered with I don’t really think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force. Unlike the other variables, certain differences were established with respect to the administrative organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As reported by Abazović (2020), 86.5% of respondents in the Federation of BiH believe in the existence of God, while in Republika Srpska this percentage is 66.8%. Still, in Republika Srpska, 25.2% of respondents believe that there is some sort of spirit or life force, while in the Federation of BiH the percentage of respondents believing in this statement is 7.7%. Although there is a generally small number of respondents who do not believe in the existence of any sort of spirit, God or life force (a total of 2.3%), their prevalence is highest among those who have a university degree as well as among those who belong to Gen Z (although the latter is not a statistically significant number).

When asked How often do you pray to God, the largest number of respondents (529) said once a day; 257 respondents said several times a week; 232 respondents said not very often; 201 said only during holidays; 167 respondents reported never praying; 164 respondents said that they pray only during religious ceremonies; 146 said once a year; 18 respondents did not answer and ten respondents answered that they did not know. Out of the total sample, 97.3% of respondents reported that they belonged to some religion, hence Abazović (2020) concluded that Bosnia and Herzegovina is ranked at the very top of European countries when it comes to religious aggrega-
tion. In a comparative analysis of data for the European context, it is obvious that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a significantly more religious country compared to the average degree of religiosity in Europe (Abazović, 2020, p.177).

Based on the findings of Bešić (2014), identifying that the role of transitional factors has contributed to an increase in religiosity (attitude towards the church/confession) among those belonging to transitional generations (born after 1980) in the countries of former Yugoslavia, Abazović (2020, p.178) posits that the transitional conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina have affected the increase in the degree of religiosity (a positive attitude towards the church/religious community/confession). This is visible for the members of the youngest generation also from the comparative analysis of the obtained data on attending religious services disaggregated by generation. The analysis has shown that 15.2% of Gen Z respondents attend religious services more than once a week, 16.3% of them do so once a week, while 17.3% of them do so once a month, which are the largest percentages of responses to this question (in the period when they were 12 years old, the percentages were 25.8% for more than once a week, 20.3% for once a week and 8.2% for once a month). Yet, on the other side, it should be noted that compared to other generations, at least when it comes to personal religiosity, i.e. the spirituality of respondents independent from indoctrinated religious belief and/or attitude towards the religious community (i.e. towards confessional belonging), Gen Z also has the highest percentage of those who reported that they “don’t really know what to think” (6.6%), while 3.5% of Gen Z respondents reported not believing in any sort of spirit, God or life force. Finally, Gen Z respondents also have the largest percentage of those who do not consider themselves to be religious at all, 14.2% of them, and the largest number of convinced atheists, 4.0%.
As an overall conclusion, Abazović (2020) considers that “Bosnia and Herzegovina is quite a typical example for checking and confirming the first and second specificity from the sociological perspective, while the third, religion as a means of emancipation, almost does not exist, particularly when it comes to mainstream religion and religiosity in practice.”
PERCEPTION OF CITIZENS ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

According to Tadić (2020, p. 184), confidence in the institutions of BiH has “failed” given the empirical data of EVS-2019 related to (1) eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens, (2) meeting the basic needs of all (food, housing, clothes, education and health), (3) recognising people on their merits, (4) protection from terrorism. Out of the total sample, the largest percentage (77.3%) of respondents considered it “very important” that society should ensure that basic needs are met for all, which is above the European and global average. Equally, a large percentage of respondents (72.4%) believe that people should be recognised on their merits, while 74.0% were of the opinion that society should be protected from terrorism. The lowest percentage of agreement (50%) was found for the statement that society should provide for eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens. Having in mind the existing problems, it is no surprise to see high percentages related to “central life issues”, which are characteristic for “collectivist” social models. Furthermore, as reported by Tadić (2020), the results of our study “have shown that the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its fundamental determinants and determinations, is oriented towards traditionalism and conservative worldviews in terms of its perception of the daily ‘experience of the world’”. The specific empirical determinants are reflected in the fact that the majority of citizens believe that: (1) the state should take more responsibility to ensure everyone is provided for, (2) salaries should be equal regardless of efficiency, and also that (3) government ownership should be increased over private ownership. It is interesting to note that differences in responses were found to align with the respondents’ level of
education. Respondents with a higher level of education expressed greater affinity towards post-materialist values. Thus, for example, when asked whether salaries among citizens should be more equal, as many as 44.4% of respondents without completed primary education fully agreed with this statement, as opposed to respondents with university degrees.

According to the opinion of its citizens, the most important goals of BiH should be *a high level of economic growth*, followed by, albeit with significantly lower percentages, *seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities*. The third ranked goal of the country, according to its citizens’ perception, should be *making sure this country has strong defence forces* and, finally, the lowest ranked goal was *trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful*. The same order was found irrespective of gender, education and age cohort.

For the largest number of respondents, the most important factor of the state is *maintaining order in the country*, followed by *fighting rising prices*; *giving people more say in important government decisions* came third, while *protecting freedom of speech* was given the least importance. According to Tadić (2020), the results once again confirm the “thesis about the very poor perception of citizens about the state, i.e. they confirm that the state has not performed its function of producing and reproducing a system of social solidarity through the integration first of material and then of symbolic values as well”: When asked whether they would fight for their country 51% of respondents responded with “YES”.

Finally, the majority of respondents, regardless of the generational gap, believe that the role of the state is decisive in ensuring the most vital basic needs. In principle, this result is completely contrary to global capitalist standards; this is also
suggested by the “generational hypothesis” according to which there are conflicting notions of the economy, capital and a “vision of the future” between at least two generations living in the same society. Judging by the results relevant to the aforementioned problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the generational gap seems to be non-existent, which is a clear signal of social involution and the prevailing logic among future generations based on the principle of *nil novi sub sole* (Tadić, 2020). This worldview also has its sociological legitimacy. Some interesting data we have obtained show that 26.3% of respondents born between 1945 and 1964 believe that the state should have key responsibility for ensuring that basic needs are met, while as many as 30.7% of respondents born between 1995 and 2012 believe the same. The difference between the aforementioned generations is 48 years at minimum. Based on this, Tadić (2020) concludes that despite the overhaul of the social system occurring between the two generations mentioned above, as well as the fact that the latter generation grew up within the “individualist” model of liberal capitalism, a fundamental transformation of the value optics of social consciousness never actually took place.
POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

This chapter, written by Randall Puljek Shank, analysed the modes of active and passive participation of citizens in politics, as well as analysing the data obtained about how interested citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are in politics, their positioning on the right-left continuum, as well as the sources used by citizens to obtain information about politics. The results also show which social and political institutions citizens trust most, the extent to which they are satisfied with the system, as well as whether they prefer military rule or a government run either by experts, men of power, or a democratic government.

Within this chapter, we asked citizens to what extent they were interested in politics. The results show that only 32.8% of BiH citizens are “very interested” or “somewhat interested” in politics. Interest in politics varies widely depending on gender, so that the percentage of men expressing interest in politics (44.5%) is 1.9 times greater than the percentage of women (23.7%). However, it is interesting that the number of men and women who vote in elections is similar, although men have a 20-30% higher rate of participation in non-electoral political activities, such as petitions and demonstrations. Interest in politics increases with education. Having in mind this pattern, it is interesting to see that the group of respondents without completed primary education differs from this tendency, with 8.1% of respondents declaring themselves to be “very interested”, which is almost equal to the number of respondents with a bachelor degree. Interest also varies between the entities: interest in politics is more polarised in RS (higher percentages of both the “very interested” and those who are “not at all interested”) than in FBiH. The largest percentage of those who reported being very interested (11.1%) was found in the Brčko
Interest in politics has been decreasing with each subsequent generation. This explains the lack of proof that the post-Dayton period has given rise to a new generation that has been more politically engaged. If there is a generational effect at all, it is likely to be going further in the direction of a continuous growth of anti-politics. Moreover, politics is a matter of high interest for a relatively small group of people who are older and more educated. Correlations between gender, age and education are also cumulative, which is why research found that, for example, only 1% of adults with completed primary school stated that they were “very interested”, whereas almost a half (49%) of the same group stated that they were not at all interested. Among younger women from Gen Z, irrespective of their education level, two percent stated that they were very interested, while 56% stated that they were not at all interested (Puljek Shank, 2020, p.222).

Furthermore, respondents were asked to position themselves on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 denoted “left” and 10 denoted “right”, meaning that 5.5 was the mean value. When observing the whole group, respondents positioned themselves slightly left of centre (average = 5.4). A similar trend was established for the other criteria variables. It was concluded that men were mostly left-oriented (average = 5.3), while women were mostly centre-oriented (average = 5.5). The main source of information on politics is still television (33% of respondents watch television on a daily basis), which is followed by social media (18%), radio (12%) and newspapers (8%). In accordance with their lower interest in politics, women follow each of these sources to a lesser extent, but they rank the media in the same order of importance.

The next question asked the respondents to rank on a scale from 1 (none at all) to 4 (a great deal) their confidence in 18 social and political institutions.
As reported by Puljek Shank (2020), in addition to comparing the total level of confidence, the obtained responses provide for a comparison of relative confidence in individual institutions. Religious institutions enjoy the greatest confidence among citizens; confidence in many other institutions is at a much lower level than in more consolidated democracies. For example, 16.1% of respondents have confidence in the state parliament (either “a great deal” or “quite a lot”), while 35% of respondents in 27 European Union countries answered in a similar way (Czike, 2010). With regard to politics, many political institutions, including political parties, parliament and the government itself are at the very bottom of the ranking, together with trade unions and the judiciary. However, the respondents have the least confidence in the print media. Summarising the obtained results, Puljek Shank (2020, p. 229) gave several conclusions: “The first conclusion is that within the context of a generally low level of confidence, the institutions that enjoy the most confidence (religious institutions, military institutions, the educational system, the European Union and the UN) are also the ones that are least directly linked to politics and governance. The institutions that are at the centre of democracy and politics (the government, political parties, parliament and print media) are the ones that enjoy the least confidence. This increases the significance of anti-politics, whereby citizens distance themselves from politics. However, it seems that in the future this tendency will take a positive turn as a result of the generational shift. Namely, the confidence in institutions expressed by Gen Z is not only generally higher, but is also the highest in terms of confidence in political parties and the parliament among all the generational cohorts, although it is the lowest when it comes to print media”.
Citizens of BiH are greatly dissatisfied with the political system; the finding that only 0.7% of citizens are completely satisfied, whereas 37.5% are not satisfied at all speaks for itself. The respondents were offered four options of types of governance: military rule, a strong leader, a government managed by experts, and a democratic political system. The responses to this question show some surprising differences between the entities. “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” was assessed as good by a quarter of respondents in FBiH, while only 10% assessed it as positive in the more centralised and highly autocratic RS. Almost one half of respondents in FBiH and one third in RS assessed technocratic rule by experts as positive. A democratic political system is the obvious favourite, because it was assessed as “good” by more than 60% of respondents in both RS and FBiH, although in the Brčko District this percentage was slightly lower. A similar trend was found for both men and women and did not seem to depend on the level of education either, although respondents with a lower level of education were found to be more supportive of a strong leader. Finally, Gen Z was slightly less supportive of a democratic system, and although there was no clear favourite, it was found to have slightly higher preferences for all three alternatives. Questions related to preferences for different types of political system showed significant differences between the entities. Given the continuous electoral success of Milorad Dodik in RS, it is important to note that respondents in RS had a much more negative reaction to the idea of a strong leader. When it comes to the inter-generational change of values, the results were mixed. On the positive side, the level of trust in political institutions is higher, or rather, the level of distrust is lower, as noted by Puljek Shank (2020).
Democracy

Respondents assessed nine characteristics of democracy on a scale from 1 “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” to 10 “an essential characteristic of democracy”. The offered features of democracy in our study included the following statements: *Women have the same rights as men; People choose their leaders in free elections; Civil rights protect people from state oppression; People receive state aid for unemployment; Governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor; The state makes people’s incomes equal; The army takes over when government is incompetent; People obey the rules and Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws.*

The responses show that the most common understanding of democracy is liberal and procedural. The majority of positive responses were related to gender equality (essential for 67.7%), choosing leaders in free elections (64.1%) and civil rights protecting people from state oppression (56%). However, the second and slightly less frequent understanding is related to social democracy. The statement *People receive state aid in case of unemployment* was identified as an essential characteristic of democracy by 53.8% of the respondents; *Governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor* by 46%, and *The state makes people’s incomes equal* by 40.5%. The respondents were less favourably inclined towards the ideas that democracy included military rule when government was incompetent, obeying rules, and religious authorities ultimately interpreting the laws. For all the educational groups gender equality was the most important characteristic of democracy, except for those with post-graduate education who considered the procedure of “choosing a leader in free elections” to be the most important.
Having identified what democracy is and what it is not in the understanding of our citizens, we analysed their responses to the following question in the EVS-2019: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? Respondents gave their assessments on a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 9 (very important). For the largest number of respondents (44.85%), living in a democratic country was “very important”. A similar pattern in the responses was found for both men and women. When it comes to the different generations, members of all the age cohorts had approximately similar assessments as the general population, except for Gen Z. Namely, a significantly lower percentage of the youngest generation (33.8%) assessed that it was “very important” for them to live in a democratic society. In terms of administrative units in BiH, the responses were very similar in both entities, RS and FBiH, although support for democracy was slightly higher in RS, which was in line with the responses to the other questions (particularly related to lower levels of support for a strong leader). However, the exception was the Brčko District where only 26.7% of respondents stated that democratic governance was very important. Finally, the results showed that the higher the level of education, the more importance is accorded to living in a democratic country (for example, 53.4% of respondents with a university degree stated that it was “very important”).

Although the majority of citizens have an accurate understanding of democracy; in the next step, we were interested in the extent to which BiH is a democratic country. The largest number of citizens (30.4%) stated that it was “not at all democratic”, while only 0.9% of citizens stated that it was “completely democratic”. In regard to all other questions related to democracy, women and men responded quite similarly. When compared to the other generations, Gen Z responses were lower in percentages for both the highest value (0.8%) and the lowest
value (21.3%), which indicates a lower level of being convinced in the democratic nature of BiH. However, the responses of respondents from the youngest generation (33.3%) ranged from 6 to 10/10, thereby falling into the upper part of the scale and being overall higher than for any other generation. This is why it may be said that this generation, generally speaking, has the highest level of “recognition” of democracy in BiH. A similar share of citizens in both RS and FBiH responded that BiH was not democratic at all. However, citizens in FBiH had the highest percentage of responses ranging from 6 to 10/10, indicating a generally higher assessment of the degree of democracy. The higher the level of education, the more critical the view of democracy in BiH. Thus, for example, 34.9% of respondents with a university degree stated that BiH was not democratic at all.

**Political participation**

The EVS provided two measures of political participation: active and passive. The measure of active political participation included, among other things, whether the respondents vote in general and local elections. After analysing the responses to the question: “Do you vote?” almost three quarters stated that they have always voted in local and general elections. However, Puljek Shank (2020) noted that the obtained responses were not a reliable indicator of their actual behaviour. The author compared the obtained findings with data on election turnout in 2018, when the turnout of citizens for the elections was found to be only 54% (Central Electoral Commission, 2019). Therefore, responses to this question should be taken with a dose of reservation, because this clearly seems to be a case of giving socially desirable responses.

Despite differences in the level of interest in politics, the responses of men and women with regard to the behavioural component, or so-called political behaviour (whether they
vote) were rather similar. Similar responses were also obtained across the administrative units of RS, FBiH and BD. People with higher levels of education vote more and the share of active voters increases negligibly with age. It is noticeable that the only exception is Gen Z, whose rates for always voting were found to be 20% lower in the local elections and almost 25% lower in the general elections. Based on the survey, the citizens of BiH are rather sceptical when it comes to the integrity of the electoral process. The majority of citizens stated that the electoral system favoured the rich and the governing party.

Significant differences were found in the perception of electoral processes by different generations. The younger generations had more confidence in procedural integrity – based on questions such as whether votes are counted fairly and whether opposition candidates are prevented from running. However, when it comes to the influence of money in politics, they were more sceptical – the majority believing that voters were bribed and that rich people buy election results. Some differences between the entities reflected the generally lower level of trust in institutions among respondents from RS compared to those from FBiH. However, respondents from FBiH were more sceptical towards the ability of opposition candidates to run, as well as in relation to the implicit and explicit corruptive influence of money. In terms of the ability of journalists to provide fair coverage of elections, citizens from FBiH expressed a significantly higher level of confidence.

The next group of questions examined passive political participation; i.e. whether the respondents would participate or have considered participating in political activities outside elections, such as signing petitions, participating in boycotts, legal protests and unofficial strikes. One third of respondents stated that they had already signed petitions, while almost one half stated that they would be prepared to do so. One out
of six respondents has participated in legal protests, which is close to the number of respondents who have participated in a boycott. Those familiar with the potential of the protest movements would be interested to know that this number almost doubled compared to the results of the EVS wave of research conducted in 2008 (EVS, 2008).

Significant differences were recorded in terms of participation between men and women and between different generations. Compared to women, men stated more often that they had signed petitions (37.5% vs. 29.7%) and participated in protests (14.7% vs. 11.1%). In all the aspects of non-electoral political participation, the likelihood of participation was higher for the younger generations. Despite this tendency, the likelihood of participation in a boycott or unofficial strike was negligibly lower for the youngest generation compared with the previous generation. However, the most striking differences were found between the two entities. As reported by Puljek Shank (2020), the likelihood of participation in a boycott, protest or unofficial strike was twice as high for respondents from FBiH, while the difference was smaller when it came to signing a petition. As with other forms of political behaviour, a higher level of education can be correlated with more frequent participation in all these activities – both in moderate activities, such as signing petitions, as well as in potential confrontations, such as strikes or protests.

**Participation in civil society**

The most surprising finding was the significant increase in membership of associations that took place in the period since the last EVS research in 2008. In the 2009 Human Development Report, which focused on social capital (UNDP, 2009), only 17.8% of the population declared themselves as members of a voluntary organisation; in 2019, this number was 2.5
times greater and amounted to 46.1%. Contributing to this was the significant growth in the most represented areas such as sport and recreation, followed by religious, educational and cultural activities. Despite this increase, more than one half of respondents were not members of any organisation. Men are somewhat more frequently members of organisations (52.1% compared to 41.4% for women). Indicators of generational shift and different interests of different organisations were also established. Younger generations are more often involved in educational and cultural activities, sports, recreation and humanitarian organisations, while older generations are more often members of groups for mutual assistance. Generation X is dominant among trade union members, Generation Y among members of political parties and professional associations, while respondents belonging to Generation Z are mostly members of environmental protection groups. Membership is not equally distributed across the entities. The rate of membership is lower in RS than in FBiH (31% vs. 53%). However, both RS and BD had higher rates of membership in political parties (FBiH: 4.4%, RS: 6.1%, BD: 11.1%). Religious organisations rank in the first three places in both entities; however, they rank first in FBiH and third in RS. Organisations for sports or recreation ranked high in both entities. People with a higher level of education are more likely both to be members and to join more different groups and associations. An exception from this tendency is membership in environmental protection organisations, which is highest among people without completed primary education. Volunteer work is a way to measure the dedication of respondents and the organisations they are prepared to support by investing their own time. Voluntary work is still relatively uncommon and only 18% of respondents confirmed their participation in voluntary work. However, there are significant differences hidden behind this figure among different segments of the population. Women were slightly
more involved in voluntary work. The younger generations also volunteered more than the older generations – 30.1% of Generation Z stated that they had volunteered. Readiness to participate in voluntary work grows with the level of education and is six times higher for persons with a university level degree compared to those with the lowest education level (32.4% vs. 5.2%). A Comparison of generations and education levels showed that while university level education had similar effects on Generation X, Y and Z; members of Generation Z with secondary school education were more involved in voluntary work compared to older generations. Finally, respondents in FBiH volunteer more than those in RS (20.5% compared to 12.6%).

“Results of the EVS that were presented here include lessons for advocates of several key approaches for changing the permanent status quo. For those who see progress happening through the population applying pressure for political accountability (Mujanović, 2017; Mujkić 2016), the indicator that gives hope is that participation in protests has almost doubled since the last wave of EVS research eleven years ago. For advocates of long-term connectivity of membership, a higher level of generalised trust and “making democracy work” (Putnam, 1992), data about a large increase of membership in associations are significant. Advocates of growing rights-based governance should find hope in the fact that liberal democracy is dominant in the minds of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although this conceptual democracy is situated elsewhere. However, taking into account the continuous and growing power of anti-politics, the key question is to what extent do such movements have the potential to influence the character of politics and motivate citizens to step into the political arena?” (Puljek-Shank, 2020, p.246).
IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

The national values study is the most significant research study in social sciences, all the more because it is part of the European family of member states of the European Values Study (EVS). The obtained data, although descriptive in nature, provide a broad overview of the values cherished by the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to their scientific implications, the data have a strong applicative validity. Based on the obtained data, it is necessary to create a range of educational programmes to improve the awareness of citizens about all the aspects important for the development of the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina on its way to joining the European Union (EU). It should be noted that many present EU member states used data obtained through the EVS in their pre-accession negotiations for membership in the union of European countries. Governments and politicians listened for the opinions of their citizens; at the same time, citizens’ voices became increasingly louder.
Note:

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