Introduction

The European Union has developed since 2003 within the framework of the civilian dimension of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) a wide range of complex civilian crisis management operations. Over the past five years the number of these operations carried out under the EU flag has reached over twenty, deployed in key hotspots of international security. It is important to consider not only the growing number, but also the more demanding profile of tasks of these civilian crisis management operations. During the Czech presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of year 2009 the Czech Republic will face in this area of security policy several challenging tasks. At the same time the Czech diplomacy will have the opportunity to use its position in the EU presidency chair to help shape the agenda of one of the most dynamic part of the foreign and security policy of the EU, reflecting also its own historical experience and long-term preferences.

Strategic context

Historical dimension

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) marked in 2008 two important anniversaries – ten years of its existence as a gradually evolved self-standing EU policy and also five years of operational deployments under the ESDP umbrella. This is a rather quick development both in terms of institutional history of the EU and in comparison with other international security actors. It is well marked out by around twenty civilian and military crisis management operations deployed by the EU in key crisis areas – from Western Balkans, through Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia to the Caucasus. The European Union has in those five years established itself firmly as a complex security actor that could bring to bear a number of comparative advantages – political credibility, impartiality and access to a broad range of conflict prevention and crisis management tools. Its interlinkage of political, economic and financial tools with traditional security elements delivers a significant advantage, hardly available to almost any other multilateral institution of the Western world.

* The analysis represents strictly personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
In the ESDP operational deployment history civilian ESDP missions of various type clearly dominate (by ratio 3:1), as documented by the following overview:

- police advisory missions - EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina (it is also the longest ongoing ESDP mission from 1 January 2003 until now), EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT in Macedonia (December 2003-June 2006), EUPOL Kinshasa a EUPOL RD Congo in Democratic Republic of Congo (April 2005-present), EUPOL COPPS in Palestine (January 2006-present), EUPOL Afghanistan (June 2007-present)

- security sector reform advisory missions – EUSEC RD Congo in Democratic Republic of Congo (June 2005-present), EU SSR Guinea Bissau (February 2008-present)

- advisory of training mission in justice area – EUJUST Themis in Georgia (July 2004-July 2005), EUJUST LEX in Iraq (July 2005-present)

- monitoring missions – AMM in Aceh (September 2005-December 2006), EUMM Georgia (deployed as of 1 October 2008)

- advisory missions in the area of border control – EUBAM Rafah (November 2005-present, operational activity suspended following Hamas establishing a control over Gaza strip); specific legal status enjoy operational activities of mission EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine and Border Support Team linked to the offices of the EU Special Representatives (EUSR) for Moldova and South Caucasus respectively

- complex mission in the area of rule of law– EULEX Kosovo (February 2008-present)

### Comparative advantages of the EU

#### Intertwining of different EU crisis management tools

The European Union can rely in the crisis management area on several comparative advantages. The strongest one is the possibility to intertwine within a single wide strategy all tools and institutions at the disposal of the EU in the first and second pillar - mainly political and economic tools of the Community with security tools of the CFSP. In a similar manner the EU should be able to utilize within the CFSP intergovernmental structures its civilian and military crisis management tools, both during the planning phase and their deployment in a concrete territory or a region. In certain neighbouring regions the EU can even add a particularly strong and effective conflict prevention tool in the form of an attractiveness of the Association Process leading possibly all the way towards the EU membership. This has been so far the most potent EU tool, but its use is limited to the regions such as Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, etc. In places having the EU membership perspective the gravitational power of the EU norms and institutions works much better, although the process may be rather long and is not a panacea in itself.

#### Unique civilian planning structures

The European Union must gradually also deal with another peculiarity of the civilian dimension of the ESDP. In the military sphere the traditional multinational peace operations or more robust peace enforcement operations are planned in and subsequently based upon the existing national structures. In the EU Member States there are therefore at the national level pre-existing military units with common equipment, weapons, training and organic command and control structures. However, in the civilian domain the situation is fundamentally different. Civilian crisis management operations are based primarily on individual experts (police officers, judges, prosecutors, border guards, customs officers, civilian administrators, etc.) or exceptionally on small units (mainly gen-
The nature of the secondment of individual experts by the EU Member States to a concrete operation produces specific challenges. Unlike in the military domain there is no unified pre-deployment training nor common equipment. Also the planning of the civilian crisis management operations must rely on ad-hoc planning mechanisms and institutions as no single EU Member State has at its disposal civilian multinational planning structures at the national level. The EU therefore had to gradually fill this vacuum with unique structures for planning and conduct of the civilian crisis management operations, unavailable on the similar scale with an exception of the UN anywhere else on the international scene. Group of planning experts and permanent multinational structures for planning and conduct of civilian crisis management operations are thus one of unique EU crisis management tools in this area.

**Demanding new missions**

After five years of the civilian crisis management operational deployment the EU gradually moves towards more demanding types of new missions, deployed in more risky environments and engaged in complicated political processes. This changing character of new civilian ESDP missions is reflected not only in tasks of the General Secretariat of the Council, but also in the increased responsibility of the EU Member States, whose active support and secondment of high-quality personnel is crucial for the conduct of civilian ESDP missions. Role of the EU Presidency country is understandably in this context even more delicate.

**Kosovo – EULEX Kosovo**

The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) was officially launched on 16 February 2008 on the eve of unilateral declaration of Kosovo independence and in the situation of a difficult search for a common stance inside the EU. EULEX Kosovo should after phased build-up to the full operational strength become the biggest ever EU civilian crisis management operation (staffed by approximately 2200 international and 1000 local personnel). Also in several other aspects the EULEX Kosovo mission will break the ground. EULEX Kosovo will be the first civilian ESDP mission with a partially executive mandate, covering especially the key areas of fight against organised crime, war crimes prosecution or financial criminality. At the same time the EULEX Kosovo will in most areas act in mentoring, monitoring and advisory capacity, while main executive responsibility will rest with local Kosovar institutions.

Another unique feature is the existence of a small planning team EUPT which had been deployed in Kosovo since April 2006 and was engaged in the long-term planning of EULEX Kosovo mission. In none of the previous civilian ESDP missions there has been any similar tool deployed directly in the field of operations. It proved to be useful not only with planning of a rather sizeable civilian ESDP mission in a sensitive environment, but also in building relations with key international partners (especially with the UN Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK) and with non-governmental organizations active in the field.

A tricky situation with continued disagreements in the UN Security Council slowed down the EULEX Kosovo mission deployment as well as it affected the transfer of tasks, personnel, infrastructure and equipment from UNMIK. According to the revised timetable the entire handover process from UNMIK to EULEX Kosovo is now supposed to be completed only towards the end of year 2008 and the mission Full Operational Capability will thus be reached just during the Czech EU Presidency. One of the most complicated tasks will be finding a modus operandi of EULEX Kosovo in the north of Kosovo, in territories populated by Serbian minority. Role of the EU Special Representative for Kosovo will be in this context quite crucial for the entire political process and through his role in promoting overall coordination of the EU presence in Kosovo. Sensitive situation will also continue in finding modus vivendi and concrete models of cooperation with a new Serbian government, created after the recent elections on the pro-European platform, but still refusing to
recognize the Kosovo's independence. This point is reflected even inside the EU, where a number of Member States refrained for the time being from recognizing Kosovo's independence as well.

**Afghanistan – EUPOL Afghanistan**

The civilian ESDP mission EUPOL Afghanistan was launched in June 2007 in so far the most challenging security environment. Security situation in Afghanistan has certainly not improved since summer 2007, on the contrary there has been a marked increase in suicide bomb attacks in recent years. The commitment to launch quickly a police advisory and training mission in Afghanistan as a contribution to the broader effort of the international community in support of security sector reform in Afghanistan was taken under a clear political pressure. Role of the German EU Presidency in first semester of 2007 was crucial for the timing of the EU political decision. Unfortunately, this political motivation clearly impacted on the major problems encountered in the build-up phase of EUPOL Afghanistan mission. It was supposed to build upon and take over the existing bilateral training police projects of several EU Member States, but a full deployment of more than 200 international personnel proved much more demanding. Mission run into serious problems in logistical and security mission support area, especially as it was supposed to deploy not only in Kabul, but gradually also at provincial level. Delays in deployment of mission personnel were also caused by rather lengthy procurement process of security equipment and shortfalls in numbers of seconded national experts offered by individual EU Member States.

In year 2008 a progress in deployment of EUPOL Afghanistan mission members was achieved by moving from the level of central Afghan government also outside of Kabul to the level of Afghan provinces, aiming at the coverage of 13 provinces. Police experts are because of security considerations and better coherence with activities of the international community deployed within the framework of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of ISAF operation. Unfortunately, limitations of the overall EU-NATO relationship did not allow to sign one strategic document covering cooperation of both organizations in Afghanistan. Instead a number of technical agreements had to be signed with individual PRTs. EUPOL Afghanistan mission in cooperation with partners from international community seeks to support reform of Afghan Ministry of Interior and building-up the Afghan National Police. EUPOL Afghanistan Rule of Law experts also try in close coordination with activities of the Delegation of the European Commission to help consolidate the entire criminal justice system. These ambitious tasks were recently reflected in the commitment to increase the personnel size of the EUPOL Afghanistan to almost double the overall total.

**Georgia – EUMM Georgia**

During August-September 2008 period the EU had to face a new demanding task in connection with Georgian-Russian conflict. After reaching a ceasefire and an agreement on 6-point peace plan negotiated on behalf of the EU by the French Presidency, the EU made commitment towards a quick deployment of the civilian monitoring mission EUMM Georgia. In the given circumstances it was a commitment to the fastest deployment of civilian ESDP mission of medium size (at least 200 civilian monitors deployed in the field as of 1 October 2008) in the EU history. The EU had to cope with unclear situation in the field following the cessation of military activities of the Russian armed forces that nevertheless remained deployed on the territory of Georgia and created ‘de facto’ buffer zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Planning of the civilian ESDP monitoring mission thus had to take into account the presence of military units (both regular units of the Russian Federation and paramilitary units of South Ossetian militias), including heavy weapons, in the atmosphere of unclear political and operational limits of activities of future EUMM Georgia mission. Moreover, during the planning process key parameters of its size, deployment timetable and tasks kept changing.

The French EU Presidency played a key role in negotiations with Moscow, at crucial times even performed by French president Nicolas Sarkozy himself. This fact underlines once again the role the EU Presidency may play in similar circumstances, thus for the upcoming semester also the
potential role of the Czech Republic. Deployment and start of operational activity of the mission should be followed by continuous evaluation and regular six-monthly review of its activities as well as organisational structure. This important task will fall squarely into the term of the Czech EU Presidency. EUMM Georgia mission will be the first ESDP mission in an operational contact with military units of the Russian Federation. Bearing in mind persisting tensions in the region, further escalation of the situation and direct conflict of interests between the EU and Russia cannot be ruled out. Unlike in the previous case of a rapid deployment of the monitoring mission AMM in Aceh, the EU lacks in this case a clear perception of its impartiality by all parties of the conflict. Its mediation and monitoring role will thus require a rather finely tuned approach. As the EU in this case had to react to the outbreak of military hostilities between Georgia and Russia it was not able to rely on its early involvement in the entire ceasefire and peace negotiations process as in the Aceh case. Also an opportunity for preparing concrete response from first and second pillar instruments was, unlike in the case of AMM mission in Aceh, much more limited due to the unforeseen character of the crisis.

**Planning structures (CPCC, DGE IX, CivMil Cell)**

A growing number, size and demanding tasks of EU civilian crisis management operations had to be also reflected in the command and control (C2) structures for them. The basic requirement was to have a dedicated professional planning structures, capable of strengthening the integrated character of the EU activities in this area as well able to help command and control civilian ESDP missions in a systematic manner. Upon negotiations within the Council structures a new entity, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), was established in August 2007. Creation of this entity delivered a unified command structure for all civilian ESDP missions, under the responsibility of the CPCC Director as a new Civilian Operations Commander. New command and control structures thus replaced previous ad-hoc arrangements, which often included EU Special Representatives in a sort of parallel command structures.

Dutch diplomat Kees Klompenhouwer was appointed as of 1 May 2008 to be the first CPCC Director. CPCC is staffed by approximately 60 personnel, both Council Secretariat officials and Seconded National Experts. Personnel structure of the CPCC allows it to combine wide expertise of its staff in the ESDP mission planning and priority functional areas such as police, rule of law, mission support, etc. CPCC works closely with the Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management (DGE IX) at the political-strategic level and with the Civil-Military Cell in the area of civil-military coordination (especially in specialized mission support tasks such as communications, logistical or medical aspects of the mission planning for civilian ESDP missions). Upon creation of the CPCC the EU has at its disposal a unique asset of permanent civilian operational HQs, able to plan and conduct multinational civilian crisis management operations. Comparable civilian structures are not available in any of the EU Member States and with a limited exception of the UN neither in any other international organization.

**Building EU civilian capabilities (CHG 2008 a new CHG 2010)**

Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG) was approved by the European Council in December 2004, in close connection with an earlier adoption of the European Security Strategy that defined several ambitions of the EU in the area of crisis management. CHG 2008 process was designed to focus on planning and development of civilian capabilities necessary for achieving those EU security aims. CHG 2008 was based on four priority areas of the EU civilian crisis management as agreed by the European Council in Feira already in June 2000 - police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. Later on two further priority areas were added - monitoring and support for the EU Special Representatives offices.

CHG 2008 process was the first ever civilian capabilities planning process within the framework of ESDP and brought about several key results - set of illustrative scenarios for civilian ESDP missions, detailed reference list of civilian capabilities essential for conduct of ESDP missions, deve-
Development of new concepts and rapid response capabilities. Last but not least the CHG 2008 process focused also on the practical recommendations concerning training and recruitment of personnel for civilian ESDP missions, as taking place in the interaction between Member States and the EU. CHG 2008 process had also a positive impact on raising overall knowledge of civilian aspects of the ESDP in the EU Member States, among Third States potentially contributing to the civilian ESDP missions and within international organizations that are close partners of the EU in this area.

Ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference taking place in Brussels on 19 November 2007 noted the CHG 2008 Final Report and adopted the new Civilian Headline Goal 2010. New CHG 2010 should focus primarily on the weaknesses identified within the CHG 2008 process:

- improving quality of the EU assets and capabilities in the area of civilian planning for all priority areas of the civilian dimension of ESDP;
- improving availability of experts and other capabilities for rapid deployment;
- development of new tools for management of civilian capabilities or better information-sharing;
- increasing synergies between civilian and military ESDP tools as well as with the European Community instruments and third pillar actors (such as Europol and Eurojust) with a view to maximize coherence of the EU in the broad spectrum of crisis management tasks;
- establishment of a comprehensive and systematic process of lessons learned/best practices.

New feature of the CHG 2010 is the establishment of an overall planning process in the area of ESDP civilian capabilities. It should be based on a planning cycle consisting of regular phases and thus align its character much closer to the military capabilities planning process that already exists for some time in the NATO/EU framework. The implementation of such a planning process of civilian capabilities will, however, for majority of the EU Member States mean the necessity of a political commitment being taken at the level of the government as a whole, with appropriate follow-up tasking to individual ministries.

**Training of personnel for civilian ESDP missions**

Quality of civilian ESDP mission personnel influences directly effectiveness of fulfilling their tasks, as the individual experts are main assets or tools of those ESDP missions. It is difficult to achieve a quick start-up of a civilian ESDP mission without an appropriate and timely training of its staff. The area of training of personnel for EU civilian crisis management operations is unfortunately adversely affected by distribution of responsibilities and activities between EU Member States and the EU institutions, or civilian ESDP missions.

Training of experts seconded to the civilian ESDP missions is currently primarily a national responsibility. The role of the EU institutions and their possible activities are only supplementary, mainly linked to the induction training for key mission personnel of a specific civilian ESDP mission, usually conducted in Brussels shortly before the deployment. In a view of this division of tasks and responsibilities it is important to note a significant heterogeneity of national training systems in individual EU Member States. The situation of civilian training actors preparing personnel for international crisis management operations is in many aspects rather specific. An absolute majority of these actors are in comparison with military academies much weaker in institutional terms, as well as concerning their financial and human resources. While military academies and system of training for military personnel exist in every EU Member State, the case of civilian training actors is far from satisfactory. Some EU Member States can utilise their police academies, which offer basic courses for police officers before their secondment to international operations, but situation in other categories of civilian experts is usually far worse. Only a handful of EU Member States have at their disposal civilian institutions taking care of a complex training of all categories of civilian experts before their deployment in international crisis management operations. In case of training for
a civilian ESDP mission there are also specific requirements for acquiring a knowledge of functioning of the EU institutions, CFSP/ESDP structures and procedures, EU financial rules for procurement of services and equipment, civil-military coordination, etc.

Reflecting such limitations the collaboration among EU Member States as well as among individual training actors in a form of concrete bilateral or multilateral projects is clearly inevitable. Also the support provided over the past several years by the European Commission was crucial for increasing participation from greater number of the EU Member States. Benchmarks in establishing a complex system of recruitment, training and deployment of civilian personnel for international crisis management operations were clearly set by countries such as Finland, Germany or Sweden. It is therefore not surprising that these EU Member States were also in the forefront of efforts towards identifying training needs for EULEX Kosovo mission personnel and subsequently offering their training facilities for preparing also personnel from other EU Member States.

The civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo could become in many respects a catalyst for deepening the collaboration in training of civilian personnel, especially when taking into account the planned size of the EULEX Kosovo mission and significant demand for personnel the EU Member States will be gradually asked to second there. The increased need for deployment of civilian experts will become a rather permanent feature due to the regular rotation of the personnel in the forthcoming years. For the first time a detailed training concept was prepared and incorporated into the training annex of the mission planning documents. In the organizational structure of the EULEX Kosovo a Training and Best Practices Unit was created, with its first training expert being already deployed as part of EUPT Kosovo. Its Training concept was based on a training needs assessment. It covered not only a detailed list of respective training activities, but it also called for a program of cooperation among national training actors. Unfortunately, implementation of the training concept in pre-deployment phase depends fully on means made available by and often also a good will of EU Member States.

A systematic solution based on a strong role for and support from the EU institutions was, on the contrary, achieved in the case of training for Civilian Response Teams (CRT) experts. These experts have been trained in 2006-2008 period by a consortium of civilian training institutes, supported by co-financing from the European Commission. The CRT training was also conducted in a close coordination with relevant structures of the Council GS that are responsible for an overall preparation and deployment of CRT experts in case of a concrete need within the CFSP/ESDP framework.

Civilian crisis management and situation in the Czech Republic

The approach taken towards creation of enabling conditions for secondment of experts to civilian ESDP mission usually correlates to the importance attached by a given EU Member State to the EU CFSP. EU Member State can achieve a high profile within the CFSP and ESDP by several methods. The most obvious would be by securing key political and diplomatic positions within the EU structure, such as the post of High Representative for CFSP. But in case of smaller or medium-sized EU Member States it is much more realistic to strive for posts of the EU Special Representatives. The Czech Republic has so far not been successful in this quest, unlike for example Slovakia (Lubomír Lažák is the EUSR for Bosnia and Herzegovina) or Hungary (Kalman Mészö is the EUSR for Moldova). Another option lies in a high degree of participation in ESDP missions, be it in terms of the overall numbers of personnel or in terms of representation in key mission personnel. The Czech Republic, however, has in the past five years performed rather poorly in both categories. The Czech Republic has contributed on a regular basis to the civilian ESDP missions in the Western Balkans (EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Proxima in Macedonia), in Eastern Europe (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine) and in Iraq (EUJUST LEX). Overall participation of the Czech experts in civilian ESDP missions rarely reached over twenty people. This number compares rather unfavourably with contributions from comparable EU Member States (e.g. Belgium or Hungary). So far
there has not been any Czech citizen acting within the civilian ESDP missions as Head of Mission or Deputy Head of Mission. Even smaller EU Member States can nevertheless be successful with their candidates in these categories, as documented by a fresh example of the appointment of the Danish Head of Mission in EUPOL Afghanistan, or the Hungarian Head of Mission of EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine being in his post since November 2005.

Moreover, it is important not only to create basic legislative conditions for secondment of civilian experts, which the Czech Republic achieved during 2006, but also to effectively implement them in a systematic manner. Financial resources assigned for this purpose in the Czech state budget (80 mil CZK in 2007 and 120 mil CZK for years 2008-2009) should be sufficient for secondment of up to 150 civilian experts. Secondment of national experts to civilian ESDP missions is further facilitated by a principle of co-financing from the CFSP budget, unlike in the case of military operations conducted by either NATO or the EU that are financed by participating states following the principle „costs lie where they fall“. A qualitatively new step could be achieved by adopting a complex national strategy for recruitment, training and deployment of civilian experts to international crisis management operations (such a strategy has been recently adopted for example in Finland). In the Czech Republic there is still predominantly a departmental approach, which is also reflected in the main category of Czech civilian experts seconded to the civilian ESDP mission - police officers or customs officers (both working under the Ministry of Interior). The Czech system faces a major weakness in seconding judges, penitentiary staff or civilian administration experts (they usually come from outside of central government ministries). There is still also an open question of motivating factors for civil service officials to seek secondment to international civilian operations as well as the utilization of acquired skills and lessons learned upon their return.

The Czech situation is further complicated also by a lack of a complex system for training of all categories of civilian experts. The Czech Republic has so far not established a full institutional link with an EC Project on Training for Civilian Crisis Management, financed by the European Commission, although it was at least able to use some of the training opportunities offered in the past within the framework of the project. Czech system of training is worse off especially in comparison to the leading training institutions such as Crisis Management Centre Finland, Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden) or Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze ZIF (Germany), which combine tasks of recruitment, training and deployment of civilian experts to the international crisis management operations as well as evaluation and lessons learned.

Human rights are one of the long-term priorities of the Czech foreign policy within the CFSP. This issue is now systematically reflected during the planning and conduct of both civilian and military ESDP operations. The EU has at its disposal a wide range of instruments for mainstreaming of human rights and gender issues into the ESDP activities. Highlighting of these issues and promoting knowledge of them within the Czech government ministries as well as non-governmental organizations and other key target audiences, however, lags behind this stated priority.

**Main tasks for the Czech EU Presidency 2009 - Recommendations**

- The Czech EU Presidency should support further systematic development of civilian capabilities within the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 process. Important tasks in this area will be practical implementation of the Ministerial Declaration on the Improvement of Civilian Capabilities adopted in November 2008.

- Significant progress could be achieved during the Czech EU Presidency term in the adoption of national strategies for training, recruitment and deployment of experts into the civilian ESDP missions. Such a tool would allow to make commitment at the level of a government as a whole and thus overcome a departmental approach. National strategies should focus on key issues of quality and overall number of experts available for the civilian ESDP missions.
The Czech EU Presidency should prepare for challenging tasks related to the full operational activity of the EULEX Kosovo mission, increase of the EUPOL Afghanistan mission strength and early operational phase of EUMM Georgia, including its first regular review planned for spring 2009.

Relevant governmental ministries as well as academic and non-governmental entities should use the opportunity of the Czech EU Presidency also to deepen and broaden the knowledge of Czech public on civilian ESDP missions and a broad range of EU conflict prevention instrument. Taking into account the long-term orientation of the Czech foreign policy complementarity of the ESDP civilian dimension with NATO instruments as well as significant comparative advantages of the EU in this area should be underlined.

The Czech Republic should reflect upon the analysis of lessons learned and apply it also internally within the respective Czech structures.

The Czech Republic should as a part of its EU Presidency strengthen the implementation of systematic mainstreaming of human rights and gender issues, as well as raising the awareness of Czech government ministries and non-governmental sector about these issues.
List of abbreviations

AMM - Aceh Monitoring Mission
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHG - Civilian Headline Goal
CPCC - Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CRT - Civilian Response Team
DGE IX - Directorate Civilian Crisis Management
ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy
EUBAM Rafah - EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point (Palestinian Territories)
EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine - EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
EUJUST LEX - EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission in Iraq
EUJUST Themis - EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia
EULEX Kosovo - EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUUMM Georgia - EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia
EUPAT - EU Police Assistance Team Macedonia
EUPM - EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL Afghanistan - EU Police Mission in Afghanistan
EUPOL COPPS - EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
EUPOL Kinshasa - EU Police Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo
EUPOL Proxima - EU Police Mission in Macedonia
EUPOL RD Congo - EU Police Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo
EUSEC RD Congo - EU Security Sector Reform Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo
EUSR - EU Special Representative
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau - EU Security Sector Reform Mission in Guinea-Bissau
GS Council EU - General Secretariat of the Council of the EU
PRT - Provincial Reconstruction Team
UNMIK - UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo