Introduction

The structure of Governments and party systems are of crucial importance for the functioning and consolidation of young democracies. But students of Comparative Politics hardly ever seem to wonder what the impact of governments on the formation of party systems exactly is. It is this question I will focus on in my presentation, which I have divided into seven sections. The first section discusses the significance of political parties for representative democracies in general, as well as their significance for the consolidation of young democracies and the functioning of governments in particular. The second section introduces a typology of political parties and party systems, and the third a typology of government forms. The fourth section advances some hypotheses about the impact of government on the formation of party systems, which are tested on their empirical validity in the fifth section. In the sixth section I will discuss some proposal for institutional reforms that are likely to reinforce the favorable effects national party systems have on democracy. Finally, I will end my presentation with a brief conclusion.

1. The Significance of Political Parties

When comparing the young democracies of the third wave of democratization (1974 and after), one soon notices a common characteristic: In each case the authoritarian regime was superseded by a representative democracy. The principle of representation as the intermediate link between state and society is undoubtedly the most stable and efficient solution to the problem of organizing political authority, equally faced by all territorial states of modern societies. In representative democracies, political parties are the central actors within the institutional framework of government. They perform the important function of legitimizing the political system by representing the different social groups and lending authority to political decisions. Moreover, by seeking votes and government offices and by engaging in policy-making, they also perform a variety of other functions: the aggregation and articulation of social interests, the recruitment of political elites, and the formulation of political programs and alternatives. They are the preeminent intermediate institutions between the population and the political elites (Almond/Powell 1978; Morlino 1998, pp. 169ff).

To be sure, democratic theory does not equate democracy with party democracy. Numerous institutional variants are at least theoretically conceivable (Parekh 1992). But the form of democracy required by mass society and large territorial states necessitates an inclusive, responsive, and responsible representation of civic interests. This holds true for all democracies independent of their respective cultural roots. Therefore, if conceptual alternatives to political parties are to be taken seriously, they need to provide for functional equivalents. Such equivalents, however, which supplant rather than complement political parties, as yet exist neither in the consolidated democracies of the West nor in Asia’s young democracies.

A party system's structure and development is of central importance for the consolidation of young democracies. But a successful consolidation requires that a system of competitive mass parties take root in society, for only such a system fosters
the development of durable patterns of peaceful and stable alternation in government (Shin 1995, p.22). This, in turn, entails that parties build up sufficient representative capacities and at the same time augment or stabilize their basis of support among the electorate. Whether or not parties succeed in establishing stable links to the voters, interest groups, and civil society, depends on their ability to become the main organizations of interest aggregation, organization, and articulation, as well as the central institution of political recruitment. Only when parties perform their "gatekeeper" function (Easton 1965) effectively, i.e. only when they are responsive to demands from society and transform them into specific policies, can they prevent the citizens' alienation from and frustration by the political system. Simultaneously, a successful performance of the gatekeeper function provides the parties with an incentive to adopt the norms and institutions of democracy (Merkel 1996, p. 49). This increases the likelihood of the relevant political actors' assessing the potential gains of compliance with the rules of the game more favorably than their violation. The existence of representative parties, which have a sufficient social basis and satisfy the conditions of responsiveness and functionality, thus serves to enhance the ability of political institutions to formulate and implement political decisions efficiently and effectively.

This testifies to the importance of political parties for the proper functioning of any democratic regime. Political parties play the key role in materializing a regime's organizational principles, and they are the most important intermediate structures between the executive and the parliament. Two aspects merit special emphasis: the party system's contribution to government formation, and its contribution to the forging of parliamentary majorities. It can be assumed that, generally, the relations of the executive to the parliament in any regime are less frictional when first, parties are at least moderately disciplined, second, the party system is fragmented only to a relatively small degree, and third, the parliamentary sub-rules facilitate the coordination and rationalization of parliamentary procedures (Carey/Shugart 1995; Morgenstern/Nacif 2000; Figueiredo/Limongi 2000). A fragmented party system, on the other hand, renders the simultaneous occurrence of one-party majorities in the executive and the legislative branch much less likely than a consolidated party system. Relatedly, weak cohesion within the parties results in undisciplined party behavior in parliament and uncertain and unstable political majorities. And the less stable the majorities, the more must the executive seek to build ad hoc coalitions through bilateral bargaining with individual members of parliament (cp. Croissant 2000/01; Croissant 2001a). These developments, by themselves, do not necessarily imperil democracy in its entirety, but they certainly make governing much more complicated volatile, and intransparent. Both the efficiency of political decisions and the effectiveness of governments in general are diminished under these circumstances.

2. The Classification of Parties and Party Systems

When we examine the impact of government on the formation of political parties in democracies, we need to discriminate between parties and party systems. I shall discuss first the former and then the latter in the following.

1. Herbert Kitschelt recently proposed a rough classification of political parties that appears help-ful when addressing the issue of young party systems. Kitschelt distinguishes three ideal-types: programmatic, charismatic, and clientelistic parties (Kitschelt 1995, p. 449).

   Programmatic parties base their work on specific party programs. They mobilize voters along social cleavages and issues that find explicit articulation in their platforms. The aims and policy proposals outlined in those platforms draw their substantive content from a certain set of ideological values (e.g. conservative, liberal, socialist, communist, or religious values) on which the party nourishes and develops. The distinctive features of their respective programs are easily discerned and thus furnish the voter with a normative and material rationale to prefer one party to the others. Consequently, programmatic parties offer real choices between competing programs to the voter so that they represent a credible alternative to authoritarian regimes, where, in comparison, personal
choice is highly circumscribed by the lack of programmatic alternatives. Programmatic parties are most apt to creating and sustaining stable linkages between the voters and themselves, since party programs based on ideological principles and values can be altered only on rare occasions, without damaging the vote and office seeking ambitions of the party elites. Therefore, programmatic parties are the most conducive to the consolidation and stability of democratic regimes among the three different party types.

Charismatic parties are defined by the leadership of a charismatic person. They deprive their constituency of their programmatic choices. Politics is reduced to the personal dimension, and programmatic choice is downgraded to a mere acclamation of the charismatic leader. Neither can the voters foresee nor influence the political outcomes of their decision. Undoubtedly, such acclamation devoid of programmatic choice is incompatible with democratic principles. Another, related problem with charismatic authority is its inherent instability, stemming from the fact that the regime's persistence hinges on the (political) survival of one single individual, the charismatic leader (Kitschelt 1995, p. 449).

Clientelistic parties too violate fundamental democratic principles and thus hamper the legitimization of any democratic regime. Officially, they act as if they abided by and had respect for the rules of the game. During electoral campaigns, for instance, they purport to champion the production of collective goods. In fact, however, they provide personal favors, partisan benefits and services for their loyal clientele. "Moreover, in countries where clientelistic parties cooperate in dividing up state revenue and jobs as the booty disbursed to their followers, voting appears as superfluous exercise ... Clientelistic parties work around rather than through the stated rules of democratic competition." (Kitschelt 1995, p. 450). Hence their behavior gives rise to cynicism and undermines the citizens' trust in democratic institutions.

All three party types, programmatic, charismatic, as well as clientelistic ones, are ideal-types. Despite the fact that actual parties are always hybrids of two or even all three types, we do find a correlation between the degree to which a party adheres to a particular program and its contribution to democratic stability. If ideology prevails over personalism and clientelism, the party has a positive effect on democratic stability and consolidation. If clientelism and personalism predominate, the opposite is true.

The concept of party systems refers to the structure of all the parties in a state, including the patterns of interaction between the parties (cooperation vs. competition). Comparative research on parties has yielded many typologies of parties; they need not be summarized here. A classification of party systems based on central features of their structure and patterns of interaction seems more appropriate for our purposes. Three factors are particularly eminent: party fragmentation, polarization, and institutionalization. Giovanni Sartori (1976) uses the two factors fragmentation and polarization to develop his typology. By counting the number of "relevant parties" and determining their ideological distance from each other, he distinguishes five types of party systems in democracies (Sartori 1976, chaps. 5 and 6).

1. In a Predominant Party System at least two parties compete for votes in free and fair elections. However, one party succeeds in becoming the decisive actor in forming government coalitions over a long period of time. Other parties may participate in coalitions, but they have no political leverage against the predominant party. Political power rests with one party only in spite of free elections. Alternation in government does not occur (e.g. Japan until 1993; India until 1977).

2. A Two Party System consists of two parties that monopolize government formation on the basis of obtained votes and seats. Other parties have little or no potential for political pressure or coalitions. The two dominant parties usually form one-party governments and succeed each other to forming the government. No sharing of power occurs between elections, and elections
frequently occasion alternations in government (e.g. UK, USA, Philippines 1946-1972).

3. **Limited Pluralism** describes a party system in which three to five relevant parties possess political “blackmail” and coalition potential, corresponding to changing party constellations. In general, no single party can form a government all by itself, so coalition governments are the rule. There is a high degree of power-sharing among the parties, and alternations in government occur between coalitions (e.g. Germany, Taiwan today).

4. **Extreme Pluralism** roughly resembles limited pluralism, with the important difference that it involves more than five relevant parties (Italy, Thailand until 2001).

5. The concept of **Atomized Party Systems** tries to capture an analytic anomaly. The degree of fragmentation is extremely high due to the unstable nature of the party system’s structure such that it defies precise measurement. Strictly speaking, an atomized party system is not really a “system” at all, for it lacks durable structures of organization and competition.

Sartori then goes on to combine the variables fragmentation and polarization to discriminate two subtypes in each one of the two basic types limited and extreme pluralism: the strongly polarized party system, in which competition between parties takes a centrifugal direction, and the weakly polarized party system that causes centripetal tendencies of competition (Sartori 120-134). We add a third to Sartori’s two variables: the degree of a party system’s institutionalization. The rate of volatility renders an approximate value for its measurement in young democracies. In the case of institutionalized party systems, the volatility index records voter vacillation between established parties and thus usually remains at low levels. By contrast, weakly institutionalized party systems facing high rates of volatility, for not only do they facilitate volatile voting behavior, but additionally, the party organizations themselves are in a constant flux, i.e. they are challenged in their very existence (cp. Mainwaring 1998; Levitsky 1998).

We argue that no matter what the government form, party systems have a positive bearing on the institutional efficiency, effectiveness, and inclusiveness and, consequently, on the consolidation of young democracies, if

1. they are moderately to weakly fragmented. Low fragmentation facilitates the forming of government coalitions and of majorities and thereby accelerates decision-making in parliament.
2. they are moderately to weakly polarized. Low polarization mitigates the danger of ideological antagonism between political parties, which otherwise would easily lead to a paralyzing and destabilizing political confrontation.

### 3. The Classification of Government Forms

Democratic governments can be classified according to the relations between the parliamentary assembly, the government, and the head of state. The distinction of parliamentary and presidential systems is fundamental. It found its first expression in Walter Bagehot’s comparison of constitutional practice in the British and American political systems. Current studies, however, generally employ more sophisticated classifications, because the simple dichotomy of parliamentary and presidential systems does not equally hold for all governments. Above all the classification of “semi-presidential systems” (Duverger 1980) is controversial. They are characterized by a “double-headed executive” consisting of a president and a cabinet. The (directly elected) president holds considerable executive and legislative powers, but he shares them with a prime minister and the cabinet. In semi-presidential systems, as in presidential systems, political action is initiated in two distinct institutions, the parliament and government. But parallel to parliamentary systems, the two institutions form no wholly separate entities. Rather, they are institutionally linked to each other, as the parliament may recall one of the two heads, the prime minister and the cabinet, while the other head, the president, need not fear the “parliamentary sword” (Rüb 2001, p. 90).
The most cogent and sophisticated typology was proposed by Matthew S. Shugart and John Carey (1992). It includes several other variables next to the power of dismissal, namely the power of parliament to check the government, the president’s power to dissolve parliament, the president’s power to dismiss the prime minister and the cabinet, presidential policy prerogatives, and the president’s power to nominate and appoint the government. Together, these criteria render a list of five different forms of government.

1. **A presidential system** involves a direct or direct-like popular election of the president and a fixed time limit both to his incumbency and to the parliamentary term. The parliament and the president are independent of each other, and the president can fill cabinet posts at will. The president furthermore has certain, constitutionally granted powers in the legislative process (e.g. USA, Philippines).

2. In a **presidential-parliamentary system**, the mode of the presidential election is identical. The president gains office via a direct or direct-like popular election. The term of incumbency is fixed. The president can dissolve the parliament, or has some legislative powers, or both. The constitutional provisions creating the double-headed executive grant the president the power to appoint and dismiss individual cabinet members. Parliament too can remove cabinet members, including the prime minister, from office by means of a vote of no confidence (e.g. Russia, Taiwan).

3. The **premier-presidential** system also provides for a direct or direct-like popular election of the president with a fixed term of office. The president holds considerable executive powers, which he shares with a prime minister and a cabinet. He in turn, depends on the parliament’s confidence and cannot be dismissed by the president against the parliament’s will. In contrast to presidential-parliamentary systems, the president is not necessarily the head of government. He shares power with a prime minister, and does not necessarily have legislative powers.

4. In a **parliamentary system** the parliament is sovereign in appointing and dismissing the government. The directly or indirectly elected head of state has no significant legislative powers, nor can he form a government autonomously, nor dissolve the parliament for political reasons (e.g. Germany, Thailand).

5. An **assembly-independent** government is elected indirectly by the assembly for a fixed period of time. The government may not dissolve the assembly, but it has legislative powers. During its term it does not depend on the parliament's confidence. The president, who is also elected by the assembly, holds no autonomous prerogatives vis-à-vis the government (e.g. Switzerland, Micronesia).

### The Impact of Government on Party Formation: Theoretical Considerations

Comparative Government and Party research advances four main hypotheses about the relationship of the type of government and the configuration of the party system:

1. **Hypothesis**

   Presidential systems, as a rule, give institutional incentives to the emergence of loosely structured *electoral parties*, while parliamentary systems tend to produce well organized parties, and rather cohesive parliamentary groups. The power to dismiss governments, held by the parliament in parliamentary systems, entails the parliament’s power to appoint the executive. Due to the power of parliament to appoint and remove the executive, both institutions are highly interlocked. The executive, and particularly the head of the executive, can exert strong control over the parliamentary majority by means of a disciplined parliamentary group (Steffani 1995, 1997). A comparable influence is hardly conceivable in a presidential system, where discipline within the several parliamentary groups is relatively low, and parliaments therefore
characteristically display certain trends towards volatility in supporting the
government. Party discipline in parliamentary systems, in comparison,
tends to be high as it is often strictly controlled and enforced by the party
leadership. Whereas parliaments in presidential systems are primarily
legislative assemblies, with a special emphasis on the power of the purse,
parliaments in parliamentary systems are mostly centers of decision-making
that can remove the executive from power if they succeed in mobilizing the
necessary majority in parliament. It is one major task of the governing
party’s leadership to prevent such defection. It is accordingly the central
function of parties in parliamentary systems to install governments and
supply them with lasting support. As a result, this form of government is
strongly conducive to the emergence of disciplined “program parties”, which
offer coherent party programs and a cohesive organizational structure. The
mutual independence of government and parliament renders the fulfillment
of such a function by any party in presidential systems superfluous.
Instead, parties here serve to supply presidential candidates with support
during their race for office (“electoral machines”). Once election day is over,
the parties do not feel in the same way as is parliamentary systems
responsible for the presidents’ political fate. This holds particularly true for
parliamentary parties and individual representatives, who are mainly
concerned with legislation and controlling government action. A presidential
system works notwithstanding the lack of stable parliamentary majorities,
since it is offset by the relative ease with which ad hoc-coalitions are built.
Neither the rigorous enforcement of party discipline nor a unified opposition
are necessary conditions of a presidential system. It hence facilitates the
emergence of electoral parties and members of parliament, who direct most
of their attention to the legislative process.

2. **Hypothesis**

Presidential systems in young democracies tend to engender parties with
personalistic or clientelistic-charismatic identities while parliamentary
systems generally give rise to programmatic parties. Either form of
government has a characteristic impact on the structure of parties and their
actions (cp. Truman 1953, p. 264), which in turn has a particularly salient
impact on the prevalent strategies of integration and mobilization employed
by the parties. The loose party structures in combination with the focus of
political conflict on the presidency further amplify the personalistic character
of political competition in presidential systems. It is not uncommon for
politicians to find additional political support in structures outside of their
own parties. It does not follow, though, that parties in presidential systems
lack any ideological core or substantive program, nor is their ideology
necessarily eclectic or populist. But their purpose in presidential systems is
limited in scope: they serve as ‘electoral machines’ that seek to gain the
highest possible number of political offices. Rarely is their structure very
complex, and it usually does not go beyond a constituency recruited on the
basis of clientelistic relations. Candidates’ prospects of winning the elections
largely depend on their individual ability to tap resources and mobilize
support.

3. **Hypothesis**

Presidential systems obstruct the institutionalization of parties. The loose
party structures result in frequent restructuring of the party system. These
restructurings may occur before presidential elections, if they are believed
to improve a candidate’s position in the electoral race. Depending on the
electoral system, such developments either contribute to the party system’s
fragmentation (plurality system), or diminish it (majority system). More
often, however, reorganizations take place after the elections. Due to the
loose party structure and the low cohesion of representatives to their
parties, presidential systems regularly witness the switching of party
membership by representatives, which usually occurs in an “upward fashion”: the representative leaves the defeated party to join the ranks of the successful one. Accordingly, presidential and presidential-parliamentary systems frequently induce reductions in fragmentation of parliamentary parties in the aftermath of presidential elections mostly due to clientelistic, personalistic, and opportunistic motives (v. Croissant 2001c on Asia). But the observed effects tend not to be of a lasting nature. Ideological bonds normally prove too weak to prevent the erosion of the newly formed coalition parties in the forerun to the next elections, and a new party realignment takes place. Presidential systems hence display high rates of volatility, too.

4. Hypothesis

In young democracies presidential systems entail a tendency to polarize the competition among parties (Linz 1994; Ackermann 2000). The presidency is the highest prize to be won in the political game. The concentration of political power in this office impels the parties to focus almost all their efforts on its attainment. As a consequence, presidential elections, as perceived by the political parties, take on the character of final judgments over the winners and losers of the political game. The winner-takes-all principle apparently pushes young democracies towards increased polarization of the political competition, which then easily turns into a zero-sum game. Confrontational perceptual and behavioral dispositions are reinforced and the risks of social polarization increased.

We can sum up these considerations with the proposition that each form of government both engenders and requires a specific type of party system. Each one relies on different functional inputs from the involved party system, stimulates the candidates to develop specific political qualities, and offers distinct kinds of institutional incentives to political elites. Presidential systems, for instance, amplify tendencies towards party systems that exhibit low levels of programmatic content and institutionalization. In young democracies they furthermore increase the polarization of party systems. Parliamentary systems, on the other hand, encourage parties to strive for higher levels of institutionalization. They usually result in more programmatic parties and more stable party systems.

These tendencies should also be understood as structural responses to the specific functional needs and institutional incentives of each type of government. In order to be able to avoid institutional gridlock between Congress and the President in the case of competing majorities, presidential systems must rely on flexible party systems, unbound by prescriptive programs or rigid structures. The satisfactory performance of this function requires that fragmentation and polarization of the party system be low. By comparison, the proper functioning of parliamentary systems depends on cohesive and well-institutionalized parties that have the ability to form durable coalitions and effective governments. Their performance too is enhanced by low fragmentation and polarization.

The classical cases of British parliamentarism and American presidentialism seem to underline this. Both models took shape by evolution rather than intentional design (Sartori 1994), and in Westminster as well as in Washington, the type of government had crystallized before definite parties and the structure of today’s party systems emerged. We argue that in both cases the party system adapted itself to the functional needs of the government institutions. Political actors, with a certain time lag, reacted to institutional developments by ‘inventing’ "appropriate" types of parties.

If we classify the existing democratic governments according to their constitutions we obtain a clear picture with regard to the several world regions (see table 1). Out of the 96 included governments, the 20 presidential and nine presidential-parliamentary systems comprise the group of governments whose executive is dominated by a president, which amounts to an overall share in relation to the entirety of examined governments of 30.2 percent. This compares to 47 parliamentary and 18 premier-presidential systems, characterized by the predominance of a parliament-controlled cabinet, whose number equals 67.7 percent of all examined governments. Two systems correspond to the fifth type of government, assembly-independent government.

Table 1

Some regional patterns are particularly salient. Parliamentary systems predominate in South America, while parliamentary systems abound in the Caribbean Islands and Europe, and semi-presidential hybrid systems in Eastern Europe. We find mostly parliamentary systems in Oceania, and semi-presidential as well as parliamentary systems in Asia. Only the Philippines are purely presidential in terms of their constitution, but political reality makes South Korea a presidential system too (Croissant 1998a).

Most regional patterns have their roots in historical precedence. The democratizations of the 1980s that brought forth the young democracies of South America represented a clear continuation of their traditional presidentialism, first instigated during the early 19th century. And just as most former British colonies adopted the British Westminster parliamentarism, so did the Asian democracies install the respective government of their former colonizers, the only exceptions being Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In cases where the young democracies could draw from earlier democratic experiences, they usually reinstated the former system with slight modifications, as it happened in the Philippines. South Korea, however, retained the presidential system it inherited from its authoritarian past despite a brief interim - period of parliamentarism during the short democratic period between 1960 and 1961. The Kuomintang simply transferred the KMT-regime from the Chinese mainland to the Taiwanese island in 1949. It was to remain in place notwithstanding various profound constitutional reforms during the 1990s (Traenkmann 1997). Thailand, Mongolia, and Japan count as exceptions since they never were colonies. Nevertheless, Thailand and Japan have developed their very own constitutional traditions of which parliamentarism is a crucial element. Only Eastern Europe seems reluctant to displaying any clear historical continuities. Instead, the individual path of democratization, short-term interests of relevant actors, and the model function of Western constitutions 4 seem to predetermine the emerging types of government in postcommunist societies more than past experiences or constitutional traditions (Merkel 1996b and 1999, pp. 138-143).

Historical continuities attest to the path-dependency of institutional development (North 1998). Once a particular institutional path has been taken, it appears to acquire some sort of resistance to further change, if it is not disrupted at an early stage, as it happened to the East European states of the Interwar period.

This hypothesis concerning institutional inertia is sustained by the fact that of all the young democracies in table 1 only four (Greece, Portugal, Belarus, and the Ukraine) switched to another type of government after democratization. Constitutional reforms instigated the transitions from premier-presidential systems to parliamentary systems in Southern Europe (cp. Morlino 1998), and the transition from a presidential-parliamentary to a presidential system in the Ukraine in 1996, while Belarus took the inverse road, from a presidential to a presidential-parliamentary system, in 2000 (Garredo 2000). None of these changes involved a transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system, or vice versa. Each one took place within a single group of types of government, i.e., either the one comprising cabinet-dominated executives or the one constituted by
president-dominated executives. Moreover, these empirical findings are not weakened even by more thoroughly examining the presidential status in presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems, respectively. Although further constitutional reforms did occur, especially in Eastern Europe, they mostly served to fortify the already dominant position of either the president in relation to the parliament, or, conversely, of the parliament compared to the president’s 5 (Garredo 2000).

It follows from the above that institutional inertia has a considerable impact on transitions, independent of the specific arguments in favor of government change in a particular case. This even holds for suboptimal institution sets, as has been repeatedly argued for the case of Latin American presidentialism (cp. Linz 1994; Ackermann 2000). Institutional economics hint at the high transaction costs for potential reformers and provide a good explanation why this should be so (cp. Genschel 1996). Apparently, radical institutional reforms like a change of government are extremely difficult and "costly" to carry out and hence extremely rare in "normal times". Only revolutionary changes may offer a window of opportunity to instigating them (e.g. Germany in 1949, France in 1958; 1989 p.p. in Eastern Europe).

Which types of parties and which forms of governments, then, predominate in young democracies? If we classify them with the help of the three types outlined above (v. section 2), and subsequently put our findings in relation to the form of government, we gain a clear picture.

Table 2

Among the 30 states about which sufficient data could be gathered eleven have parliamentary systems, twelve have presidential systems, and eight have semi-presidential systems (of which four are premier-presidential and three presidential-parliamentary). In most states with parliamentary and premier-presidential systems, program-based parties are predominant (64 and 60 percent, respectively, of all cases). The group of presidential and presidential-parliamentary systems, on the other hand, is plainly dominated by clientelistic and/or charismatic parties. Their portion of presidential systems amounts to 90 percent, and they shape the party system in two out of three presidential-parliamentary systems. The hypothesis that governments leaning towards presidentialism contribute to the emergence of clientelistic and/or charismatic parties, can count as empirically substantiated.

But the empirical data are worth noting with respect to party systems as well.

The illustration shows the type of party system found in each country. Party systems that have emerged during the Third Wave cluster in the center cell of the middle row, indicative of limited pluralism and moderate polarization (nine out of 30 cases). Slightly more than half of the party systems (53 percent) are moderately pluralistic. Strongly fragmented party systems exist in only six countries (20 percent). The remaining eight party systems fall into the category of two-party and two-and-a-half-party systems (27 percent). The party system considered most obstructive to consolidation by comparative party research (extreme pluralism with high polarization) exists only in Russia and Benin, whereas three countries, Honduras, Mali, and Taiwan, encompass weakly polarized two-party systems, which are deemed particularly favorable for presidential systems. Accordingly, the literature lists these latter countries among the most consolidated democracies. The highly fragmented party systems in Slovenia and Thailand may not pose a great threat to consolidation since they are balanced by low levels of polarization. On the other hand, the two-and-a-half-party systems in Nepal, Nicaragua, and Guatemala need not necessarily be very conducive to consolidation in spite of weak fragmentation, because they are highly polarized and further unsettled by their civil war or civil war-like experiences. Types that display only one extreme characteristic are comparatively
rare. They make up only a little more than a third of all party systems (36.7 percent). No special regional patterns can be observed. The six Asian party systems, for example, fall into six different categories.

The figure underscores that the Third Wave democracies exhibit a much lower polarization than did the Interwar democracies in Europe. This can be attributed to the collapse of the communist systems on the one hand, and to the stigmatization of fascist ideologies on the other. In cases where we do find strong polarization, for example in Eastern Europe, in Africa, and in some Asian states, it is more likely to be the consequence of ethnic strife or of conflict between individual political leaders than between the radical right and the radical left. And even true ideological polarization can be at least partly traced to those ethnic causes (e.g. in Nepal, Bulgaria, and Slovakia). The left-right ideological conflict today only occurs in Central America where it persists with moderate intensity. Similarly, the fragmentation and polarization of party systems so disastrous for the Weimar republic, the Third and Fourth French Republic, and in some African and Asian democracies after the attainment of independence, continues to be a problem only for Russia, Benin, and the Ukraine.

But the picture is less positive than these findings may suggest at first sight. The high index of volatility attests to the low degree of institutionalization in most Third Wave party systems.

### Table 4

The high voter fluctuation within 58.6 percent of the 27 examined countries indicates that neither party identification nor party organization are as yet well-established. The highest scores in the various regions are found in Benin (78.3 percent), Nicaragua (60.9), Poland (44.5), the Philip-pines (43.2), and Brazil (29.3). Only in six countries (22 percent) does a low level of volatility indicate a high level of party identifications and party organizations. A close correlation of pre-dominant party type with the level of institutionalization becomes evident. Party systems dominated by clientelistic and/or charismatic parties have greater difficulties with institutionalizing party identifications and organizations than parties with clear programmatic profiles.

Two reasons help explain this phenomenon. First, charismatic parties achieve the “accumulation of political capital” (Pasquino 1990, p. 50) primarily by emphasizing the personal attributes and political talents of their leaders. The accumulated capital is contingent on their personality and independent of the party organization. It is a 'mobile’ political resource which can easily be transferred to other organizations should the respective leader choose to switch parties. Party organizations based on the charisma of their leadership must be weakly institutionalized and structurally vulnerable for the sake of retaining power. Second, clientelistic parties often resemble private, patronage networks of individual office-holders and factions. The politicians and factions involved in these clientelistic networks enjoy a great deal of independence from the national party organization, since they generate their own resources and bases of supports. Individual groups or politicians within a party are less inclined to comply with party discipline so that their behavior brings a certain corrosive effect to bear on the party structure.

The presented empirical evidence casts new light on the four hypotheses formulated in section four about the impact of the type of government on the party systems. The following three points assess their empirical validity.

1. No significant correlation exists between types of government and the fragmentation of the party systems. The average index of fragmentation in presidential systems equals 3.59, and lies only slightly higher than that of parliamentary systems at 3.75. In parliamentary-presidential systems and presidential-parliamentary systems it totals 2.65 and 5.4, respectively. Even though the latter scores seem to represent significant deviations, they
ought not to be overestimated since both were derived from small case numbers (three and four cases, respectively). It appears as though fragmentation were not so much a product of the type of government but rather a consequence of the electoral system.

2. The institutionalization of party systems correlates significantly with the form of government. Whereas 50 percent of the party systems in parliamentary and premier-presidential systems can be classified as moderately or highly institutionalized, only 36 percent of those in presidential and presidential-parliamentary systems fall into these categories. The volatility rate of presidential systems clearly exceeds that of parliamentary systems, an unequivocal indication to the stability of party identifications and organizations in the parliamentary systems. However, here too should discretion guide the interpretation of the presented data. The level of institutionalization is low in all young democracies, and considerable differences exist within each form of government.

3. A weak correlation also exists with regard to a party system’s polarization. Only one out of 15 parliamentary and premier-presidential systems is highly polarized, while ten are moderately and four weakly polarized. By contrast, four out of 15 presidential and presidential-parliamentary systems are strongly polarized, six are moderately, and five weakly polarized.

Four of the three hypotheses advanced in section four have been affirmed by empirical evidence. Their affirmation gives credence to the hypothesis that parliamentary systems foster the emergence of program-based, stable, well-institutionalized, and weakly polarized party systems, whereas presidential systems appear to affect these developments adversely.

6. How to Move from Personalistic Party Politics to Programmatic Party Competition

One question assumes particular importance in light of the above findings: Is a constitutional change of government an apt means to influence the formation of parties and party systems? My answer is no, for two reasons.

First, the conclusion, that party systems would evolve differently if constitutional engineering of the type of government were to be applied to them, is neither logically cogent nor empirically verifiable. Moreover, the connection of the type of government form and the structure of the party system is statistically not sufficiently robust. It remains to be clarified whether or not it depends on a third, intervening variable (e.g. a democracy’s age, the existence of strong social polarization). Finally, each hypothesis, be it about a premier-dominated or a president-dominated executive, is confronted with deviant cases. Among other things, such deviations warn against treating the analytical categories presidential and parliamentary systems as empirically uniform entities. Referring only to the form of government renders but an incomplete picture of the background against which parties and party systems develop their specific structure. Various other factors affect their evolution as well: mode and path of transition, historical party roots, traditional patterns of social stratification, cleavage structure, and other central institutions (cp. Merkel 1997). The particular impact of each factor varies from case to case. There are several arguments that suggest a stronger determination of party systems by the factors just mentioned than simply by the type of government, especially in young democracies.

Asian party systems, for instance, have been hardly affected by the conflict between authoritarian regime parties and the democratic opposition parties, but all have been rather disposed to continuing authoritarian or pre-authoritarian constitutional traditions. And, again, each country takes up the thread of history in a particular manner. In Thailand (Democratic Party), Taiwan (Guomin-dang), and Nepal (Congress Party, Communists), continuation has chiefly occurred within the party organizations. Bangladesh, the Philippines, and South Korea have recycled their historical experiences on a more personal level. Former party
leaders have either retained their previous positions, or they have been able to install their close relatives. One kind of continuing previous political patterns has proven especially interesting for us. In countries where clientelistic or programmatic parties already dominated before democratization, such parties have prevailed thereafter as well. Only in Taiwan and Nepal, where programmatic parties (the Guomindang and NCP and Nepalese Congress, respectively) existed even during the authoritarian regimes, do we find today a significant programmatic element in the competition between parties. Apparently, the modes of recruitment, integration, and mobilization are path-dependent to a certain extent, too.

However, the historical dimension of party systems is of course also only a product of its traditional patterns of social, economic, and cultural variables, manifested in the cleavage structure. Several studies on South Korea, for instance, demonstrate that the absence of ideological right-left cleavages from South Korean society explains the lack of incentives for political parties pursue more program-based policies (cp. Croissant 1998b). In Bangladesh, on the other hand, the salience of ethnic, religious, and even dynastic conflicts between the country’s leading political clans covers the division between the economically privileged and the underprivileged almost entirely. Numerous studies on Thailand and the Philippines agree that the causes for the marginal significance of political programs lie in the combined effect of several institutional factors and socio-economic conditions, whose essential structure can be outlined as follows. In both countries, rural areas elect the larger share of mandates. Poverty and extreme income equality, traditional social structures and bad living conditions constitute strong incentives for the voters to view their votes not as a means to influencing political decisions but as a commercial good to be sold to the highest bidder. Similarly, the elected politicians are not seen as representatives of political interests but as distributors of state resources.

Informal social institutions coordinating the interaction between the political sphere and the rest of society form the link between socio-economic structures, the citizens’ voting behavior, and the candidates’ campaigning behavior. They can be subsumed under the concept of clientelism or patron-client relationships. Such personalized relationships offer limited economic and social security to rural voters, and they represent a key device for incorporating the rural population into the political process. But at the same time, they hamper the formation of alternative, modern and generalized modes of interest representation due to their personalistic orientation (Foth 1996, pp. 103-4; McVey 2000). Compared to the benefits afforded by the clientelistic relationship, which are directly experienced and attributed to specific individuals or groups by the recipients, programmatic engagement becomes quite unattractive for candidates and representatives. They tailor their strategies to fulfilling their constituency’s immediate and particular expectations. This kind of electoral market provides strong incentives for candidates and parties to satisfy short-term, material expectations of the local constituencies instead of adopting long-term programs for producing collective goods.

The second reason is that cultural norms, social cleavages, and patterns of social stratification elude short-term changes achieved by institutional engineering. Consequently, a change of the type of government most likely produces only midterm effects on the party system, if anything. There can be reasonable reasons be put forward against changing an organizationally unstable and volatile presidential system dominated by clientelistic and/or charismatic parties to a parliamentary one.

The implicit assumption that a change of the type of government can be combined with a tabula rasa of the party system is not very plausible. The dilemma is that a newly institutionalized government must work in combination with the same old party system. While a number of institutional arrangements such as the competition between president and Congress, the president’s
legislative powers, and the mutual independence of parliament and executive, draw at least cer-
tain boundaries to the practices of clientelistic parties in a presidential system, parliamentary systems lack these checks and balances. As I have argued earlier, a parliamentary system must rely on a party system that is able to sustain that form of government. This, in turn, presupposes the parties’ organizational stability, internal cohesion, and ideological coherence. It is not suffi-
cient for parties to be powerful enough to install a government – they also need to be stable and coherent enough to maintain it. But precisely the organizationally unstable, volatile party systems marked by clientelism and personalism are too weak, too fragmented, too deficient in authority, to change and lead the government towards a responsible party government.

A very different assumption therefore gains plausibility. Establishing a parliamentary system without simultaneously creating the corresponding parties is likely to intensify rather than attenu-ate phenomena like cron-yism, short-term policy planning, the management of ad hoc-coalitions by the government, and a deficient orientation to the collective good. The obstacles to efficient and responsible government are thereby further exacerbated. Matthew Shugart (1999) wields this argument in his advocacy of presidential systems, claiming that they are the best among bad op-tions for young democracies with a party system unapt for parliamentarism. But this does not entail that institutional reforms are impossible when it comes to party systems; rather, it must be applied at a different level than the fundamental constitutional structures.

6.1 Reforms of the Electoral System: plurality and proportional representation

Electoral systems and sub-rules of the parliamentary arena stand out as particularly suitable objects. I will therefore briefly contrast plurality systems with proportional representation and subsequently add a short discussion about the positive prospects of reforming the parliamentary sub-rules.

There is a consensus among students of political institutions and parties that the choice of an electoral system pertains to the "most important constitutional choices that have to be made in democracies." (Lijphart 1994, p. 94; Nohlen 1996; Taagepara 1998; Merkel 1998). Although the impact of electoral systems on party systems is hedged in by the various factors mentioned above, three reasons suggest that proportional representation offers better conditions for creating a system of stable programmatic parties than a plurality system.

1. Plurality systems in single-member or small electoral districts are candidate-centered electoral systems (Cain/Ferejohn/Fiorina 1987). They stimulate competition between individual candidates, not parties. Parliamentary representatives are generally more inclined to gaining reputation as representatives of local interests and promoting the particular interests of their respective constituency than to adhering to well defined party programs. Their main task therefore consists in securing and distributing private (particular) goods (cp. Shugart 1999; Carey 2000a, p. 240; Carey 2000b). Since they judge their political survival to be less a matter of policy-oriented action than of satisfying particular interests, they are not inclined to delegate much political power to the party leaders. On the contrary, representatives commonly oppose the enforcement of strict party discipline and pursue grab-and-run strategies that aim at the short-term maximum of private goods for their voter clientele (Cox/Morgenstern 2000). The consequence is not only an acute underproduction of collective goods, but also a party system with permanent deficits in terms of programmatic content.

Proportional representation, on the other hand, is a party-centered electoral system. The candidates’ prospects of electoral success depend on the parties’ organizational strength, their ability to run good campaigns, and their program’s attractiveness. Proportional representation enables the party elites to enforce compliance with their program much more easily.
than plurality systems because they often decide who is to be on the party list.

2. Plurality systems have a "mechanical effect" (Duverger) on the party system which manifests itself in a process of party concentration towards a two-party system. As a result, the number of heterogeneous coalition or electoral parties in party systems dominated by charismatic or clientelistic parties usually increases. This contributes to the candidates’ individualistic and party-adverse attitudes, and it further undermines the ability of the party leadership to punish or reward the individual representatives. We can see that the party’s programmatic indifference and the candidates’ loose loyalties to the party program are two sides of one and the same coin. Candidates and representatives therefore frequently put their party affiliation into doubt, thereby indicating the ease with which they abandon one party and join another with the intention of gaining new or securing existent political support and protection. In contrast, proportional representation can also set off a process of party concentration, because no actual electoral system can provide for a one-to-one conversion of votes into political mandates and many proportional system have certain minimal percentage thresholds (2%;3%;4%;5%) which have to be overcome by the parties in order to be considered in the distribution of parliamentary seats. However, the “mechanical” concentration effect tends to be weaker and the prospects of electoral success for small parties higher. The psychological effects change accordingly; proportional representation offers more incentives and entails less risks to vote for small and new parties.

3. The “psychological effect” of plurality systems further amplifies the mechanical effect. Voters quickly realize that they waste their ballot by casting it for a programmatic party that lacks any chances of winning the respective district’s majority. As “rational voters” (Downs), they will either abstain from voting or make their cross for one of the big parties. The political factor equally affects the supply side of political competition. Instead of wasting their resources by running as non-performing third-party candidates, politicians will join larger parties to improve their electoral prospects. More proportionally organized electoral systems offer small and new parties better opportunities for successful competition than plurality systems, which favor big parties and incumbents. Proportional representation thus exposes established parties to more competitive pressure and forces them to develop programmatic answers to new voter demands.

Proportional representation is more likely than a plurality system to shift the development away from personalistic toward programmatic parties.

The most common objections to the establishment of proportional representations are twofold. First, it is said that they increase the atomization of the party system, and second, that they (indirectly) lead to a political factionalization within parliament. But these objections chiefly address the unrestrained proportional representation as it existed during the Weimar Republic, in Italy from 1948-1993 and in Poland (1990-1992). Comparative studies about the effect of electoral systems on party fragmentation in Eastern Europe and Asia, however, show that proportional representation in fact lead to stronger concentrations of the party system than plurality systems (Beichelt 1998, Croissant 2001c). Particularly the introduction of legal thresholds of exclusion sometimes proves to be an effective rule. If the threshold is set at a sufficient high level, it averts party fragmentation quite effectively. Proportional representation ‘moderated’ in this respect helps rationalize the party system and facilitates government formation in both presidential and parliamentary systems. Substituting a candidate-centered plurality system by a party-centered proportional system therefore constitutes an important step in creating a more programmatic, more stable, and more institutionalized party system.
6.2 Reforming Parliamentary Procedures

The modification of the parliamentary procedures can affect the cohesion within parliamentary parties and their control over individual representatives too. I see three important institutional reform measures to strengthen the role of political parties.

1. The first is to give more power to the parliamentary parties in the legislative process, for instance by according them the right to nominate committee members or by setting a quorum for the initiation of the legislative process. Such reforms would undergird the power of the parliamentary party’s leaders and hence their ability to act on the party’s behalf as well as the cohesion within the party in parliament.

2. Second, a parliamentary mandate could be predicated on the proviso not to leave a party before six months have passed after the last election and not later than six months until the next election under penalty of losing it. Although this last proposition stands in clear contradiction to the principle of the free mandate, it might turn out to be a necessary sacrifice when trying to cut back the number of turncoats.

3. A third option is the introduction of a constructive vote of no confidence. It can discipline individual representatives and stabilize governments. Especially in combination with a modified proportional representation (by introducing threshold clauses) can a constructive vote of no confidence become an effective means to alleviate problems of government formation and government stability in parliamentary systems.

7. Conclusion

I set out on this presentation with the assumption that representative democracies need to rely on a system of consolidated and responsive parties with a firm base in society in order to fulfill the representative function of democracy and to secure its governability. But if we look at the development of party systems in the young democracies from a comparative view, we come to a rather skeptical conclusion. In many regions in the world where democracies emerged in the wake of the third wave, neither truly responsible and representative democracies nor consolidated and responsive party system are established yet. The question of how to reinforce those parties and party systems that promote democracy is still of crucial importance for most young democracies. One of our core arguments have been that each type of the different governments favors the emergence of a specific party system. A presidential system appears to hinder the development of stable, well-institutionalized, programmatic, weakly polarized party systems, while a parliamentary system seems to favor them. There are theoretical reasons and empirical facts to believe that institutions, once they have been created by intentional or have emerged by unintentional economic, political, and cultural interaction, have a significant impact on political organizations, such as parties and interest groups. But party systems in young democracies have been and are being shaped by many different factors. Historical factors (path dependency) as well as societal (cleavage structure) and institutional factors (electoral system) are among the most important ones. Many different economic, social, cultural, and political factors leave their impact on the specific type of parties and party systems. Anybody asking whether and when to chose which kind of institutional reform to support democratic consolidation must bear this in mind. Institutional engineering is possible, but it has its constraints, exactly in those factors.

For these reasons, it is an risky, if not inappropriate choice to switch from a presidential towards a parliamentary type of government or vice versa in order to “engineer” more programmatic, responsive (electorate) and responsible (collective goods) parties. An effective government requires compatible parties; this holds true for presidential systems and parliamentary as well. Again, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to assume that a switch from presidential governments to parliamentary systems in order to “engineer” programmatic and
non clientelistic parties run the risk of a “constitutional fallacy” and the trap of “hyperrationality”. Such a constitutional reform does not take into account the un-simultaneous time horizons: the consolidation of a party system takes much longer than the establishment of the constitutional structures. Once the new parliamentary government has been introduced, it has to cope – at least for a certain period of time – with the old, fragmented, clientelistic, and irresponsible parties. They would not be able to create strong and stable governments. In such a situation the governability of the country would be less secured, than under the old presidential system, where the prerogatives of the president could secure at least the governability, even in the absence of strong and consolidated parties.

When institutional reformers fail to recognize this, the reforms aggravate rather than mitigate the problems of consolidation and democratic governance. Incrementalism appears to be the most promising alternative to government change. It does not venture to transform the institutional macro-level, the government, but rather the meso-level, the electoral system, or the micro-level, the parliamentary sub-rules. Thereafter the ground for a constitutional switch from one type of government to the other could be prepared.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Country</th>
<th>Government System</th>
<th>Dominant Party Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>programmatic-clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Premier-presidential</td>
<td>programmatic-clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Premier-presidential</td>
<td>programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>Premier-presidential</td>
<td>programmatic-clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Premier-presidential</td>
<td>programmatic-clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>charismatic-programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South America</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>charismatic-programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>clientelistic-programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>programmatic-clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>clientelistic-programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central America</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>clientelistic-programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>clientelistic-programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>clientelistic-programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>clientelistic-programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>clientelistic-programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>charismatic-clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Premier-presidential</td>
<td>clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Premier-presidential</td>
<td>clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>charismatic-clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>programmatic-charismatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>charismatic-clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>clientelistic-programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>clientelistic-charismatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Presidential-parliamentary</td>
<td>charismatic-clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>clientelistic-charismatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Presidential-parliamentary</td>
<td>programmatic-clientelistic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This typology is unprecise for methodic reasons. It is based on the main integration- and mobilization-modus of the parties in a party-system. Each party mobilizes in different ways. Here, only the predominant pattern is indicated for the hole party-system. Clientelistic or charismatic modi of integration and mobilization can be oriented by different social cleavages (ethnic, religious, language, regional, right-left).

Source: Qualitative estimation of the author, compiled according to informations in Merkel (Ed.) 1997; Croissant 2001b, 2001c and complementary estimations.

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Table 3: Types of Party Systems in Third Wave Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fragmentation</th>
<th>POLARIZATION</th>
<th>Particle Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Extreme polarized and pluralized party system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benin (Ukraine)</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Guatemala)</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>Moderate polarized multi party system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>(Near-) Two party system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Slovenia)</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Mali)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ithalics indicate low institutionalization;
Source: Classifications based on data in table 3, appendix; volatility is missing for Mali, Slovenia and Guatemala.
Table 4: Fragmentation, Polarization, Institutionalization of Party Systems in 30 New Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Country</th>
<th>Fragmentation(^a)</th>
<th>Polarization(^b)</th>
<th>Institutionalization (Volatility) (^c)</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>No. of Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (1996)</td>
<td>moderate (3.1)</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate (15.3)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (1995)</td>
<td>moderate (3.0)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>moderate (14.4)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (1996)</td>
<td>moderate (3.9)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low (8.9)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarien (1997)</td>
<td>moderate (2.9)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>moderate (12.5)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1997)</td>
<td>moderate (2.95)</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>high (44.5)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (1996)</td>
<td>high (10.98)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high (40.0)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania (1998)</td>
<td>moderate (2.65)</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>high (29.5)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (1998)</td>
<td>moderate (4.4)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high (22.75)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia (1996)</td>
<td>high (6.32)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep. (1998)</td>
<td>moderate (4.72)</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>high (25.0)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (1998)</td>
<td>moderate (3.4)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high (37.5)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South America</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina (1999)</td>
<td>moderate (3.4)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high (20.8)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (1998)</td>
<td>high (7.1)</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>high (29.3)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (1997)</td>
<td>moderate (3.1)</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate (18.1)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay (1999)</td>
<td>moderate (3.1)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high (22.2)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central America</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador (1997)</td>
<td>moderate (4.0)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high (21.7)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras (1997)</td>
<td>low (2.2)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low (6.9)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (1999)</td>
<td>low (2.4)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (1997)</td>
<td>moderate (2.9)</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>low (7.1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua (1996)</td>
<td>moderate (2.7)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high (60.9)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin (1999)</td>
<td>high (6.2)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high (78.3)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (1992)</td>
<td>low (2.2)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia (1999)</td>
<td>low (1.7)</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate (15.85)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (1999)</td>
<td>low (2.2)</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate (18.2)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Effective number of parties based on seat share for each party, computed according to Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties ($N$) $< 3.0$ means low fragmentation; $3.0 \leq N > 5.0$ means moderate fragmentation; $N \geq 5.0$ means high fragmentation. b Classification is based on qualitative ratings by the author. Polarization relates both ideological-programmatic conflicts and the polarization within the parliament between ethnic, religious or linguistic groups and political leaders respectively (Bangladesh). Counted are only parties, which held seats in the first chamber of parliament. Polarization within the party system does not always represent the real polarization of society (e.g. Philippines). c Volatility rate according to Niedermayer (1989); volatility ($N$) $\leq 10.0$ means low; $10 < N \leq 20.0$ means moderate; $N > 20.0$ means high. Date are incomplete for the full period. We are in the process of collecting lacking missing data. Source: Computation by the author based on information in Inter-American-Development-Bank 2000; Nohlen/Krennerich/Thibaut (eds.) 1999, Rueb 2001, Croissant 2001c; Merkel 1997; Morlino 1998; Merkel et al. 2001.

- END NOTES -

[1] Personalism (charismatic leadership), programs (ideologies), and clientelism are not mutually exclusive properties. History affords many examples of parties displaying both programmatic and charismatic features (e.g. NSDAP, CPSU under Stalin), as well as examples of mixed programmatic and clientelistic parties (e.g. the Greek PASOK and the Japanese LDP). The latter cases are characterized by distinct programmatic positions, i.e., a definite programmatic core which is unchangeable even by party leaders.

[2] Different methods of measuring a party system’s fragmentation can be employed. Duverger (1951) counts the number of relevant parties, Laakso/Taagepera (1979) the number of effective parties, while Rae (1968) uses the fractionalization index.

[3] According to Sartori, a party must satisfy two criteria in order to count as relevant. First, it must find “itself in a position to determine over time, and at some point in time, at least one of the possible governmental majorities” (coalition potential). Second, “its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party-competition – by determining a switch from centripetal to centrifugal competition … - of the governing-oriented parties.” (blackmail potential, Sartori, 1976, pp. 122-124). To compare large numbers of cases we propose the threshold of at least 3% of the parliamentary seats as a minimum for a party to count as relevant.

[4] For example, Poland adopted the French model, and Hungary the West-German model.

[5] One of the few exceptions is Poland...


[7] We included the Ukraine for reasons of completeness, even though it does not appear in the figure.
This holds only partially for Nepal. Strong factionalist demands and their satisfaction through clientelistic structures have eroded and split both parties.