



Global Pakistan:

Pakistan's Role in the International System

Jochen Hippler and Vaqar Ahmed (Editors)

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List of Acronyms

ADP	Asian Development Bank
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BISE	Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CAD	Current Account Deficit
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
EFA	Education for All
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariff
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDP	Gross Domestic Production
HCI	Human Capital Index
HDI	Human Development Index
HEC	Higher Education Commission
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOK	Indian Occupied Kashmir
IT	Information Technology
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals

NACTE	National Accreditation Council for Teacher Education
NAHE	National Academy for Higher Education
NEP	National Education Policy
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OBOR	One Belt One Road
OECD	Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development
OoSC	Out of School Children
OOSC	Out of School Children
PES	Pakistan Education Statistics
QAA	Quality Assurance Agency
QS	Quacquarelli Symonds
R & D	Research and Development
RMG	Readymade Garments
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
TFP	Total Factor Productivity
UPE	Universal Primary Education
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization
WW-II	World War-II
YDI	Youth Development Index
YDP	Youth Development Program

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Preface

Political and socio-economic discussions in Pakistan's popular discourse are often inward-looking and generally focus on the country itself, or on its relationships to its immediate neighbors (Afghanistan, India, and China). We suggest here that Pakistan is part of a global system, as well. It is influenced not just by its direct neighbors, but also by: international events (war in Ukraine is just one example); by global economic factors (e.g. oil prices, changing terms of trade, or the danger of a global recession); and by various other global governance arrangements (e.g. Financial Action Taskforce and its demands from Pakistan). At the same time, Pakistan is not insulated from the global systemic changes. The global pandemic has overwhelmed the policymakers with possibilities of future epidemics also not being ruled out. In the past migration of people, both incoming and outgoing, has impacted the social fabric.

Likewise, the country is suffering from global warming and the resulting patterns of weather and precipitation. Pakistan is also a player at the international arena and is expected to play a responsible and proactive role at various global governance forums. The speech of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan at the UN General Assembly on September 27, 2019 has indicated regarding this responsibility and highlighted Pakistan's role in the Cold War, or the engagement of Pakistani soldiers abroad, either in the United Nations peace keeping framework, or bilaterally. While many Pakistanis are aware of some of Pakistan's international roles and dependencies, and of Pakistan's image abroad, there is limited discussion about the country's global role – what it should be? Who are the internal and external actors that shape Pakistan's role, engagement, influence, and perception abroad? What role does the state and citizens play in deciding Pakistan's global role? These are some of the questions that our chapter authors aimed to touch upon in this book. A conscious effort has been made to reach out to Pakistanis living and working abroad. Chapters have been invited from such resource persons who are not only Pakistanis but also study Pakistan from abroad and often through various lens external to Pakistan.

The book in your hand, "Global Pakistan: Pakistan's Role in the International System", is highly relevant, and a very important contribution. This book has

been edited by two eminent scholars, Jochen Hippler from Germany and Vaqar Ahmed from Pakistan. They have brought together experts on Pakistan nationally and internationally, for this important publication. FES wants to congratulate both editors and the authors for their outstanding work. FES hopes that this book will prove to be a timely contribution on the way to serious scholarship about Pakistan's role in the international system and the purpose of this book will be amply served if political leaders as well as the articulate sections of the public in general find it a useful compendium of ideas and arguments which should be translated into Government's policies.

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June 2022

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Jochen Hippler

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Background

Generally, Pakistan is an inward-looking country. Quite understandably, it looks at its own economic situation, at the discussions and arguments noisily being put forward by its different political actors, at the subtle and not-so-subtle behavior of the men in uniform, and at the relationship between Islamabad and the provinces. When the attention is not focused on internal conditions and policies, Pakistan looks at its neighborhood, and how it might affect the country: India, Afghanistan, and China are the main points of interest. All of this is justified, without any doubt. At the same time, this is not enough. Pakistan needs to appreciate that it is also part of an international, of a global system, and that these external, global influences determine in many regards the well-being of the own country. Pakistan has to operate in a regional context, but as well international, and in the context of Globalization.

The author of this text is a foreigner, a German. While I have regularly and very often visited Pakistan since 1988 and lived here since 2019, my views presented here are still from the outside, while taking into account Pakistan's internal conditions. After having observed the developments and changes in Pakistan for more than 30 years, and as a well-wisher for a progressive future of the country, I sincerely hope that my humble remarks might be of use for the many friends and colleagues in Pakistan who are working so hard to build an even better Pakistan, and to better understand its place in the World, and not just in the region. Especially in times of international and global interconnectedness, outside and independent views may be of some value, it is to hope.

1. Existing in a Global Market

Pakistan's economy, as we know, is not isolated but part of the global economy. But this simple truth does not affect all parts of the Pakistani economy and society in the same way. While a local hairdresser in Bannu, Khairpur or Chiniot does not have to compete with his fellow hairdressers in China, France or Nigeria, the textile exporters are in constant competition with those in Bangladesh, India, China, or Vietnam. And at the same time,

they are operating in the framework of rules and regulations of importing countries, like the European Union, Britain, and others. And while selling *Samosas* at a street corner in Karachi or Lahore is still a local affair, the financial and banking industries are not. They are deeply integrated in the international financial market.

The terms of trade are not determined in Pakistan, but by anonymous forces of the global market, and the conditions of international lending and borrowing again are not in the hand of Pakistani actors, neither state nor private business. Export opportunities for Pakistan may to some degree depend on the efficiency of Pakistani producers, and on the quality they offer, but even more on the external demand, or lack of it, from abroad. And the value of foreign currency, which Pakistan requires to pay for its imports, again is not determined in or by Pakistan, but by the international market.

We should briefly note here that many of these restrictions are not specific for Pakistan, or for Third World countries, but effect all and every country. The Global markets are dictating to everyone – though sometimes in different ways and with different outcomes. We should also appreciate that while “the market” in theory is just a technical mechanism of resource allocation favoring cost-efficiency, in reality the different degrees of power play an important role – both economic, political, and sometimes even military power. Inequality in global power relationships does affect the global market, to some degree. While countries need to buy and pay for their required foreign exchange (still, mostly US dollar), only the USA can just print dollars, though this will come at an economic price, like inflation, if done excessively. And powerful countries are not unknown for bullying weaker ones in accepting economic practices which otherwise would be unacceptable. We should recognize, therefore, the “the global market” is not necessarily and automatically fair and neutral, but often tainted by political influences and power distortions. On the other hand, instrumentalization and manipulation of markets are not without limits, and often do not work, in the long run. If the economic and political powerful could control markets at their own discretion, the rise of China as a global economic power would never have been possible, since Washington would not have allowed it. But, as we know, the rise of China did happen, and the US were not able to stop it. The global market in this case, has been stronger than US national power.

Pakistan, therefore, will remain exposed to the structures and affects of the global market, with much less influence on it compared to the global economic giants, like the USA, the European Union, or China. It might be

able to adjust and use it more or less intelligently and efficiently, but it will not be able to escape its restrictions.

2. Being Part of The Global Environment

By now, the serious effects of global environmental and ecological changes are obvious. And again, some of those do affect Pakistan very directly and dramatically, while other more indirectly. The polluting of the sea by plastic trash, being flowing down the rivers nearly everywhere, is a case in point. Plastic and microplastic are pollutants which will find their way into the food chain, and finally will end up in the food of humans, after they have affected plants and animals, which often consider them food. There are many other examples of an interlink between Pakistan and the global environment. But the most crucial probably is global warming and climate change. The Pakistani contribution for its causation is quite limited, compared to other countries, but it still should be a cause of concern, especially if Pakistan in the future will become more economically developed and its traffic congestion even worse. But though mainly caused externally, by the industrialized countries and increasingly China and India, it will create grave dangers to Pakistan. In a country where its southern parts are already experiencing temperatures of above 40 or even 45 degrees centigrade during the summer, a further increase in temperature would be frightening and even threaten the health, lives, and livelihood of many people who cannot afford electrical cooling devices or air conditioners. And it will negatively affect agriculture and the productivity of many economic activities. But, at the same time, global warming is already today negatively impacting the future of Pakistan by gradually melting the glaciers in Gilgit-Baltistan. This is visible for anybody who has been visiting the area for the last 20 or 30 years. Global warming will speed up this process. Any melting of the glaciers in turn will have disastrous repercussion for the water level of rivers in Pakistan, on which a lot of agriculture depends.

Global warming, therefore, will have grave consequences on Pakistan. But potentially even worse may be the other aspects of Climate Change. An incremental increase in temperature does not mean that the weather will stay as it is, besides being warmer. Just the opposite: it is highly likely that higher temperatures globally will increase weather extremes in many parts of the world, including in Pakistan. This means more droughts, more floods, more storms, more extreme rainfall over short times. Such phenomena have already been observed in several countries around the world, including the United States and Germany, which both are much better placed to deal with

the effects of natural disasters. The big and destructive flood in many parts of Pakistan in 2010 demonstrated what might lay ahead, if weather extremes will intensify. In many cases, though, the effects will often remain local or regional, like the unprecedented rains in Karachi in 2020.

3. Competing Cultural Globalizations

Cultural globalization is well-known. Pop music, movies, books, fashions, and some political discourses to some degree are produced and distributed nationally or regionally – but to a higher degree for a global market. This trend is anything but new, but with global TV networks and especially the internet it has intensified dramatically. This implies a measure of intercultural exchange. When I lived in Germany, I enjoyed listening to Qawwalis sung by Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan and other Pakistani singers, while when living in Islamabad I often listen to German radio stations, to stay informed about developments in Germany. And more than half of the music played there has been produced in the US and Britain. But the flow of cultural products and information is not a balanced exchange among equals, but generally more one-sided. While it is possible to find and consume elements of Pakistani (or other Third World countries) culture in Europe, one has to actively look for it. On the other hand, in most countries, including Pakistan, elements of American or European culture are readily available and often actively offered to prospective customers. The main reason is that cultural products, if not strictly local, are also market-driven. And big, global companies based in the most developed countries have crucial competitive advantages, and global networks of distribution. Their products and the cultural patterns they present at the same time provide an image of modernity, of being up-to-date, and correspond to modern technology, for expensive cars, airplanes, computers. They to some degree symbolize “modern thinking”, which can provide prestige to many, especially younger people.

A problem for Pakistan resulting from this situation is that many parts of its national culture and traditions have been of local character. The different languages in Pakistan, different ethnic identities, different religious creeds have been fruitful sources of creating Pakistani culture, and several forms of Pakistani identity. Different forms of cultural globalization have affected this negatively. On the one hand the social elite of the country feels more comfortable with English than local languages or even Urdu – which might have the side-effect of widening social gaps between rich and poor, educated and less educated, privileged and non-privileged citizens. But also, in the

field of religion globalization has changed Pakistani culture, without many people recognizing. While traditionally in South Asian Islam very localized Sufi traditions have been predominant, with major differences from region to region, even from village to village not being unusual, this is changing for the last decades with increasing speed. Two major sources of change, that reinforce each other, can be identified. One is originating from Britain, where millions of emigrated Pakistanis have settled, and became uprooted from their local and regional sources of religious inspiration. In need to refashion a new and “more modern” identity, with religious elements, they very often de-localized and instead “globalized” Islam. Less local, less spiritual, but more rule-based, more formal, and linked to some Middle Eastern religious traditions especially from Saudi Arabia, or the United Arab Emirates – such a new, “modern” Islamic interpretation has been re-exported to Pakistan, via travel and family relationships. The second source, drawing in the same direction, is located in the Arab countries just mentioned, and their religious ideology is also transmitted to Pakistan by returning migrants and other exchange. In both cases, modern technologies of communications have reinforced the common trend, thereby slowly and gradually changing Pakistani religious identities and traditions. This point here is not, obviously, about whether this trend might be good or bad, but to illustrate that cultural globalization might come from quite unexpected sources and produce equally unexpected results. And it might illustrate that seemingly contradictory external cultural influences may have more in common that meets the eye: Cultural “modernization” might take the shape of Western movies and fashion, or of a standardized version of the own, traditional religious thinking and feeling.

4. What does Globalization require from Pakistan?

Globalization is double-faced. It offers both opportunities and dangers. While Pakistan has no chance of opting out of Globalization, or to “cherry-pick” what it likes and avoid the rest, it still has the choice of being aware of its global situation or not, and to be well prepared, or unprepared. Currently, both awareness and preparedness seem to be less developed than one would hope for.

Being part of the global economy and a global market implies that economic isolation is not possible any longer, if it ever was. It opens doors to enter, and to leave. Economically speaking it might add chances for export on the one hand, and expose local industries and businesses to foreign competition, sometimes more advanced. To strategically strengthen exports (in contrast

to a short-term artificial increase) would require to improve quality of export products, and to look for exportable commodities which are not already flooding the global marketplace. It is fine to export textile and leather, but it would be much better to export high quality and fashionable apparel instead. However, it would still be more advantageous to find export commodities which would not put Pakistani exporters in competition with so many other countries, all exporting the same or very similar products. Does Pakistan have anything to offer to the world, which is more unique, of exceptional good quality and desirable? Currently there is precious little in this category (surgical instruments and footballs might be brought up as examples). And worse: very few people seem to look for such products, or even start to develop them, if not available off the shelf. If Pakistan wants to benefit from global markets, it must become more creative in developing attractive and exportable commodities. South Korea and China, for instance (and before that, Japan) did not become successful in the global market by restricting themselves to exporting textile. It may be useful, might be necessary, at least at the beginning, but it will not be enough to take off, economically. But what are the next steps for Pakistan? Which again brings us to the urgent need for creativity.

Creativity does not grow on trees. It might develop, or not, depending on the conditions in society. Waiting for bureaucrats, politicians, military officers, feudal elites, or the ulema to come up with a flood of creative ideas (about anything, including exports) would be asking for too much. Such groups, independent of their intention, will never be the drivers of innovation, in no country, and not in Pakistan as well. They don't need creativity and innovation, and generally they do very well without them. Only the middle classes provide the potential of such innovation. They often have a relatively high degree of education, they are not too poor, they to some degree have been exposed to the world and experienced more dynamic societies, and for them creativity and innovation are the most promising ways to personal success. The middle classes can only rise and flourish in society if they are creative, and more so than others. This argument has two important results. Firstly, if Pakistan, like others, needs a self-confident and creative middle class, this class of people needs the space to flourish and develop its potential. Creativity will not evolve in a prison cell, so to speak. It needs the rule of law, which implies legal boundaries to avoid excesses and criminal behavior; and it implies reliable and stable rules in society which are fair, apply to everybody in the same way, and will be relatively stable. A flourishing middle class will also result in a self-confident civil society, where private cooperation can

be exercised freely. If a state or government cannot or will not permit its development, it displays a lack of confidence, and it will restrict the rise of the middle classes. All society will pay the price.

Secondly, the middle class (and the rest of society) need education to become fruitful. And it needs not just some education, but the best education, on par with the leading countries of the world. Only this will permit society – and the middle classes – to become creative and innovative and develop the ability to be internationally competitive. Without first-rate education and research skills, the middle classes are useless and sterile, only with it they can become the drivers of development, and of economic innovation. The backside for some elites in this regard might be that this would also make them politically more self-confident and ambitious. This would be good for Pakistan, but not necessarily for some of its traditional elites. But without strong, well-educated and creative middle classes the country will never be able to successfully compete in the global market.

Finally, if Pakistan wants to successfully compete in the global market, it needs more effective and efficient governance. While progress in this field over the last decades (besides some setbacks) is undisputable, there still is a long way to go. The need to strengthen and fully implement the rule of law has already been mentioned. But also other areas of statehood need to be modernized and made fully functionable, including law enforcement (meaning police and the courts, among others), the tax system, the fight against corruption, which needs to be freed from political instrumentalization. The political system and the party system desperately need a reduction in polarization and emotionalization, and more cooperation and continuity instead. The government and the state might not be able to provide economic creativity and innovation by themselves, but its policies can destroy both with ease, either by being incapable and by intention. But this puts Pakistan at a grave disadvantage compared to many of its international competitors. If Pakistan wants to successfully participate in globalization and reap some of its benefits, it needs to set free all the creativity in society, and make the government and bureaucracies support the new-found dynamism. For this, the government apparatus needs to function like a well-oiled machine and set free the dynamics in society instead of restricting it. If state and society cooperate in this ambitious enterprise, the country will flourish and become a success story. But only if they do.

CHAPTER 2

Nation States in the Era of Globalization

What Pakistan can learn from others?

Hassan Jalil Shah
and
Aamir Khattak

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Abstract

The concept of nation states introduced in 1648 is the prevailing world order based on the respected principle of sovereignty of a state. The concept survived for centuries till the gauntlet was thrown by globalization, raising questions about the eroding state authority. Modern communication means have intensified the phenomenon of globalization, posing serious challenges to the concept of nation states. Pakistan is located at a geographically consequential location facing stiff regional, economic and political challenges in a highly globalized environment. In this intellectual discourse we have analyzed the genesis of nation states, its characteristics and compared it with the concept of statehood in Islam. Subsequently, we anatomized the impact of globalization on the concept of nation states. In the overall framework, analytical discourse of leading challenges confronting Pakistan is undertaken. Thereafter we identified comparative models and analyzed their approach in surmounting identical challenges to interpret an actionable discourse for Pakistan by which it can steer its way successfully in overcoming the existing challenges.

1. Introduction

The Peace of Westphalia proved to be a watershed moment in devising the prevailing world order by introducing the concept of sovereign nation states that withstood expansionist ambitions of Louis XIV of France and Fredrick II of Prussia in the 18th century (Kissinger, 2014). The tenacity of nation states withstood the cataclysm of French and Red revolutions and the ideology with its inherent retentiveness comprehensively defied the tides of nationalism in catastrophic world wars.

The notion negated the triumphal assertions of Fukuyama post-Cold War, declaring the prevalence of capitalism as the sole world order by carving a multipolar order. In short, the idea of sovereign nation states successfully withstood all existential challenges to its core ideology during the last four centuries till the gauntlet was thrown to the concept by the tumultuous phenomenon of globalization.

Globalization has posed a major challenge to the nation state ideology in the prevailing world order. A spirited debate has started about the mammoth impact of globalization that has raised intriguing queries about the efficacy of nation states' ideology with regards to efficacious control on sovereign decision-making with regards to economy, politics, national ideology and identity.

The aftermath of WW-II saw many states, including Pakistan, emerging from the ashes of colonialism. With the exclusive distinction of a political struggle based on religious ideology, the creation of Pakistan is considered by many as a miracle, while deeply resented by the claimants to be the natural heirs of the British Raj. Pakistan, the second largest Muslim and fifth most-populous nation is situated at a geographically consequential location which happens to be at the confluence of at least four sub-littoral systems. Having defied the established system by entering the nuclear club in May 1998, it has attained vital status in the comity of nations. Having played a perennial role in the major events affecting the world in the last few decades, Pakistan has endorsed its vitality to the international community. Paying a heavy price in all spheres of national security, Pakistan's role in stalling the Soviet expansion and taming international terrorism has been unparalleled.

The multidimensional challenges that Pakistan has been facing since its independence have been having a compounding effect. For Pakistan, with its fundamental ideology incoherent with the core concept of nation state, the onslaught of globalization has made the equation even more enigmatic. Economically constrained, politically and ideologically polarized, Pakistan is confronting regional adversary on an issue with the potential to challenge the nuclear threshold and is at the center of international power confrontation between China and the West.

In the existing phenomenon of globalization, Pakistan is being consistently associated with negative optics, coerced through the ignoble lever of FATF, pressurized to amend laws having the potential of a domestic backlash, singled out for its economic partnership with China and exposed to a highly charged hybrid assault. The challenges demand an incisive analysis to ascertain what Pakistan can learn from others in navigating a course that is ideologically acceptable, economically viable, ensures retention of sovereignty with lasting security and, most importantly, is in conformity with the existing world order highly influenced by the phenomenon of globalization.

2. Genesis of Nation State

The Treaty of Westphalia emerged from a series of discussions that took place in 1648 between 235 delegates, representing Catholic and Protestant powers in Europe in the Westphalian cities of Munster and Osnabruck (Kissinger, 2014). The treaty brought to an end Thirty years and Eighty years of wars in central Europe and catalyzed the establishment of sovereign states in Europe. The treaty established a balance of power and preserved pluralism in the European societies by ending papacy, negated the concept of alliances for the survival and avoided total wars in future (Kissinger, 2014). The treaty devised order of our times by begetting a system of mutually recognized sovereign states in Europe and, subsequently, all around the world, capable of effective governance and efficacious dispute resolution. The system, later retained by post-colonial societies, was perceived as a viable model to run a political system in modern state (Hosseini, 2015).

In the context of nation states, a state is primarily characterized as unitary, rational and autonomous (Keohane 1984 cited by (PICCIN and PUSTERLA, 2010). The newly established nation state system recognized state as the sole political authority that envisaged and exercised comprehensive and exclusive political authority over a well-defined territory. Within that territory, no other rival authority was either allowed or recognized to exercise control. Any effort or attempt to establish a parallel authority was regarded illegitimate and rebellious. Pre Westphalia, such extraordinary relationship between the state and territory was neither conceived nor recognized (Hirst and Thompson, 1995).

Interestingly, the domestic governance models and politics within the state — whether dynastic, nationalist, authoritarian, democratic or liberal — remained the internal affair of the state. Its internal politics and system of governance was its sole jurisdiction and could not be used as a pretext for any interference. Most political theorists are in conformity about the possession of a monopoly over the means of violence in specified territory as a distinct feature of a modern state. The expression of 'nation' state bolster the concept of sovereign authority having primacy over a recognized territory (Hirst and Thompson, 1995).

Sovereignty, the fundamental characteristic of states in a nation state system, implies that states not only have exclusive authority over the internal political, economic and social affairs but are also independent in their decisions with regards to their relationship with other states. Another important aspect of

sovereignty of the state is that it is recognized by all other states, alluding that all states, weak or strong, are equal in status, rights and responsibilities (Sorensen, 2004).

Parting with the varied systems of governance among the European states, the advent of the 20th century made democracy a universally accepted ideology based on universal suffrage. Post WW-II and during the Cold War, democracy was promoted as a universal ideology and non-democratic regimes were demonized as uncivilized, politically incoherent and backward. This promotion of democracy eroded the sovereignty of states in terms of political decision-making within their territories (Hosseini, 2015). The dawn of the Cold War witnessed the emergence of a powerful phenomenon, globalization that altered the prevailing perception about the concept of nation states and its exclusive authority over a defined territory. Before having the etymology of the phenomenon of globalization and eroding authority of nation states, it is important to analyze the concept of state in Islam viz a viz the concept of nation states.

3. Islam and the Concept of Statehood

The concept of state laid by our Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) himself and replicated for the next thirty years does not compliment the nation state system in the prevailing world order. Thereafter, most Islamic scholars agreed that the system lost its essence as the authority to elect/ nominate the caliph was usurped, resultantly converted the system into a monarchy (Maududi, 2000).

The western concept of nationhood follows the capitalist electoral democracy in which state is sovereign whereas in Islam sovereignty belongs to Allah. Western democracy in its essence has separated religion from state, giving utmost authority to the majority to enact any laws deemed benignant. In an Islamic state, no authority, however strong majority it may enjoy, cannot enact a law contradictory to the teachings of Quran and sunnah (Maududi, 1960).

This concept is in conflict with the western democracy that flourishes on the concept of parliamentary majority in enacting any law or rule to govern societies. In this backdrop, the Objectives Resolution bounded the parliament not to enact any law repugnant to the teachings of Quran and Sunnah. The Objectives resolution passed by the first Constituent Assembly on 12th

March 1949, was made preamble to the Constitution of 1973 and later made its operative part under article 2A in 1985 (Sohaib, 2017), endorsing the Islamic view that sovereignty belongs to Allah and not to the state or parliamentary majority. Still, it cannot be denied that with the demise of the Ottoman Empire the concept of nation state was embraced by the Islamic world. The concept, indeed, is the prevailing world order in the western and Islamic world.

4. Globalization- Genesis and Impact on the Concept of Nation State

The debate encompassing the diminishing relevance of the nation state in the prevailing era of globalization will continue to shape our perceptions and opinions on the issue. Since globalization as a phenomenon is complex and multidimensional in its essence, therefore, the term has various definitions and explanations depending primarily on the perspective and worldview of the writer (Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann, 2006), (PARJANADZE, 2009). In simplest terms, globalization refers to interconnectedness of economies, cultures, politics, environmental policies and military capabilities (Al-Rodhan, 2006).

Globalization is a complex phenomenon that is evolutionary in nature and spread over centuries. It is multi-dimensional with all its dimensions, contributing to disseminating the impact of the phenomenon (Held, 2004 p162). These dimensions mainly include political, economic, social, cultural and security dimensions. Globalists, skeptics and transformationalists have distinct views about the phenomenon.

The globalists shall persist on the irrelevance of nation states, skeptics will deny it and transformationalists will equate it as an international system with prominence of nation states (Cochrane and Pain, 2004) & (PARJANADZE, 2009). Gidden called the changes revolutionary referring to the phenomenon as a world in rush (Gidden, 2003). Marshall McLuhan coined the term 'global village' in 1967 (Rennen and Martens, 2010). (Mulgan 1998) cited by (Cochrane and Pain (2004) contested that this human connectivity was neither planned nor envisaged. (Wiseman, 1998) asserted that due to interconnectivity any occurrence in any part of the world has repercussions in other parts.

David Held justified the diversity in opinions due to diverse world views, classifying impact of globalization as multidimensional and urged the much-pronounced role of IFIs in the international trade and finance (Held, 2004). (Halabi, 2004) claimed that globalization is, in fact, global governance that is an attempt by the developed countries to regulate global financial and trade relations, thus eroding the state authority but (McGrew, 2004) differs on the issue stating that state authority has only been redefined. (Nissanke and Thorbecke, 2007) disagree with the view that globalization benefits all by pointing to the developed states as potential winners of the phenomenon. Cultural integration as part of globalization is also equated as cultural imperialism with an attempt to promote American culture around the world (Mackay, 2004).

Globalization has three major dimensions primarily, including economic, social and political (Held, 2004 p162). (Al-Rodhan, 2006) has added security and military dimension to it that logically comes under political dimension. Among the three major dimensions, economy has predominantly shaped the debate on globalisation due to its prominence. Out of 114 definitions of globalization, evaluated by (Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann, 2006), overwhelmingly 59 percent of definitions make reference of the economic dimension. Furthermore, the globalists will often refer to economic dimension to validate their opinion as the economic globalization theory render them the safest ground (Green 1999 cited by (PARJANADZE, 2009).

Advancement in the means of communication and technology has played the role of a catalyst in intensifying the economic, social and political integration among the humans, thus accelerating the process of globalization. (S. Yip, 2000) urges that the advancement in communication and information technology serve as drivers in accelerating the globalization. Information Technology (IT) is not a disembodied, autonomous or above society rather a tool that facilitated the assault of globalization on sovereignty of state (S. Yip, 2000). According to (Tehrani M, 1998 cited by (Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann, 2006), transnational media has been one of the main engines of globalization along with Transnational corporations (TNCs), Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), Non-Governmental organizations (NGOs) and Alternate Government Organizations (AGOs). Hence, information and communication technology are drivers that accelerated the process of globalization with its advancement.

5. Challenges Confronted by Pakistan

5.1 The Challenges of Inception

Pakistan, a vital member of the international community, is placed in an intense globalized environment with multilateral challenges. It is located in a region witnessing a power struggle between the existing hegemon and a serious challenger. It has been under the critical lens of the international community often for depravedness, at times highly unfairly. Considered a victim of its geography, Pakistan shares 2400 kms, 1700 kms and 800 kms of mostly porous borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran, respectively. The border with India and Afghanistan is heavily guarded for high threat perceptions. The border with Iran isn't stable either with the alleged movement of insurgents in the Baluchistan region. The only respite comes from the over 500 kms border with China.

Pakistan faced serious challenges in its nascent stages of independence, with highly bitter circumstances leading to the largest migration in history, marred by the inhuman bloodshed of hapless migrants who were hoping to live peacefully in their new abode. The highly controversial Radcliffe Award gave birth to the Kashmir dispute that remains unresolved for the last seven decades and has the potential to come to a nuclear threshold. The early demise of the founder of the nation and assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan compounded the problems. The refusal of Afghanistan to recognize Pakistan owing to the Pashtunistan issue and conflict with India over Kashmir since 1948 has kept the region's security hostage.

Getting embroiled in the Cold War by joining the US camp and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further contributed to the securitization of the state. Delay in the making of the constitution and military takeovers created a deep-rooted civil-military divide open to exploitation by the adversaries. Pakistan experienced an economic take-off in the 1960s but could not reap the benefits due to an economic meltdown later. The fall of East Pakistan due to the failure of civil-military leadership in resolving disputes and interference of arch-rival India still haunts the civil-military leadership. The war against terrorism caused massive human loss and devastated the economy.

The restoration of democracy in 2008 failed to revive the economy; it rather multiplied the economic challenges. The accession of right-wing Hindu extremists to power in New Delhi with aggressive posturing towards Pakistan has created a potential regional security threat. The Chinese investment in

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has certainly raised the Indian and US concerns with potentially destabilizing consequences for the whole region. Lastly, Pakistan's political leadership has come under corruption allegations and facing charges in the courts. The issue of corruption has severely impacted Pakistan's ailing economy and has been a core issue in domestic power politics. There is a need of an in-depth analysis of challenges encountered by Pakistan before we recommend a way forward through analysis of the approach adopted by some other countries in surmounting similar challenges in the era of globalization.

6. Securitization of the State - A Fallacy or a Necessity?

Faced with the Kashmir issue right from its inception, one of the biggest challenges that Pakistan has faced since its inception is the securitization of the state. Owing to threats to its survival, coupled with the mismanagement by political leaders leading to military takeovers, securitization of the state has eclipsed all its policies which could have led Pakistan to emerge as a strong state in the comity of nations. Pakistan's regional security issues include: the unresolved Kashmir issue, tensions with the Kabul government and playing a balancing act in the US-China confrontation and the Middle East tensions between the Gulf States and Iran.

Pakistan has fought three wars over Kashmir, however, the policy hasn't created the circumstances that may lead to the resolution of the issue, it has rather complicated the issue, providing an opportunity to India to associate the legitimate struggle of Kashmiris with terrorism. The non-resolution of this long-outstanding dispute has not only made the security of the region precarious but has also been the reason of diversion of economic resources to acquire means of power (Shah and Khan, 2019). Indian obduracy and perpetration of accesses on helpless Kashmiris has restricted policy options in the resolution of the issue.

Pakistan provided a platform to mujahedeen after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The unplanned Soviet withdrawal, the US and the West's abandonment of the region after the Soviet withdrawal and instability in Afghanistan caused serious security issues for Pakistan. Later, Pakistan's role as a leading state in the war against terror caused serious security complications that further contributed to the securitization of the state. The increasing Indian ingress in Afghanistan through its soft power strategies made the equation in Afghanistan more complicated from Pakistan's perspective (Shah,

Khattak and Attiq, 2016). The turmoil in Baluchistan exploited by India using Afghanistan as a launching pad and the Iranian territory as an intelligence base also contributed to a consistent focus on securitization.

Pakistan is also facing a highly charged hybrid warfare (Saeed Minhas, 2019). The military is under a vicious attack from the outside, particularly from some quarters within the country despite accomplishments in tackling the recent insurgency. Actions in this domain are again perceived as an attempt for enhanced securitization. Securitization of the state has been exploited for the securitization of the regime by different political and military governments to tighten their grip on power and to suppress the political opposition.

The cumulative result of the existential threat to its security and the resultant securitization is the diversion of the precious resources in the shape of an average 16 percent allocation of the total annual budget to security apparatus in the last fifteen years, which could otherwise have been utilized for the development of the state¹.

7. The Economic Quagmire: Mortgaging the Sovereignty - Myth or Reality


Pakistan's current major challenge is to revive the ailing economy. This challenge is potentially eroding state authority in dealing with all other issues. In order of priority, economy remains a difficult challenge for Pakistan, only to be followed by security. In fact, economic compulsions and persistent reliance on international donors have severely curtailed the liberty of action for Pakistan in all her policy options, including defense and foreign policy. Overcoming the economic challenge will certainly boost the state's ability to overcome all other challenges. A failure in this regard will compromise state security and sovereignty.

In 2018, Pakistan was on the brink of an economic collapse. In June 2021, though it is not out of the woods but has gained a little respite. Pakistan's economic challenges compounded during the last four decades with imprudent fiscal handling, absence of long-term economic policies, military interventions and political leadership's failure to stabilize the economy. Our economic policies have been mercurial throughout, necessitating seeking financial help from the IFIs and donor countries, unfortunately, the economic

1. Calculated from Budget statements of Ministry of Finance


policy making and its implementation in the last 15 years have raised serious questions about the capacity of those at the helm. For instance, the current account deficit (CAD) rose approximately seven times from \$2.5 billion in 2013 to \$19 billion in 2018 (Figure- 1). Pakistan’s debt and liabilities increased approximately six times, from 6000 billion rupees (\$36 billion) in 2008 to 36963 billion rupees (\$226 billion) in 2021 (Figure- 2). The gross external debt increased from \$60 billion in 2008 to \$115 billion in 2021 (Figure- 3). The debt to GDP percentage increased from 57 percent in 2009 to 81 percent by 2020 (Economic Data, 2021) (Figure- 2).

Figure 2.1: Current Account Deficit



Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Figure 2.2: Central Government Net Debt




Source: IMF

Pakistan had to pay over \$10 billion dollar in debt-servicing in financial year 2019. Knocking yet again at the doors of the IMF for the 21st time was thus inevitable. The geo-economic catastrophe was aggravated by geo-political wrangling when the US warned the IMF during the bailout negotiations with Pakistan (Dawn, 2018). Due to tough IMF conditions Pakistan approached Saudi Arabia, UAE and China for a bailout package till the settlement of negotiations with the IMF. The three friendly countries extended \$9.2 billion to bailout Pakistan in one of the worst financial crises (Arab News, 2019).

This bailout was definitely a respite but not a remedy. Pakistan still was compelled to conclude a \$6 billion bailout from the IMF for further respite to its financial woes (Mackenzie, 2019). It was not the first time that Pakistan approached the IMF for a bailout/loan and most financial experts believe it may not be the last attempt. Pakistan has embarrassingly approached the IMF 20 times during 61 years for loan requests, with democratic governments responsible of over 80 percent loan requests (Abbasi, 2019).

If the bailout packages and loans from the IMF were an economic remedy Pakistan would have been out of the economic crises long ago. Two aspects are important to understand about the IMF loans and bailout packages. Going to the IMF is admission of an economic meltdown and imposition of conditionalities is actually the acceptance of terms by the borrowing country (Ahmed 2012). The IMF loans, in most cases, negatively impact the economy with strict conditionalities like the insistence on austerity, increased taxes, eliminating subsidies, and recovering losses mostly by increasing tariffs. Blaming the IMF for economic slowdown is unfair. Whenever a country approaches the IMF, it is facing BOP crises, budget deficits, inflation and other losses. The IMF conditionalities are an immediate move towards economic stabilization, resulting in a slowdown (Ahmed, 2012). Pakistan's economic slowdown from 2018-20 was a reflection of the fact.


Figure 2.3: Pakistan External Debt



Source: State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)

While all the debts were accumulating at a stunning pace there was hardly any substantial increase in exports. Rather, Pakistan’s exports remained stagnant at the levels of 2013 till 2020 (Economic Data, 2021) (Figure- 4). FBR collections, important factor to curtail budget deficits was much lower than required to curtail fiscal deficits.

Figure 2.4: Annual Exports - Last 10 Years



Source: SBP

Pakistan’s energy crises compounded the mounting economic challenges. There was hardly any investment in energy production from 1999 to 2008 (Ali et al., 2020). By the time the shortfall was realized, it was already hurting the industry severely. By 2012 a substantial portion of Pakistan’s textiles sector

shifted to Bangladesh owing to energy shortages (The News International, 2012), (Anthony and Paul, 2011).

The approach to fill the gap of energy shortages pushed the already ailing economy into a virtual quagmire. The last government rushed to add expensive and excess power on take-or-pay basis (we pay regardless of need) (Gauhar, 2021). The tariff increase was then not passed to cover the production cost for fear of political backlash, thus adding to circular debt. The total compulsory capacity payments were 185 billion rupees in 2013 and mounted to 486 billion rupees in 2018. The capacity payments are projected to be 1,485 billion rupees by 2023 (Gauhar, 2021). These agreements were approximately 30 percent expensive with 40 percent excess power generation than our requirements by 2023 for which the country will be compelled to pay capacity payments despite not using the electricity (Gauhar, 2021).

These payments are denominated in the US dollars and add up with rupee devaluation. Ironically, the energy capacity was increased without any investment in upgrading the transmission and distribution system (Gauhar, 2021). The power sector is the biggest impediment for all categories of industrial growth as Pakistan has the highest cost of electricity across all major segments in the region (Ali et al., 2020).

The only element still keeping Pakistan's economy afloat is the increase in remittances covering our trade deficit and assisting in the balance of payments. But relying solely on remittances will not solve the economic challenges confronting Pakistan.

Sound economy is an important ingredient in developing soft power projection strategies (Shah, Khattak and Attiq, 2016). Pakistan's dismal economic condition has remained a hindrance in developing soft power projection strategies at a time when Pakistan has been a victim of a vicious campaign associating its state and security agencies with terrorism.

8. CPEC: A Game Changer or a Debt Trap

CPEC has become an integral component of Pakistan's economy and will remain associated with it in the foreseeable future. This \$46 billion infrastructure, energy and industrialization projects have generated enormous economic activity in Pakistan, particularly after the visit of Chinese premier in 2015 (Ali, 2019). It is one of the six economic corridors envisaged

by China under the BRI and will have considerable socio-economic benefits for the country, if handled prudently. The US in particular has raised serious questions about the Chinese initiative, with Rex Tillerson calling China a predatory lender and John Bolton describing the initiative as an attempt by China for global dominance using its financial muscles (Bolton 2017 cited by (Brautigam, 2019).

The project, certainly, has geopolitical implications for Pakistan with serious concerns raised by India and the US over the project, lately joined by Australia and Japan. While providing a relief zone to China, India and the US are worried about Chinese footprint in the South East Asian region with access to the Mediterranean, bypassing the strait of Malacca that frustrate the US strategies in South China Sea (Ali, 2019).

The project is certainly triggering Indian destabilizing activities in Baluchistan validated with the arrest of Indian spy commander Kulbhushan Jhadev in March 2016. The Indian and US leadership has publicly expressed their concerns on the economic corridor. The raising of a special security division for the protection of CPEC projects by Pakistan shows the threats perceived in this regard. Pakistan's political and military hierarchy should prevent the socio-economic project from causing geopolitical instability for Pakistan by allaying concerns of the US, India and other countries.

The other concern about Chinese investment that is repeatedly raised is lack of transparency and the debt trap. China has been accused of debt-trap diplomacy recurrently by top US leadership representing both the Democrats and Republicans. Chinese investment in Sri Lanka, Angola, Djibouti, Venezuela, Greece and some other African countries has been seen in this context by the US and the West. The establishment of Chinese military base in Djibouti and seizure of Sri Lankan port of Hambantota has certainly injected an element of credibility in these allegations. Matt Ferchen and Deborah Brautigam have incisively analyzed the allegations concluding that investment failures in Djibouti, Venezuela and Sri Lankan Hambantota port that led to its seizure do not validate allegations of debt trap diplomacy, citing diverse reasons for those investment setbacks (Brautigam, 2019).

Pakistan's relationship with China is strategic and built over decades. Pakistan and China are important for each other in the regional and international context. The economic activity benefit both countries in socio-economic and geo-political context. While it benefits Pakistan with over 2 million expected jobs, it also assures continuity of Chinese trade in case of any disruption in

South China Sea. It also shortens Chinese trade route for its industries in China's western region where China is expanding its industry to tame ethnic and religious sentiments with economic benefits (Ali, 2019). Thus, Pakistan is not the sole beneficiary of this corridor. Nevertheless, the huge amount of investment entails analysis and policy framework that ensures that Pakistan does not end up in a situation of debt stress like some other Chinese lenders.

9. Burgeoning Youth: A Panacea for Success or a Disaster in the Making

According to the United Nations Population Fund Report (2016-17) based on the population census of 2017, 63 percent of Pakistan's 207 million population comprises of youth with 58.5 million in the age bracket of 20-24 and 69 million under fifteen years of age (Hafeez and Fasih, 2018). This makes Pakistan as one of the youngest countries in the world.

If honed to its optimum potential in the next decade or so, this force can take Pakistan to the next level of development. Regrettably, Pakistan's performance in the area of youth development has been dismal. Pakistan ranked 154 among 183 countries in the Global Youth Development Index and Report 2017 (Durrani, 2019). Pakistan ranks 152 out of 189 countries in the HDR (Human Development Report 2020, 2020) with an estimated 22.8 million children out-of-school (Yousafzai, 2020). Pakistan has the world's second highest number of out-of-school-children (OOSC). Those children represent 44 percent of the total population in the age group of five to 16-year-olds in the country (Yousafzai, 2020). Pakistan's youth lacks vocational and technical training, has an unemployment rate of 8.2 percent, while 25 percent is categorized as illiterate (UNESCO 2016-17 cited by (Hafeez and Fasih, 2018).

Pakistan lacks policy initiatives and framework for a productive youth program. The developed countries have utilized the potential of their youth with vocational and technical education whereas in Pakistan, alarmingly, only 4 out of every 1000 students are enrolled for vocational training (Amir-Ud-Din, 2019).

The most worrying aspect is that as per YDI report 2016, Pakistan, along with Angola and Haiti, has shown the greatest decline in youth development from 2010-15 (Global Youth Development Index and Report, 2016). Lack of planning and execution in this domain can be catastrophic as unemployed and disillusioned youth develop tendencies towards drug addiction and violence (Feseha, 2018). Tapping the talent of the youth is an enduring challenge for

the policy makers that needs dire attention, imaginative planning and skillful handling to prevent this pool of young men and women from becoming a serious liability for the dwindling national economy.

10. Success Stories: What Can Pakistan Learn from Others

In the globalized environment, there are several countries whose dynamics have a close resemblance to the challenges faced by Pakistan. Those countries traversed the difficult path and emerged successful from these challenges, whereas being imprudent in their outlook, several other countries have fallen in a deep morass. We can learn a great deal by analyzing the approach of these countries in overcoming identical challenges and avoiding the pitfalls to craft a viable policy. Some of the examples are explained in succeeding paragraphs.

10.1 South Korea's Economic Development Amid Regional Security Threats

The reason for analyzing South Korea's path to development is its remarkable similarities with the overall challenges faced by Pakistan. It was a Japanese colony since 1910. The surrender of Japan led to the division of Korea into two zones, abetted by Russia and US respectively. The Korean War which involved the US, Russia and China, ended in a stalemate in 1953 with an estimated 3 million casualties, mostly civilians. South Korea is facing conventional and nuclear threats from North Korea. It has unsettled territorial dispute with Japan over Liancourt Rocks, 46-acre isles, with potentially large fishing grounds and potential deposits of natural gas. It had autocratic and military regimes till 1987 when the transition to democracy was finally achieved. It approached the IMF in 1997 for a financial bailout.

By the end of the Korean War (1954) it was one of the poorest countries with a GDP of \$1.5 billion and per capita income of \$70 (HEO et al., 2008). The per capita income of South Korea in 2019 as per the World Bank estimates is approximately \$32000 while the per capita income of North Korea is below \$2000. It is a member of the OECD and G-20, a testimony of being among the most developed economies. South Korea implemented its first five-year plan in 1960 precisely after five years of Pakistan's first five-year plan. Later, it continued to implement subsequent five-year plans. South Korea, like Pakistan, was dependent on the US aid. 1962 onwards, as the US aid started to decline, the South Korean government focused on labor-intensive

light industry to increase exports. With increase in exports, the industry was transformed into heavy chemical industry. Economic analysts refer to the government's close cooperation with the private sector and preferential treatment to the export-oriented industry to compete internationally as a potential reason of South Korea's industrial development (HEO et al., 2008).

The structural reforms adopted by S. Korea ensured swift and successful exit from the IMF program, which was necessitated in 1997 (HEO et al., 2008). South Korea has not let rivalries with North Korea and territorial dispute with Japan to hinder its economic growth. The booming economy has boosted South Korea's military spending which amounted to \$48 billion expected allocation for 2021 (Grevatt and MacDonald, 2020). High military spending has contributed to diluting the conventional threat from North Korea, indicating that strong economies boost military spending in regional security dilemmas that eventually placate regional security threats.


The autocratic rulers used rivalries with the North as a rallying point to strengthen their grip on power. North Korea was used as a security threat by all Presidents from 1972-87 to enforce a 'total security system' (Chung, 2003). After the transition to democracy in 1987, President Roh Tae Woo adopted 'nordpolitik' (open policy) and later 'cross the yellow sea' policy, whereas President Kim Dae-Jung unfolded the 'sunshine policy' from 1998-2002. These policies helped in rapprochement with the Soviet Union in 1987, ending the Soviet-North Korean defence treaty of 1961 (Chung, 2003). The rapprochement with China yielded four major advantages, including a seat in the UN General Assembly, diplomatic recognition, a potential trading partner who pursued North Korea to negotiate with the South, resulting in the landmark agreement in 1991 (Chung, 2003). South Korean trade with China reached mammoth proportions, with an estimated \$136 billion South Korean exports to China in 2019, despite widespread public mistrust of China due to its close ties with the North (LEE, 2021).

The Sunshine policy enabled people-to-people contacts and extended \$400 million aid to the North in four years (Chung, 2003). Nevertheless, North Korean withdrawal from the NPT and subsequent nuclear and missile tests undoubtedly strained the relationship in the Korean peninsula yet again. South Korean political leadership's policy of delinking the 'regime security' from 'state security', lowering regional tensions through diplomacy and economic progress amid regional threats is an invaluable lesson for countries like Pakistan that are entangled in regional security dilemmas and confronting daunting economic challenges.

10.2 Bangladesh: Consistently Increasing Exports, Resulting in Economic Growth

Bangladesh is a country that has drawn immense economic inspiration in recent times. Once termed as a ‘basket case’ (McCarthy 2015 quoted by Islam, 2019) is now regarded to be among the leading economies. In 1982, the country adopted structural reforms by privatizing state-owned industries and initiating ‘industrial policy of 1982’, thus setting up ready-made garment (RMGs) industries. 134 RMGs in 1984 with an employed force of 0.4 million grew steadily to 5876 by 2012-13, with working force of 4 million (Islam, 2020). The RMGs’ exports became a vital ingredient of Bangladesh’s economy with its exports steadily rising at an average of 0.8 percent from 1994 to 2016 (Islam, 2019).

Till 2010-12 there was a parity in the exports of Pakistan and Bangladesh, standing at around \$24-25 billion. Pakistan lost its way in the next decade. Its exports remained stagnant at approximately 25 billion whereas the Bangladesh’s exports ballooned to approximately to \$33 billion by 2019, resulting in a high GDP growth. Since the 1980s, Bangladesh’s GDP growth on average remained over 5 percent (ADB, 2016, cited by Islam, 2019).



Source: IMF

Shifting its dependency on agriculture in the 1990s, Bangladesh moved towards a more capitalistic outlook by undertaking measures to improve

exports. Though RMGs are a major component of Bangladesh's exports, it has maintained diversity by exporting jute, fish and shrimp, leather, tea and other manufacturing items from exports promotion zones (Islam, 2019). Its remittances have also steadily increased with skilled labor force working abroad. Bangladesh, while consistently increasing its exports, has kept the imports level not to imbalance the economy. The data of 22 years from 1994-2016 confirms a steady increase in Bangladesh's exports that grew at a rate of 16.11 percent while imports grew at a rate of 14.8 percent. Similarly, the exports' contribution doubled in the total GDP of the country in those 22 years (Islam, 2019). The only criticism on Bangladesh's economy is low labor wages and poor conditions of the labor force. But with a consistent GDP growth, the trickle-down effect shall ultimately improve the quality of life of the industrial labor.

10.3 Vietnam's Sustained Economic Growth


Vietnam has made emphatic economic progress by adopting reforms famously known as 'Doi Moi' (renewal) in the mid 1980s when there was pervasive unrest due to the Stalinist economic policies that led to economic stagnation. The adoption of 'Doi Moi' certainly contributed not only to the economic progress but also enhanced the political monopoly and legitimization of the Communist Party of Vietnam (Nguyen, 2016). Ever since embracing economic reforms, Vietnam has made enormous progress with a 2.7 percent increase in per capita between 2002-18, reaching \$2700 in 2019 lifting 45 million people out of poverty (World Bank Overview, 2021). Vietnam's Human Capital Index (HCI) is consistently improving with low mortality rates, high life expectancy, improved health facilities and better living conditions.

Ninety nine percent 99 of Vietnam's population used electricity by 2016, while the ratio was 14 percent in 1993. Impressively, 70 percent of the population had access to clean drinking water by 2016 (World Bank Overview, 2021).

An important factor that contributed in increasing the manufacturing capacity of Vietnam was liberalization of trade and concluding trade agreements by joining the ASEAN, WTO and a free trade agreement with the US that progressively reduced exports and import tariffs (Vanham, 2018). The second important factor was attracting investors and improvement in the ease of doing business. Vietnam made remarkable progress in that area by improving its economic rankings from 104th in 2007 to 64th in 2017 (Vanham, 2018). The investors' attraction led to the industrial revolution with companies from Japan and Korea heavily investing in Vietnam's economy that was eager

to utilize investment with the already built infrastructure and skilled labor. By 2017, Vietnam was the leading clothing exporter and second largest electronic exporter in the region that tangibly contributed in the economic growth and increase in per capita income (Vanham, 2018).

Figure 2.6: Vietnam’s Cumulative Exports and Growth Rate



Source: IMF

11. Way Forward

Pakistan finds itself in a highly globalized environment where states and societies are closely knitted and can learn for each other’s experiences in overcoming identical challenges. In the light of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs we can enumerate actionable policy measures that in our view can contribute in adopting a path that will enable the nation to overcome challenges it is facing in all the domains.

These policy measures are enumerated as under:-

Kashmir shall remain vital to regional security and Pakistan’s relationship with India will always be defined by Delhi’s approach to the resolution of the Kashmir issue and vice versa. Diplomacy is the only option for Pakistan to push the Kashmir issue towards a viable solution. The use of military means, including supporting militancy, have proved to be counterproductive and for now should be off the table. Pakistan in the last couple of years has successfully kept international spotlight on the Kashmir issue owing to

Indian actions. The same policy discourse with greater dynamism should be followed to keep India under sustained international scrutiny by highlighting its atrocities in the IOK. Nevertheless, political sloganeering over the issue in domestic politics should be revisited by all political parties in both the countries as it only contributes in restricting options for dispute resolution.

Following the Korean model, Pakistan can no longer remain hostage to regional security threats. After becoming a nuclear weapon state it has acquired minimum deterrence. Geo-economics should now take precedence over geo-politics. The resolve by the present government to be party in peace and not in conflict in Afghanistan and the Middle East is a foresighted approach, anticipated to pay dividends.

Pakistan has to demonstrate a delicate balance in its relationship with China and the US. Pakistan's refusal to allow bases must have upset Washington. But efforts should be in place to avert any further bitterness and confrontation. Vibrant diplomacy to ally the US concerns over China's deepening financial footprints in the region is necessary to maintain balance in relations with Washington and Beijing.

Preferring geo-economics over geopolitics is a much-anticipated policy change for Pakistan. The dependency on foreign loans and bailouts can be reduced by adopting export-oriented economic model successfully practised by Vietnam and Bangladesh. Prudent fiscal handling shall also play a vital role in surmounting economic challenges.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is regarded as a lifeline for Pakistan's economy. Regional and international concerns on the project can only be allayed by ensuring that the project remains in the socio-economic domain. However, projects like the Orange Line train and coal-based power projects under CPEC may lead the country into a debt distress and need to be revisited (T. Ebrahim, 2020). The advice of Cristine Lagarde should serve as guidance when she said that infrastructure projects, if not handled properly, may lead to economic crises and the BRI should only go where there is an utmost need (Brautigam, 2019).

Since Pakistan has the largest youth population and investment in youth programs, projects will yield the dividends. The approach of the developed nation teaches us that investment in human resource, including technical, vocational and entrepreneur areas proves fruitful in youth's development. It is time to eliminate a stereotype approach to education by incentivizing

admissions in technical and vocational institutes. It is also important that such programs be headed by qualified technocrats, instead of political appointees to ensure lasting success.

Lastly, military interventions in the current globalized environment are counter-productive and put military regimes under pressure to make costly compromises or face crippling sanctions. The way forward is strengthening democratic institutions and traditions that enjoy the trust of the public and are capable of steering the nation towards the path of political and economic prosperity and regional stability.

Conclusion

Globalization may have eroded the core concept of nationhood; however, the collieries of the phenomenon, i.e., seamless connectivity, transnational economic activities and international organizations also presented many opportunities to nations like Pakistan to learn from those who have successfully traversed the difficult path and surmounted the ostensibly insurmountable challenges identical to those being faced by Pakistan. Learning from these nations, Pakistan has to chew the bitter pill, navigate a difficult path, and take unpleasant decisions to reach the light at the end of the tunnel, Insha Allah.

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CHAPTER 3

Global Geo-political Changes, International Political System and Pakistan

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Abstract

Geopolitical transformations come natural to international politics due a variety of factors, including how states define or redefine their foreign policies and foreign affairs. A recent example is that of the Abraham Peace Accords following which Pakistan's close allies in the Gulf region, i.e. Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, have normalized their relations with Israel. While India for long dominated geopolitical developments in South Asia, China is increasing its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) leading to new geopolitical dynamics. These are some significant developments for Pakistan because it has strong cultural, economic and security cooperation with Gulf states, and has collaborated with the United States through various security-related partnerships, including most recently the 'war on terror'. As China seeks more influence through BRI and continues to question the US dominance in the existing world order, there is an open trade war between China and the US. Within South Asia, its partnership with China is an easy option because of mutual rivalry with India, Pakistan cannot easily choose a side in terms of conflicting relations between China and the US. Hence this chapter aims to provide a better understanding of various geopolitical shifts to see how well-placed Pakistan is in terms of opportunities and challenges. This chapter argues that Pakistan will continue to maintain balanced relations with China and the US despite its continuous closeness towards Beijing.

1. Introduction

Geo-political realignments are a natural phenomenon in international politics. We have recently witnessed this in the shape of the Abraham Peace Accords through which Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have normalized relations with Israel. A key driver of this alignment is the mutual rivalry of the states with the Islamic Republic of Iran (Adam, 2020). Since China is gradually expanding its influence in South Asia, the regional dynamics are changing through the emerging geo-political realignments. While Pakistan is leaning towards China and moving closer to Russia, India continues to expand its geostrategic partnership with the United States (US), Australia and Japan to counter China's increasing influence in South Asia and beyond.

For a developing country like Pakistan, these geo-political shifts, involving China and other actors, bring both opportunities and challenges. This chapter examines both with a focus on the rivalry between China and the US and other international regimes.

Faced with a security dilemma in connection to India, Pakistan was quick to look outside for economic and military support to enhance its military capabilities. A key aspect of this approach was demonstrated through Pakistan's security cooperation with the US that started soon after the country's independence in 1947. Since then, Pakistan's multifaceted cooperation with the US has seen many ups and downs but has continued in the areas of trade and investment and security. During 1954-55, Pakistan joined the United Kingdom-led Cold War era military alliance: the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the US-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). India opted for non-alignment during the Cold War but Pakistan was clearly on the side of the Western powers to ensure its security in times of crises. It was, however, disheartened by the lack of support of its Western allies, especially the US, during its 1965 and 1971 wars with India. Soon, following Pakistan's disintegration, it withdrew from SEATO and the Commonwealth in 1972 (Ali, 1972). While officially Pakistan avoided linking this withdrawal with the lack of support offered by SEATO members during the 1971 India-Pakistan war, it was clear that this was a major factor behind these decisions. The then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, stated that his country's choice was "in line with a promise to the people made by" him and "it also envisages an appropriate role for Pakistan in the new Asia that is emerging now". Then the New York Times reported that Pakistan's decision might have been influenced by its growing relationship with China.

Up until the 1970s, Pakistan was building a relationship with China, the US and other Western countries. Despite having difficult relations with Western countries, especially the US, Beijing never had objected to Pakistan's membership of SEATO and CENTO (Ali, 1972). After withdrawing from Western-led military alliances, the Bhutto government also started promoting the idea of pan-Islamism through greater engagement in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). This helped Pakistan gain enough support for its nuclear program which was pitched by Bhutto as the "Islamic bomb" to seek funding from oil-rich Muslims countries like Libya and Saudi Arabia (Craig, 2017). While closeness to the Arab world played a key role for Pakistan becoming a prominent actor in the Muslim world, it also helped Islamabad gain enough political and financial support for its nuclear program. The dynamics changed with General Zia-ul-Haq's coup d'état and geo-political

developments regarding Afghanistan. As Zia-ul-Haq was seeking legitimacy, he seized the opportunity through Pakistan's partnership in the US's proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Pakistan was a frontline state during the Afghan-Soviet War and was involved in recruitment and mobilization of mujahidin from Pakistan and elsewhere to Afghanistan (Ahmed, 2012).

The Taliban members received religious education in madrassas as well as military training in Pakistan (Maley, 1998). In return, the US provided economic and military aid to Pakistan. According to Weinbaum, "US assistance committed to Pakistan's military and economic budgets through the 1980s totaled more than \$7.2 billion" (1991: 72). By doing so, Pakistan gained more influence in Afghanistan which was reflected through its support for the Afghan Taliban and also recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Akhtar, 2008). Pakistan was among the only three states alongside Saudi Arabia and the UAE that had recognized the Taliban regime.

Soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, the Bush administration approached Islamabad for alliance against the Taliban. The post-2001 period provides many examples of some disturbances in Pakistan's relationship with the Afghan Taliban. Soon after 9/11, General Mehmood, then the Chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), visited Mullah Omar with a proposal to handover Osama bin Laden to the US. The Taliban refused by referring to the Pashtun code of Pakhtunwali that demands protecting guests (Sirrs, 2001). Under pressure from Washington, Islamabad joined the US-led 'war on terror'. In an interview, General Musharraf said that the US had threatened to bomb Pakistan "back to the Stone Age" (BBC, 2006). Then the military government joined the 'war on terror' by opening its airspace and providing air bases and intelligence to the US-led international coalition. Under continued pressure, Pakistan also severed relations with the Taliban and participated in the capture and transfer of Taliban members to the US. The cooperation with the US involved actions against the Taliban, including capturing their members in Pakistan. To show its commitment towards the 'war on terror', Pakistan captured dozens of Taliban leaders and officials representing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

In 2002, for example, Pakistani authorities captured Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, who was Afghanistan's ambassador to Pakistan until the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. Zaeef ended up in the notorious Guantanamo Bay and was released in 2005 (Al Jazeera, 2005). According to a report issued in 2015, 68 of the remaining 116 men detained at the Guantánamo Bay were captured by Pakistan's security forces (Ackerman, 2015).

After the fall of the Taliban regime, many of its top leaders took refuge in Pakistan – mainly in the city of Quetta in Balochistan – and formed the Quetta Shura to manage the Taliban movement (BBC, 2021). While the Musharraf administration joined the US in the ‘war on terror’ and captured and handed over some Taliban members to the US, Pakistan is blamed by Washington, Kabul and others for playing a double game by supporting the revival of the Taliban.

During 2001-2021, Pakistan was deeply concerned about India’s increasing influence in Afghanistan. In the post-Taliban era, India invested in Afghanistan’s security and provided training to the Afghan troops as well as a US\$3 billion aid to Afghanistan after the Bonn Conference during 2002-2020 (Ahmadi and Singh, 2020). India’s involvement in Afghanistan revived insecurities in Pakistan and a desire in Islamabad to establish a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul. This again brought in proxy dynamics in Afghanistan, with India and Pakistan supporting opposing factions. The 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul was blamed on Pakistan and its patronage of the Taliban. While Pakistan has officially denied on several occasions its support for the Taliban or using them as its proxy, General Musharraf once shared in an interview that “Pakistan will use its own support, and our ethnic allies are certainly Pashtuns” to counter India’s efforts of creating an anti-Pakistan government in Kabul (Shams, 2014).

It is an open secret that Pakistan has maintained a close relationship with the Afghan Taliban, offering it patronage as a crucial mechanism for gaining strategic depth vis-à-vis India (Coll, 2018, Tinkel, 2011).

The US-Pakistan cooperation in the ‘war on terror’ also faced difficulties. While the US kept pressing Pakistan to do more, Islamabad was equally troubled by an increasing number of US drone strikes in the country’s tribal areas (formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas or FATA). During 2005-2016, there were 322 incidents of US drone strikes into Pakistan in which nearly 3,000 people were killed (Ahmed et al., 2017: 142). Due to its stance of a peace settlement with the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan hosted such dialogues and has also been fully supportive of the US-Taliban peace deal signed in 2020 in Doha. Still, the relationship between the US and Pakistan is not at an even keel due to mutual mistrust. Michael Kugelman labels this as ‘disconnect’: “Due to frequent mismatches in expectations and interest, the two sides are often not on the same page about key policy issues despite considerable cooperation during the Cold War and in the post-9/11 era, and most recently on the Afghan peace process” (Kugelman, 2021a).

As it was the case in the 1970s, Pakistan has gradually moved towards China by grabbing a lucrative deal under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), involving \$64 billion Chinese investment under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). As an emerging economy, China is seeking more influence in the international political system but faces resistance from the West and Pakistan's archrival, India. In this context, this chapter will focus on the impact of the relevant geo-political dynamics on Pakistan.

2. Effects on Pakistan

This section aims to look at the impact of the international political system which is swiftly changing due to the rivalry between the US and China. The US-China competition as reflected through their trade war has implications for countries like Pakistan.

2.1 The US-China rivalry and Pakistan

Before I discuss the implications of the US-China rivalry for Pakistan, it is important to understand the multifaceted nature of Pakistan's bilateral relations with both states.

Faced with an inherent security dilemma vis-à-vis India, Pakistan began looking for security alliances soon after its creation in 1947. At the start of the Cold War, the US was also keen on formulating partnerships with countries globally. Pakistan's geographical proximity with the Soviet Union made it an attractive partner for the US. It was, however, a mutually beneficial relationship since its start in October 1947. The convergence of geopolitical interests was also reflected when Pakistan joined CENTO and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) to enhance its security cooperation with the US and the UK (Khan, 1964). While these alliances benefited Pakistan through economic and military aid, they were ineffective in terms of protecting Pakistan during its 1965 and 1971 wars with India. Hence, Pakistan pulled out of both the arrangements after its disintegration in 1971 (Akhtar, 2011).

The geopolitical dynamics changed again with the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan that offered Pakistan another opportunity to cooperate with the US in its proxy engagement during the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989) (Ahmed, 2012). After testing its nuclear capacity in 1998, Pakistan was placed under US sanctions and post-9/11 dynamics changed that through Pakistan's partnership with the US. Through partnerships during the Cold

War and the 'war on terror' Pakistan became a key recipient of assistance from Washington. Pakistan received over US\$70 billion during 1948-2016 in military aid, including US\$33 billion since 2001 (Shah, 2019). The relationship during the 'war on terror' has not been trouble-free due to the mutual mistrust and Washington's demands from Pakistan to do more in terms of actions against the Afghan Taliban's hideouts inside Pakistan (Akhtar, 2011). Despite Pakistan's active role in facilitating the Afghan peace processes, for example, by hosting the Afghan delegations, its relationship with the US continues to face hiccups.

The exceptionality of Pakistan's relationship with China can also be witnessed through the narrative that has been promoted by Beijing and Islamabad. Both label their relationship with popular slogans like 'iron brothers' and 'all-weather friends' (Arshad, 2021). To understand the true extent of the relationship, we need to see how the bilateral ties have progressed since the inception in 1950. China-Pakistan bilateral dispute over border demarcation was resolved in 1963 and their defense cooperation began in 1966. After Pakistan pulled out of Western military alliances, i.e., CENTO and SEATO, it initiated its strategic alliance with China in 1972. Their economic cooperation, however, began in 1979. Defense cooperation has reached an unprecedented level with joint military exercises and manufacturing of military hardware like JF-17 fighter jets (Khan, 2020). China is also Pakistan's largest weapon supplier. Since the start of CPEC in 2015 with US\$64 billion worth of Chinese investment in Pakistan, their economic cooperation continues to grow rapidly (Hussain and Rao, 2020). As Pakistan has been blamed for cross-border terrorism, China has proven to be a trusted partner that has often defended Pakistan at international forums, including at the United Nations. China used its veto four times at the United Nations Security Council to block India's move to declare Masood Azhar of Jaish-e-Mohammed an international terrorist (Krishanan, 2019). For this Beijing has faced enormous criticism.

Considering its desire to maintain good relations with both the US and China, Pakistan desires balanced relations. As China continues to expand its footprint in Pakistan through various CPEC-related investments, especially in Gwadar, Islamabad may find it difficult to fulfil its desire of forming balanced relations. It has more to do with the geo-strategic competition between the US and China and less to do with Pakistan's own national interest. In recent years, the US-China rivalry has reached an unprecedented level reflected through not just their differences over the South China dispute but also through their ongoing trade war. This conflict escalated under the US President Donald

Trump administration in January 2018 when the US began setting tariffs and trade barriers on China to force Beijing to change what Washington views as unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft (Swanson, 2018).

Despite their bilateral dialogues to resolve their differences, tensions continue with far-reaching impacts, beyond their bilateral conflict, on economies of other stakeholders like Australia (Dobson, 2021). Australia has sided with the US in the latter's trade war with China but a developing country like Pakistan does not have that option due to its economic reliance on both the US and China. Just like how Pakistan used to rely on economic and military aid from the US, its reliance on China is growing. This was manifested in August 2020 when Pakistan borrowed US\$1 billion from China to repay Saudi Arabia (Ali, 2020).

China and the US are amongst Pakistan's top ten trading partners. While China holds the top spot in terms of Pakistan's top trading partners, it is important to notice that Pakistan has a huge trade deficit with China. Among the top ten trading partners of Pakistan, it only has a trade surplus with the US, Afghanistan, Germany and the United Kingdom (Dawn, 2012). In terms of Pakistan's exports, the number one destination of its goods is the US with 19 percent of its total exports compared to 8.5 percent towards China (Nakhoda, 2020). Due to its flourishing relationship with China, Pakistan's exports to China are rising and experienced a 70 percent increase in the first quarter of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020 (Sajid, 2021).

These economic factors are not the only drivers of Pakistan's foreign policy as historically its security needs have also played a crucial role. Since the US has a much-advanced military technology and more resources than China (Gill and O'Hanlon, 1999), Pakistan is likely to aim for balanced relations with both. This, however, would not be easy with both sides pulling Pakistan towards them. Hence, the author agrees with Gul's assessment that the "Pakistan government has long said it is trying to maintain good relations with both China and the United States, despite rising tensions between Beijing and Washington" but there are mixed signals coming from Islamabad (Gul, 2020). In 2020, Prime Minister Imran Khan said, "Pakistan's future is tied to China. We should be clear on this that our country's [economic] development has now been intertwined with China" (Gul, 2020).

The roots of the current China-US tensions are much deeper. These also include the US support for Southeast Asian states with conflicting relations with China, such as the Philippines, over the South China dispute. Their

relations are also constrained by the US support for Hong Kong and Taiwan, and continuous criticism of the human rights violations concerning the Uighurs in Xinjiang. As Washington continues to label China's actions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang as human rights violations, Beijing denies those allegations by blaming Washington for interfering in its internal matters. By ignoring how the world views human rights violations in China, Islamabad first opted to be quiet and then supportive of China's actions under 'One-China Policy'. In an interview, Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan said, "Our interaction with Chinese officials, that version of what is happening in Xinjiang is completely different to the version of what we hear from the Western media and the Western governments ... Because we have our very strong relationship with China, and because we have a relationship based on trust, so we actually accept the Chinese version" (Al Jazeera, 2021). By doing so, Pakistan is sending a wrong message to the international community regarding its position on global norms and values, especially concerning civil and political rights.

In the context in which India is trying to isolate Pakistan and has formed an alliance with the US against China, Pakistan has limited options. In China, Pakistan sees a reliable friend that also supports its position on the Kashmir dispute. In 2019, for example, State Councilor and Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, issued a statement supporting Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue (GOC, 2019). Islamabad has already been disappointed by the lack of support of its friends in the Gulf region, for example, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, on the Kashmir issue (Basit and Ahmed, 2021). After the signing of the Abraham Peace Accords in 2020, mediated by Washington, Pakistan is increasingly under pressure from its Gulf allies to normalize relations with Israel (Kugelman, 2021b). It is, however, not easy for Pakistan considering its historic support for the Palestinians but its relations with Bahrain and the UAE will not remain the same. This leaves Pakistan with little option but to continue its cooperation with China that offers strategic and economics gains.

2.2 Multilateral Organizations

Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral organizations have expanded, and examples can be seen through the expansion of regionalism globally. Multilateralism is viewed as central to the liberal world order which was created following the Second World War. It has focused on peace, security and prosperity. Prominent examples of this are available through institutions like the United Nations, the European Union, and G20. In terms of implications

for Pakistan, there are some emerging developments with reference to global governance. As an emerging power, China seeks more influence in the existing world order but faces resistance from the US and its partners who view China's rise as a threat to the liberal world order and its norms, values and institutions.

Some tensions between global institutions and China-funded initiatives are also visible as its initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) foreshadow institutionalised international order. Besides, Beijing has long been criticizing global norms, values and institutions, therefore, it has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Hillman, 2020; Chhabra et al., 2020). In 2018, the United Nations Human Rights Council's periodic review reported a significant deterioration in human rights in China. In particular, the issue of Uighur Muslims of Xinjiang was highlighted (HRW, 2020). The Chinese Communist Party has a different position on many international norms and values, such as the freedom of religion and humanitarianism, due to which it has often used its veto to block UN Security council resolutions on Syria and Myanmar (Barber, 2021).

Beijing, on the other hand, is looking at options to spread its wings through some role in other regional organizations, like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Both are important for Pakistan in its foreign affairs. Because of Pakistan's role, China's case of SAARC's full membership has regularly been presented at SAARC. Its full membership is also supported by Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. The Indian house is divided over this issue because there are also supporters who think that China's membership of SAARC may help in improving Sino-India cooperation (Madan, 2014). For now, Pakistan and Nepal have joined hands to ensure a greater role of SAARC observers in the organization which could be seen as an incremental approach to allow China to become a full membership of SAARC. Both countries have been helping each other at multilateral levels, for example, this was also the topic of their joint statement issued on November 26, 2006 (GoC, 2006). The opponents of China's full membership, mainly India and its key allies within SAARC, e.g., Bhutan and Afghanistan, have concerns that are no longer valid. Ahmer (2011: 508) is of the view that the "inclusion of China in SAARC needs to be looked at from a positive angle as its enormous economic power can be a source of strength for the countries" of South Asia. Often, by considering the success of China's role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), high hopes are attached to China's membership in SAARC (Papatheologou et

al., 2014: 282), but regional dynamics of South Asia are different from that of Southeast Asia.

The likelihood of China gaining full membership of SAARC are also slim during the present regime of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India. Soon after becoming India's Prime Minister, Modi visited Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan in South Asia, and China and Japan, too. A key purpose of these visits was to do groundwork for a stronger cooperation with all these countries. In 2016, Modi also visited Afghanistan and had a brief unplanned stopover in Lahore to meet his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif. These visits provided a clear indication of the importance of South Asia for India. In 2014, during the visit of the Nepalese Prime Minister to India, Modi declared SAARC as a "vital instrument to add to the strength of each nation and advance collective action for shared prosperity in the region" (Sidhu and Sandhu, 2014: 5).

Irrespective of this, India has been actively trying to isolate Pakistan within and outside of South Asia. At the 2014 SAARC Summit, after Pakistan's refusal to sign agreements concerning trade and electricity, PM Modi stated that regional integration would happen with or without SAARC (Pillalamarri, 2014). New Delhi's major worry is Islamabad's mission of China's full membership of SAARC. India continues to work with extra-regional powers, such as the US, to counter China's influence in South Asia (Madan, 2014). In the wake of the Covid-19 crisis however, India has shown some interest in SAARC to counter China's vaccine diplomacy in South Asia but Pakistan may not fully support such politically motivated actions via SAARC (Ahmed, 2020). This is also because all members hold a veto power within SAARC. Due to bilateral differences between its members, especially India and Pakistan, SAARC continues to remain an ineffective regional organization. This is also reflected through its members engaging more with states and organizations outside the region.

The relationship between China and Pakistan is based on reciprocity. China played a key role in Pakistan getting full membership of the SCO in 2015. Then India also became a member raising hopes of India-Pakistan cooperation in sensitive areas, including counter terrorism, outside of SAARC. The SCO initiatives require both the countries to share intelligence data to fighter terrorism. Concerns were also raised regarding India and Pakistan taking their differences to the SCO and derailing the organization's achievements against terrorism but a study rightly argued against it: "the likelihood of the Indo-Pak conflict negatively impacting the SCO is low primarily because, unlike SAARC, the SCO is led by China and Russia who are actively invested

in keeping the SCO influential to serve their key interest in challenging the dominant Western world order” (Ahmed et al., 2019: 5). On the contrary, tensions between China and India have been restricting SCO; for example, India did not participate in a joint SCO military exercise (KavKaz 2020) in Russia because of tensions along the borders with China (Philip, 2020). There is a larger geo-political dynamic behind India’s lack of interest in the SCO.

India has been deeply concerned about the BRI and there is a convergence of interest here with Western powers, like the US. It was earlier in the twenty-first century that security pundits in the US began writing about China’s expansion in the Indian Ocean Region. In 2004, US defence analysts made a direct reference to Beijing developing a “string of pearls” through infrastructural projects (e.g. seaports) in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. It is argued in this report that a major motivation behind China’s investment in the Indian Ocean region is due to its energy security through an uninterrupted supply of oil and gas from the Gulf region (Ashraf, 2017). Thus, some scholars view the BRI as an alternative scheme that would help China in addressing its concerns regarding its dependence on the Strait of Malacca for oil imports.

Mearsheimer (2007) argues that China will try to become a regional hegemon in Asia and will pose a military threat to the US. The author, however, does not consider that India claims hegemony in South Asia and is not willing to share power with China. Based on India’s closeness to the US, some scholars claim that the latter is using the former to counter China’s influence in Asia (Khetran, 2015). Wizarat (2015) refers to Washington’s silence on the Chabahar Port in Iran as a sign of the US accepting India’s economic cooperation with Iran to counter China’s economic and political ambitions in Asia. Erstwhile scholarship on India’s concerns vis-à-vis the BRI in South Asia have looked at the Chinese investments in Pakistan and Sri Lanka in isolation from each other. There is a need to zoom out from a narrow approach of understanding India’s geo-economic and geo-political concerns on the BRI to look at a broader picture that examines the rising influence of China in the Indian Ocean region. New Delhi views the China-funded seaports in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as its ‘encirclement’ by China (Scott, 2008). Facing insecurities from China, India has formed a close military-oriented alliance with the US, Australia and Japan through Quad. India and its other Quad partners want to strengthen their partnership to counter China’s influence in the Asia Pacific (Delaney, 2021). This further complicates Pakistan’s options because its relationship with Australia and Japan may also suffer because of its continued closeness with China.

Despite Pakistan's role in the recent US-Taliban peace deal, there is international pressure on Islamabad to abandon its support of the Taliban. Under the Obama administration, the US exerted pressure on Pakistan to end the ISI's support for the Taliban but this changed under the Trump administration that looked towards Pakistan to negotiate with the Taliban (Mazzetti, 2018). Despite its leverage in terms of negotiating with the Taliban, Pakistan remains in the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In June 2018, FATF placed Pakistan on its grey list, which means that the country is under a renewed international pressure to implement the 27-point FATF action plan in relation to terror financing (Sherani, 2020). In this context, it should not come as a surprise that Islamabad has decided to fully comply with the UN Security Council sanctions against the Afghan Taliban. The first official document on this was released through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2019 and the second in August 2020. These stated that Pakistan would comply with the UN Security Council resolutions to freeze the assets of the Taliban, place travel ban and arms embargo on the group, and take actions against some high-profile terrorists (MOFA, 2019). This may again create hiccups in Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban but the latter is dependent on Pakistan more than its other partners and, therefore, might not fully break its ties with Pakistan. While Pakistan's progress against terrorism, in particular terror-financing, has been acknowledged, it still remains in the grey list. In the FATF meeting in July 2021, it was accepted that Pakistan had made significant progress on its first action plan of FATF by addressing 26 of the 27 items. The last remaining item demands Pakistan to take swift action against terrorism financing, investigation and persecution of terrorists mentioned in the UN list of designated terror groups (Business Standard, 2021). While being still in the grey list is disappointing for Pakistan, it no longer faces the fear of being blacklisted by the FATF.

3. Opportunities for Pakistan

Every challenge offers opportunities and the same is the case with the above-mentioned geo-political realignments. While China has come to Pakistan's rescue in terms of sanctions concerning cross-border terrorism, Islamabad needs to do more to change its image as a terrorist supporter. To a degree, Pakistan has transformed its narrative and continues to claim that it wants peace and stability within and outside, for example, by not having any favorites in Afghanistan (Yousafzai, 2021) but actions speak louder than words. Its leverage in the case of the Afghan Taliban presents

more challenges as it wants to show that it can convince the group for a meaningful political settlement but then it cannot fully control the group. Its influence on the Taliban has been recognized by key international actors, including the US and China, but Pakistan needs to streamline its efforts with multilateral organizations.

As SAARC remains stagnant, Pakistan needs to work with other actors through the United Nations, SCO and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation for intra-Afghan peace process. Avoiding bilateralism with reference to Pakistan's engagement with the Afghan Taliban would help a great deal in boosting the country's image as a key actor for regional peace and security.

The United States' hurried withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban's takeover of the country in August 2021 has again changed regional dynamics. While everyone has realized that the road to peace in Afghanistan goes through Pakistan, as reflected through world leaders calling Prime Minister Imran Khan of Pakistan (The News, 2021), Islamabad has to be careful by opting for multilateralism rather than lifting the whole burden. The US, already embarrassed by what has happened in Afghanistan, will continue to engage with Pakistan for negotiating with the Taliban. Similarly, China has interest in peace and stability in Afghanistan as Beijing has expressed concern in relation to anti-China elements using Afghanistan's soil against China. While Imran Khan once said that Pakistan's destiny is linked with China, one cannot deny the fact that the relationship with the US is also very important in terms of the country's economic problems and regional security. This demands a cautious approach and neutrality from Pakistan in terms of its relations with the US and China.

Conclusion

Although the international political system has never been stagnant or free from challenges, it faces new challenges from geo-political realignments across the world. As China pushes for more influence in global governance, it faces a serious challenge from the Western countries that view its rise as a threat to liberal world order. Facing security and economic challenges, Pakistan has historically tried to maintain balanced relations with the US and China but that is becoming increasingly difficult as the US is expanding its relations with its archrival India. In China, Pakistan has, however, found a trustworthy partner that defends it at international forums in connection with the allegations of cross-border terrorism.

Pakistan is leaning towards China also through multilateral organizations like the SCO that offer opportunities like joint military exercises to further strengthen their bilateral relations. By virtue of closeness to China and membership of the SCO, Pakistan has also normalized its relations with Russia. These are visible geo-political realignments that will continue to influence Pakistan's external relations in the coming decades. While Islamabad continues to cement its relations with China and the US is aligning with India, Pakistan needs to find ways to be relevant for the US. As Washington has pulled out its troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban have taken over the country, Islamabad needs to demonstrate that it can play a greater role in the intra-Afghan settlement. This would demand abandoning its erstwhile approach of looking Afghanistan through the lens of 'strategic depth' to finding ways to show that it has no favorites and sincerely wants peace in the neighborhood. Such actions would go a long way in terms of also fully realizing the true potential of CPEC that involves Afghanistan in terms of connectivity with the Central Asian Republics.

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CHAPTER 4

The Effect of Global Climate Change on Pakistan

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Abstract

This chapter offers an overview of trends and projections of key climate indicators (temperature and precipitation) about Pakistan using the data from state-of-the-art global climate models from Coupled Model Inter-comparison Project (CMIP6) database. We focus on the recent studies to understand the changing spatial and temporal climatic patterns and trends across Pakistan. This chapter unpacks the impact of climate change on various sectors, including water resources, agriculture, and ecosystem. We also highlight key vulnerabilities in rural and urban livelihoods along with recent adaptation and mitigation initiatives in Pakistan. While exploring the financial and institutional limitations, we propose recommendations for setting national agenda for an inclusive, comprehensive, and location-specific adaptation needs and mitigation efforts.

1. Introduction

Climate change is a global threat that requires effective global efforts to take action at the international, national, and regional levels. The Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on physical science basis, which was released in August 2021, incontestably stated that “it is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land. Widespread and rapid changes in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and biosphere have occurred.” It has further noted an increase in the global surface temperature with a likely range of 0.8 °C to 1.3 °C during 1850-1900 (pre-industrial) to 2010-2019 due to anthropogenic activities. Likewise, global average precipitation has also shown an increasing trend and is likely to shift regional monsoon circulation patterns (IPCC, 2021; Arias, et al. 2021).

The rising trends are also observed in the global glacier retreats, sea-level rise as well as very likely shifts in climate zones affecting land biosphere and growing seasons (IPCC, 2021).

The Paris Agreement (PA) is a global agreement which provides an opportunity and strong basis to act and respond to the threat of climate change effectively.

Article 2 of the PA has set an ambitious target to curtail the global average temperature to well below 2°C and pursue the efforts to limit it to 1.5°C above the pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. AR6 report has highlighted that climate threats would be much lower at 1.5°C as compared to 2°C, however, it requires an unprecedented effort to reduce emissions at the global scale. Even at the current levels of warming, climate change is causing profound impacts on livelihoods and environmental and ecological systems across the globe, highlighting the need for global climate responses.

Global warming and impacts of climate change may vary from one region to another. In many regions, including Pakistan, warming is already experienced close to 1.5 °C above the pre-industrial level (Allen et al. 2018). Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to such rising warming trends and have to face adverse impacts on all socio-economic fronts as well. Adaptation and mitigation actions are required to reduce climate and weather-related risks and vulnerabilities. However, due to lack of knowledge, information, capacities, and low technological base, it is challenging for developing countries to identify appropriate adaptation and mitigation needs that are country-driven, locally focused, transparent, effective, and inclusive. Moreover, implementation of adaptation requires updated information on changing climate, impacts, risks, financial resources, and societal awareness (Allen et al. 2018). Information gathering and assessment related to climate risks and vulnerabilities is challenging, particularly at a local scale, for developing countries due to lack of technological base and adequate institutional mechanisms. The situation becomes more complex due to the changing political ambitions and development priorities that hinder the agenda-setting for scaling up adaptation and mitigation measures in the country.

This chapter explores the changing trends of climate indicators in Pakistan; how climate change projection may vary across regions and what are the key effects of climate change on glacier melting, hydrological regimes, agriculture, and society at large. Moreover, this chapter explores increasing vulnerabilities and risks, particularly for rural populations and livelihoods. Furthermore, it analyzes how the government of Pakistan can intervene to shape adaptation and mitigation measures and improve the resilience of its people.

2. Climate change: rising trends

Climate scientists continue to provide analysis about the changing patterns of climate indicators for Pakistan. These climate projections are alarming. For instance, Kiani et al., (2021) projected that Pakistan has already surpassed the Paris Agreement warming threshold of 1.5 °C. The differential impacts over Pakistan at the global thresholds of 1.5 °C and 2 °C are also analyzed in several recent studies (Saeed et al. 2021a; Ullah et al., 2020; Mondal et al. 2021; Haider and Ullah, 2021; Khan et al. 2021; Pomee and Herting, 2021). Heat stress, including mortality and morbidity, heavy precipitation events, flooding due to melting of snow and glaciers, crop failures, labour productivity and ecosystem losses are a few among multiple threats the country would additionally be susceptible to, if the global temperature would rise beyond 1.5°C.

Due to high latitudinal variability, the temperature increase would not appear evenly across the country, with northern glaciated regions projected to witness increase in mean annual temperature by 3°C to 4°C, while a lesser increase is likely for southern Pakistan of 2°C to 3°C by the 2080s under RCP 8.5¹ (Iqbal and Zahid, 2014). A recent study by Ali et al., (2021), projected an even higher increase of 2.6°C in temperature across Pakistan under middle-of-the-road RCP 4.5² scenario by the end of 21st century, which goes upto 5.1°C in the case of high emission RCP 8.5 scenario. The projected rise in temperature is pronounced in glaciated and monsoon-dominated regions as well as in irrigated plains of Punjab and arid steppes of Balochistan. For the plains of Sindh, the projected increase of average temperature is comparatively lower under both RCP scenarios (Ali et al., 2021; Rehman et al. 2018).

1. RCP8.5: One high pathway for which radiative forcing reaches greater than 8.5 W m⁻² by 2100 and continues to rise for some amount of time (the corresponding ECP assuming constant emissions after 2100 and constant concentrations after 2250) (IPCC, 2008). This high emission scenario assumes about high population and relatively slow income growth with modest rates of technological change and energy intensity improvements, leading in the long term to high energy demand and GHG emissions in absence of climate change policies (Riahi et al. 2011).
2. RCP4.5: The intermediate stabilisation pathway in which radiative forcing is stabilised at approximately 4.5 W m⁻² and 6.0 W m⁻² after 2100 (the corresponding ECPs assuming constant concentrations after 2150) (IPCC, 2008). RCP4.5 is a stabilization scenario and assumes that climate policies, in this instance the introduction of a set of global greenhouse gas emissions prices, are invoked to achieve the goal of limiting emissions and radiative forcing (Thomson, et al. 2011).

Urban centers in Pakistan that are already experiencing the highest observed average temperatures are more likely to become hotter, particularly in Southern parts of the country. The urban enclaves, like Karachi, Hyderabad and Jacobabad in Sindh and Bahawalnagar and Bahawalpur in Punjab are among the hottest cities in Pakistan. The cities in Northern regions of Pakistan, including Gupis, Drosh, Chitral, and Gilgit, are also projected to become warmer over the century (Ali et al., 2021; Ali et al., 2020)

At a seasonal scale, warming is expected to be greater in winter than in the summer (Ikram et al., 2016; Ali et al., 2021). Such changes in warming have already caused variability in rainfall patterns, increase in aridity, and heatwave events in Pakistan (Saeed et al. 2021a; Saeed et al. 2018; Nasim et al. 2018). For instance, the frequency of heatwaves has increased at a rate of 11 days per decade since 1980 and is further projected to increase, particularly evident in the highly populated and agricultural plain areas of Punjab and Sindh (Saeed et al. 2017).

Results based on the latest generation of Global Climate Models (GCMs) used in the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the IPCC over Pakistan are presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2. An ensemble of 27 GCMs is used for the analysis, considering three IPCC scenarios, i.e., SSP1-26 (low emission), SSP2-45 (medium emission), and SSP 5-85 (High emission), and for three time periods represented as near future (2030-2049), mid-future (2060-2079) and far-future (2080-2099). Further details of the data and methodology are explained in Almazroui et al. (2020).

A significant and robust rise is projected even for the lowest emission scenarios which increases gradually towards higher emission scenarios. In line with the studies mentioned earlier, the high altitude northern and southwestern regions of Pakistan forewarn a higher increase as compared to southern regions. Additionally, the increase in temperature is more prominent as we go towards the end of the century (Almazroui et al. 2020).




Figure 4.1: Spatial distribution of future changes in annual mean temperature (°C) over Pakistan under three scenarios (SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP5-8.5) for the three future time slices (2030–2049, 2060–2079, and 2080–2099) as compared with the reference period (1995–2014).

The backslash and forward slash represent the grid boxes showing significant and robust change, respectively, while hatching represents the grid boxes having both significant and robust change. Significance is defined based on a two-tailed Student t test, while robustness is defined when 66% of all models project a climate change signal in the same direction (Almazroui et al. 2020).

Rising warming trends cause shifts in the rainfall patterns of Pakistan. Precise spatial and temporal rainfall projections are always challenging. This is mainly due to complex topography and varied interactions with hydro-climate systems, particularly at the regional or sub-national scale. However, recent studies provide precipitation projections with increasing confidence levels using multi-model ensemble techniques (Ali et al., 2021). Such projections show that relative average annual precipitation is increasing in all regions of Pakistan to about 5-10 percent (Ather et al. 2021; Ali et al., 2021). A rise of annual 26.4 mm is projected for the 2006-2035 period, whereas 35 mm during the mid-century (2041-2070), for both RCP low and high emission scenarios. The annual increase in precipitation reaches up to 41.8 mm for

RCP 4.5 and 58.8 mm in the case of RCP 8.5 (Ali et al., 2021). While at the seasonal time-scale, projections show a likely increase in relative precipitation during winters compared to summer (Ather et al. 2021). Khan et al. (2021), however, projected a decline in precipitation for both seasons under RCP 8.5.

At the regional scale, northern regions of the country are projected to receive more rainfall and higher number of wet days compared to southern parts of Pakistan, i.e., South Punjab and Sindh (Ali et al. 2020). For instance, Upper Indus Basin (UIB) is likely to receive more precipitation during the winter and pre-monsoon season, indicating more wet days and consequently increased river flows (Pomee and Herting, 2021; Ali et al. 2021). Dars et al. (2021) projected an increase in mean annual precipitation for UIB to about 14 percent and 8 percent under RCP8.5 and RCP4.5 respectively. For semi-arid regions, which constitute most of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, the magnitude of precipitation is also projected to rise to 3.3 mm per day, which is likely to increase extreme rainfall events (Haider and Ullah, 2021).

Projections of rainfall extreme events are most alarming for the country. AR6 projected with high confidence that monsoon precipitation is likely to increase with rising interannual variability in South Asia (Arias, et al. 2021). Under a high emission scenario, a rapid increase in extreme precipitations and extremely wet days are projected relative to normal rainfall intensity in the northern sub-mountainous monsoon-dominated region of the country (Rehman et al. 2018; Haider and Ullah, 2021). In the case of a middle-of-the-road emission scenario (RCP 4.5), extreme precipitations and wet days show less increase mainly because of less amount of radiation forcing compared to high emission scenario RCP 8.5 (Rehman et al. 2018). Moreover, the spatial distribution of the monsoon is also projected to expand northward, including UIB under both (RCP 8.5 and RCP 4.5) warming scenarios (Ali et al. 2021; Haider and Ullah, 2021). This may alter the agro-climatic zones and hydrological regime of the area (Haider and Ullah, 2021).

For a low-emission scenario (SSP1-26), findings based on multiple latest GCMs used in AR6 present spatially in-homogenous results with less significant changes (Figure 2). However, these changes get significant, robust, and more intense in the high emission scenario. The plains of Sindh and Punjab are projected to receive the highest increase in precipitation under the high emission scenario for mid and far-future periods. Though Figure 2 presents an averaged picture of precipitation, it can be inferred that these changes will be accompanied by increase in extreme events, such as heatwaves and flooding (Almazroui et al. 2021).




Figure 4.2: Spatial distribution of future changes in annual mean precipitation (%) over Pakistan under three scenarios (SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP5-8.5) for the three future time slices (2030–2049, 2060–2079, and 2080–2099) as compared with the reference period (1995–20 –2014).

The backslash and forward slash represent the grid boxes showing significant and robust change, respectively, while hatching represents the grid boxes having both significant and robust change. Significance is defined based on a two-tailed Student t test, while robustness is defined when 66% of all models project a climate change signal in the same direction (Almazroui et al. 2020).

3. Rising impacts: ‘listen to the science’

As discussed in section 2, rising temperatures and changes in the rainfall patterns in all regions of Pakistan have rendered a profound impact on the bio-physical environment. In addition, other changes in climate related patterns like significant loss in ice-caps and glacier melting, variability in water availability and river flows, loss of agriculture yield, including crops, livestock, and poultry across irrigated plains of Punjab and Sindh, with loss of lives, livelihood assets, and opportunities due to increase in extreme flood

and drought events, consequently inducing endangered mountain, desert, and coastal ecosystems, has inevitably resulted in adverse impacts on social and economic activities in the country.

In the arid to semi-arid climate, agriculture is not viable without irrigation. Any variability in the surface irrigation supply may impact the farm production of 80 percent of the irrigated arable land of Pakistan, which supplies 90 percent of the total national farm produce. Hasson et al. (2019) projected an increasing uncertainty of annual water availability under both 1.5 oC and 2.0 oC warming scenarios. They analysed three Himalayan watersheds, i.e., Jhelum, Kabul, and UIB (Upper Indus Basin), and projected a rising water availability that ranges from 10-70 percent under 1.5 oC while 14-88 percent for 2 oC warming during the summer melting regime (Hasson et al. 2019).

Fatima et al. (2020), while studying the Hunza river basin, also projected a rise in water availability with more uncertainty in the flow regimes under all RCP scenarios. They projected both decline and delay in snow and glacier melt, contributing to the overall water supply, however, the deficiency will be augmented by the rising trend of rainfall in the region (Fatima et al. 2020).

In another recent study, Dahri et al. (2021) projected an uncertain but considerably rising annual water flow regimes that may range from 17 to 74 percent under increased warming and wet conditions in three mountain regions, i.e., Karakoram, Southwest Hindukush, and West Himalaya. However, historical analysis of precipitation and temperature shows a decline in the river flows in these three regions during the summer (Dahri et al. 2021; Latif et al. 2021). Shahid and Rahman (2021) indicate likely future drought conditions in the Lower Indus Basin (mostly comprised of Punjab and Sindh plains) that signifies the uncertain upstream (UIB) water regimes due to changing climatic conditions.

Under these uncertain water regimes, the dwindling water storage capacity and very old irrigation infrastructure is another threat, along with growing demand for water from non-agricultural sectors, such as domestic use and industrial sector. Most importantly, shifts in spatial and temporal river water flows due to variability in snowmelt and precipitation regimes may desynchronize with the prevailing agricultural cylinders and cropping patterns of the country (Hasson et al. 2019).

Agriculture is the main economic activity of Pakistan's rural population, the latter representing 65 percent of the total population of Pakistan (GoP, 2017).

It contributes to the economy by employing 38.5 percent of the labour force and accounted for 19.2 percent of the national gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021 (GoP, 2021). The underlying source of climate change vulnerability for Pakistan's economy is its agricultural sector. Numerous projections indicate crop yields may decrease in the future due to (slow onset)³ climate change events, the most crucial of which are wheat, rice, cotton, sugarcane, and maize (Hussain and Mudasser, 2007; Sultana et al. 2009; Tariq et al. 2014; Siddiqui et al. 2010; Ahmed et al. 2016a; Schleussner et al. 2018; Alvar-Beltrán, 2021; Azmat et al. 2021).

Although, in northern parts of Pakistan, wheat and maize yields are projected to increase in the short term due to increase in the average minimum and maximum temperatures and decline afterwards in the longer term (Jan et al. 2021). This will cause a decline in the net farm revenue across Pakistan. Ali et al. (2021) reported about USD14 to USD35 per hectare loss because of increasing temperature and rainfall patterns on summer and winter crops.

There is also a wide gap in actual and potential crop yields in Pakistan, in comparison to similar agro-climatic and irrigation conditions elsewhere in the world (Prikhodko and Zrilyi, 2013). In this regard, under both RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5 emission scenarios, major crops (wheat, rice, and cotton) in Pakistan are projected to grow above a threshold temperature that adversely impacts crop yields, reduces farm income and increases demand for water (Mahmood et al. 2020). Likewise, precipitation as a source to meet crop water requirements is a limiting factor for crop production in Pakistan. In order to meet the water requirement of the crop above the threshold levels, artificial irrigation is required to augment crop productivity per hectare (Mahmood et al. 2020).

The situation in livestock production is also expected to be negatively affected by high temperatures, implying lower productivity (such as milk and meat), animal health, and nutrition (Ahmed et al., 2016b; Abid et al., 2016). Moreover, climate change has impacted fodder availability and rangeland for grazing as well as the rise in contagious seasonal diseases (Hussain et al. 2019).

3. Slow onset events, evolve gradually from incremental changes occurring over many years or from an increased frequency or intensity of recurring events, refer to the risks and impacts associated with increasing temperatures; desertification; loss of biodiversity; land and forest degradation; glacial retreat, and related impacts; ocean acidification; sea-level rise; and salinization (UNFCCC, 2011).

Loss and damage due to sudden climate extreme events are another major concern in Pakistan. The main cause of climate risks is the substantial rise in the variability of rainfall, along with an increase in extreme weather events. Eckstein et al. (2019) estimated that around 145 climate extreme events have occurred between 1998 and 2017 in Pakistan — an average of five events per year. These events include droughts, floods — including the mega-flood of 2010 — heavy snowfall in the northern mountains, heatwaves, cyclones, heavy rains, and landslides (Eckstein et al. 2019). For instance, the risk of wheat damage by strong winds or storms is about 43 Maunds per hectare (Elahi et al. 2021). These rising events illustrate why Pakistan is placed among the ten most climate risk-affected countries in the world.

Monsoon floods are common in Pakistan. However, their intensity and frequency become multiple. The flood events occurred almost every year since 2003 with varying intensity, however, the mega-flood of 2010 was unprecedented. About 20 million people were displaced and the flood caused direct and indirect economic losses of approximately USD 10.5 billion, excluding the restoration costs (GoP, ADB and WB, 2010; Khalid and Khaver, 2020).

4. Increasing vulnerabilities and risks: rural population, livelihoods, and adaptation potential

While climate change and its impacts are observed across Pakistan, rural areas are most vulnerable. Risks posed by climate extreme events have been damaging in the past. There are many reasons for their social and economic vulnerabilities. The foremost reason is the high poverty rates in rural Pakistan. Around 132 million (61 percent) of the population of Pakistan lives in rural areas. Of which about 36 percent (48 million) are poor (World Bank, 2018), while a further 22 percent are grouped as transitory poor (Arif and Farooq, 2014). The majority of the poor are landless, agricultural laborers, small farmers, which constitute 75 percent of the overall rural population (Bhutto and Bazmi, 2007). Moreover, most of the rural population is dependent on a single sector, i.e., agriculture, which is highly sensitive to environmental and climatic events, such as erratic rainfall patterns, frequent floods, unprecedented droughts, and rising temperature (Salik et al. 2020).

The adaptation potential of such a socio-economic deprived rural population is particularly low. With projected increase in extreme climate hazards under 1.5 oC and 2 oC warming scenarios, Pakistan's rural population is at a high risk

due to multiple reasons. First, there is a lack of disaster-related preparedness, particularly of any efficient early warning system or safe and secure physical infrastructure for protection. Second, district and local governments lack the capacity and resources for timely and effective evacuation of the vulnerable population that, in turn, causes the loss of lives and livelihood assets. Flood-affected people, for example, have no other option but to stay outside. Lastly, relief work is not well-planned and coordinated in order to provide food, safety, and health facilities (Salik et al. 2020; Shah et al. 2021; Idris, 2021).

Recent studies show some farm-level adaptation responses by farmers to climate change in Pakistan (Ahmed et al., 2016a; Abid et al., 2015; Abid et al., 2016). Farmers are well-informed of climate change impacts but the lack of access to weather and market information, illiteracy, and poverty limit their capacity to adapt (Abid et al., 2015; Abid et al., 2016). However, most of the farming occurs in less than five hectares of land (96 percent of total farms) (GoP, 2010). These small-scale farmers mostly having limited financial and technical resources with very little government support are highly vulnerable to climate and weather shocks, such as heatwaves, storms, and heavy rains (Qaisrani et al. 2018). In the absence of social safety nets and lack of access to government support and services, rural people, particularly landless rural farm labour, are compelled to migrate elsewhere (Salik, et al. 2020; Mueller, 2014).

5. Tackling climate change in Pakistan: what is missing

5.1. Mitigation: initiatives, challenges, and opportunities

Pakistan's contribution to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions always remained to the right of the decimal point with per capita emissions only 1.0 metric tons in 2018. This is well below the world average of 4.5 metric tons per capita and almost insignificant when compared with one of the highest per-capita emitters, i.e., North America which touched up to 15.3 metric tons (World Bank, 2021). However, this comparison is not for the right to emit GHGs but to highlight Pakistan's mitigation efforts which it carries out (besides the low emissions) with its meager financial resources.

In this regard, elucidating governmental initiatives is worth mentioning in terms of their scale, commitment, and achievement for GHG emissions reduction. The flagship programme is the 'Ten Billion Trees Afforestation project' that is planned to not only improve the forest cover, ecosystem

services, job creation, eco-tourism but would also act as a huge source of carbon sink. The project has already started on September 2, 2018 and is targeted to complete by 2023 with an expected cost of about Rs.125 billion. This project is financed under the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP). Recently, the prime minister also alluded to protect and expand mangrove forest cover in different coastal areas of Pakistan by highlighting its carbon sequestration and aquatic habitat restoration potential.

In the transport sector, the important initiative is the development of Electric Vehicle (EV) Policy 2020 with a focus on reducing emissions using green fuel-efficient technologies in Pakistan. The other objective is to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and decrease oil import bills for Pakistan. These important policy measures also include a shift from Euro-II to Euro-IV emission standards for petrol and diesel vehicles, promoting initially EV technology for two and three-wheeled vehicles, and provide incentives for hybrid technology for four-wheelers or higher.

In the energy sector, Alternative and Renewable Energy Policy 2019 targeted to produce 20 percent Renewable Energy (RE) power production by 2025 and 30 percent by 2030. Around one million new customers will be connected to net metering through the generation of 3000 MW solar energy by 2025. Under the green energy projects, the provincial governments are developing PV power projects to provide solar energy to public-sector buildings, including schools, hospitals, etc., as well as solar irrigation water pumps, and solar geysers for rural households. However, limiting factors for the adoption of such policy interventions are the development of cost-effective technologies accessible to the common people, better infrastructure for maintenance, and disposal of irreparable parts, such as batteries or solar panels.

However, a large-scale mitigation effort in Pakistan requires the much-needed international financial support. The largest GHG emitters are the energy and agriculture sectors in Pakistan, contributing to about 46 percent and 43 percent out of the total 405.07 MT CO₂-equivalent (GoP, 2018). Pakistan's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) 2016 projected a significant rise in emissions for both the sectors by 2030. For the energy sector, emissions may rise to 898 MT CO₂-equivalent whereas projected emissions for the agriculture sector are expected to rise to 457 MT CO₂-equivalent. Similar higher projections for GHG emissions are also estimated for other sectors of the economy, like industrial processes, land-use change, and forestry and waste. The total national GHG emissions would likely be as high as 1603 MT CO₂-equivalent.

Such mammoth rise in future emissions depicts a grim scenario for up-scaling national mitigation efforts. Pakistan's NDC (2016) presented numerous mitigation measures for the five key economic sectors which are conditional to the international climate funding. The mitigation measures listed in the NDC would cost up to USD 40 billion to reduce projected national GHG emissions up to 20 percent. However, the flow of international climate funds for Pakistan are quite low since the announcement of the NDC. Pakistan has received a grant of \$3.8 million since 2015 for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) through a competitive process by Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) of the World Bank. Pakistan secured some funding to prepare documents for the four elements required to complete the REDD+ readiness phase. Meanwhile, in 2018, FCPF provided an additional grant of \$4.01 million to further support the preparedness activities in Pakistan until June 2020. The Parliamentary Research Digest of June 2019 shows that The Global Environment Facility has provided Pakistan \$234.42 million in total financing and \$626.68 million in co-financing until June 2019. This includes financing of projects at the national as well as regional level.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) dashboard shows that its total funding to Pakistan is \$121 million as of August 2021⁴. Moreover, Global Environment Facility (GEF) also funded USD13.8 million for forest conservation and reversing deforestation and degradation in two separate projects under the Ministry of Climate Change (GoP, 2021).

5.2 Adaptation needs: setting a national agenda

Pakistan is struggling to tackle the increasing climate change impacts, loss and damage and vulnerabilities with its fragile economy. Therefore, to overcome the challenges posed by climate change, more detailed and deliberate planning is required. This planning can, on the one hand, help in responding to urgent and longer-term effects of climate change both at the national and sub-national levels, while on the other, support better compliance with global climate agreements through efficient access to information, financial resources, technology transfer, and capacity-building programmes. In this regard, two interlinked areas should essentially be considered for setting up the national climate agenda, i.e., strengthening of climate research and initiation of dialogue among the stakeholders concerned for transformative local climate-smart solutions.

4. <https://www.greenclimate.fund/countries/pakistan>

More government spending on climate research and development is important for many reasons. First, systematic observation of the climate systems is lacking, particularly at the regional to sub-regional scales (Rehman et al. 2018; Ali et al. 2020; Saeed et al. 2020; Schleussner et al. 2018). For instance, complex terrain and topography, varied hydro-climate conditions, conjunction of climate systems, such as the monsoon and mediterranean disturbances, vegetation, etc., form a complex local to sub-regional biophysical environment that makes it difficult to comprehend in climate models for reliable estimates (Ali et al. 2020; Saeed et al. 2020). This requires new integrated approaches for improving the reliability and effectiveness of climate assessments. Second, seasonal to sub-seasonal climate forecasting or short to medium range projections are needed not only to improve agronomic practices (sowing, irrigation, fertiliser, and pesticide application, harvesting, etc.) for higher yields but also for increased preparedness to face climate and weather extremes, such as heatwaves, water scarcity, storms, pest attacks, etc. Such short to medium-level climate information may also be useful for businesses and institutions, dealing with financial risks and insurances in climate-sensitive sectors, such as agriculture, health, and tourism. Third, reliable and comprehensive estimates and projections of uncertain hydrological regimes under different climate change scenarios are also important. The spatial and temporal variability of water flows needs to be assessed in the context of competing water demand among different sectors of the economy, depleting water storage capacities, power generation, water for drinking and sanitation. More importantly, contrasting results of observed and projected changes in water regimes due to a lack of understanding of warming trends, monsoonal and westerly precipitation patterns of different river basins, forecasting of GLOFs, extreme wet periods, and floods still need to be explored, particularly about disaster preparedness and protection (Hasson et al. 2019; Dahri et al. 2021). Lastly, a sound understanding of biophysical vulnerabilities, risks, and adaptation needs is still limited across Pakistan. For instance, vulnerability indicators, such as gender, poverty and income inequality, marginalized ethnic and religious minority groups need to be studied at local scales (Schleussner et al. 2018). Likewise, adaptation to climate change should be community-driven, taking into consideration the local socio-economic conditions and vulnerable populations.

The initiation of dialogue among relevant stakeholders for robust solutions and adaptation requirements is linked to transformational research. There always is an important role of scientists, researchers, policymakers, politicians, technocrats, community-based professionals, donors, and media

for problem-solving but this is the time to recognise their value and include them in the whole process of policy, planning and devising implementation strategies. For this purpose, advisory groups at different levels in the hierarchy of government institutions should be constituted to provide science-based robust information for policymaking. In this regard, maintaining communication and trust is the key for continued engagement to address climate change issues, which is less visible so far.

Scientific knowledge about rising climate change impacts, vulnerability, and risks is well-established for many years. However, until now, limited stakeholders' agreement is observed on how to bring sound (transformational) adaptation measures for vulnerable economic sectors and to develop economic and community-level resilience. For example, many studies have shown that rural to urban migration brings social and economic well-being in terms of higher (diversified) incomes, lowering dependency ratios, better access to formal and informal financial resources and information, learning new skills, particularly for poor landless rural migrant households. These factors critically strengthen the adaptive capacities and resilience of the rural population from climate change-related stressors (Salik et al. 2017; Qaisrani et al. 2018; Mueller et al. 2014; Salik et al. 2020). However, policymakers in Pakistan have not yet considered migration as an adaptation or livelihood improvement strategy unlike accepted by many countries globally (Martin, 2013). Policymakers always advocate control or limit rural to urban migration to reduce urbanization issues. Such a pessimistic approach is evident from important climate change policy documents, i.e., National Climate Change Policy (2012) and Framework for Implementation of National Climate Change Policy (2014). In this regard, there is a need for a comprehensive dialogue on how migration can be a response strategy to overcome climate change risks and vulnerabilities, by presenting scientific evidence surveyed on public opinions and experiences. This example is just to showcase how research can be integrated into policy recommendations to bring out-of-the-box options for climate adaptation and transformational change in the country.

There is another critical issue about how to design and implement location-specific adaptation and mitigation measures. The externally designed or donor-driven agenda for adaptation or mitigation is most likely to be rejected or abandoned at the community level. In this context, risk assessments for key sectors of the economy are important to suggest interventions in the national context. For example, in the agriculture sector, there are about ten agro-ecological zones in Pakistan spread across topography, climate, soil,

land cover and use, cropping patterns, surface and groundwater availability, agronomic practices, crop varieties, and yield patterns. Under climate change, many issues are emerging, like shifting of crop suitability zones, land degradation, declining soil fertility, quality and quantity of water for irrigation and drainage, etc. Although a lot of information is currently being gathered by multiple institutions, public departments and organizations at different scales, little effort is made to collate, digitise, analyse and effectively link that information to policy change and decision-making.

A dynamic risk assessment under different climate change vulnerability scenarios for the country is lacking. Therefore, a digital dashboard at national and provincial levels should be developed that would combine data from multiple sources and (socio-economic, climate and environmental, market, etc., related) variables for a comprehensive view of risks and vulnerabilities of the agriculture sector. This would not only help to develop national and local level climate risk index (like Global Climate Risk Index), but can also identify location-specific plausible adaptation and mitigation measures. The digitalisation of agro-climate and market information can further improve agriculture advisories by providing farmers with better access to information to improve farm productivity and profitability and also to increase the off-farm digital connectivity.

Additionally, this information gathered through agro-digitalisation will be critical to disperse government's (financial) support to vulnerable communities during extremes, track climate change and environmental issues, such as air quality (GHG emissions due to crop residue burning, land use/cover change and livestock), excessive use of herbicides, pesticide, and fertilizers and, thus, identify changes in agro-ecological zones and focus on climate-smart agriculture and green growth that also indicate the likely outcomes for Sustainable Development Goals in the country.

Conclusion

This chapter explores recent climate change projections for Pakistan which tell us how climatology may change over time and in what direction. The northern mountainous areas of the country, including monsoon-dominated regions and the watershed areas of most of the rivers in Pakistan are under rising warming trends. The irrigated Indus plains (Punjab and Sindh) and many urban centers are also expected to experience similar rising temperatures with some variations at regional and sub-regional levels. The precipitation

projections, though with less-to-medium certainty levels, clearly show wide variability of rainfall patterns, spatial and temporal river discharges, thus resulting into a rise in the number of extreme events, such as flash and riverine flooding, extremely wet days, or drought-like conditions in many parts of the country. Moreover, the projected shifts in seasonal precipitation can also affect river flows and groundwater aquifers and their withdrawal for agriculture, drinking, sanitation, and commercial use.

Such rising warming and precipitation trends may significantly alter local weather patterns, vegetations, and livelihoods of the millions residing in vulnerable ecosystems and places. Such projected and observed changes in climate exacerbate vulnerability and risks for people's lives and livelihoods opportunities plus resources. In Pakistan, the capacity to adapt and respond to climate change (both slow onset and fast onset) for a general population is particularly low. There are several social, economic, and institutional challenges that underpin transformational adaptation options.

Recent research at the global scale provides a potential way to de-carbonised economy, climate-resilient sustainable development, eradicating poverty, ensuring food security and equity. However, some additional aspects also need to be studied while focusing on national mitigation goals. There are critical questions to be addressed, like what will be the key characteristics of post-decarbonised economy in Pakistan; how low or zero-emission economic sectors (like energy, construction, agriculture, industrial) will emerge from its current status; how will decarbonised pathways affect the rural economy, people and their livelihoods; how effectively can a more sustainable farm production and rural development be achieved, who will be the key actors of rural transformation and how can financial and human resources and institutional support be channelized and implemented for decarbonised pathways?

Similarly, meaningful adaptation actions are critically required to reduce the adverse effects of climate change. Any country or location-specific adaptation agenda, such as introduction of new climate-resistant crop varieties, urban or rural infrastructure or technologies (such as early warning systems, digital agricultural advisories, e-markets for food supply chains, etc.) should be supported to invest in national research and development. Moreover, national adaptation plans should consider social, economic, and traditional indigenous knowledge for better community uptake. For this purpose, digital transformation is absolutely essential for the key economic sectors, especially for agriculture to co-design the right set of adaptation options through risk assessments and active involvement of national to local level stakeholders.

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CHAPTER 5

Globalization, Islam and Culture:

Lessons from Pakistan's occluded histories

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Abstract

This chapter explores the impact of globalization on Pakistani society and culture while interrogating Jan Nederveen Pieterse's model of hybridity and its premise that the "Muslim world is a fertile area of hybridization" (2015, 139). The key highlights for this investigation are the occluded people's histories of Pakistan pre-1947 partition at high risk of extinction with the culture of globalization amidst contestations around Pakistan's culture and Islamic identity. For this, Pakistan's capital city Islamabad's Buddhist heritage is highlighted to both understand the implications of globalization on a complex, multi-layered and grounded society like Pakistan's and its occluded cultures and propose a new metaphor of the Bodhi Tree to Pieterse's "braided" globalization model. Thus, we layer a longer occluded pluralistic and very global rich cultural heritage of Pakistan in its distant history, with the recent context of its birth, debates of its "Islamic identity," aftermath of "The Long Partition" (Zamindar) as they form the core part of Pakistan's social cultural institutions, before moving on to highlight challenges faced after Pakistan's birth and to date. The challenges highlighted here with this wholistic lens are in areas of education, language, and key issues in tangible and intangible culture and heritage preservation in a globalizing world.

1. Introduction: Concepts and Debates

With the aim of understanding Pakistan's global role and engaging with internal and external actors shaping the country's role, engagement, influence and perception in the world, this chapter focuses on Pakistan's unique culture and identity in the light of its longer sub-continental historical and geo-political bearings; in particular with the country's problematic engagements with its relatively recent Islamic identity, intricately entangled with its partition from the Indian subcontinent in 1947 and the baggage of the aftermath of an ongoing "Long Partition" (Zamindar 2010).

With an increase in the population of Muslim youth in Pakistan globally with the highest rising Asia-Pacific population¹, along with a growing global

1. According to the population figures compiled by the Pew Research Center in 2017 of Muslims around the world by region the regional population by percentages is as follows: Asia-Pacific 61.70%, Middle East-North Africa 19.80%, Sub-Saharan Africa 15.50%, Europe 2.70% , North America 0.20% Latin America-Caribbean 0.1%.

Islamophobia in the New World Order, stakes are high for the world, not just Muslims, and there is an urgency now for a mutual understanding and co-existence among the people from all backgrounds, beyond race, religion, and ethnic backgrounds (Iftikhar 2021). With the fastest-growing youth population in the world, it is crucial to look at the complexity and sensitivity of Pakistan's role as a unique nation carved out for the Muslims of South Asia and as an Islamic Republic. For this purpose, this chapter views the implications on Pakistani culture of globalization by zooming in on contestations around its culture and Islamic identity and in particular around the occluded aspects and people's history and present due to the nation's historical and socio-cultural processes.

Definitions are crucial to lay the groundwork for our journey in Pakistan's sub-continental historical and geo-political bearings in the light of globalization. Culture is defined as "customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious or social group" (Merriam Webster). Bennett and Bennett (2004) distinguish between an objective culture, which refers to the institutional aspects of a culture and a subjective culture that focuses on a worldview of a society's people. On another note, Cowen (2002) contends that culture refers to art products and activities, as well as other creative products that stimulate and entertain individuals, such as music, literature, visual arts and cinema. In this regard, some populations use their culture to create new products, making culture a commercial label. Most importantly, especially for our subject matter, here is the fact that culture is not rigid. It is a process that gradually builds up through interaction. Culture allows individuals to create human societies by defining the conditions of how people live among each other and together as well as by abiding to social and cultural codes that distinguish them from other cultures (Hassi, Storti, 2012).

Globalization in its literal or actual sense can be described as the process of modification or alteration of local or geographical happenings across the globe. It is a term for the emergence of a global society in which economic, political, environmental and cultural events in one part of the world quickly to have significance for people in other parts of the world (Bajwa, 2009 p.35-36). Also labeled as the phenomenon by which transnational flows of people, financial resources, goods, information and culture have recently been increasing in a drastic way and have profoundly transformed the world (Ritzer and Malone, 2001).

1.1 Globalization of Culture and Cultural Globalization: Some Relevant Debates

Globalization is a multidimensional phenomenon that encompasses not only economic components but also cultural, ideological, political and similar other facets (Prasad and Prasad, 2006). Consequently, globalization has been addressed from the points of view of economics, social sciences, politics and international relations and has been subject to endless debates in various disciplines. Nonetheless, globalization effects are rarely addressed as a determinant that impacts societies and their cultures. More precisely, the interaction between globalization and culture still remains under-researched (Prasad and Prasad, 2007).

The term "globalization" got more attention in the late 1990s as after the end of the Cold War it was perceived as a force, which compelled or provided a platform or such a scenario for the less developed countries to create a bridge to cover the knowledge gap in information technology and knowledge. But globalization per se is considered a major threat to those societies where the capacity to deal with advanced technologies, capitalistic tendencies and implications of the corporate culture are quite limited (Bajwa, 2009, p.33)

Today globalization remains a phenomenon which is both a source of challenge and opportunity. Globalization is one of the most discussed topics that remains unclear and puzzling. In this regard, the argument about globalization in literature is two-sided as there is a lack of consensus on its meaning and definition and its impact on the local culture still to be measured and yet to be circumvented (Matei, 2006). One thing is evident from literature and the ongoing debate that the phenomenon of globalization is multidimensional and has social, cultural, political and economic impacts on both the individuals and societies. Hassi and Storti (2012) has defined globalization as a policy or a phenomenon which encourages such a system in which global connections are interdependent through latest technologies. Further, this process is described as a determination and an aspiration to achieve a way of life which is applicable throughout the world focusing on the uniformity of ideas in every single part of the world. Steger (2005) commented that globalization emerged with the advent of globalism which is an ideological discourse that constitutes a political belief system. It seems that globalization has an ideological basis as it is founded on the capitalist economic tradition with its premises, such as the development of free markets, private ownership, open and free decision-making, price mechanism and competition.

Jan Nederveen Pieterse, an authority in this field for over three decades, "Global Culture; 1990-2020," was asked to reflect on globalization and its connection with nationalism, global culture, and modernity from a comparative historical lens, and how and what has been changed from 1990 till 2020 and how the story of globalization, at least in the last couple of decades, has significantly changed the world. Pieterse now preferred moving on to the term global studies instead as it contained broad patterns of changes occurring on the global stage. Historically, tracing globalization has been raised as a separate theme in the 1980s and 90s and flourished under the liberal order, global capitalism, and modernity. However, he argues that the global chessboard, once dominated by the North American and Western financial capitals, was turned in favor of the rise of China and other East Asian nations and the new equation on the global milieu rose as 'the rise of the South' that changed the "North-South order".

The author defines globalization as "the trend of greater worldwide connectivity of people over time and the awareness of this happening" and instead of a linear, or unidirectional, or organized one, the process may appear as "multicentric globalization". The Asian rise contributed to and provided acceleration to the process of globalization and its drivers in terms of socio-economic activities, expansion of markets, and diffusion of financial systems. It has been asserted that the retreat of America-Atlantic and the current Covid-19 ramifications designed new patterns of globalization which are not as envisaged under the liberal world order.

One of the counter drivers to globalization is the rise of nationalism. The current resurgence of populism and rightwing rule under the banner of ultra-nationalism have weakened the processes of globalization on the one hand and the resurgence may itself be one of the outcomes of the colliding of liberal actors, globalized processes, and international institutions. The prominent examples are the failure of the US economy and the rise of right-wing, anti-Islam, and anti-immigration policies, the rise of right-wing groups in Western Europe, and Hindutva in India. Consequently, these changes affected or vice-versa the international order in terms of the economy, capitalist financial institutions, inequality, and plurality. The 2020s' global world seems more chaotic and less harmonized; more conflicts than convergence; more nationalist forces than global; more capitalist failures than bridging the gap between the rich and the poor people and nations, and most importantly the rise of the populists and the rightwing (Pieterse, 2020).

1.1.1 Dimensions of Globalization

The notion of globalization is generally understood in a three-corner debate. First, the hyper globalists, the skeptics and the transformationalists. The hyper globalists believe in the economic perspective of globalization. They believe that globalization is instrumental in creating a consumer society which promotes the interests of the world capitalist system. Therefore, globalization introduces those cultural values that may directly or indirectly promote and safeguard the interests of the capitalists. Against this backdrop, globalization is understood and interpreted in terms of adverse economic consequences for the developing countries like Pakistan. In other words, cultural globalization widens inequality and creates economic insecurity (Kayani, Ahmad, Saeed, 2013). Some analysts viewed globalization as synonymous with Americanization. Similarly, Rothkopf (2000) held, "it is in the best interest of America that we all converge to the same cultural way". Such an imperialistic view of globalization poses a threat to indigenous cultures and local identities.

In the view of the skeptics, globalization is a myth, and it lacks clarity in terms of economic interdependence while transformationalists have attempted to unify the two polar debates in terms of structural transformation and its consequences for political, social and economic change. Thus, for the latter group of scholars, globalization is a multidimensional process that entails both positive and negative consequences (Kiyani, Ahmed, Saeed.2013).

1.1.2 Cultural Globalization

(Watson, 2020) explains cultural globalization as a phenomenon by which the experience of everyday life, as influenced by the diffusion of commodities and ideas, reflects a standardization of cultural expressions around the world. Propelled by the efficiency or appeal of wireless communications, electronic commerce, popular culture, and international travel, globalization has been seen as a trend toward homogeneity that will eventually make human experience everywhere essentially the same².

Cultural globalization refers to the rapid movement of ideas, attitudes, meanings, values and cultural products across national borders. It refers specifically to the idea that there is now a global and common mono-culture – transmitted and reinforced by the internet, popular entertainment, transnational marketing of particular brands and international tourism –

2. <https://www.britannica.com/science/cultural-globalization>

that transcends local cultural traditions and lifestyles, and that shapes the perceptions, aspirations, tastes and everyday activities of people wherever they may live in the world'³.

The cultural dimension of globalization or "cultural globalization" refers to the circulation and sharing of ideas and of meanings and values across countries; hence across cultures, with the effect of increasing social contacts (Paul 2006), this presumably leads to more positive human interconnectedness. Globalization has intensified the flow of transcontinental values and interactions between individuals, groups and regions of the globe. Such a huge flow of values and connections envelops economic, technological, political, social and cultural aspects of individuals and groups of people. Although globalization has different dimensions, it is the cultural dimension that helps shape other facets of globalization (Kiyani, Ahmed, Saeed 2013).

Given the wide interest in both globalization and culture from diverse academic fields, such as anthropology, sociology, communication and media, cultural and language studies, colonial and indigenous studies, and political science and international relations, it is not surprising to find little consensus in literature on the definitions of these two concepts, let alone consensus on how they relate to each other and on their role and impact on individuals and societies.⁴ Globalization of culture, at its most profound level, sees the growing development of a consumer culture, a culture that seems to encourage a new global vision. Cultural globalization refers to specific beliefs and values which are largely shared across the globe.

1.2 Nexus between Religion, Religious Values and Impact of Globalization

Globalisation and religion always share a connection of conflict and struggle. In general, globalisation is mostly linked with its economic perspective along with political interdependence which has ultimately brought people closer to each other and the effects of such interconnectedness are felt in far-off places, too. It has shifted the cultural build-up of the world and led to the formation of a 'global culture' — a common minimum which is accepted by all⁵.

3. <https://revisesociology.com/2017/05/25/cultural-globalization-definition-examples/>

4. Crozet C. (2017) Globalization and Culture. In: Farazmand A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_1319-1

5. <https://www.gktoday.in/topic/impacts-of-globalization-on-religion/>

Globalisation stands for increased and daily contact while religions are becoming more self-conscious for themselves as being the world religions. According to a popular general knowledge site (GK), the basic tenets of globalization stand against religious parochialism. By diminishing the barriers between different cultures, globalization lands religion in a quagmire of conflicts which reinforce social identities as some do not accept the new realities and turn to religion to rediscover their own identity. Religion provides a sense of belongingness to a group in the world. Religion has withstood the complexities and onslaught of the modern world and is seen to be further intensified under the conditions of contemporary development⁶.

1.2.1 Negative Impacts of Globalization for the Weak Muslim World

Mohd Kamal Hassan, a Malaysian scholar, well summarized negative impacts of globalization facing the Muslim world in this quote, describing nature and contents of globalization designed by the West:

Facing the challenges of globalization with all the negative impacts of Americanization, secularization, materialism, neo-imperialism, debt bondage to the World Bank and IMF, unilateralism, militant liberal capitalism, global media conglomerates' manipulation and deception, impoverishment and homogenization of culture, bullying by the powerful, imposed liberalization, dominance of the global market, international and regional competition, commodification of education, environmental degradation, moral decadence, high tech crime, violence and war — all these and more at a time when the Muslim world is divided, weak and poor.⁷

1.2.2 Some General Positive Impacts

Not all the good practices are inheritance of any particular civilization. The present version of the world we are living in is a mixture of different cultures. People, by nature, are receptive to change and if they see any imperfections in their culture, they accept and adopt norms and practices from other cultures which are more correct and in tune with the times. Societies grew with the passage of time as they welcomed people of different civilizations,

6. <https://www.gktoday.in/topic/impacts-of-globalization-on-religion/>

7. Mohd Kamal Hassan (2003), "Setting the Muslim Mindset in Malaysia: Facing the Challenge of Globalization", Keynote address delivered at the International Conference on Teaching and Teacher Education, Kuala Lumpur, 16th September, 2003.

backgrounds and have created a completely new culture of their own. Cooking styles, languages and customs have spread all due to globalization. The same can be said about movies, musical styles and other art forms. They, too, have moved from one country to another, leaving an impression on a culture which has adopted them⁸.

1.3 Islamic/ 'Oriental' and Modern Globalization

Globalization is not a new phenomenon: If the term globalization is used to refer to the phenomena that involve sweeping and comprehensive changes across the world, then, needless to say, globalization is not a new concept. The whole world, and human beings, have been experiencing globalization since ancient times. Human history can be perceived as the process of globalization from its inception. The Roman Empire globalized its values within its own world. Modernization and industrialization based on the industrial revolution have clearly been globalization processes, although they have not yet reached every part of the world. Throughout history, many cultures and races have been destroyed or forced to change by other cultures and races. Until recently, however, many other countries and races have been able to maintain their cultural and racial identities.

1.4 Impact of Globalization on Muslim Cultures and Societies: Hybridization

Malaysian Professor, M.A Abdul Razzaq in his paper, "Globalization and the Muslims World" (2011) argues for an important distinction between "Muslim globalization and modern globalization heralded by the west" which is relevant as follows:

History indicates that before the coming of modern globalization, the Muslims had their own version of globalization. During the Muslim era of globalization, which coincides with the Golden Age of the Muslims, the West benefited immensely from the scholastic works produced by Muslim scientists and scholars. Modern globalization, which started during the era of Western colonization of the East, has now gone to every nook and cranny of the world. The usage of the internet and other modern electronic media directly or indirectly has speeded up the process of transporting modern

8. UKessays. November 2018. Positive and Negative effects of Globalization. [online]. Available from: <https://www.ukessays.com/essays/economics/positive-and-negative-effects-of-globalisation-for-business-economics-essay.php?vref=1> [Accessed 8 September 2021].

globalization to the world community. Modern globalization has brought about radical change in the aims of education; it has marginalized local culture and language; it has caused brain drain everywhere in the world. Muslims, it seems, are perceiving globalization as identical to re-colonization.⁹

For (Razzaq, 2011), Muslim globalization began with Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h)'s establishment of the state of Madinah in the year 622. Cultural globalization expert, Professor Jan Nederveen Pieterse, also supports this claim, tagging it "oriental globalization" in his book, *Globalization and Culture* (2009). For him, hybridity emerged as a leading paradigm in culture and globalization that triggered an academic debate about the mixing, infusion, blending, convergence, and divergence on the various aspects of the latter. He presented three views in connection with cultural differences. (i) He takes the 'clash of civilizations' view and argues that "culture difference" is lasting and meant to generate differences and contestations, hence conflict. (ii) "McDonaldization" means more "cultural convergence" in terms of "consumerism" and connectivity. (iii) "processes of mixing or hybridization"

In an elaborate discussion on the "Islam-West" relationship, Pieterse makes a case for how "Globalization is Braided/East West Osmosis" critiquing how history has been coined in a euro-centric way, blurring the parallel history that developed during the same time and so revisionist literature indicates the emergence of "oriental globalization" that refutes euro-centric globalizational views and narratives:

East-West relations, interactions, exchanges, and competitions have been portrayed very differently on the pages of history – perhaps depicted one sided story, stigmas and binaries. History of globalization unfolds a couple of examples where the flow of goods, ideas, trade, technology, culture and overall shaping of societies were from the East to the West.

One the most controversial, complex and misunderstood divide is between Islam and the West. One of the main reasons is that the Islamic world that contains an array of cultures, practices, beliefs, interpretations and governing mechanisms, has been seen as a friction between the West and the East and is taken as problematic in terms of adjusting and configuring/operating in the Western societies. Islam has many voices which echo across the continents with diverse cultural and artistic backgrounds. The expansion of Islam and its interactions across the Middle East and Europe configured various

9. Abstract of paper, Razzaq "Globalization and the Muslims World" (2011)

influences – which are indeed across the continents, cultures and practices. The cosmopolitan Islamic world depicts European influences as well.

That era was around 1500 when many European trading companies found their way eastward and traded with the Islamic empires. Arabic goods, Central Asian carpets, South Asian paintings and architecture, crafts and designs found their way into Europe on the one hand and the Western footprints through their companies and sailing of their items and goods found partners in the Eastern world, on the other. That led to the mixing up of arts, crafts, designs and cross-cultural understandings between the West and the Orient. However, these hybridities also yield frictions, wars, politically motivated divisions and long-lasting conflicts. Nevertheless, much of these frictions are modern.¹⁰

Interestingly for our purpose, here is Pieterse's assertion that there is convergence and divergence of the Muslim world with the West, with the former on Western capitalism, consumerism, and commercialism, whereas, divergence can be witnessed on account of the Muslim way of life, Islamic values, economics, and religious fulfillments. So, both the trends, convergence on certain issues, and divergence on others, are for him deeply integrated and laced into a rope. That means he argues that the "Muslim world is a fertile area of hybridization" (p.140), an argument we delve on deeper ahead.

1.5 Two Trends in Muslim World's Response to Modern Globalization

According to Professor Chandra Muzaffar, President, International Movement for a Just World and Professor at the Center for Civilizational Dialogue at the University of Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, there is a dominant and a subordinate trend that can be seen in response to how globalization and Western dominance had impacted the Muslim world. While the dominant negative response of exclusivity and inward looking is well documented and hyped in literature, it is the second trend that he emphasizes and that we want to bring attention to in this chapter:

There is a dominant trend which is, to a great extent, negative, meaning that Muslims have become very conscious of the fact of dominance and they have become exclusive. They have become inward-looking in some respects. They

10. Pieterse, (pp123-140).

have become very reactive and sometimes very aggressive. While one can understand the historical circumstances that may have given birth to some of these trends and tendencies, I don't think there is any justification for this from an Islamic point of view, or from the point of view of the relations between civilizations.

Now there is a subordinate trend, which unfortunately remains very weak at this point in time. These are Muslims who say that, in the midst of globalization, you have to reassert the essence of Islam. And that is its universalism, its inclusiveness, its accommodative attitude, its capacity to change and to adapt, while retaining the essence of faith. In other words, expressing faith as something that is truly ecumenical and universal. Now that is a trend which has its adherents in almost every Muslim country, but it has remained on the margins"¹¹

It is this "subordinate trend" of Islam's universalism and inclusivity which needs to be highlighted, a commonality in the Muslim world but marginalized, and one that we stay with in this chapter as the key as he argues that in the future forces of globalization are supporting the progressive open approach, and the movement for change in the Muslim world and beyond.

So, I see globalization as a process which will aid the movement for change within the Muslim world...Of course, it can also lead to very reactive stances. But in the long run, as has happened in other societies at other points in time, the reactive approach would lose out to the more progressive, open, inclusive approach.

In other words, what we may see at the end of the day is a sort of intermarriage, if you like, between the spiritual essence of our religious past and the humanistic essence of our secular present. And that may give birth to a new civilization.¹²

So, our goals here, inspired by Professor Muzaffar's long-range high goals, in the next part of the chapter are two-fold:

See the case of Pakistani culture within its historical and social context and the interplay of the two trends "dominant and subordinate" alongside the impact of globalization to understand what is the nature of this impact and

11. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/muslims/interviews/muzaffar.html>

12. ibd.

where we are headed and a check in with the goal and vision of the new civilization gestured towards above.

Is Pakistan a hybrid society? It is argued that since globalization has tremendously changed the dressing, cuisine, cultural values, purchasing power and socio-economic system of Pakistan and is right now an example of a hybrid society because of globalization, trying to find its balance between Islamisation and modernism¹³. How useful is the hybridity paradigm to study Pakistani culture?

For a chapter of this length, it is not possible to go in-depth in the actively debated subject of “roots” and “routes” of Pakistani culture¹⁴ and contestations around that so ahead the focus will be on occluded or forgotten histories and in the present state of world affairs it is the gentle “subordinate trend” which is marginalized¹⁵. Secondly, the query about the Pakistani society as a hybrid one is investigated using Pieterse’s model and to understand the impact of globalization on Pakistani culture, keeping in view the birth of the nation, debates of its “Islamic identity” along with burden of “The Long Partition” aftermath that forms the core part of its social cultural institutions¹⁶. To view the case of Pakistani culture within its historical and social context and the interplay of the occluded “subordinate trend” alongside the impact of globalization, we have selected for this chapter, within the rich pluralistic history of Pakistan, to delve into one subordinate narrative of Buddha’s land in the capital city of Islamabad, followed by a discussion of the usefulness of the hybridity paradigm of globalization.

13. <https://nation.com.pk/10-Jun-2019/globalisation-and-its-impact-on-pakistan>

14. See Ahmad, D.K. (2008) *Roots of Religious Tolerance in Pakistan and India*. Lahore.

15. Elsewhere (Aslam 2012) the author methodologically go in depth of “people’s histories” with the life and work of Pakistani performing artists.

16. Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya (2000) published first book focused on long-term consequences of aftermath of 1947 Partition. Authors argued how Partition triggered a process that deeply imprinted state and society in South Asia. They argue of “bitter legacies of conflict which are engendered by partition and which have been festering like a wound ever since” (229) and how they play out in India and Pakistan. Between 1988-92 they rank first and seventh respectively among major arms importers in the developing world. Clearly, the size of their military arsenals is huge, and is a matter of grave concern to the international community (228). See Tan and Kudaisya’s edited volumes 2000, 2007 edited three volumes on Partition aftermath.

2. Pakistan's Rich Pluralistic Occluded Histories ("Subordinate Trend")

It is very hard today to access Pakistan's composite history and culture beyond the nationalistic relatively recent history of the 1947 partition. But the composite history goes back thousands of years and so today persists despite it, a history forgotten but important for South Asians to remember for any attempts to bring peace in this region. Unfortunately, that link is fragile and delicate and unless maintained at an institutional and government level may be lost for the next generation. It is a precious link that, if not acknowledged and nourished, could be lost forever. Why should we protect this composite cultural legacy? Lessons from the oldest history of the land of Pakistan is the figurine of the "Dancing Girl of Mohenjo-Daro" according to renowned Pakistani historian, Professor Arfa Zahra. She represents the crucial "balancing dance" between the rush for economy on the one side and the role of religion in the Mohenjo-Daro society, depicted by the "Head Priest"¹⁷. It is crucial for Pakistan's development to remember this "balancing dance." To sample for this rich array of pluralistic histories that comprise the indigenous land of Pakistan we share only one example of the forgotten Buddhist heritage of the area comprising the capital city of Islamabad, an indigenous heritage that may be lost from neglect and increasing demands of today's capitalist-oriented globalized world.

2.1 The Buddhist Heritage of Pakistan: The Bodhi¹⁸ Trees of Islamabad Today

In India, from 250 BC to the middle of the 1st century AD, Buddhism was at its peak¹⁹ According to N.A. Baloch, a historian, educationist, and professor emeritus at the University of Sindh, in his book *Land of Pakistan: Perspectives, Historical and Cultural* (1995), it was in this region during the 5th century BC that Gautama Buddha rejected the earlier institutionalized

17. Personal correspondence with Arfa Zahra at East West Centre Alumni conference, Manilla Jan, 2016.

18. As the story goes for this particular species of Banyan called Bodhi tree are common in Islamabad, it is believed that Buddha performed his "Dhian"/ meditation underneath it a long, long time ago. According to dance teacher and choreographer Indu Mitha who make a choreography about this a Bodhi tree (See Aslam 2012) admitted to me that now scientists have found, though carbon testing, that this tree is in fact not that old. The seed of this particular Bodhi tree must have been planted by devotees only a few hundred years ago, but the legend goes that the Buddha himself had meditated under it.

19. Bechart and Gombrich, *World of Buddhism*, 60.

Brahman that had evolved out of the early eras of Vedism in 900 BC (p.1). Then Gautama's contemporary Vardhamana, or the Mahavira, also rejected the Brahmanical "blood shedding sacrifices" and founded Jainism, which focuses on peace and pacifism. Two great empires arose out of Buddhism, namely the Mauryas (circa 300-200 BC) and the Khushanas, which after a millennium of dominance were overshadowed in 4th century AD by the rise of the Imperial Guptas. The Guptas ruled for a long period, which started to decline between the 6th and the 12th century when Muslims ruled North India (8th century in Sindh). The region of the Indian subcontinent is vast with a long history of different invaders. We zoom into the region of North India that is now present-day Pakistan. Baloch mentions that this region was more politically aligned with Iran and Central Asia, with such diverse groups as the Achaemenians, Scythians, Huns, and Sassanians. From the 4th-6th century the Sassanid Persian influence was dominant politically in the region.

The present-day Lahore had a kingdom but the part comprising Taxila near Islamabad remained independent or under Kashmiri rule; and before that, from the 4th-7th century, was an important part of the "Buddhist Kushan Shahs or Turkic Shahs of the trans-Indus Gandhara kingdom with Peshawar as their capital" (Baloch 1995, 3).

2.2 "Synthesizing" Gandharan Culture

The late professor emeritus and legendary Pakistani archeologist and anthropologist, Ahmad Hassan Dani, addresses the historical importance of the land of Islamabad, with reference to the new capital in the first ever Congress of Pakistan History and Culture held in Islamabad in 1973:

The shift of events has brought back Islamabad to the forefront and placed it in the old Asian highway that once connected Samarkand and Bokhara in the Oxus with Delhi and Agra in the Ganges Valley. The population concentration in the valleys of the Ganges, Indus and Oxus has much to play as a definitive role in history as the old Silk Route that descended from the Land of the Chins and moved across Pakistan to the world of the Persians and the Romans. It is this unique position of Pakistan that once supported the mighty Kushana Empire which was responsible for the growth of the so-called Gandhara Civilization and world-famous art bearing the same name. The footprints of the by-gone people have been traced in different cities excavated at Taxila. They are a great pointer to the direction in which the natural history of our country has flowed. Whether it is Alexander or Timur, Babar or Nadir Shah, the Aryans, the Huns or the Mongols have all trekked

the same path and halted on the slopes of Margalla where stands today the new city of Islamabad...We know the past of Taxila and the role it has played in history. What is the future of Islamabad has to be determined by the present actors in history as well as by the historians who are to interpret the coming events.²⁰

The city of Taxila, home of the world famous Gandharan art as mentioned by Dani, is only five kilometers from the present-day city of Islamabad. Writing extensively on Taxila in his book, *The Historic City of Taxila* (1986), Dani quotes G.A. Pugachenkova²¹ in his discussion on how the city of Taxila had played an important role in the region for centuries:

Taxila, the region's capital, was the seat of a famous university where astronomy, mathematics, medicine, Sanskrit and Prakrit grammar were taught. The country's cities were centres where artistic corporations and guilds of craftsmen were organized, with skills and crafts handed down from generation to generation. Caravans crossing the Khyber Pass descended into the valleys of Gandhara loaded with goods from distant lands, through which the Gandharans got acquainted with the arts and crafts of other peoples (p.151).

Dani says that what modern scholars call "Gandharan" was the unique amalgamated culture of Taxila, and he argues that based on all the archeological evidence it can be seen that the city emerged as "the meeting ground of the east and the west" (p.151), with everything from Greco-Roman influences to that of the Huns (Hinduism) and the Khushans (Islam). This is particularly evident in the unique face of the Buddha carved by the Gandhara School sculptors. It evolved from a technique of working in stucco, a sculpturing technique that reached its peak during the 3rd century AD and was imported via Iran from the eastern Mediterranean.²²

Earlier evidence from the Indian epics and Puranas depicts two different cultural trends coming together. One group of people are the Takshaka, the followers of the Naga (serpent) or "the Naga culture," and the other are the "Aryan culture," which refers to the Arya group with their own distinct language, religion, and material culture. Dani argues that in the city of Taxila these two cultural trends met; an evidence of that can also be seen

20. (Dani 1973, 20).

21. Pugachenkova, G.A. *Iskusstvo Gandhari*. Moscow: Unesco Commission of USSR, 1992.

22. Berchert and Gombrich, *World of Buddhism*, 160.

in the archeological context (p.39). Similarly, looking at the later Gandharan archeological evidence, Dani argues not for a borrowing but a unique “synthesizing” which is distinctly Gandharan. Looking at the Gandharan culture of this area it is evident over millennia that the nature of the culture was assimilative, as is apparent by the presence and persistence of the remains of the people and their beliefs, such as the stupas and the Bodhi tree (Aslam 2012)²³.

It is important to remember this occluded assimilative and pluralistic trends, which are part of very global rich cultural heritage and roots of Pakistan in its distant history that Dani reminds us of, before moving on to highlight challenges faced after its birth and to date. With these in sight, the key problem areas of education, language, and key issues in tangible and intangible culture and heritage preservation with a modern globalizing world will be discussed in this chapter before we return to the message this tree has for Pakistan today.

3. Globalization And Pakistani Culture Today: Education, Language, Tangible And Intangible Culture Heritage Preservation

Globalization has allowed languages, customs and traditions from around the world to merge into each other. While it opens doors it also leads to blending of cultures and the deterioration of unique cultural differences. Today, trending globalization, like in all other countries, is affecting the culture of Pakistan in both positive and negative ways. The media plays an important role in depicting changes in the culture and promoting the values of a particular country on an international platform. Pakistani media is seen moving towards a more westernized approach. As a result of globalization, English language is becoming the lingua franca. It has already been the official language of Pakistan but its popularity is because of English and American television networks that broadcast their programs across the globe. Families prefer to live separately rather than as joint families, a tendency that suggests that Pakistani culture is now moving towards individualism. Gender roles seem to be changing and women rights have become an important matter of discussion and understanding as women in Pakistan strive to learn better and achieve more. Another important aspect of cultural change can be seen

23. PhD thesis, Aslam 2012.

in the everyday dress code of the Pakistanis (Shahzad, 2015)²⁴.

3.1 Impact of Globalization on Education

Since there is a separate chapter on the case of education in Pakistan in this book, we will highlight some points in changing the ideals in education in recent years. In a colonial historical perspective, there is much to be learned for Pakistan from the case study of Malaysia, also an Islamic nation state, and also previously a British colony. There are similar concerns of Muslim thinkers and scholars in both the countries on the change in the ideals of education over time and the impact that globalization is having on education over the decades.

According to Professor Razak:

The idea of having public schools was to see education as a means of transmitting knowledge, skills, expertise, values, civilization, language, culture, customs and religion from one generation to another. ...All these lofty ideals and ideas of education that started with the establishment of public schools are now being overshadowed or overridden by the relentless pounding waves of globalization... Though the old ideals of education are still there, much of today's perception on education and the reason why parents send their children to school have somehow been forgotten due to globalization and modern-day lifestyle. Living in a modern and globalized world, education is viewed as a passport for achieving a good life that promises material gains.

The original values of education are slowly vanishing. It is not wrong altogether to seek knowledge for material gains but the sole motivation to seek material gains through education and learning makes the seeker of knowledge less concerned for the community and the well-being of the nation state. People of a country become more individualized and egocentric if the true aims of education are missing. As for a nation, with the missing values and philosophy of education, it will fail in creating a common goal and national identity for its citizens.²⁵

24. Personal conversation with Professor with the author in his class (1999), how he turned down the request of Chief Marshal Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq when he was in power who wanted him to write the "Shalwar Kameez" as Islamic dress. Dani explained how it's a mix like our culture shalwar from Huns, dupatta from Kushans.

25. Abdul Razak, 2011, p281-282.

Similar views are expressed by Pakistani scholar (ex-Vice Chancellor of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics), Dr Asad Zaman, in his writings and presentations to students on the importance of reflecting and aiming on their higher goals in education and career beyond economic ends.²⁶ Pakistan currently has religious, national and international sectors and many issues that we face in the dual medium of instruction started during the "Islamization regime" of Martial Law Administrator, Zia-ul Haq (more ahead in language discussion). A latest study by teachers from these three different education sectors on their understanding of "Global curriculum of education" indicated conflicting agendas. They recommend that "creating common ideas within these different sectors of education is significant for developing sustainable peace within the divided society (Ashraf, Tsegay and Ning, 2021)

3.2 Education, Youth and Information Technology: Lahore Case Study: (a transformationalist view)

In an attempt to determine whether or not cultural globalization poses a threat to local cultures by rapid flow of alien values and ideas through information and communication technologies a study was conducted in urban Lahore (2013) to explore the knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of both genders towards culture and its influence on the values and culture of Pakistani society. The findings of the study showed that globalization increased job opportunities and improved the quality of people's life. According to this study in Lahore, sample information technology and communication technologies had improved the parent-child relationship and given a voice and autonomy to the Pakistani women. However, information and communication technologies led to a decline in Pakistani traditional moral values by spreading obscenity and negativity and made life costly and stressful (Kiyani, Ahmed, Saeed 2013). For the researcher, globalization, although complex with regard to its multifaceted ramification, their study supports transformationalist's position which synthesizes hyper globalists and skeptics' polar debate. Their findings revealed that most respondents believed that globalization had improved their life and created more opportunities for employment and opportunities in the market. Information and communication technologies had improved the relationship between individuals and increased the traditional parental control.

The role of the internet has played a positive role in bringing awareness and increased knowledge within the country and across the globe. The internet

26. See <https://asadzaman.net/> for body of his work.

and exposure to the media had given a strong social voice and autonomy to the Pakistani women. The governance improved due to the use of internet and mobile technology. Media and information have increased awareness about human rights and democracy. However, respondents were also concerned that modern technology (such as the internet, mobile, and cable TV) had made life costly and stressful. The increasing cultural flow seems to have threatened societal contexts and introduced various cultural traits alien to their native cultures. Lifestyles, media portrayals and contents shown in films could challenge the traditional values and moral standards of local cultures. An ethically responsible censorship code for the media and internet facilities were deemed necessary for the preservation of cultural identity. Sexual content in English and Indian movies had led to a decline in Pakistani traditional moral values by spreading obscenity and negativity, particularly among the youth. Some of their respondents felt that globalization was another version of Americanization of the Muslim culture and values. They believed Islamic values (such as respecting elders, compassion to children, honesty, truth, etc) were essential to preserve their cultural identity and keeping the society intact from alien cultural invasion (Kayani, Ahmad, Saeed, 2013).

3.3 Impact of Globalization on National and Regional Languages of Pakistan

Globalization has become so influential that English will overtake all other languages and, hence, all other cultures because "it is buttressed by the formidable panoply of the mass communication industry." (Dalby as cited in Morrison, 2002, p.26). The status of English as a global language has been well established and the universality of English is undisputed (Brut-Griffier, 2002, Cronin, 2003, Jerkins, 2003, Ulrich, 2003). According to Phillipson (2003), "English has been trespassing on the territories of some national languages like French, Swedish, Danish", Urdu, "and many other depriving them of many of their customary functions and rendering those languages as having second class status and leading to conflict between global and national interests at economic, political and educational levels".

Pakistan is a multilingual society with at least six major languages and 59 minor ones. The official language of Pakistan is English and the national language is Urdu. Over the past many years, as the system of government has become more centralized, regional dialects and minority languages have been dominated by the centrist dialects of the ruling parties. Urdu has given

way to English. Linguists concur that minority languages all over the world are giving way to more dominant languages, such as English and Spanish, etc. In the given diverse multilingual environment of Pakistan, the major reason for the extinction of small regional languages can be attributed to many factors: urbanization and adoption of the language of the powerful, lack of commitment on the part of the government, small number of speakers disinterested in its promotion and preservation and lack of documentation by the authorities concerned, etc. The pressures of globalization on minority languages is undeniable, and many may disappear but this trend towards the homogeneity of global culture has stimulated people to search for their native roots and maintain their cultural identity.

Globalization has fostered neo-colonization, i.e., dominance of English over national and regional languages of Pakistan. The current government has announced as of June 2021 that Urdu is the national and official language for the country. The decision to implement Urdu as the national and official language was decided in the Constitution of 1973, Article 251, but unfortunately the implementation was problematic. Let us hope the latest announcement by the Prime Minister on enforcing a Single National Curriculum (SNC)²⁷ will lead to better outcomes than what we experienced in the aftermath of Zia's "Islamization agenda" of partial implementation of Urdu medium schools.

3.4 The Partition Baggage and Language: Unchanged Colonial Mindsets

According to a Pakistani social linguist, Tariq Rehman in *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (2011), modern Urdu and Hindi both belong to a common language known as "Hindustani" or Hindvi or Old Urdu or "Urdu-Hindi." Rehman also illustrates that the colonial legacy lives on in South Asia today through the case of Urdu and Hindi language. He traces the departure of modern-day Urdu and Hindi back to when the British introduced the census, which required Muslims and Hindus to identify themselves. This was the origin of what we know today as the Hindi-Urdu controversy, according to Rehman. Consequently, at the official government level, efforts were made to revive and build on Hindi's devanagari roots in India and to not use the Persian script. On the other hand, in Pakistan, these efforts have been on removing words with Sanskrit origins from modern Urdu.

27. <https://pssr.org.pk/issues/v5/1/insightful-perspectives-about-effective-implementation-of-esl-single-national-curriculum-snc-in-pakistani-schools.pdf>

Unfortunately, the attempt to “Islamize” the educational system by enforcing Urdu as the medium of instruction by Zia-ul Haq in the public and model schools of Pakistan had a divisive role in society, accentuating the existing class divisions. The main reasons were the simultaneous sprouting of expensive English medium private schools for the elite as the means to ensure better jobs both home and abroad as even the local market remained unchanged from the British colonizer's times, favoring fluent English speakers. Meanwhile, this resulted in a fall in the standard of the model schools forced to enforce Urdu medium education.

3.5 Cultural Heritage Preservation and Globalization

The 1947 partition and consequent wars with India and the trauma of the loss of East Pakistan (1971) resulted in the emergence of a reactive culture, in opposition to its enemy neighbor India, and thus began the process of blocking composite histories and cultures shared over centuries, especially painful for the provinces like Punjab, Bengal and Kashmir divided into two. The post-1971 Pakistan needed healing and it came in the shape of a borrowed model of Islam, not integrated with the indigenous flavor of the land. As mentioned above, General Zia-ul-Haq imposed law and began his project of making Pakistan an “Islamic republic” but his version of Wahabi Islam was imported from the Middle East and didn't gel with the South Asian Islam²⁸.

Pakistan continues to struggle to bounce back in the aftermath of that decade of martial law when quick problematic enforcement of dogmatic laws was ensured. It was ill-conceived for the society, especially regarding women²⁹ and related issues, particularly intangible cultural heritage. Though many of those laws have been revised, the damage to the mindset done by this decade will take a very long time and consolidated effort to change.

For instance, Zia enforced a ban on all “dance” in the 1980s, not distinguishing between classical dance and mujrah, its deteriorated form taken up for men's entertainment and thus made dance a criterion of “vulgarity” in popular perception. Though the ban was removed a decade later, artists till only a few years ago had to get a “no-objection certificate” (NOC) with a statement

28. Historian Nile Green defines “Other Islams” referring to other than the Middle East, see work of Manchester School for more on how Islam has a distinct flavor around the world acquired according to the unique features of the region where it spread.

29. “Hudood Laws” implemented in that decade impacted women in both domestic and especially public domain.

declaring, "I will not indulge in any vulgar activity, such as dance" before each performance. Absence of state patronage for Pakistan's folk and classical performing arts on the one hand and globalization of media and music industry on the other has resulted in many contradictions and double standards in society; for instance Western style fashion shows with half naked women allowed for corporate interests and elite consumption, dance parties became a trend but the beautiful aesthetics and traditions of this land of classical music and dance were frowned upon and not considered a part of "Pakistani culture".

The author discussed this in the keynote address on: "Folkloristic Understanding of Nation Building"³⁰ organized by HSF-QAU. How, for Pakistan, that knowledge of our "roots" is indeed power and by owning, protecting and celebrating our inherited treasure of indigenous heritage, combined with the core reflective higher principles of Islam, can we best avail some benefits from the positive aspects of globalization?

3.6 Lessons from Islamabad's Bodhi Tree: A Reflective Conclusion

We find cultural globalization expert, Jan Nederveen Pieterse's idea of globalization as braiding or interlacing influences a useful starter to think through the impact of globalization on Pakistan's culture, particularly his discussion on the sensitive zone of cultural encounters between Islam and Europe:

The cultural friction between the West and Islam seems one of the most contrived and exaggerated cultural divides ever. What is striking, first, is that it is a recent cleavage which follows centuries and millennia of intermixture. What is often overlooked, too, is that the Islamic world is profoundly mixed, a middleman world that straddles geographic and civilizational spheres and combines, among others, Mesopotamian, Sumerian, Acadian, Nabatean, Arab, Bedouin, Persian, Hebrew, Phoenician, African, and Hellenic influences. The prophet most often mentioned in the Quran is Moses. Of course, Islam is steeped in the Hebrew and Christian traditions, and of course, Islam comes in many varieties — clerical and folk, urban and rural, Sufi and scriptural, Arab, Persian, Turkish, Berber, Indian, Malay, Chinese, African, European, and American.

30. HSF-QAU publication, Holtz 2020.

The Hellenic world — itself a composite, including many oriental influences — exercised a major influence on the Arab and Islamic world (Amin 1978). When the cosmopolitan worlds of Sanskrit and Latin receded and gave way to vernacular cultures (Pollock 1996, 2000), Arabic and the world of Islam succeeded in their place and, in time, extended beyond their reaches. The world of Islam became a cosmopolitan that bridged the ancients and the moderns and reached most continents (Nederveen Pieterse 2007, Kamali 2006 129).

Interestingly, Pieterse's analysis supports similar critique from within the Islamic scholarship of the selective history writing and occlusion of "Muslim globalization" mentioned early on in this chapter (Muzaffar, Zaman amongst others). Starting with Pieterse's premise that Islam is a good case study of "hybridization," we propose that for the case of Pakistan, instead of "braiding" more productive is the metaphor of a Bodhi Tree. Its roots, its indigenous pluralistic culture, the centuries-rich heritage that Dani points to in the previous section; its stem, the backbone of Pakistani society and the branches and stems are the visible culture of Islam. Pieterse' definition of hybridity paradigms don't fit in the complex scenario of Pakistan's case as reflected in a number of studies reviewed in this chapter. Instead, we prefer to view the complexity and grounded-ness of South Asian cultural civilizational heritage and identity with the metaphor of the beautiful and strong Bodhi Tree, abundantly found in and around the capital city of Islamabad.

The picture ahead is of one such tree unfortunately murdered by extremist elements in society in 2003 and is a harsh reminder for Pakistani of the high stakes of this work and the need to take urgent steps to protect, preserve and nurture the rare, assimilative and pluralistic treasure of its cultural and historical heritage. The picture was taken by a Japanese writer who knew the tree personally and revered it having lived in Islamabad briefly and we share an excerpt from a letter he wrote when he heard of its tragic fate and how it reminded him of Hiroshima. There is much to reflect here for getting lessons from cultural heritage preservation for Pakistan from a much-advanced neighbor, Japan, specializing in the former alongside disaster management and mitigation.³¹

31. Japan is forerunner in world in field of Cultural Heritage management and disaster management and mitigation studies. <https://www.preventionweb.net/event/unesco-chair-programme-cultural-heritage-and-risk-management-international-training-course-0>



Message of Islamabad's Bodhi Tree for Pakistan

Photo and letter by Tajima Shinji (Used with permission from Fauzia Minallah's book Glimpses into Islamabad's Soul).

"I was shocked to find the painful remains of the tree burnt and completely destroyed. It reminded me of Hiroshima, when not only tens and hundreds of people died and maimed, but 'nature' was destroyed. I was shocked to hear from my friend, that the tree was not burnt by natural causes such as lightening, but was burnt by people on purpose, because the students of the nearby Madrasah did not like the Buddhists coming here for meditation. I could not believe the hatred, which compels people to destroy nature. Nature is what we have to treasure and maintain. It has been alive for more than 1000 years and its trunk was as big as twelve adults stretching their arms together to hold a trunk. When the whole world is trying their best to sustain natural heritage, why could not we protect this Banyan tree, one of the greatest natural heritages of Pakistan?"

As I was walking besides the painful remains of the burnt tree, I found a small young bud coming up. It also resembled the people of Hiroshima, standing up again, after all the loss and misery of atomic bomb damage. I wished the young bud of the Banyan would grow big and remind us human beings of the meaning of peace, tolerance, and understanding. I wished the young bud of Banyan! Grow big for the future of children in Pakistan.³²

For this young bud to grow, and hopefully bear a uniquely and true Pakistani fruit, it will need constant protection and attention against both external and internal storms of extremism and harsh winds of change from globalization. In line with what we highlighted in the first two parts of this chapter, the key is to address first the inconsistent, contradictory and confused response of the Pakistani state to various cultural globalizations due to tensions within its national identity. In Air Commodore Shahid Latif Bajwa's words in *Globalization: Challenges for Pakistan* (NDU 2009):

On the one hand, Pakistan aspires to remain a modernizing Islamic democracy with a commitment to modern democratic freedom, on the other, theocratic tendency, inherent in its freedom movement and later co-opted in its constitutional and legal provisions by successive governments, requires a manifest adherence to Islamic law and morality.

While cultural globalization aims to push diverse cultures into a melting pot shaping these in such a manner that the culturally underprivileged groups are also able to play their role, there is a backlash against globalization from the cultural nationalists. For Islamists, globalization is a threat to the traditional family system which encourages women to seek independence from the closely-knit family system. For modernists, globalization is an opportunity to reshape Pakistan's cultural paradigm by breaking traditional taboos.³³

Regardless of which camp one aligns with, the Pakistani state and citizens both have important roles to play in nurturing its unique identity and culture and protecting it from strong winds of change and possible destruction. Though a number of useful recommendations for Pakistan are offered by Bajwa in his paper to infuse pride in the youth in their culture and promote it, and developing cultural heritage sites, and promotion of what he simply calls "own culture," he doesn't elaborate. That is precisely what we are unpacking here and arguing in this chapter as the first step towards understanding what

32. (Shinji in Minallah's book *Glimpses in the Soul of Islamabad*, 2007, p.139)

33. (Bajwa 2009, 47)

this culture actually is; to develop that pride through a holistic and inclusive learning of Pakistan's history. This requires teaching our youth and the next generation all parts of the history, accepting it, and the next step would be celebrating it. This way they will be well-equipped to counter both the extremist elements within and from the world as well. Whether to counter the challenges of globalization to Pakistan in order to reap any benefits that it offers, or protect its indigenous heritage from possible storms, Islamabad's Bodhi trees with their old but strong roots symbolic of Pakistan's assimilative synthesizing Gandharan culture have a lot to say.

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CHAPTER 6

The Place and Role of Pakistan in United Nations Organizations

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Abstract

Pakistan's relations with the UN can be classified into two broader domains: political and developmental. This chapter dwells on this taxonomy. Pakistan's political role in the UN aims at securing Pakistan's geo strategic interests in the world and securing a balance of power in South Asia. On the development side, Pakistan aligns itself with the UN SDGs that help it address its socio-economic problems. The discourse identifies two critical problems with regard to Pakistan's role and place in the UN. One, despite Pakistan's strenuous work in the UN organizations, the country has only partially been successful in gaining political advantages. Two, the UN development work in the country is underutilized. The chapter concludes that the country needs to undertake concerted efforts to benefit from its partnership with the UN.

1. Introduction

Pakistan is an active and committed member of the United Nations (UN). It participates in all the activities of UN's specialized agencies and organizations. It maintains a permanent mission to the UN in New York and in Geneva. It has energetically participated in discussions at the United Nations on a host of issues, including nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Security Council expansion, human rights, development, environment and climate change, and international law. Its active involvement in the UN peacekeeping operations is widely acclaimed. For years it was the largest troops-contributing state to the UN peace-keeping force. Pakistan is a beneficiary of billions of dollars of UN project funds annually in support of its national efforts to end poverty and address socio-economic challenges. The question is what defines Pakistan-UN relations?

For a deeper understanding of the place and role of Pakistan in the United Nations, Pakistan-UN relations can be classified into two broader domains: political and developmental. This chapter dwells on this taxonomy. Pakistan's political role in the UN aims at securing Pakistan's geo strategic interests in the world and securing a balance of power in South Asia region. On the development side, Pakistan aligns itself with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Table-1) that helps it address its socio-economic

problems.¹ The discourse identifies two critical problems with regard to Pakistan’s role and place in the UN. One, despite Pakistan’s strenuous work in the UN organizations, the country has only partially been successful in gaining political advantages. Two, the UN development work in the country is underutilized. In the SDGs 2021 Index, Pakistan is ranked at 129 out of 165 and its progress score is 57.72 per cent.² The chapter concludes that the country needs to undertake concerted efforts to benefit from its partnership with the UN. To this end, policy recommendations are given.

Table 6.1: UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	
No.	SDGs
1	No Poverty
2	Zero Hunger
3	Good Health and Well-being
4	Quality Education
5	Gender Equality
6	Clean Water and Sanitation
7	Affordable and Clean Energy
8	Decent Work and Economic Growth
9	Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure
10	Reduced Inequalities
11	Sustainable Cities and Communities
12	Responsible Consumption and Production
13	Climate Action
14	Life below Water
15	Life on Land
16	Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
17	Partnership for the Goals [SDGs]
Source: https://sdgs.un.org/goals	

1. In September 2015, the General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that includes 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on the principle of ‘leaving no one behind.’ This emphasizes a holistic approach to achieving sustainable development for all. Pakistan affirmed its commitment to SDGs as its own national development agenda through a unanimous National Assembly Resolution in 2016.

2. The overall score measures a country’s total progress towards achieving all 17 SDGs. <https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/rankings>



2. Pakistan's role in the UN: political relations

Pakistan made an impressive start in the United Nations. Muhammad Ali Jinnah outlined a clear vision for Pakistan in his February 1948 speech: "We believe in all principles of honesty and fairplay in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the UN Charter."³ Pakistan, under the dynamic representation of Zafarullah Khan, advocated the liberation of Kashmir, Libya, Northern Ireland, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Indonesia. Pakistan's vocal advocacy of the position of the Muslim world on the Palestinian issue, its continued projection of the cause of Afro-Asian states and support to their right to self-rule, its strong opposition to racial discrimination and the way it endorsed the admission of new members to the UN has won it universal approbation and recognition.

It was during the 1950s and 60s when Pakistan enjoyed the status of a champion for the causes of the developing countries and the Islamic world. Its consistent success in several elections to various UN bodies is a manifestation of this. However, this image dwindled in the post-1970 period. Several factors

3. Jamil-ud-din Ahmed (ed.), *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Volume II* (Lahore: Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf Press, 1976), pp. 463-64.

were responsible for this. India-Pakistan rivalry, the East Pakistan crisis, and subsequent disintegration of Pakistan, and more so, Pakistan’s support (for good or bad reasons) to the Mujahideen and Taliban for the past 40 years negatively impacted on the country’s image in the world as Pakistan came to be known as a state that was home of extremist forces, that projected radicalization and was involved in double play. Pakistan appeared to lose its clout in the UN. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s role in some of the key areas in the UN can hardly be undermined. Its contribution to the UN peace-keeping missions is particularly notable. It has also tried to secure its geo-strategic interests through its active participation in the deliberations on the issues of Security Council reforms, non-proliferation, and disarmament.

3. Peace-keeping operations: Pakistan’s strength at the UN

Pakistan has been the most consistent participant in the UN peace-keeping operations since the 1960s and for several years has been the largest troops contributor to peace-keeping missions.⁴ It believes that the UN peace-keeping operations are an important element of the UN’s responsibilities under its Charter for the preservation of international peace and security. It deployed its first-ever contingent in Congo in 1960. Pakistan has since participated in 41 peace-keeping missions in 23 countries, with over 160,000 peacekeepers, some deployed in most difficult and trying conditions (Table-II).⁵

Table 6.2: Pakistan’s contribution to the UN missions 1960-2018/19
United Nations Operation in Congo, 1960-64.
United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea, 1962-63.
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission, 1964.
United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia, 1989-90.
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, 1991 to date.
United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara, 1991 to date.
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 1992- 1993.
United Nations Operation in Somalia, 1992-1993.
United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia, 1992-1996.

4. At present it is the sixth largest troops contributing state to the UN peace-keeping missions.

5. <https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/detail/MTA4NQ==.html>

United Nations Operation in Somalia, 1993-95.

United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 1993-97.

United Nations Mission for Assistance in Rwanda, 1995-96.

United Nations Angola Verification Mission, 1995-97.

United Nations Mission in Haiti, 1995-97.

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, 1995 to date.

United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slovenia (UNTAES), 1996-97.

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 2000 to 2005.

United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) 1999-2010

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) 2007-to date

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) 2014- to date

Pakistan paid a heavy price for its contribution. Over the years, there have been 144 casualties, including 23 officers. Both its military and police personnel services and contributions have won recognition and international approbation. The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, visited Pakistan on its Independence Day in 2013. His words in praise of Pakistan's role in the UN peace-keeping missions are remarkable: "more than hundred countries contribute troops and police for the UN peace-keeping missions. Pakistan is number one. It is impossible to speak about the history of the UN peace-keeping without highlighting the country's contribution."⁶

Pakistan believes that the UN peace-keeping operations must have a clear political direction, a precise mandate, an effective command and control structure as well as a well-defined rules of engagement for every situation. Besides, it emphasizes a need to supplement UN peace-keeping efforts with diplomatic and political initiatives to address the root causes of conflicts which necessitate peace-keeping operations. Pakistan considers it important that the UN should develop a system of preventive diplomacy to address and intervene in a situation before the outbreak of a conflict. Moreover, it suggests sustained efforts for resolving political disputes by a frequent recourse to Chapter VI of the UN Charter which, inter alia, provides for

6. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/08/446652-un-chief-hails-pakistans-leading-role-peacekeeping-operations>

mediation, arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement of disputes and good offices.⁷

Pakistan was among the pioneers of the idea of a dedicated UN institutional mechanism for peace-building. In 2004, Pakistan first proposed the idea of ad-hoc composite committees with membership drawn from the principal organs, major troops-contributing countries, donors, and relevant UN agencies to address complex crises, particularly in Africa. Building on that, Pakistan actively participated in the discussions on the peace-building commission during the 2005 World Summit and the subsequent negotiations on and adoption of the General Assembly resolution (60/180) that sanctioned the establishment of a Peace-building Commission in 2005. The Commission's country-specific formats resemble closely with Pakistan's concept of ad-hoc composite committees. It also contributes to the UN Peace-building Fund.

4. Security Council reforms and expansion: Securing geo-strategic interests

Since the establishment of the UN in 1945, its membership has substantially increased from the original 51 states to 193 states today. Similarly, the scope of the UN programmes and activities has expanded considerably in response to the growing global interdependence. The present composition of the UN Security Council, with five permanent members and ten non-permanent members, therefore, does not correspond to the overall increased membership of the UN.

Pakistan has been actively and constructively participating in the deliberations of the Working Group to consider Security Council's expansion.⁸ It believes that the issue of reform and expansion of the UN Security Council is of vital importance and has far-reaching implications for the global political order.

7. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>

8. The UN General Assembly, at its 35th session held in 1980, decided to include the item of reform and expansion of the UN Security Council on its agenda. However, this agenda item continued to be deferred by the UN. General Assembly until its 47th session when the UN Secretary-General was requested to invite member states to submit written comments on a possible review of the Security Council's membership. At its 48th session held in 1993, the UN General Assembly decided to establish an Open-Ended Working Group to consider all aspects of the issue of increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council. This Working Group commenced its work in January 1994 and has continued to extensively deliberate upon this important question.

Pakistan has, therefore, supported the predominant view that this issue should only be finalized with the general consensus of the UN membership. It fully supported and endorsed the consensus resolution adopted by the 53rd Session of the UN General Assembly in December 1998. This resolution reiterated the importance of reaching a general agreement and indicated its determination not to adopt any resolution or decision on this issue without the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the UN membership. This resolution conforms to Article 108 of the UN Charter as well as the position taken by a large majority of member states and various groupings, such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the African Union (AU).

Pakistan is opposed to the concept of permanent membership as it is at variance with the principle of sovereign equality of all member states. Pakistan believes that Security Council should reflect the interests of the wider UN membership. It cannot be based on the objectives of power politics. Pakistan as part of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC)⁹ group has always advocated an effective and feasible reform of the Security Council reform based on a consensus among the UN Membership. It supports the General Assembly's decision 62/557¹⁰ to hold inter-governmental negotiations (IGN) on Security Council reform in a comprehensive and membership-driven nature.

Pakistan argues that inequity, which is inherent in the concept of permanent membership, should not be further augmented. That this would further proliferate the centres of privileges, create a new aristocracy and, in the process, alienate the small and medium-sized countries which constitute an overwhelming majority in the UN General Assembly. Pakistan is strongly opposed to the grant of permanent membership to any state which has not abided by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council. Pakistan is sensitive to India's bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council. It believes if India gets a permanent seat in the Council, it would 1) undermine Pakistan's position on the Kashmir and regional security issues, 2) make India more belligerent, 3) affect Pakistan's economic and financial position, and 4) disturb the balance of power in South Asia. India's continued propaganda

9. Uniting for Consensus (UfC), nicknamed the Coffee Club, is a movement that developed in the 1990s in opposition to the possible expansion of permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council. Under the leadership of Italy, it aims to counter the bids for permanent seats proposed by G4 nations (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) and is calling for a consensus before any decision is reached on the form and size of the Security Council.

10. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/decision-62-557.php>

for placing Pakistan on the grey list in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); and recently as a President of the Security Council its denial to invite Pakistan in the meeting on Afghanistan, a country where Pakistan is an important stakeholder, ratify Pakistan's concerns.¹¹

5. **Non-proliferation and disarmament: Securing a balance of power in South Asia**

Pakistan has always been sensitive to international non-proliferation concerns because of the arms race in South Asia. This was evident in several proposals made over the years after the 1974 Indian nuclear test to keep the region free of nuclear weapons. Pakistan's initiatives included a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia, a joint Pakistan-India declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, mutual inspection by Pakistan and India of each other's nuclear facilities, simultaneous adherence to the NPT by both countries and acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, the conclusion of a bilateral or regional test-ban treaty, and a proposal for a meeting to discuss conventional arms control and confidence-building measures and nuclear restraint to prevent possible nuclear escalation in South Asia. Not a single proposal made by Pakistan elicited a positive response from India. Out of strategic compulsions and in response to strong public sentiments on nuclear tests by India on May 11, 1998, Pakistan decided to conduct nuclear tests on May 28 and 30, 1998 to establish deterrence in the region.

While existing challenges to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime remain unaddressed, some new challenges have emerged. Pakistan officially maintains that cooperative multilateralism, underwritten by the time-tested instruments of diplomacy and dialogue, represents the best way forward in addressing old and new challenges. It shares the concerns arising from the potential misuse of WMD materials and technologies by non-state actors. Pakistan is part of global efforts and processes to establish effective barriers against this common threat.

The on-going growth and sophistication in several types of technologies has added further complexity to the disarmament and non-proliferation discourse and institutions. The increasing reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles,

11. <https://news.abplive.com/news/world/closest-neighbour-pak-slams-india-for-not-inviting-to-unscc-meet-on-afghanistan-situation-1474785>

deployment of missile defence systems, and hostile use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) require responses in view of their potentially negative impact on global peace and security.

Excessive production and proliferation of some conventional weapons has understandably caused a great degree of unease in the international community. Pakistan supports efforts that seek to promote a comprehensive reform and regulation of the entire cycle of global trade in conventional arms.

It is ironic that Pakistan could not capitalize on its active and acclaimed contribution to the UN post-independence period. Its continued sacrifices in peace-keeping operations and in the US-led war on terrorism have not won it recognition for its foreign policy objectives and peace characterization of Pakistan. It is frequently tagged with nuclear weapons, terrorism, security, conservative Islam, radicalization and the Taliban. Pakistan, in essence, needs to defy a narrow definition of its national interests that project the defensive form of Pakistani nationalism and reframe its international identity. Pakistan's current mode of foreign policy, driven solely by the demands of a perceived external security threat, largely from India, is unsustainable. Pakistan requires redefining its security perception that is inclusive of the changes taking place at the international level.

6. The UN's role in Pakistan: development relations

The United Nations' programs in Pakistan support national efforts to end poverty, address socio-economic challenges, raise the living standards, bring transparency to legal system and other institutions, and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The promotion of human rights and equality cut across all UN programs. The UN works closely with the government, civil society organizations and humanitarian partners in the country through its 20 agencies working across the country:

1. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
2. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
3. International Labour Organization (ILO)
4. International Organization for Migration (IOM)
5. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
6. UN Habitat

7. UN Women
8. UNAIDS
9. United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
10. United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
11. UNFPA-UN Population Fund
12. UN Information Centre (UNIC)
13. United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF)
14. United Nations Industrial Development Fund (UNIDO)
15. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
16. United Nations Office on Drug Crimes (UNODC)
17. United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
18. United Nations Volunteers (UNV)
19. World Food Program (WFP)
20. World Health Organization (WHO)

At present, the United Nations Sustainable Development Framework for Pakistan (UNSDF), also known as the Pakistan One United Nations Programme III (OP III) 2018-2022, articulates the collective vision and response of the UN system to Pakistan's national development priorities.¹² This medium-term strategic planning document is closely aligned with Pakistan's national development plan, Vision 2025, and reflects Pakistan's commitment to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). OP III highlights activities to be implemented in partnership with the government of Pakistan as well as in close cooperation with international and national partners and civil society.

Over the years, the UN has carried out significant activities in Pakistan, effectively contributing to skills development programs, development of natural resources, establishing healthcare and education. Given space limitation, the subsequent section defines briefly the ongoing work of some of those UN agencies which address the most pressing problems of the country. This is not to refute the significance of any. For a policy planning, it is

12. ONE UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME III 2018-2022, UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK FOR PAKISTAN <https://pakistan.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/UNDAF-OPIII-v9.pdf>

imperative that the concerned authorities ascertain the work of the respective agencies and consolidate their partnerships with them for better outcomes.

6.1 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)

The Food and Agriculture Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations that leads international efforts to defeat hunger. It is collaborating with Pakistan under the Pakistan Country Programming Framework (CPF) 2018-2022. The CPF has three priority areas which are zero hunger, healthy, safe and nutritious food for all, climate smart resilient agriculture and sustainable ecosystems, including forests, fisheries, livestock, rangeland and water management and inclusive and efficient agriculture and food systems. The FAO is implementing a wide range of development and emergency assistance projects in Pakistan which are funded by organization's own funds, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and governments, and the government of Pakistan (Table –III).

Table 6.3: FAO ongoing projects in Pakistan

No.	Project	Total FAO contribution in US dollars*	Partner Organizations	Alignment to SDGs
1	Feasibility Study and Piloting of Farming of new Shrimp/ Prawn and Fish species in Punjab and Sindh Provinces	195,000	-----	1, 14
2	Restoration of Livelihoods in FATA (Phase II)	4.9 million	Japan International Cooperation Agency-JICA	1, 2, 6, 13
3	Restoration of Livelihoods in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts	13.38 million	DFID	1, 2, 5, 13, 15

4	Technical support for designing Agriculture and Natural Resource Management (ANR) related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) programmes/ plans	50,000	TCP	2
5	Restoring Subsistence and Commercial Agriculture in FATA	10 million	USAID	1,2,5,13,15
6	Support in Implementing the Agriculture and Livestock Policies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	50,000	-----	1,2
7	Support to develop a National Policy and Implementation Plan for Fisheries & Aquaculture sector	68,000	-----	2
8	FAO's Technical Assistance to the UK/DFID-funded "Building Disaster Resilience in Pakistan" Programme	3,901,170	UK-DFID	2
9	Multi-Year Humanitarian Program (MYHP)	6,703,725	DFID	1,2,5,8,13
10	The Australia Balochistan Agri Business program (AusABBA II)	16.9 million	Australian Government (DFAT)	2,5,8

11	The Alternative Livelihood Option Project explores potential alternative livelihoods options in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by engaging the communities to develop agricultural value chains by increasing capacities of value chain actors, service providers, and prom	793 000	U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)	1,2,8
12	The Horticultural Advancement Activity (THAZA)	16.2 million	USAID	1,2,8

Source: <http://www.fao.org/pakistan/programmes-and-projects/project-list/en/>

6.2 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

IFAD is committed to combat rural poverty by promoting integrated participatory rural development. It is currently carrying out twenty-eight projects in Pakistan with its contribution of 796.59 million dollars.¹³ These country programs are evolving and are aligned with the government's development and policy agenda. Four major projects are highlighted in Table-IV. IFAD intends to leverage national and other development resources in the pursuit of province-wide and programmatic approaches under a strategy of transitioning the ultra-poor through proven graduation models centered on women and youth and promoting value chain-centered small-holder agriculture development in partnership with the private sector.

As a complement to these strategic directions, the ongoing and pipeline projects are facilitating and promoting housing security and asset transfers for vulnerable groups, skills development (including vocational training), and enterprise and value-chain development. These also pursue access to financial services and financial inclusion.

13. <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/operations/w/country/pakistan>

Table 6.4: IFAD ongoing projects in Pakistan

No	Project	Total IFAD Funding in USD	Partner Organizations	Alignment to SDGs
1	Gwadar-Lasbela Livelihoods Support Project II Cost: 72.80 Million dollars	63.16 million	National Government	1, 2
2	National Poverty Graduation Programme Cost: 149.80 Million dollars	82.6 million	National Government	1
3	Economic Transformation Initiative - GilgitBaltistan Cost: 120.15 Million dollars	67 million	National Government	9, 11
4	Southern Punjab Poverty Alleviation Project Cost: 195.12 Million dollars	104.57 million	National Government	1

Source: <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/operations/w/country/pakistan#anchor-2>

6.3 International Labour Organization (ILO)

ILO activities in the country are guided by Pakistan Decent Work Country Programme III (2016–2020). It has been a joint effort of the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development (MOP&HRD), the Employers' Federation of Pakistan (EFP) and the Pakistan Workers' Federation (PWF) with support from the ILO country office. Initial tripartite consultations were held in Islamabad in May 2004 and the first DWCP was finalized in September 2005, covering the period 2006 – 2009. Similarly, the second DWCP was prepared and implemented through 2010 to 2015. The current

DWCP was originally designed for 2016-2020 but has been extended to 2022 in order to align with the on-going United Nations Sustainable Development Framework 2018-2022.

The ILO is a pro-active member of the One UN Reform Programme for “Delivering as One” in Pakistan. It works with other UN system entities, multi- and bilateral agencies and non-governmental and civil society organizations to contribute to the national economic and social development objectives and international commitments, such as the SDGs and other international instruments. Its work in Pakistan has ranged from supporting the ratification of International Labour Standards to labour policy formulation, labour administration, labour and employment/industrial relations, occupational safety and health, social security, employable skills and vocational training, workers education, women workers rights, gender equality and non-discrimination at the workplace, elimination of child labour, prevention and elimination of bonded labour, migration, rural infrastructure and livelihood recovery.

6.4 International Organization for Migration (IOM)

The International Organization for Migration has an extensive presence throughout Pakistan, with its main office in Islamabad and sub-offices in Lahore, Mirpurkhas, Karachi and Peshawar. At the request of the government of Pakistan, it initiated its activities in Pakistan in 1981 to support the influx of Afghan migrants into the country. Pakistan has been a member state of IOM since 1992, and in October 2000 the government of Pakistan and IOM signed a cooperation agreement. In line with its global priorities, and in coordination with the government of Pakistan, IOM implements a broad range of projects in Pakistan related to migration management, migration health, resettlement and reintegration, disaster risk reduction, resilient recovery following disasters, capacity development and community stabilization.

6.5 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

OCHA's involvement in Pakistan began in 1987 when an office was set up in Peshawar to support the organization's Afghanistan operations. This office was moved to Afghanistan in 2003. An office was officially established in Pakistan in 2005 to respond to the devastating earthquake in the north. OCHA's presence was scaled back in the ensuing years but the organization re-established an office in 2009 to assist over 3 million people displaced

by insecurity in the north-west. When the monsoon floods struck in 2010, OCHA established cluster-based coordination structures due to the scale of the emergency. OCHA established field coordination offices and extended its reach into the worst-affected districts. Devastating flooding reoccurred in August 2011 and in September 2012.

OCHA brings together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies in Pakistan and to establish a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort. OCHA continues to deliver its core functions, such as operational coordination, humanitarian financing, advocacy and information management in response to the humanitarian needs in Baluchistan and Sindh.

6.6 UN-Habitat

The current UN Habitat Country Program (HCP), Pakistan 2018-2022 has been prepared in consonance with the Pakistan Vision 2025, United Nations Sustainable Development Framework (UNSDF), One UN Programme (OP-III) and New Urban Agenda. It lays down the roadmap for achieving Sustainable SDGs in general and SDG 11 that aims to make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable.

The key objectives of the Habitat Country Programme, Pakistan 2018-2022 are:

- To promote socio-economic growth and eradication of poverty through enhancing municipal finance and turning local assets into economic drivers
- improve access to affordable housing, energy, water and sanitation and other basic services
- develop policies and regulatory instruments for sustainable urbanization
- reduce the impact of disasters and climate change on human settlements for inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable development
- The HCP is meant to operationalize the program objectives over the period of four years (2018-2022) in the following seven thematic areas (Table V):
 - Urban policies, legislation, land and governance
 - Urban planning and design
 - Urban economy

- Urban basic services
- Housing and slum upgrading
- Risk reduction and rehabilitation
- Research and capacity development

Table 6.5: UN Habitat Ongoing Projects

No	Projects	Donor	Alignment to SDGs
1	Enhance community, local and national-level urban climate change resilience to water scarcity, caused by floods and droughts in Rawalpindi and Nowshera, Pakistan	Adaptation Fund Board	6, 7, 11, 13
2	Project on Improvement of Disaster Resilient School Infrastructure	Japan International Cooperation Agency	11, 13
3	Development of enabling environment for urban low emission development under Paris Agreement	South Korea East-West Power Project	11
4	Implementation of Waste Wise Cities Tool in Karachi, Pakistan	-----	6, 11

Source: <http://unhabitat.org.pk/projects/>

6.7 UN Women

Pakistan has adopted a number of key international commitments to gender equality and women's human rights – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Beijing Platform for Action, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Sustainable Development Goals.

The national commitments in place include a National Policy for Development and Empowerment of Women, Protection against the Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences in the name or pretext of honour) Act, Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences Relating to

Rape) and a National Plan of Action on Human Rights. Local commitments include Gender Equality Policy Frameworks and Women's Empowerment Packages and Initiatives.

Despite these commitments, Pakistan's ranking for gender equality remains one of the lowest in the world, i-e 153rd out of 156 countries.¹⁴ With gender equality and women's empowerment being at the heart of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN Women in Pakistan is working with its partners to ensure:

- an enabling environment to translate, monitor and report on implementation of gender equality and women's empowerment commitments
- gender responsive plans, policies and systems of governance with institutions being more accessible to and delivering equally for women and girls
- an environment where women benefit from decent work, income security and socio-economic development
- a safe environment where women and girls can live a life free from violence in private and public spaces and survivors are able to access quality essential services.

6.8 United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

The UNDP is working with the government of Pakistan, civil society, national partners and the people of Pakistan to help find solutions to its persistent development challenges (Table-VI). It works to build lasting institutional capacity, provide technical expertise to improve development outcomes and help link the government and the people of Pakistan to innovative global solutions in areas, such as improved data quality and collection, better environmental management, climate change finance and adaptation, strong and accountable governance mechanisms and capacities to respond effectively to conflict and disasters.

14. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2021.pdf

Table 6.6: UNDP's Ongoing Projects in Pakistan

No	Projects	UNDP Funding	Alignment to SDGs
1	Institutional Support to Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation – II	3.56 million	1,12,13,15
2	Eco-Tourism & Camping Villages Project	483,267	
3	Youth Empowerment Programme	2.04 million	8, 16
4	Policy Support Programme	3.78 Million	10, 17
5	Improvement of Central Karakoram National Park (CKNP) Management System as Model for Mountain Ecosystems in Northern Pakistan	50,00K	1, 2, 13
6	Stabilisation and Development Programme (SDP)	No data available	1
7	Merged Areas Governance Project	100.00K	10, 16
8	Reforms And Innovation In Government For High Performance	1.37 million	10, 16
9	Strengthening Electoral and Legislative Processes	1.97 million	10, 16
10	Supporting Rule of Law for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies in Pakistan (Amn- o-Insaf)	4.86million	5, 16,
11	Policy support for mainstreaming the Sustainable Development Goals in Pakistan	1.74 million	10, 17

12	Decentralization, Human Rights and Local Governance (DHL)	3.35 million	1, 10, 16
13	New World: Community Stewardship and Water Replenishment for Drinking and Hygiene	3.56 million	1, 12, 13, 15
14	Sustainable Energy For All (SE4ALL)	Worked under project-1	
15	New World: "Zindagi " Inclusive Sustainable Human Development Initiatives (3rd Generation)	Worked under project-1	
16	Scaling-up of Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) risk reduction in Northern Pakistan	Other	1, 12, 13, 6
17	Snow Leopard and Ecosystem Protection Programme	Other	13
18	Comprehensive Reduction and Elimination of Persistent Organic Pollutants in Pakistan	525,24K	12,13,15
19	Institutional Strengthening Project for the Implementation of Montreal Protocol - Phase IX	No data available	15
20	Sustainable Land Management Programme to Combat Desertification in Pakistan (SLM) - Phase II	476.92K	12, 13, 15
21	Governance of Climate Change Finance to Benefit the Poor and Vulnerable in South Asia	3.56 million	1, 12, 13, 15

22	Disaster Risk Reduction Programme	1.94 million	1, 12, 13, 15
23	Sustainable Forest Management	385.41K	12,13,15

Source: <http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/projects.html>

6.9 United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF)

UNICEF supports the government of Pakistan to accelerate progress for children, work to achieve SDGs and help children realize their rights under the Convention on the Rights of Children. This is possible only through strong partnerships with provincial authorities, teachers and health professionals, frontline workers and social mobilisers, communities and families, and the children and adolescents themselves. UNICEF is trying to ensure that:

- every child survives and thrives — being in good health, immunised, protected from polio and accessing nutritious food
- every child learns
- every child is protected from violence and exploitation and registered at birth
- every child lives in a safe and clean environment, with access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation

6.10 World Health Organization (WHO)

As the lead health agency, the WHO works with different partners to support the government of Pakistan to achieve universal health coverage and the sustainable development goals. These partners include United Nations agencies and other signatories to the 'global action plan for healthy lives and well-being' – UNICEF, United Nations Population Fund, World Food Program, UNAIDs and United Nations Development Fund, World Bank, Global Fund, Global Financing Facility, and other donors and academic institutions.

The WHO has provided a wide range of technical support to Pakistan for strengthening health services, addressing public health issues and supporting and promoting research on health issues. The major areas of WHO collaboration with the government of Pakistan are based on the following triple billion goals to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages:

- One billion more people to benefit from universal health coverage
- One billion more people better protected from health emergencies
- One billion more people enjoying better health and well-being¹⁵

A host of structural weaknesses undermine UN agencies' role in Pakistan and its potential remains underutilized. To identify corruption is just the beginning and the problems go beyond that. Structural weaknesses within the country tend to dilute the thrust. The country's institutions lack both physical and digital infrastructure and the capacity to utilize foreign funding in a proficient way. There is poor implementation of agreements and at times the state lacks the political will to come under binding commitments. In case of ILO for example, Pakistan has accepted obligations under the eight fundamental conventions against forced labor: on the right to unionise, on the right to collective bargaining, on equal remuneration, on the abolition of forced labour, against discrimination in employment/ occupation, on minimum age, and against the worst form of child labour. However, the state has never fully implemented the fundamental conventions and the unions have been agitating for due compliance. Pakistan has only signed 36 ILO conventions out of 190 and ratified only 30.¹⁶ The ILO conventions and its 206 recommendations are of considerable importance to the workers but it awaits government's active interest.¹⁷

In addition to this, there is an improper dissemination of information about the UN's involvement in the country due to which its benefits do not reach all sections of the society. And no less important is the fact that Pakistan-UN relations suffer from neglect in the academic discourse and, therefore, the subject does not evoke informed intellectual debates, except when there is some topical issue. That is why we seriously lack literature that can be helpful in shaping Pakistan's policy with regards to the UN.

There is a tendency to term the UN a failure because it has not been able to resolve political disputes. This is partly a result of global power politics that dominates the UN's capability to work and partly due to lack of binding institutional mechanisms that limit its capacity to act. However, its

15. <https://portal.who.int/triplebillions/>. Almost 6 million people are covered under this program. See <https://portal.who.int/triplebillions/PowerBIDashboards/UniversalHealthCoverage>

16. I.A Rehman, 'The ILO and Pakistan,' Dawn, 17 January 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1458080>

17. Reasons for this lackluster response lie in the feudal political structure of the state that it has been unable to dismantle.

effectiveness in other fields can hardly be undermined. Pakistan is sure to gain enormously in the areas apart from politics if it intensifies its efforts to make most of the vast scope of the UN. Pakistan's most projected foreign policy shift from geo-politics to geo-economics perhaps is required more in case of the UN, an approach that must embrace the needs of human development as the basis of domestic and foreign policies.

7. Policy Recommendations

Pakistan is at present faced with two sets of problems. One is its acute financial crisis and the resultant socio-economic problems. The other is emanating from the regional political change. The UN agencies might be very helpful for Pakistan in addressing these problems and challenges. For instance, the IOM and OCHA must be engaged properly by the government to address the refugee-related issues. The UN Women and UNICEF are highly relevant in solving the women and children-related problems. Their funding and research capabilities can help the government and society cope with the toxic situation Pakistan is faced with. The WHO, over the period, has been very helpful for Pakistan and in this COVID crisis its support has been very useful. The UN Habitat, WFP, UNDP and the like are of enormous efficacy for Pakistan. Its active partnership with the UN agencies may be utilized to garner international support and trust for Pakistan that is the need of the hour.

Pakistan is required to make concerted efforts to extract maximum advantage from its political role in the UN and latter's development role in the country. A few following recommendations might give some pointers:

- The government should meticulously generate infrastructure capacity and a fool-proof system for funds utilization. It is noted in many cases that the funds lapse because of the absence of physical and digital infrastructure needed for resource utilization.
- A sound mechanism for proper coordination between the centre and provincial governments and UN agencies should be established for proper planning and implementation of the agreed proposals. The establishment of the UN information centre in Islamabad, along with its provincial chapters across the countries that disseminate updated information about Pakistan-UN activities, may also work.

- The above coordination mechanisms should not only be for the government but also for the UN agencies. In fact, all the development work and the local and foreign funding in this regard need to be coordinated well. Only such coordination can bring tangible results.
- Academic and policy research should be encouraged and sponsored by UN-Pakistan partnerships in different areas. This will generate literature for policy planning. Pakistan is a lot to gain from its partnership with the UN, provided it takes the right direction.

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CHAPTER 7

Emigration from Pakistan:

How influential is the diaspora?

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Abstract

Pakistan is ranked among the top 10 emigration countries, the second largest in South Asia (The World Population Review 2021). As of September 2021, Pakistan's Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) states that 11.49 plus Pakistanis live abroad for jobs and have a permanent or temporary resident status. With this huge number of emigrants, Pakistanis form a big diaspora. This chapter tries to give answers of a few fundamental questions: a) Where do the bulk of Pakistani emigrants go? b) Which labor market do they join in foreign lands? and c) To what extent is the Pakistani diaspora influential in the host countries?

The chapter also discusses the state of emigrants and their level of integration and contradiction while interacting with the host societies in three major regions — the Middle East, UK/Europe and US/Canada and the West together. This chapter also critically analyses whether labour export is serving the cause of promoting Pakistan as a vibrant diaspora or is causing a brain drain?

1. Introduction

The World Population Review 2021 ranks Pakistan among the top 10 emigration countries, the second largest in South Asia, based on the number of Pakistanis living abroad, predominantly residing in the Middle East, Europe and the United States with minor numbers in other parts of the world. These three major regions play a key role in regional and global arenas and Pakistani diaspora there is largely integrated into these societies depending upon their period of stay and status of the emigration — citizenship, resident permit or temporary work permits and others.

As of September 2021, Pakistan's Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) states that 11.49 plus Pakistanis are living abroad for job and on permanent or temporary resident status.

The OEOE in its employment analysis report 2020 quotes from the global migration data that 63.5 percent of the migrant population living abroad (other than their own countries) are there for employment purposes while the rest of the 36.5 percent have either acquired citizenship or resident

permits for various reasons, including those who are residing there as refugees or asylum seekers. This global trend may also reflect in Pakistani diaspora abroad.

The Pakistanis living in foreign countries are vibrant in their respective societies, whether they are employed at foreign companies, doing their own business or rendering services. Those having permanent residency status and citizenship of foreign countries, especially the United States, Europe and Britain, play their roles in their societies while being fully integrated into their respective societies. In the United Kingdom, Pakistanis are holding important political positions in the parliament and cabinet, including the two-time mayorship of London by a Pakistani, Sadiq Khan.

There are many Pakistanis who are members of parliament in the European countries, the European Union, the UK and the United States. As compared to the UK, the US and Europe, Pakistanis living in the Middle East do not have any role in the local politics because they do not hold the citizenship status as they do in the Western countries. In the West, a majority of Pakistanis, while being integrated into those societies to the required extent, are reported to have been keeping their Muslim and Pakistani identities intact while in the Middle East, due to the predominant Muslim culture, they do not need to separately maintain their Muslim identity though they do maintain their Pakistani identity while living with a large number of other South Asians in the region. A sizeable population of Pakistanis in their global role while working with the United Nations, its agencies, International financial institutions and other global institutions also live in the countries around the world. They do play their role in global governance and financial and environmental arenas.

2. Impacts and challenges of COVID-19 restrictions

Though the trend of emigration from Pakistan picked up very quickly once the COVID19 travel restrictions eased in the Gulf states and the rest of the world, this cannot be ignored that the COVID-19 lockdowns and travel bans caused trouble for Pakistani labour in various countries; some of them whose contracts were either suspended or were near expiry and they lacked resources to survive in the host countries opted to return to the country. The returnees felt that their dreams were shattered and they returned to their country with literally nothing or little in their hand. Thousands of them had to seek support of International Organization of Migration (IOM) and other agencies for their rescue to the home country. This sort of COVID-19-led

forced migration back to Pakistan caused hardship for the returnees and their dependents in Pakistan. Their sudden departure and economic woes made it difficult to reintegrate as the returnees at the time of evacuations had not reached the level of economic self-sufficiency and upon their return their social stability within their communities was marred by the pandemic-riddled situation. They lost their income overseas and upon their return to the country they did not find any job or livelihood options and, hence, they had to spend their savings and plan re-emigrate either to the countries they had been living in or to some other destinations for seeking jobs. There will be a new start for most of them who in their earlier tenure of overseas employment were integrated in their country of work.

They have to face new challenges amid the new normal work situations in the foreign countries. Those who returned to Pakistan with economic sustainability and have had enough to re-migrate to their original or other host countries planned their re-emigration.

3. Quantum and State of Pakistani Emigrants Abroad

The Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) data says the number of Pakistanis registered for overseas employment dropped from 600,000 emigrants in 2019 to 224,705 in 2020 due to COVID-19 travel restrictions but the State Bank of Pakistan's data reports that, surprisingly, the remittances were increased to US\$25.963 billion in 2020 from US\$22.124 billion in 2019 due to Pakistani banks' Digital Roshan Account operation facilities and digital transactions from overseas Pakistanis to their families, friends and relatives bearing the brunt of COVID-19.

The Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE)'s data only talks about those Pakistani emigrants who have been registering with them since 1971 onwards to go abroad for work purposes. There were a large number of Pakistanis living in foreign countries even before 1971 with their third generation that had grown up in their countries of residence. The actual number of Pakistanis living abroad may be much higher than the reported 11.492476 million registered with the BEOE from 1971 to September 2021.

According to the BEOE 2021 data, out of 11.492476 million registered overseas Pakistanis, 11 million live in six Middle East countries: Saudi Arabia (5.698369), United Arab Emirates (3.932458), Oman (0.822389), Qatar (0.217007), Bahrain (0.189293) and Kuwait (0.185150). The remaining

0.492476 live in the rest of the world. The trends in registration for overseas employment show that all the 11 million emigrants went to the Middle East for work as there was no provision to get citizenship status while the number of emigrants who went to the West for work are marginal as only high-tech professionals: doctors, engineers, Information Technology experts, and a few academics could get jobs there and have been registered with the BEOE. The number of registered (for work) Pakistanis who have been in the West are reported to have been a fraction of the number of Pakistanis living in the West with citizenship, permanent residence, spouse or social partner visas, refugees or asylum-seeker status.

To support this argument, the BEOE data from 1971 to September 2021 confirms that the Pakistani workers registered with the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment who have gone to the United States are 6741 emigrants while they are 15831 in the United Kingdom, 1181 in Germany, 558 in Greece, 28596 in Italy and a few hundred in the rest of Europe. These figures do not match the actual number of Pakistanis living in the West.

Migration, whether regular or irregular, is a reality though it has been affected largely over the last two years due to COVID-19 pandemic but it goes unabated otherwise and still the number started increasing since the opening up of travel in 2021. Migration is a global phenomenon and has multiple reasons which prompt people to migrate from their own place to other places within or outside their country of birth and residence. As discussed above, the policy framework in Pakistan dealing with migration somehow lacks strength amid a dearth of evidence-based data on emigration/migration (in full) from Pakistan to the rest of the world. Only those who are registered with the BEOE are reported as emigrants while those who do not fall under the purview of the BEOE are left unaccounted for.

The preparation and implementation of effective migration and reintegration policies in Pakistan are currently very difficult due to unavailability and scarcity of a sound evidence-based database (Zeeshan and Sultana 2020).

A major chunk of Pakistanis lives in the Middle Eastern countries/the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. As the above quoted data of BEOE (2021) says that out of 11.492476 million registered overseas Pakistanis, 11 million live in six Middle Eastern countries and the remaining 0.492476 live in rest of the world. In the West, Pakistanis either hold dual citizenship or single citizenship of the Western countries but hardly a few thousand Pakistanis would be lucky enough to get citizenship of the Middle Eastern countries as

they do not allow citizenship to foreigners. Their migration is characterized by a temporary status which disallows migrants to settle down permanently (Errichiello and Nyhagen 2021).

The sense of belonging is constructed beyond the legal status, formal membership and material resources, or beyond the rules and structures of the migration context. This practice of family separation in the UAE is dictated by two mechanisms. Firstly, there is a minimum wage required to sponsor family members. The UAE regulations stipulate that individuals working in the private and public sector should have a monthly salary of US\$1,100 or US\$820 plus accommodation in order to sponsor family members. Secondly, the cost of living in the UAE had traditionally prohibited low-salaried migrants from bringing their families to the UAE, especially those from countries where there is free or inexpensive access to education and healthcare, both of which are costly in the UAE. (Charles 2021). They have their own difficulties as they report that the initial terms and conditions of their employment are not adhered to while they land in the country of employment. In the Middle East, they have to work under the supervision of a local national. Now the UAE is introducing new rules to relax the emigration regime free of the control of 'Kafeel' (the local guarantor).

In a highly technically advanced country, South Korea, Pakistani emigrants do not possess much technical expertise; they are largely unskilled workers, small merchants, restaurant owners and workers. There are a number of students who have a potential to grow in the technically advanced environment as they are studying technology and other subjects. Moreover, there are some Pakistani refugees in South Korea. They are not only excluded formally (legalization) and informally (racism, discrimination) on the basis of their migration status but also on the basis of their distinct Muslim identity. Some Pakistanis who got married to South Korean nationals are naturalized and somehow better placed, still they are not integrated into the society. Since Pakistan and South Korea are entering into a new phase of economic cooperation, there is a great hope that this may increase the influx of Pakistani emigrants, though temporarily, to South Korea but this cannot be predicted that it may lead to increase in a permanent settlement of Pakistanis on a large scale in South Korea (Shahzad and Lee 2020).

Similarly in Japan, Pakistani emigrants are less in numbers and are not very influential. Most of them have their status similar to what they have in South Korea. Pakistani emigrants have gone to China in a large number in recent years. Pakistani students are in bigger numbers in China than any other

country as China gave over 20,000 scholarships to the Pakistani students. In South East Asia, Pakistani emigrants in Malaysia are doing well while in Indonesia they are not very visible and in Thailand, they are doing businesses. In Thailand, there were a large number of temporary emigrants before COVID-19 and most of them are engaged in businesses.

Before 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, there was a trend of Pakistani emigrants going to the United States. But the incident created a resistance against accepting Muslims and Pakistani emigrants into the United States. Islamophobia, racism and exclusion have increased, impacting the Muslim identity and community (Fijac and Sonn 2004). A majority of Muslims of the Arab and Pakistan origins, including the veiled women experienced discrimination, hate and violence in the United States. They underwent economic and social deprivation and were treated as other economically underprivileged minorities are treated, such as Hispanic and African-Americans do (Mohammad-Arif 2009).

A majority of Pakistanis who are now American citizens still hold their Pakistani identity — whether they are living with foreign spouses and children or with Pakistani spouses and children. These first and second-generation Pakistanis observe mixed cultural traditions, though to some extent, they are dominated by Pakistani traditions. They retain their ethnic identity and adhere to the norms and values of their native country, though sometimes with some colour of the American society while they socialize with Americans hailing from other origins. Amid a kind of social construction of inter-ethnic solidarity and social integration, they still behave as more Pakistanis than Americans (Shahzad and Lee 2020). Almost a similar model can be applied to the Pakistanis living in Europe, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. They live in the West but they still maintain their identity as Pakistanis. Hence, they represent the country and its traditions, though with a limited influence in the host societies.

In the West, however, Pakistanis have complained of discrimination since 9/11 and ever-increasing incidence of violence in some European cities and the UK. The British Pakistanis have often been the focus of concern over integration, which heightened after the Bradford riots in 2001 and intensified amid the anxiety over extremism in the name of religious in Britain. A study on 'Marriage, Migration and Integration' shows that some British Pakistani women marry a migrant for personal freedom rather than a transnational marriage being a sign of traditionalism or creating more patriarchal domestic relationships (Charsley, Bolognani et al. 2020).

There were approximately 0.208 million Pakistani natives residing in the United Kingdom in 2020 (Statista 2020). The British Pakistanis are eight times more likely to be the victims of racist attacks as compared to a white individual. The probabilities of a Pakistani being racially attacked in a year are more than four percent which is the highest rate in the country (Khan, Khan et al. 2012).

Pakistanis, who have established themselves as British citizens, will never abandon their British nationality. They prefer to remain British as well as Pakistani. The first generation of migrants at the beginning, to a larger extent, remained connected to their cultural roots but with the passage of time they started interacting with the socio-cultural life to adapt to the Western societies that, too, in a limited way from low to medium level but not in the real sense of full integration, though.

The senior members of Pakistani diaspora in the UK and Europe suggest to the new emigrants that even if they feel difficulty in integrating with the West, they have to adjust by observing the host country's rule of law and norms by avoiding any sort of violent behavior and exhibiting peaceful nature of good Muslims to lead a happy and prosperous life and look for a bright future for their children as they have opted to live in the West which is different from that of their own country of origin.

Amid the fear of being discriminated against by some racist and intolerant individuals and groups in Australia, Pakistani emigrants still feel it relatively easy to adjust (not to integrate fully) in the Australian society which otherwise has a lot of physical space, interest for cricket, hockey and other sports in addition to the English language in contrast to non-English-speaking Western countries, especially in Europe. The integration of Pakistani emigrants into the Western societies is difficult because a majority of Pakistani parents do not permit their children to dating, drinking, smoking and social mixing. They seem somehow right in their claims being Pakistani Muslims but it contrasts with their children's interaction or socialization with their Western counterparts. At times, this conflict leads to an inter-generational conflict or tension. Either their children come in conflict with their parents or with their Western counterparts. This conflict results in more inter-ethnic marriages once the children of Pakistani parents opt for such marriages which are frequently taking place due to the social mixing and interaction of young Pakistanis with Australians at educational institutions and workplaces (Iqbal 2014). Such marriages are also occurring in other Western countries, too.

4. Emigration or Brain Drain in Terms of Migration of Skilled Professionals

In the post COVID-19, resumption of travel and increase in the demand of human resources encouraged a large number of Pakistani old or new emigrants either to go back to the destinations from where they came to Pakistan amid COVID-19 restrictions or to seek new jobs elsewhere. Many fresh emigrants also opted to go abroad for want of a better future. The key informants in their interviews with the author disclosed diverse reasons to opt to migrate to other countries. These reasons are cited and analyzed in the section underneath.

A majority of them cited reasons which show their dissatisfaction with their future opportunities in Pakistan; they hail from labourers to middle to high-level professionals. In a nutshell, the current outgoing emigration trend will ultimately lead us to a sort of brain drain, and not what is expected as a potential export of labour overseas. A majority of the skilled professionals say they do not have enough opportunities to earn their livelihood inside the country as there is no stable labour market so they have no option but to emigrate to excel in other markets. There are different kinds of emigration which are taking place from Pakistan. Temporary displacements, climate change, especially extreme weather, did force people to migrate (Salik, Qaisrani et al. 2017) other than the lack of opportunities in Pakistan.

One may not deny the fact that the recent outgoing migration trend from Pakistan is more than the export of labour market; it is rather a brain drain from Pakistan due to lack of opportunities for skilled professionals; this has been a continued process. A predominant majority of the key informants hailing from the Western countries and associated with academia, businesses and media were of the view that a large number of Pakistanis are coming in the West on the pretext that the Pakistani society and the state did not offer what the Constitution of Pakistan guarantees to its citizens in terms of equality before the law, security of livelihood, and the right to live their life in dignity.

According to the key informants, the incumbent emigrants from Pakistan cite political victimization, shrinking spaces for dissent and civil liberties and civil society, religious extremism, fear of being declared as 'anti-state' amid narrow definition of patriotism, fear of being picked up by unknown elements and fear of being hit by religious extremists if not compliant to the stated

religious brand of these extremist groups, fear of 'no future' of qualified and skilled and unskilled youth in terms of employment or self-employment opportunities with grim socio-economic uplift and social injustices amid weak legal and judicial system as the major reasons for their departure from the country, thus leading to possibilities of continued brain drain.

In a snap focus group discussion (FGD) conducted with semi affluent middle-class people, more than 70 percent participants were of the view that they would like their young children to find their future in the West or Asia's developed countries and select some open societies to live in. This trend has been testified by the migration trends globally wherein the migrants, who hailed from somewhat close societies where they used to live in fear, injustices and in an environment of discrimination or persecution amid a number of unending challenges, tend to use social networks (formal and informal) more frequently to make their living at ease in a new environment where they migrate with regular channels.

For those who opt for irregular migration channel, they have to face new challenges of coercion and exploitation. The respondent of the FGD viewed that they want their children/young ones to acquire knowledge and skills and opt for regular and legal migration to the West, the UK, Australia, Canada, the United States and Asia's big economies. Some of them wished that their young children opt for the nearest places, such as the Middle East to earn their livelihood and to live there. So, with the ever-increasing fears and uncertainties in Pakistani society due to the reasons cited above, a new wave of brain drain of youth is taking place as the new job markets are opening up after the COVID-19 restrictions are easing, especially after the Brexit, UK needs more skilled professionals after most Europeans are leaving the UK, a key informant confirmed this statement.

Pakistan is an appropriate market for such migrations to the developed countries as the country is producing millions of educated youths who do not have opportunities in the country so they will certainly look for the job markets abroad. From Pakistan, a large number of youth started freelancing work online but they are facing a lot of trouble in getting their hard-earned money into their accounts as unfortunately, a new culture of doubting every one by the tax authorities of being tax evaders is causing irritants for the youth. Most of them have expressed their frustration while taking part in a focus group discussion (FGD) with the youth for this chapter. Unfortunately, the participants see no one around to listen to them. Many have confessed stopping their online free-lance service providing work. Though the

government has put in place some mechanism of applying a minimum tax on freelancing, still there is no structured policy framework that can address such fears and irritants faced by the youth. So, a predominant majority of the youth in the FDG expressed the desire to go abroad to earn and get a professional space and respect. It is feared that this would add up to the brain drain further. Amid such trends and thoughts of the young professionals, it is feared that if the brain drain goes on unabated, who will serve this country and how can we compete with the rest of the world?

Pakistan's Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Fawad Chaudhry (2nd December 2021), in a tweet believed that two million more Pakistanis will seek overseas employment in the next two years. He made this calculation probably on the basis of the data of the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis. He was quoted as saying that more than 1.1 Pakistani workers went overseas to seek job during the last three years despite the COVID-19 pandemic.¹

According to the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE), 1,026,640 (1.026M) Pakistani workers were registered for overseas employment during 2019-2021 (October). As many as 569,870, more than 50 percent of the total went to Saudi Arabia, followed by 271,775, over 25 percent to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 61,423 to Sultanate of Oman, 53,692 workers went to Qatar while 1,943 got jobs in the United Kingdom. The remaining 67,937 went to various other countries. In a nutshell, we see that during 2019-2021 (October), 93.38 percent Pakistani workers went to the Gulf states while only 6.62 percent went to other countries, including the United Kingdom. The Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis say that only 217,669 Bangladeshis and 94,145 Indians went abroad in 2020. Pakistan outmatched both the countries.

When asked to comment on the latest data about the people seeking overseas employment and why is there a huge gap between the number of Pakistanis going abroad to seek jobs and the number of Bangladeshis and Indians seeking job abroad, a labour market economist/key informant responded to this author that there are two dimensions of looking at it; one is a tone with which the Federal Information Minister had tweeted, saying Pakistan is exporting more labour in the regional and global market and hoped to send two million more in the forthcoming two years; the other dimension is that perhaps Pakistan does not have opportunities to absorb

1. <https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/02-Dec-2021/two-million-pakistanis-to-go-abroad-for-jobs-in-next-2-years-hopes-fawad>

its own labour force inside the country which means the economy has less cushion to provide jobs to the skilled and unskilled workers and, hence, they have no other option but to go abroad to seek employment. When people at home do not have enough opportunities in the job market they go to other markets. This causes a brain drain which continues unabated due to uncertain socio-political and economic development. The uncertainty leads to further brain drain. On the issue of why less Bangladeshis and Indians are opting to go abroad, the answer is simple, their economies and job markets have enough space to retain them in domestic labour market so they have no charm to go abroad.

This is an alarming situation for policy makers in Pakistan, the labour market economist added, suggesting that there is a need to rebuild trust of the potential professionals in the labour market by promoting development-oriented economy with more jobs opportunities.

5. The Role and Influence of Overseas Pakistanis While They Live in Host Countries

We have so far discussed the state of migration from Pakistan. Though we see that we have a bulk of outgoing emigrants, predominantly in the Gulf states and marginally in the rest of the labour markets around the world, we have to see how much influence they may exert on the host societies. To make the best use of their presence on the foreign land, be it the Middle Eastern countries, Asia, Africa and the West, Pakistani emigrants need to play a constructive role to boost their soft image against the image created by Islamophobia by the western media. Instead of being influenced by radicalization, they need to own democratic ideals and behavior of a democratic country, learn the secrets of its modernization, progress and development as a prerequisite for a qualitative and progressive state of society. They should work hard, prove their worth and contribute to the development of their host country and, at the same time, manage to carve out a bright future for their children (Khan, Khan et al. 2012). In the Middle East, they do not have any Muslim identity crisis. They are large in number and, hence, they can prove their worth. In the West, however, they have multiple challenges of identity, and amid Islamophobia, Pakistani Muslims are seen from the radicalization lens.

The diaspora in each foreign land represents one's native country. Since a predominant number of Pakistanis registered with the BEOE live in the Middle East where they hold temporary resident permits and only limited jobs or

some businesses; they may not play a greater role in influencing the host governments in favor of Pakistan if the relations deteriorate. For example, for a short span of time in 2020, there has been a bad patch in relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The Pakistani community in these countries could not do anything until the relations improved between the governments. Since there is no political space available in the Middle East, so Pakistanis cannot exercise their influence.

But in the West, Pakistanis have citizenship of those countries with voting right; they take part in local and national politics of those countries, so they have a role to play to project Pakistan's soft image. According to the majority of key informants hailing from Europe and UK, Pakistani emigrants can only succeed if the governments in Pakistan are respected and known for democratic ideals because the Western countries would appreciate if Pakistanis at home enjoy democratic space and civil liberties. They said if the Western countries conclude that the citizens of Pakistan are not getting civil and democratic rights, they will try to put Pakistan under restrictions — FATF or any other tool of pressurizing the country.

Since they gather information through their own sources, so even if Pakistanis living in these countries lobby for their country, they will generally not entertain their lobbying. If there is religious extremism in Pakistan and civil society is curbed, trade unions and democratic institutions have less space, Pakistanis abroad may not be in a position to play their role to build a soft image of Pakistan. One of the key informants noted that when the prime minister himself says that 'THERE IS NO NEED FOR A SOFT IMAGE,' dubbing it an excuse for diluting Pakistan's position, then certainly Pakistanis abroad cannot help influence the host governments and societies.

Pakistanis are facing a lot of difficulties while living in open societies, being doubted as radicalized elements. A key informant hailing from Pakistani diaspora and representing media expressed the view, saying that since politics in Pakistan is divided between new animosities in recent years, this bitterness reflects in Pakistani diaspora in the West and will further divide them as a Pakistani community and weaken their voice which they used to raise collectively for the cause of Kashmir and other Pakistan's foreign policy objectives. The KI who used to organize rallies in Europe for the cause of Kashmir says this bitterness in Pakistani politics impacted badly on the unity of Pakistani diaspora which has been weakening their lobbying capacity for national causes.

A majority of the key informants from the West were of the view that when Pakistani emigrants take part in Pakistani politics, they will be further divided and the bitterness in Pakistani politics will further increase tensions among the Pakistani diaspora which will further weaken their unity to stand for Pakistan in the Western countries. However, the emigrants living in the Middle East who comprise a major chunk of overseas Pakistanis may not have to face this dilemma as they can hardly play any influential role for Pakistan's national causes in the host countries as those who live in the West do.

Conclusion

The discussion and analysis in this chapter talk about the quantum and state of Pakistani emigrants, their status, roles and influences they can have in the host societies. As mentioned (quoting from the data of the BEOE) in the first section of this chapter, out of 11.492476 million registered overseas Pakistanis, 11 million live in six Middle East countries: Saudi Arabia (5.698369), United Arab Emirates (3.932458), Oman (0.822389), Qatar (0.217007), Bahrain (0.189293) and Kuwait (0.185150). The remaining 0.492476 live in the rest of the world.

About 5 percent of the total population of Pakistan lives abroad. Out of them, 95.70 percent live in six Gulf states while only 4.30 percent live in the rest of the world. The analysis in this chapter quoting the key informants says that 95.70 percent Pakistanis living abroad (being in the Gulf states) cannot play any influential role though they contribute largely in terms of remittances matching to their ratio of presence abroad as there is no political space available in these countries even for their own citizens, what to talk of any space for Pakistanis. When Pakistan's relations with Saudi Arabia and UAE were not cordial in the recent past, Pakistanis living in these two countries (9.63 million together- 83.79 percent of total Pakistani emigrants) could not play any role and could not raise their voice in favor of Pakistan as there is no political space available.

As compared to the 95.70 percent Pakistanis living in the six Gulf states (83.79 percent only in Saudi Arabia and UAE), the rest of 4.30 percent who largely live in the West somehow play their role and they do influence, to a limited extent, the democratic governments in the West. Pakistani diaspora in the West plays its role because as they can raise voice for political rights, enjoy citizenship status there, or benefit from the democratic and civic spaces. As the key informants added to this analysis, the political divide which has

now transformed into a bitter enmity among the overseas supporters of the two major political parties of Pakistan. This has hampered unity among the diaspora. Their divided voice is getting weaker and, hence, their role in host societies is reducing day by day. This is an alarming situation that despite attaining the position among the top 10 emigration countries and the second largest position in South Asia as per the World Population Review 2021, Pakistani diaspora has a limited influence in the West.

In this situation, one can conclude that Pakistani emigrants have only one role and that is earning their livelihood from abroad and sending foreign exchange to the country or those who live in the Western societies with citizenship status build their own resources there and contribute to the development of the host countries, sometimes at the cost of the development of their own country — Pakistan. In addition to analyzing the influence of Pakistani diaspora, this chapter also analyses the brain drain in terms of increasing emigration trends due to lack of job and progress opportunities for professionals and experts and the fear of being subjugated to social, economic injustices in addition to the fear of being declared as 'anti state' or the fear of being killed by a religious extremist or being discriminated against for political, religious and any other orientation.

There is a need that the ministries of overseas Pakistanis, foreign affairs and information make a comprehensive plan to make Pakistani emigrants vibrant in their home countries in playing their social roles. The embassies abroad should keep close liaison with the diaspora and brief them on issues of national concern and give them respect so that they feel more connected as a community. There is a need to encourage youngsters in the country to start their businesses; the startups are good ideas to further promote, build trust of the people in general on the systems and governance so that they feel a proud and equal citizen having constitutional and legal protections. There is a need to reduce political temperatures through introducing decency while having a difference of opinion. Tolerance needs to be promoted to reduce tensions inside the country so that it may reflect positively on the Pakistani diaspora abroad.

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CHAPTER 8

A Rearticulation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Wake of the Twenty-First Century Challenges

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Abstract

Pakistan is trying to realign its foreign policy with the 21st century challenges. The major repositioning is the shift from geo-strategic/politics to geo-economics. This approach is geared towards redefining its worldview, image, and role in the international community. However, the changing security's global and regional matrix has placed Pakistan in the midst of a global competition between a superpower and an emerging superpower. Pakistan has drawn some red lines; for now it is standing its ground, the question is will Pakistan be able to sustain this and move towards the path of growth and prosperity or once again get sucked into the quagmire of conflict in the region. The chapter discusses in great detail how the growing superpower rivalry between the US and China is pushing Pakistan towards camp politics. The stated foreign policy thrust of Pakistan is 'connectivity' and 'balance' with the implicit understanding that peace and regional connectivity are mutually reinforcing.

1. Introduction

As the third decade of the 21st century dawns, Pakistan needs to overhaul its foreign policy. Pakistan for at least the last two decades faces what is called convulsive environment in foreign policy where there is a high degree of change in geo-strategic global environment that has also impacted the foreign policy of the country. Pakistan's strategic environment has been a challenge since its inception. Existential threats from India, fighting terrorism, and getting caught up between superpower rivalry are some of the few. However, post 9/11 period had posed challenges that brought about a paradigm shift in Pakistan's threat perception. It became more focused on internal challenges and comparatively less India-centric, this becomes more obvious in retrospect. The new literature on national security also identifies internal factors as equally, if not more, important than the traditional factors.

Pakistan's former army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, in 2013 was perhaps the first chief of the military staff to identify terrorism and extremism as bigger challenges for Pakistan than India. While talking to the BBC in 2013, defence analyst General (retd) Talat Masood said, "Pakistan army

for the first time has admitted that the real threat is emanating internally and along the western borders and not from India, which was previously considered as number one enemy of the state" (Dawn, 2021a).

Pakistan was largely perceived as a geo-strategic state with labels like 'frontline state' in the Cold War and the war on terror; this stifled human development and turned Pakistan into a hardcore security state. Pakistan is now in the midst of rearticulating its foreign policy thrust whereby it wants to be acknowledged as a geo-economics state rather than an exclusively geo-political/geo-strategic player.

The present government has launched a major economic diplomacy project: "Economic Outreach Initiative". The project aims to reposition Pakistan internationally through a paradigm shift in the foreign policy narrative which is away from security and political issues. It also seeks to showcase the country's economic potential to the world to increase trade, tourism, and foreign investment. The logic behind the initiative is to have a coherent strategy which brings together the entire space known as economic diplomacy and is based on the premise that the nation's military security is intrinsically linked to its economic security.

The geo-economics vision aims at divulging into new strategic directions based on a comprehensive security framework. It is to factor in the realities of economics and human development of the country and the region. Largely, the focus is to showcase Pakistan's desire to change the narrative from "geo-political contestation to geo-economic integration" and in the process "alter Pakistan's image" as a "peace-loving nation and a useful member of the international community" (Devasher, 2021).

Instead of being stuck in the traditional grooves of 'national security,' a euphemism for military security built on hard power (conventional and nuclear), there is now a focus on non-traditional security, which includes elements of economic development, the role of technology, and regional connectivity (Devasher, 2021).

The vision was encapsulated by Chief of the Military Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa at the Islamabad Security Dialogue, "The contemporary concept of national security... is not solely a function of the armed forces anymore. National security in the age of globalisation, information and connectivity has now become an all-encompassing notion wherein, besides various elements of national power, global and regional environments also play a profound role."

His geo-economic vision is centered around four pillars (Devasher, 2021):

- Lasting peace within as well as outside the region.
- Non-interference in internal matters of neighboring countries.
- Boosting intra-regional trade and connectivity.
- Sustainable peace and security through the establishment of investment hubs.

2. From Military Conversations to Economic Ones

The economic security paradigm conversations will now focus on connectivity and development partnerships and will move away from relying on development assistance. Pakistan's newly found desire to serve as an economic base for the developed world, instead of presenting itself as a military base, is a big change from its policies of the past. The objective is that the vision for a renewed economic-centric Pakistan will gradually start making its place in the global politics.

Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, while addressing the Pakistan-Hungary Dialogue in Islamabad, explained this particular shift and identified three essential pillars: peace and development, partnership, and connectivity. He said the structure and policy reforms undertaken by the government had led to an improved investment ecosystem. Pakistan has improved by 28 ranks on the World Bank's ease of doing business index and by 58 positions in the starting of business indicator. Pakistan's investment policy offers equal treatment for local and foreign investors. All economic sectors are now open to foreign direct investment. The government of Pakistan has also eased visa requirements for businessmen from 95 countries, the business community can avail visa on arrival facility now (Dawn, 2021b).

In a recent advisory board meeting of the National Security Division and Strategic Policy Planning, the Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, Dr. Moeed Yusuf, noted how Pakistan, instead of sticking to the conventional geo-strategic lens, is headed towards a new direction and is leveraging its geo-economic position by partnering with the world under the economic security model. The country is now working to provide economic avenues to its budding economic partnerships (Express Tribune, 2021a).

He pointed out that the country's new vision of 'connectivity' and 'economic security' would bring dividends to the region and the partner countries.

"Pakistan is on the path to become a global economic hub and targets to become a melting pot of competing global economic interests." Regarding the regional connectivity subject, the premier's aide said that Pakistan possessed the potential to serve as a 'regional pivot' because of its geo-economic location and the country could become a potential hub of trade and economic activities (Wilson Center, 2021).

3. The New Cold War Paradox

The Twenty-first century will be defined by the American contest with China. Many are of the opinion that China will be a far more formidable adversary than Russia ever was. The ensuing second cold war between an emerging and an existing superpower is a fusion of military, trade, economic, and ideological tensions, combined with the disruption of digitalization (Roberts, 2019).

The New Cold War has brought the world at another historic turning point; one where the US-led global hegemony is being seriously challenged by China. The global international order is undergoing a power transition; one irrefutable reason for this is the re-emergence of China as a global power and Pakistan seems to be at the epicenter of the ongoing superpower competition.

The strategic aims of the US in Asia to counter China are fixated on making India a regional power. It wants India to act on behalf of the US to curtail China's influence in South Asia and Asia as a whole. The obsession of the Americans to contain China has given rise to a new cold war optics, which may eventually pitch all big, small, and middle level countries against one another.

There is a substantial pressure on smaller and mid-level countries, such as Pakistan to align with one bloc or another just as it happened during the US-Soviet Cold War of the previous century. However, this pressure is coming more from the US than China. Consequently, the policy makers in Islamabad are finding it extremely difficult to choose between the US and China. Pakistan is reluctant to join one camp and is looking to adopt a balanced approach between the two. Prime Minister Imran Khan hinted at it in his talk on China with the China Global Television Network (CGTN), that Pakistan would not bring any change in its ties with the time-tested ally. Pakistan is looking at having good relations with everyone. It will not be pressured to take sides and it is unfair to exert such pressures on the middle power countries (Express Tribune, 2021b).

In his message to the World Political Parties Summit held on July 6, 2021, he emphasized that Pakistan and China were “iron brothers” and that Pakistan supported China’s efforts to safeguard world peace, contribute to global development and preserve international order. He further added that President Xi Jinping’s vision of shared prosperity through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had made a “major impact on global sustainable development” and “proved his credentials as a world statesman” (Dawn, 2021c). This may be a response to the US regarding an indirect pressure on Pakistan to distance itself from the emerging superpower.

Kurt Campbell, National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific in the Biden Administration categorically declared that the era of engagement with China had come to an end. The Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy of December 2017 had also earlier stated that “a geo-political competition between free and repressive visions of the world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.”

Biden’s approach to China is also largely built upon Trump’s hostile posture. If anything, Biden has increased sanctions on China’s tech sector. In June 2021, he ordered to ban investments in fifty-nine tech and defense firms having a Chinese connection. Beijing views Washington’s economic measure against it since 2018 as part of a broader US effort to contain China’s rise. The Biden administration has mellowed down the confrontational tone compared to Trump, however, there is no dramatic shift on the ground. The Biden administration’s foreign policy blueprint, the Interim Security Strategic Guidance released in March 2021 asserts that China is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system. Many in Washington are of the view that the tough new consensus on confrontation with China is a response to a now more assertive and aggressive China. The conventional wisdom in China has also gone through a paradigm shift. Most Chinese believe that the behavior of the US is driven by fear and envy of China. China’s rise is a source of neuralgia and anxiety for the United States (Jisi, 2021).

As per China’s perspective, the most significant threat to its sovereignty and national security has been US interference in its internal affairs, aimed at changing the country’s political system and undermining the Chinese Communist Party. More recently, the western region of Xinjiang has become a major source of discord. Beijing alleges that Uyghur activists in 2009 were backed by Washington for carrying out violent riots in Xinjiang and have

been supported consistently since then. The human rights groups in the United States had accused the CCP in 2019 of torturing and detaining at least one million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.

In 2020, the US demanded China to report on abuses in the region whereas Beijing has repeatedly denied the allegations and accused Washington of fabricating lies to use Xinjiang-related issues to contain China (Jisi, 2021).

The US policy towards Hong Kong is also a source of friction between the two. Beijing has accused the US government and non-governmental organizations of helping protesters in Hong Kong during the violent protests of 2019-2020. The issue of Taiwan has bred the Chinese distrust of the United States. In Beijing's view, Washington can eventually become a major stumbling block to unification. Under Joe Biden's administration Washington has confirmed its "rock solid" commitment to Taiwan. The CCP believes that all these attempts by the US are to provoke instability in China as part of an integrated American strategy to prevent China from becoming a great power. The central Chinese government and official media views all American institutions, including the US government's executive branch, the US Congress, American media, and American-based non-governmental organizations as players in a well-planned and well-organized campaign of sabotage (Jisi, 2021).

Beijing has also sanctioned US officials, organizations, and individuals whom the party alleges are working against China. The CCP leadership has formulated a number of laws and policies aimed at restricting the ability of the Americans and other foreigners to encourage political dissent in China. The CCP's concerns about US interference in China's internal affairs have a direct connection to the deteriorating relationship between Washington and Beijing on a range of geo-political issues, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea and blame-game over the origins of the virus that caused the COVID-19 pandemic (Jisi, 2021).

The US under Biden remains committed to maintaining its military presence in the Asia Pacific and has firmly declared that the twenty-first century will be a US battle for democracy "against China's autocracy". He has also initiated a propaganda campaign akin to Trump's against China where he constantly blames China of genocide in Xinjiang. Biden has also demanded from the US Intelligence Services a review of more than a year-old claim that COVID-19 was either produced or released from the Wuhan Institute of Virology. The

racist characterization of China in the US corporate media has revived the "Sick Man of Asia"¹ stereotype.

The first Cold War initiated by the US against the Communist world was marked by a sharp ideological divide, making the world bipolar. It brought the order of bipolarity and balance of power. International security was dominated by highly securitized and polarized ideological confrontation between the superpowers. This confrontation divided the industrialized north into the First World and the Second World. Because their rivalry was intense, the danger of war was real and political/military concerns dominated the security agenda. This political/military emphasis was transmitted into the periphery of the Third World through arms transfers and politics of making allies by both superpowers (Lippert and Perthes, 2020).

The Cold War never really ended; it just transformed into a softer version. As before, the United States and its rivals are engaged in an arms race, focused on defense and arms building of ever-increasing range, precision, and lethality. In a characteristic Cold War fashion, countries are lining up allies in what increasingly looks like a global power struggle. But the similarities end here. The superpower rivalry now is primarily among three poles, the United States, China, and Russia. The US views China as an encroacher of the Western security architecture and Russia as a meddler. Thus, the US is stuck with what is known as the 'Thucydides Trap'. The defining features are:

- Intensification of trade war
- Rising Chinese influence and assertiveness
- Shift of wealth and economic power from the West to the East
- Convergence between China and Russia. (Rumer and Sokolsky, 2020)

4. Asian Geo-politics

Nicholas Spykman once wrote that "ministers come and go, even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed". He regarded geo-graphical conditions – the physical reality that states face – as being decisive in international relations (Spykman, 1942).

1. The Wall Street Journal published an opinion piece titled "China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia", a clear example of the blatantly incompetent and racist media coverage that the western media has resorted to. Chinese sentiments were hurt and still the Journal refused to apologize for publishing the racist headline. The phrase "sick man of Asia" is now known as a racial slur and is considered as a symbol of China's past humiliation.

Asia is home to eight of the world's ten largest militaries. It contains four dangerous flashpoints: the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, Kashmir, and Pakistan-Afghanistan. Asia's geo-political security agenda includes a volatile mixture of extremism, transnational threats, and weaker and smaller states. The rise of China and the growing multi-polarity of Asia is a challenge to the US supremacy. Asia is also increasingly a laboratory for the cross-cutting themes for instance: the old security agenda and modern realist geopolitics, inter and intra-state rivalries and the new security agenda of post-modern globalized security — the new Cold War.

The withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan by the mid of September 2021 will lead to further destabilization of the region. The great powers are yet again in the midst of securing their own political and security interests in the Asian region. The growing tension between an existing and an emerging superpower has further complicated the already stressful South Asian security environment. South Asia is important to both US and Chinese objectives in Asia due to its inter-regional connectivity. The rise of China has increased India's importance for the US to advance its defence cooperation. Its obvious leanings towards India to counterbalance China in the region has direct ramifications for Pakistan, thus disturbing the strategic stability in South Asia.

The United States, by pulling out its forces from Afghanistan, hopes to curtail China's ambitions as chaos and destabilization will increase in the region. Moreover, the United States is switching its attention to countering Chinese and Russian military might after almost two decades of focusing on the fight against terrorism. "Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang as per US assessment have demonstrated the capability and intent to advance their interest at the expense of the United States and its allies. The US calls China a competitor challenging the United States in multiple arenas — especially economically, militarily, and technologically — and is pushing to change global norms. Russia is also giving a push-back to Washington where it can, which does not exclude the use of force. Iran by use of its proxies continues to exercise a malign influence in the Middle Eastern politics which is a direct challenge to the US. North Korea remains a disruptive player both at the regional and global levels." (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021). In order to survive this global power rivalry and geo-strategic shifts, Pakistan needs to act as a front-runner state in promoting a comprehensive regional connectivity strategy and not commit the mistake of becoming a part of camp politics.

Pakistan has also perhaps for the first time declined to let its land be used in any conflict and will only participate in peace initiatives and bridge-building between states. In an interview, Prime Minister Imran Khan to the question that if Pakistan would allow the American government to have CIA here in Pakistan to conduct cross-border counterterrorism missions against Al-Qaeda, ISIS or the Taliban?" said, "Absolutely not."

5. The US and China's Active Role in Asian Regionalism

Asia is emerging as a region of importance, both in international politics and economics; the credit for its newfound importance can be mostly given to the rise of China. To state it simply, the rise of China is testing the limits of the US. China, a traditional regional power that lacked economic prowess, is now an emerging superpower. Its political influence is also increasing which is backed by its high economic growth, impacting both political and economic spheres at the regional and global level. However, China cannot possibly replace the United States' hegemonic position just yet.

China has always been an active player in Asian regionalism as demonstrated by the upgrading of the Shanghai-5 to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001. Further, China also increased its participation in the ASEAN-led regional architecture by actively endorsing the China-ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA).

After President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China's regional initiatives underwent a paradigm shift. They now have a regional thrust with a global focus. He started a new campaign of projecting China's integrated regional and global vision by putting forward the One Belt One Road/Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the New Asian Security concept. The country is currently the second largest economic power in the world and is now exercising political leverage.

On the other hand, the US bilateralism-centered regional engagement policies are the preferred regional approach in both the security and economic arenas of Asia. These policies have helped the United States apply influence on its key trading and security partners more efficiently and openly, centered on its major military and economic superiority. The United States has handled the inclusion-exclusion logic in Asia by employing an effective approach to tackle all problems. An indirect manifestation of this was that the US encouraged its key ally and agents in East Asia, such as Japan, to support bringing together

nations sharing the common values of the United States, thus bringing together nations, such as Australia, New Zealand, and India.

This led to the US-friendly East Asia Summit in 2005. Subsequently, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), an informal alliance was formed between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia in 2007. The loose alliance was formed to initiate conversation and cooperation between the four maritime democracies in the context of the rise of China in the South China Sea from mid-2006 to early 2008. But as of 2021, leaders of all four countries have become more aligned in their shared concerns about China's increasingly assertive behavior in the region and are more willing to define a constructive agenda of cooperation (Smith, 2021).

All four QUAD states: Australia, Japan, India, and the United States view China as a potential security threat in their regional peripheries. In a nutshell, for Australia, there is the subject of Chinese influence in politics and universities. For India, there are face-offs at the border, the effect of One Belt, One Road and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on its strategic landscape, and China blocking its Nuclear Suppliers' Group membership. For Japan, there is the dispute over the Senkakus and the targeting of Japanese companies. In the United States, there is economic espionage, allegedly sponsored by Chinese government (Madan, 2017).

In a joint statement titled, "The Spirit of the Quad" released in March 2021, the QUAD leaders pledged to "strengthen their cooperation on the defining challenges of the time" although they did not directly mention China in the statement. The closest they came was speaking of "challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas".

India will play a pivotal in curbing the rise of China in Asian geo-politics. Also, because India feels encircled by China's strategic moves in the Asia Pacific and IOR. Herve Lemahieu, director of the power and diplomacy program at the Sydney-based Lowy Institute, said in November 2020 that "the Quad comes about as an effort to try to deter China's ability to challenge and disrupt the rule-based order and the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region." He adds on to say that the Quad is "a signaling on the part of these four democracies that they are and they would get even more serious about acting as a military and strategic counterweight to China, if Beijing were to continue to challenge [the status quo], not just in the South China Sea but also in the Indian Ocean' (Rasheed, 2020).

Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, almost dismissed the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue as nothing more than dissipating “sea foam” in 2018. However, recent developments have compelled China to take QUAD more seriously. From 2018 to 2021, Chinese perception shifted from calls to “drive wedges” between the four states to marginalize the QUAD by highlighting other regional institutions where the balance would favor China. Beijing is unlikely to respond to Quad as a real threat unless the group begins to work on concrete strategies that undermine Chinese economic appeal for the wider region. Chinese work with basic realities of economy, which are that it is the largest exporter market for the US, Japan and Australia, largest trading partner for East Asian countries, and the largest overall trade partner for India.

Moreover, Sino-Russian strategic cooperation and solidarity has rapidly expanded. It is a response to the renewed momentum and solidarity among the Indo-Pacific maritime democracies with a flurry of military exercises and diplomacy of their own, including a new embrace of Iran as well as warm words for North Korea and the Myanmar junta. But the most pertinent question is that if the US is ready to de-emphasize on shared values and prioritize shared interests? The dilemma is that it needs to do that to counter China and garner wider support in East Asia and elsewhere. However, it is going to be a shift from its original stance and everything it stands for. Its convergence with India is also a huge compromise on what US stands for in terms of human rights, be it Kashmir or minority rights. The US cannot point fingers at China and close its eyes at what is happening in India.

6. The New Cold War

The new Cold War has no firewalls because of the overlapping trends of geo-politics and geo-economics, but more importantly, because the west is not cohesive, and the non-west is differentiated. COVID-19 and climate change remind the movers and shakers of the world of how interconnected and interdependent the world has become.

In the twenty-first century there are already strong shifts on the ground, indicative of the fact that the security agenda among the great powers will be much less dominated by political/military issues. Geo-economics along with geo-politics has resulted in reshaping of wealth and power poles, creating a new Cold War scenario where old enemies have become new economic allies and hard power alone is becoming futile. The US failed in Afghanistan, Iraq,

Libya, and Syria, testifying to the impossibility of imposing a new world order by force (Dupont, 2020).

The Not-So-New World Order is the New World Disorder. United States' hegemony is only seventy-five years old and stands seriously challenged by China. The rising competition between the US and China will be the most obvious and notable episode of the post-COVID-19 period. Some form of political order already existed in the Western world for several centuries. Woodrow Wilson, with his fourteen points, may be referred to as the blueprint for New World Order, hoping that it would finally become possible to create a system for maintaining international peace and security. Fast forward to 1991, President Bush once again talked about the New World Order, post the Persian Gulf War. The modern political system has witnessed three powerful shifts post-COVID-19:

- From state to human security
- From greed-driven capitalism to conscious capitalism
- From US-Euro centric global politics to an Asia-centric order

7. The Rise of China

In the 1990s, China was just 6 percent of what the American economy was. By the year 2000, the percentage rose to 12 percent, by 2008 to 30 percent and by 2011 to a surprising 50 percent. In 2020, China's GDP expanded by 2.3 percent whereas the US gross domestic product contracted by 2.3 percent. "China's economy is only \$6.2 trillion behind the US, down from \$7.1 trillion in 2019. The latest projections are that the size of China's economy in USD terms will overtake the US in 2028." (Elegant, 2021).

This trend will contribute to the fulcrum of growth, shifting from the West to the East as Asia is projected to overtake the combined economic power of Europe and North America. The Asian economies were larger than the rest of the world combined in 2020 for the first time since the 19th century (Romei and Reed, 2019). By 2025, two thirds of the world's population will live in Asia whereas the US and the European Union would account only for 5 and 7 percent, respectively.

8. The Pandemic and China

The UN has estimated that the global economic losses could reach up to \$2 trillion (Ross, 2020). Developing countries tend to be more vulnerable and China may be the only country in a position to help.

The global economy saw a sharp contraction of 3.6 percent by the end of 2020, as the great lockdowns all over the world curbed productivity (Rapporteur and Smialek, 2020). For the first time since the Great Depression, advanced economies, emerging markets and developing economies all are in recession (Gopinath, 2020). China's GDP shrank by 6.8 percent during January-March period (Bradsher, 2020), the country's first decline since 1976.

However, despite contraction in the Chinese economy, the IMF projections of its economic growth are positive; it is to grow by 1.2 percent in 2020 and 9.2 percent in 2021 (Lawder, 2020), ahead of all major economies. On the other hand, the US regardless of pumping massive amounts of money into stabilizing the economy will suffer a 5.9 percent shrinkage in 2020 and grow by 4.7 in 2021, as per IMF projections (Lawder, 2020).

However, China also must make a comeback. This will further fuel the existing tensions between the two countries. To accelerate its comeback, China will go back on its commitments to the US to rectify specific practices endemic to China's economic model that systematically tilt the playing field in favor of Chinese companies domestically and globally (Meltzer and Neena Shenai, 2019). The commitment of internal economic liberalization and reforms will also receive a setback. In fact, President Xi may resort to strengthening one-party rule because despite the rapid growth in its economy and acceptance of a role for competition and markets, the Chinese Communist Party remains firmly in control of China's economy (Albert, Xu and Maizland, 2020). This is surely not the time to revisit Chinese economic model or political structure. The shrinkage of economy is the only challenge Chinese government is facing at the moment.

However, the fact that China will manage a positive growth rate in 2020 is a testament of its strength. China's Gross domestic product grew 2.3 percent in 2020 and its GDP expanded 6.5 percent year-on-year in the fourth quarter of 2020, as shown by the data from the National Bureau of Statistics (Crossley and Yao, 2021). China's economy further grew a record 18.3 percent in the first quarter of 2021 compared to the same quarter last year (BBC News, 2021). China is gradually but surely emerging as a country that has not only survived COVID-19 but may be a global savior (Dawn, 2021d).

9. The US Desire to Rebalance Asia

Asia has become economically far more successful and consequently far less dependent on the United States, with a substantial rise in Intra-Asian trade, more intra-regional organizations, and the development of intra-regional production networks. The overall economic success of Asia has reduced the US presence in the region from what it had been in the 1970s and 80s. Asian regionalism was triggered by decline in the United States' power and rise of China as a global power and the international liberal order's retreat became visible towards the end of the 2000s (Oba, 2019).

The Obama Administration first announced that they would expand and intensify the US role in the Asia-Pacific region because the center of gravity for the US foreign policy, national security, and economic interests is gravitating towards Asia. A continuity of Obama's US "pivot" or "rebalancing" with respect to Asia became more focused with Trump's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific". There is an element of continuity in the policy by Biden. The desire to pull South Korea closer in alignment with the US is a testimony to that. South Korea agreed to install the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system on its territory despite China's warnings that deploying the system could "destroy" bilateral relations "in an instant". China believed the system could be used to monitor its missile deployments, thus posing a threat to its national security.

The US-India defense partnership has also enabled India to acquire the US made long-range patrol aircrafts and drones, maritime helicopters, aircraft-carrier technology and anti-submarine gear. India argues that it needs all this to counter Chinese-built bases from Myanmar to Pakistan to Djibouti.

China sees economic and military opportunities in areas of strategic neglect by Washington and has actively sought to explore these opportunities over the past two decades. China geo-strategically sees Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean as a part of its Maritime Silk Road, the trade and infrastructure corridor, linking coastal China to other Asian countries. This broad vision leads Beijing to pursue an integrated set of trade, commercial, diplomatic, and military initiatives from the South China Sea to the African littoral.

The US strategy is focused on competing with or curtailing China; it is both myopic and unsustainable. Smaller Southeast Asian nations live under the shadow of Sino US competition and do not want to make invidious decisions or overtly pick sides. The middle powers, like Australia and Japan, also do not want the Indo-Pacific to be defined by the US-China rivalry despite QUAD.

A reason for this hesitation is possibly the trade relations between China and the QUAD members. China's total imports from Australia in May 2021 rose more than 55 percent to US\$13.6 billion while exports rose just over 1 percent to US\$4.9 billion (Tan, 2021). The trade between China and India soared 70.1 percent in the US dollar terms in the first five months of the year 2021 and were \$48.16 billion (Patranobis, 2021).

The US involvement in wars, focus on short-term interests, rather than on cooperation with other countries, imposing protectionist trade barriers against other countries, requiring other countries to pay more for their collective defense, and the failure of the US in addressing health issues in 2020 on its own land has given China the requisite tailwind to acquire global eminence. China is touting its success in containing the COVID-19 pandemic as evidence of its superiority over the US. The Biden Administration is committed to rectifying it but will remain occupied with damage control, course correction, and image-building amongst other things.

10. The US excludes Pakistan, China includes Pakistan

The United States largely excludes Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, and the African littoral from its conception of the Indo-Pacific region.² For almost two decades, the United States has actively sought to de-hyphenate India from Pakistan as part of an effort to build ties with New Delhi. The key feature of the US Indo-Pacific strategy is to build the economic, defence and military muscle of India so that it could effectively act as a counterbalance to China. Unlike China, the United States' relationship with Pakistan is transactional and contingent to counterterrorism and the ground situation in Afghanistan.

Pakistan and China have had a very longstanding relationship. The One Belt-One-Road initiative by China of which CPEC is the first and the most important corridor, has further consolidated the relationship. It has immediate geo-economic returns and came at a time when Pakistan was facing acute diplomatic isolation and economic perils. It has allowed Pakistan to emerge as a player in the connectivity game both in South Asia and beyond. It has brought about a paradigm shift in Pakistan's foreign policy construct. It seeks functional relations with its neighbors. Although CPEC is largely the belt part of BRI, which is on land, it has allowed Pakistan to play a more prominent role on the seas. Its convergence with China is a precursor.

2. As per US thrust, "Asia" was too broad and continental. "Asia-Pacific" – which traditionally stood for "the Asian littoral of the Pacific" – was inadequate. The "Indo-Pacific" (Indian Ocean-Pacific Ocean combine) – seemed more appropriate.

11. Pakistan has the Golden Chair

Pakistan plays a pivotal role in Asia Pacific and rising IOR as CPEC is one of the most important elements of the Belt and Road; it provides a direct land bridge from China to the Arabian Sea and allows trade access to support economic development in China's restive west. Being one of the major trade corridors, Pakistan is in the unique position of playing a positive role in the complex geo-strategic and geo-economic conflict matrix of the region, linking the maritime and continental components of the Belt and Road Initiative, thus becoming a bridge between the US and China. Pakistan's potential to emerge as a corridor state in the region and a zipper state between Europe and Asia allows the exploration of twenty-first century regional paradigm in Asian geo-politics as the new ground reality.

Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst states in Eurasia Future, that "Pakistan's promising economic potential, international connectivity capabilities, and unparalleled geo-strategic location combine with its world-class military and proven diplomatic finesse over the decades to turn the South Asian country into the global pivot state of the 21st century." He further stressed that "Pakistan, under the BRI, can transform itself from being a passive object of international relations to a leading subject of the rapidly changing global order if it creatively expands this central corridor throughout the rest of the supercontinent in order to become the Zipper of Eurasia." He states that Pakistan is uniquely positioned at the crossroads of China's future trade route with the rest of the "Global South". Prime Minister Imran Khan, while talking to the UAE's World Government Summit, categorically said not to "miss the boat" and lose out on their chance to capitalize on his country's expected growth.

The emerging Eurasian supercontinent offers immense opportunities for Pakistan, particularly in terms of connectivity, trade, energy, and social sector cooperation. Several big economies, such as China, Russia and Turkey fall in Pakistan's immediate and extended neighborhood and unprecedented developments are taking place in and among these economies. Building of its CPEC+ civilizational-geo-strategic connectivity prospects, Pakistan can institutionalize its role as the Zipper of Eurasia by bringing together the two incipient multilateral strategic partnerships that it is a part of: Iran and Turkey and China and Russia.

Moreover, the Aman-21 initiative, with the participation by forty-five navies around the world, under the motto "Together for Peace", is the face of

Pakistan's Indian Ocean Policy. Its major objective is to contribute to regional peace and stability, and more importantly, bridging the gap for peace and enhancing inter and intra operability between regional and extra regional navies. The world's top navies took part in the series held every two years since 2007. The exercise held in February 2021 was even more significant because the three largest navies of the US, China and Russia exercised for collaborative maritime security model. It is also for the first time in a decade that "Russian Black Sea Fleet" with three ships took part in the joint military exercise with NATO members (Baqai, 2021).

The Aman series is an ideal forum for the exchange of information, mutual understanding, and identification of areas of common interest. It may enable regional navies to better deal with common challenges in the maritime domain while avoiding friction. Indian Ambassador M. K. Bhadrakumar acknowledges that it is the biggest event of its kind in the Indian Ocean or anywhere. He adds on to say that "Aman-21 makes a mockery of India's aspiration to be a 'net security provider' for littoral States in the Indian Ocean" and calls it Pakistan's growing diplomatic clout as a "regional power on spectacular display" (BHADRAKUMAR, 2021).

Conclusion

Pakistan is in the midst of rearticulating and reformulating its foreign policy as a response to the twenty-first century challenges. The key thrusts are: 'connectivity' and 'balance'. However, the emerging new Cold War has made these options difficult to exercise. Pakistan, a middle-power country and very geo-strategically relevant to any initiative in Asia, is going to constantly struggle to find a balance in its relationship between a superpower and an emerging superpower. The fact that once again India and Pakistan, the two protagonists of South Asia, find themselves being pulled into camp politics and power rivalry in South Asia on the ocean lanes and beyond, does not ease the situation. The triangular US-China-Russia relationship will continue to cast both conflict and cooperation behaviors of the middle powers, including Pakistan.

China may outcompete the US in the Asia Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Pacific Ocean in the next two decades due to its strong military and economic presence. The rational option for Beijing and Washington is to cooperate at best and at worst compete; acute confrontation is not an option. Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, captured it beautifully when he says that

the US-China relationship is the key element of global relations. The US must have the ability of competing and collaborating at the same time, which is true of all major relationships. However, there are some factors that cannot be ignored, which include: rising affection between Russia, China and Iran, the Himalayan Quad as a counterweight to the Quad.

Way Forward and Policy Options

Pakistan must not repeat the mistakes of the past, draw its own red lines and make sure that it remains committed to its twenty-first century foreign policy response mechanisms. These include a commitment to be a state on the right side of the international law with a focus on its economic revival and development of its people.

Interestingly, while Pakistan is gearing towards a geo-economic thrust in its foreign policy, geo-strategic challenges are mounting; the Afghanistan situation being the most pertinent, followed by Modi governments' belligerence, his Kashmir policy, and India's strategic convergence with the US against China. These three elements make the shift trickier. Pakistan for now is standing its ground, the question is will Pakistan be able to sustain this and move towards the path of growth and prosperity or once again get sucked into the quagmire of conflict in the region. The policy options for Pakistan are to remain committed to 'connectivity' and 'balance'. Pakistan has both CPEC and the new QUAD on its plate. The New QUAD signed in July 2021 is an agreement on regional support for the Afghanistan peace process and post-settlement reached between the representatives of the United States, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan "to establish a new quadrilateral platform focused on enhanced regional connectivity is a watershed event in regional politics. Marking a transition in the US regional strategy from wars to geo-economics. The idea stems from the realization on the Biden Administration's part that peace and regional connectivity are mutually reinforcing." This is Pakistan's way forward where only geo-economic initiatives are what Pakistan wants to be a part of. With the US now convinced of regional connectivity as the way forward for peace, it makes Pakistan's shift from geo-politics to geo-economics a very viable option.

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CHAPTER 9

High-Quality Education to Survive in the Global Economy

Pakistan's Perspective

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Abstract

Over the twentieth century, education, skills, and information acquisition have become significant components. Human capital is the most important predictor of a country's standard of living. In recent decades, access to basic education has risen substantially. The evidence shows that developed countries have efficient education systems, unlike the developing countries. Pakistan's education system is falling behind. With about 220 million inhabitants, it is now the world's sixth most populated country and it boasts one of the world's biggest youth population, with 64 percent of Pakistanis under the age of 30. If Pakistan can educate its youth, it would be able to realize a huge youth dividend that will ensure the country's economic growth. The failure to integrate the country's children into the education and job markets, on the other hand, may translate the population expansion into a "crisis in the making".

This chapter is an attempt to analyze the quality education and global economy nexus with a special focus on the gaps in Pakistan's education system. The authors have also analyzed the existing education system by the end of chapter and given recommendations for the education sector.

1. Introduction

Quality education being the fundamental human right, essentially contributes in the evolution of human progress and a nation's development (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2021). It not only plays a vital role in political, social, and economic development of a country but also helps to enrich human lives, empower people and thereby augments human welfare (Steward, 1996). An efficient educational system of a country can potentially stabilize its economy by alleviating poverty as it improves skill sets. "Quality" is the defining feature of the 21st century knowledge-driven society, much as "tradition" defined ancient civilization, "Religion" defined society in the Middle Ages, and "Reason" characterized the 19th century society. Quality in education, like freedom and justice, is intangible as it can be felt but not articulated. The process of measuring the quality of education is extremely difficult since it is related with several factors, many of which cannot be measured objectively

(Budiharso and Tarman, 2020). However, it is certainly possible to discriminate between high and low-quality education, and some western countries have already done so. Although there are several degrees or categories of quality, it is often defined as the difference between average and great. The focus of authors is particularly on quality of teachers and learning outcomes.

The global perspective on the quality of education varies across countries. Different education actors and organizations also have their own defining factors. However, most tend to agree on UNESCO's framework on the variables of education quality and it has five discrete dimensions (Pigozzi, 2009):

- **Learners' Characteristics:** including learner's aptitude, perseverance, readiness for school, prior knowledge, barriers to learning, and demographic variables.
- **Context:** including public resources for education, parental support, national standards, labor market demands, socio-cultural and religious factors, peer effects, and time available for schooling and homework.
- **Enabling Inputs:** including teaching and learning materials, physical infrastructure and facilities, and human resources.
- **Teaching and Learning:** including learning time, teaching methods, assessment, and class size.
- **Outcomes:** including skills in literacy and numeracy, values, and life skills.(UNESCO, 2004: 36).

With more than half of Pakistan's adult population unable to read and write, the country lacks a literate and skilled human resource that could contribute in the development of the country. Education has the power to unleash creativity and innovation among Pakistan's more than 200 million human capital. Pakistan, thus, has the responsibility to equip its youth with knowledge, creativity, critical thinking and leadership skills so that they can make the right choices for themselves and their country and play a responsible role as a global citizen.

2. Pakistan's Education Landscape

The Constitution of Pakistan says the state will provide free and compulsory education to children between the ages of 5-16 years and enhance adult literacy (Article 25-A). The devolution of the education functionalities

to the provincial level after the 18th Amendment in 2010 has given the responsibilities of ensuring quality education to the provincial and local governments (UNDP Pakistan, 2019).

Pakistan holds its commitment to promoting education and literacy in the country through domestic education policy and participation in international education initiatives. In this context, national education policies aim for boosting literacy rates, capacity, and facilities in schools and other educational institutions.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Education for All (EFA) initiatives are two of Pakistan's international commitments to encourage literacy. However, little has changed in Pakistani schools, according to the evaluations of the country's education system. Pakistan's perspective of quality education is in line with the global standards but Pakistan's education sector, unfortunately, has low enrollment ratio, lacks well-trained teachers, has gender disparity, poor infrastructure and various other distressing issues. Low financing coupled with inefficiency in spending and weak governance and management have crippled the system, resulting in poor education outcomes (Bilal, 2019). Academic, managerial, budgetary, and social problems continue to obstruct the country's integrated educational system.

3. Pakistan's Journey towards Global Goals

Pakistan's journey towards MDGs has been onerous, plagued by internal and external factors. Natural disasters, man-made conflicts, institutional, administrative and political amendments, weak commitments to structural economic and social reforms and belated localization and ownership of the MDG agenda at sub-national level were the impediments encountered by the country. Pakistan was altogether ineffectual in accomplishing education-related MDGs, which focused primarily on the Universal Primary Education (UPE) and promoting gender equality and women empowerment (Planning Commission of Pakistan, 2013).

The enrolment ratio of children aged 3 to 16 years has increased since 2014, however, in order to meet the MDGs, there is still need to increase student enrollment further. Punjab had the highest recorded net primary enrolment rate in the country at 62 percent. The enrolment rate in Sindh was 52 percent, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) stood at 54 percent while primary enrolment rate in Baluchistan was only 45 percent at that time. Moving towards gender disparity, male literacy rate on average was recorded to be around 70 percent

while the female literacy rate was merely 48 percent in 2016, highlighting a drastic gender gap. All the provinces were afflicted by gender disparity which is quite evident from the statistics. The male literacy rate in Punjab was 71 percent while that of females was 54 percent. In Sindh, 72 percent males were literate in comparison to 47 percent females. The situation in KPK was no different where male literacy rate was at 70 percent and female literacy rate was at 35 percent. Baluchistan being the most deprived, exhibited 62 percent male literacy rate and a meager 23 percent female literacy rate. According to the EFA Review Report, 2014, despite recurrent governmental commitments, Pakistan has been unsuccessful in attaining universal primary education. The primary gross enrolment rate was reported to be 85.9 percent, which had to be 100 percent by the year 2015-16 in order to meet EFA targets.

It was gauged that 68.5 percent of the estimated total primary school-aged population of 21.4 million children (age 5 to 9) were enrolled in schools, with 8.2 million (56 percent) boys and 6.5 million (44 percent) girls. The Pakistan Economic Survey stipulated higher literacy rates in urban regions (76 percent) compared to the rural regions (51.9 percent) in the year 2013-14. Adding to the dilemma is the presence of about 22.5 million out-of-school children (OoSC), with more girls than boys. The enrolment data when disaggregated by geographic areas is much more alarming for certain districts, e.g., primary Name Entry Registration (NER) (age 5-9) is as low as 40 percent in Bahawalpur (Punjab), 26 percent in Tando Mohammad Khan (Sindh) and Harnai (Baluchistan) and 30 percent in Kohistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) against an average of 57 percent for Pakistan. This indicates that some parts of Pakistan are sorely deprived than others. Similarly, children coming from destitute families and those residing in rural areas are further disadvantaged; also, girls are more underprivileged than boys. Most of the OoSC in Pakistan reside in rural parts of the country, with Baluchistan and ex-FATA having the highest percentages

The OoSC challenge when disaggregated by levels of education represents a dangerously high number at the middle (Grade 6-8) and secondary level (Grade 9-10). In addition to other contributing factors, the scarce number of middle and secondary schools available across the country as compared to primary schools is one of the significant reasons (Asif et al., 2021).

There is no doubt that the government of Pakistan is striving hard to meet with the global demands of quality education. Pakistan's sincere commitment to education and fundamental goals was evident in February 2016 when it became the first country in the world to adopt the Sustainable Development

Goals (SDGs) as a part of its national development agenda through a National Assembly resolution. Learning from the experience of the MDGs, Pakistan's national and provincial assemblies established SDG taskforces to oversee progress of the goals (Government of Pakistan, 2019). The SDG 4 is about achieving inclusive and quality education for all. It reaffirms the belief that education is one of the most dynamic and authentic instruments for sustainable development. The goal ensures that all girls and boys complete free primary and secondary schooling by year 2030. It also aims to provide equal access to affordable vocational training to eliminate gender and wealth disparities and to achieve universal access to quality education at all levels (SDG Pakistan).

The Pakistan Planning Commission's Vision 2030 seeks to create an education system that encourages critical thinking. The purpose of Vision 2030 is to have a single curriculum and a single national examination system under state control. The following are some of the strategies devised to achieve the goal:

- Raising public spending on education and skills generation from 2.7 percent of the GDP to 5 percent by 2010 and 7 percent by 2015.
- In the final two years of secondary school, reintroduce the technical and vocational stream.
- Raise the proportion of students enrolled in vocational and technical education to 25-30 percent of all secondary enrolment by 2015, and 50 percent by 2030.

However, gaps in service provision at all educational levels is a major constraint to access education. Socio-cultural demand-side barriers combined with economic factors and supply-related issues (such as availability of a school facility), hamper access and retention of certain marginalized groups, in particular adolescent girls. Putting in place a credible data system and monitoring measures to track retention and prevent drop-out of out-of-school children is still a challenge.

At the system level, inadequate financing, limited enforcement of policy commitments and challenges in equitable implementation impede reaching to the most disadvantaged. An encouraging increase in education budgets has been observed though at 2.3 percent of the total GDP in fiscal year 2019 (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2021), it is still well short of the 4 percent target. The problems are specific to the nature of educational institutions and an in-depth analysis needs to be taken at the local and national levels to formulate specialized tailored solutions. So, there is a need to develop a long-lasting, economically viable and socially accepted system.

4. Importance of Education in Pakistan

One major factor in the 21st century is that the world entered a fast-tracked process of change, encompassing the fields of economy, science and technology, communications, education, culture, and politics. For Pakistan, education is as vital as its security as it has to develop further and for that skillful human capital is required. The level of quality education delivered in a country determines the amount of human capital produced. The importance of education in the development and prosperity of a country cannot be overstated.

5. Education and Economic Development

The importance of education in economic development prior to the nineteenth century systematic investment in human capital was not considered important. Expenditures on schooling, on-the-job training, and other similar forms of investment were quite small. This began to change radically during this century with the application of science to the development of new goods and more efficient methods of production, first in Great Britain, and then gradually in other countries. During the twentieth century, education, skills, and the acquisition of knowledge have become crucial determinants of a person's and a nation's productivity. One can even call the twentieth century the "Age of Human Capital" in the sense that the primary determinant of a country's standard of living is how well it succeeds in developing and utilizing the skills, knowledge, and furthering the health and educating the majority of its population (Hamdan et al., 2020).

The past decades have seen an extraordinary expansion in accessing basic education throughout the Middle East. Many countries are increasing access to secondary and higher education and making improvements in the quality of education offered at all levels. As increasing numbers of students complete their basic education, their demand for education at higher levels is similarly increasing. Educating girls and women is probably the single-most effective investment a developing country can make, whether or not women work outside the home. It results in remunerations for families, including better family health and nutrition, improved birth spacing, lower infant and child mortality, and enhanced access to education for children. Countries in the Middle East are increasingly integrated into the world markets for manufactured goods. Their ability to compete in these markets and in

globalizing service markets will depend on the excellence of human capital they bring to the competition. Ensuring all citizens are educated, that many possess a wide range of problem-solving skills beyond the basic level, and that some have world class professional skills will necessitate new curricula, improved teacher programs, and academic methods that encourage higher order cognitive skills (Bouhajeb et al., 2018).

No country has achieved constant economic development without considerable investment in the human capital. Previous studies (Brandt 2015, OCED 2006) have shown handsome returns to various forms of human capital accumulation: basic education, research, training, learning-by-doing and aptitude building. The distribution of education matters. Unequal education tends to have a negative impact on per capita income in most countries.

Investment in human capital can have little impact on growth unless people can use education in competitive and open markets. The larger and more competitive these markets are, the greater are the prospects for using education and skills.

The most contentious issue existing in literature is the source of sustainable growth in developing and developed countries. Productivity growth or factor accumulation are the two main sources of economic growth (physical capital, employed labor force and human capital). However, there are three lines of evidence in literature; one supports the idea that productivity growth is the driver of economic expansion. The second backs the opposing viewpoint that economic growth is produced by the accumulation of factors. The third is those who believe that human capital is a fundamental source of economic growth. To promote economic growth, total factor productivity (TFP) and human capital both must expand.

Solow's (1956) growth model is where the concept of economic growth begins. Solow (1956) emphasized the idea that economic growth cannot be described solely by growing labor and capital but that technical improvement, in addition to labor and capital, contributes to economic expansion. The Solow (1956) growth model was regarded as the most important.

In the last few decades, several researchers have emphasized the importance of human capital. They discovered that human capital is the most essential source of economic progress. Furthermore, human capital draws on other components of production, such as physical capital. According to Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990), a government should invest more in human

capital because it can help with economic growth and social welfare. It has a perfectly positive relationship with workers' productivity, resulting in high pay and long-term returns (Van Leeuwen and Foldvari, 2008).

Later, Fogel (1994) highlighted the point that education and training with good health and strong physical and mental capabilities can enhance the production of human capital or labor force. Human capital did not help economic growth in developing nations with low nominal tax rates, such as Pakistan (where taxpayers avoid paying taxes). Despite the significance of human capital, the most contentious topic remains: what are the key variables that constitute human capital? What should be the most appropriate human capital proxies? These proxies differed in literature and focused on either a combination of education and health or measuring human capital independently.

To capture the impact of human capital, Romer (1990) concluded that it had a positive relationship with growth. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) prefer secondary school enrollment as a measure of human capital, concluding that human capital can help the economy. Khan (2005) used gross secondary school enrollment, average years of schooling, and life expectancy as indicators of human capital in a single-country analysis. Some studies employed education and health spending to estimate human capital stock, but none of these proxies accurately reflected the full picture of available human capital. Almost every growing country faces two key challenges: first, achieving economic growth, and second, maintaining economic growth. In developing countries, maintaining a high growth rate is more difficult. Pakistan's economy grew at a rate of roughly 5 percent per year until 2008 when the government was unable to maintain the rate due to a variety of policy failures, including political instability.

In Pakistan, in 2004-05, the growth rate was at an all-time high of 8 percent but the million-dollar question now is what should the government do to maintain high level of growth? Many Pakistani experts are focusing on the relevance of human capital and utilizing various proxies to determine its link to economic progress.

In a comparative examination between India and Pakistan, Abbas (2000) employed enrolment at different levels of education (i.e. primary, secondary, and higher) as a stock of human capital to examine its effect on economic growth. These proxies have a positive impact on economic growth.

In a cross-country analysis of the impact of human capital on the GDP (a proxy for economic growth) in Pakistan and India (2000) and Pakistan and Sri Lanka (2001) found that human capital played an important role in the expansion of the economy of middle-income countries.

6. Integration of Education with the Global Economy

In the recent decades, globalization of education has become more prominent and conducive, raising the benchmark of marketing for educational tools more than ever. Education is considered one of the most basic needs for human civilization and eradicating poverty. It is vital for national growth and a flourishing society. Education is the government's responsibility and should be controlled with national resources. Furthermore, focusing on higher education, it has significant social and economic implications. As a result, the governments and society have a vested interest in maintaining a steady stream of students entering higher education.

The swift development and adoption of technology has created an integrated global economy. Globalization has brought with it remarkable changes in all realms of life, including education (PECC, 2008). Globalization of education has been prominent in recent decades. Furthermore, it cannot be categorized as beneficial or detrimental; it depends on one's position, perspective, values and priorities. Globalization and education together, through mutual goals, groom and direct young people towards a successful future along with connecting their nations thoroughly (Awan et al., 2011).

Global education interconnects various methods of teaching all around the world to encourage the international development of environmental sustainability and contributes towards reinforcing global industries. These educational initiatives prioritize global access to school from the primary to the university levels, instigating learning experiences that prepare students for leadership roles. Globalization enhances the student's ability to acquire and utilize knowledge. It augments the ability of learners to access, assess, adopt and apply knowledge. Educational globalization enables learners to think independently, to exercise appropriate judgment and to collaborate with others to make sense of new situations. Globalization encourages explorations and experimentation to push the frontiers of the potential information technologies and communications for more effective learning. Globalization in education may end up creating more legitimate opportunities for advanced countries along with a new form of colonization of developing countries.

In South Asia, the educational landscape is rapidly evolving. In developing countries like ours, the government is finding itself incapable of bearing the responsibility of higher education as it is already facing acute dearth of resources. Universities and colleges are short of funds as the support of the government is being reduced and grants are not being provided in time, causing hardship to them (Pastor et al., 2018). Privatization of higher education, particularly in the field of medical, engineering, information technology, computer science, and management, is another option but according to some researchers it will further degrade the quality of education along with further stratification of educational services.

The following section elaborates the current situation of the country in terms of skills gained and jobs achieved after graduation, these important parameters determines the quality of education received at the institution.

7. Defining the Role of Quality of Education in Employability

The quality of education as described above has one of the significant implications on developing employers' perception about graduates from the educational institutes of Pakistan. Even the job market in Pakistan, around 80 percent of the employers, are not satisfied from the fresh Pakistani graduates as they are unable to justify their grades at the time of initial assessment (Shahbaz et al. 2018). Similarly, another employers' perception survey reported around 52 percent of the employers who prefer international graduates with the perception of their ability to perform (HEC, 2016). This situation indicates that Pakistani universities lack the vision to strengthen employability of the graduates. The demand-supply gap, in other words, the mismatch between education and skills required in the job market, reflects the importance of producing well-prepared students to enter the job market through the provision of relevant education.

Butt, (2020) identified that the teaching staff lacks the expertise and, hence, they lag behind in terms of emerging challenges. This is one of the reasons that the teaching staff found it difficult to shift from the traditional teaching method of classroom delivery to the virtual method of teaching during COVID (ibid). Other aspects that describe the gloomy picture of education quality include: the curriculum, delivery method, and teachers' qualification as reported by Raza and Naqvi, 2011

According to the international practices, there are several activities and outcomes, such as international study programs and internships that help in transferring market orientation and required skills to the students (Butt, 2020). Further describing the best international learning practices, Usman et al. (2019) mentioned the following techniques:

- **Lesson Study** — a Japanese professional development method — comprises of three activities, namely: identification of lesson goal, lesson studies to explore the goal, and process reflection in the form of written reports. This method provides continuous learning opportunity.
- **Real-World Learning:** Under this method, teachers relate classroom learning with real-life experiences that helps to strengthen students' interest and learning.
- **Use of Technology:** In the era of digital world, particularly after COVID, use of technology became inevitable. Interactive smart boards and tablets are used as a supplementary source of learning for students.
- **Role Play:** This method is being used to develop interpersonal skills of students.
- **Video-based Reflections:** As a successful method to improve the students' achievement, videos are widely used. For instance, a professional development initiative in the United States, namely: My Teaching Partner–Secondary is used to enhance student-teacher interaction. This initiative provides a video library with the best teaching practice examples along with individualized and web-based coaching to the teachers on a regular basis.

8. Contributing Factors of Low-Quality Education

8.1 Policy Aspects of Quality Education

As the journey of defining the minimum standards of quality education by the government of Pakistan was initiated in 1976 with the first ever “Federal Supervision of Curricula and Maintenance of Education Standards” and National Education Policy (NEP), 2009, the first national document that officially recognized the importance of standard for quality education (Usman et al. 2019). This policy document focused on the major factors, such as the teachers' qualification, curriculum reforms, learning environment, assessments, as well as incorporating the labor market demands. Regarding responding to the market demands and requirements, NEP 2009, mentioned:

*"Approaches shall be found to provide students
with a window to the world of work.*

*This could involve short assignments with the local
enterprises and institutions or*

*job shadowing' approaches to familiarize students
with the work environment."*

And

*"Career guidance and counselling shall be introduced
at the secondary and upper*

secondary levels, if not in each school, at least for school clusters.

This shall involve

*local employers in providing information about job openings
and nature of work requirements."*

Educational institutes couldn't implement the "job shadowing" approach and provision of career counselling support to the students. Yaqoob et al. 2017 revealed the fact that most of the schools in Pakistan don't provide this facility though students showed interest and positive attitude towards career guidance. At the university level, only the large universities are providing these services and even a majority of the universities with career counselling centers are not providing the required guidance (Zahid et al. 2019, Iqbal & Amina, 2017). It implies that there is a gap in implementing policy directives.

The latest document titled, "Minimum Standards for Quality Education in Pakistan" was prepared by the Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training (MoFEPT) based on the interprovincial consultations and adopted in the 7th Inter-Provincial Education Ministerial Council (IPEC) (MoFEPT, 2017). This document covers major components of curriculum, learning environment, pedagogical methods, and learning outcomes.

Acknowledging the poor education quality as a policy concern, another latest document, the National Education Policy Framework, 2018, elaborated some contributing factors, including poor qualification of teachers and their accountability, poor learning environment, multi-grade teaching, and lack of availability of data on students' learning outcomes that leads to the situation of ineffective policies. Another important factor that is covered in this framework is to focus on the market-oriented education to bridge the skills demand-supply gap in Pakistan. Some other considerations mentioned in this document include: the Smart School System to deliver virtual lectures


and Education Volunteer Program to address the teachers' shortage, and the National Curriculum Council to promote minimum standards of curriculum across Pakistan.

9. Qualification and Professional Development of Teachers

Teachers' qualification is one of the key determining factors of quality education (Akareem & Hossain, 2016). In Pakistan, poor quality of teachers is one of the major policy concern reported by Ashraf et al. 2015, Khan, 2019, and Hunter, 2020. It is characterized by lacunas in training to update their knowledge as per the emerging knowledge and demands, gaps in merit-based hiring of teachers, and outdated teaching methods (ibid).

During the last five years, around 13 percent more teachers were hired in public schools and 48 percent in the private sector (Pakistan Education Statistics, 2018). Among public school teachers (primary to higher secondary level), 1 percent of teachers reported untrained and a majority of hired teachers (37 percent) have B.Ed./B.S.Eds.¹ degree followed by P.T.C (23 percent) and M.Ed. (21 percent) (ibid), as given in the figure below.

Figure 9.1: Professional Qualification of Teachers in Public Schools (Primary-Higher Secondary)




Source: Pakistan Education Statistics, 2017-2018, Academy of Educational Planning and Management

1. These are the degrees/certification required for teachers' hiring. B.Ed is Bachelor of Education, BS.Ed is Bachelor of Science in Education, M.Ed is Master of Education, and P.T.C is Primary Teaching Certificate.

Qualification wise analysis of Pakistan Education Statistics (PES)-2018 data in figure 2 shows that 46 percent teaching staff of schools have master’s degree followed by Bachelor’s (29 percent), and intermediate (11 percent). This trend is visible at all educational levels from primary to higher secondary level. Despite the fact that a majority of school teachers have attained higher education, lower achievement level of students draw attention towards the teachers’ inability to understand and deliver the changing dynamics of the curriculum, teaching methods, along with other factors. Figure 2 gives another insight about the presence of teachers with Matric and Intermediate at the higher secondary level. It implies that teachers with low academic qualification need in-service trainings to keep up with the changing pace of the content to teach students in class.

Figure 9.2: Teachers’ Qualification as per Education Level=



Source: Pakistan Education Statistics, 2017-2018, Academy of Educational Planning

According to PES 2018, total 217 teachers’ training institutes are imparting training to 76,227 teachers in Pakistan. The Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training (MoFEPT) and Higher Education Commission (HEC) are responsible for designing the pre-service training syllabus (P.T.C., C.T., B.Ed., and M.Ed.) whereas the provincial Education Extension Centers or Staff Development Directorate provide for in-service trainings (refresher courses, crash programs, donor-funded initiatives) (Siddiqui, et al. 2021). The in-service refresher courses are not offered to all teachers, there are teachers who never received any in-service training in their teaching career. Limited

financial resources as well as management issues and examination system are among the challenges associated with the teachers' training in Pakistan. (ibid). Other issues related to the teachers' training reported by Bari et al. (2020) include: the missing element of appraisal mechanism for the trainers as well as similar training for both the rural and urban teachers as a different teaching method is required in rural and urban settings.

Multi-grade teaching is another issue that schools are facing as 29 percent schools reported single teacher in school (DAWN, 2016) and on average the number of available rooms for teaching at a primary government school is 2.5 (ASER, 2011). These statistics indicate that teachers are imparting education to multiple grades in a single or limited classroom. Further, unfolding this issue, the Annual Status of Education Report, 2011, indicated that teachers in schools with multi-grading are not well-trained to handle the situation. The presence of ghost teachers is also a factor for low-quality education as in Sindh 134,000 ghost teachers were reported by Tariq (2019).

Similar to the school education, the HEC has also an institutional set-up; various departments, including the National Accreditation Council for Teacher Education (NACTE), National Academy for Higher Education (NAHE), and Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) are playing their role to ensure quality education in Pakistan. Buzdar & Jalal (2019) revealed the fact that teachers showed concern about the role and effectiveness of Quality Enhancement Cells.

10. Outdated Curricula

Unfortunately, curriculum development is not responsive to the overall changing dynamics and it's outdated (Naeem, 2016). The curriculum design failed to develop concepts and build knowledge as it promotes rote-learning. Lack of teachers' engagement with curriculum design and the missing link with life problems are among other associated factors (ibid).

11. Assessment Mechanism/Examination

The examination system to assess the learning outcomes of students is focused on cramming rather than assessing the concepts (Asian Development Bank, 2019). Mostly, test scoring by the Board of Intermediate and Secondary

Education (BISE) is done by outside professionals that is not up to the mark. Khattak, 2012 highlighted the predictability of the examination questions that also leads towards a defective examination system as these questions repeat every three to five years and students rely on these patterns. Additionally, lack of BISE’s capacity to analyze students’ learning assessments and its utilization to improve teaching in schools contribute to the situation (Asian Development Bank, 2019). At the university level in Pakistan, universities do course evaluation, evaluation of teaching faculty as well as program evaluation but the triangulation of these three components is missing to further improve the quality of learning in the universities (Usmani & Khatoon, 2013).

12. SWOT Analysis of Education System

SWOT analysis is an effective way to understand the existing quality of education as well as a guide for further steps for improvements. In this chapter, SWOT analysis is used as a mechanism to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses as well as opportunities and threats for educational institutes, including schools, colleges and HEI’s in particular as HEIs have a direct nexus with the growth of the economy. The author’s interpretation of the literature, evidence from data and daily life observations are summed in Table 1. The SWOT analysis is general and simplified which also shows that the country needs to start changing the basics of the education sector.

Table 9.1: SWOT Analysis of Pakistan’s Education System	
Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Internationally recognized academic programs and professional courses• Ideal location and size and regional vicinity• Increasing flow of publications and research activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Inadequate national and institutional policy to internationalize HEIs• Lack of appropriate budget for internationalization• Poor higher education system• Weak Legal System• Inappropriate funding

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New accreditation policy and quality assurance strategies • Partnerships and strategic alliances with developing countries • Government increasing efforts to assist education ministry for the enhancement of education at all levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of faculty development • Lack of equipment and facilities for advance research • Lack of international staff and faculty members • Experienced staff leaving for greener pastures • Lack of facilities for student welfare, counseling and career guidance • Skill gaps • Lack of knowledge economy for effective learning
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased chances of international collaboration and partnerships. • Prospects for Foreign Aids from World Bank and IMF • Use of distance education and e-learning and adoption of latest information and communications technologies • Strategic positioning for the organizations of international seminars and development programs within the context of globalization • Increased chances of developing and enhancing of capacity to accommodate more international students and research collaboration activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stakeholder resistance • Leadership deficit • Fiscal uncertainty, mismanagement, and corruption through misuse of power • Underdeveloped research culture • Inability of senior management to hire and retain qualified faculty • Limited resources for faculty and staff development • Growth of privatization of educational institutes • Politically represented academic and decision-making bodies • Fear of terrorism • Intellectual property rights, patent and copyrights issues

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Improvement in quality of higher education and reduction in student tuition fee due to fair and free competitions amongst the universities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Inappropriate distribution of national and international funding• Less developed infrastructure of the Educational institutes as compares to international standards
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Recommendations

On the way towards quality education, some crucial recommendations to develop a strategic plan on institutional and national level are given. These recommendations are based on the perspective of students, faculty, research, curriculum, engagement and culture.

Perspective	Recommendations
1. Student	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Activities to enhance skills by adding more creative tasks to the daily routine• National and international fellowships funded by government, institutes and sponsors• Promotion of distant learning/e-learning• Incorporate technology with education in the form of recorded lectures, illustrations and animations to help understand the concept• Compulsory internships of high school and college students to get professional experience right from the beginning• Establish career counselling centers
2. Faculty	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Recruit experienced faculty on permanent and contract basis• Develop faculty exchange programs within cities of Pakistan and abroad• Train teachers before job• Mental and physical health assessment of faculty members before permanent recruitment• Annual teachers workshops and evaluations by experts

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish a curriculum devising committee comprising of national and international educationists
3. Curriculum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The difference in public and private institute's curriculum must be eliminated by devising one national level curriculum for all institutes which also fulfills global standards.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Earmarked financial resources to promote skillful learning
4. Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish audit office in each district and tehsil to sustain quality of education delivered Limit the privatization of educational institutes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance strategic alliances with international schools, colleges and universities
5. Engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish strong ties between education institutes and governing bodies, i.e., the HEC and the ministry of education

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CHAPTER 10

Risks, Challenges and Opportunities in Globalization

Carving a role for Pakistan

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Abstract

The chapter seeks to revisit Pakistan's journey of development of national power and obstacles that have impeded it in realizing its potential and what Pakistan's place in the new world order can be. The chapter attempts to identify Pakistan's core strengths as a nation-state and how these strengths, including but not limited to those of soft power, can be leveraged on the international stage to advance Pakistan's interests.

An important part of the chapter is on addressing Pakistan's image problem and how the country can be rebranded internationally. In a nutshell, the chapter summarizes what Pakistan's key issues are and how Pakistan can navigate through the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead.

1. Context

This chapter aims to identify the promise that Pakistan holds and explore how this promise can be realized. To do this, it is important to revisit and introspect the mistakes that were made in the past and suggest how the future can be made better for Pakistan and its citizens. This chapter also emphasizes that Pakistan, being part of the global system, cannot be seen as a lone actor. Rather, it is an actor that demonstrates agency within an existing geo-political realm where it has an interplay with other states as well as non-state actors. The chapter will assess the steps that Pakistan needs to take to actualize the opportunities that exist for it whilst navigating through the challenges that it faces.

The chapter suggests that all elements of national power, which include the civil society, businesses, think-tanks, academia, the government, and military, can work together to make a robust Pakistan that engages with the rest of the world with confidence as well as clarity. This chapter also advocates for a more inclusive and tolerant Pakistan, which celebrates diversity rather than shuns it and argues that a diverse society with versatile perspectives is a country's strength rather than a weakness.

Pakistan has been mired with conflict, internal strife and governance failure throughout its history (Afridi, Khan & Jamil 2017). Bordering arch-rival

India in the east and a perpetually unsettled Afghanistan in the west have compounded Pakistan's challenges. Pakistan and India have fought four wars since their partition in 1947 (Aljazeera 2019), which has led Pakistan to become a "security state" that has prioritized defense and security above other key elements of national power, such as education and economic growth (Hussain 2010). Furthermore, Pakistan's role in uprooting Soviet Russia from Afghanistan, in collaboration with the United States and fueling as well as arming the Afghan mujahideen under the policy of "strategic depth" established a transactional relationship between Pakistan and the United States (Khan 2005). Pakistan was, thus, perceived as a political (and somewhat military) gateway to Afghanistan. Pakistan's role in the Afghan War branded Pakistan with Afghanistan and the two countries were seen by pundits as "two sides of the same coin", so much so that think tanks and policymakers in the West established "Af-Pak" programs to study the interplay of Pakistan and Afghanistan in South Asia — largely through a security prism.

Pakistan's past camaraderie and working relationship with the Afghan Taliban sowed the seeds for the spread of extremism in Pakistan — there was a mushrooming of militant organizations in the country which professed and justified violence against minorities as well as against the state (Khan 2005). As Pakistan evolved, its major political parties were unable to develop a consensus or a collective long-term vision on the major priorities for Pakistan's development, which led to "trouble-shooting" through crisis management.

2. Rebranding Pakistan

This section seeks to explore how Pakistan can navigate through the complex web of international diplomacy that is laced with interests and agendas, opportunities and challenges, and pick its battles selectively as well as let go of others pragmatically.

Just like an individual who is invited to an international conference has to brand himself with a business card and a narrative about what he is doing that distinguishes him from his peers at the conference, Pakistan needs to rebrand itself so that when it mingles with the international stakeholders who matter, Pakistan's identity and narrative is clear. In order for Pakistan to rebrand itself, it is imperative that it develops its own strategic clarity of how it sees its role in the world, and this strategic clarity should be shared by all relevant pillars of the state: the parliament, the military, the foreign office,

and the executive. George F. Kennan, a top US diplomat who dealt with the US's Soviet policy and was the architect of US's containment policy vis a vis the USSR, gave the US sensible advice in his article published in 1947 in the Foreign Affairs Journal, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", where he stated, "create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal strife and with the responsibilities of a world power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time." (Kennan 1947)

The advice originally meant for the US, may seem dated but it still applies to Pakistan, albeit it not being a world power (Kennan 1947). Even though Pakistan's image has improved incrementally in recent years, it is still seen as an unstable country, which is unsafe to visit and poses a high-risk to foreign investment. The July 14 attack on the Chinese company working on the Dasu hydropower project in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province is one such example (Diplomat 2021). How can this misperception of Pakistan be addressed and subsequently changed?

2.1 Proactive and out-of-the-box diplomacy

Pakistan's Ambassadors in all the major capitals traditionally engage predominantly with the host government. In today's day and age, the role of think tanks, civil society, pressure-groups, and media (both traditional and new), is critical in shaping public opinion (Senate of Pakistan 2018). The Foreign Office of Pakistan, as the primary driver of foreign policy, needs to reorient and adapt to the new opportunities of projecting Pakistan by adopting what may be called "targeted diplomacy". This should consist of developing working relationships with the afore-mentioned entities in the host countries. The focus of this "targeted diplomacy" should be key capitals of the world where Pakistan's narrative is yet to sell, for example, Washington DC, London, Berlin and Brussels. Forging these relationships requires sustained, proactive and focused strategic engagement and is a process, not an event. Take for example Washington DC, which hosts some of the leading think tanks of the world. The predominant lens through which Pakistan is discussed and written about is from that of an unreliable partner to the US that has been playing all sides in Afghanistan, despite Pakistan being at the forefront of the Afghan peace process as well as the single-largest victim of terrorism (Brookings 2020).

The Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, which has a Pakistan chair, provides an opportunity each year to a noted scholar from Pakistan to spend their year doing research and/or publishing a book, which gives them an opportunity to create and share their perspective in important policy circles in Washington (Wilson Centre 2014). However, there is little similar representation of Pakistan in other leading think tanks in the U.S.

The United States has a diverse set of members in its House of Representatives and Senate (Pew Research Centre 2021). It is important that Pakistan does not treat the United States government and its powerful legislature as one monolithic entity but distinguishes between the two and engages accordingly. Pakistan should engage, cultivate and nurture long-standing relationships with the US MPs across both the aisles. For example, they can be invited to visit Pakistan to speak and participate in international conferences or as part of bilateral parliamentary diplomacy, or even for adventure tourism and skiing (which is a very popular sport in the US) in the Himalayas and Hindukush mountains in Pakistan. When the late Senator, John McCain, visited Pakistan and was taken to Waziristan and other parts of the country, he was impressed by Pakistan's fight against terrorism as well as the people of Pakistan and the culture. After his visit to Waziristan, the Senator said, "I was very impressed with the progress (on the ground)" (Reuters 2016), negating the prevailing perception that Pakistan has not acted against terrorist networks previously present in its former tribal areas (Reuters 2016). However, the visit of Senator McCain was an ad-hoc initiative and not part of a sustained policy.

By engaging with the MPs, think tanks, lobbying groups, and US companies and Chambers of Commerce, the objective should be to have more friends in Washington that have a genuine goodwill for Pakistan and believe that the US and Pakistan's interests converge more than they diverge. Another opening that Pakistan received was that of Malala Yousafzai as she became the face of Pakistan's resilience against terrorism and was celebrated the world over (Brookings 2018).

Pakistan hesitated in owning her internationally even though Malala could have been and is a great leveraging point for Pakistan to show that Pakistan has a strong and resilient civil society that fights back and is interested in development and education rather than being skeptical and on the defensive, Pakistan should embrace Malala as an opportunity for its soft-power projection.

2.2 The Big 'C': Culture

The culture and history of a country are its assets that distinguish it from other states and contribute in forming its identity. It is important that the state and the nation recognize the uniqueness of its culture, learn about it, and celebrate it. The understanding and internalizing of a country's culture by its people is a dynamic and evolutionary process that happens over generations. The culture of a society and/or a country consists of past history, language, art, dance, theatre as well as folklore and literature. Some examples include the Bolshoi Theatre in Russia, which was historically part of the Imperial Theatres of the Russian Empire (Bolshoi); the Confucius Institute of China that teach Mandarin in many countries (Przychodniak 2019); and the American Higher Education system that attracts exceptional students from around the world are some demonstrations of soft power.

Soft power, which is based on processes, unlike hard-power that is often based on instances and events, has more relevance in today's world where the states usually keep militaries for the purpose of deterrence and security as opposed to offensive purposes (Wagner 2014). Soft power has to be cultivated, nurtured, and honed by consistent and focused efforts by governments, academia, artists and culture enthusiasts in unison. However, in order to be able to promote culture abroad, it first has to be preserved and protected at home as a national priority. Whilst Pakistan has a rich culture and heritage with different ethnicities, dialects and history, Pakistan has not forged a coordinated and coherent strategy that would ably preserve culture and heritage, historical artifacts and relics. For example, in July 2020, an 1800 year old Buddha statue that was said to date back to the Gandhara civilization was destroyed by construction workers in the Takht Bai area of Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa province. The construction workers used a sledgehammer, allegedly on the instigation of a local preacher (India Today 2020).

For example, the ethnic Pashtuns that primarily reside in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and some parts of Balochistan boast that Pashtunwali predates the onset of Islam. Lahore, the capital of Punjab province, with its Mughal architecture and heritage still intact, provides a glimpse into the pre-modern Subcontinent. In fact, the Indus Valley civilisation, which preceded Islam, was situated in the present-day Pakistan, including cities, such as Moenjodaro, Taxila and Harappa. Moreover, Lahore, the capital of Punjab province, provides a glimpse into the pre-modern Subcontinent since its Mughal architecture and heritage are still intact.

Sindh and Punjab also have a rich Sufi tradition with tombs of Sufi saints who imparted wisdom to the ancestors of the residents of this region and this form of mystic Islam allowed Muslims to undertake a spiritual journey that brought them closer to God (Shoaib 2012). This Sufi tradition is a more emancipated version of Islam that allows men and women to explore their connection with God and romanticize their belief in the oneness of the universe (Shoaib 2012). In a 2nd January 2018 article of the Washington Post, "Why Turkey's president was among thousands in Konya paying homage to Rumi," the article refers to how the Turkish state has leveraged its connection to Sufism and Rumi and that the "dervishes have provided Turkey with some of its most iconic images". In 2008, UNESCO added the dance of the whirling dervishes to its Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity list (UNESCO 2008). Similarly, 'Suri Jagek', a traditional and astronomical practice that relies on the observation of the sun, moon and stars in reference to local topography, is still practised by the indigenous Kalash tribe that still exists in the North of Pakistan (UNESCO 2020). This practice allows the Kalash people to predict the upcoming weather as well as respond collectively to these changes that ensures the continuity of their way of life. In 2018, UNESCO included 'Suri Jagek' in the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in need of urgent safeguarding (UNESCO 2020). Kalash is another opportunity for Pakistan to preserve and promote the rich and unique culture of this indigenous tribe.

Also, Pakistan has produced some of the top performing artists in Asia, such as Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan and Madam Noor Jehan – both considered legends internationally. For example, a university for the performing arts that is named after either of the aforementioned artists or someone of their stature that teaches performing arts, singing, theatre and aspires to be the top university in South Asia can be one significant step in the projection of Pakistan's soft-power. In 1997, an article published in the Time Magazine, titled, "Pure and Powerful", discussed how Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan's music was appreciated by the likes of Pearl Jam (a famous rock band) as well as the legendary Peter Gabriel who signed Ustad Nusrat for his 'Real World' label and helped his songs reach many non-Asian audiences (Express Tribune 2013). Ustad Nusrat's music exuded a magnetic force that transcended borders and artificial boundaries so much so that the renowned music artist, Mick Jagger, travelled all the way to Lahore just to listen to the Ustad (Express Tribune 2013). Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan lives on through his music but little, if any, concrete effort has been undertaken to preserve his music and his legend, which has and still can do so much service in helping people outside Pakistan to understand Pakistan through the lens of music (Express Tribune 2013).

Pakistan has lacked a cohesive and coordinated policy to promote, preserve and project its culture and heritage. The Ministry of Culture and National Heritage is an add-on to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, which is considered a demanding and high-powered portfolio. In order to revive and revitalize Pakistan's culture, setting up a taskforce on culture and heritage that comprises of artists, culture enthusiasts and experts is the need of the hour, which demonstrates that work on culture is no longer business-as-usual and injects a sense of purpose and urgency to achieve time-sensitive and result-oriented objectives. A good example to learn from would be South Korea (UNESCO 2021). Its Minister for Culture, Mr. Park Yang-woo, on February 1, 2021, chaired the 14th session of the Inter-governmental Committee of the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. S. Korea's Ministry of Culture, in liaison with UNESCO, has institutionally internationalized S. Korea's culture (UNESCO 2021). The importance of culture has been recognized at the highest level in S. Korea and integrated in its overall official development assistance budget (UNESCO 2021). In 2007, the Republic of Korea launched the Korea-UNESCO Fund-in-Trust, which provides budgetary funding to the secretariat of the aforementioned convention to support the development of cultural and creative industries (UNESCO 2021).

3. The Islamabad Consensus

Now, more than ever, Pakistan needs to prioritize steadfast and long-term economic growth. This will be premised on a predictable economy that provides a degree of certainty as well as confidence to local and foreign investors alike. However, to do so, there has to be a political consensus on a long-term economic blueprint for the future of Pakistan's economy. The current political polarization is such that the ruling and opposition political parties are unwilling to engage with each other and petty political interests are trumping leadership and decision-making on issues of national interest (Akhtar 2009). A bi-partisan consensus must be forged where it is collectively agreed that the issue of economic planning is not up for politicking. The objective of the "Islamabad Consensus" should be to make a 15-20 year economic policy which is adhered to regardless of who is in power, making it a sacrosanct document that is above board and is linked to state interest, as opposed to any one government.

In our neighborhood, China is a good example of sustaining economic growth. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping, who is largely responsible for setting the

tone for China's rapid economic growth, initiated the Opening Up and Reform of China. This policy meant the decision to gradually liberalize China's economy and integrate it with the rest of the world (Butt & Sajid 2018). To make sure that China has a consistent economic policy as it joins the global economy, Deng Xiaoping nominated his two successors: Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao ruled China as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of the People's Republic of China from 1992-2002 and 2002-2012 respectively, a whopping 20 years. This also meant 20 years of consistent, clear and predictable economic policy, which was a key enabler for China's economy to grow so rapidly (Council on Foreign Relations 2018).

The "Islamabad Consensus" must be reached before the next general elections which are to be held in 2023, as the window of opportunity exists right now and there is no reason for Pakistan not to seize it.

4. Getting Back to the Drawing Board

4.1 Strategic Clarity

In order for Pakistan to be a geo-political player and have a seat at the table, it must undertake a comprehensive internal review of what its core national interests are, how they have changed in the past few years of the rapidly changing regional scenario, escalation of US-China big power competition as well as the Covid-19 pandemic and what steps Pakistan needs to take to enhance and give impetus to the processes for protecting, promoting and preserving its national interests. Pakistan's foreign office, parliament, incumbent government, and the military must redefine, review and reform its identification criteria of core interests and adapt the core interests to include climate change, water and food security, energy security, in addition to the Kashmir issue, nuclear program and the CPEC, which are already considered core interests (Khan 2011).

For example, China and the US have diverging strategic interests globally, yet they are the biggest trading partners in the world (Forbes 2021). It is in the economic and, therefore, national interest of both the countries to trade and continue with an economic partnership, albeit uncertain, as the mammoth US market provides jobs, foreign exchange and sustained economic impetus to China. The leading US company, Apple, generates approximately 17 percent of its revenue from China (Statista 2020). The Boeing 2019 market outlook

predicted that China would be the largest market in the aviation industry in the next two decades and it will require 8,090 new planes by 2038, making continued business engagement with China critical for Boeing (CNBC 2019). Pakistan's strategic introspection should be hard-nosed, clinical, and evidence-based, where partner states who have proactively supported our core national interests in the past are identified as well as those that have been sitting on the fence and/or stayed neutral, and those that have actively harmed Pakistan's core interests.

Pakistan has historically invested its diplomatic and international political capital in championing the unification of the Muslim Ummah as well as perceived it to be a monolithic entity, which has collective core interests in the world. The reality is that this policy has not been conducive. To continue to harbor expectations from this religion-driven policy would be naïve and futile. In the past year, we have seen that the United Arab Emirates, which Pakistan considers to be a "brotherly" country, gave the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi their highest civilian award when his government had just annexed Jammu and Kashmir, directly affecting Pakistan's core interests in Kashmir (Diplomat 2020). The UAE did this due to its significant economic partnership with India. Since the UAE is a beneficiary of this economic relationship, it was in their interest to cement and advance their relationship with India, albeit at the cost of Pakistan (Diplomat 2020). Similarly, the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), a leading manifestation of the Muslim Ummah, has not demonstrated agency and taken a consequential position, whether it was the apartheid in Gaza by Israeli security forces or the gross human rights violations in Kashmir by the Modi-led government (Anadolu Agency 2020). That said, Pakistan has rightly and consistently shown solidarity with countries that have been at the receiving end of oppression, a policy which is based on ethical principles and moral values.

Thereafter, future engagement with partner states should be based on this internal review, which should be based primarily on state interests and should be implemented with unequivocal strategic clarity.

4.2 CPEC and Economic Diplomacy

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is the flagship project of Chinese President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative, brings an unmatched 62 billion USD of foreign direct investment to Pakistan and has helped uplift Pakistan's economy and rebrand Pakistan's image as a formidable destination for international investment (Government of Pakistan). Since the first phase of

CPEC was primarily hardware projects of 'brick and mortar,' including energy power plants, highways and Gwadar Port development, the second phase, and arguably the crucial phase, includes 3 key Special Economic Zones (SEZs) which are: Rashakai (in KPK province), Allama Iqbal Industrial Zone (Punjab province) and Dhabeji (in Sindh province) (Government of Pakistan). These SEZs have the potential to help relocate Chinese manufacturers to Pakistan where they would receive lower costs of production and a geographical vantage point for exporting their products to Central Asia, Middle East and the rest of South Asia (Government of Pakistan). If done right, these SEZs can enable Pakistan to become a key part of the global supply chain (Government of Pakistan).

It is important that Pakistan learns from Singapore and China on how they conceived, initiated and governed SEZs. As China experimented with SEZs, their better known SEZs, such as that in Shenzhen took off while lesser-known ones, such as the one in Hainan province did not (Asian Development Bank 2019). It is important to study and learn from their experience and incorporate "what to do and not to do" as we proceed with the 3 CPEC SEZs. Furthermore, the nuanced expertise required in running SEZs is lacking in Pakistan since the country does not have prior experience in this realm. Pakistan has the option to solicit assistance from Chinese or Singaporean experts and/or companies with extensive experience in launching and running SEZs, so Pakistan's first experience in this regard is not a shot in the dark.


It is vital that the Special Economic Zones under CPEC are undertaken in a scientific manner and successful SEZs in the region, such as in China and Singapore are factored into Pakistan's SEZ strategy. It is also pertinent to learn as to why some SEZs in the world did not take off and what were the mistakes made by those countries that contributed to those SEZs not taking-off (Asian Development Bank 2019). To do this, it is worth analyzing the contrast of the two Special Economic Zones of China: Shenzhen (launched in May 1980) and Hainan (1988) that were launched around the same time but delivered different results (Tao, Yuan & Meng L 2016). The following figures summarize the contrast between Shenzhen and Hainan, showing that Hainan has performed relatively poorly (Tao, Yuan & Meng L 2016).

Table 10.1 Foreign Investment in China's Five SEZs (in USD 10,000s)

Time	1980	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1995-2000	2001-2005	2006-2010	2011-2013	1980-2013
Region	(Year 1)	(6th 5-Year Plan)	(7th 5-Year Plan)	(8th 5-Year Plan)	(9th 5-Year Plan)	(10th 5-Year Plan)	(11th 5-Year Plan)	(Current 5-Year Plan)	Total
Shen Zhen	3264	73446	165828	442571	1099156	1965683	2304793	1556118	7610859
Zhuhai	1575	28003	27448	183272	360994	368620	565736	497018	2032666
Shan Tou	490	5360	31092	254954	366848	72742	97880	62436	891802
Xia Men	-	12166	38195	418431	648351	349971	729637	517627	2714378
Hai nan	10	3641	36149	360492	313338	288675	560235	497478	2060018

Source: SEZ Research Center, Shenzhen University of China (2015) Cited in African Development Bank Group 2016

Figure 10.1: Average Growth of Five Chinese SEZs, 1980-2014 (in percent)



Source: African Development Bank Group 2016

Shenzhen's biggest advantage was that it was next to Hong Kong, a major and booming port city, with a connection to the east and to the west (because of British colonial rule) (Yeung et al. 2009). In 1981, over 50 perent of all foreign investment into China was concentrated in Shenzhen, which played a vital role in making it a leading SEZ of China (Yeung et al. 2009). The Hainan SEZ, however, lacked proximity to a developed financial center like Hong

Kong and did not have a developed business community and entrepreneurial cluster like Shenzhen did (Yeung et al. 2009). The location factor, which was of significant advantage for Shenzhen, was Hainan's major disadvantage, as it was unable to internationalize its SEZ (Yeung et al. 2009). A research paper published by RAND in 1991, "A Comparison of Hainan with the Other Special Economic Zones", offers an insightful comparison on how Hainan's SEZ, in some counts, received more preferential policies than other SEZs, such as Shenzhen. Some of these policies were: i) Hainan was authorized to provide a 70-year lease of land to investors whereas Shenzhen was given 50 years, ii) Hainan had a tax exemption on all projects that required technology investment (Roll 1991).

The purpose of this policy was that investors are able to focus on growth and technological advancement without any hurdles of taxes that could hold them back (Roll 1991). This incentive, too, was unique to Hainan and not offered to Shenzhen's SEZ, iii) An enterprise that was owned by foreign investors by 25 percent or more had the right to export and import freely and revenue generated in foreign exchange could be kept the same. Businesses earning profits could remit their money outside of the province without payment of income tax (Roll 1991). This, too, was unique to Hainan's SEZ (Roll 1991). Another important factor why Hainan was unable to compete with the likes of Shenzhen was that, unlike Shenzhen, it was unable to attract significant investment in the manufacturing sector and most of the investment came in the real estate sector which led to a speculative bubble that eventually crashed in 1993 (Asian Development Bank 2019).


Also, it is important that the regulatory regime and incentives that are offered to the afore-mentioned SEZs are competitive and attractive for prospective investors, including but not limited to Chinese investors. Some of the SEZs that are prospective competitors to Pakistan's CPEC SEZs and that provide alternative options to Chinese industries to relocate their manufacturing are Cambodia's Sihanoukville SEZ (Xinhua 2019) and Ethiopia's Chinese-invested industrial parks, such as Mekelle Industrial Park and Hawassa Industrial Park. The Sihanoukville SEZ exported products worth 372 million dollars in 2018, which was 68 percent greater than that of the previous year's (Xinhua 2019). Similarly, Chinese-invested industrial parks boasted \$142 million in exports in 2018 (Xinhua 2019) and the Hawassa Industrial Park was projected to employ 60,000 people and provide an additional 150,000 indirect jobs (HSBC 2018).

The particular SEZ authorities should have a proactive and targeted strategy in soliciting select Chinese industries that their informed assessments show will be befitting prospective investments in their respective SEZs. Therefore, rather than merely accepting proposals from foreign investors, the SEZ authorities should demonstrate agency and identify, persuade, and market Pakistan's SEZ opportunity to the investors. The Board of Investment (BoI) which supervises the SEZs should have a result-oriented criteria for judging the performance rather than roadshows and investment conferences that focus on MoU signings and media publicity but have little to show for maturing actual projects.

5. Education- The Missing Link

Pakistan has not been able to prioritize, inculcate and collectively understand the unmatched impetus that an educated populace can provide to the economy as well as to the body-politics of a nation-state. A fundamental issue is the understanding of the importance of education in the nation's collective consciousness. From the standpoint of the government and its ministers, education is seen as a marginalized department of the government that is not considered glamorous and wielding clout, as opposed to portfolios, such as that of the interior (security), industries and communications (UNDP 2018). This view is also reinforced by the education sector that underpays teachers, both in schools and universities, with some exceptions of the elite private sector universities (UNESCO 2017). Furthermore, in addition to being underpaid, teachers are not provided a social security net that, for example, civil servants, military officers and employees of multinational corporations receive, exhibiting a stark contrast for young people that are aspiring professionals and in the process of selecting a career for themselves. Pakistan lags behind its South Asian counterparts on key indicators of education, such as adult literacy rate and gross primary enrollment rate. The following graph summarizes the performance of Pakistan on various key indicators in the education sector.

Figure 10.2: Relative performance of Pakistan and other South Asian countries on key indicators of education



Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2015

The 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan, which was passed by the Parliament in 2010, devolved the subject of education to the provinces (National Assembly of Pakistan 2010). The 18th Amendment was meant to strengthen the federation and give provinces more autonomy (National Assembly of Pakistan 2010). Like every major surgery that jolts a human body, postoperative care and transition is key in the person's complete recovery to normalcy, the same was required in the transition after the passing of the 18th Amendment. Whilst the constitution was amended, the capacity of the provincial education departments was not enhanced and put at par with the new levels of responsibility and subsequent expectations that came with it (Rana 2020). Article 25-A of the 18th Amendment states that it is the state's responsibility to provide free and compulsory education to all children aged between 5-16 years (Rana 2020). However, thus far, Sindh is the only province that has developed rules to put education laws into effect (Rana 2020).

The inability of the state to provide quality education across the country has contributed to the mushrooming of religious seminaries that have filled the vacuum created by the absence of state-provided educational institutions. Many of these seminaries give shelter, food and their version of religious

education to the youth from impoverished families from across the country, creating large numbers of pseudo “imams” that, in turn, recruit more people with backgrounds similar to theirs, getting students as young as six years old who are deprived of a basic, all-rounded education which otherwise should have been a prerequisite, rather than a choice (Brookings 2001). A report by the Brookings Institution also stressed that the discretionary teaching techniques of the preachers and weak oversight of the education being imparted to the students makes Madrassas conducive for sectarianism and extremism (Brookings 2001). In fact, the 2004 9/11 Commission Report confirmed that numerous Pakistani seminaries were associated with imparting radicalism by promoting and justifying the use of violence (National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States 2004).

According to a 2014 Education for All Global Monitoring Report, working women that have an education of secondary education or higher earned 95 percent more than women with negligible or no literacy. The difference, in the case of men, was only 33 percent (UNESCO 2014).

A useful example to learn from is Kerala, a state in Pakistan’s next-door neighbor, India. While the rest of India maintained a GNP of \$330 and a literacy rate of 52 percent in 1991, Kerala still managed to attain 100 percent literacy despite its lower GNP of \$298 dollars. This example suggests that poverty is not an impediment to literacy as it is commonly believed (The Yale review of International Studies 2013). One of the factors that led to high participation in the schools by children of Kerala was the Mid-day Meal (MDM) program that involved freshly cooked lunch served to the children in government and government-aided schools (Government of Kerala 2011). The meals are prepared by members of the Parent-Teacher Association that ensures the quality of the food and are prepared in permanent or semi-permanent kitchen sheds that have been put up in every school since 1985 (Government of Kerala 2011). The civil society of Kerala and its citizen-led movements have also significantly contributed to the high literacy rates in Kerala (The Yale Review of International Studies 2013). For example, the Kerala People’s Science Movement, which had 70,000 volunteers in 1994, initiated the Total Literacy Campaign that eventually enabled the unmatched literacy rates of Kerala (The Yale Review of International Studies 2013).

Conclusion

This chapter appreciates Pakistan's abundant potential and gives a way forward for actualizing it. The future development paradigm of Pakistan should center upon the 3 Ss: schools, SEZs and soft power, all three of which are critical ingredients for a country that aspires to be a formidable part of today's globalized world. As demonstrated in this chapter, a more literate populace, generating export-led economic growth and rebranding of 'brand Pakistan' via soft power can propel Pakistan forward and help in carving its place in the 21st century. Undertaking this development paradigm has to be a sustained and consistent policy that is driven by a bi-partisan 'strategic consensus' by Pakistan's civilian and military leadership.

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CHAPTER 11

Supporting Export Competitiveness in Pakistan's Industrial Sector Amid Covid-19

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Abstract

The objective of this study is to investigate possibilities for an export-led recovery amid and post-pandemic in select industrial sectors. We study here firms from textile, leather, agro and food processing sectors of Pakistan. We have surveyed 256 Pakistani exporting firms across these sectors. Our findings reveal that pandemic has led to changes in production, information, and trade costs, product and quality standards demanded by international buyers, including stringency in Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. We also found that temporary trade restrictions could prevail during medium to longer term as new strains of COVID-19 are appearing. The smaller firms are now also forced to bear some additional sunk costs including investing in their digital capabilities and embrace digital trade integration. Based on these findings it is recommended that the government apart from supporting some of the production costs of firms may also investigate trade-related costs where small and medium-sized exporters will need help. There is a need to understand why some firms are still unable to access government support package; what are the post-pandemic capacity building needs of exporting firms and how government policy can help; what changes may be required to existing bilateral and regional trade agreements in the wake of new forms of trade restrictions or recurrent temporary trade barriers; and which evidence sourcing methods can lend rapid information to the government and enable them to insulate exporting firms from the negative impacts of future lockdowns.

1. Introduction

COVID-19 has impacted global trade via 3 key transmission channels. These include disruption of domestic supply; reduction in global demand; and contagion effect spread through disrupted global value chains (Friedt, 2021).

As a consequence of the pandemic, it is estimated that global trade volume could fall by 5.3 percent in 2020 and the improvement could take longer as the world continues to experience various forms of lockdowns (World Trade Organization, 2021). Forecasts show that the 60 percent of the economies are going to operate at suboptimal level till 2024. Rise in infectious cases in

most of the developed and developing economies forces governments to adopt extreme measures. These measures expedite the need for even more resources for the economic recovery.

Governments around the world tried to rescue production through fiscal and monetary stimulus, and the efforts are still on going. Most governments are trying to understand which stimulus design is best to help firms trading across borders. Developing countries are more likely to face severe trade-off between adopting right extent of contingency measures to curtail the spread of virus and to embrace policies for revival of the trade sector.

Like other developing economies, Pakistan is no different. The very first measure taken by government was to ensure awareness, so industry and labor can quickly undertake safety measures and pivot. Due to less responsive behavior during the initial days, Pakistan also observed strict lockdown at the start of pandemic (Noreen et al., 2020; Tripathi et al., 2020). It was followed by country-wide lockdown imposed in the last week of March 2020. Temporary shutdown of business and trade operations was also observed during this time. In the wake of food shortages, farm output and processed food items were allowed movement within and across cities. Some imported food supplies faced shortages. This strict form of lockdown was eased after the first wave, only to be replaced by micro or smart lockdowns as in no time the country saw another surge in cases. Within a 12-month period since March 2020, the country had already witnessed three waves of the pandemic with more expected due to delays in vaccines and medical solutions.

As micro lockdowns on short notices are a norm now and could continue in the medium term the government has tried to develop communication channels with the business community so that they are informed well in time regarding possibilities of disruption. However, such a state is now hampering the manufacturing sector's ability to meet deadlines, scale up operations, or secure long term orders from abroad (Ahmed et.al., 2021).

The lack of clarity with regard to future prospects of trading firms has also affected their ability to access the government support through banking sector. The banking and financial institutions continue to assess the potential borrowers using the pre-pandemic valuation methods. While large firms still can navigate their way, access for the small trading firms is still subject to large transactions costs and time delays (Nazir et al., 2021).

The policymakers, now faced with new challenges around inclusion will have to rely on instruments that had particularly benefited the excluded firms (Raihan et al., 2020). For this purpose, the designing of inclusive support packages could encompass several priorities in terms of selection criterion. These may include a) identification of existing and potential exporting firms, b) firms and sectors that contribute most in terms of value addition or job creation, and c) firms with deeper integration with the region and beyond (Srhoj et al., 2020). Such approaches could also help understand which firms are most vulnerable and therefore worthy of receiving government support prior to others.

Besides the firms working in conventional sectors in any economy, the role of support enterprises in, for example, the digital sector has become increasingly important for smooth functioning of online business operations. Firms working in digital space have bright prospects even during these challenging times. Through this effort we are also interested to know how non-traditional exporting sectors (e.g., in services) can be facilitated by change in policy priorities at federal and provincial levels. Ultimately sectors supporting trade operations would also require a comprehensive response (Evenett et al., 2020; Naudé & Martin, 2020).

The key research questions of our survey-based inquiry are provided below.

- What recurring issues are faced by manufacturing sector exporters during the pandemic?
- What is the revenue loss observed while comparing pre-pandemic and peak of pandemic periods?
- What type of additional costs (fixed and variable) were faced by exporting firms during the lockdowns?
- What were the coping strategies adopted by exporting firms?
- How did government support help to pivot? Which policy and regulatory measures were most effective? What new government measures are desired?
- Which engagement tools could help strengthen a shared understanding of how to avoid short term losses and what evidence or communication tools are helpful to improve the response during future crises?

The next section summarizes the emerging literature on this subject. This is followed by a discussion on our methodology. In section four we explain the pattern of Pakistan's exports and imports amid first and second wave of the pandemic. In section five we discuss findings from a firm level survey conducted between October and December 2020. We conclude with policy recommendations.

2. Literature Review

A number of studies reported the impact of Covid-19 on exports (Minondo., 2021; Veeramani & Anam, 2021; Verschuur et al., 2021) and exporting firms and have highlighted the disruption in a) domestic and international supplies; 2) reduction in global demand; 3) disruptions in global value chains (GVCs). These types of impacts were highlighted across various sectors such as textile; leather; agriculture (Lin & Zhang, 2020); food; and services.

Espitia et al., (2020) in their work while analyzing the export restrictions which come about because of pandemic shock show how the food prices increased in turn affecting the food importing countries adversely. Similarly, (World Bank, 2020) found that food sector was affected due to containment policies which limit the mobility of seasonal workers whereas the activities which require larger number of workers doing work in close proximity were also affected. In their study while highlighting the major challenges faced by businesses such as financial, supply chain disruption, decrease in demand and lack of sales and profit, (Shafi et al., 2020) found out that firms adopted strategies such as applying for bank loan, shut down of operations, temporary layoff of employees and decrease in workers' salaries and some of these coping strategies were found to be effective.

On the impact of lockdowns (World Bank, 2020) found out that businesses such as transport, warehousing, retail and wholesale along with communication services were the businesses badly affected. This ultimately will result in a slowdown in trade-in-services. Explaining relationship between trade costs and competitiveness (Maliszewska et al., 2020) examined that higher trade costs resulted in decrease of competitiveness of Chinese production.

There are also studies highlighting the economic contraction and its impact on the demand and price of key exports. Wijayasiri (2020) highlighted that to deal with situation of economic contraction and its impact on the price of export items, exporters can focus on promoting value-addition, branding,

differentiation, and quality in order to boost their export and export competitiveness. Chabossou et al., (2021) found that due to the pandemic, exporting firms faced decline in quarterly turnover and through timely support to these firms gloomy medium term trade outlook could be reversed.

To our knowledge no study exists which provides the analysis on impact of COVID-19 in the context of current and potential exporting firms of Pakistan, including impact on firm's output, labor productivity, resilience to external shocks, and trade costs. Second, no study at this point tries to ask the exporting firms which government facilitation measures were more effective than others amid the pandemic. Third, this is the first study that provides lessons for both government and exporting firms and how these lessons from first and second wave can help design of better response amid future lockdowns.

3. Data and Methodology

For our survey we have identified a mix of exporting sectors of Pakistan. We divided the sectors into traditional exports such as value-added textile (Sodhi, 2014) and leather; and non-traditional exports such as agro¹ and food processing². Within these sectors, our sample comprises of firms from Islamabad (capital territory), and provinces including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh. Reason for selection of cities within these provinces is on the basis of location of exporting firms, e.g., in case of traditional sector majority of the value chain point of interest are present in the cities or location selected. In case of textile and leather, Punjab has the highest value chain points of interest (38) followed by Sindh (26) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (14) (BOI, 2020). Similarly, looking at the non-traditional sector (agro-processing and processed food), contribution of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh is large compared to other regions. Punjab has the highest total crop area of 73% (GoP, 2019) (out of 22.7 million hectares, it has 16.5 million-hectare crop area) followed by Sindh with 16% of the total crop area (GoS, 2018). The sample distribution is provided in Table 1. The questionnaire was sent out to 400 firms out of which 256 valid responses were received.

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1. Output from cultivation of agricultural and horticultural crops, vegetables and post-harvest operation on all fruits and vegetables.
 2. Output after converting fresh foods into food products. This includes washed, chopped, pasteurized, frozen, fermented, packaged, and cooked food etc.

Table 11.1: Sample Distribution across Sectors	
Sectors	Exporting Firms (Number)
Traditional Sector:	183
• Value added textile	136
• Value added leather	47
Non-Traditional Sector:	73
• Argo-processing industries	23
• Processed food industries	50
Total Sample Size	256
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ratio of sectoral exports to total exports	

Most of the share in our sample has been allocated to traditional sector (183 firms in total) due to significant export value as percentage of total exports. Within the traditional sector, textile has been given highest weightage i.e., 75% (136 out of 183 firms). Leather has a weight of 25% (47 out of 183 firms). The non-traditional sector (agro processing and processed food) has been allocated share of 28.5% (73 out of 306 firms). It is based on the percentage of agro and food exports, which comprises 20% of the total exports on average per annum, with majority going to processed food sector (50 out of 73) whereas rest are exporters in agro-processing sector (SBP, 2020).

The next step in our methodology was key informant interviews (KIIs) and structured public-private dialogues (PPDs) to strengthen our qualitative insights. Both KIIs and PPDs were aimed at bringing out information related to future outlook as envisaged by the trade sector firms. Total of 66 KIIs (47 male and 19 female) were completed with representatives from government (federal and provincial); think tanks; development organization; academia; Chambers of Commerce and Industries; and associations such as leather and leather goods association, leather association and various economic cooperation associations.

A discussion and crosstalk between private and public sector participants during PPDs allowed a candid exchange of ideas and probing questions by both sides. In this regard 7 PPDs were conducted with representatives from readymade garment (firm and association representatives); women-led

exporting enterprises and associations; and representatives from horticulture and processed food sectors.

4. Findings from the firm level survey

4.1 Reporting a lockdown

Overall duration for low turnover due to lockdowns in 2020 varies between 1 and more than 6 months. Approximately 70 percent of the exporting firms reported a shutdown in plant operations. Shutdown period ranges from 14 to 52 days. Within the firms reporting a shutdown 60 percent faced export revenue loss; 15 percent struggled to deliver in time and decrease in future orders whereas 10 percent firms report a shift in consumer demand.

The larger firms were more resilient in comparison to small and medium sized firms thus were least impacted by the shutdown – a conclusion we also see in (Dua et al., 2020; OECD. 2020). This also indicates towards larger firm's ability to manage cashflow challenges. As per government policy, firms which were having export orders were also allowed to reopen earlier as compared to others. Additional time was spent in dealing with various government departments and demonstrating compliance with standard operating procedures (SOPs) of Covid-19.


Firms on average reported between 1 and 10 days of dealing with various government departments with larger firms having smaller number of days relative to the smaller ones. This may be due to better understanding of SOPs available with larger entities. Agro-based and food processing firms reported the highest, more than 30 days of dealing with government departments during the first and second waves. On the other hand, the leather and textile firms reported relatively lower number of days. Dealing with the labor department and ensuring SOPs for labor was a major challenge for textile and leather firms.

Almost 100 percent of the firms in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Punjab provinces reported low turnover. This declined to 91.5 percent for firms in Sindh province. Lesser number of agro-based and food processing firms reported reduced turnover compared to firms in leather and textile industries as the former were allowed to open relatively earlier in view of food security needs.

4.2 Challenges Amid Covid-19

The frequency of problems faced by firms during the Covid-19 pandemic is reported in Figure-1. The problems frequently reported include (a) inability to deliver existing orders on time and as per quantity agreed³, (b) decrease in export orders⁴, (c) shift in consumer demand⁵, (d) increase in financial difficulties⁶, (e) decrease in local orders⁷, (f) disruption in logistics, and (g) upstream and downstream disruptions. There are over 15 percent of the exporting firms who struggled in either their ability to deliver existing orders or report a decrease in export orders. Around 10 percent firms report either a shift in consumer demand or an increase in the difficulty in financing their production.

Figure 11.1: Challenges Faced During First and Second Wave of the Pandemic



Source: Authors

Out of 256 firms, 120 reported at least one of the following problems: export loss, transportation delays, cash flow issues and production loss. The firms in the agro-based industry reported the highest prevalence of the problems with production loss being the most significant outcome of first wave of Covid-19. The prevalence of problems increases as the size of the firm decreases.⁸


3. Also reported in World Bank., 2020.
4. Also reported in Shafi. et al., 2020.
5. Also reported in Mehta, Saxena, & Purohit, 2020
6. Cash flow challenges also reported in OECD, 2020b
7. Also reported in Zou, Huo, & Li, 2020
8. Broadly firm size is as follows: small: 10-50 employees; medium: 51-250 employees; and Large: 250 and above. This is inline with State Bank of Pakistan’s definition.

Disruption in logistics is a major issue for firms in both agro-based and food processing industries. There were increased regulations for safe and hygienic handling of food. The decrease in future purchase orders from abroad was also as a challenge more intensively seen in agro-based industry. The gas supplies and associated tariff during first wave posed a challenge for firms in both leather and textile sectors relatively more than the other two sectors. Leather sector reports the highest prevalence in cost per firm across four industries.

4.3 Cash Flow Sustainability and Working Capital

Cashflow sustainability remained another challenge for firms during first and second wave. Firms reported different types of costs which created cashflow difficulties. Within the provinces these costs vary e.g., Khyber Pakhtunkhwa finds disruption in logistics, including storage and warehousing; Sindh reports high electricity costs (despite low production), and the Punjab reports uncertain gas supplies and uncertainty around tax rates during pandemic period, including slow (tax) refunds as the most significant costs. Despite a reduction in tax rates for some sectors, the compliance costs have remained high for trading firms (as most are also supplying locally). Despite low turnover, staff salary budgets remained high as firms resisted the layoffs (losing trained labor would have meant a permanent loss).


Figure 11.2: Major Costs Posing Cash Flow Challenges



Source: Authors

To deal with the above-mentioned costs, firms took remedial measures to deal with cash flow shortages. Overall, approximately, 15 per cent of the exporting firms reported cash flow availability of less than 1 month, 65 per cent reported sustainability of 1-3 months and 20 per cent reported sustainability of more than 3 months. The firms in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reported lower levels of sustainability than the firms in the Punjab and Sindh.

Figure 11.3: Measures to Deal with Cash Flow Shortages



Source: Authors

Although, firms reporting cash flow availability of more than three months were equally prominent across the four industries, a larger percentage of firms in agro-based and leather industries reported low levels of cash flow and working capital availability. Larger firms showed greater cash flow sustainability than smaller firms. More than 35 per cent of large-sized firms showed cash flow sustainability of more than 3 months.

Temporary shutdown of operation and borrowing from formal financial or other sources were the most prevalent forms of coping mechanisms in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; firms in the Punjab resorted to temporary shutdowns, rationalized operating costs, and pursued tax rebates with Federal Board of Revenue. The most prevalent measure in Sindh was staff layoffs or reduction.

The leather industry revealed multiple and most number of measures to deal with cash flow shortages, with heavy reliance on temporary shutdowns. The

textile sector was helped by the rebates it received to deal with the cash flow shortages, while the agro-based firms reported a higher prevalence of loans from sources other than the financial sector (e.g., peer to peer lending) and the food-processing firms relied on reduction of operating costs.

Approximately 60 per cent of the firms surveyed reported an export loss (higher for small size firms), with an average loss in export value of 46 per cent. Firms in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reported the highest in terms of export loss due to the pandemic. The firms in the agro-based industry reported an export value loss of 67 per cent, which was the highest among the four industries.


Approximately 14 per cent of all firms surveyed reported a change in export documentation processes after COVID-19. The learning costs associated with such changes in documentation are felt dearly during emergency times. Firms in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reported the largest change followed by Sindh. In sectoral terms, firms in the leather industry reported the highest change, while firms in food processing reported the least.

Training labor on pandemic-related SOPs and workplace hygiene was a major strategy to continue smooth operations at plant sites. Firms in Sindh adopted the highest number of measures per firm. In sectoral terms, food processing industries adopted the highest number of measures per firm. Larger firms reported a higher prevalence of these strategies than the smaller firms.

4.4 Increase in Operations Costs

The approaches towards pivoting adopted amid pandemic are presented in Figure 4. These include: (a) training labor on SOPs and improved workplace hygiene, (b) quality control measures, (c) use of livestreamed online stores, (d) production or exports of new products, and (e) finding new export markets abroad. There is a significantly higher mention of training labor on SOPs and workplace hygiene as 213 out of 256 firms reported this strategy. This also seems to be a major demand of buyers abroad once they conduct own due diligence. The adoption of other strategies is limited. Many exporting firms see investing in adoption of new and safe production methods as part of their organizational learning although this led to temporary increase in operations costs. The firms in the agro-based industry reported the highest increase in fixed costs, followed by firms in the food-processing, leather, and textile industries, respectively.

Figure 11.4: Costs Associated with New Approaches Adopted during the Pandemic




Source: Authors

4.5 Cost Structure and Role of Expectations

The expectations of the future fixed and variable costs are presented in Figure 5. These expectations will play a significant role in future pricing strategies adopted by exporting firms. A little over 50 per cent of the firms believe that fixed costs could increase further during the pandemic period. However, the share of firms expecting the variable costs of production to increase as the pandemic prevails is much higher at 80 per cent.


In terms of the fixed costs, rental, salaries, and access to utilities continue to top the list. There is fear of many suppliers approaching a shrunken market or faced with lower global demand for a long period. Owing to this, the expense on marketing and related promotional activities is also expected to increase. Agro and food processing sectors show a much higher expectation of increase in fixed costs than textile or leather. In terms of the variable costs, direct material expense, freight-out, and compliance with SOPs and other hygiene related measures are expected to increase more than other categories. Pakistan’s commitment under the program finalized with International Monetary Fund also indicates that medium term tariffs of both electricity and gas could go up. Agro-processing and leather sector expect a much higher increase in variable costs compared to other sectors.

Figure 11.5: Expectations Regarding Firm's Fixed and Variable Costs




Source: Authors

Figure 11.6: Expectations Regarding Firm's Disaggregated Fixed Costs




Source: Authors

Figure 11.7: Expectations Regarding Firm’s Disaggregated Variable Costs



Source: Authors

Figure 11.8: Sector-wise Expectations Regarding Firm’s Fixed and Variable Costs



Source: Authors

4.6 Government Support and Uptake

Only a half of the exporting firms reported availing at least one facility offered under the government's package for exporters (including facilitation offered by the central bank). 13 per cent firms in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 98 per cent in the Punjab and 27 per cent in Sindh have availed at least one facility. It is likely that the facilitation, information, or outreach regarding these support measures was not uniform across the country due to which we observe a large variation in uptake.


Firms in the agro-based industries reported the lowest percentage at 13 per cent, while on average 55 per cent of the firms belonging to other industries availed at least one facility. There are 17 per cent micro-sized firms who availed government facilitation compared to 50 per cent small-sized firms, 64 per cent medium-sized and 49 per cent large-sized firms.

More specifically, our survey inquired about access to: (a) central bank refinance scheme to support employment and prevent lay-offs, (b) borrowing at reduced interest rate, (c) relief package for businesses by federal or provincial governments, (d) ensuring availability and continuity of financial services, (e) facilitation with online presence and payments, (f) relief in utility bills, including electricity, (g) tax facilitation and rebates, (h) access to new information on business opportunities provided by various government departments, and (i) farmer field schools.

The most effective schemes as per our respondents were: (i) information provided on new business opportunities⁹, (ii) relief in utility bills, (iii) facilitation with digital payments (Veeramani & Anam, 2021), and ensuring availability and continuity of financial services. The least effective measures were those adopted by tax authorities, according to our respondents as shown in Figure 9. Contrary to the popular perception regarding liberal availability of loans, respondents in Sindh informed regarding slow processing of loans for fixed investment and modernization that also adversely impacted firms who have potential to get more export orders.


9. For example, SME clinic was initiated by Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority.

Figure 11.9: Effectiveness of Government Support




Source: Authors

Figure 11.10: Effectiveness of Government Support by Province



Source: Authors

Figure 11.11: Effectiveness of Government Support by Sector




Source: Authors

4.7 Precautionary Measures

All firms surveyed adopted at least one of suggested measures on their premises to curtail the spread of the pandemic. The main precautionary measures as shown in

Figure 11.12: Precautionary Measures taken by Firms during the pandemic



Source: Authors

Figure include: (a) usage of masks, sanitizers, handwash facilities and face shields, (b) multilingual communication on SOPs notified by the government, (c) use of germ-killing spray, and (d) monitoring of employees' health status, including regular COVID-19 tests of employees. 192 out of 306 firms (67%) made it mandatory to use personal protective equipment at all times. 120 firms ensured multilingual communications on SOPs, and 107 firms disinfected their premises on a daily basis.

Firms in the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reported greater precautionary measures than other parts of the country. The firms in the Punjab were more likely to adopt the use of masks and sanitizers, while firms in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa adopted communication in local language on SOPs. More than 50 per cent of the firms surveyed in the Punjab spent less than Rs 20,000 per month, while this percentage for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh was much lower.

Precautionary measures were more prevalent in the food processing industries relative to other industries. More than 70 per cent of the firms in this sector spent Rs 100,000 (USD 640) to 1 million (USD 6400 approximately) per month on the precautionary measures, while more than 40 per cent of the firms in the leather industry spent less than Rs 20,000 (USD 130) per month.

Larger firms were more likely to monitor the health of their workers and use of sanitizers. The smaller firms were more likely to enforce the use of face masks and multilingual communications.

4.8 Human Resource Challenges

Most firms had to consider changing the number of daily wage workers present on the premises, and the salary or incentives provided to workers. Around 19 per cent of the exporting firms laid off their staff. The highest percentage was reported in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at 31 per cent followed by Sindh at 17 and the Punjab at 15 per cent.


The agro-based and leather industries reported the lowest percentages at 13 per cent. The textile industries reported the highest percentage of staff laid off at 23 per cent and food sector firms followed at 18 per cent. There is emerging evidence now that as textile industry reopened some of the laid off staff was able to make its way back to regular job routine. However, this evidence is at best anecdotal. Small-sized firms reported the highest (25%) of staff laid off. Firms located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and firms in the textile industry are likely to be relatively vulnerable.

The measures to manage the surge in labor costs (and cost to make labor practices compliant with SOPs) over the months following the COVID-19 outbreak are presented in Figure 14. The main measures include adopting (a) flexible working hours, (b) new modes of worker education or training, (c) scaling up of employees' skills for efficient working, (d) critical compensation, (e) monitoring performance management and organizational restructuring, and (f) ad hoc hiring to accommodate increased demand (for example seen in some regions for food sector). Out of 306 firms, 154 firms adopted flexible working hours and 81 firms invested in improving employee skills.

Firms in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were found more likely to experiment different measures to manage labor costs than firms in the Punjab and Sindh. The flexible working hours method is more preferred in the Punjab compared to other provinces. Firms in the Punjab are unlikely to hire more in the near future given the perception of future waves.

The firms in the food processing industry experimented different measures relatively more than firms in other industries. The new hiring to accommodate an increase in demand for products (once economy recovers) is also more likely for firms in food processing than in the other industries. Furthermore, firms in food processing industries are more likely to invest in improving the skills of the employees. Lastly, the micro-sized firms were more flexible, and keen towards worker training.

Figure 11.13: Measures to Manage Future Labor Costs



Source: Authors

4.9 Challenges in Acquiring Inputs and Intermediate Goods

Exporting firms reported challenges in acquiring raw materials to produce their output amid COVID-19 pandemic. Some firms highlighted how difficult it was to source raw material from abroad due to disruptions in transport, logistics, and customs immediately after the outbreak. Around 77 per cent of the firms reported constraints in acquiring domestic inputs and 29 per cent reported challenges in acquiring foreign inputs.


Firms in the Punjab were the most constrained in acquiring their domestic inputs as 100 per cent of the firms reported difficulty followed by 52 per cent of the firms in Sindh. Firms in the Punjab and Sindh were equally constrained when acquiring foreign inputs, at 33 per cent. The firms in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were the least constrained by the pandemic in acquiring foreign inputs as 15 per cent of the firms were impacted.

The firms across the four industries were equally constrained in acquiring domestic inputs, with 80 per cent of the firms reporting constraints. On the other hand, less than 10 per cent of the firms in the agro-based industry reported difficulty acquiring foreign inputs, 18 per cent of the firms in the food processing industry, 34 per cent in leather industry and 35 per cent in the textile industry.

The large-sized firms (65%) reported difficulties in getting domestic inputs, however a substantial 97 per cent of small-sized firms reported difficulties. The larger firms were more constrained than the smaller firms in acquiring foreign inputs. Micro-sized firms did not report any constraints in acquiring foreign inputs. This is possible if micro-sized firms are not purchasing foreign inputs for their production.

The export sector took several measures to counter the constraints due to shortages of raw material or increase in prices of inputs. The most important measures were (a) negotiating a delayed delivery of goods, (b) decreased production levels, (c) seeking new procurement channels, (d) reducing range of products and focusing on core items, and (e) additional working hours for existing workers.

Figure 11.14: Measures taken due to counter raw material shortages or rising input price




Source: Authors

4.10 Adoption of Digital Channels

The effectiveness of digital trade integration can be essential in the pivot process. This is exhibited in Figure 16. More than 60 per cent of the firms reported that the use of online banking facilities for payments were either effective or highly effective – a phenomenon less resorted to before the pandemic. The customer support within banks to bring their clients online was expedited after the pandemic. The central bank also scaled up its digital space initiatives under the National Financial Inclusion Strategy. Around 30 Pakistani firms have recently been listed on Amazon – a development which should also help the e-commerce sector development in the country.

Figure 11.15: Effectiveness of digital trade measures



Source: Authors

Conclusion

This study looks at the competitiveness of exporting firms amid pandemic. We argue that with timely government support an export-led recovery is certainly possible in the medium term.

Based on the survey and analysis, it has been found that government continues to focus on production costs’ amid Covid-19 however it is equally important to understand the trade costs and how they are changing for key exporting firms of Pakistan. The pandemic has led to changes in product, health and safety standards demanded by buyers, including stringency in SPS measures. All these have cost implications. Furthermore, temporary trade measures could remain in place for some time as sudden trade restrictions come into play once new strains of Covid-19 are discovered in the with whom Pakistani firms trade.

We also note that transport, warehousing, and logistics chains will continue to be marred by various forms of lockdowns. This also affects countries whose trade-in-transit is dependent on Pakistan (e.g., see case of Afghanistan-Pakistan transit trade in Ahmed & Shabbir, 2016). It is therefore important to

develop rapid evidence-use systems (e.g., trade portals and commodity-wise dashboards) which inform both buyers and sellers with regards to possible supply chain disruptions. Such systems could act as an early warning alarm and will ultimately reduce the extent of uncertainty. The government could share some of the costs of setting up such country-wide dashboards.

To deal with the pandemic and improving healthcare support for trade-related persons, there should be improved health facilities ensured for workers dealing with moving goods or receiving them at port and other border destinations. There is a case for expanding health and life insurance facility for workers in logistics chain and subsidizing costs related to Covid-19 tests and vaccinations.

Information and networking costs remain high for women-led exporting firms. The smaller firms will also face additional sunk costs to pivot and adopt online and digital tools for smooth operations. Concessional lending should be available for creative and innovative startup exporters to help them cover such costs. Some capacity building needs of the small, startup or even potential exporting firms could be covered through the Export Development Fund at the Ministry of Commerce (Ahmed et al., 2020).

Covid-19 also gives opportunity to policy makers to allow greater regional integration a chance. Economies such as India and Pakistan have complementarities for example in textile and garments sector (Batool & Ahmed, 2021). Any delays in raw materials or temporary price hikes for input items could be avoided if manufacturers in both countries are able to trade freely.

The new realities also call for revisiting the arrangements under Pakistan's already signed free trade agreements with China, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and other economies (Ahmed et.al, 2010). As the movement of people has been curtailed, provisions regarding trade-in-services would need to be revised in an accommodative manner. Pakistan's exporters in social enterprise space will also gain from increased facilitation of services exports (Nazir et al., 2021). Greater online integration between financial systems of trading partner countries could be a timely step. Improved trade diplomacy is also desired to understand and develop new procurement channels for inputs of exporters awaiting more economical raw material and machinery related inputs¹⁰.

10. Hoekman (2020).

This study informs that timely access to trade finance is always important for exporters, who find themselves cash-starved and unable to commit to larger orders amid emergencies.¹¹ Trade finance is confined to traditional export sectors currently and the know-how regarding business models of non-traditional exporting sectors, including those in the digital space, needs to be enhanced at the lending institutions.

Most of the firms interviewed in our survey wanted more information on how consumers taste, and preferences (outside of Pakistan) would change as a result of pandemic. Such evidence could be collected through trade officers of Ministry of Commerce posted abroad in Pakistani embassies (Ahmed, 2018). There is also need for establishment of regular communication channels between Pakistan's embassies abroad and export community at home. To strengthen digital trade integration, a policy drive to support transition of firms towards online modes is required. The e-commerce policy already has some such outputs whose implementation needs to be expedited.

Continuous reform of trade taxes including customs duties could keep a check on anti-export bias, and incidence of informal trade (Ahmed & Donoghue, 2010). Frequent changes to tariff policy could lead to delayed trade and investment decisions by the business community. Likewise, it is important to review the tax refunds arrangements which should remain prompt so that exporters do not face any working capital crunch amid emergency times. For better understanding of future uncertainties, there is need for regular, inclusive, and structured public-private dialogue convened by the government which will help in sourcing rapid evidence on how various forms of risks and challenges to trade could be mitigated.

11. Defever (2020). Also see Christine Apedo-Amah (2020).

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