Towards an Accountable Security Sector in Nigeria

Abdulwahab Ademola Lawal
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Issues of unprofessionalism from relation with the citizens and fellow agencies to accounting for funds abound with the security officers.

The effect is seen in the worsening insecurity in the country and the bad name of the armed forces.

Effecting synchronised civilian participation in the security institution will help check accountability.
Towards an Accountable Security Sector in Nigeria

by

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Inclusive Participation in Nigeria’s Security Sector: Trends and Opportunities by Dr Iro Aghedo

Analysis 3:
Institutional Capacity and Capability of Nigeria’s Security Sector by Dr Wilson O V Ijide

Analysis 4:
Non-State Security Sector in Nigeria: Trends and Challenges by Dr Ndubuisi N Nwokolo

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Analysis 6:
Policing, Police and the Feasibility of Their Reform in Nigeria by Dr Chris M A Kwaja

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The rising intensity of insecurity challenges in Nigeria necessitates the quest for effective and efficient security. The ideal expectation is that the country reflects the findings of the analytical discourses in its security reform as evidence-based decisions.

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Abstract

Nigeria’s security sector does not enjoy public acclaim because of unrealised security hopes of the people. The hopes and peace of the people are threatened in the rising insecurity in the country. It is obvious even to the public that the security agencies lack professionalism and there is the lack of synergy among the security agencies as they trespass each other’s jurisdiction, causing further threats and sometimes fatalities that they are engaged to manage. The situation points to security agencies’ failure, resulting from ethics failure and corruption. Therefore, this analysis, just as Nigerians, challenges the staggering amounts budgeted for defence and security, like that of the 2020 Budget that is ₦1,388.9 trillion ($3.853 billion)¹, while insecurity continues rising. The discourse used the Armed Forces of Nigeria, the predominant part of Nigeria’s security architecture, as the independent variable with regard that the forces make up the state’s major instrument for operationalising security. Thus, expectedly, treating the challenges of the armed forces shall significantly and effectively affect the entire security sector. The study treated the challenges by reviewing local media reports, international practices and experts’ observations of professional practices in the field. The findings highlighted the need for effecting the inclusion of non-state actors in the security sector and posited that only a synchronised civilians’ involvement structured in an accountability mechanism of the defence and security sector can mitigate the challenges for the sector to render its duties accountably. The study made further case with details for an imperative reform of Nigeria’s security sector.

Keywords: Hybridity of Forces, Counterbalancing Forces, Interagency Collaboration, Concentric Circles, Professionalism, Ethics and Values, Rules of Engagement, Civil-Military Relations, Civilian Ombudsperson, Freedom of Information Act

1 Introduction

Nigeria’s security sector includes the armed forces of the federation, which comprises the Nigerian Army (NA), the Nigerian Navy (NN) and the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) with the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) as its part and other branches as the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the State Security Service (SSS) nicknamed the Department of State Security (DSS), National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), the National Agency for the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP), Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), Police Community Relations Committee (PCRC) and Peace Corps. And by definition, the Federal Fire Service (FFS) ought to be included in the list of Nigeria’s security sector. There is also the non-state security sector which comprises the private security organisations.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria delineates jurisdictions for each of the services and agencies. For a detailed recap on the functions and responsibilities of the armed forces see Ukpabi (1976), and for a general view on the armed forces see Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed (DCAF 2015) on the armed forces’ roles and responsibilities in good security sector governance.

¹ Nigerian naira converted to the Central Bank of Nigeria’s posted central value (the average buying and selling rates) to United States’ dollar, ₦360.50 to $1 as of July 7, 2020. Source: from CBN Exchange Rates https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/ExchRateByCurrency.asp
Despite the delineation for their operation, the armed forces operate beyond their bounds, interfering in each other’s roles. Particularly, the NA, the army, charged with the responsibility for land warfare, has become omnipresent in the Nigerian security sector and is often in a clear and intimidating presence around the country. The army is currently deployed for security operations in virtually all the 36 states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). In a 2019 publication by the NA, it said that its troops are being deployed across the country to identify every citizen in what it called ‘Operation Positive Identification’ among other anti-crime patrols as ‘Ayem Akpatuma’ in the north-central; ‘Egwu Eke’ in the south-east and ‘Crocodile Smile’ in the south-south and southwest (Campbell 2019; Ogundipe 2019), the mandate and jurisdiction which should be purely for the police. The NPF, whose responsibility it is to maintain law and order, has been rendered ineffective, perhaps because of their non-performance or their loss in the power dynamics within the Nigerian power game. There is a total confusion regarding their functions and responsibilities to the extent that the services clash or bump into each other. Such clashes create fatalistic disasters as it happened in Taraba State, where the army killed police operatives on special assignment (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] 2019; Nnadozie, Usman and Okolie 2019) or the recriminations between the army and other security agencies over whose responsibility it was to secure Dapchi in the Yobe State saga where insurgents overran a girls’ school and abducted many schoolgirls (Amnesty International [AI] 2018). And most embarrassingly, the EFCC versus NIA in the seizure of stashed away fund in a private home in Ikoyi, Lagos (Falana 2017; Oladejo and Dunia 2017).

The outcry today is about the collapse of the Nigerian security system. Even among themselves, there is a lack of collaboration and cooperation. In what has become common Nigerian parlance, inter-agency cooperation is a new field of public concern. There are many laws in the Nigerian statute books that oust civil liberty. Two examples are the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2011 and the Armed Forces Act. Specifics of these examples shall be discussed later in this study. Across the country, though in varying degrees, Nigerians face security challenges of insurgency in the north-east, rural banditry in the northwest, farmer-herder conflict in the north-central, kidnapping, cultism, communal clashes and rebellions across the entire country. In addressing these issues, vast sums of money are budgeted to the defence and security sector. For the year-2020 budget announced by the President, the Ministry of Defence alone has a budgeted recurrent and capital expenditures of ₦778.59 billion and ₦999.87 billion, about $2.16 billion and $27.70 million, respectively (Central Bank of Nigeria [CBN] 2020), while the Ministry of Police Affairs has an allocation of ₦395.83 billion. The Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) has ₦114.91 billion (Budget Office of the Federation 2019). If security votes of the states are added, the Nigerian security sector shall be the single most funded public sector.

In the wake of this heavy funding, financial accountability is weak as corruption in the sector is rife, civil-military relations are tenuous and materiel supplies for operation are in short supply (Dixon, Watson and Raymond 2017; Dixon and Wawro 2017). Accountability of the military to the people came to the hilt in the clash between the military and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN). The military’s atrocities were revealed at the Kaduna State Judiciary Commission. Public outcry together with damning reports from AI (2015) caused the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to institute an enquiry on the human rights abuses of the military. Till date, neither has the report of the enquiry been made public nor has the lack of accountability in military operations abated. Now and ongoing, in the military, is the trial of a Major General accused of looting ₦400 million.

2 Towards an Accountable Security Sector

This discourse, Towards an Accountable Security Sector in Nigeria, is an examination of the current security challenges, the structures available to address insecurity and the practices that have brought about these seeming elusive ends to the stalemate (Babalola and Onapajo
2018). The meaning of accountability in the context of the Nigerian security sector is the level of response to civil authority in terms of professionalism, budgetary control and subordination to civil authority. It is measured by the extent of the respect for human rights, the rule of law and the efficiency and effectiveness. Accountability includes being assigned responsibility and to transparently render stewardship to the relevant authority (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC] 2011). In this regard, there are observed shortfalls in the security sector’s accountability seen in the symbolic corruption in the sector, abuse of fundamental human rights, curtailment of civil liberty and the inability to deliver peace as a public good and the financial cost attendant to it. It is not surprising to have the Human Rights Watch (HRW 2010) work’s main title ‘Everyone’s in on the Game’, pointing the scope and depth of corruption in the police as well as Banini (2019) main title, ‘Security Sector Corruption and Military Effectiveness,’ that is one of the many works pointing the security sector’s corruption which affects its practices and accountability. The internal mechanisms even within the services do not accord with best practices that assure public accountability. To this extent, to secure loyalty and professionalism from the rank and file have been challenging and this much has been admitted by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in a public outcry (Mutum 2019; Oketade 2019).

This discourse set towards establishing the path to the best practices across the board of all stakeholders in the sector argues that if achieved, the nation would attain great heights in accountability to the people of Nigeria. There would also be professionalism, and consequently, effective delivery of the services of the sector which would achieve the outcome of peace and security not only in Nigeria but in the subregion. Above all, vast sums of money would be saved for the needed services for education (further on-the-job training and research & development), health and infrastructure.

The methodology adopted in this study is a combination of comparative analysis of practices in developed democracies, media reports and observed practices in the operational field by experts. We note, first, that the arrowhead of the Nigerian security architecture is the armed forces. If the armed forces get it right, much more would be achieved in accountability in the security sector of Nigeria. Second, a more responsive bureaucratic oversight functions are required to refocus the sector for better performance. Third, the sector faces modern challenges where the monopoly by the state in using coercive instrument has been eroded by the possession of civil materials that can be easily converted for applicable military use with catastrophic result. Training and technical expertise, hitherto, the exclusive preserve of the military can now be accessed freely in the cyberspace. Non-State Actors (NSAs) possess lethal capabilities to wrought devastation in the civil populace and match tactics and strategy strength to strength with the state. However, the phenomena of the military coercive instrument and technical knowledge expositions to the public and NSAs have forced a rethink in the strategy and doctrinal concepts to the effect that asymmetric warfare is an imposition upon the military causing nightmares and thinking outside the box. The recent invocation of the prayer warrior conference by the COAS is but an example of ‘thinking outside the box’! Winning the hearts and minds of the populace becomes a key determinant in conflict management.

Therefore, any security architecture that ignores the input of NSAs confronts legitimacy and possible failures. The explosion of information technology has shrunk the space of military secrecy. All these perspectives impact on the security sector. Civil-military relations have to be strong for any military campaigns to be successful. The United States Armed Forces lost the Vietnam War (1954-1975), not on account of lack of armament and might but partly, the account of the loss of home support. In effect, the role of the media and indeed the civil society cannot be discounted. The security sector is no longer an exclusive preserve of security agencies. This study offers recommendations to all stakeholders in the defence and security sector to achieve accountability in the sector.
3 Reconstructing the National Security Architecture

The security challenges of the nation call for a re-design of the national security architecture towards the concept of hybridity of forces. The current structure lacks synergy and there is an over-reliance on just one security force: the army. As can be observed from the security situation, the near-total loss of intelligence upon which combat operation must depend has granted initiatives and liberty to insurgents and bandits to strike at will and places of their choosing. The obliteration of jurisdictions and lack of inter-agency, inter-service collaboration and cooperation have hampered progress and service delivery. The national security architecture needs to be designed along three concentric circles, namely border security, provincial security and community security.

3.1 Border Security Force

The primary responsibility of the armed forces is the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation. It is a strategic responsibility which requires collaboration with other forces whose mandate impact on the success of this strategic objective. Herein lies the first hybridity of force talked about. A porous border is one of the enablers of insecurity. The talk of border walls in some climes is symbolic of the extreme need for border protection. For Nigeria, the situation is dire. Nigeria has total land boundaries of 4,447 kilometres with 4 neighbouring countries, with 20 of its 36 states on its boundaries. Each of the states has communities with their peculiarities. Most of the border communities lie between two countries and in mostly ungoverned spaces and difficult terrain.

Criminalities ranging from arms trafficking, smuggling of goods, human and drug trafficking thrive with little challenge from the state. The recent closure of the Nigerian border is in frustration of the situation. The proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Nigeria is alarming to the extent that unofficial figures of illegal SALW are about 12 million. Easy access to weapons is an enabler of violent extremism and criminality. The influx of undocumented migrants and itinerant merchants of violence are strong factors in the promotion and sustenance of insurgency. The possibility of retreat to a haven across border emboldens insurgents. A border protection force woven around the armed forces; the army, the police, the immigration and customs need to be created. Such creation should have a command centre that pools resources from the services to create border protection. Such joint components have become international best practices.

3.2 Provincial Security

In the Nigerian context, provincial refers to the interior administrative jurisdiction, which includes the states and local government areas. The second concentric circle of security should be managed by the police using a special branch roughly like the francophone gendarmes. Currently, there is the Nigeria Mobile Police Force which should be taking care of internal security like the role of the gendarmes of the francophone countries. Nigeria’s mobile police force is virtually inactive and needs to be reactivated strongly to take on their appropriate role. Other structures like the NSCDC responsible, primarily, for the protection of critical national infrastructures should complement internal security. The establishment of a ranger corps is also worth considering. The ranger corps should be run along the concept of forest guards under the authority of the state. This is yet another set of hybridity of forces. No one seems to be in charge of the forest, the desert and the remote geographic terrains that constitute security threat.

Hybridity of Forces

It is apt then to talk of hybridity of forces. What does hybridity mean? Simply put, it the capacity to mobilise independent options to address a challenge. In some climes, there are rangers, forest guards and desert police, etc. For hybridity, one may add NSAs like local vigilantes and registered private security companies to the provincial security architecture. The creation of these options grants the authority the freedom to use an applicable capacity to address threats. In the invasion of Iraq by the US forces, different
independent forces under different command and specialisation were encountered from province to province, culminating to the Presidential Guard, which defended the capital city of Baghdad. If adopted, the Police Zonal Command should be made the coordinating centre of the hybridity of forces.

3.3 Community Security

The third component of the security concentric circle is community security. It is a security mechanism necessary to defend the local community. The component of this segment is basically the resources of the community. This is where discussions surrounding the participation of NSAs come to prominence (Ordu and Nnam 2017). The vigilantes and the local hunters need to be integrated into the formal security system. There has been national dialogue about community-based policing. Community-based policing should be driven by the community where community resources can interface with state apparatus, namely the police and the justice system, to achieve community security resilience. Formal state police embedded in the community sympathises with the community and supports the community to achieve security objectives of the community. It is a community governance mechanism where planning and strategies are community-driven. It is not autonomous because it would have police oversight functions. To legitimise the community level structure, state enactments and local government bye-laws need to be put in place. The building block of national security architecture is the community. In addressing community security, many other components like community disaster management should be brought in. Such components include mode of communicating emergencies with the community and actions to be taken by every segment of the community, from schools to business and religious establishments.

4 Civil Control of the Armed Forces

Accountability in the security sector must begin with the armed forces, being the arrowhead of the national security architecture. Civil authority should have full control of the activities of the armed forces. The mechanism for civil control can be found in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Nigerian democracy, from 1999 to date, has faced security challenges that have sometimes shaken the very foundation of the country’s existence. Arising from the dividends of democracy, namely freedom of expression, the rule of law and fundamental human rights, much bottled-up anger over perceived injustices have been thrown up in agitations and confrontations with the country. The confrontations manifest in the forms of the Niger-Delta upheavals, the Boko Haram (BH) insurgency, communal clashes, IPOB agitation and the most daring confrontation between the IMN (the Shiite religious sect) and the NA (Obasi 2015). The confrontations indicate the test of will between the Nigerian government and internal non-state violent forces who illegally possess lethal weapons to confront the state in pursuit of their agenda. In all these tribulations, the country has normally resorted to the use of its instruments of coercion to defend its sovereignty. The clashes that take place between government forces and the agitators/insurgents have always led to public outcry over uneven handedness by government forces (HRW 2012).

Accountability in military operations can be measured through the application of fundamental human rights and the rule of law. In the Niger Delta, military operations at Odi village on November 20, 1999, left the community devastated. The village came to ruins and many young men and women non-combatants lost their lives. In the suit against the federal government by the community, the federal government was described by the judge of the court as irresponsible and was, thus, fined ₦37 billion out of which a negotiated ₦15 billion was paid by the federal government. Following on the heels of the Odi massacre came that of Zaki-Biam in Benue State (HRW 2001), fortuitously, the birthplace of a retired COAS. This village was similarly razed down by security forces. The war on BH in the north-east zone of the country has equally been characterised by destructions and humiliating loss of lives. At a time, in defiance to the military operation, the Borno State elders demanded the withdrawal of the army from their domain.
The AI has not, till date, relented in its accusation of the Nigerian military of high-handedness in handling the confrontations. On top of this is the concern about financial probity in the defence and security sector. The questions that follow all these are; “How can Nigeria control its security agencies to be less destructive?” and better still, “How can the country’s armed forces be made democratically accountable to the people from whose taxes they are maintained?”

Defence and security are public goods supplied by the state through military services. Given the amoral attitude of government services’ officials in their operations and resisting reforms, it is not surprising that the Nigerian security agencies continue to be replete with complaints and cases of corruption and inefficient performance. To democratically manage the armed forces, both the executive and the legislative arms of the government must take direct responsibility to manage the forces. Can the larger society also absorb themselves of the blame for this untoward situation? What platform is available for the citizenry to demand accountability?

4.1 Mechanisms for Civil Control

The civil authority in democracies is always at a dilemma as to ways and means of controlling its armed forces. By the nature of security, information on capacity, preparedness and future tasks must be made secret. There is the Official Secret Act just as there is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Each time a military operation takes place, public concerns about casualties, financial burden and curtailment of liberty, and in particular the rule of law become political issues erupting in the public domain. Adequate regulations and procedures must, therefore, be put in place for efficient and effective use of the armed forces. Yet nothing must be seen to tie the hands of the military in the discharge of their responsibility. The crucial question therefore is, “How can the nation manage its armed forces to be accountable, and that the civil authority is in firm control?”

a. Defence Policy

Defence policy sets the strategic framework through national interest and threat analysis in the short- medium- and long-term basis. Civil authority comprising the executive and legislative branches must work in tandem to produce a defence policy document that can serve the security needs of the nation. There must be periodic defence and security reviews by every incoming administration of the state. To produce this document, experts and even laymen will have to contribute in various ways. The document must seek to defend the culture, values and beliefs of the people as well as the nation’s aspiration in the comity of nations. For example, the role of the CJTF in the north-east brought to focus the need to factor inclusion of NSAs in the National Security Strategy (NSS) in the same manner community security resilience has become an issue.

Defence policy is used to galvanise the industrial sector of the nation as well as stimulate intellectual best minds, for in that document are the vision and aspiration of the nation. The preparation of such a document must not be taken lightly. In recent times, any cursory observer will not fail to realise that the Nigerian Defence Policy preparation and implementations are on an ad hoc basis. Nigeria maintained an army of 5 Divisions and was equipped for conventional warfare. Suddenly, it became massively expanded with budgetary implications not fore-planned. Within the last few years, the nation has been running around black markets to purchase arms and equipment to meet the new asymmetric warfare. This has resulted in catastrophic embarrassments for the nation. The incident of cash seizure in South Africa (BBC 2014) and revelations from Dasuki gate are reported fraudulent spending of the money among Dasuki and some notable Nigerians. See http://venturesafrica.com/why-nigerias-central-bank-recently-introduced-a-monetary-instrument-called-special-bills/ and ICG (2016): Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform. International Crisis Group Report 237 pp 11-12.
obvious manifestations of poor defence policy. The recent furore over the emergency purchase of Super Tucano not from the original manufacturers but a third-party country indicates ad hocery.

In the wake of overwhelming security challenges, the army has increased its strength from 5 to 8 Divisions. What this means is that force level was low and threat analysis and anticipation of future tasks extremely poor. Military personnel need adequate training to attain a certain proficiency level. Recruitment explosion into security forces compromises professionalism along with its ethical implications. In many climes like Canada, the UK and the US, reservists are the first line of mobilisation. Does the defence policy have any vision of the use of reservists and notional units? What ‘whole-of-society approach’—a concept in defence and security—do we have in any policy document? Many informed commentators have therefore called for the need for a review of Nigeria’s defence and security policy to include strategies for the mobilisation of ‘whole-of-society’ resources. The recent review of the NSS has brought on board the ideas of mobilising resources from society. It is yet to be seen how this needful concept can be implemented successfully.

b. Parliamentary Acts
The parliament is the representative of the people. The CSOs are often the voice of the people and so often instrumental in influencing bill proposals to the parliament. The parliament forms the major plank for the control of the armed forces and all other security services. In collaboration with the executive branch, it manages the sector through enactments and oversight functions. To effectively achieve this goal, the following mechanisms are to be adopted;

i. Budgeting: The parliament looks at the defence budget to ascertain that it conforms with the defence policy, and that expenditure is cost-effective and cost-efficient. To achieve this, members of the National Assembly (NASS) of Nigeria should be abreast of military technical terms and their tasking to achieve appropriate equipment capacity. It is instructive to note that whereas the US assembly members are not only grounded on military matters, but they also have military experts among their staff; most of their Nigerian counterparts have neither the knowledge nor experts among their staff to guide and build informed debate on defence and security matters. This flaw has obvious consequences on the management of Nigeria’s defence and security. Here lies the role of the civil society to fill the knowledge gap of generating informed debate and the building of capacity in the budgetary process. The foundation for financial and operational accountability of the security forces is the budget, and so needs utmost attention.

ii. Armed Forces Act: The advocacy around the Armed Forces Act has been very weak. It is instructive to note that some of its chapters are outdated. For example, Section 219 of the Armed Forces Act which relates to ‘billeting’ is sometimes abused. Currently, some school premises are being occupied by the military as operational bases in the north-east. Such a practice violates international laws and regulations. There must be a periodic review of the Armed Forces Act, say, every 5 years. This shall provide the opportunity for the civil authority to evaluate practices and amend them when required. In recent times, it has been seen how several service personnel have been court-marshalled and sentenced. Should a commander who has a vested interest in a case charge an accused and try him? The ongoing trial of the General Officer commanding 8 Division over alleged theft of ₦400 million has generated controversies (Vanguard 2019). The legal counsels of the accused have raised fundamental issues regarding conflicts of interest. Under the principle of fair hearing, should a service officer be fairly tried where the neutrality of his case is being questioned? The US, for example, has designed several mechanisms injecting neutrality into the administration of justice in the armed forces. For example, there is in the US Armed Forces an appeal court that is headed by a civilian judge. Nigerian military courts must be brought under the supervision of the ministry of justice.
In a similar vein, detention camps run by the military must come under the strict supervision of the ministry of justice. The Nigerian Armed Forces Act needs to be reviewed not by the military itself but by the NASS. This cannot happen without informed research work and strong advocacy by civil society.

ii. Confirmation Hearings: The appointment of Service Chiefs is the prerogative of the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the armed forces. However, to ensure that the person and character so appointed has served meritoriously and in conformity with the rule of law and democratic sensibilities, public hearings shall enable the people to testify and thus make such appointees accountable. It has been seen in the past how service chiefs with ethnic and religious agenda were appointed to the headships of their service and continued such aberrations as ethnic and religious biases. One could recall how some Generals of the US armed forces nominated for high command positions got turned down on account of their records. Some were even removed from the service or forced to resign. General David Petraeus is an example. The NASS can do more regarding the democratic management of the armed forces by ensuring that people of the right character are appointed.

iv. Post-Legislation Monitoring and Evaluation: Post legislative scrutiny is a common feature of democracy. Where it is practised parliamentary committees are established to review the implementation of laws in a timeframe of three to five years. Such practice increases accountability and public trust. Some European parliaments, like the UK and Belgium, have developed systems of post-legislative monitoring and evaluation. In Belgium, parliament can call for scrutiny; where individuals or organisations petition about implementation, where court ruling affects the objectives of the law and where an annual report of the administrator of the law requires a review. In the process of post-legislative scrutiny, the public is availed with the necessary information to create credibility in the process. The Nigerian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2011 as amended in 2013 contains some clauses that may abridge civil liberty and grant discretionary powers to operators of the law. For proper accountability, such a law needs post-legislative scrutiny.

c. Accountability in Military Operations
Accountability begins with a firm establishment of political goals of military operations. A vivid example can be drawn from contemporary international military operations. In the Gulf War of 1991, the mandate of the coalition force was to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait, not their destruction. At the time that the Iraqi forces were in disorderly withdrawal across the border, General Norman Schwarzkopf was convinced that the pursuit and destruction of the Iraqi forces would render them impotent to foment trouble in the subregion. Washington objected to the general’s option and ordered not to annihilate the Iraqi forces but to ensure their retreat. History is replete with Generals removed from command on account of their non-compliance with political goals. Another reference can be made of General Douglas MacArthur of the Korean War of 1950, where disagreement over political objectives and military expediency led to his removal on April 11, 1951. In an address to the nation, the US President Harry Truman said MacArthur was fired “so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.” In the Vietnam War, the President of the US sent envoys to coordinate goals, materiel and ideological propaganda of the counterinsurgency war. The lesson to be learnt here is that political goal(s) must guide military operation(s) as measures of democratic accountability. It is the fulcrum of military accountability. In fighting insurgency in the north-east, it makes an accountability sense to have a presidential representative who briefs and renders situational account to the president. This gap in briefing has been illustrated by President Muhammadu Buhari himself when he declared to a visiting delegation from Niger State that he was not aware that insecurity in that region had escalated to such high magnitude.

d. Executive Order
Presidential Executive Orders are issued to provide a political guide for military operations.
From the political goal shall emanate the direction of funding. An Executive order is the instrument for direct instructions to an armed force. It symbolises the general will and guidance for acceptable military conduct. It is the order provided by the civil authority; either the President or the Minister of Defence or any other political appointee to ensure that military commanders act legally in the use of arms and that military operations reflect the national policy and objectives intended by the civil authority.

e. Rules of Engagement (ROE)
One key instrument for the control and accountability of the military and other security agencies is the ROE. According to International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL), “ROE are issued by competent authorities and assist in the delineation of the circumstances and limitations within which military forces may be employed to achieve their objectives.” The US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defined ROE as “directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.”

Excessive use of force in the operations of Nigerian security agencies has been legendary. The cited Odi village massacre is an example. Other examples include the Army vs Shiite clash in Zaria, Kaduna State, where a judicial enquiry was set up by the Kaduna State government. These examples of abuses are not limited to the army; the police have severally been accused of extrajudicial killings of suspects either in custody or while in operation. The celebrated ‘Apo Seven’ is a case in point. Indeed, Yusuf Mohammed, the founder and leader of BH died in police custody sparking reactions that the nation continues to contend with till date. Excessive use of force is always condemned by local and international communities and when such condemnations happen, changes sometimes occur. Following world condemnation of the Tiananmen Square incidence of brutal repression of students’ demonstration in 1989, China has become somewhat responsive in cautious governance. It can be seen in the restraints of the Chinese government over the 2019 demonstrations in Hong Kong compared to its 1989 brutal response.

Training manuals abound on ROE, which Nigerian security agencies can learn from. There has not been any evidence of dedicated training on ROE. Security experts invited to testify at the Presidential Commission on Human Rights Abuses made clear to the panel that seriousness on the part of security agencies to dedicate themselves to the path of ROE is the way forwards for accountability. It is not surprising, therefore, when the Chief of Defence Staff in response to the outcome of the Presidential Commission announced a committee to review the ROE in the armed forces. It is expected that other security agencies will follow the example. If there is any doubt as to the damages the lack of ROE can wreak, the Taraba State shooting of policemen by soldiers at a roadblock is symbolic of the neglect of ROE. The utility of the application of ROE is enormous for public accountability. The basic features include:

i. Political Purpose: Proper application enables positive public opinion and international support. For example, the Borno State’s elders’ demand for the withdrawal of soldiers from their domain over the complaints of high handedness by the military or the Al’s persistent investigation of human rights abuses. It would be recalled that international support for the war against BH waned, leading to defence procurement from the black market or third parties. Neglect of political accountability to both the local and international stakeholders imperils operations of security agencies.

ii. Military Purposes: Professionalism and international best practices in military operations are measured by the application of ROE. ROE influences training and operational planning and provides the guideline for the lawful use of force, combat planning and military training. ROE must guide Field Training Exercises (FTX), Command Post Exercises (CPX) and Tactical Exercises
Without Troops (TEWT). It must be encoded in Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of units.

iii. Legal Purposes: It is a standard practice for a civil inquisition to hold after military operations. The Chilcot Report of the inquiry into the UK’s participation in the Iraq war is an example. Judicial inquisition of the prosecution of armed conflict is a necessary component of the legitimacy and accountability of security agencies. This feature should be more routine than present practices.

iv. Declaration of Hostile Force (DHF): For accountability purposes, a declaration of who and what constitutes a hostile force should precede security operations. These should be found in laws, executive orders and the bye-laws of regulatory bodies of government. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2011 amended is an example. Operations like the military Operation Python Dance and the police Operation Puff Adder must have declarations of who and what may constitute hostile force and be made public.

f. Accountability in Self-Defence
The individual security personnel must be liable for actions he or she takes in the prosecution of tasks. Principles guiding self-defence include:

i. Necessity: The use of force must be proven necessary in terms of hostile acts or intents and any response to such acts must seize immediately after an abatement of such hostility. Instances abound in Nigeria where, after cessation of hostility, reprisal attack sprung up to the surprise of the targets. Liability for such actions should rest squarely on the shoulders of the unit commanders and the individual personnel of such organisation.

ii. Proportionality: One measure of objectivity in security operations is proportionality. Force, as may be minimally required to stop a hostile act or intent, has a legal provision. Admittedly, this may fall in the realm of discretion by the individual, upon judicial inquisition, the individual shall be required to justify his action. Collateral damage has become a phrase often argued in operations. Losses of innocent civilians and properties not connected to the hostile act or intentions should be avoided. Operations should not exceed the scope, duration and intensity required. In many instances, curfews and restricted areas for security operations are extended beyond limits, thereby creating enormous hardship and loss in investments and earnings of citizens.

iii. Distinction: Security operations must clearly distinguish between what the object of the operations is as opposed to directing force on persons and properties that have no bearing with the issue. The principle of Positive Identification (PID) should normally apply. Hostile acts and hostile intents must be manifest and isolated for security actions. Also, the security personnel must distinguish personal and private concerns from unit security operations. It is against the law for a security officer to use the weapons in his or her possession in the defence of personal gains or enterprise. A clear distinction must exist in the use of force between what is official and what is private.

iv. Humanity: Human rights and humanitarian considerations should be placed as high priorities in the planning and conduct of security operations. Security objectives must be weighed against the gains for humanity else any achievement from such operations becomes negative and inconsequential. Both civil and military authorities may do well to apply self-censorship and sensitivity to public concerns when ordering and conducting operations.

Training institutions like San Remo Institute in Italy and others exist for the study of ROE as a tool for public accountability in security operations. Other training and general education should seek to imbibe good morals and patriotism in the citizens who are also the security personnel. Moral consciousness and patriotism help people with keeping to rational actions and the ethics of their profession.

4.2 Ethical Approach to Accountability

Another approach to accountability in the security sector is by ethical control of the personnel. This is based on promoting professionalism through behaviours, norms,
culture and upright. Huntington (1957) wrote that “the optimal means of asserting control over the armed forces is to professionalise them.” Like seen in most other professions, code of conduct established either through norms or codification forms the core of accountability to the organisation and the public. For security sector actors to be held accountable, professional ethics need to be entrenched. These ethics must flow from societal values and norms. There are basic characteristics of ethics and values of every profession, namely integrity, loyalty, selflessness, dedication and excellence in service delivery, honesty, trustworthiness, among others. The enforcement of these codes is mainly through internal sanctions and legal enforcements. The consequences of poor ethical conduct in every profession lead to national calamities. Poor professional conduct in the country’s security sector costs the country enormous financial and human losses. Steps are therefore needed to address the question of professionalism in the security sector. Some of these steps include:

a. Internal Administrative Mechanisms: Many unethical behaviours in organisations generate from unwholesome practices in administration. Cronyism, favouritism and disregard for best practices and promotion of incompetence should be avoided. The SOP should be entrenched and strictly adhered to. In developed democracies, the military and other security services have departments of ethics, and the US and Canada are examples. These departments engage in the promotion of ethical practices through education reviews and counselling. Presently, the country’s security services have scanty institutional memoirs and records on practices. The service cultures rely more on oral history between the new entrants and their superiors. Perverse traditions become the norm without a mechanism for corrections. Instructional materials should be produced by security services to guide the code of conduct of personnel.

b. Careerism: Unbridled pursuit of career without ethical consequences creates professional dilemmas. Where the superior officers’ dispositions determine the fortunes of the subordinates and where the measure of success depends on the end and not the means, unethical behaviours thrive. Therefore, measures must be taken to inject more of professional accountability rather than career compliance. It is for the sake of career enhancement that often some truths are never admitted. When a ThisDay reporter asked a theatre commander how many local government areas were in the hands of BH, the commander responded that if he had been answering such questions, he would not have been where he was in rank and appointment. That is a typical undue pride at answering a question and perhaps a cover-up of his ignorance because he prides on his disposition against humble professionalism of being accountable to the details of his work.

c. Anonymity Mechanisms: As mentioned on careerism, open confrontation with the superiors amounts to career suicide. Structures for anonymous reporting need to be created. Such examples like ombudsperson, whistle-blower and complaint bureaus from other climes can be introduced into the Nigerian security architecture. Such structures must operate outside the control of the services and to be responsible to the NASS.

d. National Social Values: Asking security agencies to be accountable to the people implies that the people to be accounted to must respect accountability. To wish otherwise is to be unrealistic. Society begets what it deserves, so, national ethos on accountability must change for the better. Where social norms glorify graft and unexplained wealth, accountability in the security sector becomes a challenge. Society often influences a service personal’s belief orientation. A society of impunity and lack of social justice cannot wish for an accountable security sector.

e. Recruitment Process: Security service requires the finest of character at the recruitment level. To attract such quality characters whose belief orientation is that of selfless service, the welfare of the service personnel must be of high quality. Basic training must be packaged in a manner consistent with high moral and ethical standards and imparted upon recruits with the disposition
for excellence. Those sent to institutions for the moulding of character must also be well selected and appreciated. Any form of posting service personnel to training institutions on punishment grounds must be avoided.

4.3 What Needs to be Addressed

What must be addressed on ethical issues of accountability include:

a. Commercialisation of Security Services: The purchase of security services by influential persons has negative and corrupting tendencies, particularly, where a sizeable staff is used for the protection of the few rich against the many poor. On important national occasions like the election period, security agencies are bought to commit electoral fraud (Oruodo, and Wali 2013: 15). The current national debate about strengthening security forces must first include the appropriate use of the present number and how security must be deployed for the protection of the people and not against them. Any law allowing a security agency to commercialise its services, as it is the case with the police, must be repealed.

b. Conflict of Interest: Security personnel must not engage in trading activities that border on conflict of interest. Soldiers deployed in conflict zones must not engage in local trade or aid in the perpetration of illicit trade like bunkering, smuggling, logging of timber, drug trade and cattle rustling. Neither must they use proxies to achieve the purpose. This is where the use of neutral ombudsperson becomes relevant.

c. Extortion by Security Agencies: A study by the Transparency International (TI) titled, ‘Military Involvement in Oil Theft in the Niger Delta’ detailed the activities of the military in the Niger-Delta, on how extortions of communities were carried out by security agencies deployed to protect the people and critical national assets. A need for a constant watch by the civil society is therefore compelling.

d. Financial Probit: One living beyond his or her means and the display of unexplained wealth have to be put in check through mechanisms within the security agencies. Commanders must first eschew ostentation and living above means while demanding the same from their subordinates. External influences like expensive gifts and sponsorships from affluent families upon service personnel must be regarded as not just intrusions but viruses that eat up the system.

e. Publication of Code of Conduct: In the face of rampant unethical behaviours of security agencies, a code of conduct must be published and supervised for implementation. It is common to see printed notices at military checkpoints denouncing the practice of bribe-taking, yet the practice goes on. Thus, what is lacking is the supervisory capacity of the authority in implementing the standards. Issues of gratification, forced labour and torture, abuse of power, gender violence, trespass and destruction of private property among others must be codified and properly implemented.

5 Administrative Mechanisms for Accountability by Security Agencies

Security agencies need to institutionalise practices for oversight functions, checks and balances. Oversight functions need not be limited to the parliament. Professional bodies like the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), Nigerian Medical Association (NMA) and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) should take an interest in the conduct of their members in the various security agencies. Professional bodies should have their members face disciplinary sanctions for unethical behaviour. Also, civilian employees should handle purely non-security functions. A visitor to Pentagon in the US would not miss the massive presence of civilians working in the establishment. In Nigeria, civilians should handle accounts, legal and administrative functions. It was so in post-independent Nigerian military and security sector. Clerical staff and ordnance store staff were composed of civilians. By adopting such measures, many practices shrouded in secrecy shall be unveiled. Simply put, civilianisation of the military is a mechanism for accountability.

a. Domestication of Human Rights Approach to Accountability

In recent times, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have made tremendous
impacts on the accountability of the security agencies on human rights issues. The departments of the Directorate of Civil-Military Relations (DCMR) have been created with very senior officers placed in charge. Procedures for public complaints have been eased and as commendable as this may be, there is room for improvement. Steps are required to deepen and widen the scope of human rights in the services. These steps of improvement may include public hearings at the parliament for appointments of senior leadership to beam searchlight on the conduct of individuals’ career trajectory as a measure of accountability. Travel ban on corrupt and human rights abusers within the security sector is a strong weapon of deterrence, which must be applied by foreign countries in support of internal accountability.

b. Freedom of Information Act
FOIA has not been made to work decisively in the security sector. Over classification of information is very deep-rooted in the practices of the security agencies (Segall 2010). One way of addressing this phenomenon is to establish a FOIA department similar to the creation of DCMR. Advanced democracies like the US have dedicated departments for the classification of documents. It is instructive to note that much information about the ongoing war in Afghanistan and Iraq have been declassified. Books and research studies on wars are being published even for the wars yet to end. Examples of such publications include the US Army’s two volumes of three books: ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War Volume 1: Invasion Insurgency Civil War 2003-2006,’ Book 1, ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal 2007-2011,’ Book 2 and ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War: Surge and Withdrawal 2007-2011,’ Book 3. This approach has allowed introspection and new thinking in strategy and management. The NASS has a lot more role to play in bringing about such a modern way of classifying and declassifying security information.

c. Reform of Justice Administration within the Military
Included in this accountability reform proposal is the need to look at how justice is applied to service personnel. To what extent do they receive justice? It is axiomatic that one cannot give what one does not have: an oppressed person cannot render freedom and liberty as services to the people. The justice system within the military should be reviewed to grant more openness and less totalitarianism. The Ministry of Justice should take more than a passive role in the administration of justice within the security sector. A listener to the Human Rights Radio FM 101.1, aired from Abuja, must have heard stories of infractions from the security authorities to their subjects. Neglect of welfare, perversion of justice and impunity by superiors are all manifestations of denial of rights. These tendencies promote abuses, which their repercussions reverberate in the society. As accountability of the services to the public is demanded, there should also be accountability within the services.

d. Cost-Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness
Currently, there is much debate on inter-agency rivalry and lack of cooperation among the agencies. On the October 11, 2019, NASS members’ visit to the theatre of war in Borno State, the theatre commander was demanding the creation of an army’s aviation. While it is true, as he asserted that the NAF was responsible for close air support and what the army needed was helicopters for tactical support, the same NAF has also established its special forces with helicopters playing the role of infantry. Cost-efficiency and cost-benefit should be properly aligned to overall budgeting in the defence and security sector. Perhaps it is time to take the route of a former US Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, who introduced management science theories into defence budgeting to achieve cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency (Lorell 2003: 78; Shrader 2008: 39). The method included planning, programming and budgeting systems. The NASS should go beyond reactionary procedures to proactive and visionary procedures in the defence budgeting.

e. Synchronised Counterbalancing of Security Forces
Advanced democracies establish mechanisms of countervailing forces, that is a counterbalance, to avoid absolutism in the defence and security sector. The concept of counterbalancing force
enables the forces to check and balance each other. In the US, for example, the armed forces comprise the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Space Force and Coast Guard. The Army National Guard and the Air National Guard are reserve components of their services and operate in part under state authority (U.S. Defence Department 2020). The US has several other security agencies actors, which are state security and law enforcement providers, governmental security and justice management and oversight bodies, civil society, institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies and non-state justice and security providers powerful enough and synchronised to counterbalance each other, thereby, strengthening collective security and multinational defence arrangements and organisations (Obama White House Archives 2003). Under such circumstance, the possibility of holding the nation to a ransom is removed.

The armed forces should be limited to the defence of the state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and allow the police the responsibility of maintaining law and order. Where the armed forces trespass this jurisdiction, they do not only come in opposition with the people, but their budget also becomes bogus with the attendant mismanagement and corruption.

To add to counterbalancing, to some extent, mobilisation of the CSOs and the populace may also constitute a countervailing force. Coherent coordination of an inclusive collaboration beyond the security sector can bring effective security and accountability. Similar to this concept is the delineation of jurisdiction.

6. The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Accountability of the Security Sector

As was mentioned earlier, the advancement of democracy can be measured by the level of control of the armed forces and security agencies. The key players in governance can be grouped into two sectors: the public and the private sector. In advancing the course of democracy and good governance, a third sector has emerged, which is the CSOs. The CSOs are non-partisan, non-profit making and voluntary in nature. This third sector moderates the polity as the conscience of the society and mediates for the common good.

In promoting accountability in the security sector, the role of promoting good governance by the civil society cannot be underestimated. However, the role of the CSOs in good governance has been controversial in Nigeria, and indeed, Africa. Both government and military pronouncements are antagonistic to the civil society. The influence of foreign donors on local NGOs, which are part of the CSOs, compounds the problem. Unable to fund its programmes, most Nigerian NGOs are stuck with foreign donors who also often promote policies not helpful to local NGOs.

The CSOs are repositories of knowledge in good governance. They possess advocacy powers and as well can mobilise the populace for good causes. This activist role brings them in collusion with both government and security agencies.

Regardless of these challenges, the CSOs have numerous roles to play towards accountability in the security sector:

a. Legitimacy of Government: A civil control of security agencies must be preceded by the legitimacy of the government. Where politicians use security agencies to manipulate elections, the moral high ground with which to control security agencies become weak. Besides, accountability in electoral funding is important. Evidence abounds where defence and security votes have ended up as election slush fund as with the case of Dasukigate.

b. Monitoring and Evaluation: Government ministries involved in the defence and security sector, namely defence, internal affairs and justice ministries, may lack the capacity to develop policies and monitor implementation. CSOs and NGOs should be on hand to engage in capacity building, proper articulation of policy objectives and strategies for implementation.

c. The Mobilisation of Citizenry: In the promotion of accountability of government,
including the security sector, the CSOs should mobilise opinion on issues and publish their findings. Security establishment itself is a powerful institution that weak civil authorities find difficult to control. Often, security sector becomes a state within the state wherein their demands and practices defy control.

d. The Watchdog Role: The control of the security sector is constitutionally to be counterbalanced among the executive, the legislative and the judiciary arms of government. Obedience of court orders is necessary for accountability. The CSOs should act as a watchdog to these arms of government. They should seek through the enlightenment of the masses to positively influence the three arms of the government by working and ensuring free and fair election processes where the patriotic and well-meaning people are elected to leadership positions in the executive arm, following up with the legislative arm on bill proposals and enactment of laws and policies for an effective functioning (governance) of the polity and paying close attention to the judiciary on court judgement for delivery of justice addressing injustices in the country. Through such efforts as a watchdog, the CSOs can establish a synchronised coordination for accountability.

7 The Debate over Security Vote

The Security Vote cropped up in Nigeria during the military era. It was, ostensibly, to deal with local security challenges. A little eyebrow was raised at the time, perhaps, due to the limited quantum of money involved and the curtailment of civil liberty during the military regime. The practice became so alarming as the budgetary allocation both at the federal and state levels became so humongous and amorphous. Research work done in 2018 by Matthew Page and published by TI showed a damning abuse of the concept of ‘security vote’, a secretive, unaccounted-for expenditure is estimated at ₦241.2 billion ($670 million) annually (Page 2018). This trend has increased both in widespread and volume of the fund. One such abuse is the security vote for political patronage.

Lagos State has found a clever way of creating a formal structure as well as an indirect way of making payments for its political patronage. The Lagos State Security Fund is a structure for the management of security votes, which goes to provide for the requirements of the security agencies and other contingencies. Another means of exhausting the allocated security vote budget is payments to political masters and their cronies, funnelled through contract awards for social services like environmental cleaning of the state. Although this method may not be devoid of corruption in total, it is a ‘camouflage of cash’ in more refined ways.

No matter the good intentions for the security vote, accountability is lacking and must be instituted. The enormous sums misappropriated for security votes could have gone into solving security challenges caused by unemployment, lack of infrastructure for health and education and fighting poverty, which if unsolved have harmful effects and consequences on security. Nigeria has over the years failed in achieving most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and struggling on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) due to the lack of adequate funding and mismanagement. Funds required for the implementation of the SDGs could be raked conveniently from security votes. By implication, the opportunity cost of abuse of security vote is a lack of human security. Security vote for a regime’s protection rather than people-centred programmes is a negative net worth. Security votes should be abolished by legislation, while contingencies should be pegged at a minimum and accounted for under general services of the Secretary to Government of each level of government.

8 Recommendations

a. Accountability in the security sector should begin with a structured security architecture delineating jurisdictions and avoiding clashes of responsibilities.

b. A national security architecture should be built around three concentric circles. Each circle must contain a hybridity of forces. The
three concentric circles should be the border, provincial and community.

c. At the provincial level, the hybridity of forces has to be established to cater for internal security. Such hybridity should include the mobile police force, the civil defence force, the forest guards and such other paramilitary forces to cover internal security. Some of these forces should be under the states’ control.

d. A community-based policing incorporating NSAs should be instituted as the third tier of security architecture. Community resources and community-driven security should be instituted where joint planning can be undertaken with state security apparatus.

e. In order to have firm civil control of the military, the defence policy must be reviewed not just periodically but by every new federal administration. This shall form the direction and measurability of the performance of the security sector.

f. Political objectives must be clearly stated to the military and strictly adhered to. A presidential envoy to oversee security operations can be appointed in conformity with international best practices.

g. A civilian ombudsperson working under the authority of the NASS should be created for the security sector as an independent adjudicator in civil-military relations.

h. For proper accountability and fair hearings, military court martials should be brought under the oversight function of the Federal Ministry of Justice.

i. Public hearing at the NASS for key military appointments should be instituted to query erring military and security officers and hold them accountable for their professional conduct.

j. Post-legislative scrutiny, as a means for the monitoring and evaluation of laws administered by the defence and security sector, is a best practice mechanism for post-legislative accountability and should, therefore, be practised at the NASS.

k. There should be judicial and legislative inquisitions into security sector operations at the end of each major combat operation.

l. All security forces must be trained on ROE. A school dedicated to the study of ROE is recommended. Should this be too expensive, structured curricula should be drawn for each level of training.

m. Ethical values which are the core objectives of professionalism have to be taught in the various institutions. Departments of ethics should also be established and embedded in the training curricula of ethical compliance courses.

n. FOAI must be domesticated by the security sector. A department for the management of classification of documents should be created.

o. Off-budget activities of security agencies should be controlled to avoid loopholes in public expenditure.

p. The CSOs should partner with the legislature to fill the knowledge gap in the oversight functions of the polity.

q. Security vote should be abolished by federal legislation. In its place, a limited and accountable contingency fund under a ‘general services vote’ should be created.
References


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