Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future

State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation

Brig Gen Saleh Bala (Rtd)
July 2020

→ Studies on the more than two-decade-long insecurity in the country point out the same factors as the causes of the security failure.

→ The significant factors for the failure lie in institutional make-up and implementation of security plans.

→ A successful security provision requires a network of the country's security agencies and international bodies to combat the local and intra-nation threats.

Co-funded by the European Union

CISLAC
CIVIL SOCIETY LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY CENTRE
STRENGTHENING THE WORK OF CSO AT PARLIAMENT

FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG
Nigeria Office

Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future

State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation

by

Brig Gen Saleh Bala (Rtd)

Chief Executive Officer of White Ink Consult
and
Founder and President of White Ink Institute for Strategy Education and Research (WISER)

saleh.bala@yahoo.com

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Nigeria

©Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Nigeria

Contents

Acknowledgements

Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future

State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation

Abstract

Nigeria continues to grapple with rising insecurity, especially the insurgent Boko Haram jihadists. The group has extended its threat to some other African countries, making their threat a regional one. As part of the urgency to seek an end to the two-decade-long rising insecurity, the study overviewed the security agencies and analysed the everyday events in their handling of security issues among their fellow agencies and the citizens with a comparative view of international best practices. The analysis pointed out that most of the issues leading to the inability of the country's security sector to manage conflict lie in the institutional design and implementation of the country's security architecture. The discourse highlighted the coordination and collaboration of security operations as the country's major security challenges. Conclusively, the analysis suggested that Nigeria needs to reform its national security architecture to beat the rising crime and terror rates. Recommendations are offered, mostly and directly, to the federal government as the custodian of security policies, institutions and activities. Further recommendations concerning international partners called for support and the need for harmonised efforts, as crime and terrorism are also remotely perpetrated and have reverberating regional and international consequences requiring nations to harmonise efforts for information sharing and dealing with the threats.

Keywords: National Security Architecture, Coordination, Collaboration, Cooperation, Nigerian Security Services, National Security Strategy

1 Introduction

A nation's security architecture comprises the totality of its constitutional and legal frameworks and institutions that form and provide safety and security services for its citizens and the defence of its territorial integrity. The Governance Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) of the University of Birmingham Topic Guide by Shivit Bakrania in 2014, and updated by Huma Haider in 2016, stated that "National security architectures include management, decision-making and oversight structures and institutions, as well as national policies, strategies and plans," (Bakrania and Haider 2016). For most countries, institutions and agencies like some executive arm of government members, national security advisory bodies, legislative/parliamentary committees, ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units) and civil society organisations (CSOs, civilian review boards and public complaints commissions) make up and contribute to national security management (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2007). So, the co-ordination of decision-making is important, (Beaene, Oliker, O'Brien and Rathmell 2005). The effectiveness of a security architecture depends on a politically led security governance service system, delivered by a constitutionally mandated defence; security and intelligence institutions that are organised, trained, equipped and professionally led. While the various services and institutions as constitutionally established are designed and mandated to address specific threats within defined domains, the reality and inevitability of overlap of responsibilities across domains require

cooperation and collaboration to deny space for any threat to thrive, a threat with a possibility of upsetting the whole architecture. Hence, an effective national security architecture is one in which the state security institutions work in cooperation and collaboration under a political direction for effective security service delivery.

The violent threats that Nigeria's internal security architecture faces are asymmetric ones that have the military powers and tactics of the belligerents (a standing, professional army against an insurgent or militia group(s)) significantly different, a scenario that differs greatly from the traditional symmetric threats where the belligerents have comparable powers and resources. The asymmetric violent threats the country faces are based on sub-national (indigenous or surrogate forces), highly networked groups with a wide variety of objectives that are dangerous for the country's internal security and corporate existence. Most of the violent groups expound ethnic and religious sentiments as reasons for their resort to violence against the state.

In classic security studies, threats become symmetric conflicts when one side, usually a state, deploys its instrument of coercion to breach the territorial or strategic interest sphere of another state. Since the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, there has been no significant symmetric threat to Nigeria, except the seizure of Nigerian islets in the Lake Chad by the Chadian government in the early 1980s and the decades-long intermittent Bakassi Peninsula region conflict with Cameroon, which, however, was resolved through a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the World Court, in favour of Cameroon in 2008. This situation of non-interstate wars follows the dyadic mantra that 'Democracies do not fight each other'. But at the turn of the century, since the fall of the bipolar world, the country has seen a spiralling of intra-state conflicts. The country applies greater coercive national forces against those 'internal enemies' rather than by applying the soft approach and the more enduring development and the criminal justice and human rights instruments. Nigeria has deployed troops to the West African sub-region and farther afield to stabilise other countries as part of its international obligations.

1.1 Overview of Nigeria's Geopolitical and Socioeconomic Structure

Nigeria is made up of an estimated 202 million people of over 250 ethnic groups. The ethnic groups often clash with each other, inciting differences in their ethnic and religious orientation that are consistently and sentimentally whipped up by a self-serving elite, incendiary media rhetoric and through violent insurgencies (Ochonu 2014; Çanci and Odukoya 2016). The present three-tier structure of 36 autonomous federating states around a central government, with 774 local government areas subordinated to the state governments, has often highlighted the fragility of the state and fuelled conflict based on various local fears around clear and present security threats. The high poverty rates that have been consistent over decades (Nwuzor 2002; World Bank 2019), ranging from 54 to 77 per cent in some parts of the country further complicate these threats. The country has one of the largest populations of youths in the world. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 2018) Demographic Statistics Bulletin showed that about 72 per cent of the Nigerian population is under 30 years old, making the country a traditional youth bulge-case study (Beehner 2007), with the attendant indicators. The country has a fast-growing labour force, resulting in the high and rising rate of unemployment. In 2007, the unemployment rate was 5.8%. In 2019, it rose to 27.1%, with another 20% of the labour force underemployed in 2018 (World Bank 2019; Trading Economics 2020). So, the rising unemployment continues increasing poverty, increasing insecurity (crime) and pressuring further the weak state.

The young citizens are threatened by poverty, lack of job and self-development opportunities.

Lam (2006) projected that the pressure of poverty on the youth population would continue in Africa and Asia. It is so in Nigeria to date. It suggests no significant positive effect in efforts to change the situation in the country. Resentments arise in the youth's instinct to survive, the pursuit for heroism and self-identity. Given the human nature to survive, some of the people steer out of law and order and the democratic system. "Any form of *government* [1] – dictatorship, autocracy, monarchy, oligarchy and what have you – may spring up (as long as it may last) …," (Nwuzor 2002: 80) and even anarchy that is seen in the country, expressed among the young population at the centre-stage of various criminal activities and social deviance (breaches to constitution and democracy).

Human trafficking and smuggling of goods, usually the signs of a crisis on the ground as the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2020) pointed out, emerged in Nigeria as major issues of concern over the last two decades, with the effect being an increase in the availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW), which add a fatal dimension to local grievances arising from the state's fragility. Human and drug trafficking cartels in Nigeria feed the local market and are the grounds for exports of humans and drugs, thus serving as a source, destination and transit country, which affect both the local stability as well as international relations. The UNODC (2020) noted that women and girls are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking.

Crude oil theft and illegal bunkering have had billions of dollars frittered away into private pockets and foreign banks. The monies could have been put to better use. The youth are, majorly, the perpetrators of most of the violent conflicts in Nigeria's threat profile, from unethical hacking and cybercrime to robberies, and the now rampant kidnapping for ransom. These vulnerabilities are important in understanding the terrain of Nigeria's national security architecture failures.

The decades-long terror has been a major threat, starting with the herdsmen and the now decade-long Boko Haram (BH) sect's insurgency threatening mostly north-eastern Nigeria. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP 2015) on Global Terrorism Index (GTI), Nigeria experienced the highest increase in deaths from terrorism in 2014; the country recorded 7,512 fatalities in 2014, which was an increase of 300 per cent from 2013. The BH sect is also active in Chad, Niger and Cameroon, cutting across countries. In 2016, the Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA) Province (ISWAP) sect, an ISIS affiliate in Nigeria, began working with the BH, unleashing terror in Nigeria. The Fulani extremists also contributed to the rise in terrorism (IEP 2019). In December 2019, the BH sect released a video of their executions of eleven people in Senegal (Maclean and Schmitt 2019). The insurgent sects have launched other hallmarks of terror, including the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against 'soft targets' to guerrilla-style attacks against troops and communities alike. A key feature of this threat bearing on Nigeria's security architecture is that it has seen the army deployed on a massive scale for internal security operations beyond their extraordinary counter-terror deployment. The deployment of the army has a major effect on military performance ratios, as well as on the effectiveness of other components of internal security, such as the police.

---

[1] Government (not italicised in the cited work) is analogous to steering a direction of living in the breakdown of law and order and failed democracy. While a government cannot just be overthrown or turn a dictatorship or establish an oligarchy, anarchy is often a response to failing democracy. The analogy is to trace the cause of the country's failed system and its consequences seen in coups (in the past), dictatorship and anarchy in the country. Dictatorship and anarchy come as alternatives to a fair election (a democratic process). Revolution may also be an option to restore a failed democracy. See Little, W (2016): Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Canadian Edition. BC Open Textbook project. https://opentextbc.ca/introductiontosociology2ndedition/

1.2 The Security Threats and Management Failure

The threats, the hybridised multi-dimensional asymmetric ones, can only be dealt with by a strategic orchestration of the instruments of national power, and in association with regional and international partners because of the cross-national, cross-cutting and even global effects of the challenges. However, at the basis of success is the critical synergy of efforts and practices among Nigeria's defence, security and intelligence organisations. Collaboration and effective communication are much in deficiency and even in some cases absent among Nigerian agencies (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] 2019; Nnadozie, Usman and Okolie 2019). It takes a robust and elaborate multi-agency, multi-disciplinary and professional network of agencies to effectively combat the modern security challenges emerging around the world, especially where they are enhanced by adverse uses of the convenience which technological advancements in communications and transport provide.

The subsequent discourse looks at what inter-agency coordination and collaboration entail and their importance in addressing the critical safety and security challenges of Nigeria from a citizen-centric security and safety service delivery perspective. The approach will entail an overview of Nigeria's security architecture and its quality and capacity to deliver on its constitutional responsibility keeping to modern democratic best practices. An assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities of and threats to the security architecture, as well as an examination of the state of laws, practices and infrastructure provided within the architecture, will be looked into for the enhancement of collaboration and cooperation within and among the security governance institutions' structure.

While Section 1 highlighted the problems, establishing the increasing threats and the security operatives' failure in dealing with them so far, there are cases of efforts and successes recorded among Nigeria's security services across the nation. Efforts at improving on operations beyond the established interactions are enhanced by collaborative and cooperative efforts, which policy and strategy prescriptions have made possible among the leaderships at strategic levels. The operations are mostly at the tactical levels, where in each state of the federation there are internal security organisations involving the main security agencies (codenamed mobile police, the civil defence and the units of the armed forces). The inter-agency involvement of the main security agencies has been in place since the days of the military administration, though they often cross each other's domain, suggesting the basis to build further on collaboration and cooperation in higher operational and strategic levels.

2 Inter-Agency Security Coordination and Collaboration

The necessity of inter-agency security coordination and collaboration is rooted in global security experience and is now a matter of global security best practice (Han 2013; Canton 2016). The September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks in the United States (US) met the country with a security structure not vastly different from Nigeria's current structure. The threat profile facing Nigeria is akin to that facing the US at the start of the 'War on Terror'. Some levels of coordination exist within Nigeria's internal security services as it did in the US. However, the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks were successful because critical information was not understood for what it was and not interpreted correctly across the agencies. In Nigeria, such information is sometimes hoarded, and other agencies are treated with suspicion, leading to information silos and analysis gaps.

The structures of both countries comprised several agencies with varying mandates that were steeped in the vainglory of territorial autonomy and authority, without clear legislation, regulations, policies and practice for cooperation and collaboration (Wither and

4

Mullins 2016; Frontline 2019 [a collection of interviews over time of W Rudman, B Esposito, R DiSabatino, L Schiliro, P Goss and J Smith]).

Jeffery Smith, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) general counsel, and Lewis Schiliro, former assistant director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Congressman Porter Goss, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Bill Esposito, former deputy director of the FBI, indicated that issues from the ban on political assassinations[2] to bureaucratic recruitment policies and prohibitions to the lack of qualified personnel and an intelligence culture that has not adapted to a post-Cold War world were responsible for the failure of the US intelligence on the attacks. Lewis Schiliro questioned if the US has enough resource for intelligence operation and technical ability to infiltrate terrorist groups. Rich DiSabatino, the director of Intelligence Support Group Limited, a private company providing electronic intelligence training, support and equipment to government, military and law enforcement agencies within the US and approved foreign countries, warned of the limitations of electronic intelligence, arguing that it can only augment human intelligence, not replace it. Porter Goss suggested the need for qualified personnel and analysts that can decode electronic information, and Warren Rudman, former President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, pointed out the failure of the US intelligence despite noting that while intelligence agencies may assess security threats, they can rarely predict terrorists' intentions. While not accepting the attacks resulted from intelligence failure, Bill Esposito talked about the need for far better working relations between the FBI and CIA, and the lack of agents skilled in Arabic languages. Invariably, all the experts pointed to issues with inter-agencies' synergy.

Just like the US security agencies were reluctant and failed to share information in the aftermath of 9/11 terror attacks, the unfortunate but well-publicised BH insurgents' abductions of the Chibok, Borno State and Dapchi, Yobe State schoolgirls on April 15, 2014, and February 19, 2018, respectively, show how command and control coordination and collaboration among state institutions and even the civilian populace could cause grave breaches to national security and safety of citizens. While the army and the police in Dapchi's case bickered over the true position on handing and taking over of the town's security, it remains a wonder that the intelligence institutions were also unaware of the movement of the terrorists from their base around the fringes of the Lake Chad up to the town (Leo, Mutum and Matazu 2018). The incidents are instances of lack of harmony among the various institutions.

The painful lessons from the 9/11 attacks duly informed the creation of the new Department for Homeland Security (DHS) in November 2002 as the US cabinet inter-agency administrative structure to deal with the new threat profile, by housing policy direction, operational control and coordination of all national security and safety agencies. The DHS became the central hub for the coordination of the 22 different federal agencies that include the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Transport and Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, among others.

In dealing with threats that are highly networked and run by operatives that communicate with each other in complex ways, state security information management must be coordinated at inter-agency levels from the strategic to the operational cadres. Intelligence and operational units as state services must synergise efforts to

---

[2] This is merely a report of those interviewed. This work has neither argued for nor against assassination for countering terrorism. Targeted killing, often argued to be effective, is not a panacea for countering terrorism but differs from assassination, a politically risky undertaking. See Hunter, T

B (2010): Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism. *Journal of Strategic Security* 2 (2): 1-52. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/

achieve sustainable successes. Inter-agency coordination and collaboration in security services are mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship entered by organisations to achieve common goals (Han 2013).

For common goals to be achieved, there must be a clear definition of participant agencies and set tasks. In some cases, agencies already exist with prescribed mandates, while in others, new agencies need to be created or repurposed to deal with varying aspects of a threat. Regardless of the agencies, a strategy-level document must set out the responsibilities of each participating agency in a multi-agency cooperation setup. Also, a management procedure for the exchange of information between participating agencies must be worked out for cooperation to work, and this procedure must be broad-based, covering local, national and regional level administrative units of participating agencies. The relevant cadres of executive officers in each agency need to have quick and easy access to available and needed information within other participating agencies. The last part of an inter-agency cooperation framework is the interoperability of platforms, which deals with technical infrastructures such as those of communications or mobility. These platforms must be common to participating agencies.

The ultimate purpose of collaboration and cooperation is to achieve operational synergy. The difference between cooperation and collaboration lies in the centrality of the common goal to each participating agency. In a merely cooperative framework, participating agencies carry out cooperative tasks that, taken together, aid or achieve the common goal. Collaboration takes it further such that the participating agencies are united in their understanding of the common goal as well as their part in acting towards that common goal. A collaborative framework is more complex and more effective than a cooperative network because it thrives on several nodes of connectivity within each participating agency and the others. Where cooperation deals with shared goals, collaboration is tied to a shared vision and values and tends to be a longer-term solution. Engagement and the sharing of ideas as a group lie at the heart of a cooperative framework. With a collaborative strategy level document, the purpose becomes the empowerment of all participating agencies through the generation of new ideas that are beneficial to all towards meeting identified common goals. Synergy and interdependence are thus the end-state. Finally, collaboration is vertical because it provides policy and strategic direction in an inter-agency situation, a whole of government approach while cooperation is horizontal, limiting itself to institutional operational directives, supervision and the tactical execution of tasks.

Collaborative efforts are often complex, requiring integration of the full range of multiple missions and occasionally crossing the boundaries of civilian, intelligence, homeland security and military agencies. In these situations, cross-functional and cross-agency teams are necessary to jointly apply centralised control and decentralised execution constructs to coordinate adaptable and agile efforts against the various threats. The centralised control and decentralised execution exert control through clear guidance and accountability. Decentralised execution also increases execution ability and agility by delegating authority to those with the precise knowledge and capability to execute.

There are four major determiners for assessing good multi-agency cooperation and collaboration. The determiners are the quality of the institutions or agencies themselves; the resilience of the country implementing the administrative realignment; the national cohesion of the people and the quality of leadership available to the participating agencies. Where participating agencies have internal transparency issues, for example, those that border on corruption or the lack of accountability, the first step towards cooperative and collaborative frameworks needs to be systemic institutional reform of the affected agency.

3 Scope of Nigerian Security Architecture

Nigeria's internal security infrastructure is composed of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) as the lead agency. The second largest component is the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). While the NPF maintains law and order, the NSCDC, known as the Civil Defence, is tasked with protecting critical national infrastructure. The Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) is tasked with border control, while the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) controls the importation and exportation of prohibited items. Other administrative components of the national security architecture are the Nigeria Correction Service (NCS), formerly the Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS), the Federal Fire Service and the State Fire Services, the State Security Service (SSS) self-styled and nicknamed the Department of State Security (DSS) and the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) amongst others. *Table 1* (on page 8) shows some of paramilitary policing agencies with their roles, like the NPF's.

Aside from the DSS, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) through focusing on foreign intelligence plays requisite roles within the national intelligence framework along with the various intelligence services of the forces in the defence and security establishment, as well as those of the paramilitary services. The police, being the lead agency in internal security, dovetail with the justice administration system of courts through their ability to frame charges at all levels of courts in the country having carried out investigations. There is the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), which by constitutional prescription coordinates and manages man-made and natural incidences of disasters and crises. There are also state and local level operational aggregates, the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and the Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA) that are part of the National Disaster Management Framework (NDMF).

From the foregoing, to meet the new and highly networked threat profile facing the country, these components of internal security need to be designed into a framework that will allow for effective communication of threat as well as the effective leveraging of system-wide threat suppression protocols. The importance of building seamless communication, cooperation and collaboration culture and infrastructure to enhance synergy for effective service delivery cannot be overemphasised (Canton 2016; Sedgwick and Hawdon 2019). If the several working parts are to work effectively and efficiently, unified efforts are needed to deal with the multi-dimensional, multi-faceted and increasingly fluid existing and emerging security challenges with domestic, transnational and global threats.

3.1 The Nigerian Security Inter-agency Regime

The key documents which outline the basic components of Nigeria's inter-agency regime are the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) and the National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP) 2001. The latter which by law is to be owned and coordinated by NEMA is a hardly known, seen and operated guidance document.

The 1999 Constitution, being the groundwork, created a National Security Council (NSC), which has advisory responsibility to the president on all matters relating to public security, including matters related to any organisation or agency established by law for ensuring the security of the federation. The composition of the council reflects its inter-agency scope. Beyond the President and Vice President, who chairs and deputises the council respectively, other members are the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the heads of the ministries of defence, interior and foreign affairs, as well as the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the Inspector General of Police (IGP). Other members of the council are subject to the president's discretion. Each of the officials oversees the agencies that make up the Nigerian security architecture. The Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministry of Interior

Table 1: Some Paramilitary Policing Agencies in Nigeria and Their Summarised Duty

Agency	Establishment Act and Year	Summary of Duty
FRSC	Commissioned on Decree No 45 of 1988 as amended by Decree 35 of 1992 referred to as the FRSC Act cap 141 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN). Passed by the National Assembly as FRSC (establishment) Act 2007	Maintenance of traffic laws and offences
NSCDC	Statutorily empowered by lay Act No 2 of 2003 and amended by Act 6 of 4th June 2007	Commissioned to provide measures against threat and any form of attack or disaster against the nation and its citizenry
NDLEA	Established by the promulgation of Decree No 48 of 1989, now Act of Parliament	Aimed at exterminating illicit drug trafficking and consumption in the country
NAPTIP	Created on July 14, 2003, by the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act 2003 Created to supplement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)	To prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children
ICPC	The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 (Act 2000)	To fight against corruption; receive complaints, investigate and prosecute offenders in the form of a holistic approach encompassing enforcement, prevention and educational measures
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment Act (2004) and responsible for enforcing: The Money Laundering Act 1995, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) act 2004, the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act 1995, the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994, the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991; and Miscellaneous Offences Act	Empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise economic and financial crimes and is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of other laws and regulations relating to economic and financial crimes
NCS (prison service)	Established under the Nigeria Correctional Service Act 2019 that repeals and makes up issues not covered in the Prison Act Cap P29, LF 2004	To take into lawful custody all those duly certified to be so kept by courts of competent jurisdiction, produce suspects and other prisoners in courts as and when due, identify the causes of their anti-social disposition, train (in Prison Farms and Industries) and reform prisoners to return to society at discharge and in the process generate revenue for the government
NCS (customs service)	The Customs & Excise Management Act (CEMA) Cap 45, LFN, 2004 vests Legal Authority in the Nigeria Customs Service to act on behalf of the Federal Government of Nigeria in all Customs matters. This is supported by various supplementary legislation.	Revenue collection, prevention and suppression of smuggling, combat illegal trade activities, money laundering, traffic of illicit drugs
NIS	Extracted from the NPF, formerly, its Immigration Department in 1958. On August 1, 1963, the department was formally established by an Act of Parliament, Cap I71, LFN as a civil service outfit. In 1992, it was granted a paramilitary status.	To control persons entering or leaving the country, issue travel documents to bona fide Nigerians in and outside the country, issue residence permits to foreigners in the country, carry out border surveillance and patrol and enforce laws and regulations with which they have been directly charged

Source: Compiled from the agencies' websites and Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC 2020), detailed in the References.

[MOI]) is the hub of internal security, comprising the NSCDC, the NIS, the NCS (customs) and the Federal Fire Service (FFS). Until recently, the NPF was subordinated to the MoI.

The operational agencies under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) include the Defence Headquarters (DHQ), the Nigerian Army (NA), the Nigerian Navy (NN), Nigerian Air Force (NAF) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) oversees the DSS and the NIA. Again, the NPF is constitutionally the lead on the internal security of Nigeria. Headed by the IGP, the NPF is tasked with the maintenance of law and order. With a staff strength of 371,800 (Global Firepower Index [GFI] 2019; Punch Online 2019), it is structured into 36 state commands grouped into 12 zones. The NPF has four policy, administrative and operational controlling constitutional organs: the National Police Council (NPC), chaired by the President, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Armed Forces; the Ministry of Police Affairs, with a minister who on behalf of the President, provides political direction and budgetary regulation to the service; the Police Service Commission, chaired by Chairman of the Police Service Commission Board; and the NPF led by the IGP, who has operational responsibility for the daily running of the entire force.

Beyond attending the NSC meetings and acting on coordination activities such as Joint Task Forces (JTF), as directed by the president, these organisations remain distinct in terms of objectives even in the face of a threat profile that demands a more integrated security approach. The disparate security agencies determine their objectives and come up with budgets that often go directly to the National Assembly (NASS) for incorporation or appropriation. A good example of this was with the NPF while it was under the MOI, but just after a four-year trial has reverted to its autonomous ministry. Both the Minister of Interior and the IGP would, when needed, approach NASS for funding without recourse to each other.

In analysing the Nigerian regime concerning good inter-agency cooperation and collaboration, it will be noted that while the agencies have been identified, there is still no common goal as these agencies still operate under mandates created at the times they were set up. The NSS 2014 and the NACTEST provided good examples of creating a unified vision and mission that, were they fully adopted, would suffice as a common goal framework for the NSS. The reviewed NSS (2019) stated that the "overarching vision is to make Nigeria a secure, safe, peaceful, prosperous and strong nation." It also stated that the "inherent mission is to apply all elements of national power to ensure physical and human security, a just society, peaceful co-existence, national unity, prosperity and sustainable development while promoting Nigeria's influence in regional, continental and global affairs." Crucially, the NSS, drafted by the ONSA (2014) and the revised ONSA (2019), did not identify comprehensively the security agencies that it is meant to guide. The Foreword written by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the C-in-C of the Armed Forces, Muhammadu Buhari, for the revised version (ONSA 2019) recapped the objectives of the strategy but did not provide a presidential directive to remedy the gaps.

The research by Eme (2018) that interrogated the inter-security agency rivalry as an impediment to the NACTEST concluded that in spite of the strategy's mandate to the ONSA to coordinate the national counterterrorism effort, the various mandated agencies still work at cross-purposes. Aside from the monthly Joint Intelligence Board (JIB), which is chaired by the NSA, there is hardly any operational output that ensures or provides for mandated close cooperation and collaboration in practical terms among the agencies. Eme (2018) observed gaps in the NACTEST, which are said to compound the cooperation and collaboration problems in operating the counter-terrorism strategy. The matrix, *Table 2*, below (on page 10) as presented in Eji (2016), confirmed and pointed out the gaps and their implications for security.

Table 2   Security Gaps and Implications to National Security

Serial No	Observed Gaps	Implications of Gaps
1.	The Terrorist Acts (2011 and 2013) lack a national definition of terrorism	Poses a challenge to the policy implementation as terrorist acts could be subject to various interpretations
2.	Placed its driving organ, the Counter-terrorism Centre (CTC), under the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA)	This could inhibit the effective implementation of the strategy because the ONSA does not statutorily have executive functions but advisory roles (as an adviser to the President)
3.	Tends to lay sole emphasis on the Boko Haram Sect	Its provision/implementation may not readily apply to other categories of terrorism or terrorism-related threats that could arise
4.	Government's disposition to negotiation with terrorist not stated	Raises doubts and suspicion on policy thrust of government
5.	Silent on the protection of Nigeria's interests abroad and on responses to state-sponsored terrorism	Necessary contingency plans may not be developed in this regard
6.	Discrepancies and lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities assigned to the ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) for implementation	Erodes the command directive and authority NACTEST ought to command, as a policy instrument
7.	No designated lead ministry or agency	Makes the coordination of the MDAs involved in counter-terrorism difficult
8.	Ambiguity on government's overall strategic approach	Could result in a disconnect between policymakers and implementation agencies/the public

Source: From Eji, E (2016) on Rethinking Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy (see References)

3.2 Military Usurpation and Dominance of Internal Operations of the Police and the Paramilitary Agencies

Nigerian security is influenced by a garrison military mentality. Because of the 36 years of post-independence military rule and even from the colonial era, force is used for punitive rather than preventative and corrective purposes of civil law enforcement and justice delivery. This mentality has continued to date, thereby, in about 20 years of democracy, the military is in the lead of internal operations instead of the police that is pre-eminently constitutionally created for and mandated for the task. The NA is involved in internal security operations in all states of the federation, including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, while the NPF rather than taking the lead role is playing far from the complementary roles to the military.

The situation has deepened the rivalry and mistrust between the army and the cluster of their civilian counterparts in the national security architecture. In October 2019, the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Tukur Buratai, is quoted in several media outlets to have announced the prospective extension of the NA nationwide, beyond the north-east epicentre of the BH counterinsurgency operations, of an operation codenamed 'Operation Positive Identification' among other anti-crime patrols as '*Ayem Akpatuma*' in the north-central; '*Egwu Eke*' in the south-east and '*Crocodile Smile*' in the south-south and south-west (Campbell 2019; Ogundipe 2019), the mandate and jurisdiction which should be purely for the police. The Operation Positive Identification would compel all persons to present their identity documents to the military on counterterrorism/insurgency patrols, a responsibility of the police, the NSCDC

or the NIS. Such interference does not augur well or promote requisite understanding and constitutional territorial respect among security agencies. While the idea of introducing Operation Positive Identification has not only met a public outcry, its negative effect of corrupt practices through the exertion of authority, punishing and extortion of the civilians with illegal toll was proved when the Governor of Borno State, Prof Babagana Zulum witnessed security forces holding up traffic and collecting illegal toll from travellers at a checkpoint along Maiduguri-Damaturu highway (Haruna 2020).

However, one must not fail to acknowledge that aside from political opportunism that has made the NA become the first, and so far, lasting choice of the ruling class for policing roles, it is also the mistrust, apathy and even the disdain at which the public holds the NPF, especially because of the police officers' weakness and lack of professionalism that characterise their operations. Reports of repressive and non-professional tactics include the pervasive corruption in the police institution. Unfortunately, large scale corruption is also rife in the military, that everyone is in on the game as the Human Rights Watch (HRW 2010) used the words of a former police commissioner that pointed out the scope and depth of corruption in the police as well as Banini (2019)—that is one of the many works that confirmed the security sector's corruption which affects its practices and accountability.

While the military complains of overstretch and distraction from its constitutional defence of territorial integrity responsibility, it has shown unwavering interest in deployment for internal security operations and even interfering with the efforts of the police. Though a rogue case, an example of how extreme and fatal such interest can be is in the recent murderous intervention of a military internal security unit. In August 2019, the NPF-IGP Special Intelligence Squad in Taraba State released a kidnap kingpin, Bala Hamisu (aka Wadume), which led to the death of three police officers and the wounding of a member of the squad.

Another case of how a usurpation of responsibilities could have dangerous consequences is the incidence of the authority gap that made room for the abduction of the secondary schoolgirls in Dapchi. While the NA is said to have security governance authority over all agencies in the north-east counterterrorism/insurgency theatre, at the wake of the abduction crisis, there was a spat of blame game on liability, as the NA blamed the NPF for failing in its responsibility to secure Dapchi. Besides the authority gap, the abduction is one case of the grave outcomes that follow the lack of trust in a system that does not lend itself to the importance of professionalism and the principles of good cooperation, collaboration, coordination and communication.

4 The Politicisation of Agencies and Effects on Order in Service and Professionalism

Indeed, for a democratic nation, the pre-eminence of civilian executive control and policy direction of its security architecture is foundational to its effectiveness (Han 2013). That is in terms of leadership direction in policy enunciation, evaluation, assessment and oversight to include budgetary allocation and appointment of leadership for the various services while ensuring that the important cooperation and collaboration purposes are adhered to for their fullest benefit of delivering on citizen-centric service.

The Nigerian security establishment has been under the yolk of poor political control, right since independence. The historical evolution and experience have been social disorientation, political instability, economic dislocation and poverty (Nwuzor 2002). Appointments of leadership and general interpretation of constitutional mandates have ever since been influenced by political interest of succeeding political regimes, even over the 36 years of military rule. Appointments of service

leaderships have mostly been based on nepotism, ethno-religious and political affiliations instead of meritocracy that is the principle on which professional leadership is sourced and formed. Consequently, with the aberration, constitutional mandates are served regional and other sectarian considerations rather than cooperate national interest of a section's perception or interpretation of it. It is usual that despite seniority of officers at the highest echelon of service, succession to headship is usually skewed to favour junior and unqualified officers, perhaps with the same regional, ethnic or religious identity as the leadership in charge of appointments. Skewed appointments breed disregard for the rule of law, disrespect and no submission to other constituted superior authorities, frustrating and jeopardising their command and control for the synergy required to deal with modern multi-dimensional security challenges (Olaniyi 2003).

There are many incidences where service chiefs have refused to honour the invitation of relevant committees of the NASS to oversight meetings. In September 2019, military service chiefs were notably absent at a meeting called by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr Femi Gbajabiamila, for a hearing over the spiralling security challenges in the north-east. The Service Chiefs had sent representative junior officers who the Speaker said are not acceptable, and so, called off the meeting (NAN 2019). There are also reports of similar non-attendance of the JIB at ONSA, despite the mandate in the NACTEST and the NSS. Also, there are recorded cases of clashes within administrative and operations controlling organisations in conducting policy delivery. One current case is the President's inability, even as the Chair of the Police Council, to resolve the dispute between the IGP and the Police Commission over the recruitment of 10,000 people into the service, despite the existing Commission's constitutional mandate for the recruitment, promotion and discipline of all police personal (Umeh 2019; Mohammed 2019).

5 Nigeria's Peace and Security Architecture for the Future

No doubts, insecurity is increasing in Nigeria. The leadership of the country sought to address the situation by its efforts on NSS 2014. The government pointed out that "since then the security environment has continued to evolve, giving rise to emergent challenges, thus necessitating a review. While significant progress has been made on multiple fronts between 2014 and 2019, the nature of security challenges facing Nigeria today is more complex than in the past," (NSS 2019). Terrorism is also on the rise and not just within, but also from outside the country as the BH terrorist sect merged with and gets support from ISIS. The fight against the rising crime requires a reform of the security architecture and international cooperation and collaboration.

5.1 Need for Improved Security Architecture and Harmonised National Fusion Centres

Command and control (C2) and situational awareness of the information environment (IE) are at the heart of effective modern security operations and service delivery (Paul, Clarke, Triezenberg, Manheim and Wilson 2018). Technology has, to a great extent, enabled the effectiveness of these critical enablers of security. The elaborate assemblage of complex satellite communication and broadband internet assets to provide spatial audio and video real time information, as well as analysis and storage of information for on-the-need retrieval, have made, especially crime prediction, recording, prevention, detection and response to emergencies more efficient (Carter and Carter 2009). However, where there is a proliferation without the discipline to protocols for integration of effort, access and use among agencies, a nation's effort rather than effective results works at cross-purposes or even antagonises itself. In the wake of the BH challenge, a National Fusion Centre at the ONSA was established with the support of the US government, while a similar asset was built at the

presidency to provide intelligence briefings to the President and the NSC. There are also similar assets at the NN Headquarters (Operation Falcon Eye, a maritime surveillance system) and the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) for national and regional maritime domain awareness capacity, while the NAF and the Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) oversee the air space.

In 2010, Nigerian government took a $470 million loan from Chinese NEXIM Bank and awarded the Chinese IT company, ZTE Corporation, a contract for a Public Security Communications System (PSCS) as relevant infrastructure installations for e-policing to check BH terror and crime. The ZTE Corporation was to install closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs) in Lagos and Abuja. The project was signed without consideration for linkage to a central control and coordination centre. Neither the National Fusion Centre nor the similar assets were considered as the hub when the plan was being made. The NPF's Special Anti-robbery Squad (SARS) headquarters where the PSCS is located had its independent situation centre. The whole PSCS is said to be incompletely set up, and currently are vandalised, constituting another colossal waste of national resources amid a critically needed security architecture reinforcement while terrorism forges (Morris 2016).

In June 2020, the MOI signed a ₦51-billion ($141.5 million) contract with the Chinese communication company, HUAWEI, to provide assets for e-land border management for national border security (Per Second News 2020), which is besides the National Security Centre established at the ministry in 2018. The awareness assets are neither connected to a national hub to form and provide an integrated nationwide situational awareness capability nor backed by any legislated national situational awareness policy and strategy.

It is important that such an asset is created from among one central operational awareness centre where all services and agencies can be represented by some executive and operational officers to deal with evolving security challenges, and thus, promote and harness the importance of critical communication, cooperation and collaboration. The MoI as the ministry in charge of the internal safety and security could be assigned the charge for the National Fusion Centre, thereby providing a national coordination, collaboration and communication centre that will ensure the synergy for a seamless and efficient national response to security threats, disasters and emergencies.

Another situational awareness and coordination centre is the Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC) at the Abuja Hilton Hotel, to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts, particularly in the north-east over the BH crisis. The organisation is owned and led by the federal government's Inter-Ministerial Task Force (IMTF) established with the support of the US government independent of NEMA, notwithstanding that NEMA has more direct relevance to managing emergency. The ECC is under the administration of the Ministry of Budget and National Planning.

5.2 Scaling the Civilian Component into an Inter-agency Security Regime

The security sector comprises a military component (the army, navy, special forces and the intelligence services under them) and a civilian component. By civilian, it simply means those not of the military. The civilian security in Nigeria comprises the law-enforcement and intelligence agencies such as those under the MoI's affairs, which are the PCS, FFS, NIS and the NSCDC. Even the NPF is a civilian security organisation. Others include the NIA, DSS, EFCC, ICPC and even the Ministry of Justice, which along with the NPF and the NCS form the tripod on which the Nigerian criminal justice system is operated. Indeed, even the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), Nigeria Agricultural Quarantine Service (NAQS), etc. are

part of the civilian component of the national security architecture. Usually, the unison of work for these two components, because of their institutional, domain and culture differences, constitutes a problem for communication, coordination and collaboration.

At the centre of the problem of reforming the national security architecture of Nigeria is the scaling in of the civilian component into the mix, i.e., the juxtaposition of the function of the military and civilian security components into a unified working system. Effectively, the long years of military rule are to be blamed for this problem of not unifying the security actors (the military and civilian). That unifying them is a problem shows the reality of most agencies in the Nigerian security system still being stuck in the power-centric regime protection mindset characterised by the military administrations in which most of these agencies were established. While the regime administering the country has changed from a centralised military structure to a democratic, plural government, the guiding ideology of state institutions has not been reinterpreted to fit into democratic operations. Consequently, there is little conception of the people, the country's citizens, being the beneficiaries of all executive, legislative and judicial actions. This is particularly so with the security architecture, which played a key role in stabilising the country at the expense of its people's desires during the military regimes. To scale a civilian component into the security, it will be necessary to holistically reform the security services so that human-centric security becomes the central purpose of the activities of participating agencies. This starts with a transparent recruitment process as well as a curriculum that guides the desired ideology. The people, too, need to be socialised into the mindset that conforms with the civilian control of the security forces.

Complicating the scaling in of civilian component, however, is the increased role that the military, especially the NA as well as the NN,

play in internal security operations. The NA still substantially provides urban and rural security in the liberated areas of north-eastern Nigeria as it carries out further operations against the insurgents. The NN is actively involved in policing the waterways of the Niger Delta to guard against piracy and illegal bunkering. The effect of continued use of the military for policing roles is an overstretching of it and a further degradation of the civilians' perception of the capability of the NPF and the other conventional internal security architecture component agencies. The Nigerian Armed Forces estimated at 181,000 is currently deployed in 32 of the 36 states (GFI 2019).

At the centre of any strategy to scale the civilian population into the internal security architecture, must be the aim at shoring up community resilience (Ojebode, Ojebuyi, Onyechi, Oladapo, Oyedele and Fadipe 2016). This is especially so in border areas, areas far from the centre of power, and areas that have seen minimal government presence. Traditional institutions such as chieftaincies; administrative organisations centred around trade and markets; as well as religious organisations often survive in these communities. These must not be ignored as they are the structures of the communities and are often more influential on the day-to-day lives and perceptions of citizens than more formal institutions such as courts. While some state governments with their assembly collaborate communal and regional policing as vigilantes in the security efforts, the federal government disputes their legitimacy (Okon-Ekong, Enumah and Sowole 2020; Kupoluyi 2020).

In scaling the civilian component, accountability mechanisms that have the participation of the community are key to effective security cooperation and collaboration. The mechanism works best using a bottom-to-top approach with community representatives of all relevant security agencies routinely interacting with the community leadership so that a bi-directional flow of information is created and maintained.

When security sector reforms that emphasise citizen-protection are put in place, community-level intelligence will be more forthcoming, especially where there is close civilian oversight. In order for communities to participate effectively in an inter-agency cooperative and collaborative framework, members of the community need to know what sort of items or behaviours are suspicious enough to warrant the attention of security agencies and how to identify threats at the community level. The reporting procedure also has to be clear, with specifically designated officials or offices for the purpose. The process must not be cumbersome, and it must guarantee anonymity. To achieve effective community participation in security cooperation and collaboration, state agencies must know and liaise with community-based and faith-based organisations and leaders within their areas of operation. On the whole, effective participation of civilians in internal security can only succeed where the people feel involved in the decisions and responsible for their cooperation with security agencies. However, an effective civilian involvement requires reform in the country's NSS and a change in philosophy by the state security agencies and the subsequent creation of new, bi-directional means of communication and control between both parties (Kerr 2003).

5.3 Funding for Security in Nigeria

Several research sources and think tank reports, including those of development partners, concluded that huge annual budgets for security funding in federal state and local governments in Nigeria are run on an opaque system lacking transparency and accountability. Also, the consensus confirmed that the rising state of insecurity does not reflect the huge security funding. A tradition of extra-budgetary expenditure known as 'security votes' has become a perverse culture within the governance sector. These are monies not subject to the government executives' declaration and not under the scrutiny of the public or even the

established government auditing institutions or the anti-corruption agencies. Page (2018) in a Transparency International (TI) sponsored and Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) corroborated study titled, '*Camouflaged Cash: How 'Security Votes' Fuel Corruption in Nigeria*,' highlighted that security votes "are opaque corruption-prone security funding mechanisms widely used by Nigerian officials." They are for formal, informal, political and personal expenditure by public officers. TI estimated that these secretive, unaccounted-for cash expenditures add up to over $670 million (₦241.2 billion) annually. The sums of the security votes dwarf the annual international security assistance the country receives, are comparable to the annual budgeted spending on national defence and security institutions, they also exceed 70 per cent of the annual budget of the NPF, more than the NA's annual budget, and more than the NN's and NAF's annual budget combined (see *Analysis 3* page 15 of this *Analysis* series). The CISLAC report concluded that rather than phase out the corruption infested sources of expenditure, Buhari administration expanded their use in both scope and scale, citing the example of the December 2017 announced withdrawal of $1 billion from the Excess Crude Account. The security vote is a 'slush fund' from which government executives corruptly make unaccountable disbursement and expenditure.

The spiralling security challenges in Nigeria have been providing convenience and ample opportunity for corrupt politicians, public servants and even leadership of the defence and security agencies to involve in massive looting of funds provided for various aspects of security services. Several politicians, public officials have been arrested by several administrations of the country. Some investigation and prosecution on corruption charges for outright stealing of funds are ongoing. The most celebrated case is the NSA under President Goodluck Jonathan-led administration, Col (Rtd) Sambo Dasuki, who is facing trial for alleged corrupt diversion of about

$2 billion, meant for the purchase of critical military hardware for the prosecution of the counterinsurgency operations against BH. The former NSA is also joined by several top military officers, particularly the service chiefs, who served with him.

Due procurement and funding processes in accordance with global best practices will need to be practised in accordance with established national financial regulations and laws to eliminate the institutionalised corruption so rampant in the security sector governance structure of Nigeria. There is the need to eliminate the institutionalised opaque and contentious 'security vote' funding aberration. Every aspect of defence and security funding and expenditure should be made available for scrutiny without hindrance and without the invocation of extra-legal principles under the cover of expenditure for highly classified operations, procurements and/or payment for services in the name of national security. If expenditure for such classified activities must be incurred, then they should be declared appropriately to the legislative security and intelligence oversight committees of the various legislative institutions, as they represent the public.

5.4 Bracing up to Expected Regional and International Influence

On a wider note, as Nigeria desires and stated in its NSS (1999) publication to secure its citizens and play regional and global influence roles in security, it needs to remodel and strengthen its security architecture. The country is recognised by West African and other African countries with its economic and demographic dominance to wield unmatched influence in West Africa, so it is expected to play a leading role in implementing the security reforms of its regional associations as pointed by the International Crisis Group Report (ICG 2016). It is important to appreciate that Nigeria, as a leading member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission and overarching African Union (AU) multi-lateral platforms, is expected to be part of the sponsors and work within the early warning protocols of the two organisations. However, one wonders how effective Nigeria's resourcing and application of the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) and the AU African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and Regional Economic Community (REC) would be while its situational awareness and crisis response organisations are not unified, coordinated, collaborative and cooperative. To participate effectively and benefit fully in the multi-national and regional early warning frameworks, Nigeria will have to ensure that its domestic arrangement is synergised and functioning effectively.

6 Conclusion

Nigeria has since independence been confronted with various security and governance challenges, bothering on the sanctity of national integrity as seen in the civil war, the several (eight and one alleged) military coups and the continuously emerging violent crisis. The country is grappling with several security challenges that are intensified with the Niger-Delta militancy and the now over 10 years of extremely violent BH insurgency. The BH insurgency escalated to a regional conflict with BH's support by ISIS, making it a regional challenge to Nigeria and its neighbours. The other challenges are rural and urban crimes as kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling, highway robbery, cult killings and sectarian crisis, fake news, hate speech, cybercrime, among others.

Since independence, the governments over the years used the institutions, policy enunciations and changes in the security architecture to address the security challenges, while providing funds for sustenance and enhancement of the capacity and capability of the institutions and efforts. Unfortunately, the agencies (old and new ones) and the policy frameworks adopted over time, have had their roles muddled up, cross-cutting their purposes in the complex, multi-dimensional, multi-disciplinary

professional security ecosystem with regional and global implications. The situation, over time, jeopardises and frustrates the unity of efforts to provide and promote cooperation, collaboration and communication needed for effective security service.

If the new dispensation of citizen-centric security, albeit human security needs of Nigeria, is to be well served, appropriate legislation, as well as the development of doctrines for joint operations and provision of multi-agency operations hubs, must be considered and duly established. This will need to be well supported with corruption-free structures that will be manned and operated by professionally trained, adequately motivated and equipped operatives. The international community has shown much financial and technical support in enhancing the capacity of security sector governance of Nigeria. Improving on the cooperation to build robust synergies among Nigerian security agencies is an important and indispensable area to focus on for Nigerian government to be up to its responsibility and the enunciated plan (NSS) for the safety and security of its citizens, its region and by extension the expectation to support the global superstructure.

6.1 Recommendations to the Federal Government of Nigeria

a. The National Fusion Centre (for intelligence gathering, data storage and processing, information sharing and planning hub) needs to be activated to further Multi-Security Agency Doctrine, Training and Exercises to ensure that early warning function of the fusion centre is adequately matched with efficient and effective response system to achieve the desired robust safety and security services.

b. There is the need to create a Multi-Agency Procurement protocol to encourage interoperability, common usage and absorption of equipment and expertise redundancy among all defence and security organisations.

c. There is the need to legislate an Act into law that will mandate all defence and security agencies to commit to multi-agency operations.

d. The MOI will need to be appointed by law as the national centre for security policy and operational coordination.

e. To resolve existing ambiguity in command and control, there is the need to clarify the operations and intelligence service provision nexus which a non-executive member of the ONSA and all agencies in the national intelligence community should occupy.

f. The aberration of the pre-eminence of the military in Internal Operations (Aid to Civil Authority) will need to be addressed so that the NPF returns to its constitutional role in practical terms as the lead internal security organisation. There should be a rationalisation of the coordination role of ONSA in the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

g. Meritocracy rather than other non-professional considerations should guide the appointment of the leadership of the service agencies.

h. The debate over the devolution of the levels of policing from the present unitary federal structure will need to be furthered towards actualising the clear and present need for the restructuring through a formal wide consultation, with a view to legislation. This has become obvious given the continuous increase in the proliferation of state and non-state (community-based organisations) carrying out various security and safety responsibilities that require formalisation through legislation and legal backing.

i.   Due procurement and funding processes in accordance with global best practices will need to be practised in accordance with established national financial regulations and laws to eliminate the institutionalised corruption so rampant in the security sector governance structure of Nigeria, especially to eliminate the institutionalised opaque and contentious 'security vote' funding aberration.

j.   There is an overwhelming need for a re-orientation of Nigeria's defence and security infrastructure, mechanisms and actors to appreciate the fundamental change from the traditional state-centric to the modern citizen-centric commitment in security, to conform to democratic best practices.

6.2 Recommendations with Respect to International Development Partners

a.   The international development partners' support and sponsorship of the design and delivery of homegrown policies and practices will help to entrench the culture of collaboration, cooperation and collaboration of global best practices among Nigerian security agencies, through diplomatic engagement to enhance training, equipment and funding support.

b.   The partners' increased support for the design and delivery of homegrown programmes will help to increase knowledge and update technology for the improvement of practices for the legislature on oversight and public service sector practices (Okenyodo 2018) to capacitate transparency and accountability in the security budgeting and procurement systems of Nigeria.

References

Bakrania, S with H Haider (2016): Safety, Security and Justice: *Topic Guide*. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

Banini, D K (2019): Security Sector Corruption and Military Effectiveness: The Influence of Corruption on Countermeasures against Boko Haram in Nigeria. *Small Wars and Insurgencies, Taylor & Francis Journals* 31 (1): 131-158.

BBC (2019, August 8): Nigeria Army-Police Shoot-out Sees Kidnap 'Kingpin' Flee in Taraba. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49278789

Bearne, S, Oliker, O, O'Brien, K A and Rathmell, A (2005): *National Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform*. Cambridge: RAND Corporation.

Beehner, L (2007): The Effects of 'Youth Bulge' on Civil Conflicts. *Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)* 27: 1-5.

Campbell, J (2019, October 30): Nigerian Military Introduces Controversial Plans to Identify Terrorists and Criminals. *Council on Foreign Relations*. https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerian-military-introduces-controversial-plans-identify-terrorists-and-criminals

Çanci, H and Odukoya, O A (2016): Ethnic and Religious Crises in Nigeria: A Specific Analysis upon Identities (1999-2013). African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-religious-crises-nigeria/

Canton, R (2016): Inter-Agency Cooperation: How Can It Best Enhance Compliance with the Law? 162nd International Senior Seminar Visiting Experts' Papers. *Resource Material Series* 99. https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/RS_No99/No99_VE_Canton_2.pdf

Carter, D L and Carter, J G (2009): The Intelligence Fusion Process for State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement. *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 36 (12): 1323-1339. https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/3855

EFCC (2020): The Establishment Act: Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/about-efcc/the-establishment-act

Eji, E (2016): Rethinking Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy. *International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs* 18 (3): 198-220. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/23800992.2016.1242278?scroll=top&needAccess=true

Eme, O I (2018): Inter-Security Agency Rivalry as an Impediment to National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). *AfriHeritage Research Working Paper Series* 3. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Inter-Security-Agency-Rivalry.pdf

Federal Republic of Nigeria (2011): *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria* (Amended). Federal Republic of Nigeria. Abuja: Government Press.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, NEMA (2001): *The National Disaster Management Response Plan 2001*. Abuja: Government Press.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, ONSA (2016): *The National Counter Terrorism Strategy 2016* (Revised). Abuja: Government Press.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, ONSA (2014): *National Security Strategy 2014*. Review. The Federal Republic of Nigeria. Abuja: Government Press.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, ONSA (2019): *National Security Strategy*. Review. Federal

Republic of Nigeria. Abuja: Government Press.

Frontline (2019, September 11): Why Did U.S. Intelligence Fail on September 11th? A collection of Interviews over the years of W Rudman, B Esposito, R DiSabatino, L Schiliro, P Goss and J Smith by *Frontline*. In Frontline's *Looking for Answers. Frontline.* https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/terrorism/fail/

FRSC (2020): *About FRSC*. Federal Road Safety Commission. https://frsc.gov.ng/about-us/

GFI (2019): 2020 Military Strength Ranking. Global Firepower Index. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp

Han, J S (2013): Team Rivals: Building Synergy Civil-Military Synergy in the Interagency. *InterAgency Journal 4 (2).* http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/IAJ-4-2Summer-2013-12-21.pdf

Haruna, A (2020, January 6): Furious Borno Governor Accuses Soldiers of Extortion. *Premium Times* Newspapers. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/371382-just-in-furious-borno-governor-accuses-soldiers-of-extortion.html

HRW (2010, August 17): "Everyone's in on the Game": Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force'. *Human Rights Watch.* https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/08/17/everyones-game/corruption-and-human-rights-abuses-nigeria-police-force; *The Big Spin.* 23-25.

ICG (2016, April 16): Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (III): West Africa. *International Crisis Group Report* No 234/Africa. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/implementing-peace-and-security-architecture-iii-west-africa

ICPC (2020): *History of ICPC*. Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission. https://icpc.gov.ng/icpc-history/

IEP (2015): *Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism.* Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) Australia: Sydney. http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015-Global-Terrorism-Index-Report.pdf

(2019): *Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism.* Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) Australia: Sydney. https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/GTI-2019web.pdf

Kerr, P (2003): The Evolving Dialectic between State-centric and Human-centric Security. *Department of International Relations RSPAS Australian National University Working Paper* 2.

Kupoluyi, A (2020, January 22): The Boiling Debate on Operation Amotekun. *Vanguard Newspapers.* https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/01/the-boiling-debate-on-operation-amotekun/

Lam, D (2006): The Demography of Youth in Developing Countries and Its Economic Implications. *World Development Report Background Papers.* World Bank Open Knowledge Repository. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9215

Leo, R, Mutum, R and Matazu, H (2018, February 18): Military, Police Trade Blames Over Missing Dapchi Schoolgirls. *Daily Trust Newspapers.* https://dailytrust.com/military-police-

trade-blame-over-missing-dapchi-schoolgirls

Maclean, R and Schmitt, E (2019, December 27): ISIS Affiliate in Nigeria Releases a Video Showing 11 Executions. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/27/world/africa/ISIS-executions-Nigeria.html

Mohammed, Y (2019, September 25): Police vs PSC: Matters Arising. *The Guardian Newspapers.* https://guardian.ng/opinion/police-vs-psc-matters-arising/

Morris, D Z (2016, February 16): China's ZTE Under Investigation in Nigerian Security Network Failure. Tech: Cities. *Fortune.* https://fortune.com/2016/02/16/china-zte-nigeria-cctv-scandal/

NAN (2019, September 20): Gbajabiamila Express Disappointment over Failure of Service Chiefs to Appear in House of Reps. *The Guardian Newspapers.* https://guardian.ng/news/gbajabiamila-express-disappointment-over-failure-of-service-chiefs-to-appear-in-house-of-reps/

NAPTIP (2020): About NAPTIP. National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons. https://www.naptip.gov.ng/about-naptip-2/

National Security Architectures https://gsdrc.org/topic-guides/safety-security-and-justice/themes/national-security-architectures/

NBS (2018, May): Demographic Statistics Bulletin 2017. National Bureau of Statistics.

NCS (2020): *Legal Framework.* Nigeria Customs Service. https://customs.gov.ng/?page_id=3103

NDLEA (2020): National Drug Law Enforcement Agency https://ndlea.gov.ng/about-ndlea/vision-mission/

NIS (2020): Nigeria Immigration Service. https://immigration.gov.ng/nis-

Nnadozie, E, Usman, E and Okolie, I (2019, August 14): Nigeria: Taraba Police Killings - Army Captain Had 191 Phone Chats with Wanted Kidnapper. *Vanguard Newspapers.*

Ochonu, M (2014, March 10): The Roots of Nigeria's Religious and Ethnic Conflict. *The World.* https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-03-10/roots-nigerias-religious-and-ethnic-conflict

OECD (2007): *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice.* Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf/38406485.pdf

Ogundipe, S (2019, October 27): Nigerian Military Plans Operation to Demand ID Cards from Citizens. *Premium Times.* https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/359720-nigerian-military-plans-operation-to-demand-id-cards-from-citizens.html

Ojebode, A, Ojebuyi, B R, Onyechi, N J, Oladapo, O, Oyedele, O J and Fadipe, I A (2016): Explaining the Effectiveness of Community-Based Crime Prevention Practices in Ibadan, Nigeria. *Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Working Paper No* 479. https://www.ids.ac.uk/publications/explaining-the-effectiveness-of-community-based-crime-prevention-practices-in-ibadan-nigeria/

Okenyodo, 'K (2018): Judicial Oversight in Nigeria: Challenges and Opportunities. *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Study Series.* Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/15969.pdf

Okon-Ekong, N, Enumah, A and Sowole, J (2020, January 16): South-west Govs Resist FG, Say No Going Back on Amotekun. *ThisDay Newspapers*. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/01/16/south-west-govs-resist-fg-say-no-going-back-on-amotekun/

Olaniyi, R (2003): C*rime Control, Police and Vigilante Groups: Community Action for Security in Sabongari, Kano*, 1953-2001. Research Report submitted to the French Institute for Research in Africa, Nigeria | *Institut français de recherche en Afrique*, Nigeria (IFRA) Ibadan Newsletter XI (2).

Page, M T (2018): Camouflaged Cash: How 'Security Votes' Fuel Corruption in Nigeria. Transparency International and Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre. https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/DSP_Nigeria_Camouflage_Cash_Web2.pdf

Paul, C, Clarke, P C, Triezenberg, B L, Manheim, D and Wilson, B (2018): (Improving C2 and Situational Awareness for Operations in and Through the Information Environment. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2489.html

Per Second News (2020, June 11): FG Engages Huawei for E-land Border Surveillance, Says Aregbesola. *Per Second News*. https://persecondnews.com/2020/06/11/fg-engages-huawei-for-e-land-border-surveillance-says-aregbesola/

PLAC (2020): *Nigeria Correctional Service Act, 2019: Explanatory Memorandum*. Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre. https://placng.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Nigerian-Correctional-Service-Act-2019.pdf

Punch Online (2019, February 4): Private Security Companies Recruit 823,502 People in Six Years — NBS. *Punch Online*. https://punchng.com/private-security-companies-recruit-823502-people-in-six-years-nbs/

Sedgwick, D and Hawdon, J (2019): Interagency Cooperation in the Era of Homeland Policing: Are Agencies Answering the Call? *American Journal of Criminal Justice* 44 (2): 167-190. https://www.infona.pl/resource/bwmeta1.element.springer-doi-10_1007-S12103-018-9456-4

The Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (2016): *The Buhari Master Plan*. The State House. Abuja: Government Press. https://statehouse.gov.ng/policy/councils-committees/presidential-committee-on-north-east-initiative/

Trading Economics (2020): *Nigeria Unemployment Rate: 2006-2020 Data*. Trading Economics. https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/unemployment-rate

UNODC (2020): *Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants*. United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/nigeria/en/human-trafficking-and-smuggling-of-migrants.html

Umeh, K (2019, September 21): Police Recruitment Crisis Will Not Affect Our Relationship with NPF, Says PSC. *The Guardian Newspapers*. https://guardian.ng/news/police-recruitment-crisis-will-not-affect-our-relationship-with-npf-says-psc/

Wither, J K and Mullins, S (eds) (2016): *Combating Transnational Terrorism*. International Edition. Sofia: Procon.

World Bank (2019, October 13): The World Bank in Nigeria. *World Bank Overview*. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview

About the Author

Brig Gen Saleh Bala is a retired Infantry-Special Forces officer of the Nigerian Army. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in English, from the University of Maiduguri, Nigeria. Brig Gen Bala has a master's degree in International Peace Studies from the University for Peace, San Jose, Costa Rica and another master's degree in National Security Strategy, from the National Defense University, National War College, Washington DC, the United States of America. He is at present the Chief Executive Officer of White Ink Consult, a private defence and security, strategic communication and training consultancy. He is also the President and Founder of White Ink Institute for Strategy Education and Research (WISER), based in Abuja, Nigeria.

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre and the European Union.